Problems of British Policy in China at the End of the 19th Century1 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. — Aleš Skřivan, Jr. During the long period of the years 1815–1902 Great Britain pursued a consistent prin‑ ciple of Splendid Isolation in its foreign policy, a term which means it sought to main‑ tain the balance of power in Europe above all, while with one exception,2 avoiding commitments which might force it to get involved in continental conflicts. As well as only sporadic involvement even in regions outside Europe, Britain did not develop ac‑ tivities on the basis of any close ties to the great powers or any other parties. London pursued this policy, underpinned by its economic power and naval supremacy, for decades. The situation changed significantly, however, in the 1890s, a period which demonstrated that in many contexts Splendid Isolation was becoming ever less of an advantage for Britain, and in a number of cases was even a threat. The volatility of German foreign policy and the development of “Weltpolitik” pursued after the removal of Bismarck from the office of Chancellor in March 1890 brought with it considerable uncertainty. The rapprochement of Russia and France from the end of the 1890s, which culminated in a treaty of alliance ratified at the turn of 1893/1894, caused great concern in London. For the British, the fact that St Petersburg and Paris had begun co‑operating in implementing their expansionist objectives overseas put them in an unfavourable position, and “from 1895 the political thinking of British states‑ men pivoted on the central fact that Great Britain had no satisfactory reply to this poten‑ tially hostile combination”.3 In terms of the determining forces of British policy, there were fundamental dif‑ ferences in the general perspective of foreign policy. Long ‑standing Liberal leader and four‑time Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, was a supporter of the “Lit‑ tle England” ideology, meaning that he opposed the acquisition of further overseas territory, instead prioritising the construction of a so‑called informal empire, where such territory would be linked to the British Empire only through economic ties formed on free trade principles. The facts supported this stance — since the 1880s the 1 Thisstudy is one of the outcomes of the grant The Political and Economic Interests of Great Britain and Germany in China, 1894–1914, awarded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GA13–12431S). 2 The xceptione mentioned occurred in 1854–1856, when Great Britain took part in the Crimean War against Russia alongside France, the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire. 3 L. K. YOUNG, British Policy in China, 1895–1902, Oxford 1970, p. 1. aleK š S řIVAN, SR. — ALEš SKřIVAN, JR. 73 British had expanded their empire, but trade with these territories was negligible; in 1901 they contributed only 2.5% to total British foreign trade, while 75% was with for‑ eign countries.4 Confronted with these facts, the argument of those supporting Em‑ pire building, including leading members of the Conservative Party that further co‑ lonial expansion would lead to a considerable growth in trade, could not be justified. Nevertheless, trade remained a key factor, which right up to the First World War affected London’s foreign policy in a significant way, although Britain’s position in the decades before the war had undergone much change. The British Empire had main‑ tained its primacy, but its share of world trade had significantly fallen. Despite vari‑ ous initiatives, it maintained the principle of free trade until 1914 and did not impose duties to protect domestic manufacturing. Economic considerations did of course af‑ fect British policy in terms of the huge opportunities available in China, Latin Amer‑ ica and the Ottoman Empire. From a general perspective, the British hoped that profit from their trade with China, India and Japan would help what had then become an unfavourable balance of trade with the United States, Canada and Argentina. Fur‑ thermore, there were greater fears of competition from Germany overseas. It was soon demonstrated that their fears were justified — in 1902, for example, Britain held 33% of foreign investments in China, while Germany already had 20.9%.5 On the other hand, we cannot present Britain’s situation as a clear case of de‑ fence and retreat. Britain still had very effective means for defending its position. The British navy had maintained the supremacy it needed over its potential rivals. More than half of the world’s merchant shipping fleets were British. Dominance on the world’s seas was both a guarantee that trading relations would operate unim‑ peded, and an effective tool for any policies of expansion. London continued to re‑ main banker and lender to the rest of the world. British foreign investment grew between 1875 and 1900 from 6 to 10 billion pounds, with annual interest achieving a level of 500 million pounds, exceeding profit from foreign trade by up to five times. Britain’s financial and trading influence was directly associated with the size of its empire, since, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, declared on 10 June 1896, no nation had ever achieved greatness without commerce, nor survived its decay. Britain’s economic position was greatly dependent on overseas trade, which between 1880 and 1900 amounted to an average annual volume of 710 million pounds, which in that time was a truly huge amount. It was three times France’s foreign trade, and ten times that of Russia at the time. All of Britain’s global considerations at the time were based on securing mari‑ time links and protecting trading routes. For Britain, maintaining dominance on the world’s seas was fundamental, and as the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Selborne, declared in his memorandum of 16 November 1900, any defeat in naval warfare would mean “a disaster of almost unparalleled magnitude in history”6 for Brit‑ 4 C. J. LOWE, The Reluctant Imperialists. British Foreign Policy 1878–1902, Vol. 1, London 1967, p. 4. 5 M. H. WILGUS, Sir Claude MacDonald, the Open Door and British Informal Empire in China, 1895–1900, New York, London 1987, p. 30. 6 The ationalN Archives, London, Kew (further TNA), Cabinet Papers 38/59/118, Selborne Memorandum, 16 November, 1901. 74 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2014 ain. The requirement for naval dominance had been de facto generally accepted from 1815, and was expressed by the Two Power Standard doctrine in 1889, according to which Britain should have a flotilla of warships stronger than the combined power of the second and third largest navies. This principle was essentially accepted by the politicians of both main political parties. However, it became ever more difficult to maintain the principle with spending on the navy growing significantly. While this law assigned annual navy costs of 4 million pounds in 1889, by 1907 this had already grown to 43 million pounds. We can assume this fact in the end forced leading politi‑ cians in London to consider withdrawing from “Splendid Isolation” and searching for an alliance with another naval power. The claim that at the end of the 19th century, Britain had relatively little interest in continental European affairs in essence reflects reality. From a certain perspective, it can be said that Britain’s navy secured it not just its position in the world’s seas and vital links overseas, but on the other hand it de facto isolated the country from the European continent. However, by the end of the 19th century, this state of affairs was proving to be ever less beneficial due to the requirements of securing its posi‑ tion beyond Europe, which was leading to a “strain on resources”, and as such Prime Minister, the Marquess of Salisbury, opposed direct annexations in China, despite the pressures placed on him by powerful organisations advocating this policy. During the 1890s, the attention of the great powers was focused outside Europe mainly on Africa and the Far East. In Africa, the British mainly faced the ambitions of France, and in China faced the growing pressure of Russia, in relation to the build‑ ing of the Trans ‑Siberian Railway,7 whose construction was approved in 1891, and so “the grouping of two naval powers whose imperial ambitions had long caused problems for Britain threatened serious embarrassment for British policy — particularly in the Mediter‑ ranean but also in Africa and Asia”.8 Great Britain, along with Russia, was the earliest state to show interest in China, with the first attempts at establishing closer relations with the Middle Kingdom oc‑ curring at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries.9 After the First Opium War with China in 1839–1842, Great Britain acquired the island of Hong Kong in the Peace Treaty of Nanking of 1842, five ports were opened for British trade10 and China was obliged to pay war reparations. Soon after, similar treaties were signed with China by the USA, France, Russia and other countries. The Second Opium War of 1856–1858, in which Britain and France fought against China, ended with the signing of the Tien‑ tsin Treaties on 26 and 27 June 1858, on which basis amongst other things the victors secured further extensive privileges. The Third Opium War of 1859–1860 ended with 7 For further information on the Trans‑Siberian Railway and the transfer of Russia’s atten‑ tion to the Far East, see A. MALOZEMOFF, Russian far Eastern Policy 1881–1904, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1958, pp. 20–40. 8 E. W. EDWARDS, British Diplomacy and Finance in China, 1895–1914, Oxford, New York.