Citizen Perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan

David Deng and Rajab Mohandis

May, 2021 Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 2

Photo Credits:

UNMISS / Eric Kanalstein South Sudan National Dialogue Facebook and Twitter pages - @SSNatDialogue Creative Commons Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 3

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the many citizens of South Sudan and its international partners who graciously shared their time and their views on the National Dialogue process. We would also like to thank Victoria Jacob and Alfred Uliny for their support with research activities in Yambio and Wau. This study was made possible by financial and technical support from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The views in this report are those of the authors and the people they interviewed and do not necessarily represent the views of the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF), Detcro or USIP.

About the Authors

David Deng is a human rights lawyer who has been conducting research and advocacy in South Sudan since 2008. Deng’s work has touched on a range of issues, including citizen perspectives on peace processes and transitional justice; land policy and housing, land and property (HLP) rights; and security and justice provision at the local level.

Rajab Mohandis is the Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance (ORG) based in Juba, South Sudan. Mohandis is a signatory to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and represents civil society in the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC), an oversight mechanism of the peace agreement. He is also the coordinator of the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF). Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 4

Acronyms

ARCSS Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan CHRSS Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan CNHPR Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement HLRF High-Level Revitalization Forum IDP Internally Displaced Person IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development NUF Necessary Unified Forces POC Protection of Civilian Site R-ARCSS Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan R-JMEC Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission R-TGONU Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLM-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition SSCSF South Sudan Civil Society Forum SSOA South Sudan Opposition Alliance SSTV South Sudan Television R-TGONU Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity UN United Nations Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 5

Contents

Acknowledgements 3 About the Authors 3 Acronyms 4 Introduction 6 Context 8 Overview of the Conflict 8 Past Dialogue Processes 10 Perspectives on the National Dialogue 12 Initiation and Restructuring 12 Awareness and Sources of Information 18 Horizontal Inclusivity 20 Vertical Inclusivity 22 Quality of Citizen Participation 26 Complementarity with IGAD Peace Process 30 A Politically Tumultuous National Conference 36 Conclusion and Recommendations 40 Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 6

Introduction

On 14 December 2016, President Salva Kiir announced plans to launch a National Dialogue to “save the country from disintegration and usher in a new era of peace, stability and prosperity.” In the eyes of many, the timing, just one day before the third anniversary of the civil war, could not have been worse. The outbreak of violence earlier that year and the flight of the opposition leader, Dr. Riek Machar, to the Democratic Republic of Congo and onwards to South Africa seemed to be a fatal blow to the peace agreement. War had spread to every region of the country. A month before the President’s announcement, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, had warned of potential genocide in Yei and two months after the announcement a conflict- induced famine would be declared in southern Unity. South Sudan was arguably at its lowest point.

Unsurprisingly, the President’s announcement was met with considerable skepticism from both South Sudanese and the government’s international partners. People viewed it as an attempt by the President and his inner circle to undermine the peace process and to confuse and mislead the public about their commitment to peace. They described it as a ‘monologue’ since key opposition parties, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), refused to participate. But to its proponents, the National Dialogue was an attempt to save a nation that was rapidly devolving into chaos. They had given up on a regional mediation effort that was beset with problems and argued that it was time to pursue homegrown solutions to the conflict.

Fast forward to November 2020. The world is in the grip of the Covid-19 pandemic. The peace process in South Sudan is faltering once again. After more than seventeen months of what was meant to be an eight-month pre-transitional period, the parties had finally managed to establish the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) in February 2020.1 However, the governance vacuum, coupled with political maneuvering among elites at the national level, has contributed to a sharp increase in subnational violence in several parts of the country. The humanitarian impacts are further exacerbated by some of the worst flooding in recent memory. Hundreds of thousands are displaced, and the worst-hit populations have been pushed to the brink of famine.2

In Juba, the National Dialogue was preparing for its final activity—a national conference that would bring together 518 delegates from each of the 79 counties in South Sudan and from the contested border area of Abyei. At the national conference, members of the National Dialogue shared what they had learned from dozens of grassroots consultations and three regional dialogues conducted between May 2017 and August 2019.

1 The President, First Vice-President, four Vice-Presidents and ministers assumed their positions in February and March 2020. Nine out of 10 state governors were appointed in June and July 2020 and the final governor (Upper Nile) was appointed in January 2021. At this writing, the Revitalized Transitional National Legislature has yet to be appointed. 2 Sam Mednick, Floods, fighting, famine: Inside South Sudan’s triple crisis, The New Humanitarian (8 Feb. 2021), available athttps://www. thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/2/8/floods-fighting-famine-south-sudan-crisis. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 7

In all, the National Dialogue spoke to some 20,000 people across the country and in the diaspora. The discussions are summarized in twenty reports, available on the National Dialogue website, as well as video and audio recordings that are being stored by the National Dialogue for future reference.

Among the resolutions of the national conference were the adoption of “a mixed federal system with full political, administrative, and financial powers to the states and restricts federal interference in state affairs,” and that land shall be “owned by the communities and …managed by various levels of government in accordance with the law.” Perhaps most controversially, in their cover note to the reports, the National Dialogue co-chairs place the blame for the country’s problems squarely on the shoulders of the political leadership, calling upon the President, First Vice-President and four Vice- Presidents to stand aside in elections at the end of the transitional period.

At this writing, the National Dialogue is in a quagmire. On the one hand, it has generated a wealth of information and recommendations that have a democratic legitimacy that the peace agreement lacks. On the other hand, the very government that is meant to implement these recommendations is comprised of political leaders who, for various reasons, are highly skeptical of its outcomes. The ability of the proponents of the National Dialogue to bridge this gap will determine whether the initiative will have a lasting impact on the conflict or whether it will be forgotten like so many past reconciliation initiatives.

This report provides an overview of the National Dialogue in South Sudan with a focus on citizen perceptions of the process. Data was compiled through a combination of in-person and virtual interviews and focus groups conducted at various points between June 2020 and April 2021.3 Overall, researchers spoke to a total of 60 people in four locations: Juba, Wau, Yambio and Nairobi.4 After an overview of the context, including an examination of past dialogue processes in South Sudan, the report discusses the initiation of the National Dialogue, people’s awareness of the process, inclusivity both in a horizontal and vertical sense, quality of citizen participation, complementarity with the peace process, and the how the national conference and its outcomes have been received. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for how to support the implementation of the National Dialogue’s resolutions and lessons learned for other participatory processes moving forward.

3 Researchers conducted 40 semi-structured interviews (8 in Juba, 18 in Wau, 12 in Yambio, 2 in Nairobi) and 8 focus group discussions (4 in Wau and 4 in Yambio). The focus groups were relatively small with just four participants in each group, except for one of the focus groups in Wau which had just two participants. 4 While the three locations in South Sudan do provide a range of views from the national and subnational level, they cannot be said to represent the full diversity of South Sudan. One of the main criterions used to select the locations was the strength of researcher networks and the availability of secure internet facilities that would allow for virtual interviews to be done in a safe, effective and ethically responsible manner in the context of a global pandemic. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 8

Context

Overview of the Conflict

The war in South Sudan has passed through at least four major phases since the initial outbreak of violence in Juba in December 2013. The first phase was characterized by intense conflict concentrated in the Greater Upper Nile region as forces allied to the Government and the SPLM-IO fought for control of territory. The fighting subsided somewhat with the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015, though violence persisted in parts of the conflict zone.5

The second phase of the conflict started in July 2016, when violence broke out for a second time in Juba and spread throughout much of Greater Equatoria and parts of Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal, including the towns of Wau and Yambio. This phase followed a similar trajectory to the first, starting with a period of intense violence after which fighting reduced and war fatigue began to set in. From this point on, Government forces enjoyed a distinct military advantage and opposition groups became increasingly fragmented with limited capability to sustain military operations.6 In December 2017, the warring parties and other stakeholders again entered into political dialogue under the auspices of the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) and quickly signed a cessation of hostilities agreement that same month.7 The HLRF culminated in the signing of a permanent ceasefire in Khartoum in June 2018 and the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in Addis in September 2018.8

5 Intergovernmental Authority for Development, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) (August 2015), available at https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_south_sudan_conflict.pdf. 6 Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan (12 Apr. 2018), available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ S_2019_301_E.pdf; see also, D.K. Deng, Compound Fractures: Political formations, armed groups and regional mediation in South Sudan, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (10 Dec. 2018), available at https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/compound-fractures-political-formations- armed-groups-and-regional-mediation-in-south-sudan. 7 IGAD, Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, Addis Ababa (21 Dec. 2017), available at https:// igad.int/attachments/article/1731/1712%2021%20Signed%20CoH%20Agreement.pdf. 8 Khartoum Declaration of Agreement Between Parties of the Conflict in South Sudan (Jun. 2018) (stating that “A permanent ceasefire is hereby declared throughout the Republic of South Sudan and shall enter into force within seventy two (72) hours of the signing of this Declaration of Agreement”), available at https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/khartoum-declaration-agreement-between-parties-conflict-south-sudan; Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (12 Sep. 2018), available at https://igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office/1950-signed-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the- conflict-in-south-sudan. 9 Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to Resolution 2418 (2018) (Apr. 2019), available at https://reliefweb.int/ sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_301_E.pdf. 10 See Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/56, para. 61, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/A_HRC_43_56.pdf. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 9

The signing of the R-ARCSS marked the start of the third phase of the conflict in which a few pockets of violence persisted, mostly between Government forces and non-signatories to the agreement.9 Despite improving conditions throughout much of the conflict zone, the parties struggled to implement key tasks required under the R-ARCSS, and what was meant to be an eight- month pre-transitional period dragged on for nearly a year and a half. A worrying trend towards increasing intercommunal conflict also began to emerge. In its February 2020 report to the Human Rights Council, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS) noted a 192 per cent increase in casualties from intercommunal conflict between February and May 2019 as compared with the same period in 2018.10

The conflict is now in its fourth phase marked by the establishment of the R-TGONU, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and worsening economic conditions. The partial formation of the R-TGONU came after the parties agreed, under great pressure from the region and the international community, to revert to the preexisting 10 states with three new “administrative areas” and to allow the screening, training and redeployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) to continue into the transitional period.11 As of this writing, the parties have fully reconstituted the executive branch at the national and state levels but have yet to reconstitute the national or state legislatures.

9 Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to Resolution 2418 (2018) (Apr. 2019), available at https://reliefweb.int/ sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_301_E.pdf. 10 See Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/56, para. 61, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/A_HRC_43_56.pdf. 11 When the initial pre-transitional period ended in May 2019 without the formation of the new unity government and with transitional security arrangements still unimplemented, the parties were given a six-month extension to complete the remaining pre-transitional tasks. That six-month extension also elapsed without the parties fulfilling their obligations, at which point they were given an additional 100 days that ended on 22 February 2020. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 10

The delays in implementing the agreement and the consequent governance vacuum at the state and local levels have precipitated declines in the security situation. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) documented the killing of 2,421 civilians in 2020, more than double the number from the previous year. According to UNMISS, this subnational violence “involves civil defence groups and/or community-based militias with a level of organization, capable of conducting planned and coordinated military-style attacks, independently as well as with the support of members of Government or opposition forces.”12 There has also been a resurgence of violence in parts of Central Equatoria between government and SPLM-IO forces and non-signatories to the R-ARCSS in April 2020, signaling the breakdown of a ceasefire previously mediated by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome.13 Two-and-a-half years after the signing of the R-ARCSS, the prospects for lasting peace through the R-ARCSS framework hang in the balance.

Past Dialogue Processes

Southern Sudan’s history prior to independence in 2011 was punctuated by a number of political dialogues that sought to create consensus among political actors on matters of public interest. The first such dialogue was the 1947 Juba Conference convened by the British colonial authority to consult Southern Sudanese about retaining Northern and Southern Sudan in a single colonial administration, though it was already a foregone conclusion at the time as the British had already decided against a separate administrative future for Southern Sudan.14 In 1994, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) convened a national convention in Chukudum, Eastern Equatoria, to discuss the establishment of a civilian administration and other issues of concern regarding the Movement. In the run-up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the SPLM and other armed groups allied to Khartoum began a ‘South-South dialogue’ to address some of the issues that divided them and to promote southern unity. The All Political Parties Conference held in Juba in 2010 had a similar objective of consolidating the position of Southern Sudanese political actors on the remaining tasks for the interim period, particularly the referendum on self-determination. Indeed, the referendum itself can be seen as a form of public consultation, if not dialogue, on a single issue of national importance. With the exception of the referendum, each of these examples differs from the National Dialogue in that they focused on political elites and did not aim to engage the population in broad-based dialogue.

12 Annual Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians: January – December 2020, UNMISS Human Rights Division (31 Mar. 2021), available at https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNMISS%20annual%20brief_violence%20against%20civilians_2020.pdf. 13 Dimo Silva Aurelio, Fighting Raises Tension Between Government, Rebel Force in South Sudan, Voice of America (VOA) (29 Apr. 2020), available at https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/fighting-raises-tension-between-government-rebel-force-south-sudan; 14 Douglas H. Johnson, Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought, Rift Valley Institute (RVI) (2014), p. 6 (stating that the Juba conference was the “The first time that the collective opinion of southern Sudanese was canvassed concerning a national political issue”), available at https://www.cmi.no/file/2876-RVI---Research-Papers---Federalism-in-the-history-of-South-Sudanese-political-thought.pdf. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 11

After South Sudan’s independence in 2011, political actors began to consider more seriously a bottom-up national dialogue process that would aim to reconcile South Sudanese and address the legacies of successive civil wars in the country.15 As with the National Dialogue, each of these experiments was politically contested; but unlike the National Dialogue, none managed to see their plans through to completion. First, in November 2012, then Vice-President Dr. Riek Machar announced plans for the establishment of a National Reconciliation Committee that he had been developing with a Swiss-based organization called Initiatives of Change. 16Viewing the initiative as a political threat, the President issued two decrees in April 2013 dissolving the committee and establishing his own Committee on National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (CNHPR), led by two prominent church leaders, Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul and Bishop Paride Taban. The CNHPR had developed plans for a bottom-up dialogue process across the country and began a number of preliminary activities when its role was usurped by the National Dialogue.

This history of political dialogues and incomplete reconciliation initiatives demonstrates the complexities of dialogue processes in a conflict-affected country such as South Sudan. On the one hand, political actors fear that they may release a Pandora’s box of grievances among communities by opening the space for dialogue and reconciliation, particularly around politically consequential moments such as Southern Sudan’s referendum on self-determination. On the other hand, there is a political incentive to be seen as the champion of such processes in that it presents an opportunity to cast oneself as a peacemaker and statesperson. One common thread among all of these examples of reconciliation initiatives is the difficulty that they face implementing their resolutions. The SPLM never managed to establish an effective civilian administration after the Chukudum Convention, nor did it open political space for opposition parties as it pledged to do in the All Political Parties Conference. The National Dialogue has now become the latest initiative to confront this challenge.

15 Despite a provision in the CPA in which the SPLM and the Government of Sudan pledge “to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace building process,” no serious efforts were made in this regard during the six- year interim period following the signing of the CPA. See Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army (9 Jan. 2005), available at http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/ General/cpa-en.pdf. 16 The Council of Ministers authorized funding for the initiative in January 2013 and the Committee was established with plans to launch the program in Juba on 18 April 2013. See Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, Emile Yakani Taban and Nhial Gogok, Reconciliation Without Regret: National Reconciliation and Healing in South Sudan, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Policy & Practice Brief No. 27 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.accord.org.za/images/downloads/brief/ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-27.pdf. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 12

Perspectives on the National Dialogue

Initiation and Restructuring

The National Dialogue was announced on 14 December 2016, a day before the third anniversary of the civil war. South Sudan was arguably at its most desperate point. With the de facto collapse of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict (ARCSS) in July 2016, the opposition was fragmented, and government forces were engaged in intense counter-insurgency operations in various parts of the country, including Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and Western Equatoria. A little more than a month before the announcement, Adama Dieng, then UN Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of Genocide, had warned of potential genocide following a trip to Yei where fighting between government and opposition forces was ongoing.17 Two months after the announcement of the National Dialogue, a conflict-induced famine would be declared in two counties in southern Unity.18 Meanwhile, the international community had tacitly endorsed the detention of the leader of the SPLM-IO, Riek Machar, in South Africa, and there was no platform available for dialogue among the warring parties.

The idea of convening a National Dialogue to address the political crisis in the country first arose many years earlier, in the first few months of the war.19 Dissatisfied with the inability of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to broker a meaningful ceasefire and with the meager progress that talks in Arusha were making towards reunification of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) party, a network of intellectuals began discussing the idea of convening a national dialogue as early as May 2014.20 According to an interviewee who participated in these discussions, the political leaders with whom they shared the idea gave it a cool reception. 21 Over the years that followed, the idea continued to be discussed in think tanks and government institutions. According to a member of the National Dialogue leadership,

17 Media briefing by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on his visit to South Sudan (11 Nov. 2016), available at https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/media-briefing-adama-dieng-united-nations-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-his. 18 Farai Sevenzo and Bryony Jones, Famine declared in South Sudan: 4.9 million people need urgent help, CNN (2017), available at https://edition.cnn. com/2017/02/20/africa/south-sudan-famine/index.html. 19 The Berghof Foundation notes that national dialogues often have long gestation periods and come about through a confluence of factors: “The idea for a National Dialogue is likely to have been discussed and explored for a long time before it takes root. It may have appeared under different names at different times, sometimes over the course of many years.” Berghof Foundation, National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners (2017), p. 39, available at https://www.berghof-foundation.org/en/publications/national-dialogue-handbook/. 20 Interview with member of the National Dialogue Secretariat, Juba (25 May 2020) [hereinafter Interview #2]. According to an academic, “The originators of the ideas is some disgruntled SPLM veterans who are not happy with how Kiir has been running the party. Some of them are hiding in the DPF. They had some presentations in Juba Grand on leadership failures and the way forward. That’s where the idea of the ND came in.” Interview with academic, Juba (29 May 2020) [hereinafter Interview #3].

21 See Interview #2. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 13

They say that a successful initiative has many fathers or mothers. I have heard from a number of sources that seem to have a role in the initiative, including the Minister [in the Office] of the Presidency, some young men from think tanks. The head of the peace and reconciliation commission came with a huge volume they had prepared on their efforts to promote community dialogues…there were many sources [of the idea of a national dialogue]. The degree to which these sources were critical in the outcome, I’m not sure. I can see the initiative itself is one that appealed, but it is not easy to say which is the one main source.22

The idea gathered momentum following the collapse of the ARCSS in July 2016. Proponents of the national dialogue concept met with political parties and proposed a structure that would be headed by religious leaders and backstopped by think tanks and academic institutions.23 This time, political leaders were more receptive to the idea and within a few months the President announced that the initiative would be moving ahead at a speech to parliament.

The reasons for the change in the Government’s position between 2014, when the idea was first introduced, and December 2016, when the National Dialogue was announced, remain somewhat unclear. One factor may have been the Sudanese National Dialogue process, which took place from 2014 to 2016. Indeed, a member of South Sudan’s National Dialogue secretariat acknowledged that some political leaders may have watched the Sudan process unfold and thought such an initiative could help to ease national and international pressure on the Government of South Sudan.24

22 Interview with member of the National Dialogue leadership, Nairobi (14 May 2020) [hereinafter Interview #1]. According to a civil society activist who has worked closely with the National Dialogue, “In terms of where the idea originated from, there are so many myths around that. Some of the myths I might not even talk about it, but from what I’ve been hearing that the idea actually originated from an informal group of intellectuals that felt there was a need to launch the National Dialogue as a political process to address issues facing the country at that time. So that was at an informal level.” Interview with civil society representative, Juba (2 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #4]. 23 Interview #2. According to a UN representative, “One day the peace commission chair called me and said, ‘There is some discussion of ND in South Sudan and asked if we can develop some ideas. The president is looking for options on how to organize it. Ebony and Sudd are putting something together and the peace commission should put something together.’ We put it together and it was presented to the president.” Interview with UN representative, Juba (3 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #5]. 24 As a civil society activist in Wau observed, “I think it’s a borrowed idea from the north, that they need to dialogue to resolve the political issues. Initially I think it’s just something borrowed from somewhere and they wanted to see if it was going to work or not.” Interview with civil society representative, Wau (19 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #13]. As Jędrzej Czerep observes, “In many aspects, borrowing the neighbour’s ideas remains a natural choice.” Understanding Sudanese and South Sudanese “National Dialogues”, DiploMATTERS (May 2017), p. 90, available at http:// www.themarketforideas.com/understanding-sudanese-and-south-sudanese-national-dialogues-a275/. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 14

Other observers suspected that the government was trying to dilute and undermine the regional peace process by creating a competing space for dialogue.25 Given the troublesome relationship the warring parties have had with the IGAD mediation since the start, such reasoning is difficult to dismiss. An academic in Juba described his skepticism of the government’s motives while observing that at the time it was difficult to criticize them too directly:

These suspicions were there, but then people were carried by the logic that nobody can reject dialogue because dialogue is important in human life…You will look like a warmonger if you don’t want dialogue. That is the reason that a number of critics of the National Dialogue decided to sit back and watch.26

While a possible government interest in creating a competing space for dialogue may have factored into its longer-term calculations, this explanation is somewhat less compelling in the short-term since the regional peace process had already been hobbled by the collapse of the ARCSS in July 2016. Indeed, the High-Level Revitalization Forum that would eventually lead to the signing of the R-ARCSS was not announced until June 2017, a month after the launch of the National Dialogue.27

Another possible explanation could be that a small group of people with access to the President had lost hope in the regional peace process and felt a need to act in the face of a rapidly deteriorating conflict situation.28 As a United Nations (UN) official who worked closely with the National Dialogue observed, “There would have never been the best time to do the National Dialogue. The peace process was almost dead. There was fighting going on. That was part of the rationale for the National Dialogue; to provide a valve for the polarity that was engulfing the country.”29 A civil society activist described how a number of organizations involved with advocacy on the peace process cautiously welcomed the initiative in light of the dire circumstances facing the country:

When the Juba incident happened [in July 2016], it disturbed the agreement and the National Dialogue was seen as a response to address this state of affairs. The President from his speech [to parliament] listed the very long objectives for the National Dialogue. Those were genuine, and I see them as important issues to be addressed, and therefore in our position as civil society, when the National Dialogue was announced, we felt it was an opportunity for people of South Sudan, especially the grassroots, to express themselves without fear or favor.30

25 An academic in Juba, for example, saw the National Dialogue as an attempt to evade the peace agreement’s provisions on accountability for atrocity crimes that have been committed over the course of the war: “They want to replace Ch. V with a national dialogue and say that we use African methods of reconciliation rather than rushing to hybrid court and all this. This is what they are interested with.” Interview #3. 26 Interview #3. 27 According to a member of the National Dialogue secretariat, “We were saying that the government initiated this thing in December 2016, before we even heard of the HLRF. So we said, ‘No, you can look for other reason but there is no way the government is doing this to undermine the HLRF.’” Interview #2. 28 Acknowledging that “the actual motivation may not be known,” a member of the National Dialogue secretariat noted, “In 2016, when they conceived the idea, the country was in bad shape. This was just after the events of state house and there was violence spreading across the country, especially Equatoria. There was ethnic targeting on the roads and in the towns, and it appeared at the time like the country was disintegrating.” Interview with member of the National Dialogue Secretariat, Juba (24 Jul. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #29]. 29 Interview #5. 30 Interview #4. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 15

Ultimately, the government’s decision to move ahead with the National Dialogue was likely shaped by a number of factors; it may be misrepresenting the situation to reduce it to one overriding objective. Over the years, the level of skepticism with the initiative would ebb and flow, but the National Dialogue would never garner unequivocal support from South Sudanese society as a whole or from the international community.

In his speech to parliament, the President laid out an ambitious mandate for the National Dialogue to “end all violent conﬂicts in South Sudan, constitute national consensus, and save the country from disintegration and foreign interference.” The overall goal was accompanied by 10 objectives that ranged from “end all forms of violence in the country” to “strengthen social contract between the citizens and their State.”31 The President said that he himself would serve as patron and that a committee of “eminent personalities and persons of consensus” would be selected to lead the process. The secretariat was to be comprised of two think tanks that helped to develop the concept—Sudd Institute and Ebony Center—and the Center for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba.

The concept note structured the National Dialogue in three stages. The first stage would consist of grassroot consultations throughout the country to “map out grievances that are unique to each community and ones that are encompassing in order to deal with these issues at an appropriate level.”32 In the second stage, the National Dialogue would convene regional peace conferences in which “major issues shall be identiﬁed, discussed, and resolved and those resolutions shall be adopted by states.” The final stage would consist of a national conference to provide final approval of what was recommended at the subnational level and tackle any remaining issues. After the national conference, the National Dialogue would forward relevant resolutions to the appropriate processes, including the “constitutional conference, peace, healing and reconciliation, etc. for consideration and inclusion therein.” Questions relating to how the outcomes of the National Dialogue would be formalized, whether they would be binding on the government, and what framework would be used for implementation were not specified at this point, though they were later developed in preparation for the national conference.

31 The 10 objectives elaborated in a concept note for the National Dialogue published concurrently with the President’s speech included: (1) To end political and communal violence in the country and resolve how to properly transform the military; (2) To redefine and re-establish stronger national unity (including redefining citizenship, belonging, residency and political participation); (3) To restructure the state and negotiate social contract between the citizens and their government (address the nature of federalism tackle the arising conflicts over land, viability, belonging and border, federation of political decisions affecting party structures); (4) To settle issues of diversity (deal with fear of political domination, address issues of the national army, civil service, foreign service); (5) To resolve issues related to resources sharing and allocation (these include land ownership and management, communal and states land disputes, oil, gas, mineral, and taxes); (6) To settle social disputes and sources of conflict (cattle raiding and rustling, child abduction, communal violence related to marriages, territory, murder and other, cattle and human migration related matters); (7) To set a stage for an integrated and inclusive national development strategy; (8) To agree on steps and guarantees to ensure safe, fair, free and peaceful elections and transition in 2018; (9) Agree on a strategy to return internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; (10) To develop a framework for national peace, healing and reconciliation. Government of South Sudan, National Dialogue Concept Note (2016), p. 3-4, available at https://www.ssnationaldialogue.org/resource/concept-note-national-dialogue/. 32 Id., p. 5. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 16

The announcement of the National Dialogue initiative was received with considerable skepticism both among South Sudanese and internationally. Armed opposition groups refused to participate, and government critics labeled the initiative as a ‘monologue’ that in their view could not bring peace to the country.33 Three prominent leaders initially appointed to lead the process—Bishop Paride Taban, Rebecca Nyandeng and Kosti Manibe—refused their appointments, citing disagreement on the terms of reference, and the absence of “level ground for dialogue, and lack of pre-consultation and transparency.” 34 In addition, the initial 30-person steering committee was perceived by some to be disproportionately comprised of the President’s allies and ethnically unbalanced.35

In June 2017, the President acquiesced to the calls for restructuring the National Dialogue. He recused himself as patron and adjusted the composition the steering committee. The leadership was expanded to six individuals, all men, and co-chaired by two veteran politicians, Abel Alier and Angelo Beda. Three prominent women were subsequently added to the leadership to improve gender and regional representation. The steering committee grew from 30 people to more than one hundred in response to various calls for political, geographic and ethnic inclusivity. According to a member of the National Dialogue leadership,

This was a case where people wanted to be comprehensive in representation. There was no formal process of selecting members. It was this informal way of going to the President and saying we need more from this region and more from this gender. It was an informal way.36

While the ultimate configuration of 97 steering committee members was geographically representative and included opposition political parties in Juba, the lack of clarity regarding the selection criteria contributed to suspicions about the credibility and independence of the process. Moreover, the armed opposition’s refusal to participate has remained a fundamental weakness of the initiative throughout.

As was the case with the initiation of the National Dialogue, the government’s decision to restructure the National Dialogue came in response to pressure from several different sources. Civil society organizations were among those lobbying for changes, as were political leaders at the national and international level.37 According to a member of the National Dialogue leadership,

I heard a lot of people saying they talked to the President and changed his mind. I know there were also international actors and civil society activists that made their position known. There are many people who claim [to have played a role], but I think all these voices were echoed and contributed to the decision. I doubt it was any individual.38

35 According to Jędrzej Czerep, “Despite the promise that it will be run by persons who are ‘trusted, genuine and credible’, the first 30-member body was composed of his prominent supporters.” Jędrzej Czerep, Understanding Sudanese and South Sudanese “National Dialogues”, DiploMATTERS (May 2017), p. 92, available at http://www.themarketforideas.com/understanding-sudanese-and-south-sudanese-national-dialogues-a275/. 36 Interview #1. 37 According to a civil society activist, “As part of the Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce for the implementation of the peace agreement, we saw the National Dialogue as a space where we can get views of the people and feed them into that national process. We contributed at an informal level and we keep engaged with the National Dialogue Steering Committee. We held a number of meetings with them. We asked them to come and brief us about what they are doing and what they think we can do to contribute.” Interview #4. 38 Interview #1. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 17

While the design and initiation of the process may have fallen short of good practice with regard to its transparency and technical rigor, it nonetheless did provide some space for civil society and opposition voices to engage constructively with the government at a time when there was precious little space for such engagement.39 Through these initial concessions and a number of confidence- building measures that would follow, including the release of approximately 30 political detainees in August 2017, the National Dialogue managed to garner just enough support at the national and international levels to avoid being dismissed altogether.40

Over the years, international actors have tended to skirt around the issue of the National Dialogue, neither outrightly condemning it nor providing it with unequivocal support. According to a member of the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC), a body set up to monitor implementation of the peace agreement,

There was a feeling [among international actors] that the National Dialogue was a diversion. [There were] comments like, ‘It was run by the Jieng Council’, and there was no evidence for this, and it was said that it was an attempt by the ruling elite to water down what was going on in the peace talks. …We [the international community] were so obsessed with HLRF as the only game in town. We didn’t take the National Dialogue seriously until it was too late. And when we started to pay attention then came Covid.41

The National Dialogue eventually managed to secure some financial support from several countries, including Japan, South Africa and Egypt, and the UN provided some in-kind support. But in many respects the National Dialogue never overcame the controversy that surrounded its establishment. According to a representative of a UN agency that worked closely with the National Dialogue,

There was international legitimacy deficit because the ‘big boys’ didn’t support this process and the National Dialogue didn’t have the profile that it would have had. It was never discussed at the [UN] Security Council because the big actors didn’t support and there was no need to have that discussion.42

At the same time, the lack of international support may have also helped reinforce a sense of national ownership over the initiative. Although the National Dialogue has not yet produced a public accounting of its financial records, members of the National Dialogue credit the Government for providing the overwhelming majority of the funds that enabled them to conduct their activities.43 The fact that the process was seen through to completion, albeit with considerable delays and on a smaller scale than initially planned, also demonstrated to external actors that the Government is capable of leading such processes when it wishes to do so.

39 According to a civil society activist, “As part of the Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce for the implementation of the peace agreement, we saw the National Dialogue as a space where we can get views of the people and feed them into that national process. We contributed at an informal level and we keep engaged with the National Dialogue Steering Committee. We held a number of meetings with them. We asked them to come and brief us about what they are doing and what they think we can do to contribute.” Interview #4. 40 According to a member of the National Dialogue secretariat, “The release of political prisoners was something the President promised the [National Dialogue] leadership. That’s why we took it up. The Opposition was saying, ‘How can we do dialogue when people are jailed if they speak out?’ So it was done to assure people that if you speak out you will not be arrested because of your views.” Interview #2. See S. Sudan dialogue body urges release of political prisoners, Sudan Trib. (27 Nov. 2017), available at https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64103. 41 Interview with member of R-JMEC, Juba (5 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #6]. 42 Interview #5. 43 On a webinar that the SSCSF and Detcro organized in April 2021 to discuss the way forward for the National Dialogue, a member of the National Dialogue secretariat said they plan to make their financial reports available for public scrutiny. See Webinar on ‘National Dialogue in South Sudan: The Way Forward’, SSCSF and Detcro (8 Apr. 2021),available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UCkQ8LXX_wQ. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 18

Awareness and Sources of Information

Public awareness is critical to the success of any national dialogue process. But keeping the public informed about national processes can be challenging in a place like South Sudan, with its limited communication infrastructure, high rates of illiteracy and severe restrictions on the media. The lack of external support also played a role in constraining the National Dialogue’s ability to communicate effectively. According to a UN official who worked closely with the National Dialogue,

From a technical perspective, the National Dialogue was weak in terms of communication. They were not very aggressive. They were doing a lot of good work, but you would only know about it if you were associated with the National Dialogue. In terms of communication, they should have done more in selling the idea. You might have a Ferrari, but if you drive it in front of my mother, she will not know what it is. The National Dialogue did a poor job of selling what the National Dialogue was all about. This would have greatly improved people’s perception of it.44

The National Dialogue’s outreach efforts started with considerable momentum. The President’s speech to parliament and the decree establishing the National Dialogue were widely covered in the media.45 National Dialogue proceedings, particularly in the early days, were aired on South Sudan Television (SSTV), and even the President himself would watch on occasion.46 Politically aware people in urban areas were able to follow proceedings and most interviewees appeared reasonably well-informed about the initiative. According to a civil society representative in Yambio, for example,

I receive information in two ways: First, I received a message on television because I have a television set that is broadcasting SSTV, and normally I have to attend to what is happening in Juba. I could watch Angelo Beda discussing whenever he is in another state. And I also Google on National Dialogue and get some tips from what people are saying.47

44 Id. 45 As a male elder focus group participant in Yambio observed, “The National Dialogue that was initiated by President Kiir was announced as a decree by the government over the radio. Whenever there’s a decree people listen to it.” Focus Group Discussion with male and female elders, Yambio (18 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Focus group #8]. 46 Interview #2. 47 Interview with civil society representative, Yambio (23 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #20]. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 19

Across the urban-rural divide, however, major information gaps were apparent. In rural areas, people often do not have access to traditional media sources and rely mainly on word-of-mouth. Language barriers also played a role in that National Dialogue communications were done in English and Arabic, while many people, particularly in rural areas, are only fluent in their local languages.48 Security risks, particularly in opposition-controlled areas, presented additional obstacles. According to a civil society representative in Wau,

In the state headquarters, people are informed. But in much more remote areas, for example, in Tonj East and Tonj North, in Raja and Baggari where the rebels were in control, people don’t really know about it. If any information has reached, it might have been through informal processes.49

Information gaps also started to grow over time as the National Dialogue encountered delays and other developments in the peace process, including the signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018, began to take center stage. According to a male youth focus group participant in Yambio,

In the beginning, the effort to sensitize the community was there and to some extent it has gone down. When we reached somewhere [in the process], we were no longer following. The sensitization went down and the information went low and people’s minds were not focused. So we are not so well informed, particularly on the current situation.50

48 According to male youth focus group participant in Yambio, “The National Dialogue was in Arabic and English and some people are deep down there who do not understand those languages. They might not have understood about the National Dialogue. The language being used were not languages they are familiar with.” Focus group discussion with male and femaly youth, Yambio (16 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Focus group #5]. 49 Interview with civil society representative, Wau (23 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #17]. A civil society representative in Yambio gave a similar assessment: “The communities living in Western Equatoria, I can say less than 50 percent understood the issue of National Dialogue. Why? Normally this issue of National Dialogue they regard it as a government program. So many communities have not yet been aware of the issue of National Dialogue because it was targeting the government personnel. When they come to the state, they have to call the governor and the cabinet and the ministers and they talk on the issue of National Dialogue. And when they go to media they can talk and people in villages without radio or phones are green and unaware.” Interview with civil society representative, Yambio (23 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #20]. 50 Focus group #5. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 20

To a certain extent, these shortcomings are systemic in nature and reflect communications challenges more generally throughout South Sudan. Previous research, for example, has shown large information gaps relating to the IGAD process as well, particularly among women.51 A civil society representative in Yambio compared lack of awareness of the National Dialogue to lack of awareness about the Covid-19 pandemic:

Currently as we speak, this deadly disease of Coronavirus, some people at the grassroots are not aware. So that is the same for National Dialogue. Most of the people at the grassroots are not aware of this National Dialogue. If you ask them, they will say they don’t know. They will even ask you, ‘What is it?’ People have not gone there to explain to them. Some are aware, but majority are not fully aware.52

Research fatigue and exasperation with outsiders who are perceived as extracting information without giving anything in return is a common source of disappointment for populations in South Sudan who have lived with large humanitarian interventions for generations. Complaints from interviewees about a lack of follow-up from the National Dialogue and a sense of skepticism about whether their ideas were accurately captured and whether the outcomes would ever be implemented shaped their perceptions of the process.

Horizontal Inclusivity

Regional mediators have struggled with the question of who to include at the negotiating table throughout the seven-year conflict. During the first round of peace talks (2014–15), mediators focused on the Government and SPLM-IO as legitimate representatives of the various armed groups with whom they were allied. While this approach may have made the process more manageable, it arguably glossed over questions about the extent to which the two parties really represented the interests of the many groups that were fighting under their umbrellas.53 Over the course of the conflict, armed groups increasingly began to fragment, and mediators in the HLRF process were forced to adopt a different approach in which some opposition groups negotiated jointly through the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA).54 This strategy had only limited success as the SPLM-IO judged that the alliance would dilute its position and opted to negotiate separately, and the SSOA split at the signing of the R-ARCSS with several members choosing to continue their armed struggle.

The National Dialogue was meant to complement the IGAD process by extending dialogue to the local level and providing space for groups from all sides of the political divide to come together and sort out their differences. While it managed to secure the participation of Juba-based opposition political parties and eventually some SSOA members, the SPLM-IO refused to participate throughout.55

51 See e.g. David K. Deng et al., Search for a New Beginning: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Healing in South Sudan, South Sudan Law Society (SSLS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Jun. 2015), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/ library/Rule%20of%20Law/Perception%20Survey% 20Report%20Transitional%20Justice%20Reconciliation%20and%20Healing%20-.pdf. 52 Interview with civil society representative, Yambio (30 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #23]. 53 See John Young, South Sudan’s Civil War: Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking (2019). 54 David K. Deng, Compound Fractures: Political Formations, Armed Groups and Regional Mediation in South Sudan, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (Dec. 2018), p. 17, available at https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-21-1.pdf. 55 The National Democratic Movement (NDM) has also consistently refused to engage with the National Dialogue. An academic observed rising discontent among some of the opposition political parties participating in the National Dialogue: “Maybe the other smaller parties have gotten there, but some have complained about the treatment they have gotten. Some will have a different opinion. The opposition political parties were not happy how they were treated at the regional conferences. Joseph Ukel was enthusiastic at the beginning, but he is no longer. Without support of IO and NDM, and OPP, those of Ukel and George Kongor, you can see the National Dialogue will face a lot of problems.” Interview #3. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 21

The National Dialogue leadership made several attempts to reach out to the SPLM-IO leadership to convince them to participate. Machar refused an initial request to meet with National Dialogue representatives in South Africa in mid-2017, and according to interviewees, the leadership of the SPLM-IO indicated some willingness to participate in 2019 but ultimately decided against it.56

A similar lack of inclusivity was apparent in the grassroots and regional dialogues in Yambio and Wau. In both cases, when the initial round of dialogue took place in 2017 and 2018, Government and SPLM-IO forces on the ground were involved in active combat operations, which effectively precluded their participation in any sort of dialogue initiative.57 According to a civil society representative in Wau, opposition groups only started traveling to Wau town in January 2020, long after the National Dialogue had concluded its activities in the area.58 The National Dialogue had no choice but to accept the SPLM-IO decision not to participate. Even after the security situation improved and dialogue among the warring parties became more feasible, Machar arguably had little to gain by participating in a process that fell under the authority of his political rival. According to a member of the National Dialogue secretariat,

We were set up as a partisan body from the perspective of the Opposition although we claimed we were independent. But to be fair to the Opposition, it was a body that was set up without their consent, and so they could not listen to us. We noticed that was a challenge and there was a need for a broader process to allow the parties to ceasefire.59

Nonetheless, the lack of inclusivity presents a fundamental obstacle to the National Dialogue’s stated goal “to end all violent conflicts” in South Sudan. The SPLM-IO is now a key player in the same R-TGONU that will be expected to implement the outcomes of the National Dialogue. Without the SPLM-IO’s buy-in, the National Dialogue is likely to lose the support of many of its constituencies as well. The lack of inclusivity also makes it easier for political actors who did engage with the National Dialogue to ignore outcomes that are not in their personal interest.

It remains to be seen whether the bottom-up approach that the National Dialogue adopted will create sufficient political pressure on the leadership of the R-TGONU to abide by its outcomes. On issues such as federalism, the strong position that the National Dialogue has taken aligns well with the SPLM-IO position. However, its recommendation that the existing leadership not contest in the elections at the end of the transitional period has proven difficult for the R-TGONU to accept.

56 Interview #2; South Sudan National Dialogue Committee Fails to Meet Riek Machar, Anadolu Agency (Jul. 2017), available at https://www.aa.com. tr/en/africa/south-sudan-dialogue-committee-fails-to-meet-riek-machar/853407. According to a civil society representative, “The other opposition groups, they stood their ground, and some of them they argue that the timing is not right. …They said the National Dialogue cannot be fruitful as the war was still going on and dissenting voices may not be considered.” Interview #4. 57 According to a member of SPLM-IO based in Wau, “The National Dialogue was organized in favor of one party. …Members of the SPLM-IO were still in the bush. The National Dialogue did not address the root cause. …The National Dialogue was not inclusive. It was just organized at the level of one party, that is SPLM-IG. We are not a part.” Interview with member of SPLM-IO, Wau (24 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #19]. The National Dialogue subcommittee for Western Bahr-el-Ghazal held 13 grassroots consultations and one national public forum in the region in December 2017. The subcommittee for Western Equatoria was divided into two, with one covering Maridi and the other covering Tambura. The subcommittee held consultations in Western Equatoria in December 2017 and March 2018. 58 Interview #17. 59 Interview #29. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 22

Vertical Inclusivity

The IGAD peace process has faced criticism for focusing too much on political elites and not enough on fostering a sense of ownership among South Sudanese more broadly. During the first round of peace talks (2014-15), mediators insisted on including civil society, faith leaders and other civic actors at the negotiating table. However, this attempt at inclusivity backfired when the parties coopted most of the civil society seats and filled them with their supporters. By the time the ARCSS was signed, the mediation had essentially reverted to bilateral talks between the two main warring parties. HLRF mediators seemed to have learned from the first mediation’s mistakes and invested time at the outset into identifying more credible and independent civic actors to participate in the process. Nonetheless, the mediation still struggled to conduct effective outreach and communication to the population in South Sudan. As a result, there is a general perception among South Sudanese that the IGAD peace talks focused primarily on dividing power and wealth among the warring parties and only secondarily about addressing the root causes of the conflict.60

The National Dialogue was meant to complement IGAD’s top-down approach by involving people at the grassroots in discussions about the way forward. Whether it succeeded or not depends in part on one’s vantage point. Proponents of the process point to the fact that the National Dialogue engaged some 20,000 people from across South Sudan and refugee camps in neighboring countries in their consultations.61 According to a UN representative that worked closely with the National Dialogue,

The biggest success of the National Dialogue is about talking to the people. The amount of people the National Dialogue has spoken to, I don’t think anybody believed. Even the people at the National Dialogue, I don’t think they believed they could do it. For the first time South Sudanese were able to translate a concept into a framework for mass engagement with the people, and in doing so they changed the perception of the National Dialogue from pessimism to cautious optimism. I know of no other initiative, except maybe the liberation struggle, that has ensured mass participation of people.62

Criticisms of the National Dialogue’s engagement with populations at the grassroots fall mainly into two categories: a perceived politicization of the delegate selection process to privilege SPLM party members and their supporters; and a failure to meaningfully engage with rural populations, including, but not limited to, those residing in opposition-controlled areas. The perception that the selection process was politicized was prevalent among interviewees in Wau and Yambio who felt as though the state governments actively excluded individuals with opposing viewpoints. According to a civil society delegate who participated in grassroots consultations in Wau and Tonj,

There was a team [from the National Dialogue] responsible for mobilizing, but they work hand-in-hand with the state governors. I think that element of choosing the governor to do mobilization was a bit of a letdown in terms of allowing the governor to select those who he thinks should be part of the National Dialogue. That was a weakness in terms of selection. I remember civil society with radical views were not invited to the council of ministers for the meeting, but after seeing it was an open forum some people went in there on their own.63

60 Compound Fractures, p. 16 (citing cynicism among interviews about the warring parties’ interest in the peace process). 61 Interview #5. 62 Id. 63 Interview #17. A student at Bahr-el-Ghazal University expressed a similar view: “The steering committee was in charge of nominating and if you are not in a certain party you are not able to participate. That was very clear. Some of the members of civil society were not all allowed to participate. The subcommittee who came from Juba were the ones in charge of nominating because some parties are here. The SPLM and other political parties are also here. So that’s where the nomination was through parties. If you look at, almost 90% they came from political parties.” Interview with university student, Wau (24 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #18]. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 23

This issue of representation in the National Dialogue was not really in the right manner because it was politically motivated…I’m not accusing [the former governor], but I was there and saw the people that were nominated. It was personal interests; he nominated people based on what he knows—tribalism, nepotism—but it was not really balanced well because those people when they were nominated to participate, I was there, and they did not participate well.64

Some of these shortcomings in the selection process were acknowledged by representatives of the National Dialogue. A member of the secretariat admitted that they could not be entirely sure that each of the subcommittees strictly adhered to the selection criteria for the grassroots consultations, though he was more confident in the integrity of the process for the regional and national conferences:

The selection for the regional conferences was conducted after the [grassroots] consultation itself. The selection for the national conference is the one we oversaw. The delegates were selected at the regional conferences and the names were passed themselves. The selection from the regional to the national conference was transparent, fair and open but for the other processes, I can’t say for sure.65

The regional conference for Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal was more controversial than the other two, in this regard. According to interviewees, the process was highly politicized and some of the resolutions, such as those recommending that South Sudan revert to a model of landownership based on state ownership of unregistered land, diverged from the predominant viewpoint expressed in the grassroots consultations. According to an interviewee in Wau,

[The regional conference] was dominated by the governors. By then, you had governors of Tonj, Gogrial, Aweil, and Wau. These are all members of the SPLA. And some ministers came from Juba. They were doing the talking and the rest are just listening. It was dictated. There was no freedom.66

According to a member of parliament, several parliamentarians actually raised a concern in the State Legislative Assembly that the outcomes of the grassroots consultations were not represented fairly in the regional conference.67 Interviewees generally viewed the selection process for the Equatoria regional conference to be less politicized in this regard.

Regarding the criticism that the grassroots consultations did not meaningfully engage rural populations, the official position from the National Dialogue is that its representatives traveled to 77 of the 80 counties that they had targeted, only leaving out the opposition-controlled counties of Akobo, Panyjiar and Raja.68

64 Interview with youth, Wau (16 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #7]. A participant in one of the grassroots dialogues in Yambio expressed a similar viewpoint: “The selection of the people who went there, like what we call in the youth league and women league, all these leagues are attached to the SPLM political party. That means most of the people who move were pro-SPLM. It would have been a common selection or at random, but this one was targeting people who were in the system of SPLM.” Interview #20. 65 Interview #29. According to the interviewee, “Each region, we had these 15 subcommittees, and each area there was a chairperson from the ND who oversaw the grassroots consultation. We cannot speak with great confidence whether they actually carried out the process how it was envisioned.”Id. 66 Interview with civil society representative, Wau (19 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #13]. 67 Interview with Member of Parliament, Wau (22 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #14]. 68 National Dialogue, Framing the National Dialogue Conference Agenda, unpublished paper (n.d.) (on file with the author). Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 24

While this may be technically correct, there was nonetheless a strong perception among interviewees in Wau and Yambio that the National Dialogue’s activities were concentrated in urban areas and neglected the majority of the population residing in rural areas. As a female chief in Yambio that participated in some of the grassroots consultations observed, “The consultation only consisted of the key stakeholders and the local chief and women representatives. It didn’t touch the grassroots.” 69

Due to insecurity, National Dialogue subcommittees were not able to reach some communities residing in opposition-controlled areas. Similarly, refugee leaders in predominantly Nuer refugee camps in Ethiopia refused to meet with representatives of the National Dialogue.70 A civil society representative in Yambio noted how this reinforced a broader marginalization of these groups:

Communities in opposition areas were denied a chance. They don’t even have access to services, leave alone the National Dialogue. Those are hard to reach areas. It was hard for the National Dialogue to reach, because they were SPLM.71

A civil society representative based in Wau explained the challenges he encountered trying to represent the views of communities from his home area of Raja, an opposition stronghold, in the grassroots consultations. According to the interviewee, the state government had selected its own delegates from Raja and it took more than a week of lobbying and a three-day discussion with the concerned parties to sort the issue out. In the end, three Wau-based community representatives participated alongside the six that the state government had selected who were based in Raja:

We managed to convince them that we are not competing with those from Raja, but we are from the area and have a paper to present…I remember the paper presented from Raja was also appreciated by Angelo Beda [the National Dialogue co-chair] and the team from Juba. We made a good presentation and outlined our views clearly. The process was not easy, but we managed.…There was an indication that the governor wanted his people from Raja to present. And they had a different agenda from what we were trying to expose to the people.72

69 Focus group #8. A female focus group participant expressed a similar viewpoint, “The communities are not aware about the ND, as we are talking about the people coming from Juba, they just end here in the state and they don’t go to the grassroots and also they don’t give us a chance. Those who attended the dialogue they don’t go to the grassroots.” Focus group discussion with adult women, Yambio (17 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Focus Group #6]. 70 See Compound Fractures. 71 Interview #20. A representative of an intergovernmental organization also acknowledged this shortcoming: “The National Dialogue never went to opposition-held areas, but it wasn’t their fault. They never went to Akobo, they went to Wau but not to rebel-held areas. So inclusion was not ideal because communities in rebel held areas were not consulted.” Interview #5. 72 Interview with civil society representative, Wau (18 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #10]. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 25

The criticisms of the National Dialogue’s vertical inclusivity notwithstanding, financial constraints also played a role in limiting the initiative’s ability to reach certain areas.73 The funding constraints were apparent to populations in Wau and Yambio, as explained by a female participant in one of the Wau consultations: “The dialogue should have gone to the grassroots in different villages. It was launched in Yambio and participants were told to go to counties to disseminate but there was no money, transport and fuel for them to use.”74 The lack of funding was also evident in the approach to the regional conferences. There were originally meant to be 10 regional conferences each involving 1,000 participants, but financial constraints forced them to downsize to just three conferences with 300 to 500 participants each.75

Taking into account the many financial and logistical difficulties associated with broad-based citizen dialogue in the South Sudanese context, and the fact that South Sudan does not have much experience with such initiatives, the National Dialogue outperformed many people’s expectations in terms of its geographic coverage. At the same time, the perception that the National Dialogue had limited reach in rural areas, where most South Sudanese reside, and that it was unable to engage broadly with communities in opposition-controlled areas cannot be ignored. The bottom-up nature of the process is critical to the perceived legitimacy of the National Dialogue, and perceptions that it did not fully capture the views of these critical constituencies could be as damaging to the initiative as any actual shortcomings.

73 According to a representative of an intergovernmental organization that worked closely with the National Dialogue, “In terms of logistics, we launched the ND when the country was going through a deep economic crisis and there were little funds to support. With donors not putting in the money that had effect in terms of the coverage of the National Dialogue process.” Interview #5. 74 Interview with citizen, Yambio (23 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #26]. 75 Interview #5. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 26

Quality of Citizen Participation

One of the National Dialogue’s main selling points has been that once a platform for broad-based civic engagement was established, South Sudanese participated with a forthrightness that was itself a legitimizing force in the process. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan acknowledged as much in their February 2019 report to the Human Rights Council:

Despite the criticisms about the non-participation of significant sections of the South Sudanese, the organisers of the National Dialogue strove to ensure that the consultations were as free and candid as possible. The Dialogue managed to gather a wide range of views from the public on the root causes of the conflict, and received surprisingly candid responses, including submissions attributing blame to the government for the crisis in South Sudan. Despite the difficulties surrounding the National Dialogue, many citizens within the country have engaged with the organisers during the consultations in good faith, expressing their views with a remarkably high degree of candour.76

A civil society representative that participated in grassroots consultations and the regional dialogue for Greater Equatoria also explained how he and his colleagues saw in the National Dialogue an opportunity to engage constructively with political actors in a context where few such opportunities existed. According to the interviewee,

A lot came up during those discussions, such as space for civil society and perceptions that civil society are being perceived as pro-West allies. We clarified that and we said, ‘We are South Sudanese and we are nationalist. We feel civil society should not be misconstrued. If it is a question of grants from Western countries, the same countries provide grants to the same governments. They give us tens of thousands, and they give our governments millions.’ So it was an opportunity for us to argue.77

76 See CHRSS report, pp. 191-92. An academic and prominent government critic interviewed for this study also grudgingly acknowledged this strength in the process: “The structure is fine because you start from the grassroots. That’s commendable actually and the grassroots gave their view what the country should look like. But the steering committee succeeded in that by default, not because they meant it. They thought the people of South Sudan didn’t know much, but when they went, they saw that people know more than what they thought.” Interview #3.

77 Interview #4. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 27

However, alongside the frank and candid dialogue was a deep sense of fear and mistrust that characterizes many interactions between citizens and the state in South Sudan.78 According to interviewees, before the National Dialogue began its activities, it was not uncommon for people to be arrested for speaking out on politically contentious issues such as federalism or transitional justice.79 A female civil society representative in Yambio described the prevailing atmosphere:

Even up to now, people still fear to express themselves. Especially here at the state level, you don’t talk about the negatives because you don’t know what will be the reaction. When someone gets the information, you’ll be the next victim, so you kind of go around if you can say general but not finger-pointing. If you touch the government, you are in problem. If you touch the rebels, you are in problem. It is better to be neutral.80

Another civil society representative who participated in grassroots consultations in Wau and Tonj noticed a similar fear among participants:

In Tonj people spoke openly. Some people of course feared, and they mentioned that fear. They spoke out saying that people are being asked to talk about this, but they are not sure if they will be in prison. In Wau, I know a number of people who could have spoken something, but they refrained themselves because they did not trust the process. They did not believe that there would be no repercussions. But that did not stop some people from speaking. People were able to speak their minds, but sometimes the debate was not balanced.81

78 A researcher with ACCORD observed a similar fear: “Drawing from an analysis of the situation in South Sudan, an evaluation of various reports emanating from the dialogue consultation forums conducted so far, and observation of live recordings of some of the consultation sessions, these challenges relate to the exclusion or non-involvement of key stakeholders to the conflict; non-existence of a conducive environment for peaceful dialogue; mistrust and misperceptions by some stakeholders to the conflict; low levels of attendance during dialogue consultation forums; shortage of resources; and the prevalence of fear among some citizens.” The National Dialogue Initiative in South Sudan.

79 See Amnesty International, South Sudan: Arbitrary arrests, torture of detainees despite repeated promises (4 Sep. 2018), available at https://www. amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/south-sudan-arbitrary-arrests-and-torture-of-detainees-despite-repeated-promises/.

80 Interview with civil society representative, Yambio (30 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #25].

81 Interview #17. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 28

Although it is often claimed that no one was targeted for expressing their views during the National Dialogue, one interviewee noted an instance in which several people were arrested after raising concerns about unlawful detentions at a consultation in Nagero County. According to the interviewee, the National Dialogue subcommittee faced considerable interference from the local authorities in Nagero who limited invitations to the grassroots consultation to 50 people and assigned responsibility for moderating the meeting and deciding who would speak to the SPLM secretary. The interviewee continued:

After the National Dialogue team returned from Nagero, three people were arrested; the Nagero payam administrator, inspector of police and a youth leader. They were arrested and taken to the army barracks. The reason for these arrests was that they spoke during the National Dialogue saying civilians should not be detained at the army barracks but in the police station.82

The incident took place while the Nagero County Commissioner was away at the state headquarters. According to the interviewee, the Commissioner learned about the detention upon his return to Nagero and ordered the release of the three individuals. They were released without charges after spending three days in detention.

Even if this was an isolated incident, the sense of fear that interviewees in Wau and Yambio expressed represent a significant contrast to the frank and open dialogue that tends to be emphasized at the national level. To a certain extent, regional variation may account for some of these divergent narratives. As a result of counterinsurgency operations being conducted during much of the National Dialogue process, populations in Wau and Yambio were particularly sensitive about being perceived as sympathetic to the Opposition. A member of the National Dialogue secretariat admitted that the restrictive environment may have affected the quality of the discussion during some of the dialogues:

I would say Yambio and Wau were a bit different from other places because conflict was ongoing, and people were fearing. Even in places where there was no conflict, people would get up and say they would speak their mind no matter what happened to them. At the time, people were a bit suppressed. People were afraid because people were arrested for speaking their minds. There was a feeling in some of these places that the population rebelled against the government, so I would not be surprised that people felt intimidated.83

82 Interview with member of National Dialogue Steering Committee, Juba (22 Jul. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #30].

83 Interview #29. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 29

The quality of participation in the National Dialogue’s activities raise a number of issues regarding the objectives of such a process in the context of an ongoing civil war. An approach that conceives of the National Dialogue as a time-bound process that is meant to provide a foundation for the reform agenda for many years to come might favor timing the initiative for a more stable part of the transition to maximize opportunities for citizen input. However, if the National Dialogue is itself meant to provide a platform to start a discussion that will be continued through other transitional processes, that might justify starting the discussion as soon as certain minimum standards for safety and security have been met.

The National Dialogue’s role in this regard is somewhat obscured by its broad mandate. One might question, for example, if some of its loftier objectives, such “end all forms of violence in the country” and “strengthen social contract between the citizens and their State” would be possible in a context of extreme fear and insecurity. The lack of coordination with the peace process also complicates efforts to feed the National Dialogue’s outcomes into other transitional processes. Nonetheless, the process has demonstrated the strength of cultural norms around speaking one’s mind in public forums and reaffirmed people’s interest in dialogue, even if it does not fundamentally change the severe restrictions on civic space that prevail in South Sudan. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 30

Complementarity with IGAD Peace Process

When he announced the initiative, the President stated that the National Dialogue would be situated “within the framework” of the ARCSS and that its proceedings would “augment and enrich” the agreement.84 As it happened, the processes were mostly independent from one another with minimal coordination between the two. When the National Dialogue was announced in December 2016, the ARCSS had all but collapsed. Machar had fled Juba and was under house arrest in South Africa and Government forces were engaged in extensive military offensives against SPLM-IO forces in various parts of the country, including Western Equatoria and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal. Regional governments and the international community had tacitly approved Machar’s detention in South Africa and were investing their efforts into monitoring the implementation of a largely defunct peace agreement. The pretense did not come to an end until June 2017, a month after the launch of the National Dialogue, when IGAD announced that it would be convening a High-Level Revitalization Forum in an effort to salvage the peace agreement.85

The two processes had a tense coexistence from the start. Proponents of the National Dialogue viewed their initiative as an attempt to rescue a nation that was rapidly descending into chaos. As a UN representative that worked closely with the National Dialogue observed:

There would have never been the best time to do the National Dialogue. The peace process was almost dead. There was fighting going on. That was part of the rationale for the National Dialogue to provide the valve for the polarity that was engulfing the country.86

84 See National Dialogue Concept Note.

85 The National Dialogue was announced in December 2016 and launched in May 2017 and the HLRF was announced in June 2017, began pre- consultations in August and began talks in December.

86 Interview #5 According to a member of the National Dialogue subcommittee that traveled to Yambio, “The timing is a bit complex. It was not clear when the HLRF would end. It was a good timing to give a push for the HLRF. The time may not be appropriate but was a good strategy.” Interview with member of National Dialogue Steering Committee, Juba (22 Jul. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #31]. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 31

Indeed, the HLRF struggled for almost a year without meaningful progress, until the talks shifted to Khartoum and there were a number of breakthroughs in fast succession, including the signing of a permanent ceasefire in Khartoum in June 2018, leading to the signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018. A few efforts were made along the way to consider how to link the two processes, but the lack of inclusivity and the lack of international support proved an insurmountable obstacle.87 According to a member of R-JMEC,

JMEC was too involved in the HLRF to have time for the National Dialogue, and it was biding its time to say that ‘when they’ve got something coherent, we’ll sit down and listen.’ It really got going when they got on the ground and National Dialogue started to meet with people and started to produce reports from those meetings. The HLRF unfolded to where everyone lost hope, and we all went to Khartoum and made sudden decisions.88

As the National Dialogue prepared to start its grassroots consultations, it struggled to counter perceptions that it was a government ploy to undermine the HLRF process in order to sidestep reforms and avoid sharing power with opposition groups.89 As a civil society activist in Wau explained:

I think the government are trying to cover up their mistake which they have done to the general public by dragging the whole country to war, which they themselves at the end came to realize it was an unnecessary war. They have no way to apologize so they try to confuse the general public that they are for general issues…They were trying to get another way of sneaking.”90

87 Discussions about how to make the two initiatives complementary are still ongoing. According to a member of R-JMEC, “It all culminated shortly before Covid in a meeting with the National Dialogue and R-JMEC. They sat down and said let’s have a meeting. Unfortunately, it was interrupted by the pandemic.” Interview #6. 88 Id. 89 According to a December 2017 report by UN Secretary General on the situation in South Sudan, “Challenges persist in ensuring inclusive participation, however, as many stakeholders perceive that the Government is using the national dialogue to override the implementation of the peace agreement.” United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 September to 14 November 2017), U.N. Doc. S/2017/1011 (1 Dec. 2017), available at https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/report-secretary-general-south- sudan-covering-period-2-september-14-november-2017. 90 Interview with civil society representative, Wau (19 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #12]. According to a member of SPLM-IO in Wau, “Because it was a time to divert the attention of the people. They were very keen to know what was in the agreement, but it was a manipulation to confuse the people at the grassroots level.” Interview #19. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 32

A member of SPLM-IO in Wau also emphasized what he saw as the Government’s ulterior motives in pursuing the National Dialogue:

SPLM-IG might have a hidden agenda, and this is why they rush to conduct the National Dialogue before the SPLM-IO come to power. …We consider it as a violation of the agreement because the National Dialogue was not included in the agreement. …They need to divert the attention of the citizens so that they could not understand the document of the agreement. …They want to confuse the public about the agreement.91

Members of the National Dialogue contest these narratives by pointing to the timing of the initiative and the fact that the National Dialogue was announced six months before the HLRF to say that it could not have been intended to undermine the peace process.92 They emphasize the manner in which the two processes complement one another, such as the HLRF’s horizontal inclusivity and its ability to negotiate a ceasefire among the warring parties that then could create an enabling environment for the National Dialogue to engage citizens on matters of national concern.93 According to a member of the National Dialogue leadership who also participated in the HLRF process,

Each one suspected that the other one was meant to undermine theirs. The National Dialogue saw the peace agreement as a way of countering the National Dialogue. Those in the peace process saw National Dialogue as undermining them. Neither was true. … The leverage of the R-ACRSS is that it was supported by regional actors. The national process didn’t have leverage, but it had credibility of involving people. The HLRF focused on power sharing and security. The National Dialogue was more expansive, dealing with all the issues.94

91 Id. A focus group participant in Wau noted his confusion about the Government’s decision to conduct a National Dialogue alongside the peace process: “My thinking of why the National Dialogue was initiated, this is what I’m asking as a citizen. Because during that time, as you mentioned, people were in the conflict and there was a peace agreement. A negotiation going on at the same time, and at the same time there was a national dialogue. So I was confused which one was which. Are we going for the peace agreement and negotiating or are we for ND?” Focus group discussion with male and female youth, Wau (19 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Focus group #1]. 92 According to a member of the National Dialogue secretariat, “We were saying that the government initiated this thing in December 2016, before we even heard of the HLRF, so we said, ‘No, you can look for other reason, but there is no way the government is doing this to undermine the HLRF.’” Interview #2. 93 After describing the complementary nature of the two initiatives, a member of the National Dialogue secretariat acknowledged that it was still difficult to coordinate them: “Because opposition were not interested in National Dialogue when there was ongoing conflict. They also wanted a process that was initiated collectively. So this frustrated our efforts in reaching out to the opposition and achieving a more deliberate complementarity.” Interview #29. 94 Interview #1. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 33

As the National Dialogue began producing reports from its grassroots consultations and regional dialogues, it became apparent that there were some areas that complemented the IGAD talks and others where the two initiatives appeared to be in opposition to one another.95 With respect to land, for example, the R-ARCSS includes just four provisions addressing concerns relating to land, whereas the issue emerged as a major area of concern in the National Dialogue process.96 Similarly, the National Dialogue heard a strong endorsement of a federal system from the people with whom they spoke, whereas the IGAD process only provided for a relatively vague commitment to enact a “federal and democratic system of governance” through the constitutional development process.

Regarding areas of possible tension between the two processes, an academic in Juba suspected the Government would use the National Dialogue to evade its obligations with respect to transitional justice and accountability for atrocity crimes under Ch. V of the R-ARCSS:

They want to replace Ch. V with a national dialogue and say that we use African methods of reconciliation rather than rushing to hybrid court and all this. That’s where they cooperate with the Office of the President because they have the same objective. That’s where the IO is also comfortable with them. This is one of the areas where we see collaboration.98

Another area of tension concerns political accountability. The National Dialogue heard a strong message of discontent with the leadership in its grassroots consultations, with many citizens calling for both Kiir and Machar to step aside. Conversely, the IGAD process focused on a power-sharing arrangement that would leave Kiir and Machar in power for the duration of the transitional period, at which point they would both be allowed to run for office in open national elections. According to a member of the National Dialogue secretariat,

It is a stark contrast that in Addis and Khartoum where they make up the peace agreement it is believed that South Sudan cannot do without the current leaders, while at the grassroots people believe that it is the status quo that caused the problem and to move forward we musty rid the country of the status quo. When you talk of reconfiguration of power, the National Dialogue is likely to clash with the peace process.99

95 According to a civil society representative in Yambio, “When you look at the parties engaged in Addis Ababa, you could not say these are the voices of our people of the ND, and these views are not in line with what political parties are saying. The parties are saying one thing, and the views from the ND are different. There was a gap.” Interview with civil society representative, Yambio (30 Jun. 2020) [hereinafter Interview #22]. 96 See R-ARCSS, Ch. IV, Arts. 4.8.2.1.1-4. 97 See R-ARCSS, Ch. I, Art. 1.4.11; Ch. VI, Art. 6.2.2. According to a civil society representative in Yambio, “In the region, they were talking about federalism. In Addis Ababa, the parties are saying they’re not going for federalism. Here some communities were pushing for federalism. Others were saying in Addis that our people are not saying that.” Interview #22. 98 Interview #3. 99 Interview #29. According to the member of the National Dialogue secretariat, “People say there is three problems with the status quo, the leaders don’t know what they’re doing and they’re causing more harm, and two, the leaders are so much engrossed in the power struggle and that they will go to any length to pursue their interests, and the third aspect is that they have corrupted the country.” Id. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 34

Now that the National Dialogue co-chairs have attributed the conflict to a failure of leadership and endorsed the idea of a political transition, the question remains as to whether the leaders of the R-TGONU could conceivably muster the political will to implement a recommendation that so sharply diverges from their political interests.

What is clear from research participants in Wau and Yambio, South Sudanese are rapidly losing hope in both the National Dialogue and the IGAD process. Aside from the extensive delays, many research participants are skeptical that reforms proposed in either process will ever be implemented. According to a civil society representative in Wau,

I don’t think that either process helped this country…[A]t the end of the day we saw a power sharing deal that only brings back all the people that rebelled and returns the country to the status quo before 2013. So actually, the IGAD process was a letdown in the expectation that people had and the outcome…The National Dialogue process emphasized accountability, but there is no commitment from government to implement.100

Moving forward, the question remains whether the National Dialogue and the IGAD peace process will be able to coordinate more effectively when it comes to implementation. According to interviewees, some meetings between representatives of the National Dialogue and R-JMEC had been planned to consider options, but they were hampered by the Covid-19 pandemic.101 One area that members of the National Dialogue have focused on is the constitutional development process. As explained by a member of the National Dialogue secretariat, issues that have received consensus support during the grassroots consultations, regional dialogues and national conference could be forwarded to the National Constitutional Conference that is to be convened under Ch. VI of the R-ARCSS for adoption:

I see a natural bridge between the two [processes] with one process being about power and military configuration and the other about the relationship between people among themselves and how to complete the social contract that has been broken and the instruments of governance that have been discredited…[W]here they meet in my view is the constitutional making stage. That is where the constitutional conference is to sit and discuss the structure of the state and other issues. There will be nothing for the political leaders or the people of the constitutional conference to argue over because some of these issues have been decided [in the National Dialogue].102

100 Interview #17. An academic in Juba noted a similar concern, “When it comes to Ch. I, power and succession of power, that’s where the National Dialogue and the agreement are in a different area.“ Interview #3. 101According to a representative of R-JMEC, “I think the National Dialogue and the peace agreement need to be in the same space and that’s what Njoroge and the National Dialogue agreed. This needs a combined effort. As we speak, we’re not going much of anywhere. Even before Covid, we were stumbling along.” Interview #6. 102 Interview #29; see also Framing the National Dialogue Conference Agenda. According to a UN official who has worked closely with the National Dialogue, “We see that today that the government saying that the outcomes of the ND will go into the constitution making process. Our argument was that there was no harm in having the two processes going because to an extent they complemented each other. It was about speaking to the people. As the UN we made it as a condition of our support that in no way the National Dialogue should be used to create new political realities that would implicate the peace agreement.” Interview #5. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 35

Similarly, the transitional justice process described in Ch. V of the R-ARCSS could provide another area of coordination between the National Dialogue and the IGAD process. Indeed, several of the National Dialogue reports reference citizen support for the hybrid court and truth commission provided for in Ch. V. The R-TGONU’s approach to reconciliation in the context of Ch. V in particular could benefit from a thorough examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the National Dialogue. While the issue of criminal accountability for atrocity crimes may be more politically sensitive, a failure to engage with such issues could reinforce the suspicions expressed above that one of the objectives of the National Dialogue is to undermine the envisioned transitional justice process.

In an ideal world, the National Dialogue and the IGAD process would have developed coordination plans from the outset to harness their mutual advantages and avoid conflicts further down the line. However, due to concerns about the National Dialogue’s inclusivity and independence, and the major challenges that IGAD mediators faced in bringing the parties together behind the R-ARCSS, close coordination between the two initiatives may not have been politically feasible at the outset. Whether the two processes are able to coordinate more effectively when it comes to implementation will depend to a large extent on whether the R-TGONU is able to overcome its dysfunctionalities and how the leadership weighs the legitimacy of the National Dialogue outcomes against their political interests. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 36

A Politically Tumultuous National Conference

As an inherently political process, a central challenge for national dialogues is to muster the political will to challenge the status quo while not losing sight of what is realistic, both politically and in terms of the many structural constraints that confront underdeveloped and conflict-affected countries such as South Sudan. Whatever intentions surrounded the initiation of the National Dialogue, once that space was created the initiative took on a life of its own. Despite the shortcomings in terms of horizontal and vertical inclusivity, the National Dialogue far surpassed previous reconciliation processes in the breadth and depth of its consultations, which has conferred its own legitimacy on the process.

Nonetheless, as the National Dialogue was preparing for its final activity, a national conference that would bring together more than 500 delegates in Juba to deliberate on its final resolutions, there were growing signs that the political leadership was losing interest in the National Dialogue since they had already entered into an agreement with the armed opposition and in their view the war was over. According to a member of the National Dialogue secretariat, speaking in July 2020 about three months before the national conference was to be held,

There is a growing realization in the steering committee that the National Dialogue is fast losing the political support because of some of the positions that the steering committee has taken. The leaders are obviously not so excited about it anymore and because the problem for which they wanted the National Dialogue from their perspective is no longer there.103

103 Interview #29. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 37

Despite the waning support from the R-TGONU and logistical complications posed by the Covid-19 pandemic and flooding in many parts of the country, the National Dialogue proceeded to hold its national conference in Juba in November 2020. From the outset, it was apparent that it would be a politically contentious event. In his opening statement, co-chair Angelo Beda laid the blame for the conflict squarely at the feet of the ruling SPLM party and the leadership on all sides of the political divide even as he praised the President for his support of the National Dialogue,

This process has been so critical of your government, your security forces, your ruling party and your person as a leader of this country. But you have kept your composure, and you kept faith in this process. The people at the grassroots have even call for your resignation and for Riek Machar and Lam Akol to step aside, you still kept faith in the process and this process will go down in history as one of your wisest decisions and it is a legacy that no one can take away from you.104

Over the next two weeks, delegates to the national conference discussed the wide range of issues that had been decided in the grassroots consultations and regional conferences. They ultimately produced a communiqué that presented some 54 resolutions and recommendations across four thematic areas: governance, economy, security and social cohesion. Among the resolutions of the national conference were the adoption of “a mixed federal system with full political, administrative, and financial powers to the states and restricts federal interference in state affairs,” and that land shall be “owned by the communities and …managed by various levels of government in accordance with the law.” The final communiqué was silent on the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, a court that the African Union (AU) and the R-TGONU are mandated to establish under Ch. V of the R-ARCSS to bring cases against individuals accused of international crimes, but it did call on the R-TGONU to expedite the enactment of legislation for the Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), as provided for in that same chapter of the R-ARCSS. Lastly, and somewhat controversially, the national conference called for a reversion to 32 states “to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of South Sudan.”105

104 Statement of the Co-Chairman, Hon. Angelo Beda, on the Occasion of the Opening Ceremony of the National Dialogue Conference on 3rd Nov. 2020 (on file with the authors). See also National Dialogue Co-Chair says SPLM failed South Sudan, Radio Tamazuj (4 Nov. 2020), available at https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/national-dialogue-co-chair-says-splm-failed-south-sudan. 105 Communiqué, The South Sudan National Dialogue, National Conference, Juba, South Sudan, 3rd – 17th Nov. 2020 (on file with author). Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 38

After the national conference, the National Dialogue co-chairs issued a cover letter to the National Dialogue reports that raised the stakes even further. Referencing what they heard from people in the grassroots consultations, the co-chairs again reiterated that a failure of leadership lay at the heart of the problems in South Sudan:

Our country is stuck in the hands of these two leaders [Kiir and Machar] and both have proven beyond reasonable doubt that their joint leadership is no longer capable of getting the country out of its present predicament. Nothing is likely to improve or work in South Sudan unless this political deadlock is broken.106

They go on to call on the President and First Vice-President to either step down or else govern through the end of the transitional period and not run for office in the national elections currently scheduled for December 2022,

We…believe that the success of any elections in South Sudan will hinge on the non- participation of President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar. No transition or arrangement in which President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar take part together will succeed. We believe that the most patriotic thing for them to do is to prepare for their exit from politics with the honor, dignity and legacy of having been the founding fathers of the independent nation of South Sudan.107

106 Office of the Co-Chairs of the National Dialogue Steering Committee, Covering Note to the National Dialogue Reports (n.d.) (on file with the author). 107 Id. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 39

After the cover letter was reported in the media, several members of the National Dialogue steering committee disowned the document. As Chan Dhel, the Deputy Head of Information and Communication at the National Dialogue Secretariat, told Eye Radio,

The report was rejected by members of the steering committee who are eminent people because they think that report should talk about the whole work of national dialogue from the beginning up to the end of the process. But should not include some resolutions that came out from the grassroots consultation like the issue of the president.108

William Othuon, the deputy rapporteur, echoed this position a few days later, saying: “This is not our document. It had been rejected and was put aside.”109 He added, “The official document of the national dialogue will be presented to the president and another one is the communiqué. These two documents are here which have been approved by the national conference.”

As of this writing, the National Dialogue as an institution no longer exists, having fulfilled its mandate with the completion of the national conference. The National Dialogue co-chairs stand by their position and the institutions in the secretariat are in the process of compiling the 20 reports from the grassroots consultations, thematic dialogues and regional conferences, together with the communiqué from the national conference and the co-chairs’ cover letter, into a single volume that represents a summation of the National Dialogue’s output. Yet the way forward remains unclear. Groups that were thought to be close allies to the President have taken the opportunity to voice their criticisms and echo the National Dialogue’s recommendation that the existing leadership not contest in elections. A February 2021 statement from the Jieng [Dinka] Council of Elders (JCE), some of whom were members of the National Dialogue Steering Committee, said,

President Kiir and Dr. Rick Machar symbolize both failure of leadership and political deadlock. Addressing this dual problem demands that both of them step aside and give the country an opportunity to explore other options politically per the National Dialogue recommendations.110

Meanwhile, the Office of the President has not commented publicly on the matter. As a member of the National Dialogue leadership observed, “The President was good about hearing. He was good about giving people the freedom to talk. He was good about funding it. But I don’t know how seriously he expected to act upon it.”111

108 Jale Richard, People want Kiir, Machar to “step aside” – ND report, Eye Radio (17 Dec. 2020), available at https://eyeradio.org/people-want-kiir- machar-to-step-aside-nd-report/. 109 Alhadi Hawari, National Dialogue disowns ‘step aside’ report, Eye Radio (21 Dec. 2020), available at https://eyeradio.org/national-dialogue- disowns-step-aside-report/. 110 Jieng Council of Elders (JCE), Breaking the Silence – The Way Forward (19 Feb. 2021) (on file with author). 111 Interview with member of the National Dialogue leadership, Nairobi (8 Apr. 2021) [hereinafter Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 40

Conclusion and Recommendations

As of this writing, some five months since the national conference concluded in Juba, the contribution that the National Dialogue has made to peace and stability in South Sudan remains elusive. The National Dialogue was meant to observe the principles of inclusivity, credibility and transparency, but these were difficult to achieve in the politically fractured and insecure context of an ongoing civil war. For the same reason, complementarity between the National Dialogue and the peace process, though a valid objective, was not practical under the circumstances. The National Dialogue took steps to ensure freedom of speech, but it was necessarily constrained by the fear and self-censorship that characterize citizens’ relationship with their government in South Sudan. The National Dialogue tried to maximize horizontal and vertical inclusivity, but it was limited by the vastness of the geographical area to be covered and by the diversity and adversity of the constituencies and stakeholders involved.

In many respects, the National Dialogue exceeded expectations both domestically and internationally, which is a function both of the effort that its members put into the initiative and the low expectations that people had at the outset. But the National Dialogue’s real impact in terms of addressing the multiple crises in the country—the true measure of its success—remains in question. The grassroot consultations and regional dialogues have created space to comprehensively discuss the problems of the country for the first time since the conflict erupted, but the dialogue was structured in a wide- ranging manner that arguably lacked focus and did not include a clear strategy for pursuing and achieving the desired goals. Bringing the results of the National Dialogue and the R-ARCSS together into a coherent and consolidated whole remains a formidable challenge. At the same time, what has so far been achieved by the National Dialogue is valuable raw material that can still be made effective if afforded the necessary support. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 41

As the National Dialogue looks ahead to the implementation of its outcomes, at least two considerations emerge as priorities. First, the establishment a robust implementation mechanism that can work closely with the relevant government institutions is necessary to ensure that the National Dialogue’s resolutions are not shelved by the national leadership. This will require close cooperation both with R-JMEC and the peace process, as well as with the international community. While the current situation in South Sudan may be more conducive to a dialogue than was the situation when the National Dialogue was first announced, it is too late to consider repeating the initiative. The National Dialogue has worked to deliver on its mandate for four long years, and the public space for dialogue is likely to become increasingly crowded as the transitional processes envisaged in the R-ARCSS become operational. A more appropriate strategy would be to hand the mantle over to the constitutional development process and the truth and reconciliation process, and to view the National Dialogue as a catalyst for more public participation in governance processes moving forward, and not as a one-off solution for the multiple crises confronting South Sudan.

Second, the custodians of the process should work within the framework of whatever implementation mechanism is established to undertake the necessary substantive work of going through the primary and secondary source material that the National Dialogue produced, identifying the major recommendations that were made on the consolidation of peace, security, governance and economic development, and translating these into real policies that can contribute to the longer-term transformation of South Sudan. One aspect of this work could be to explore synergies with existing or previous policy discussions, such as the SPLM’s stated goal during the previous war of ‘taking the towns to the people’, investing in infrastructure and channeling essential services to rural areas, and building on South Sudanese cultural values and institutions. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 42

In pursuing these dual aims, policymakers should consider the following recommendations:

To the custodians of the National Dialogue’s outcomes:

• Continue to invest efforts into securing the support of the leadership on all sides of the political divide, including officials in the incumbent government, opposition groups that are now party to the R-TGONU and non-signatories to the R-ARCSS. Political inclusivity is as important now as ever. Any additional buy-in that can be secured can contribute to the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes.

• Develop plans for civic engagement efforts to raise awareness about the National Dialogue and its outcomes. The efforts invested into implementing a bottom-up process could be lost if people are not kept informed about the impact that it has had and lose confidence in the process. Any such civic engagement efforts should extend to opposition-controlled areas and rural areas where people may be less aware of the National Dialogue.

• Continue to explore opportunities for coordinating activities with R-JMEC and other transitional institutions created under the umbrella of the R-ARCSS. Take stock of areas where the various initiatives and complement and reinforce one another and where they must be deconflicted and design implementation mechanisms accordingly.

• Proceed with plans to convene an annual national conference to review progress towards implementation of the National Dialogue’s outcomes.

To the R-TGONU:

• Formalize the National Dialogue outcomes through appropriate procedures, including the enactment of legislation. Establish a robust implementation mechanism and provide it with the political and financial support necessary to conduct its work.

• Ensure that future transitional processes, including the constitutional development process and the truth and reconciliation process, study the National Dialogue and learn from its strengths and weaknesses. Take steps to insulate delegate selection processes from political interference, include appropriate oversight mechanisms, and invest into increasing their outreach in rural areas. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 43

To civic actors in South Sudan:

• Work with the custodians of the National Dialogue to engage citizens on the process, it outcomes, and the way forward.

• Conduct outreach among national, regional and international policymakers to support the implementation of the National Dialogue’s outcomes and to ensure that other transitional processes make maximum use of the lessons learned from the National Dialogue.

To South Sudan’s international partners:

• Provide political and financial support to the National Dialogue’s outcomes. The National Dialogue has provided a wealth of information to begin thinking about what state and nation- building efforts in South Sudan might focus on moving forward. South Sudan’s international partners should incorporate this thinking into their strategies for the country.

• Work with regional mediators and R-JMEC to find ways of maximizing the complementarities between the National Dialogue and the peace process.

• Support the custodians of the National Dialogue’s outcomes to collate, analyze and promote the National Dialogue’s recommendations and resolutions among South Sudanese and other interested parties. Reach out to research institutions and other interested third parties to study primary source material from the grassroots consultations, regional dialogues, national conference and other activities of the National Dialogue and process it in a way that can maximize its utility moving forward. The establishment of a searchable database of the primary and secondary source material from the National Dialogue could help to facilitate such efforts. Citizen perspectives on the National Dialogue in South Sudan | 44