Issue 4 (6), 2016

SUBSIDIARY IDENTITY

UNION COOPERATION REGION ORGANIZATIONEASTERN EUROPE ORGANIZATION INTEGRATION REGION TRANSFORMATION

EASTERN EUROPE UNITY BLACK SEA VISEGRAD FOUR IDENTITY INSTITUTIONS EUROPE REGIONALISMPOLITICS

BSEC ENVIRONMENTBSEC IDENTITY AMERICA NORTH

BALTICS COOPERATION

• REGIONS AND POLITICS • REGIONAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION • VISEGRAD FOUR AND THE BLACK SEA UA: Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 1 Issue 4 (6), 2016 BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the Regionalism European Policy Institute)

Dr. Iulian Chifu Analysis and Early Warning Center) (, Director of the Conflict Editors Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National Dr. Hanna Shelest University by I.I. Mechnikov) Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Deputy Director at the Institute) Publisher: Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural Stephan Meuser (Germany, Director of the Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Romania) of the Representation of the Friedrich Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support Ebert Foundation in Ukraine, International James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine) and the and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the Black Sea Trust. Royal Institute of International Affairs)

UA: Ukraine Analytica Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, State Secretary, analytical journal in English on International Ministry of Defence) is the first Ukrainian Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador students interested in the international Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to relations and Ukraine in particular. France)

Contacts: Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ Director Defence Transformation at The Hague e-mail: [email protected] Center for Strategic Studies) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ ukraineanalytica Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice- Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic Integration of Ukraine) The views and opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors and do not Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director of the Center for International and European Studies, Analytica, its editors, Board of Advisors or Kadir Has University (Turkey)) necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine donors. (Norway, Research Director at the ISSN 2518-7481 Dr. Asle Toje Norwegian Nobel Institute)

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

BSEC IS ESTABLISHING A DENSE NETWORK FOR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION . . 3 Interview with the Secretary General of the BSEC PERMIS H.E. Ambassador Michael B. Christides

THE EMPTY SHELL OF BLACK SEA REGIONALISM ...... 5 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

EAST EUROPEAN REGIONAL IDENTITY: MYTH OR REALITY?...... 12 Olena Khylko

RUSSIA’S PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AT THE PRESENT STAGE...... 21 Olena Snigyr

NETWORKS AND NODES: EURASIAN REGIONALISM REVISITED...... 30 Viktor Konstantynov

THE BALTIC STATES AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: A STRENGTHENING FACTOR FOR REGIONALISM?...... 38 Dovilė Šukytė

THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION OF UKRAINE WITH THE EU...... 44 Olga Brusylovska

NORTH AMERICA CHALLENGES: NEW PROSPECTIVES FOR THE REGION?...... 51 Iryna Bochar

2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 BSEC IS ESTABLISHING A DENSE NETWORK FOR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION Interview with the Secretary General of the BSEC PERMIS H.E. Ambassador Michael B. Christides

Is the Black Sea a region? How protracted conflicts in the region influence the work of the BSEC and It certainly is and, perhaps, one of the regional cooperation? most geostrategic regions between central Europe and Asia, with a common history As we all know, our wider region faces today that goes back to thousands of years. The unique issues, like political and economic connecting factor, the Black Sea itself, uncertainty, terrorism, tension among States, makes the region attractive and interesting for various economic and geopolitical to the latest data by the Black Sea Trade and rising xenophobia, even conflicts! According reasons. Just consider its importance in Development Bank, the region of the Black what today concerns Energy, in general, or Sea faces the greatest problems, has the even the “revival” of the Silk Route uniting lowest index of development and is negatively Europe to Asia and vice versa. rated by international economic agencies.

Can such organizations as BSEC No doubt, the above problems cast their shadow on the quality and effectiveness of construct a regional identity? the BSEC Organization. Yet we enjoy a long tradition of avoiding the Organization’s Indeed, they can, if this is one of the aims involvement in political issues (solutions of its Member States. The idea and initiative to which are sought in other fora), by for the establishment of this Organization concentrating in the promotion of the in the far away 1992 was, admittedly, economic cooperation among BSEC Member a stroke of genius: it represented an States and beyond. The fact that despite the earnest effort to promote and consolidate in a systematic manner a pattern of representatives of all Member States meet cooperation and coordination among its severalexistence times of a bilateral year around issues a table, or conflicts, in order Member States, in a region gaining every day in geostrategic importance. For the not only a dense network for dialogue and cooperationlast twenty five among years, publicBSEC is andestablishing private Regional cooperation should entities of its Member States, but it also be possible – and desirable – «among neighbouring States consolidates a valuable precedence of of a certain geographic area, synergy and coordination in almost all irrespective if these neighbours sectors of economic life, thus contributing are economically equal or not. to the formation of a collective identity of the Black Sea region.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 3 to promote concrete projects of economic of a certain geographic area, irrespective nature, clearly indicates the added value if these neighbours are economically of BSEC’s existence and activity, in a sense equal or not. Regional cooperation, in essence, means that you wish to address building, dialogue and understanding. as a first, initial mechanism for confidence more than one State in a coordinated way, What are the most perspective spheres withcommon a sense issues of influencingbalance among and all affecting those of cooperation in the Black Sea region interested and committed to the principle for 2017-2020? of good neighbourliness. The existence of a single leading country as the locomotive We wish to be able to concentrate our efforts of regional cooperation can be useful only in promoting, in a coordinated way, concrete if this leading country avoids to gradually projects and the implementation of good adopting autocratic or domineering practices in what concerns cooperation attitudes. in crucial sectors like Transport, Trade, Tourism, Energy sources, preserving the Black Sea environment, among other by promoting Fisheries and Aquaculture in a sustainable way, and on so many other issues Amb. Michael B. Christides, citizen of the Hellenic in which our Organization is involved. We Republic, assumed his duties as Secretary General of will be trying very hard, with the help of the the BSEC PERMIS on 1 July 2015. In 1976, he joined the relevant authorities of our Member States, to Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, from where retired in 2014. A career diplomat, Ambassador CHRISTIDES fulfil if not all, most of the above objectives. held various key positions at the Ministry of Foreign Should the regional cooperation Affairs of the Hellenic Republic and served in a number have the single leading country as a of Greek diplomatic and consular missions abroad, locomotive or is regional cooperation including in Tripoli, Naples, Milan, Sofia and Ankara. possible only among equals? He served as the Ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to Bulgaria, Turkey, Argentina and Bolivia. Regional cooperation should be possible – and desirable – among neighbouring States

4 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 THE EMPTY SHELL OF BLACK SEA REGIONALISM

Dr. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou Kadir Has University,

At a time when Russia has become more assertive to the point of challenging the mainstay of the international order, it helped establish since 1945, and Turkey seeks to maintain the status quo in the realm of maritime security, the European Union struggles to define its foreign policy objectives and priorities towards the Eastern Neighborhood, and thereby show its gravitas. Consequently, the Black Sea region finds itself more divided, unsteady, and uncertain about its future as regional actors such as Ukraine and have cast aside their balancing acts towards a turn to the EU and NATO with negative territorial implications. Thus, the fluidity of the international order raises doubts as to whether regionalism is a realistic prospect in this region or it needs to be replaced by another model of regional governance.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Black Sea Regionalism Organization (BSEC) is about to receive a ton of silver as it will celebrate its 25th year The reasons for the not so steady ride of existence in late June 2017. An example towards the Black Sea regionalism are many. of institutional regionalism, the BSEC, in Yet, they are also telling of its complexities as spite of its membership being stuck at a region. It should not be forgotten that the 12 since April 2004 with the accession of drivers behind the construct or attempted Serbia, keeps on ticking with its member construct of the Black Sea regionalism were states undoubtedly preparing another high the uncertainties the end of the Cold War brought to fore as the search for stability and security became sacrosanct among all purpose.profile commemoration, Yet, this venerable as institution it seems to with do the states of the region. In fact, the littoral itsevery complex, five years yet attesting comprehensive to its longevity decision- and states grew from four to six, further adding making structure has not been meeting its an element of urgency to the post-Cold War benchmarks. To a large extent, the culprit security architecture for the region. From is not the Organization itself and its people; a Turkish and a Russian perspective, the

also meant addressing the issue of maritime statesit is the comprising context, whichit increasingly smacks of at a odds fluid securityfluidity of and the preservation regional and ofEuropean the acquis order of withregional each andother. global In other order words, that the finds BSEC the is the Montreux Convention. This kept their emblematic of the state of regionalism in the relations in a sort of equilibrium, albeit Black Sea Region or lack thereof.1 their strategic divide, which allowed for the

1 T. Japaridze, P. Manoli, D. Triantaphyllou, and Y. Tsantoulis, The EU’s Ambivalent Relationship with the BSEC:

media/133_original.pdf access: 15 December 2016] Reflecting on the Past, Mapping out the Future, “ICBSS Policy Brief”, January 2010, pp. 1-34. [http://icbss.org/

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 5 common quest of some sort of regionalism Bush administration as it sought to contain in the region. Russian aggression during the Putin era.2

Over time, the region has grown in size to Simultaneously, the changing nature of the include non-littoral countries with constantly shifting interests, and priorities, while the limits of the European integration project, relations among some of the littoral states have whichBlack Seahas regionalalways been framework perceived reflects as the progressively worsened, in particular with optimal model of regionalism to be replicated regard to those between Russia and Georgia, elsewhere, in particular, around its borders. and Russia and Ukraine, as well as between The proximity of the European Union to the Armenia and given the volatility of Black Sea Region, and the osmosis between the two in terms of the multiple identities These aforementioned undercurrents project of some countries, as they belong both to the tenuouschanging cease nature fire of in the Nagorno-Karabakh. power dynamics the Union and the Black Sea Region, have a among the states of the region where its powerful effect on Black Sea regionalism. hegemons – Russia and, to a lesser extent, In other words, if the experiment falters in Turkey – have become more active in trying Europe, why should it succeed around the to project their dominance, notwithstanding Black Sea? The exclusionist, national identity the fact that the reasons might have more to based, and in some cases, segregationist vision of those rejecting integration within policy choices. many EU member states is mirrored by the do with regime legitimacy or redefined foreign rise both of exceptionalist agendas among the Black Sea states as well as those that anywhere from the narrow one, composed seek solace or protection in the arms of ofLinked the tosix the littoral issue ofstates, defining to the the region,BSEC’s other integrationist projects such as NATO. membership of twelve countries, is whether the Black Sea Region can be perceived to be a Nevertheless, as a unit of analysis, the Black product of the single region-building project Sea Region remains in play in spite of its or the encounter or cartographic space of variable, accordion-like membership. Though, many. These range from the vision of Turkey interests among the regional state actors may and Russia leading them to establish the BSEC in the early 1990s to cope somewhat with the exigencies of the changing global implydiverge, a certain leading regional to potential security conflicts. regime The of order, to the European Union vision of an thefrozen type or Robert protracted Jervis nature writes of about: these “Securityconflicts all-compassing space, that looks towards regimes are thus both especially valuable it as the states and peoples comprising it, are attracted by the magnetic power of the because individualistic actions are not only European integration process. It is inevitable and especially difficult to achieve - valuable, to the Euro-Atlantic version of the Black Sea because the fear that the other is violating regionalism that emerged in the mid-1990s, orcostly will butviolate dangerous; the common difficult understanding to achieve, is a potent incentive for each state to strike led by the late Ron Asmus, inspired by the out on its own even if it would prefer the accessionfirst as a Germanof the Baltic Marshall states Fund to NATO initiative and regime to prosper.”3 This, of course, implies a the EU, and later adopted by the George W. region-building process out of necessity. Thus,

2 See, for example, Y. Tsantoulis, Towards a geneology of regions in International Relations: an autopsy of the Black Sea (region), “unpublished PhD Dissertation, University College London”, 2016, p. 289. 3 R. Jervis, Security Regimes, “International Organization”, Spring 1982, p. 358.

6 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 via the promotion of what some refer to as visionsaccording of tosolidarity Anssi Paasi, or unity “[r] egional but may identities coexist arank “Eurasian as a first-tier pole” andpower a regional both at global revisionist level withand affiliations internal oppositions with region arebased not onalways cultural, rosy heavyweight in the Black Sea region. According to Janusz Bugajski and Peter

War, it is no longer unthinkable to consider the changing nature of the theDoran, possibility “[f]or the of first Moscow time sinceextending the Cold its Black Sea regional framework future control along the northern coast of «reflects the limits of the European the Black Sea. This would position Russia to integration project, which has always exert greater pressure on NATO members been perceived as the optimal model of Romania and Bulgaria, including the mouth regionalism to be replicated elsewhere of the Danube and, among other targets,

exclusive economic zone (EEZ).”6 The same thepressures maritime apply energy to Turkey, fields whose of Romania’s interests are directly challenged in particular with of Othering, i.e. in making distinctions with regard to the delicate equilibrium fostered othereconomic groups and politicalof people.” conflict4 There and isprocesses a valid by the Montreux Convention that has argument to be made that we are living in allowed it give a heads up in a domain of an era of enhanced competition among and maritime security. The Russian actions in between state actors, or in other words, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its annexation a world of pronounced realism. This return of the state coupled with “the emergence of in Eastern Ukraine coupled with Turkey’s autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes that ownof Crimea, troubles and along its fuellingits borders of the with conflict have high levels of legitimacy, whether real and Iraq have led it to acquiesce in part or perceived, among the population, based on to “Russia’s gradual re-imperialization” of the primacy of a mix of national security and the Black Sea and its neutralization of its identity concerns” has, undoubtedly, an impact southern littoral.7 Pavel Baev puts it best on the Black Sea Region.5 when he writes that Russia plays on “the unpredictability of the New Cold War”,8 Individual Actors’ Factor where with fundamentally no allies even in the post-Soviet space, Moscow has been The Russia factor in particular is crucial making use of “hybrid” methods in its quest to compete globally. has to do with its attempt to maintain its here due to a number of reasons. The first

4 A. Paasi, The region, identity, and power, “Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences”, 2011, p. 15. 5 “CIES Commentary”, 21 December 2016, pp. 1-3. For more on the return of the state, see D. Triantaphyllou, Reflections on the fluidity of the international order, pdf access: 23 December 2016] 6 J.[http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/CIES%20Commentary%20-%20Dimitrios%20Triantaphyllou. Bugajski and P. B. Doran, Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe, “CEPA Black Sea Strategic Report”, February 2016, p. 2. 7 J. Bugajski and P. B. Doran, Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe, “CEPA Black Sea Strategic Report”, February 2016, p. 6. 8 See P. Baev, Russia plays of the unpredictability of the New Cold War, “CIES Commentary”, 31 October 2016,

December 2016] [http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/CIES%20Commentary%20-%20Pavel%20Baev.pdf access: 23

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 7 In the meantime, the region’s other big Harmony while Black Sea regionalism was power, Turkey, has also misread the tell-tale limited to the economic agenda of the BSEC. signs of a regionalism in need of repair. In its Consequently, this has meant limiting the attempt to ensure that it plays a pivotal role aspiration of other security actors such as in what happens in its northern backyard, NATO and, transformative entities, such it has seen its relations with the European Union and NATO worsen considerably. region.10 By seeking to minimize the role Part of the reason for the aforementioned asof the EuropeanEU, from havingUnion ina significantparticular roleby not in development is that it considers the Black accepting it as a key stakeholder in the region and playing only lip service to EU- which its share of control has historically led initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy, shrankSea as aand, privileged as a result, sphere it triesof influence to maintain over which aim to enhance regional cooperation, its hold. The loss from exclusive control Turkey has contributed to the region’s over the sea during early Ottoman times to vulnerability in these times of Russian sharing it with Russia’s historical expansion revisionism. to the south in the quest of Peter the Great’s vision of a warm sea port strengthened both The inability of the Atlantic Alliance to Ottoman, and later, Turkish resolve, to keep have a Black Sea policy in light of Ankara’s the Black Sea away from big power politics. objections imply a weak role for NATO in Eventually, the signing of the Montreux the region. A cursory look at the July 2016 Convention in 1936, which gave Turkey the right to control access to and from the Black presence of the term “Black Sea” eight times Sea, shaped its perception of its role in the mainlyWarsaw in Summitterms of Communiquerecognizing the reflects emerging the region. As a result, as Mustafa Aydin notes, challenges by Russia to the regional security order. It offers no concrete proposals for Turkey’s sine qua non” became the order of action other than developing a “tailored the“[m]aritime day with securitythe evolving in thepost-war Black regional Sea as forward presence” and assessing “options context threatening Turkey’s hold over the for a strengthened NATO air and maritime region.9 presence.”11 This “Turkey First”12 approach has weakened regionalism, the aspirations For Turkey, thus, regionalism has been of countries like Ukraine and Georgia to a means to an end; i.e., ensuring its come closer to the West, and the ability of leadership in maritime security related the EU to contribute positively to a more issues via the proliferation of initiatives comprehensive sort of regionalism than the such as BLACKSEAFOR and the Black Sea one the BSEC is currently able to implement.

9 M. Aydin, Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power security agendas for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative, “Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, September 2009, p. 280. 10 See S. Petriashvili, Where is the Black Sea Region in Turkey’s Foreign Policy?, “Turkish Policy Quarterly”, 13 Decem-

access: 31 December 2016]. See also, H. Shelest, What is the Future for Navy Cooperation in the Black Sea?, “UA: Ukraineber 2015, Analytica”, [http://turkishpolicy.com/article/777/where-is-the-black-sea-region-in-turkeys-foreign-policy#_ftnref1 Issue 3 (5), 2016, pp. 56-61. 11 See Article 41 of NATO Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 8-9 July 2016,

12 This approach is clearly elucidated in M. Aydin, Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power securi- ty[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm agendas for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative, “Southeast access: European30 December and 2016]Black Sea Studies”, Septem- ber 2009, pp. 271-285. See also, O. Ozdamar, The Black Sea Region in the New Turkish Foreign Policy, “EDAM, Black Sea Discussion Paper Series”, 2011/2, pp. 1-14,

[http://edam.org.tr/document/BSPaper_Series2.pdf access: 30 December 2016] 8 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 The European Union Approach between countries within the EU proper, many of which considers the Eastern The European Union is the other key Partnership and its value laden approach as component in the quest for regionalism in the primary instrument of curbing Russian the Black Sea Region. One cannot deny that it has produced a great number of initiatives, among regional actors. The EU’s ambitious policies, and instruments that propound the influence, exacerbate the dividing lines virtues of regional cooperation as well as its the EaP Summit of Late November interests.13 Nevertheless, their effectiveness 2013,approach which suffered led ato significant a political reversal volte-face with is in doubt for a number of reasons. First, within Ukraine with negative territorial the EU has failed to convince both Russia implications. and Turkey that it is a regional stakeholder in its own right. Second, as a corollary to the Fourth, this EU overreach represents its aforementioned, the continued insistence underperformance as a foreign policy actor of Turkey of decoupling its membership as its “capability-expectations gap” has perspective from its “Turkey First” approach not necessarily narrowed albeit its many in the Black Sea Region has weakened efforts to reform its foreign policymaking the Union’s hand in prioritizing regional capacity.14 cooperation. has been stated repeatedly by this author, the Union’s lack Invariably, of a strategy this towards deficit implies,its Eastern as Third, the EU simultaneously invariably Neighbourhood, or even in terms of its projects contradictory policies. On the one general foreign policy making priorities, as hand, it promotes the Black Sea Synergy Robert Cooper suggests.15 The mix between as a new regional cooperation initiative values and principles, a sense of unity and very much modelled after its own model of purpose, and realism has lacked the potency regionalism within the EU space, while on the other, it promotes deeper integration order where revisionism and realpolitik for the regional countries via the Eastern haveto deal never with really the evolvingbeen absent. and At fluid the globalsame Partnership (EaP). Though fundamentally, this has been the model of integration attack from within with growing differences the EU has been pursuing elsewhere betweentime, the itsEuropean member project states findson the itself economic under such as Southeastern Europe, it has faced front, the handling of the refugee crisis, the major stumbling blocks in its Eastern reality of BREXIT and the lingering omen of Neighbourhood due to the overweening GREXIT, and populism threat to undo the presence of the Russian , as elitist politics of integration, the EU’s foreign has projected a competing historical and policy challenge in the Black Sea is plainly “manifest destiny” narrative towards its evident. near abroad. The dissonant perspectives

13 For an extensive list of EU initiatives towards its eastern neighbourhood, see D. Triantaphyllou, The European Union and the Black Sea Region in Search of a Narrative or a New Paradigm, “Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies”, June 2014, p. 289. 14 The term is borrowed from Christopher Hill’s seminal article on explaining the EU’s foreign policy role. See C. Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, September 1993, pp. 305-328. 15 See D. Triantaphyllou, The European Union and the Black Sea Region in Search of a Narrative or a New Paradigm, “Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies”, June 2014, pp. 286-299; R. Cooper, The EU’s global strategy: Three quotations, “ECFR Commentary”, 15 July 2016,

[http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eus_global_strategy_three_quotations_7077 access: 15 December 2016] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 9 The new Global Strategy announced by its foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini on less stable before 2014, the Black Sea 28 June 2016 does suggest some effort on securityGlebov correctlysystem has asserts been thatrapidly “[m]ore moving or the part of the EU to be more coherent and from the multilateral cooperative military emphatic with its “principled pragmatism” mechanisms to the bipolar balance of power approach and its emphasis on supporting format.”18 In this context, the foreign policy “cooperative regional orders”.16 In other words, “Mogherini aims for a more realist foreign policies visions or approaches that approach without abandoning the EU’s presentpriorities “no of alternatives” Ukraine and in Georgiaterms of reflect what transformational agenda”.17 However, the EU’s their directions should be. As indicated capacity to deliver is already fundamentally challenged with the advent of BREXIT and Council “Ukrainian Prism” regarding the loss of the UK’s military capabilities. Thus, Ukrainianby the latest foreign findings policy, of the“the Foreign engagement Policy how it can work in the Black Sea Region at the and political interest of most domestic policy time when Ukraine and Georgia, for example, have invested heavily in their ties with the needactors to in contain foreign the policy Russian issues aggression.” was defined19 byIn the armedGeorgian conflict case, inthe the 29 East December and the 2016 parliamentary resolution on foreign although regionalism still policy clearly states that the country’s commands a high place in main foreign policy priorities are EU and «the EU’s foreign policy, in NATO membership as well as the pursuit practice its reach in the Black of a “rational policy” with Russia in order Sea region is very limited to minimize threats and restore “territorial integrity.”20

As Russia challenges the postwar order to West in the face of Russian revisionism, which it has been a privileged stakeholder by remains to be seen. In other words, although seeking to rewrite its terms, for the Black Sea, regionalism still commands a high place in this implies one of two possible trends. The the EU’s foreign policy, in practice its reach in the Black Sea region is very limited. order that favours cooperation among the region’sfirst is a continuationcountries ofwhile the currentfundamentally regional Future Perspectives maintaining the status quo and, hence, the primacy of Turkey and Russia. The second is a regional order that a sort of bipolar (Russia is the nature of its regionalism. Sergii and the West) or even trilateral (Russia, The Black Sea Region is thus in flux as

16 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and - view_web.pdf access: 24 December 2016] 17 S.Security Lehne, Policy, The EU “European Global Strategy, External a Triumph Action Service”, of Hope June Over 2016, Experience, [https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_re “Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie

18 S. Glebov, The Black Sea Security Architecture in Times of Collapse: The Case of Annexed Crimea and Military Chal- lengesEurope”, for 4 theJuly US, 2016, NATO, [http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64003 EU, Turkey, and Ukraine, “UA: Ukraine Analytica”, Issue access: 3 (5), 162016, December p. 45. 2016] 19 “Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2015”: Overall Assessment of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy, “UA: Ukraine Analytica”, Issue 2 (4), 2016, p. 10. 20 -

Parliament Adopts Resolution on Foreign Policy, “Civil Georgia”, 30 December 2016, [http://www.civil.ge/eng/arti cle.php?id=29737 access: 2 January 2017] 10 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 Turkey, and the West) balance of power Trump administration will strike a Faustian whereby minimal cooperation at regional bargain with Vladimir Putin’s Russia that level is ensured while its parts enhance will have implications in the Black Sea their cooperation with the others that share Region and pretty much everywhere else. the same aspirations and objectives.21 The question in this case is whether the key stakeholders are ready to work toward such a security order or regime where all sides Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, the Chair of the Department balance the others out in order to ensure of International Relations and the Director of the Center regional stability. for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University (Turkey). He has previously served in a Undoubtedly, as the BSEC prepares to number of policy and academic positions including at celebrate its 25th year in existence in late the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris; the Hellenic June 2017, none of the issues presented here will be at central stage as the longevity Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens; of the Organization and the usefulness of the Hellenic Observatory at the London School of its work will be highlighted. Yet, the end Economics; the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the of utopianism is here as is the need for a International Center for Black Sea Studies, Athens; and strategy to counter Russian revisionism and the University of the Aegean, Rhodes. He is Associate aggression. Regionalism will undoubtedly Editor of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies survive for some time to come in the Black (SSCI-indexed) and a member of the Advisory Boards Sea Region but its current shape and form of the Black Sea Trust, ; the International is not sustainable as it risks collapse from Institute for Peace, Vienna; the Corporate Social within as its dominant actor risks subverting Responsibility Association of Turkey, Istanbul; and UA: it completely. Also, one should not discount Ukraine Analytica. 22 Yet again, much will depend on whether the incoming the risk of an accidental conflict.

21 For a two scenario variant regarding the future evolution of relations between Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea Region, see M. Celikpala and D. Triantaphyllou, The Changing Face of Black Sea Security, “PONARS Eurasia

January 2017] 22 See,Commentary”, for example, 31 R.N.May Burns2016, [http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/changing-face-black-sea-securityand J.L. Jones, Restoring the Power and Purpose of the NATO Alliance, “Atlantic access: Council 2 - cations/Restoring_the_Power_and_Purpose_of_the_NATO_Alliance_web_0624.pdf access: 20 December 2016] Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security” June 2016, p. 8, [http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publi

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 11 EAST EUROPEAN REGIONAL IDENTITY: MYTH OR REALITY?

Dr. Olena Khylko Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

The political and economic fragmentation of the EU, intensified by the migrant crisis, leads to the intensification of nationalism and regionalism. In this context, East European common historical heritage as well as current economic and security challenges encourage speculations that enhanced regionalization may bring additional resources to empower resilience capacity of the regional countries. Given that the European integration is a remote prospect, the ideas of subregional alliances are becoming popular among Ukrainian politicians and analysts, and the issue of the East European regional identity as a possible unifying factor arises. Analysing the origin and evolution of this perception and self-perception of Eastern Europe in the context of the regional identity, we come to a conclusion that it cannot become a crucial factor for subregion consolidation. This fact should be taken into account in Kyiv when shaping long-term foreign policy goals and developing relations with its neighbours and partners.

Eastern Europe is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world, a shatterbelt consisting threat to the common European identity and of relatively small nations, which try to intensified by the migrant crisis poses a withstand the pressure of neighbouring regionalism. powers while being fragmented into leads to the intensification of nationalism and several areas with inconsistent positions Regarding this, it seems rational to analyse and unpredictable perspectives. Historical the issue of common regional identity, which heritage and common problems as well as could be considered as one of the most security challenges encourage a generation fundamental and interlocking substances for of ideas that enhanced regionalization. This the regionalization. Anticipating the reveal of may bring additional resources to empower the regional identity issue, two conceptual resilience capacity for the countries of issues should be stressed and indicated. The the region. The regional security complex regional identity will not be considered in theory by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever1 is terms of primordialists and perennialists, yet again actual today within the Russian- who study identity as a given, something crafted security environment. The political inherent and immanent that existed from the and economic fragmentation of the EU very origin. We will apply the constructivist

1 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 564 p.

12 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 perspective of identity as a mental construct determinative factor for any collective identity that has been revealed in an intellectual and shaping should be the division into the Self political discourse of respective countries and the Other (alien, the one who differs from since the beginning of the 20th century. me). Identity can exist only in the “Self-Other” dichotomy and self-perception is realized via The approach to the East European regional identity has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is based on social constructivism and means that the East European regional identity is Historical heritage and a construct, an image, an idea that arouses common problems as well and is realized by the countries of the region, «as security challenges their political elites and academicians as well encourage a generation of ideas as other representatives of their intellectual that enhanced regionalization. sphere and aimed to perform a certain function. On the other hand, it is a result of some empirical experience that is a complex of different elements: common values and attitude to the Other. The markers of attribution interests shaped by common historical and of this or that subject to “Self” or “the Other” are cultural practices as well as their religious usually narrowed to the following similarities: heritage. locality, shared values, norms and traditions; articulated sense of belonging to this or that Herein, the boundaries of Eastern Europe will be referred to in the broad sense, with the group (region in our case) should be a including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, sourcegroup thatof self-esteem is seen as and a single even pride; unit; affiliationcollective Hungary, Ukraine, , Moldova and historical memory with certain common myths and narratives, culture and religion; models set aside due to the unique Balkan identity of political and economic development. Such the Baltic states. The Southern flank will be markers in a very general form could be found Empire that should be a subject of separate in the Charter on European Identity (1995), analysis.significantly It should influenced be noted by that the up Ottoman to the initiated by Vaclav Havel2. Based on these middle 19th century both terms – Eastern markers, a group experiences self-perception Europe and Central Europe – were rather via attitude to “the Other”. The same should obscure. The latter one was used for a long be said about the regional identity. “The time to denote the territory of the Holy identities of regions are constructed through Roman Empire, and only after the World War their relationships with other regions”.3 In this I, it became a term to describe the countries sense, the representatives of a region consider between Germany and Russia. themselves as one group opposing the other group. Any type of collective identity derives from psychological analyses and should answer Eastern Europe as an “Invented” several key questions: Who am I? Where am Mental Construct I from? Which group do I belong to or which East European regional identity has group do I affiliate myself with? The central

2 pdf] 3 JohnCharter Allen, of European Doreen Massey, Identity, Allan October Cochrane 28, 1995, (2002), [daten.schule.at/dl/Charta_europ_Identitaet_119142657213287. Rethinking the Region: Spaces of Neo-Liberalism, Routledge: New York, p.10.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 13 ambiguous nature. On the one side, its well as Ukraine. These indicators generated emergence was historically driven; on the by Larry Wolff from the works of writers, other side, it was shaped by the Western historians, philosophers of the Enlightenment Europe, in Edward Said’s Orientalism period were presented by him as an absence terms. The latter developed an idea of the of civilization. East / Orient as a concept designed by the West as its own opposite in the image, Immanuel Wallerstein, who analysed Eastern idea, individuality, experience, a symbol of Europe as a periphery region dominated by otherness (that is alien / external), and of Western European economic core since the the “Orientalism” as a style, with the help of 16th century, introduced its differentiation which the West suppressed, reshaped and from the economic perspective. It seems that colonized the East4. Larry Wolff, in his book nothing has changed in perception of the “Inventing Eastern Europe”5 developed the West up to the collapse of the Soviet system. idea of Eastern Europe as an image created It was 1985 when the Rockefeller Foundation in the era of Enlightenment as a “subsidiary hosted in Bellagio an international conference half” of the West, something “belated”, named “Origins of backwardness in Eastern “underdeveloped”, the edge of barbarism and Europe”. backwardness. This vision laid down the idea of Eastern Europe as a marginal zone, a belt A new vision of the region emerged in times that comprised features of the West European preceding or during the collapse of several civilization as well as barbarian features from empires at the beginning of the 20th century. the East. Therefore, Eastern Europe including Swedish and German scholars and civil Russia became that image, opposing which activists, primarily Rudolf Kjellen, Joseph the West shaped its own identity, it was a kind Partsch and Friedrich Naumann, introduced of “alterity making” process. In Western self- a notion of “the Middle Europe” as a kind of realization, Eastern Europe has never been Germany-dominated buffer with common an integral part of genuine Europe. geographic fate, located between Russia and Western Europe. Friedrich Naumann wrote The crucial indicators of the Eastern Europe in his “Mitteleuropa” (“Central Europe”)6 dissociation from the Western one, outlined about the need to shape, in between France in that discourse, were the following: social and Russia, the Baltic, Adriatic and Black and economic society structure; deep seas, a common economic, cultural and legal space that would embrace the peoples who between the nobility and the peasantry; lack have generally common historical, economic, ofstratification discipline in ofthe societies;army; absence sharp of attempts contrast cultural, and religious characteristics. These geopolitical in their essence concepts of education and knowledge; high level of resonated with ideas pursued by some diseases;to cultivate great national desolated culture territories, and art; deficitfertile regional activists like Tomas Masaryk who but uncultivated land (mismanagement), stood for a “Central Europe of small states” poor roads; special role of Jews in trade at the liberated from German, Austrian and territories of modern Poland, as Russian imperial domination.7

4 Edward W. Said (1995), Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient, Penguin Books: London, p.2. 5 Larry Wolff (1996), Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford University Press, 436p. 6 Friedrich Naumann (1916), Central Europe, P.S.King & Son: London, 388 p. 7 Timothy Garton Ash. History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s, Vintage Books, 1999. – p.350.

14 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 The academic substantiation of East Europe Central Europe from what has been a concept, evolved in post-Versailles Europe, mainly historical and spiritual phenomenon was especially followed by the establishment into a political phenomenon. We have an of the Federation of historical communities opportunity to take this wreath of European of Eastern Europe (1927). A Polish historian states – so recently colonized by the Soviet Oscar Halecki, in his speech at the Congress of historians (1923), stated that Eastern Europe was merely a geographical notion and in civilization terms, it was divided into The terms Middle Europe/ Central a Western part as an organic compound of Europe were obliterated after the Western world, and an Eastern part «the World War II, when Western under civilization domination of Russia with Europe began to call the region under immanent Byzantine and Tatar tradition. Soviet domination as Eastern Europe Oskar Halecki coined the notion of East- Central Europe that according to him was situated “between Sweden, Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and Turkey and Russia Union ... and fashion it into a special body. on the other”.8 His ideas were followed by Then we can approach the richer nations other historians, including well-known Piotr of Western Europe, not as poor failures Wandycz.9 or helpless, recently amnestied prisoners, but as countries that can make a genuine The terms Middle Europe / Central Europe contribution.”11 This was the very case were obliterated after the World War II, when the representatives of the region were when Western Europe began to call the themselves the authors of the construct region under Soviet domination as Eastern named Central Europe. Since the early Europe. The term Central Europe was 1990-s, the term Central Europe emerged in revived and further coined by Hungarian, diplomatic turnover as applicable to Poland, Polish and Czech writers10 as an alternative Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. to the Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe notion. This split was actively exploited The emergence of the term Central-Eastern in political discourse of these countries as well as East-Central Europe is associated aimed at implementation of the “Back to with the Polish political discourse. These Europe” concept and gaining pace of their geopolitical notions embrace the Visegrad recognition by the Western world as its Four (V4) countries as well as the Baltic compound, alternative to space in the East. In 1990, Vaclav Havel called to the Polish the Polish dubious historical perception – : “We have an opportunity to transform Polandstates, belongs Ukraine to and the Belarus,Western andcivilization reflect

8 Oscar Halecki (1923), L’histoire de l’Europe orientale. Sa division en époques, son milieu géographique et ses - saw: Comité National Polonais, 1924, pp.79-94. 9 Piotrproblèmes Wandycz fondamentaux, (2006), The [in:] Price La of Pologne Freedom: au AVe History Congrès of International East Central Europedes Sciences from theHistoriques, Middle Ages Bruxelles.; to the Present, War Routledge Press: New York, 335 p. 10 Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 29, No. 2/4, pp. 131-184; Czeslaw Milosz (1984), The Witness of Poetry, The Charles EliotJenő Szűcs,Norton Julianna Lectures, Parti 128 (1983), p.; Milan The Kundera Three Historic (1984), RegionsThe Tragedy of Europe. of Central An Outline, Europe, Acta The HistoricaNew York Academiae Review of Books, Vol. 31. 11

Speech by Vaclav Havel before The Polish Sejm and Senate, Warsaw, January 25, 1990, [http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/ showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=324_aj_projevy.html&typ=HTML] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 15 world, but the boundaries of Rzeczpospolita, parts of Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. A in Polish self-perception as a part of its famous Hungarian novelist György Konrád13 identity.stretched Polish far to intellectualthe east, affiliate heritage this favours space presented Central Europe not as a compound the term East-Central Europe because it: 1) of Western Europe, but as an autonomous separates Poland from German Friedrich Neumann’s Mitteleuropa, and 2) indicates Jenö Szücs named Central Europe as one at Rzeczpospolita and Polish-Lithuanian ofunique the “three unit with Europes”, its own14 specificplaced between identity. Commonwealth legacy. A special place in Western and Eastern Europe (mainly advocating East Central European regional Russia). Distinguishing Central Europe identity via Polish-Lithuanian state legacy from the Eastern continental part, the belongs to the representatives of the Hungarian authors stated that in the Middle “Jagiellonian” concept,12 who stated that the Ages this territory experienced a profound impact of Rzeczpospolita became a decisive Westernization, which laid down structural factor for culture and mentality of Ukraine, changes not shacked by any following Belarus and Lithuania, and endued them changes and transformations. with Central European features. According to this concept, there is no Eastern Europe; The abovementioned examples illustrate the instead, there is Central Europe and Russia, efforts of the V4 countries to escape from which is associated with Eurasia. Europe during the Cold War period towards The Czechs and the Slovaks quite evidently distinguishingthe broad inclusive Central definition Europe ofas Easternbeing feel no connection to nations of the former different from the Eastern Europe space. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its line in distinguishing Central Europe from eastern borderlands. They bear in their Eastern Europe lies in its involvement into historical memory a cultural space of the the Renaissance and Enlightenment cultural Austro-Hungarian Empire that stipulates processes. As Milan Kundera states15, their adherence to the Central European Bohemia, Poland, Hungary and Austria have concept. For Czechs, their identity never been a part of Eastern Europe. Central (illustratively described by Tomas Masaryk) Europe gave the world its rich cultural

as Protestants (posed as carriers of second part of the XXth century led to losing progress)was tightly opposing connected to withthe Austria-imposed self-affirmation itsheritage, gravity butcentre the by Soviet Western influence culture. in Milan the Catholicism (considered as alien to Czechs). Kundera considers that Central Europe lacks the centre and the feeling of belonging; it is One of the most popular approaches in torn between West and East, “culturally it is Hungary is to identify Central Europe in the West and politically in the East”.16 with the former territory of the Austro- Hungarian Empire that embraced Austrian With this, as it was shown above, even the and Hungarian lands, the Czech territory, V4 countries lack a common interpretation

12 Illya Prizel (2004), National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, p.57. 13

14 ScientiarumGyörgy Konrád Hungaricae, (1985), Does Vol. the29, DreamNo. 2/4, of pp. Central 131-184. Europe Still Exist?, [http://www.konradgyorgy.hu] 15 MilanJenő Szűcs, Kundera Julianna (1984), Parti The (1983), Tragedy The of Three Central Historic Europe, Regions The New of Europe.York Review An Outline, of Books, Acta Vol. Historica 31. Academiae 16 Ibid, p.1.

16 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 more intense, more important one, until the culture itself becomes the living value around With this, as it was shown above, which all people rally. That is why, in each of even the V4 countries lack a the revolts in Central Europe, the collective «common interpretation of the cultural memory and the contemporary regional identity, and they in different creative effort assumed roles so great and so ways interpret their own “otherness”. decisive. These were writers, philosophers, historians, political activists and dissents, who stood for the liberation of the small of the regional identity, and they in different nations from the imperial domination and ways interpret their own “otherness”. Their later from the Soviet control. idea of belonging to Central Europe turned out to be not so much a unifying concept of The authors from the region emphasized regional identity, but rather a technology of the Western character of their countries, “fellow travellers” to jointly escape from the such as the tradition of democracy, Latin Soviet legacy and integrate into the Western Christianity, Western art, architecture and regional security, political and economic literature etc. According to them, only due to structures, namely NATO and the EU. After a political misfortune their countries came reaching these goals, the Visegrad Four reduced their activity within the V4 sub- whose values were foreign to Central regional format as well as the level of foreign Europeans.under the influenceFor the of theCentral Eastern European empire, policy coordination, and now they show countries, Russia / USSR was posed as different approaches even in such sensitive issues as their policy towards Russia after its with such principal criteria of otherness aggression against Ukraine. asthe the Other following: or even synthetic the Significant (not analytical) Other thinking, the extensive way of economic Negative Identity – Who Is the “Other” development, low density of population, low For Eastern Europe? level of culture materialization, collective forms of relations in the societies, neglecting The crucial feature of the East European law, recognition of egalitarianism but not identity is its negative nature stipulated by historically driven processes of self- “brotherhood”, offensive and expansionist foreigndemocracy, policy. wars A Polish not foressayist profit Kazimierz but for the external pressure of the Other. The Brandys says that “the fate of Russia is not nomadaffirmation tribes’ via invasions opposing orin eventhe Middle confronting Ages, a part of our consciousness; it’s foreign to European and Ottoman empires domination, us; we’re not responsible for it. It weighs on Soviet subjugation, permanent division, us, but it is not our heritage. That was also shifting and redistributing territories and my response to Russian literature… I do peoples, assimilation and imposition of alien know it is different: Russia knows another values – all of this determined turbulent (greater) dimension of disaster, another times for Eastern European nations’ image of space (a space so immense that statehood development. As Milan Kundera entire nations are swallowed up in it), states,17 when the identity is threatened, the another sense of time (slow and patient), cultural life grows correspondingly into a another way of laughing, living, and dying”.18

17 Ibid, p.2. 18 Ibid, p.4.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 17 Milan Kundera’s argues that “the Czechs and and helpless stories ... All its history is a the Russians have never shared a common non-stop, continuous series of uprisings, world, neither a common history nor a common culture. The relationship between military coups, intrigues, quarrels and the Poles and the Russians, though, has wars, conflagrations, famines, invasions, never been anything less than a struggle of and the Polish state anthems indicate the life and death”.19 permanentplots.” Even strugglethe first linesof these of the nations Ukrainian for survival.

syndrome of victimization and trauma in Region’s Function, Destination and self-consciousnessDifficult historical of legacythe nations brought of the a the Issue of Identity region. Milan Kundera brightly describes this negative self-identity: “Central Europe Eastern Europe in a broad sense has always as a family of small nations has its own vision of the world, a vision based on a deep limits of the Western world in Eurasia, the bordersbeen a of European the Western frontier and Eastern that empires defined and later a zone of political and ideologies rivalry. From a geopolitical perspective, The negative self-identity is Eastern Europe is a large strategically also immanent to Ukraine, located region consisting of a number of «the historical and literature relatively small countries placed between heritage of which is a history of permanent struggle for survival. Great Powers. It is an area from which the conflictingHalford John interests Mackinder’s of neighbouring Heartland might be controlled, a Crush Zone in James Fairgrieve’s terminology or a Shatterbelt in distrust of history. ... The people of Central Saul Cohen’s language. Europe are not conquerors. They cannot be separated from European history; they After the collapse of the , the cannot exist outside it; but they represent countries of the region exerted efforts to the wrong side of this history; they are its change a notion of the barrier / buffer victims and outsiders. It’s this disabused region through their integration into the view of history that is the source of their EU and NATO – and nowadays they actually culture, of their wisdom…”20 perform a function of the EU and NATO eastern borders, the edge of stability and The negative self-identity is also security. With this, the function attributed immanent to Ukraine, the historical and to the countries of the region was not literature heritage of which is a history of always an external construct, but their permanent struggle for survival. In 1918, own perception as well. It is a sense of a famous politician and thinker Volodymyr national mission that became an object of Vynnychenko wrote: “Ukrainian history pride and self-esteem. The Czechs had a should be read only with taking bromine as belief in a special national mission rooted it is one of the most unfortunate, senseless in Hussite movement. The Polish and

19 Ibid, p.5. 20 Ibid, p.8. 21

Володимир Винниченко (1918), Щоденник (Diary), p. 285. 18 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 etc., turned out to be by far less popular than the perspective to melt down in the After the collapse of the Soviet Western world, and these ideas failed to Union, the countries of the region «exerted efforts to change a notion genuine regional identity. of the barrier / buffer region through become a sufficient substratum for shaping their integration into the EU and NATO Conclusions

Thus, the issue of the East European regional Hungarian peoples perceived themselves identity turns out to be more a matter as a frontier or “a pivot wall” of Christianity of speculations than a fact of reality. The against pagans and Muslims. This sense geographical location and the realization of of national mission was embodied in its own otherness from the West and Russia literature, national myths and narratives is not enough for shaping a certain common and gave a rise to national ideology. regional identity, it cannot become a crucial A Polish ideological project known as factor for region consolidation; and one “Prometheism” also shaped a vision should not be misled by the temporary of Poland’s civilization mission among coincide in the foreign policy goals of the neighbouring Slavic nations. Besides, Polish countries in the region. Jagiellonian concept and geopolitical construct exploit the legacy of This should be taken into account in Kyiv, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to create when shaping long-term foreign policy a new kind of sub-regional consolidated goals and developing relations with its area.22 neighbours. The decisions on strategic partnership and possible regional alliances The function of a buffer at peacetime and should not be guided by misleading an area of clashes at wartime could not illusions of a common regional identity. Ukrainian historical tradition exploits the notion of Central Eastern Europe that but influence to a certain degree the self- includes Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, leadidentification to the domination for the countriesof the concepts, of the Hungary, Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, whichregion. promoted However, thisthe influenceidea of regional did not and Moldova as well as Balkan peninsular exceptionalism and unicity for the sake states. The speculations on the extended of any unique regional mission. Peoples V4 with the inclusion of Ukraine (V4+1 disregarded the region’s functions and role formula), of Intermarium and other in the international relations, and preferred sub-regional integration projects are to integration into the Western projects to some extent popular in Ukraine, but they get rid of their own past and geopolitical often do not properly consider the actual fate. The concepts exploiting the ideas geopolitical situation, differences in power of regional exceptional mission, from status of the countries of the region, and Mitteleuropa to Prometheism, Intermarium non-conformities in national interests.

22 Prometheism, a concept elaborated by Jozef Pilsudski and Edmund Charaszkiewicz, stated that Poland by virtue of its history was called to civilize and emancipate countries oppressed by Russia, which were crucial for Polish independence. Jozef Pilsudski endorsed the Jagiellonian concept according to which the Jagiellonian period of the Polish history was the ideal for Poland, and should have been replicated. The concept considered Ukraine, Belarus

and Lithuania as a zone of Polish cultural influence and in this sense rivaled the Piast concept, which advocated politicalwestern spaceorientation opposing of Polish Russia. foreign policy. The Jagiellonian concept influenced the emergence of the Intermarium or Międzymorze geopolitical concept regarding unification of Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania into a single

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 19 It is highly probable that the latest events in Europe including the migrant crisis may Dr. Olena Khylko, Associate Professor at the Institute challenge the idea of European identity of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National as a holistic phenomenon, and the issue University of Kyiv, Senior Research Fellow. She is also an of regional identities will be shadowed by the return of national identity factor. In expert at the East European Security Research Initiative this regard, it would be more pragmatic for Foundation. Being the author of more than 50 academic Kyiv’s foreign policy to pay more attention and analytical publications, she focuses her research to consideration of common coinciding interest on international relations and security in interests with the partner countries than to Eastern Europe, identity issues, foreign policy of Ukraine the search of common identities or common and geopolitics. fate.

20 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AT THE PRESENT STAGE

Dr. Olena Snigyr National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine)

The article is devoted to the analysis of participation of the Russian Federation in the European international organizations (OSCE, CBSS, and BSEC), its goals and the efficiency of use of multilateral platforms for the Russian international agenda. It considers the level of correspondence of Russian goals with the basic goals of the given international organizations and the influence of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the policy within the organizations.

The membership of Russia in international Organisation of Security and organisations is one of its foreign policy Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) priorities. The Russian Federation participates in numerous European OSCE is the most sizeable organisation in organisations and initiatives: this, inter alia, goes in line with the EU strategy wide geographic representation and tools considering involving Russia as much forEurope. activities, Considering it is a itsfocal political area of influence, Russian as possible within various cooperation diplomatic actions in the continent. formats. The nature of Russian policy on participation in European regional In two latest foreign policy concepts of organisations can be observed through the Russian Federation as of 2008 and the example of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe Russian foreign policy within the European (OSCE), Council of the Baltic Sea States 2013, the definition of the main goal of (CBSS), and Organization of the Black really open and democratic system of the Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). These overallfield remains regional constant:collective “establishingsecurity”1 that a three organisations totally demonstrate shall be implemented through “rendering the specifics of unions in Europe: by legally mandatory political declarations purpose, by geography, by influence on indivisibility of security regardless of on international policy and by Russian influence on such organisations. alliances”2. Thus, the goal of Russia is to affiliationerode the Euroatlanticof a state to any security military-political system and

1 ru/acts/news/785 2 Концепция внешней� политики Россий� ской� Федерации. 15 июля 2008 года. Web-ressource: http://kremlin.

Концепция внешней� политики Россий� ской� Федерации Утверждена Президентом Россий� ской� Федерации В.В.Путиным 12 февраля 2013 г. Web-ressource: http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/ files/9/13617765900.pdf UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 21 make the idea of the common security space and gaining international legal standing of “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” come true the OSCE is still up to date.4

decisions of European countries and the Despite internal disputes and crisis aspects EU,by gaining in particular, an opportunity in the aspect to influence of security the in the OSCE, this organisation remains policies. Russia has been striving to gain being an important tool of monitoring and such rights through signing new binding international treaties, namely, by reforming including the territory of war actions in OSCE and providing it with a legal standing. Donbas.collecting Nowadays information it is the from only conflict international zones, organisation able to inform the international In January 2004, the Russian Federation community on the course of events at the East proposed to shape a common pan- of Ukraine. Conversely, the presence of Russian European security space based on the representatives in the process of regulation and OSCE; in 2008, drafting of a legally binding monitoring at Donbas is a risk factor. In theory, European Security Treaty was initiated. As it is possible to push Russia, as an aggressor a reaction to the Russian initiatives, Greece state, completely aside of OSCE activities on the (chairing in the OSCE at that moment) Ukrainian territory and of making decisions on launched a Corfu Process promoting a dialog on Euroatlantic and Eurasian tool for this: so-called “consensus minus one” security and the perspective of adoption of principleconflict resolution5 approved at Donbas.at the Prague OSCE meetinghas a legal of the OSCE statutes3. The need of enhancing the OSCE Council of Ministers in 1992, which OSCE functioning was well-considered by was once applied to ex-Yugoslavia. However, all member countries, so the Corfu Process such a decision is less probable in view of the gained an overall approval. Meanwhile, member states of the EU and NATO were OSCE and the overall political and diplomatic not considering as necessary to restructure situationRussian influence,with the Russian consensus aggression principle against in the the bases and tools of European security in Ukraine (not even all the European states made a way as it had been proposed in the EST the decision to join the EU sanctions against draft. Both ideas were actively discussed Russia). for a while; however, today, considering that European states have recognised Thus, membership and activities within the Russia’s involvement in the conflict at the OSCE are important for the Russian politics East of Ukraine, the authority of Russia as in Europe. Due to the aggression against of a participant of shaping the common security area has significantly dropped OSCE has decreased. On the other hand, Russia down as well as its position in the context Ukraine, a “moral” influence of Russia in the of the OSCE reforming, whereas the idea organisation’s activities. Using the consensus of EST absolutely disappeared from principle,keeps the necessaryRussia allows toolkit OSCE for influencing taking only the international agenda. Meanwhile, the issue those decisions that do not impede Russian of expanding the possibilities of the OSCE goals.

3 http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/254/ 4 RenewingСнігир О.В. dialogue, “Росій� ські rebuilding ініціативи trust, для restoring загальноєвропе security. Theй� ської� priorities безпеки”. of the Аналітична German OSCE записка Chairmanship Web-ressource: in 2016

5 The procedures and mechanisms of the OSCE Web-ressource: http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2006/2/1 6/32a78695-6b86-46d0-98cc-e6db63fd4037/publishable_en.pdfWeb-ressource: http://www.osce.org/cio/215791?download=true

22 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 Council of the Baltic Sea States stronger position of Russia in the BSEC. It (CBSS) and Organization of the Black is worth to study these two organisations Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) separately for better understanding of peculiarities of Russian activities in CBSS The activity of Russia in minor European and BSEC. regional organisations might be studied through the example of cooperation within regions of Baltic and Black seas. Council of the Baltic Sea States and Organisation When comparing the Baltic of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Black sea regional have a lot of common: a union based on a «cooperation, it may be joint economic interest, similar geographic affirmed that CBSS is a much particularities, the willingness of members more effective and functional to support the regional environment, etc. organisation with higher region- The membership in these organisations consolidating potential that BSEC. also looks similar: members are seaside states, some being members of the EU and NATO. Russia is the only country with a membership in both CBSS and BSEC. For Council of the Baltic Sea States is the the sake of cooperation with Russia, the EU biggest among regional cooperation adopted the Northern Dimension Strategy in structures in the Baltic Sea area. CBSS has the Baltic region and the Black Sea Synergy 12 members (11 states + Eurocommission) in the Black Sea region, involving not only and 10 observers. The organisation is a Russia but all other states of the Black Sea well structured institution with regular region that are not members of EU (Turkey, consultations at a high political level. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova Since the very beginning CBSS has two and Ukraine). After Russia has launched its priorities: 1) to provide a common ground aggression against Ukraine, EU has amended for development of regional cooperation both strategies, restricting cooperation with between partners, having a common legal Russia by sanctions. Thus, in the Black Sea framework and ready to combine resources region, all the projects related to Crimea (Germany, the EU, Northern countries); 2) have been suspended except those directed to involve Russia in the cooperation through at supporting civil society and human numerous institutional relations, like contacts6. When comparing the Baltic and connections between cities or participation the Black sea regional cooperation, it may be of Russia in various regional projects. and functional organisation with higher Russian interests in the regional cooperation region-consolidatingaffirmed that CBSS is apotential much more that effective BSEC. in the Baltic region in general and within This is mainly because most of the Baltic CBSS in particular have consisted in States are consolidated around the EU policy infrastructural and educational projects, policy shaping in these countries7, unlike a whereasinvolving CBSS financial itself resourceshas been considered for economic, by and due to a low Russian influence on the

6 Joint Working Document. Black Sea Synergy: review of a regional cooperation initiative. Brussels, 20.1.2015

7 Andrey Makarychev. The Baltic Sea Region: Does Russia Fit In? (Hint: In Many Indices its Way Worse than the Web-ressource: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/docs/body/swd_2015_6_en.pdf many-indices-its-way-worse-worse-performing Worse Performing) Web-ressource: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/baltic-sea-region-does-russia-fit-hint-

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 23 Russia rather as a platform for a diplomatic of Kaliningrad and surrounding districts, dialog. The notions of the region sustainable development including business and to discrepancy of approaches of the economic cooperation, implementation of partnershas demonstrated to its implementation: poor efficiency Russians due joint actions on environment protection, were ready to obtain funding from the development of energy and transport European partners for the implementation network, support of activities of democratic of infrastructural projects, whereas those institutions, assistance in humanitarian partners preconditioned such funding contacts enlargement — all these have not with ensuring reforming the legislation been perceived as of interest by Moscow. and State institutions, responsible for enhancing the investment climate in the region and for preventing corruption and areas of the regional cooperation show the 9. differenceDifferences of inapproaches the definition of Russia of and priority other partners of the CBSS. This was especially abusesIn some of areas, office Baltic countries’ priorities well demonstrated in the program document are fully contradictory with the Russian of the Russia’s presidency in CBSS in 2013.8 Neither environment protection nor energy strategy: first, it concerns the program are mentioned; two out of four Russian implementationof energy supply of innovative diversification, energy energysaving prioritiesefficiency, concern so important the regional for thepartnership region, technologies.efficiency program Instead and of theparticipating program in of in modernization and entrepreneurship, and the regional program on energy supply two others, such as extremism prevention and visa-free regime promotion, are has been promoting Nord Stream, the absolutely out of CBSS prerogative. bilateraldiversification project and with energy Germany. efficiency, Another Russia example of divergence of the strategical Interests of Russia might be observed through development perception is that Russians projects that were promoted during the Russian presidency: an agreement between Vneshkombank and KfW German State Bank controlconsider and the regulation Internet as unlike a field the of Europeanbattle for was signed on the joint loan program for approachinfluence on and accessibility as an area of the requiring Internet state as a the small and medium businesses in South- crucial human rights component. Western regions of Russia (with a $110 mln fund); work was conducted on creation of However, even in the areas of its priority, a touristic cluster at the border between Kaliningrad and Lithuania; the Baltic Artek opportunities of cooperation due to project was launched, as well as the project traditionalRussia failed obstacles, to benefit such as fromprotectionism, all the of development of Eurofaculty in Pskov absence of legal safeguards, corruption etc. State University. However, the SEBA project (Partnership for modernisation on the from the institutional mechanisms of CBSS, South East of the Baltic Sea), aimed at the preferringThis is why bilateral Russia was cooperation. unable to fully profit cooperation for boosting the development

8 The Russian Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (July 2012 – June 2013) Web-ressource: http://www. cbss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Russian-Presidency-Priorities.pdf 9

А.А.article/n/rossiya-i-evropeyskiy-soyuz-v-baltiyskom-regione-ternistyy-put-k-partnerstvu Сергунин. Россия и Европей� ский� Союз в Балтий� ском регионе: тернистый� путь к партнерству / Сергунин А. // Балтий� ский� регион. 2013 № 4 (18). С.61 (с.53-66) Web-ressource: http://cyberleninka.ru/

24 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 When Russian aggression against Ukraine of the state observing the organisation”. It started, the Baltic regional partnership is also stated over there that the Russian revealed to be in crisis: as a multilateral economy “pays a price” for the Russian format, it was not suspended, yet the actions in Ukraine even though it is the partnership with Russia was to be revised whole region that suffers from losses. since EU policy on Russia had changed. Russian aggression and the following Thus, the crisis of trust because of the introduction of sanctions against Russia Russian aggression against Ukraine caused the suspension of the political dialog in years of organisation’s existence history) the 10thcaused summit cancelling of CBSS (for planned the first for timeJune in2014 22 at the level of Prime Ministers10. This type of summits has not been resumed since then. In this regional cooperation crisis, at least partial excluding of In this regional cooperation crisis, at «the aggressor state from the full least partial excluding of the aggressor CBSS working format is representative state from the full CBSS working format is representative. The level of consolidation of other member states is high enough, and their position is clearly stated in two regional the Baltic region. The main indicator is the reports of 2014, economic and political cancellation of CBSS summits and ministerial 11 begins with the following meetings since 2014. Cooperation with words: “When the leaders of the Baltic Russia is limited to the lower regional ones.region The countries first meet at the 16th summit level and regular meetings of high CBSS of the Baltic Development Forum in Turku, a usual dialog on economic opportunities and partners of Russia in the Baltic region shall go along with a tough discussion showofficials. their Meanwhile,interest in a wide Eurocommission involvement of the political context. Russian actions of Russia to regional projects: this is against Ukraine and the consequences of also demonstrated in the EU’s updated such actions for relations between Western strategy of Northern Dimension. Nuclear cooperation principles in the Baltic region. radioactive materials, strengthening ...Europe “As an appropriate and Russia reaction influence to the the Russian basic readinesstechnologies, to theemergency prevention cases of trafficking— those actions against Ukraine, the region shall Russia in CBSS. Another Russian priority of development”. In the political report,12 it are traditional fields of cooperation of isrevise stated its as economic follows: “2014 cooperation cannot and be a fields year organised crime. In 2015-2016 Russia of business as usual since Russia, one of the waswithin heading regional an cooperation appropriate is Target fight against group members of the Council of the Baltic Sea aiming at enhancing cooperation of police States, has annexed the part of the territory

and prosecutor offices of the Baltic states

10 President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy discussed the situation in Ukraine. Government Communications Department. Press release 159/2014 Web-ressource: http://www.formin.

11 2014 State of the Region Report. The Top of Europe – Emerging from the Crisis, Adapting to a New Normal Web-ressource:fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=304007&nodeid=%2015146&contentlan=2&culture=en-US http://www.bdforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/BDF_SORR_2014_web.pdf 12 Political State of the Region Report 2014. Web-ressource: http://www.bsr2014.eu/wp-content/uploads/BDF_ PSoRR_2014_web_03.pdf

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 25 in the prevention of illegal migration, shall be subject to be revised or cancelled

Today, Russia basically has a possibility to new projects). “And if the sanctions cannot cooperatehuman trafficking, within all Baltic and initiatives drug trafficking. related be(EBRD lifted and then EIB new have mechanisms blocked financingshall be to environment protection, development of 13 infrastructure capacity and humanitarian partnership. It is highly probable developedWithin such for financinga framework, projects Russia by EU.” has a considering the applied sanctions that powerful leverage by sabotaging solving Russians now will pay more attention to all environmental issues under its competence. available opportunities they used to ignore A bright example is ignoring the problem of before, bearing in mind obtaining additional Krasnyi Bor, an overloaded hazardous waste

political isolation. already threatens the Gulf of Finland, creating financial aid and compensating their partial alandfill problem in Leningradof international region. scale. The dumpsiteConcerns Ukraine is present in CBSS as an observer. have been expressed by Estonia, Sweden, This status provides the tools enabling Finland and Baltic Marine Environment monitoring how Russia attempts to Protection Commission HELCOM.14 Ekokem, overcome sanctions through participation a Finnish company declared its determination in regional projects, and therefore, widely to launch the decontamination of the waste at publicize such attempts, including informing 15. The position of the Russian side the EU institutions. It is also worth to is still unknown. constantly bring to the attention of CBSS the landfill member states an inappropriate use of The regional cooperation in the Black Sea funds by the Russian part and emphasize region, foremost, through the format of Organisation of the Black Sea Economic monitoring during the implementation of Cooperation includes more diverse actors, the projectnecessity scope of financial of work. control and quality whereas the position of Russia is considerably stronger that other countries of the region. In the Baltic region, environment protection BSEC has 12 member states and a developed topic was also lobbied as an area of institutional structure including the highest cooperation with Russia. Despite the fact political level of representation: Council of that Russia itself did not set this topic as Ministers of Foreign Affairs. priority during its presidency in CBSS in 2013, Paavo Lipponen (Finnish Prime- Unlike a tough and compelling stand of the Minister in 1995-2014, now Nord Stream Baltic region states, the Black Sea states independent consultant), one of Kremlin continued to communicate as usual at the lobbyists, insists on keeping the ecological level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. At partnership with Russia within the frame the session in January, 2016, Ukrainian of Northern Dimension and openly declares delegation demonstratively left the meeting the sanctions impeding such cooperation to show their protest against Russia taking

13 Paavo Lipponen. The future of northern dimension cooperation must be secured. Web-ressource: http://www. northerndimension.info/component/content/article/50-category-eng/norhern-dimension/nd-institute/activi- -

14 ties/335-the-future-of-northern-dimension-cooperation-must-be-secured?highlight=WyJtaW5pc3RlcmlhbCIsIm 1lZXRpbmciLCJtaW5pc3RlcmlhbCBtZWV0aW5nIl0=

15 Меликян Татьяна. Не НАТО угрожать. Как президенты России и Финляндии обменялись угрозами вместо ru/social/20160705/237072162.htmlлюбезностей� . Web-ressource: https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/07/02/suomi/ Ekokem может помочь России с полигоном токсичных отходов «Красный� Бор». Web-ressource: http://inosmi.

26 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 the presidency (from 1st January to 1st July of priorities of the Russian Presidency in 2016) and during the 6 months Ukrainian BSEC)16. Among the Russian Presidency representatives did not participate in priorities, the following shall be mentioned:17 meetings held on the territory of Russia, 1. Expanding the use of warranty funds including BSEC Parliamentary Assembly for simplifying the access of small and (28 June 2016) and Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1st July 2016). resources, as well as their perspectives ofmedium international businesses expansion; to credit financial 2. Implementing the Russian initiative on a consolidated stance due to a considerable development of the multimodal freight divergenceIt is difficult of fortheir BSEC interests. members The to EU develop keeps being the most powerful integration project of 3. Implementing the project of the the region, therefore, the majority of the BSEC and passenger ferry traffic in the region; projects will be most probably implemented circular road around the Black Sea and within the Black Sea Synergy, the EU strategy development of maritime passages in for the region and in compliance with the the region; EU regulations. Meanwhile, considering the 4. Implementing the project of creating growing interest of China to the Black Sea an Electric power belt around the Black Sea; projects interesting for them, additional 5. Shaping new and enhancing existing region and Chinese readiness to finance the cooperation opportunities are expected mechanisms of interaction of national to be created within the BSEC. However, emergency services; everything listed above still does not make 6. Developing cooperation in the area of BSEC an effective regional organisation since food security, involving investments the member states do not have the political into agricultural complex development will to develop neither regional cooperation in Russia and the BSEC countries; nor clearly stated mutual obligations and liabilities within the organisation. Thus, BSEC 7. Developing the common research today is still more of a platform for a dialog. environment through the creation of

BSEC is of Russia’s interest in two ways: research projects; support of 1) using organisation’s opportunities for networkmechanisms cooperation of financing of research multilateral and educational institutions, mainly within Russian projects; 2) attempting to legalise the network of Black Sea Universities Crimeaattracting through financial the resourcesinvolvement to of implement Crimean (BSEC’s partner on sectoral dialog); players of economic, educational, civil society joint use of the research infrastructure (mainly ecological) activities to international of BSEC countries. projects within the BSEC (this was almost clearly announced by Yevgeniy Stanislavov, Russia is very much interested in the Director of Economic Cooperation implementing infrastructure and transport Department of the Russian MFA on 22 January projects in the Black Sea region, including as 2016 in Istanbul during representation follows18: 1) construction of the new Taman

16

17 bsec.mid.ru/prioritiesРоссия стала председателем ОЧЭС. Web-ressource: http://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/world/20160122/1016970539.html 18 Приоритеты россий� ского председательства. Россий� ское Председательство в ЧЭС. Web-ressource: http:// events/08787.html Россия развивает транспортную инфраструктуру в рамках ОЧЭС. Web-ressource: http://ac.gov.ru/

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 27 deep-water port (using the concession to include an issue of condemning the tool); 2) construction of the bridge through annexation of Crimea and occupation of the Kerch Strait; 3) extension of capacities of the part of Ukrainian territory to the agenda of Krasnodar railway junction. every meeting of BSEC high bodies, and to insist on including such statements in the Russia is also interested in developing minutes and summaries of these meetings. bilateral business contacts. For this purpose, they use BSEC platforms, foremost, the Conclusions Business Council. During the Russian Presidency in the Organisation, the activity To summarize, we may state that of this Council was, in fact, continuing the participation and activity of Russia activities of the Russian National Committee within the frame of regional European of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the Head of RNCBSEC was elected the Head policy and striving for gaining the status of BSEC Business Council for the period oforganisations a regional isand, defined in prospect, by its revisionismworldwide of Russia’s presidency. RNCBSEC declared power. In no way Russia considered regional the following priorities of its activities: organisations as a region-consolidating tool 1) development of Situation Information through uniting the potential of member Analysis Centre (preventive informing on countries, but only through the prism of probable technogenic accidents); 2) Black usefulness of organisations for gaining Sea Basin Ecological Monitoring project; 3) its primary goal of strengthening Russian interaction of RNCBSEC and the delegation of the Stavropol Government to the Federal funding Russian business entities and local Russian Government. Meanwhile, activities administrations.influence and/or as an additional source of • Through membership in the OSCE,

In this regional cooperation on decisions of European countries Russia strives to reinforce its influence crisis, at least partial excluding of in the area of foreign relations and «the aggressor state from the full security. A useful tool for Russia in this CBSS working format is representative case is lobbying acceptable decisions on European multistake platforms. Notably within the OSCE, Russia was

of both RNCBSEC and BSEC Business 2013 via initiatives on signing legal bindingtrying to international legalize its agreements, influence before and concentrated on organising and holding an after 2013 via the OSCE’s bureaucracy Council in the first half of 2016 were in fact international trade exhibition in Russia. and consensus principle for promoting Russian stance on current events of The main task of Ukraine in facing the European security. For this purpose, Russian policy is monitoring and preventing Russians working in OSCE structures the attempts of involving Crimean legal and missions, as well as foreign entities in international projects, the representatives engaged by Russia are intentions of international partners to do business in Crimea, implementation of any • In European international organisation infrastructure projects related to Crimea, used as influence tools. as well as attempts of Russia to obtain of the regional format (Council of the international funding bypassing sanctions Baltic Sea States and Organisation of through participation in international the Black Sea Economic Cooperation), projects. It is crucial for Ukrainian delegation Russia is concerned about involving

28 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 funding through the tools of the involvement of Crimean entities of organisations, about lobbying its own economic, educational, ecological and infrastructure projects and conserving other activities in international projects its own presence at regional negotiating within BSEC. Considering a growing platforms. In CBSS, Russia has been interest of China to the Black Sea region, rendering from the full extent of attempts of Russia are to be expected cooperation at the highest level, and to participate in economic projects of the implementation of joint projects has been revised in compliance with possibility to bypass economic sanctions the sanctions imposed by EU. This was andChina legalise for Black the statusSea region of Crimea. for finding a enabled by a consolidated stance of the • Russia was not interested in developing Baltic region states on inadmissibility effective regional organisations neither of the annexation of Crimea, occupation of the part of Ukrainian territory and by the absence of effective international continuance of aggressive actions at the projectsbefore nor initiated after 2014. by ThisRussia is confirmed in both East of Ukraine by Russia. organisations, CBSS and BSEC. Projects • Striving to overcome a partial being implemented with Russia’s obstruction on behold of CBSS participation are also estimated to members and seeking for using tools of be of low-level. However, considering obtaining international funds through EU striving to conserve the “policy of the programs of organisation, Russia Russian involvement”, continuation of increases its activities in the areas cooperation with Russia is to be expected not interesting before: ecological, within European formats of regional humanitarian, energy saving etc. In cooperation. Meanwhile, stricter control order to promote such cooperation, procedures of using project funding and Kremlin will use both risk factors and of scope of work implementation can be lobbyists of Russian interests. predicted to be introduced by European countries. • In Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Russia has kept its position as the member of organisation. In the meantime, in Dr. Olena Snigyr has a Ph.D. in Political Science (Kyiv, compliance with the revised EU policy 2004), specializing in European security and Russian on the Black Sea region, all regional international projects related to foreign policy. She currently works as a chief consultant Crimea have been suspended. The in the Research Centre for Russian Federation Problems implementation of major infrastructure (National Institute for Strategic Studies under the projects with Russia’s participation President of Ukraine), manages foreign policy analytical is also stopped. Most of economic projects of the Institute for Social and Economic Studies activities of Russia within BSEC today and is an associated expert of the Foreign Policy Council concentrates on creating opportunities “Ukrainian Prism”. Her publications include the analysis for bilateral contacts of Russian of Russia’s foreign policy, the EU foreign and security business representatives with possible policy, the EU and the Black Sea region and Ukraine’s international partners. Meanwhile, the foreign policy. main purpose of Russia is still trying to legalise the status of Crimea through

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 29 NETWORKS AND NODES: EURASIAN REGIONALISM REVISITED

Dr. Viktor Konstantynov Institute of International Relations, Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University

The very existence of international regions in post-Soviet space remains one of the central issues of international cooperation as lack of cohesion and collective actions manifested by weak regional institutions remain one of the features of Eurasia even twenty five years after the collapse of the USSR. With ongoing economic recession and rising security challenges, Eurasian nations need closer cooperation with each other more than ever. However, it is not just their reluctance to engage into wide-range regional cooperation that interferes with cooperation efforts. Current rationale of regional integration in Eurasia and the latest history of regionalization take little account of region’s potential and needs. Thus, a shift from already traditional geopolitical regionalization to network-like regionalism is seen as vital for the whole region in order to attain positive dynamics of development at both regional and national levels.

Eurasia on the Political Map of the Modern World region in terms of regional cohesion, which canRegionness be seen asdefines a long-term a position historical of a particular process, The landmass of Eurasia encompasses changing over time from coercion, the plenty of different nations and stretches building of empires and nations, to voluntary for huge distances. Yet nowadays when cooperation1. The latest introduction of the this term is used to denote some political term “Eurasia” into political and academic unity it attributes to a much smaller region, discourses was itself undermining this mostly consisting of nations that emerged idea. From the start of the 21st century, in the wake of the Soviet Union collapse. steady migration from the use of “post- These post-Soviet nations are involved Soviet” designation to the Eurasian one was in active interaction with each other and participate in several projects of regional Soviet legacy. For post-Soviet nations, this cooperation. Nevertheless, Eurasia is still movedesigned was to seen signal as the the end final of departurethe transitional from not reintegrated nor even shows steadiness period – at least in political rhetoric – while in the development of regional institutions they tried to establish their position in the and initiatives. Thus, the question international system2. remains whether Eurasia even exists as an established region in contemporary For outsiders, mostly in the West, this was a international relations. symbolic gesture to hail the shrinking of the

1 B. Hettne, Beyond the ‘new’ regionalism, “New Political Economy”, December 2005, p. 548 2 Integration Yearbook, Eurasian Development Bank: Almaty – 2012, pp. 81-82; also see T. Carothers, The End of the TransitionE. Vinokurov, Paradigm, A. Libman, “Journal Eurasia of Democracy”,and Eurasian January Integration: 2002, Beyond pp. 5-21. the Post-Soviet Borders, [in:] EDB Eurasian

30 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 3 and to re-conquer its command over post-Soviet to denote the fragmentation of the space left space4. Thus, while the trajectory represents byRussian the collapsed zone of influenceSoviet Union. in the region the only viable region-building project in Eurasia, many nations are cautious if not However, this rhetoric turn had little to add to reluctant to join this enterprise. the ongoing quest for tracks of development in the region. Novelties in regional discourse Other nations found themselves on the depicted what region-building in the post- periphery of the Eurasian regionalism. Soviet space should not be like: it should However, their individual trajectories also vary a lot. For the East European nations – primarily Ukraine and Moldova avoid reinstating a unified state even in the – the European Union presented a viable alternative of regionalization or even Eurasia is still not reintegrated regional integration, promising to end nor even shows steadiness in their quest for development framework in «the development of regional the safe harbour. For the nations of South institutions and initiatives Caucasus, situation rapprochement with the EU was more complicated, both because of geography and for security reasons. mid-term perspective. While delivering a Therefore, they were looking for closer ties strong message about the intentions of some with great powers, both regional and global, parties engaged in post-Soviet international putting bilateral agenda ahead of regional politics, it gave little insight into their cooperation. Finally, Central Asian nations potential actions and possible scenarios still rely upon balancing between extra- of cooperation. As an immediate outcome regional powerhouses. of this state of affairs, Eurasia witnessed several competing trajectories for individual With such diverse dynamics and trajectories nations.

One trajectory is set for the so-called wholeof regional Eurasian consolidation, space. One it may is hard claim to that find core of Eurasia – Russia, Belarus, and therea definite is more pillar consistency of region-building in dismembering for the Kazakhstan, nations involved in the deepest Eurasia than in any attempt to bring its integration in the region under the Eurasian pieces together. Even with formal Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and having the integration under the EAEU, we see an most interdependent economies within obvious division in terms of consolidation this integration community. This trajectory between the old core (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) and the latest additions Eurasianism, the policy-determining (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). Though on the conceptis heavily of the influenced Russian control by the over Russian transit other hand, the current development in routes from Europe to Asia. Eurasianism is Eurasia makes dramatic changes in regional often seen both in the region and in the West dynamics inevitable. The push by the EU as Moscow’s neo-imperial project, designed eastward stalled, and with the Eastern

3 of the former Soviet space, either its Slavic core or Central Asia – otherwise named as Northern and Central Eura- sia.While This definitions point of view of Eurasia has many differ proponents a lot from oneboth another, in Russia for and many in the experts, West. Eurasian means Russia with only part 4 M. Laruelle, The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism, “Nationalities Papers”, March 2004, p. 115-136.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 31 Partnership under deep revision, it seems these products simultaneously because this highly unlikely that European integration is phenomenon of international life is, as Haas able to substitute local regional cooperation pointed out, “covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation frozen, are threatening regional security designed to meet commonly experienced again.options. Central In South Asia, Caucasus,in its term, conflicts, faces a major once need”6. While regionalism is truly lacks challenge of its sub-regional organization the transformation power of high-end from internal instability and the raise of regional integration projects, it still bears Islamism all over Asia. It means that already the ability to reorganize regional space imperfect Eurasian regional cooperation 7. is rapidly becoming obsolete, and regional For Eurasian nations, this sense of control actors risk to fall from the cooperative trend overalong developmentdefined economic trajectory and political is necessary: lines of contemporary world. it will allow regional actors to ensure that the transformation of the political space Sources of Regionness in Eurasia will promote their individual interests, it will leave enough room to renegotiate A fair question should be asked whether previous agreements if necessary, and it will the nations of Eurasia need to be engaged balance different interests within regional in any regionalization. After all, for decades establishment. Accordingly, region-building some countries existed outside of regional precludes accommodation for the national establishments, relying exclusively on interests of individual nations, with further bilateral ties with great powers. Is this regional negotiations aimed to support the an option for Eurasia? It looks like latest equal accommodation of these interests for international developments already ruled all partners8. out this option. Eurasian nations’ shares in the world GDP and the world trade Another very important feature of are diminishing5. The same is true about regionalism for the Eurasian space comes attracted investment, while most of the from interdependence inherent in the region. Within the social structure of the current state of the world economy there are region, its constituent elements show fewregion opportunities witness capital for theflight. region Considering to catch theup. their dependence on each other from the As a result, the most viable option is seen in inauguration moment (as any regional developing intra-regional cooperation. establishment arises because of regional agreement, whether formal or informal) to Eurasian nations do not just need more further activities. Together with norms and investment to boost their economic informal rules produced in the process of development. They also need to ensure regional cooperation, the interdependency stability and steadiness in their social increases the level of predictability in the progress. Regionalism is apt to provide all regional space and contributes to regional

5 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015: The Global Economic Outlook, New York 2014, pp. 107-109; World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, 2015, pp. 48-53. 6 E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, Stanford University Press 1958, p. 16. 7 Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order, Macmillan 1996, p. 2. 8 W.A. PayneA. Axline, & A. Cross-regional Gamble, Introduction: comparisons the political and the economy theory of of regional regionalism cooperation: and world lessons order, from [in:] Latin A .Gamble America, & A. the - ation: Comparative Case Studies, Pinter 1994, p. 217. Caribbean, South East Asia and the South Pacific, [in:] W. A. Axline (ed.), The Political Economy of Regional Cooper

32 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 stability – which is exactly what the Eurasian is far from a full-scale integration. Amid nations need to show to the outside world in economic crisis, domestic markets are order to succeed in their joint development shrinking, thus nations in the region have efforts. less incentives to promote an open market

It would be incorrect to say that Eurasia was completely alien to the region-building if Eurasian nations need for the last quarter of a century. Contrary to regional cooperation but remain that, the post-Soviet space saw numerous «unwilling to build an all-around political, military and economic from the Commonwealth of Independent supranational community, what kind Statesattempts to several to define Central its newAsian regionnesssub-regional – of region are they ready to build? institutions, to Nazarbaev’s Eurasian Union idea. But those efforts were undermined by primarily in territorial terms, precluded strategy, to introduce free trade or to launch one fundamental flaw. They were all defined the integration project. As most successful and represented the so-called “closed and the strongest economies in the region regionalism”,exclusive affinity the one to oneto defend regional the groupingregional – Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan – depend heavily on oil and natural gas sales, the to “open regionalism” meant to enforce current low prices on hydrocarbons space from external influences, as opposed curb their ability to be the locomotive of combination of major elements turned industrial development, thus the potential post-Sovietregional influence region-building on external into entities. an exercise This push for deeper industrial cooperation is in geopolitical regionalism, in its almost also diminished. typical Cold-war era edition9. Nevertheless, this approach to regionalization requires Potential of Network Regionalism in Eurasia over geopolitical regions. That is the exact scenarioregional most leaders post-Soviet to establish nations firm were control eager While full-scale economic integration to avoid. As soon as they were reluctant to remains an unlikely scenario for further concede a part of their sovereignty (neither regional dynamics, there are several to supranational integration institutions nor elements of typical regional cooperation to another nation within some single-leader pattern available for Eurasia. Firstly, it is political community), it was obvious that trans-regional transport infrastructure development. The transit potential of Eurasia territorial region are bound to fail. has been praised since the mid-1990s. It the attempts to build a classical full-fledged is the most universal currency in every So if Eurasian nations need regional Eurasian development strategy because all cooperation but remain unwilling to nations of the region, even those without build an all-around political, military and energy resources or developed industries, economic supranational community, what do represent a valuable asset for numerous kind of region are they ready to build? The international transport projects. Trans- current state of post-Soviet cooperation Caspian routes to bring oil and gas from

9 This type of regionalism is best described in S. B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, Rowmann & LittleField 2003.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 33 Central Asia to Europe, a Chinese endeavour building. Most Eurasian nations are unable to reach the EU market by land, an Indian search for alternative energy supplies – on their own, so they will entirely depend those are only few reasons behind regional onto provide foreign a significantinvestors. portionThey still of investment see each urge to develop transport capacities. other as competitors, so any collective and coordinated action requires much Transport infrastructure in the region in political effort and remains an exception most cases is not developed to meet potential in behaviour. With little joint stand to face requirements for mass transit, or is absent major international investors Eurasian at all for required destinations. Transport nations put themselves in a weak negotiation routes in the region were mostly constructed position. Another reason for failure to during the Soviet period and were never convert transit potential into sealed projects meant to provide huge international transit. relates to security issues. Most nations in the Besides, both Central Asia and South region are weak internally and exposed to Caucuses had very limited cross-border numerous external threats. Their traditional transport infrastructure to connect with balancing approach to relations with major foreign countries. After these nations gained engaged enough to be obliged to intervene shouldpowers some backfires threat as transfernone of thoseinto crisis. powers That is is signalling potential investors that security Network regionalism does not risks may rise above acceptable level. harm individual sovereignty «in a profound way like The major task is to ensure deep regional traditional regionalism does cooperation that will allay the fears of investors, and at the same time to enable all Eurasian nations to gain their ends through the cooperation. Transport infrastructure independence, only few big infrastructure projects will not just tie different nations projects were completed in the region. in the Eurasian space with each other, but That means that infrastructure will require will also create a physical network equally huge amount of investment. China-Pakistan important for every regional state. This Economic Corridor, a collection of transport transport network will become a backbone projects comparable in scale and complexity of regional cooperation capable to generate to those to be constructed in Central Asia or joint interests and to change development Southern Caucasus, has an estimated cost of dynamics in Eurasia. Network regionalism more than USD 46bln10. Hence, harnessing does not harm individual sovereignty in a regional transport potential is an obvious profound way like traditional regionalism choice for the driver for Eurasian regional does, but it still has potential to transform development. regional space and to promote Eurasian

from major infrastructure projects so their big enough to meet current aspirations individualregionness. interests All nations should are expected not contradict to profit ofHowever, regional while actors, it may investment cast financial is inflowsneither each other in this instance. The inclusive

guaranteed nor sufficient for region- and mutually beneficial nature of network

10 Z. T. Ebrahim, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A boon for the economy, a bane for locals, “Dawn”, 12 May 2016

[http://www.dawn.com/news/1236159 access: 5 December 2016] 34 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 regionalism should mitigate a competitive actors involved in major regional projects. A attitude between neighbours and enable generation of secondary interest within the effective region-building in a more profound region is vital. It does not matter what kind of way. interest it will be: self-sustainable consumer markets able to compliment emerging There is another feature of network infrastructure with local demand, or regionalism that is important for discussed exclusive high quality services, or production regionalization in Eurasia. Lately much attention was paid to the issue of additional supply. The main purpose is to interregionalism – a phenomenon of formal providehubs enhancing some unique existing incentives trade to flows investors with and protracted cooperation between and operators to invest to full capacity into different regions within the contemporary regional partners and to choose the region international system. Interregionalism is as a primary destination for its transport seen from two different prospective. On the one hand, it deals with a special type of network regions with nodes crucial for international cooperation where regional stabilityflows. Such of regional strongholds operations will supplementand able to activities are add-ons to traditional inter- deliver additional development impulse. state diplomatic relations, which makes diplomatic agenda more complex and The attractiveness of a regional project to multifaceted. On the other hand, engagement extra-regional actors is especially important in interregional cooperation contributes for the network regionalization because for to the development of region’s actorship, its development such regions rely heavily which enables them to establish links with each other and to transform interregional organizational, and even institutional one. To and global structures within the illustrateupon external the matter intervention we may use – one financial, of the international system. The global impact of latest – and most important – initiatives to interregionalism may be a matter of distant promote infrastructure projects in Eurasia. future. Even established regions, albeit “One Belt, One Road” initiative elaborated harbouring potential structural changes in by China and mostly Chinese-funded, world governance, are still embryonic11. which provides a unique opportunity for Yet interregional ties are already material many Eurasian nations to participate in a and in case of Eurasia they may constitute major international investment project. the supra-regional tissue that will not only Presented by Xi Jinping in 2013, originally enforce regionness for the most of the post- the “Belt” part of the initiative targeted only Soviet space, but may also widen Eurasian Central Asia12. Yet soon China dramatically regional space into neighbouring regions – expanded the number and scope of the East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. overland routes within the initiative. Now Central Asia is not even designated as the Secondly, regional structure needs the major transport corridor under “One Belt, strongholds of regionalization capable to One Road”. To much extent, the lack of generate mutual interest to cooperate for uniqueness of the Central Asian regional regional countries and for extra-regional space for China is reducing the opportunity

11 B. Hettne, Beyond the ‘new’ regionalism, “New Political Economy”, December 2005, p. 558 12 P. Zhiping, Silk Road Economic Belt: A Dynamic New Concept for Geopolitics in Central Asia, “CIIS Time”, 18 Sep-

tember 2014, [http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-09/18/content_7243440.htm access: 10 November 2016] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 35 to attract bigger portions of investment and, represents one of few successful regional in a more distant future, transit freight. cases of investment and construction of a major transport corridor – a more than Thirdly, Eurasia needs to translate its regional one thousand kilometres long railroad cost undertakings into effective institutions around USD 1bln, and after completion of regional cooperation. Institutions are it became a part of a bigger North-South very important elements of regionalism. international transport corridor14. Yet the As Hettne noted, “the region as community lack of coordination, when each nation takes shape when an enduring organizational constructed its section of the link separately, framework facilitates and promotes social led to substantial delays in the process. communication and convergence of values Thus, an initially complete freight link had to be inaugurated in December 2012. egion as institutionalized polity has a and behaviour throughout the region. [R] obligations. Even though Turkmenistan did and stronger actor capability”13. Formal notHowever, face any the shortage Turkmen of side funding, failed itto failed fulfil itsto institutionsmore fixed structureprovide interplay of decision of makingmutual organize the construction process properly efforts, coordination and cooperative but did not inform their partners about the control. On the one hand, coordinated incoming delay until after it happened.15 actions empower regional establishment This example illustrates the importance with greater leverage in negotiations of the of coordination mechanisms, which agreements with extra-regional actors. Ad- hoc instruments are likely to fail when it is institutionalized regional cooperation. necessary to develop a collective approach to should definitely be implemented under the issue and to implement a joint decision. Region-building in Eurasia based upon Formal permanent institutions produce regional networks and primarily linked to better coordination and mutual trust crucial major transport infrastructure projects, may to stand united. represent the most viable and promising option for regional cooperation. As nations Another aspect of intervention by regional in Eurasia are inclined to extend cooperation formal institutions is their coordination with each other, this approach allows to of efforts to implement joint projects remove political obstacles for those nations within regional cooperation space. The reluctant to participate in more centralized lack of collective management was already vertical forms of regionalization. The affecting the ability of Eurasian nations to focus on the creation of a new long-lasting deliver joint projects in time and to their regional network to promote development full capacity. One of the latest examples also efforts rather than on integration of national comes from infrastructure development. In economies will grant regional countries a 2014 Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran possibility to concentrate on negotiating launched a railroad corridor to give two Central Asian nations access to the Iranian with extra-regional actors. Joint projects to ports in the Persian Gulf. This project developmutually beneficialnodes of conditionscooperation of cooperationwithin the

13 B. Hettne, Beyond the ‘new’ regionalism, “New Political Economy”, December 2005, p. 54 14 J. Lillis, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran Launch Railroad to Get Trade on Track, “Eurasianet”, 3 December 2014,

15 [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71166 access: 7 December 2016] DecemberС. Расов, Дорога 2016] не достроена, вице-премьер уволен (Road is not completed, Deputy Prime Minister is fired), “Gundogar”, 14 January 2013, [http://www.gundogar.org/?0130513236000000000000011000000 access: 7

36 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 network structure of the region, as well as inauguration of regional institutions directly Dr. Victor Konstantynov is an Associate Professor of linked to the concrete projects will provide International Relations at the Institute of International additional incentives for Eurasian nations Relations, Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. to participate in deep regional cooperation He holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences. His research and to promote a balanced regionalization interests are focused on international regionalism, approach. regional security and stability, regional cooperation in the post-Soviet space, and the methodology of international relations research.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 37 THE BALTIC STATES AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: A STRENGTHENING FACTOR FOR REGIONALISM?

Dovilė Šukytė Policy Analyst, Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Vilnius)

When newly arising challenges constantly threaten to divert European capitals’ attention from the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP)1, the position of three Baltic States – Estonia, and Lithuania – remains unshaken. Such solidarity and assistance to democratic reforms can be compared to one of Nordic states, which invested a great deal into the post-Soviet transformation of the Baltics. However, the Baltic states’ engagement into the EaP region, which often includes criticizing Russia, is more complex than a policy of ‘giving back’. The article takes a closer look into the role the Baltic States play in the EaP region, with particular attention to Ukraine. In addition to estimating the Baltic support, the main aim is to assess the impact that active involvement and transfer of the best reform-related practices to the EaP countries has on the Baltic States. It will also evaluate the hypothesis that the Baltic States’ actions in the EaP region strengthen them as a region.

The restoration of independence of the Baltic Currently, the Baltic States are among the States in 1990/1991 and their accession to strongest supporters and contributors to the EU/NATO in 2004 are both watershed the EaP countries’ reform processes and events that shape popular understanding of their ambitions for closer cooperation how far the three countries have gone - and with the EU and NATO. Such involvement how far they still have to go. Their progress is strengthens their image as a trustworthy often credited to intra-regional cooperation, partner and neighbour and also witnesses while existing competition, which is a their transformation from a recipient to a strong motivator to do more and surpass provider of international support, including one another, is little known. Comparing the political, economic and expert assistance, Baltic development with that of their EU among others. But does this also strengthen counterparts, the further North and West the Baltics as a region?

detected at home The Baltic States as a Region one looks, the more unfulfilled potential is By contrast, the EaP target countries remind The understanding of the Baltic States as a of what might have happened if political unity and will for a democratic and liberal and daily life perceptions. Interestingly, it is economic transition had not been found. notregional necessarily unit is influenced the Baltic by States historical themselves events

1 The EaP region encompasses the following six countries that are part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

38 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 that encourage understanding them as a also appealing to the EaP region. Moreover, regional unit. Instead, they pragmatically common history, which is not limited to and selectively refer to themselves as the Soviet period but reaches back to the years of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, for example, when advocating for common which encompassed the lands of what is interestsBaltic when within it deliversthe EU and concrete NATO, benefits,but they now Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova and which, from the 13th to the 18th centuries, fostered the development of societal links, that currently serve as a strong link for as the Baltic states were an transmitting Baltic experiences. In case of example to be followed in Soviet Ukraine, the country reaches out and accepts «times, their post-1989 evolution Baltic assistance in seeking closer ties with is also appealing to the EaP region the EU and NATO.

In addition to the mentioned EU and NATO platforms for cooperation, the Baltic States do not do that when other relations are seen also use Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) or e-PINE formats. The latter in addition to seeks to leverage its advantages in economic growthas more and influential. the IT sector Estonia, to portray for example, itself as Furthermore, during its Presidency, Latvia a Nordic country. promotedthe five Nordic the idea countries of a Euro-Atlantic includes theEastern U.S. Partnership, which would involve such third During the Soviet period, the Baltics were countries as the U.S. and Japan.2 known as Pribaltika, or the “countries by the Baltic Sea.” They were idealized for The Baltic States within the EU’s their economic development and quality Eastern Partnership agricultural and industrial products. As a result, other Soviet republics wished to emulate their example. Partnership were Poland and Sweden, theThough Baltic official States initiatorshave always of thebeen Eastern strong In the West, there was relatively little supporters and advocates for greater EU attention paid to the Baltic States until their engagement in the EaP region because of the Singing Revolution and the 1989 Baltic following factors. Strengthening democracy Way. The latter - a chain of 2 million people in the EaP region was perceived as the connecting Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn - once best way to ensure stability and security. again intertwined countries’ destinies. This Experiences of the Baltic States demonstrate time, however, it resulted in liberation and that EU-dictated reforms via ‘carrots and return to the family of democratic European sticks’ have the strongest success rate in nations. achieving democratisation. Second, Russia’s continued approach towards the post- The EaP countries are able to relate to both interpretations of the Baltic states. Actually, is a common problem. Thus, assistance they complement each other: just as the toSoviet the EaP space region as the does area not of only its influencelimit the Baltic states were an example to be followed reach of Russia but also increases regional in Soviet times, their post-1989 evolution is security by expanding the boundaries of

2 Diana Potjomkina, “A More Geopolitical Eastern Partnership: U-Turn or “the Ladies Not for Turning”?”, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Report, November 2015, http://liia.lv/site/docs/Eastern_Partnership_Diana_Pot- jomkina.pdf

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 39 democratic countries together as well as Estonian Presidency in November 2017. During Lithuanian Presidency, the EaP Civil Third, as previously mentioned, the Baltic Stateslessens and the the influence EaP region of Russia have elements to the East. of time and later continued by Latvia. Estonia shared common past from which a feeling isSociety to follow Conference the tradition was organized and to host for thethe first3rd of solidarity arises. For example, many Lithuanians were present at the Maidan was also initiated by Lithuania and then to repay support that was expressed by continuedConference. by The Latvia. first (However, EaP Youth the Conference next one Ukrainians during the acts of civic resistance will be held in Warsaw in June 2017, outside in 1991 that became known as the January the auspices of the Estonian Presidency. Events. In general, the Baltic States relate well to the EaP countries and it is in their During their Presidencies, the Baltic states interest to see the EaP region advanced and facilitate numerous processes focused on successful. deepening EaP countries’ engagement with the EU. Ministerial meetings are used to assess and Both Lithuania in 2013 and Latvia in 2015 further assist the adoption of EU regulations, used their Presidency in the Council of the while such events as the EaP Business Forum EU (hereafter – Presidency) to prioritise are organised to boost EaP economies and EU engagement in the EaP region. Estonia, attract additional support. Spurred on by the which is to assume the Presidency in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Latvian Presidency second half of the 2017, has also pledged distinguished itself by hosting the 1st EaP Media Conference, which addressed the danger of Russian language media channels that intentionally or unintentionally broadcast The Baltic States are still Russian propaganda, and called for greater investing into themselves and support for independent journalism in the EaP «cannot be expected to donate as countries. The event will be followed up by a much as rich countries like Sweden 2nd EaP Media Conference in Kyiv, held under the Estonian Presidency.

Even outside the six-month Presidency term, to do the same. During each of the Baltic the Baltic States are constantly vocal about Presidencies, the EaP Summits took place. the events in the EaP region. They criticize The 3rd EaP Summit in Vilnius was a historic Russia for non-compliance with the Minsk one, with Georgia and Moldova initialling Agreements, remain among the strongest their Association Agreements (AA), including advocates for continuing sanctions against the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Russia, and actively support Ukrainian forces Area (DCFTA) treaties, with the EU. Moreover, in eastern Ukraine. In addition, the Baltic States and most importantly, the Summit marked offer various training programmes either the beginning of what soon happened to be bilaterally or within the framework of NATO. the end of the President Viktor Yanukovych’s The Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade, rule in Ukraine and a change of the country’s operationally ready since 2016, acts as a sign geopolitical orientation towards Europe. The of security commitment and interest to reform 4th EaP Summit in Riga took a closer look at Ukrainian military by making it interoperable the other three EaP countries without AAs in with NATO forces. force, and offered alternative agreements to Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as additional Many experts within the Baltic States are cooperation possibilities to Belarus. The involved in assisting the EaP countries. The 5th EaP Summit is to take place under the Estonian government even established the

40 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership to Ukraine in 2016 consisted of EUR 3.32 million. Estonia’s bilateral development and civil society and to promote EaP-related cooperation with Ukraine in 2015 amounted issues.provide Intraining Latvia programmes and Lithuania to EaPlocal officials think to EUR 998 779.4 In 2015 Latvia devoted tanks, non-governmental organizations EUR 644 250 to Ukraine of which EUR 150 000 went to international organisations functions. and foundations supporting the country. An (NGOs) and educational institutions fulfil such additional amount of EUR 161 278 was given Bilateral Support for the EaP as humanitarian aid.5 Lithuania’s bilateral Countries: The Case of Ukraine development assistance in 2015 accounted for EUR 8.3 million, most of which was given Based on how actively the Baltic States to the EaP countries. Also, EUR 400 000 advocate within regional and international out of EUR 600 000 for humanitarian aid formats for the EaP countries and their were earmarked for Ukraine.6 Projects for societies, it can be assumed that their development of cooperation and democracy promotion implemented in Ukraine in 2015 accounted for EUR 356 000, while in 2016 stillpolitical investing support into isthemselves of greater and significance cannot be there was an increase to EUR 452 000.7 expectedthan the financialto donate one. as much The asBaltic rich States countries are A great part of Ukraine-focused development assistance (ODA) in 2015 reached 1.5 cooperation projects funded by the Baltic percentlike Sweden, of its gross whose national official income development (GNI) or States prioritise actions contributing to USD 7.09 billion, or Germany, which donated the implementation of the Association 0.53 percent of GNI or USD 17.78 billion. Agreement. Particular attention is given to Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian ODA good governance and strengthening the rule totalled 0.15 percent, 0.09 percent and 0.11 of law, economic development (especially percent of GNI respectively.3 As a result, the of regions), development of civil society, Baltic States aim to optimize and channel and education. Estonia and Latvia allocate their development cooperation assistance funds to areas of common interest with Chernihiv oblast, where Latvia facilitates a possibility to transfer their transitional region’sa significant territorial share reform of their and assistance municipal to experiences and success stories. cooperation, while Estonia focuses on environmentally friendly farming models. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the country’s budget for Each country focused on its own strengths development cooperation and humanitarian in providing assistance. Estonia supported aid for Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and

training programmes for Ukrainian officials

3 OECD, “Development aid in 2015 continues to grow despite costs for in-donor refugees”, April 13, 2016, http:// www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, Estonian Aid to Ukraine in 2015, http://www.vm.ee/sites/

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, Latvia’s support for Ukraine, May 4, 2016, http://www.mfa. gov.lv/en/news/developments-in-ukraine/latvia-supports-ukrainedefault/files/content-editors/development-cooperation/estonian_aid_to_ukraine_in_2015_0.pdf 6 2015, https://www.orangeprojects.lt/en/statistics 7 Official Website of the Lithuanian Development Cooperation, Lithuanian Official Development Assistance 2004- Programme in Ukraine, https://www.orangeprojects.lt/en/ukraine-projectsOfficial Website of the Lithuanian Development Cooperation, Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 41 on e-governance and cyber security, while Lithuania has used its success story of the Latvia focused on anti-corruption and EU integration to increase public support for transparency in the use of public funds, as well pro-European course and to refute myths as urban development planning. Lithuania, about the West spread by Russia. In 2013, for its part, assisted with the creation of a a Ukrainian-language magazine containing sustainable system of state registers and shared experiences of increasing energy on the advantages of the EU membership wasstories published of renowned8. Currently Lithuanians the Baltic reflecting States are focusing on increasing their own Manyefficiency initiatives and independence. are aimed at assisting societies’ resilience to Russian propaganda; Ukrainian internally displaced persons as a result, numerous projects facilitating exchanges of experience and even content between Baltic and EaP journalists are now who(IDPs), travelled especially abroad conflict for medical affected assistance children underway. and warrehabilitation veterans. Thewas first received Ukrainian in Lithuania. soldier Multiple summer camps aiming to provide Due to good knowledge of the EaP region, friendly environment and psychological Russia and Russian language, many assistance to refugee children were held in professionals from the Baltic States were the Baltic States. Furthermore, government- sent by their governments or assumed funded scholarships for the EaP students positions at different international missions aimed at assisting the Ukrainian government

of Ministers even included Lithuanian- with reforms. The first post-Maidan Cabinet Each country focused on its own strengths in providing Economic Development and Trade. born Aivaras Abromavičius as Minister of «assistance. Estonia supported training programmes for Ukrainian Future Cooperation officials on e-governance and cyber security, while Latvia focused on anti- corruption and transparency in the where Baltic experiences are of use to the Among briefly described cooperation areas use of public funds, as well as urban EaP region, a continuous attention should be development planning. Lithuania, for given to the following, among others: its part, assisted with the creation of • Supporting implementation of AAs a sustainable system of state registers and DCFTAs in Georgia, Moldova and and shared experiences of increasing Ukraine; energy efficiency and independence. • Detecting areas of mutual interests with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus and using them as a basis for strengthening were initiated in the best Baltic universities. democratic developments, especially For example, in 2015 Latvia allocated EUR respect for human rights; 40 000 EUR for 15 Ukrainian students to • Developing people-to-people contacts study the European Studies program at with focus on the youngest citizens of the University of Latvia. The same year, a the Baltic States and EaP countries. Since scholarship program in Estonia accounted young people in both regions have not of to nearly EUR 200 000.

8 Magazine can be accessed here: http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id668/UKR.pdf

42 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 course had a common Soviet experience, Vilnius square in Tbilisi and Tbilisi square thus, the risk of weakened ties arises. in Vilnius. Recently, a Lithuanian square was The implementation of visa-free travel opened in Kyiv. for Ukrainian and Georgian citizens is a part of solution; Development cooperation of the Baltic states • Contributing to the common security more or less covers similar areas. However, by using NATO as a platform for it is nothing close to the Visegrad Group (V4) initiatives such as the above-mentioned engagement, where supported projects have Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian battalion. to include at least three of the V4 countries. Support for the NATO integration of The application of a similar approach and interested EaP countries should be a joint fund for development cooperation provided; projects would avoid overlapping and would • to the EaP region. using success stories of the Baltic states efficiently increase the Baltic States’ support whenImproving arguing communication, for pro-European first, reforms by As long as the Baltic states and the EaP and geopolitical direction, and second, countries’ cooperation is dominated by by informing local populations about the bilateral initiatives, the hypothesis that EU support to the EaP region and raising their actions in the EaP region have a role public awareness about the actions of in strengthening the Baltic states as a region their respective governments; • Creating a multi-layered cooperation, developments within the EaP countries which would not rely on the activities docannot have be an confirmed. effect on Of the course, Baltic any States, positive as of the Baltic and EaP NGOs, but involve they increase the perception of safety in inter-governmental/parliamentary/ their neighbourhood. But it is in times of party cooperation. Bigger challenges instability, for example, after the emergence arise when aiming to change the mind- of Ukrainian-Russian war, when Baltic set of EaP political elites. Paradoxically, states lean towards each other, assess their most resources are directed towards joint capacities and advocate within the already advanced EaP society. EU and NATO for greater support. It can be concluded that, despite existing competition, The ultimate advice is to accept the EaP the Baltic States have a strong tendency to countries as equal partners able to contribute to the development of the Baltic States. For This pattern should prevail in the future. example, Ukrainian experiences are of great stick together in the most difficult times. use for increasing the Baltic States’ resilience to Russian propaganda and modern unconventional warfare. Furthermore, not all of the Baltic experiences are applicable to Dovilė Šukytė is a Policy Analyst at the Eastern Europe the EaP region. They often need revision and Studies Center in Vilnius. She also serves as a Steering adaptation to current realities. Therefore, an Committee Member of the Eastern Partnership Civil open mind when it comes either to bilateral Society Forum. Previously, Šukytė was a Research Fellow or regional cooperation is essential. for the New European Democracies Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Conclusions D.C. Her research interests include Russian foreign policy as well as democratization and reform in the The links between the Baltic States and the Eastern Partnership countries, among other issues. EaP countries are strong. The testaments of existing friendships are such initiatives as

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 43 THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION OF UKRAINE WITH THE EU

Prof. Dr Olga Brusylovska Chair of the Department of International Relations, Odessa National University

The main goal of this paper is to analyse cross-border cooperation (CBC) of Ukraine with the EU in order to present a set of ideas and activities, which turned the EU into a key actor of multi-level cooperation. The main research questions are the following: researching the aims of cross-border cooperation of the EU and Ukraine; analyses of the EU’s CBC politics in the areas of fighting corruption and bringing multilateralism and transparent politics to Ukraine; researching the example of the EUBAM as the EU experience in the sphere of CBC.

The Aims of Cross-Border bilateral CBC between the new EU member- Cooperation of the EU and Ukraine states and Eastern Partnership countries, in particular Ukraine, have been introduced The policies of enlargement are a success since the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. story of the EU, which should be continued. They seek to maintain existing links in the The last accession of Romania and Bulgaria areas of human contacts, cultural exchanges, brought the EU to the Ukrainian border and trade and seasonal migration. The role of raised new direct concerns, such as building CBC in regional/spatial development is a deep sustainable democracy, supporting stipulated by its ability to mobilise and an inclusive and sustainable economic growth, strengthening the Eastern regional border areas and to join the resources of dimension and providing mechanisms and borderefficiently regions use of the neighbouring existing potential countries of instruments to support these objectives. The EU’s approach to a cross-border cooperation to foster co-operation within trans-border (CBC) politics has a main goal to bring regions.to find solutions to common problems and multilateralism and transparent politics to Ukraine as a part of its neighbouring One must understand that in many aspects strategy. the EU member-states are no longer individual actors. In terms of communitarian The core policy objectives of the EU policies, competences have been cross-border cooperation are to support transferred to the institutions, including the sustainable development along both sides Commission (such as movement of goods, of the EU’s external borders, to reduce services, persons and capital, as well as differences in living standards and to other common policies). Despite general address the challenges and opportunities policy implications, there are psychological following the EU enlargement or otherwise barriers of internal political thinking about arising from the geographic proximity of it. Security, democracy, human rights, illegal cross-border regions. Different modes of migration etc. related to the Republic of

44 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 Moldova and Ukraine became new challenges of values by the neighbour countries are for the EU as well as it had previously been valued with economic advantages. Political for Romania. Despite the fact that ENP does interests include political cooperation and not give a European perspective to the dialogue (comprising of human rights and new neighbours, it does not establish any “ban” for this process in the future. This the goals of a free and democratic society reforms and progress towards andpartnership a functioning is orientated economy at achievingorientated first to the convergence of values by the EU model. The support granted by the «the neighbour countries are EU would also compensate the “adverse” valued with economic advantages (collateral) effect of its extension on trade agreements, trans-border cooperation etc. (GSP +, visa liberalisation agreements, autonomous preferences etc.).1 of security and foreign policy, cooperation in Poland and Romania are the most interested justicegood governance), and home affairs cooperation as well inas thecultural field countries in this dimension. They could cooperation and cross-border cooperation. accept the responsibility of sharing the task of assessing, planning, and enforcing those technical aid to the South-West border Sea Region and second in the Baltic region. regionsThe EU isof a keyUkraine donor (Odesa, giving financial Chernivtsi, and Thepolicies assistance at the border, of all European first of all countriesin the Black in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Zakarpattya, and Volyn oblasts). In 1998-2002, the European Commission through the TACIS CBC twothis fieldneighbour will be spaces very much - in terms welcomed. of values, The Programme granted to Ukraine 22.5 million waydifferences and means between of living the specific- are a weightcommon of Euros3. The CBC Programmes 2007-2013, in ground for encouraging and developing which Ukraine’s involvement was approved in 2008 reached up to: 1) Hungary Slovakia- Romania-Ukraine: € 68.640 million; 2) andany emergingdivergent conflicts.positions Atare the less same probable time, Romania-Ukraine-Moldova: € 126.718 toas theappear differences or escalade disappeared, and could the be conflicts solved million; 3) Poland-Belarus-Ukraine: € by diplomatic means. Another axiom of 186.201 million; 4) The Black Sea CBC Sea democracy states that democratic states basin programme: € 17.306 million.4

The ENP was updated in 2011, partly in thearrive other very2 but hard have to directthe diplomatic conflicts, tools do not to response to the Arab Spring. In addition to fightsolve andthose do disputes. not use This violence is the one theoretical against supporting the Euro-Mediterranean and grounds of the ENP. That is why reforms Eastern Partnerships as set out above, CBC and progress towards the convergence in the Neighbourhood also complements

1 org.ua/pics/content/4/1184149091_ans.doc access: 7 November 2016] 2 J.M.I. Chifu, Owen, The How Eastern Liberalism Dimension Produces of the Democratic European Neighbourhood Peace “International Policy: Security”, A Romanian 1994, approach Vol.19 (2), [http://www.ieac. p.93-94. 3 European Neighbourhood Policy. Country Report. Ukraine. Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 12.5.2004,

4 Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008. Progress Report: Ukraine. Commission Staff Work- ingSEC Document, (2004) 566, Brussels, COM (2004) 23/04/2009, 373 final. Sec (2009) 515/2.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 45 other important regional or sub-regional For the period 2014-20, a total of 12 land- initiatives including the Northern border and 1 sea-crossing programmes Dimension, Black Sea Synergy and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. CBC in basin programmes. Among land-border the European Neighbourhood from 2014 programmeswill be financed, there asare wellsuch asprogrammes four sea- onwards builds on experience of planning as “Poland/Belarus/Ukraine”, “Hungary/ and implementing CBC in the European Slovakia/Romania/Ukraine”, and “Romania/ Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine”. These programmes are more or (ENPI) in the period of 2007-2013. It also less identical, but the list of their priorities draws on experience with CBC within the EU does not help to understand why their useful under the European Territorial Co-operation effect is so small. From our point of view, it programmes and CBC between Member becomes clearer if we look at the problem through the theory of transparency; in fact, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, it is exactly the absence of transparency that andStates under and older IPA instruments beneficiaries such under as PHARE, the distinguishes Ukraine from the EU member- TACIS and Meda. states.

CBC from 2014 is included in the European Transparency studies are very popular Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) regulation and important in the EU today. The general covering the period 2014-2020. Within the concept of local government transparency general ENP policy context, CBC has an incorporates a host of distinct forms of essential role to play, distinct from other information pertaining to actions taken forms of cooperation by virtue of operating by local government. However, according to Gregory Porumbescu, the types of external border, and drawing on funding information publicly disclosed by local fromfor the both benefit external of bothand sidesinternal of headings the EU’s governments, often in accordance with of the EU budget. CBC contributes to the various legal obligations, do not necessarily overall ENI objective of progress towards lead to increased availability of government ‘an area of shared prosperity and good information that the public views as relevant. neighbourliness’ between EU Member Rather, merely adhering to legal obligations States and their neighbours. To advance this for disclosure is, in itself, unlikely to be goal, based on reviews and evaluation of CBC under ENPI, CBC under the ENI will have 3 greater responsiveness and trust in local overarching strategic objectives: promote government.sufficient for obtainingAs such, goalsefforts of engenderingto enhance economic and social development in regions public disclosure must be supplemented by on both sides of common borders; address attempts to ensure that the transparency common challenges in environment, public policies of local governments disclose health, safety and security; promotion the types of information that the public of better conditions and modalities for deems relevant, to improve the chances ensuring the mobility of persons, goods and of the general public accessing and using capital. Each programme must contribute to the information afforded to them. It is only at least one of the strategic objectives.5 by ensuring the general public accesses government information that we can then

5 Programming document for EU support to ENI Cross-Border Cooperation (2014-2020), European Commission

6 G.A. Porumbescu, Using Transparency to Enhance Responsiveness and Trust in Local Government: Can It Work? “State[https://eeas.europa.eu/.../cbc_2014-2020_programming_document_en.pdf and Local Government Review”, 2015, Vol. 47 (3), p. 208. access: 7 November 2016]

46 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 hope to see greater responsiveness and trust and establishing a new customs regime by in local government.6 Ukraine and Moldova on 3rd March 2006

EUBAM as the Main Success in the multilateral cooperation under the EU’s Ukraine-EU CBC sponsorship.became the first Despite example the ofagreements such successful that existed at that time between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the initiation a key cross-border challenge. The EU of the demarcation processes by a joint supportsThe fight bilateral, against regional organised cross-border crime is Commission, and also the drafts of bilateral and international cooperation with third countries in improving the prevention of and agreements, there were some difficulties onfight combating against organisedall sorts of crime, organised corruption crime, Ukraine and Moldova and terrorism. Specific emphasis should be are requested to adapt smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, counterfeited «their rules at the border including illicit trafficking of human beings, to the European standards for contraband. Close cooperation at the local controlling persons and goods. andgoods, regional firearms level and between stolen vehicleslaw-enforcement or other bodies and other competent authorities on both sides of the EU’s external borders will be when establishing effective communication. a valuable complement to cooperation at the Only for an illustrative purpose and as a national level.7 matter of example, we would mention: “joint control posts” in the separatist One of the tangible successes in the Ukraine- EU relations is fruitful cooperation on Novodnestrovsk Power Plant; territorial border and customs-related matters in the disputesregion; borderin the guardsdemarcation conflicts Commission; near the Ukraine – EU - Moldova triangle. The EU Palanka border management etc.8 Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) is probably the best and The customs and border dialogue between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine border management. On the other hand, it is has entered a new phase after the failed anthe expensive most efficient exercise reform that tool proved in the the field ability of attempt in September 2001 to establish of the EU to set and organise a big mission joint Ukraine-Moldova control posts on the rather quickly. It should also be mentioned Ukrainian territory. Later customs dialogue that necessary political will had to be was focused on the reestablishment of joint created previously in both neighbouring control-posts, particularly on the separatist countries – the Republic of Moldova and segment of the common Moldova-Ukraine Ukraine in order to allow the operations on border (including, Kuchurgan-Pervomaiskoe their respective territories. and Kuchurgan-Novosavitskoe). This bilateral dialogue has been mediated since Launching the EU Border Assistance Mission 2003 by the EU.9 By that time, the President at the Ukraine-Republic of Moldova border of Moldova announced that German, British

7 Programming document for EU support to ENI Cross-Border Cooperation (2014-2020), European Commission

8 [https://eeas.europa.eu/.../cbc_2014-2020_programming_document_en.pdf access: 7 November 2016] 9 org.ua/pics/content/4/1184149091_ans.docOfficial site of EUBAM [http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what_we_do access: 7 November 2016] access: 7 November 2016] I. Chifu, The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Romanian approach [http://www.ieac.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 47 etc. customs had agreed to substitute or and border management matters to the observe on the ground the cross-border cooperation on readmission procedures and investigations. Ukraine. traffic between the Republic of Moldova and The EUBAM is a compromise of “international corruption, EUBAM strives to lead by customs control on the separatist segment example,As a contribution espouse the to most the fightprofessional against of the state boundary line of the Republic of standards in its daily work, and adhere of Moldova and Ukraine and assistance for strictly to the Mission’s core values. The an effective international mechanism of its Mission has appointed an anti-corruption monitoring …” as stated in a joint letter of advisor to work with its partners and the heads of the states from the Republic developed an Anti-Corruption Assistance of Moldova and Ukraine on 2nd of June Strategy to guide its approach, based on the 2005.10 EUBAM has no executive power and European principles of good governance, it cannot enforce legislation by itself, which namely: openness, participation, is prohibited even by its mandate. However, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. there is an observer at the border who may The main areas of assistance EUBAM ask for additional checks at the request provides in this regard are related to or upon the information of the respective regulatory framework, transparency and competent services. openness, audit and investigation, code of conduct, human-resource management, and Nonetheless, we would like to mention awareness raising and training. the collateral effects. First, it is the EU involvement on the ground and its presence in the region. It gave a better mission of the Republic of Moldova- knowledge of the situation and a more UkrainianThe first year’sborder record was encouraging, of the monitoring issues effective policy orientation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Second, it has Western stolen cars, chicken meat smuggling offeringlike illegal positive migration, statistics drugs,12 trafficking. Moreover, of and trust between the competent border the implementation of modern container authoritiessignificantly of improved both neighbour the communication countries. checking techniques proved fruitful in terms The third element to be mentioned is 41 of hunting guns and unmarked cigarettes. recommendations of the Needs Assessment and Recommendations Report (NARR) that Some points remain to be better guide the reform process after 2006.11 implemented. A new improvement is

Despite its actual technical role, the impact border guards. Training and expertise on modernisation of border authorities forneeded those in theinvolved efficiency at the of Ukraine/Moldovaborder – border of the Republic of Moldova is the most guards, police, and customs – should be relevant. It could also be envisaged to extend more extensive and targeted. Ukraine and or transfer this experience from customs Moldova are requested to adapt their rules

10 org.ua/pics/content/4/1184149091_ans.doc access: 7 November 2016] 11 I. Chifu, The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Romanian approach [http://www.ieac. pdf access: 7 November 2016] 12 EUBAM Annual Report [http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/EUBAM-Annual-Report-200506-ENG. pdf access: 7 November 2016] EUBAM Annual Report [http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/EUBAM-Annual-Report-200506-ENG.

48 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 at the border to the European standards for controlling persons and goods. The EU not forcibly reoriented from Transnistria in its term has been preparing the second toThe bypass EUBAM the proposed Transnistrian that import portion flows of theare phase of its monitoring mission in the larger Ukrainian-Mol¬dovan border. The presence framework of the Concept on ESDP missions of the EU mission on the border and the at the frontiers. The document envisaged Agreement on the exchange of information a new approach towards border security between the Customs Services of Ukraine challenges and risks brought forward by the and Moldova dated 16.11.2006 is used to eastward and southward expansion of the EU. in the region. organize the surveillance of all import flows centre of EUBAM was opened in Illichivsk Conclusions andIn July Odessa 2006, respectively, a new office the and staff analytical of the mission was increased by 40 persons, and “peripheral”, “rural”, “provincial” in the amount of 6 million EURO. EUBAM support conditionA new of regionalspatial cooperation paradigm network defines as wasCEC critical allocated in the additional creation of finances the Pre-Arrival in the something that is not necessarily structurally Information Exchange System (PAIES), weak, as well as “central position” is not which since April 2008 has given the inevitably linked with economic prosperity. customs services of Moldova and Ukraine a way by which they can share, quickly access, border areas’ development and is a means and coordinate information on imports and ofNowadays fostering CBC Ukraine’s is an efficientmove towards tool of the exports, thereby helping to tackle customs European integration. In this context, fraud and other illicit activities. EUBAM the role of cross-border cooperation in had a budget of €21 million (2011-13) and regional/spatial development is stipulated a staff of approximately 100 seconded and contracted staff mostly from EU member use the existing potential of border areas States, and more than 120 national staff of andby itsto join ability resources to mobilise of border and regions efficiently of Moldova and Ukraine.13 common problems and to foster cooperation However, the fundamental objective of this withinneighbouring trans-border countries regions. to find solutions to cooperation – effective border assistance and tackling with the challenges of TMR Transparency has long been considered unrecognized status – cannot have been a cornerstone of good governance. It achieved without the settlement of the can improve decision-making, impede Transnistrian problem. The EU is interested corruption, enhance accountability, and in neutralizing a grey un-transparent zone foster a more informed and understanding in the shape of a breakaway republic. One citizenry. When taken together, the of the EU priorities remains establishing should culminate in more responsive and Moldova, including what goes through ports trustworthyvaried benefits public of organizations. enhanced transparency Therefore, incontrol Ukraine, over such freight as Odessa traffic and connectedIllichivsk. The to EU’s recent attempts in Ukraine to enhance main priority for the EU in the resolution transparency through all instruments (the of Transnistria is ensuring stability and Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, regional security near its external borders. older instruments such as PHARE, TACIS and

13

Official site of EUBAM [http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what_we_do access: 7 November 2016] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 49 have generally been welcomed. Meda, and specific initiatives like EUBAM) Prof. Dr Olga Brusylovska is a Chair of the Department of International Relations, Odessa Mechnikov National For better CBC cooperation of the EU and Ukraine the next steps are crucially University. A member of editorial staff of “ONU Herald” important: 1) formulating clear positions (Odessa), and an electronic journal “Rhetoric and of the EU in the sensitive areas in order to communication” (Sofia). Scientific interests: foreign avoid misuse and misinterpretation of the policy and transformation of the post-communist EU goals, values and interests, in particular: countries. 90 publications in academic journals in stress on consolidation of democratic Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland (including, “Systemic institutions and rule of law, and solution of Transformation of the Region Eastern Europe (1989- 2004)”. Saarbrücken, 2016. 328 p.).

initiativesregional conflicts on the on basisthe basis of ofthe territorial EUBAM experience;integrity; 2) 3) continuous stronger support specific to regionalUkraine

corruption and transparency growing. in the areas of border management, fighting

50 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 NORTH AMERICA CHALLENGES: NEW PROSPECTIVES FOR THE REGION?

Iryna Bochar Open Ukraine Foundation

This article is aimed to analyse the most prominent and essential political, economic and security trends of the last 20 years in this region, as well as to forecast further developments based on election promises of the President- elect of the United States of America, the key country in the region. Attention is also paid to the possible influence North American regional trends might have on world politics, economics and security in the next several years.

Today, in the time of increased political region like no other. The countries generally turbulence the world is facing, the North agreed on efforts to manage climate change American region is considered, fair enough, and environment challenges, committed to as a key region in the international political deeper regional and global cooperation as well as strengthening regional security and that in the early 2000s became a political oneaffairs. as muchThe North as it Americahad been has a geographical a definition by the U.S. President Barack Obama, one. Today, the North American region is a Canadiandefence. That Prime was Minister last stated Justin and Trudeau reaffirmed and complex political, economic and security President of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto at system. This system is not a monolithic the North American Leaders’ Summit in late one, but it is stable as within the last 20 June 2016.1 years it has been able to create necessary mechanisms and practices allowing to Basic Stability: Common Vision and take coordinated decisions and to become Strong Economic Ties a complex with unique environment that successfully reacts to current threats and The economies of the three countries challenges. are deeply interrelated and integrated, especially in key export/import areas, The United States of America, Canada and including vehicles, machinery and electrical Mexico remain three different countries – machinery, agriculture, mineral fuels, and with different interests, powers, and diverse plastics a.o. The countries enjoy stable and style of leadership. However, despite the differences, these countries came to an whole region, despite their different basic positionslong-lasting and trade asymmetric relations benefitinginvolvement: the American Leaders’ Summit in Waco, Texas – while the U.S. export to and import from onagreement being constructive in 2005 – at theand first joined annual together North Canada and Mexico reaches a partner share to present a unique security system and a

from 13% to 18%, Canada and Mexico

1 FACT SHEET: United States Key Deliverables for the 2016 North American Leaders’ Summit // The White House.

sheet-united-states-key-deliverables-2016-north-american-leaders Office of the Press Secretary. – June 29, 2016: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/fact-

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 51 partner share in export to the U.S. gets pre-NAFTA relations4. 2 goods and up 191% in services compared to around 76% and 81%, and in imports from The North American Free Trade Agreement U.S.the U.S.into – arounda stronger 53% andposition 47% respectively. with more has unlocked opportunities and has made Diversification of partnership puts the the trilateral relations deeper: more than for creating economic agenda in the region. 3 million American jobs (Made-in-America flexibility and broader negotiating capacity jobs) and over 140 000 small & medium- sized businesses have been supported due cooperation has been created by the North to cooperation within NAFTA5. Expanding AmericanA solid basisFree Trade for beneficialAgreement economic(NAFTA). trade opportunities via North American Free Trade Agreement became an important when NAFTA was signed, the U.S. exports precondition for ensuring stability in the As reported by the USTR Office, since 1993, region: by signing NAFTA Agreement and export categories – vehicles, machinery andto Canadaelectrical are machinery, up 179% inmineral goods fuels, (top Governments of the U.S., Canada and Mexico haveimplementing raised the thisbar for deal further efficiently, eradicative the intellectual property, including software and changes in trade and economic rules existing audio-visual,and plastics) andand 237%transportation); in services (travel,similar among the countries for more than 20 years. data has been demonstrated in imports Politically the NAFTA project remains sustainable, as it has been supported periofrom 3the. An U.S. even to Canada more –intensive up 165% dynamicin goods both by Democrats and by Republicans: remainsand 232% in inU.S.-Mexican services withintrade therelations: same that was President George H.W. Bush who negotiated the deal together with goods (top export categories – vehicles, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney machinerythe U.S. exports and electrical to Mexico machinery, are up 468% optical in and Mexican President Carlos Salinas and and medical instruments, mineral fuels, and signed it. But it was President Bill Clinton who contributed the most and passed the (travel, transportation, intellectual property, NAFTA bill in the Congress on November 17, includingplastics) andcomputer up around software) 196% since in services 1993; 1993, even with more Republicans voting for it (132) than Democrats (102), who

the U.S. imports from Mexico are up 638% in

2 Due to the World Bank data: the U.S. exports – to Canada worth US$ 279,990 million, with a partner share of 18.62 percent, to Mexico worth US$ 236,377 million, with a partner share of 15.72 percent; the U.S. imports – from Cana- da worth US$301,036 million, with a partner share of 13.05 percent, from Mexico worth US$ 297,500 million, with -

Canadaa partner exports share ofto 12.90the U.S. percent. worth US$[WITS: 312,131 World million, Integrated with Trade a partner Solution: share http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryPro of 76.66 percent. Canada imports from file/en/Country/USA/Year/2015/SummaryText]

Mexicothe U.S. exportsworth US$ to the 222,999 U.S. worth million, US$ with 309,110 a partner million, share with of a53,25 partner percent. share [WITS: of 81.18 World percent. Integrated Mexico Trade imports Solution: from http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CAN/Year/2015/SummaryText] -

3 the U.S. worth US$ 187,301 million, with a partners share of 47,39 percent. [WITS: World Integrated Trade Solu https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canadation: http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/MEX/Year/2015/SummaryText] 4 U.S.-Canada Trade Facts // Office of the United States Trade Representative. Executive Office of the President. – https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/mexico 5 U.S.-Mexico Trade Facts // Office of the United States Trade Representative. Executive Office of the President. –

agreement-naftaNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) // Office of the United States Trade Representative. Executive Office of the President. – https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-

52 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 supported the North American Free Trade – by creating regional semi-domestic Agreement Implementation Act.6 Despite some discussions over several provisions, level and by securing environment across including taxes and anti-dumping measures, economic rules within NAFTA on the first or slight scepticism over the free trade deals demonstrated even by then-Senator the negative Pacific and impact the Atlanticof steel and on thealuminium second Obama during the 2008 elections, the major level. Regardless of some difficulties such as support of NAFTA was kept. Discussions brought better solutions, and the President Obama became an advocate of free trade in Thus, economically the North Washington. American region has been put «under two-level barrier – by Based on positive experience and following creating regional semi-domestic economic rules within NAFTA on the Obama Administration committed the first level and by securing tobeneficial expand tradethe stability policy zone in theby starting region, environment across the Pacific and negotiations over and signing the Trans- the Atlantic on the second level.

4, 20167 as well as by negotiating since Pacificearly 2013 Partnership the Transatlantic (TPP) on Trade February and excess production on companies, workers Investment Partnership (T-TIP). While and trade in North America, the countries TPP addresses environmental challenges remain cooperative in solving sensitive issues both bilaterally and in trilateral a.o.), responds to newest global trade format pointing to ‘the fact that free trade developments(including wildlife (including trafficking, growing illegal fishingdigital also has to be fair trade’10. By keeping these economy) as well as upholds cutting-edge Agreements, the region will be saved from labour and environmental standards for the dramatic economic turbulence. workers8, T-TIP is aimed to increase access for Made-in-America goods & services to Leading by Example: The U. S. the European markets with a commitment Running the Region to unlock opportunities for business, farmers and workers as well as to keep high Guided by the belief of the strong U.S. standards of consumer protection9. leadership both globally and regionally, based on dynamic economy, strong military Thus, economically the North American power and American values, it is interesting region has been put under two-level barrier to look through the basic origins and

6 H.R. 3450 (103rd): North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act // Voting the Bill in the House. – https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/103-1993/h575 7 news/business-35480600 8 Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal signed in Auckland // BBC News. – February 4, 2016. – http://www.bbc.com/ – https://ustr.gov/tpp/ 9 The Trans-Pacific Partnership // Office of the United States Trade Representative. Executive Office of the President.-

10 TransatlanticRemarks by President Trade and Obama, Investment Prime Partnership Minister Trudeau (T-TIP) of // Canada, Office of and the President United States Peña TradeNieto Representative.of Mexico in North Execu tive Office of the President. – https://ustr.gov/ttip - American Leaders’ Summit Press Conference // The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. – June 29, 2016. – https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/30/remarks-president-obama-prime-minis ter-trudeau-canada-and-president-pe%C3%B1a UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 53 and enhanced technical capabilities to the region not only in terms of successful withstand cyber threats, as well as improved economicexpanding cooperation, tools defining but also the by agenda ensuring in the ability to recover from cyberattacks. In security as well as facing new challenges of regional format, the U.S., Canada and Mexico the modern complex world. are working within the Trilateral Cyber Experts Group led by foreign ministries and In line for keeping security issues among the intended to strengthen cooperation aimed main priorities as well as putting appropriate at ‘an open, interoperable, reliable, and spending in this regard, the U.S. is well secure Internet underpinned by the multi- positioned in supporting several regional stakeholder model of Internet governance’12. formats for successful security cooperation Moreover, the three countries continue with aimed to face pressing challenges and make their joint work in 2016/2017 UN Group of the environment in the region safe. In terms Governmental Experts, the G-20 as well as of regional cooperation that means focusing within the Organization of American States on homeland security, ensuring border supporting key cyber security objectives. security, improving security and inspections That speaks loudly that in the World Order at ports as well as strengthening screening procedures at airports. A good example establishing a special regime based on sovereign2.0 as defined obligations by Richard of the N. Haass,Governments before American Drug Dialogue held by the U.S. in and by creating ‘international agreements Octoberin this regard2016 to is create the firstan opportunity annual North for that encourage benign uses of cyberspace information exchange on drug trends as well and discourage mailing uses’13, the U.S. keeps as discussing regional tools to combat the leading and proposes several options for heroin and fentanyl crisis in the countries, safeguarding the region in this regard. including respectively health care protection in this regard.11 The three countries are As Obama Administration set a decisive also working with the private sector on policy over the climate change, a lot has implementing public awareness campaigns been done in this regard for the region. By maintaining the climate policy globally, the public in terms of this transnational including signing the Paris Agreement on human trafficking in order to educate as well as contributing to the UN Green information exchange between intelligence Climate Fund, the U.S. have taken important andchallenge. law enforcement The countries agencies. also benefited from domestic steps in this regard: increased solar power 20-fold and tripled the amount The U.S. also remains strong in facing of electricity produced from the wind since new challenges of the modern world, 2008, introducing new rules doubling fuel among others cyber security. By facing this transnational threat, the United States 2025, as well as set the plan to reduce the have expanded the partnership between amountefficiency of of carbon the cars dioxide in the Unitedemissions States from by governmental and private organizations the power plants. The example set by the U.S.

11 2016. – http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263847.htm 12 FACT North SHEET: American United Dialogue States onKey Drug Deliverables Policy // forU.S. the Department 2016 North of AmericanState, Office Leaders’ of the Spokesperson.Summit // The – White October House. 28,

sheet-united-states-key-deliverables-2016-north-american-leaders 13 HaassOffice ofRichard the Press N. World Secretary. Order – 2.0.June The 29, Case2016: for https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/fact- Sovereign Obligation // Foreign Affairs. – December 12, 2016. – https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/world-order-20

54 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 remains an example for other countries to the new political environment. That is not meet their obligations for the overall good. referred anymore as a global challenge: as In cooperation with Canada and Mexico, it was already proved within the last seven the U.S. proposed to amend the Montreal years, the U.S. can lead the world facing new Protocol to phase down production and challenges from the ISIS to Ebola and climate change. Moreover, the Obama Administration potent greenhouse gases.14 has also renewed the focus on the Western consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Hemisphere that put a measurable impact These vocal examples demonstrate the on regional security and prosperity. The ability of the U.S to propose in the proper changing political environment is basically way, to manage well and to support connected with domestic political processes, the neighbouring countries with more and the 2016 U.S. elections and their results opportunities in several areas facing new are the most vocal in this regard. jointly from a real platform and formats Trap for Trump: Strong Leadership forchallenges cooperation, efficiently, so as as to well deliver as to the benefit best Needed the U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, stating: The new U.S. Administration is put in a ‘America’ssolutions forgreatest the region.strength It is was not the defined example by complex situation of delivering the electoral of power, but the power of example’15. And promises by the President-elect and at more can be done on the trilateral level the same time taking further sound and for adapting the regional countries to the new challenges. The example in this regard on previous experience and having ‘the might be the Stakeholder Dialogue on bestbeneficial-for-the-region information possible to decisions make the based best North American Competitiveness held in decisions possible … for not flying blind’17. late September 2016 in Washington D.C. to The nominees for the Cabinet to be chaired create the opportunity for the private sector, by the President-elect Donald Trump look local government and civil society to share much different compared to the previous ideas aimed to increase competitiveness in Administrations and represent a business- the North America16. Such initiatives make oriented establishment with less governance the relations between the countries deeper experience and close ties with Wall Street and more comprehensive. and corporate America.18

The challenge for further cooperation in During the election campaign, the the region, delivering successful projects Presidential nominee from the Republicans and ensuring regional stability became Donald Trump was very generous with

14 See more: A Historic Commitment to Protecting the Environment and Reversing Climate Change // The White House. – Data as of December 17, 2016. – https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-record/climate 15 Building on Success. Opportunities for the Next Administration // By Joseph R. Biden, Jr. – Foreign Affairs. – Sep- tember/October 2016 Issue. – https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-08-07/building-suc- cess 16 - son. – September 29, 2016. – http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/262570.htm 17 Stakeholder Dialogue for the North American Leaders Summit // U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesper - Donald Trump taking intel briefings only once a week // By Eugene Scott and Jim Sciutto, CNN. – December 9, 18 Trump’s2016. – http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/09/politics/intelligence-briefings-trump/?sr=fbcnni121316intelli $6 Billion Cabinet: Mostly Men, Mostly White and Not Much Government Experience // Bloomberg. –De- cembergence-briefings-trump0132PMVideoVideo&linkId=32319863 15, 2016. – https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-trump-cabinet/

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 55 promises that were rapidly growing from 76 support American manufacturing and to in January 2016 to 282 before the elections in November 2016.19 Part of Trump’s good idea will place several challenges electoral rhetoric may undermine the key beforeprotect thethe U.S.new workers. Administration This at firstin making glance preconditions for stability in the region, this promise a success, mostly in terms including renegotiating the NAFTA deal and of changing the education system for the workers becoming well prepared for the replacing regional consultations by manufacturing at home.21 Moreover, in negotiatingpulling out bilateral the Trans-Pacific deals, constructing Partnership, a terms of regional stability such a step will wall along the border with Mexico, pulling create a different environment: without the out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, etc.. The only issue the President-elect will not proceed, and the vacuum of promised to continue supporting is cyber United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership security, and that will happen by assembling another strong player, most likely China. If a cyber review team, establishing training thatleadership is the case, in the the regionsecond willlevel be of filledsecuring by programs for government employees as well the North American region will not be as developing a cyber . as strong and sustainable as it is needed. Furthermore, the bilateral trade deals the In delivering the promises, the Trump President-elect intends to choose as the Cabinet members should stand committed main political tool, will also create fewer as well as get fast the necessary skills preconditions for regional cooperation, as for cooperating with the Congress to get well as will allow the countries to renew new decisions adopted. Regarding the the deal by less means and with smaller NAFTA renegotiations, the discussion has economic loss.22 already been started whether the only Building the ‘impenetrable, physical, tall, referring to the Article 2205 is enough or powerful, beautiful southern border wall’23 written notification to Canada and Mexico will become a hard task with major economic decision as the deal had been enacted and political risks for President-elect notablythe final by decision the Congress needs through a special the Congress NAFTA Trump, who has in fact already informed Implementation Act.20 the President of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto of such an intention. Such construction Trump’s promise of pulling out of the TPP Agreement correlates with his intention to human resources, but also leadership skills will require many technical, financial, and

19 ‘I will give you everything.’ Here are 282 of Donald Trump’s campaign promises. // The Washington Post. – No- vember 28, 2016. – https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/i-will-give-you-everything-here-are-282-of-don- ald-trumps-campaign-promises/2016/11/24/01160678-b0f9-11e6-8616-52b15787add0_story.html?utm_ter-

20 What would it take for Donald Trump to rip up NAFTA? // By Mark Gollom, CBC News. – June 30, 2016. – http:// www.cbc.ca/news/world/donald-trump-nafta-trade-1.3657673m=.3622ad33fc21 21 See more: Make America Make Again. Training Workers for the New Economy. // By Katherine S. Newman and Hella Winston. – Foreign Affairs. – January/February 2017 Issue – https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti- cles/2016-12-12/make-america-make-again 22 Instead of blanket trade agreements, Donald Trump wants to negotiate one-on-one with countries. // By Jenna Johnson, The Washington Post. – May 2, 2016. – https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/ wp/2016/05/02/instead-of-blanket-trade-agreements-donald-trump-wants-to-negotiate-one-on-one-with-coun-

23 Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech. // The New York Times. – September 1, 2016. – http://www. tries/?utm_term=.a3d7def76448

nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html?_r=0 56 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 both to negotiate with Mexico over terms President-elect Trump. Special relations, and conditions for cooperation in this regard so called ‘bromance’, between Obama and as well as to make this project a reality. Considering that nearly eight-in-ten Tramp visit in nearly 20 years paid by the Canadian supporters favour building a wall along the PrimeTrudeau Minister were outlined to the U.S. during in May the 2016 first26 state and Mexico border24, delivering this promise will be a key domestic issue in terms of getting on board the voters from the southern states summitreaffirmed in duringPeru in thelate last November meeting 2016 at the27. at the 2020 election campaign. Now,Asia-Pacific the Canadian Economic government Cooperation should leaders’ build a new type of relations with the U.S. by In August 2016, in the rush election season, managing the disagreements over the climate the U. S. Vice President Joe Biden told publicly change, NAFTA future, refugees’ policy as well several warnings over the future policy of as military spending and participation at the their successors. In VPOTUS’ summary of UN peacekeeping missions. what Obama Administration has done for the country and common success, he states The President of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto very clearly that it is ‘worth remembering looks more prepared to building constructive that our indispensable role in the world is not relations with the new U.S. Administration. inevitable’. According to his words, in case the Considering the hard election rhetoric new Administration decides to turn the policy delivered by that time GOP candidate Donald inward, the hard-earned progress within the Trump, including renegotiating the NAFTA last seven years could be well squandered.25 deal, constructing the wall on the U.S.- Generally, the Obama Administration keeps Mexican border as well as reconsidering supporting the transition team in keeping long- the immigration policy, the President Peña Nieto has started with new nominations in up to the President-elect Donald Trump. his Cabinet for making the cooperation with term formats strong, but the final decision is The Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau Administration will begin operating. A good has publicly stated his readiness to cooperate examplethe U.S. efficientin this regard from theis the first appointment days the new of with the new U.S. Administration. But that Mr. Luis Videgaray, the former Finance Minister change might be not easy considering a very and a close ally of the President, to the position close relationship between the President 28. It Obama and the Prime Minister Trudeau as was Mr. Videgaray who organised the meeting well as several differences in views existing ofwith the Mr. Minister Trump of for Foreign the President Affairs of Peña Mexicо Nieto in between the Prime Minister Trudeau and August 2016, and it will be Mr. Videgaray, who

24 Trump voters want to build the wall, but are more divided on other immigration questions. // By John Gramlich. – Pew Research Center. – November 29, 2016. – http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/29/trump-voters- want-to-build-the-wall-but-are-more-divided-on-other-immigration-questions/ 25 Building on Success. Opportunities for the Next Administration // By Joseph R. Biden, Jr. – Foreign Affairs. – Septem- ber/October 2016 Issue. – https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-08-07/building-success 26 President Obama Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to the White House // The White House. – March 10, 2016. – https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/10/president-obama-welcomes-prime-minister-jus- tin-trudeau 27

28 LuisHow Videgaray,We’d Like ToKey Remember to Donald ThatTrump Bromance Visit, Named // By Mexico Kenny ForeignYum. – The Minister. Huffington – The PostWall Canada.Street Journal. – November – January 20, 4,2016. 2017. – http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/11/20/how-wed-like-to-remember-_n_13114654.html – http://www.wsj.com/articles/luis-videgaray-key-to-donald-trump-visit-named-mexico-foreign-minis - ter-1483556976

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (6), 2016 57 will become responsible for relations with the In terms of economy, there are slight most important political ally and the largest chances for a changing environment due economic and trade partner for Mexico. to the possible cancelation of the TPP deal. At the same time, chances remain high for Conclusion keeping basic stability in the region, because expanded trade opportunities via NAFTA The North American region enjoys strong raised the bar for any eradicated changes political cooperation based on common and any reconsideration of current rules is values shared by the regional countries and weighed down by legal procedures. strong economic ties established within the Several challenges, including ensuring cyber security, climate change, further cooperation decades, which are beneficial for the regional and stability in the region depend on the decisions the President-elect Donald Trump expanded trade opportunities will take in delivering his new policy based via NAFTA raised the bar for both on his electoral promises and on the «any eradicated changes and any experience his Cabinet will bring to the reconsideration of current rules is White House. The most interesting in this weighed down by legal procedures regard is how strong the current political system is for balancing basic rules with new

region in the future. players. The new political environment set initiatives to be beneficial for the whole up after the latest elections in the United States has created new challenges the region has to face further. Iryna Bochar is a Project Manager at the Open Ukraine Foundation (since 2011), where she is The political cooperation in the region is currently working on the annual 10th Kyiv Security more likely to develop smoothly as the Forum – one of the leading platforms in Ukraine as three countries share common values and well as in Central and Eastern Europe for high-level have many formats for discussion, including discussions on international security issues. Iryna the North American Leaders Summit as has M.A. in International Relations (Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University) and is working on her issues resolved and for threats overcome, PhD thesis on the security system in North America. forwell making as specific the region platforms safe and for gettingprosperous key successfully.

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