VII. Southern Africa

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VII. Southern Africa VII. Southern Africa In several countries, the year was dominated by elections, which differed in terms of their legitimacy. Due to the death of Zambian President Mwanawasa in offi ce and the subse- quent ousting of South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, SADC had three different chair- persons during the year. The sub-regional body, which welcomed back the Seychelles as its 15th member state during its annual summit, was kept busy with a number of meetings in the reluctant search for a political solution in Zimbabwe, but failed to contribute in a meaningful way to a lasting improvement there. The country remained mired in violence and confl ict, while the situation for the majority of the population deteriorated further. The general stability of SADC and cooperation among its member states was tested by the differences in view over the handling of the Zimbabwe crisis, but the sub-regional bloc avoided a split over these political matters. Swaziland and Angola, next to Zimbabwe, 400 • Southern Africa remained among the worst performers with regard to democracy and human rights, while elections in all three countries testifi ed further to the authoritarian nature of the dominant political culture. Intra-regional economic integration went ahead with the implementation of a FTA, though multiple affi nities among member states with different preferential trade organisations, and the differences over the interim EPAs remained a challenge. The gen- eral economic performance declined considerably towards the end of the year as a result of the global economic crisis, and rising food prices had severe impacts on many people, forcing governments to take relief measures for the poorest. Elections, Democracy and Human Rights This was a rather turbulent year in terms of elections and political life, though as in previ- ous years few lives were lost, with the notable exception of Zimbabwe, where politically motivated violence seemed to remain chronic. During the year, three new heads of state took offi ce, only one of these transfers being planned and anticipated: on 1 April Ian Khama took over the presidency of Botswana from Festus Mogae. Due to an amazingly rapid loss of support and confi dence within his own party, South African President Thabo Mbeki was forced to resign at the end of September and Kgalema Mothlane took over as interim president for the balance of the year and beyond. In Zambia, the death of President Levy Mwanawasa on 19 August led to presidential elections within 90 days, as required by the constitution. From these the former vice president, Rupiah Banda, emerged as a close and somewhat unexpected winner. President Robert Mugabe managed once again to stay in offi ce against all the odds, though this time round it was a diffi cult exercise, test- ing his abilities as a plotter to the fullest, while also suggesting that others in the internal power circle representing the military might already have taken over the decisive role on policy issues. Scheduled parliamentary elections took place in Angola on 5 and 6 September and in Swaziland on 19 September, while parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Zimbabwe on 29 March, with a second round of presidential elections on 27 June. While Zimbabwe’s parliament as a result had a new majority composed of the two factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the battle over the presidency raged on with strong suggestions of foul play. The second round of the presidential elec- tion (after a highly dubious and much delayed result from the fi rst round denying Tsvangi- rai the absolute majority of votes that many believed he had actually secured) turned into a farce after Tsvangirai opted out as a result of the systematic use of state terror against supporters of his MDC party. Parliamentary elections in Swaziland were also a mockery of the meaning of the term, as no political parties were allowed to register and campaign. King Mswati III ruled almost as a feudal monarch. Consequently, it was hardly any sur- prise that Zimbabwe and Swaziland remained among the pariah states for their political restrictions, repression and lack of civil liberties. Ongoing disputes over contested parli-.
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