DOCSLIB.ORG

Iraqi Forces Involved in the “Liberation” of Mosul, Total About 80,000 from Six Major Groups

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Iraqi Forces Involved in the “Liberation” of Mosul, Total About 80,000 from Six Major Groups Lessons learned from the battle for Mosul 2016-7 Professor Clive Williams MG Centre for Military and Security Law, The Australian National University 1 Scope of presentation • Mosul statistics (and some comparisons with Aleppo). • “Allied” interests and military forces involved. • The lead-up to the Mosul battle and current situation. • What will happen after Mosul falls? • Lessons learned from the battle. 2 Operation Okra.. • About 780 ADF personnel have deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation OKRA. These personnel make up the Air Task Group (ATG), the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) and Task Group Taji (TG Taji). 3 Operation Okra • Comprising approximately: – 400 personnel assigned to the ATG at Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE – 300 personnel assigned to TG Taji in Iraq – 80 personnel assigned to the SOTG in Iraq • The SOTG soldiers have been deployed to assist the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) at Mosul. 4 Mosul statistics 5 Stats – Mosul.. Mosul’s population prior to IS occupation in 2014 was 2.4 million. It had - and still has - a Sunni Arab population majority (85-90%), concentrated particularly in Mosul west of the Tigris. Across the Tigris and further north in the suburbs, Mosul's population comprises mainly Assyrians, Kurds, Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis, Armenians and Mandeans. 6 Mosul cultural sites • Mosul is rich in ancient cultural sites and its museum was the second largest in Iraq after Baghdad. • IS destruction of cultural treasures seems to have been widespread. https://vid.alarabiya.net/images/2014/07/24/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea- aca3d8554b25/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea- 7 aca3d8554b25_16x9_600x338.JPG Mosul cultural sites • IS has a unit Kata'ib Taswiyya tasked with selecting cultural targets for demolition. • Some easily transportable artefacts have been looted and sold to finance IS activities. https://vid.alarabiya.net/images/2014/07/24/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea- aca3d8554b25/344392b2-81b7-496a-99ea- 8 aca3d8554b25_16x9_600x338.JPG Stats - Mosul . Important commercial products of the Mosul area include marble, sulphur and oil/petroleum. One of IS’ obstructive defensive measures was to set fire to a major sulphur Local marble factory south of 9 Mosul. Comparisons with Aleppo 10 Stats – Aleppo.. Aleppo’s population is 1.8 million, with 1.5 million in government controlled areas. Comparing built-up areas, Aleppo is much the same size as Mosul with an area of 190 sq km – compared to Mosul’s 170 sq km, but Aleppo has more multi-storey buildings. In Aleppo, the attacking Syrian government and Russian forces were seen in the West as the “bad guys” and the US-supported opposition fighters (other than those aligned with al-Qaeda (AQ)) as the “good guys”. 11 Stats - Aleppo . The reality was that the Aleppo opposition groups were an unsavoury loose coalition who used civilians as human shields and lacked much popular support. https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=mosul+street&as_epq=&a s_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearc h=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&tbm=isch&q=Ale12 ppo+human+shields&imgrc=qJqWfW0uSNoaEM%3A Stats - Aleppo . The Syrian government and Russian forces were ruthless in going after the opposition groups and were prepared to cause civilian casualties in the process. http://pravda-team.ru/eng/image/article/3/0/4/57304.jpeg 13 Mosul - allied interests and military forces involved 14 Competing interests . Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the US, the Arab Gulf States, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shia groups, Sunni tribal groups and Iraq’s ethnic minority groups - all have overlapping or competing strategic interests in Mosul. To take one example, Turkey’s interest dates from the period of the Ottoman empire. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and later the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne removed territory that included Mosul from Turkey. 15 Competing interests.. Turkish nationalists still believe that Mosul should be part of Turkey. The Turkish government wants to maintain a military presence near Mosul to keep the lid on Kurdish separatism and protect Turkmen interests. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/images/d c5hur-6n0r9r4chrdiyuzre2a_original.jpg 16 Competing interests . The US focus is on defeating IS in both Mosul and Raqqa as soon as possible, but it does not want US casualties. It has encouraged the Kurdish Peshmerga to take on IS, but is now limiting US air support to them in favour of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and CTS. At the same time. the US does not want to alienate Turkey by making the Peshmerga capable enough to take over Mosul, or seeming to support Kurdish separatism. 17 Competing interests . Iraq says it does not want foreign forces on its soil - but does not have the capability to remove the US-led 60 nation coalition or Turkish troops. https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=turksih+forces+in+iraq&a s_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as _sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#gws_rd=ssl&img http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/01/26/concerns- rc=E_ZbyjaFN1RI7M%3A 18 about-fatigue-mount-iraqi-troops-prepare-retake-mosul.html Participating forces.. US intelligence sources believe that IS committed 3- 5,000 fighters to protect Mosul, of whom more than 1,000 are foreign fighters. 19 Participating forces.. While a number of IS commanders have remained in Mosul, more senior IS figures have reportedly sold their properties and moved their families to Syria. IS leader al-Baghdadi is probably in Raqqa. 20 Participating forces.. Iraqi forces involved in the “liberation” of Mosul, total about 80,000 from six major groups: https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=i sch&as_q=iraqi+forces+advancing+on+Mosul& as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&i mgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesear ch=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&g ws_rd=ssl#gws_rd=ssl&imgrc=9S- sTkTU29bHYM%3A 21 Participating forces.. First, the ISF, (20-25,000) - the regular Iraqi Armed Forces and Interior Ministry forces - including the Iraqi Police, and the General Security Directorate’s Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). They have three divisions around Mosul. Iraqi military forces include the CTS (1,800) separate from Defense and the Interior Ministry, under command of the PM. The CTS has two Task Forces at Mosul. They wear black uniforms. 22 Participating forces.. Second, the Hashd al-Ashari, a 15,000 strong Sunni militia force under the nominal control of Falah al-Fayad, head of the National Security https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q= mosul+street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar= &imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe Agency. =images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&t bm=isch&q=Hashd+al-Ashairi . Third, the Haras Nineveh, which consists of local Sunni Arab tribes. https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q=mosul+ street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar=&imgc=&imgc olor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=images&as_filetype=23 &as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&tbm=isch&q=Haras+Nineveh &imgrc=DUUdLjbjsDaXvM%3A Participating forces.. Fourth, the Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a Shia coalition of 40+ militias https://www.google.com/search?as_st=y&tbm=isch&as_q= mosul+street&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&imgsz=&imgar= &imgc=&imgcolor=&imgtype=&cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe supported by Iran =images&as_filetype=&as_rights=&gws_rd=ssl#as_st=y&t bm=isch&q=pmf+iraq&imgrc=FTMjC-lKXkqAOM%3A and nominally under Iraqi government 24 control. Participating forces.. Fifth, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, estimated at 40,000 to 50,000, that have surrounded Mosul in a crescent formation from NW to SE. They include 1,500 http://rudaw.net/ContentFilesArchive/232115Image1.jpg members of the Turkish-backed Nineveh Guard Force. 25 Participating forces . Sixth, smaller armed groups including Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Kakais, and Turkmen who are affiliated with, and supported by, either the Iraqi government, the PMF, or Kurdish groups. One such group is the 600-strong Christian Nineveh Plains Protection Unit (NPU). http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnnnext/dam/assets/141120092346- 26 qassim-shesho-with-a-group-horizontal-large-gallery.jpg The Fallujah blueprint 27 Fallujah the blueprint.. • Despite US protestations that Mosul should be recovered first because of its importance to IS (and Washington), the Iraqi Haider Al-Abadi government made the recovery of Fallujah its first priority. • Fallujah, being only 66 km from Baghdad, was a much more pressing concern for the Iraqi government than distant Mosul because it was a base for attacks on Baghdad. 28 Fallujah the blueprint • Fallujah fell after three months’ fighting but much of the city was destroyed. • Resettlement of the displaced Sunni population back into Fallujah has been hampered by excesses of the Shia militia, government’s failure to restore destroyed infrastructure and property, and IS’s placement of booby traps and mines throughout the city. • IS has now shifted to rural guerrilla warfare around Fallujah. 29 30 Conduct of the battle.. • The Iraqi advance towards Mosul began on 17 October 2016. • The offensive began with Iraqi troops and Peshmerga fighters engaging IS on three fronts outside Mosul, going from occupied village to village in the surrounding area. • More than 120 towns and villages were freed from IS control in the first two weeks of fighting. By 3 December that number had increased to 369. 31 IS preparation.. • IS was always expected to put up strong resistance in Mosul, as they had done elsewhere, and particularly because of Mosul being the “capital” of the IS caliphate in Iraq. • IS also had two and a half years to prepare for an allied attack. 32 IS preparation.. • As anticipated, IS has made extensive use of: – Snipers and mobile combat teams. – Tunnels to target Iraqi HQ areas and re- access “cleared” areas. – Suicide belts to avoid capture alive.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Stomperud I Bagdad
    Fagfellevurdert artikkel A˚ rgang 74 | Nr. 3 | 2016 | ISSN 1891-5580 Stomperud i Bagdad Cecilie Hellestveit*, PhD, Seniorforsker, International Law and Policy Institute Artikkelen foretar en analyse av Norges militære bidrag i Irak fra 2015 med utgangspunkt i folkerettens regler for militære utenlandsoppdrag. Artikkelen argumenterer for at de folkerettslige rammene for det norske militære bidraget i Irak pa˚ et par vesentlige punkter skiller seg fra andre nyere norske militære utenlandsoperasjoner. Den peker pa˚ tre utfordringer som det norske militære engasjementet i Irak derfor medfører: notoriteten til det militære oppdraget innad og utad, rettssikkerheten til norske soldater, og effektiviteten til soldater i en prekær rettslig situasjon. Stikkord: folkerett × maktbruk × Irak × Syria × IS × norske militære utlandsoperasjoner The article analyses the Norwegian military contribution to Iraq initiated in 2015 from the perspective of international law regulating military operations on foreign soil. It argues that this military operation is distinguished from other Norwegian military expeditions in recent decades. The article draws attention to three challenges that consequently arise: a low level of clarity concerning the nature and scope of the assignment, lack of legal guarantees calibrated to the tasks of the soldiers and finally poor efficiency resulting from a precarious legal situation. Innledning Den norske regjeringen besluttet i oktober 2014 a˚ sende 120 norske soldater til Irak for a˚ «bidra til a˚ trene opp irakiske sikkerhetsstyrker» (Solberg 2014). Fra april 2015 er en kontingent stasjonert i den kurdiske provinshovedstaden Irbil, formelt underlagt sikkerhetsstyrkene til den autonome kurdiske regionen i Nord-Irak (KRG), mens en annen er stasjonert i hovedstaden Bagdad. Militærpersonalet skal støtte irakiske sentralmyndigheter og kurdiske regionale myndigheter i kampen for a˚ gjenerobre territorium fra organisasjonen Islamsk Stat (IS), som i 2015 kontrollerte ca.
    [Show full text]
  • Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
    Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security Updated August 24, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44135 Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Contents The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State ........................................................................ 1 Counter-IS Coalition Mandate......................................................................................................... 2 Military Aspects of the Coalition .................................................................................................... 2 NATO ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Turkey ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Challenges to Coalition Coherence ........................................................................................... 6 Figures Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month ................................. 3 Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq .......................... 7 Tables Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State ....................................
    [Show full text]
  • Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq Key
    ACAPS Briefing Note: Conflict Humanitarian Implications of Violence Key highlights (25 July – 7 August) 1. August has seen significant deterioration in the humanitarian situation. An in Northern and Central Iraq estimated 200,000 individuals may have been displaced from recent fighting in 7 August 2014 Sinjar and surrounding areas, and as many as 35-50,000 IDPs could be trapped in Jebel Sinjar in extremely urgent need of humanitarian assistance: tens of children are reported to have died from dehydration. Insignificant Minor Moderate Important Major 2. Conflict affected areas face a breakdown of basic services, affecting an estimated Expected impact X 5 million people. Many qualified health, teaching and technical staff have fled and items such as spare parts, medicines and vaccines are in short supply. Not required Low Moderate Important Urgent Need for international International humanitarian organisations are mostly unable to reach those assistance X trapped in contested areas and information on the current situation is extremely limited. 3. Fighting between IS and Kurdish Peshmerga is currently concentrated around Key Findings Mosul dam, Iraq's largest hydroelectric facility. If maintenance of the critically Anticipated An estimated 850,000 people have been displaced in the two unstable dam is disrupted, the dam could be breached, leading to massive scope and months since the start of Islamic State’s (IS) ‘Ramadan offensive’, flooding. IS’ takeover of the dam could disrupt electricity supply to large parts of scale bringing the total displaced since the start of the year to 1.4 million. the country, including Baghdad. An unknown number of civilians are affected by conflict and the breakdown of public services.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-ISIS States by Dr
    Background Report VII: September 5, 2017 - April 30, 2018 Post-ISIS States By Dr. Gina Lennox Kurdish Lobby Australia Email: [email protected] Website: www.kurdishlobbyaustralia.com ©2018 Kurdish Lobby Australia You are welcome to share this report but please do not make changes without permission from Kurdish Lobby Australia. 1 Table of Contents Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................ 3 Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Summary ................................................................................................................................ 5 Why what is happening in the Middle East is relevant to Australia .......................... 9 What the Australian Government Can Do ........................................................................... 9 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 10 ISIS................................................................................................................................................... 10 Cost of War ................................................................................................................................... 11 Reconciliation and Reconstruction ..................................................................................... 14
    [Show full text]
  • Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
    Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security August 24, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44135 Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Contents The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State ........................................................................ 1 Counter-IS Coalition Mandate ........................................................................................................ 2 Military Aspects of the Coalition .................................................................................................... 2 NATO ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Turkey ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Challenges to Coalition Coherence ........................................................................................... 6 Figures Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month ................................. 3 Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq .......................... 7 Tables Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State ..................................... 8 Contacts
    [Show full text]
  • The Rojava Revolution
    The Rojava Revolution By Aram Shabanian Over five years ago an uprising in Dara’a, Southern Syria, set into motion the events that would eventually culminate in the multi­front Syrian Civil War we see today. Throughout the conflict one group in particular has stuck to its principles of self­defense, gender equality, democratic leadership and environmental protectionism. This group, the Kurds of Northern Syria (Henceforth Rojava), have taken advantage of the chaos in their country to push for more autonomy and, just perhaps, an independent state. The purpose of this paper is to convince the reader that increased support of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) would be beneficial to regional and international goals and thus should be initiated immediately. Throughout this paper there will be sources linking to YouTube videos; use this to “watch” the Rojava Revolution from beginning to end for yourself. In the midst of the horror that is the Syrian Civil War there is a single shining glimmer of hope; Rojava, currently engaged in a war for survival and independence whilst simultaneously engaging in a political experiment the likes of which has never been seen before. The Kurds are the second­largest ethnic group in the middle east today, spanning four countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) but lacking a home state of their own. Sometimes called the ultimate losers in the Sykes­Picot agreement, the Kurds have fought for a homeland of their own ever since said agreement was signed in 1916. The Kurds in all of the aforementioned nations are engaged in some degree of insurrection or another.
    [Show full text]
  • Cause for Concern: Civilians Killed in Coalition Strikes
    Cause For Concern Hundreds of civilian non-combatants credibly reported killed in first year of Coalition airstrikes against Islamic State Aftermath of a devastating Coalition airstrike at Hawijah, Iraq on June 3 2015, which reportedly killed up to 70 civilians (picture via Iraqi Spring) August 2015 Cause For Concern: Civilians Killed in Coalition Strikes Acknowledgements This Report is the result of a six-month study begun in February 2015, with the aim of building as clear a picture as possible of alleged civilian fatalities from Coalition airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria. The project has been made possible thanks to generous funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, which enabled us to employ two highly-skilled experts. Research into civilian and ‘friendly fire’ deaths in Iraq has been conducted by our Baghdad-based researcher Latif Habib, while our London-based researcher Kinda Haddad has pursued claims of civilian deaths in Syria. This Report is written by Airwars director Chris Woods with an additional feature by Kinda Haddad, and is intended to be read in conjunction with our full database of events. All data modelling and mapping is the work of Basile Simon, who also designs and maintains our ever-expanding website. We are particularly indebted to those monitoring groups, journalists and ordinary citizens in Iraq and Syria whose own courageous work informs many of the incidents we cover. In particular we would like to thank the Syrian Network for Human Rights; the Violations Documentation Center; the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; Raqaa is Being Slaughtered Silently; and Iraq Body Count, all of which have worked tirelessly to expose not just fatalities from Coalition strikes but also from the far greater carnage still unfolding in Iraq and Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
    Contents Introduction................................................................................................................... 3 Objections to listing mechanism based on the statutory criteria .......................... 4 Minister’s decision founded upon unreliable foreign intelligence. ................... 4 Failure to take into account political context........................................................ 7 The PKK do not meet salient non-legislative factors ............................................. 11 Non-legislative factor: ideology............................................................................. 12 Non-legislative factor: risk to Australia ............................................................... 13 Non-legislative factor: engagement in peace or mediation processes............. 14 The conflict in Turkey and Iraq is properly the subject of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and not domestic criminal law...................................... 16 Impact on Kurdish Australians – chilling effect of re-listing on freedom of political communication ............................................................................................ 19 [f] Page 2 Introduction 1. These submissions are made on behalf of the Kurdish Democratic Community Centre of Victoria and the Democratic Kurdish Community Centre of NSW (collectively, the KA) in relation to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s (the PJCIS’s) review of the re-listing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (the PKK). 2. The re-listing
    [Show full text]
  • 1 2 3 4 a B C D E F G H I
    A B C D E F G H I J K AG Capabilities for Implementing Sources Program Authorities Overseeing Agency Implementing Agency Budget Overview and Purpose Guiding Document Prerequisites, requirements, findings 1 Capacity Building Personnel Infrastructure Australian Civilian Corps None found at time of Department of Foreign Australian Civilian Corps Australian Civilian A$7.9 million The Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) was formed in 2011 to bridge the gap None found at time of The budget for the 2014/15 financial year allows the [1]Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Development (ACC) report Affairs and Trade (ACC) Corps (ACC) (2014-2015) [1] between emergency relief and long term recovery programs, and to enhance report government to deploy around 40 specialists for 6 months Trade. "Overview of the Australian Civilian specialists the quality of Australia’s response to situations of disaster and conflict. Since each deployment. ACC specialists deploy as Australian Corps." Australian Civilian Corps. Available: http://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment- its establishment, the ACC has undertaken over 100 deployments in over 15 Government officials under the Australian Civilian Corps Act priorities/building- countries, the majority in Asia and the Pacific. The ACC register is comprised 2011. All specialists are trained and prepared in advance of resilience/acc/Pages/australian-civilian- of over 500 experienced civilian specialists with expertise in fields including deployment, and are typically deployed for between three to corps.aspx aid coordination, disaster risk reduction, electoral assistance, health twelve months. [1] administration, engineering, and law and justice. Consistent with the government’s new development policy the Minister of Foreign Affairs has approved a new ACC mandate - “to provide Australian specialists, primarily to help our neighbours in the Indo-Pacific region, to prevent, prepare for stabilise and recover from disasters and conflict”.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asian Responses Countering Daesh Extremism: European And
    02/2016 PANORAMA INSIGHTS INTO ASIAN AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS COUNTERING DAESH EXTREMISM EUROPEAN AND ASIAN RESPONSES K o n r a d A d e n a u e r S t i f t u n g Panorama InsIghts Into asIan and euroPean affaIrs Countering daesh extremism Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs is a series of occasional papers published by the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung’s “Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia and the Pacific/Singapore”. This is a special edition published in collaboration with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. © 2016 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Singapore Editors: Dr. Beatrice Gorawantschy, Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Megha Sarmah, Patrick Rueppel Publishers: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ltd 36 Bukit Pasoh Road Singapore 089848 Registration Number: 201228783N Tel: (65) 6603-6160 Tel: (65) 6227-8343 Email: [email protected] Website: www.kas.de/singapore International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Block S4, Level B4 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying or recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the publisher. Manuscript offers, review copies, exchange journals, and requests for subscription are to be sent to the editors. The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S.
    [Show full text]
  • Ladies and Gentlemen, the Australian Defence Force Is Entering a Period
    AIR CHIEF MARSHAL M.D. BINSKIN, AC CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE Opening Statement Budget Estimates Hearing 01 March 2017 **Check against delivery** Thank you Senator. I will give an overview of our operations around the globe. Firstly, our operations in Iraq are currently focussed on supporting the Iraqi Security Forces as they continue their offensive to regain control of the city of Mosul. In late January, Prime Minister al-Abadi declared East Mosul had been fully liberated and on 19 February, he announced the start of Iraq’s campaign to retake west Mosul. Over the past week, the Iraqis have recaptured a number of strategic positions including Ghazlani military base and Mosul Airport with support from Coalition nations, including Australian Special Forces advisors and the Air Task Group. I had the opportunity to join the Air Task Group during a recent mission in support of the Mosul operations. Flying over Iraq, observing the F/A-18 Hornets, following the targeting processes as well as monitoring the interaction between coalition aircraft and ground forces reinforced the complexity of the battlespace and the excellent work our people are doing at all levels of operations against Daesh. In numeric terms, to date, the E-7A Wedgetail has completed 319 airborne command and control sorties while the KC-30A Tanker has offloaded an impressive 33.5 million kilograms of fuel to Australian and Coalition aircraft since Operation OKRA commenced in October 2014. Our Hornet aircrat have conducted more than 2,100 sorties over Iraq and Syria, including those in support of the Mosul offensive which began last October.
    [Show full text]
  • ISIS: the Military Response in Iraq and Syria
    ISIS: the military response in Iraq and Syria Standard Note: SN/IA/6995 Last updated: 12 November 2014 Author: Louisa Brooke-Holland and Claire Mills Section International Affairs and Defence Section The United States has led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. RAF Tornado GR4 and the Reaper remotely piloted air system (RPAS) have conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. Reaper and Rivet Joint aircraft have also been authorised to fly surveillance missions over Syria. France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Canada and Denmark have all conducted air strikes in Iraq. Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have all supported US strikes against ISIS in Syria. Combat troops have been explicitly ruled out by the UK and the other the countries involved, amid debate about the reliance on air power alone. However a number of British soldiers are training Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq, while further advisory personnel are expected to be deployed to Iraqi headquarters as part of a broader package of support announced on 5 November. The US also announced on 7 November the intention to deploy up to 1,500 additional military personnel in order to initiate a more comprehensive training package for Iraqi forces. Several Coalition partners have offered additional trainers as part of that initiative. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it.
    [Show full text]