THE SIEGE of PAVIA Passage by Charlemagne's Army Through The

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SIEGE OF PAVIA

Passage by Charlemagne’s army through the Lombard fortifications at Chiusa obviously was the necessary first phase for successful Carolingian military operations in Italy against King Desiderius. Charlemagne knew very well, however, that once his forces broke through Desiderius’ defenses in the clusae and prepared to enter the plains of northern Italy, there would be new and different strategic and tactical problems with which to deal. Desiderius’ army, which had fled from Chiusa, had not been seriously damaged, although its morale is likely to have been weakened by the sud- den and unplanned retreat. Therefore, Charlemagne had to consider the possibility of having to engage a reformed and reinforced Lombard army in the field under royal command. Since Desiderius was on the defensive, he was positioned to choose both where and when to confront the invaders. In addition, Charlemagne might have to capture numerous city, town, and lesser fortifications, either by storm or extended sieges, should these strongholds choose not to sur- render but rather to oppose the Carolingians. In fact, the need to deal with only a few important fortress cities before advancing to Pavia likely would be exceptionally disruptive to the Carolingian march on the Lombard capital and rather different from Pippin’s operations in 754 and 756, which faced no local opposition. In addition, Charlemagne had to consider the possibility, despite the deployment of Bernard’s army to the east in order to block an enemy advance, that relief forces might come to Desiderius’ aid from his son-in-law in Bavaria, with or without Avar support, or even by way of a possible Byzantine intervention. During the Merovingian era, as various histories and chronicles well- known to the Carolingians attested, Frankish armies from north of the Alps traditionally had little trouble ravaging the countryside of northern Italy. However, these forces had great difficulty in taking the fortress cities and other strongholds that dotted the landscape. Armies from the regnum Francorum that had been deployed south of the Alps usually either negoti- ated some sort of peace with city officials or exhausted their supplies and retreated north as best they could. These retreats usually were undertaken under increasingly difficult material conditions due to logistical problems the siege of pavia 311 and harassment by militia levies mobilized from among the militarized indigenous populations at the local level.1 Closer in time and importance to Carolingian military operations in 773, as a possible guide to Charlemagne’s planning, were Pippin’s successful invasions of the Lombard kingdom in 754 and 756. After breaking through the defenses that were more or less well-established by King Aistulf in the clusae, Pippin struck in both campaigns directly at Pavia, the Lombard capital.2 Charlemagne and his advisers had what would appear to be sound information regarding Pippin’s operations from the reports recorded by the Carolingian court chronicler, to whom we refer as Fredegar’s Continuator. In addition, Charlemagne likely also had information from men serving in his army who had participated in these operations. It was recorded that in 754, for example, Pippin had established a fortified camp, or castra, in the environs of Pavia. Then, the Frankish king is said to have dispatched raiding parties to forage throughout the countryside and to ravage and burn what could not be carried away. This strat- egy included the destruction of what would appear to have been the relatively small Lombard military encampments, referred to by the Continuator as castra,that dotted the region in the neighborhood of Pavia. In addition, Pippin made a point of capturing the inhabitants of these fortifications and holding them as prisoners.3 These castra were the home bases for units of Lombard arimanni. These men dwelled in the environs of Pavia with their families and served as elements of the standing army of the regnum Langobardorum, i.e. they were members of the king’s military household or obsequium. Because of their proximity to the capital, the arimanni may be considered presen- tales.4 The use of military colonies of this sort would seem to have had a contemporary analogue developed under papal auspices in central Italy. The popes called such installations domus cultae. These settlements of

1 See the discussion by Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 26–27, 60–61; and more recently, Dick Harrison, The Early State and the Towns: Forms of Integration in Lombard Italy, ad 568–774 (Lund, 1993), pp. 67–68, 102, 112, 141–142. Historical works such as those of Gregory of Tours were frequently copied and edited by the Carolingians. See Goffart, “From Historiae to Historia Francorum,” pp. 255–274. 2 Fred. Cont., chs. 37, 38. 3 Fred. Cont., ch. 37. 4 See Fred. Cont., ch. 37, where mention is made of the tentoria, either soldiers’ tents or much more probably, in the present context, military equipment (see below), that was taken when the Lombard castra in the countryside fell to Pippin’s forces. The emphasis on the capture of military equipment gives some support to the idea that these castra were military bases.