The army of the Dutch Republic and the military revolutions
‘A eelding […] van het belegeren en innemen der stadt Naerden’. Published by Marcus Doornik, Amsterdam 1673. See p. 103. Royal Netherlands Army Museum, Delft, nr. 053918
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Warfare print. essays W.def.indd84 84 17-09-2008 08:06:40 3.1 Introduction 1 Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560 – 1660’, reprinted in: Cliord J. Rogers (ed.), The Since the 1950s, Michael Roberts’s concept of a military revolution between 1560 and 1660 Military Revolution debate. Readings has become a common feature of all military studies dealing with the early modern peri- on the military transformation of Early od, in particular those from the English speaking world. Roberts argued that the intro- Modern Europe (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford 1995) 13 – 35, duction of firearms led to new tactics. The complexities of this new way of fighting re- quotation at 20. quired stricter discipline and a higher level of training. Consequently, soldiers were seen 2 Georey Parker, The army of as investments to be retained in peacetime. Standing armies required higher taxes, and Flanders and the Spanish road 1567 – 1659. The logistics of Spanish hence the creation of a governmental apparatus to eect this. ‘The transformation in the victory and defeat in the Low Countries’ scale of war led inevitably to an increase in the authority of the state. (…) This develop- Wars (1972, revised edition ment, and the new style of warfare itself, called for new administrative methods and Cambridge 1990); The Military Revolution. Military innovation and standards; and the new administration was from the beginning centralized and royal.’ the rise of the West, 1500 – 1800 (2nd Further army growth was now possible, increasing the scale of war and the impact on so- edition; Cambridge 1996); ‘The ciety. Although Roberts – and subsequently Georey Parker – made important contri- “Military Revolution 1560 – 1660” – A myth?’ (1979), reprinted in: butions to the debate concerning the relationship between military change and society at Rogers, The Military Revolution large, it should be remembered that Roberts was elaborating on a familiar theme. The debate, 37 – 54; ‘The limits to revolu- notion that the Dutch army reforms instigated by the two Nassau cousins Maurice and tions in military aairs: Maurice of Nassau, the battle of Nieuw- William Louis ushered in a new era in military history was already well established. poort (1600), and the legacy’, in: Dutch military historian J.W. Wijn’s doctoral thesis (1934) entitled Het krijgswezen in den The Journal of Military History, ¨©©ª, tijd van prins Maurits scientifically underscored the widely held view that the Dutch army 2 (2007) 331 – 372. 3 Gerhard Oestreich, ‘Der römische really came into being thanks to Maurice’s good care. Moreover, in 1953 the German his- Stoizismus und die oranische torian Gerhard Oestreich set out to prove that Maurice and William Louis were not only Heeresreform’, in: Historische responsible for the return of military discipline and drill, but also for the birth of the Zeitschrift, ¯¨©©°ª (1953) 17 – 43. 4 Werner Hahlweg, Die Heeresreform standing army. The dark era of the soldateska had ended; the refined professional super- der Oranier und die Antike. Studien zur seded the rough mercenary. Partly inspired by Roberts and Oestreich and in part in reac- Geschichte des Kriegswesens der Nieder- tion to them, Werner Hahlweg propounded a new view in the 1960s and 1970s. In his doc- lande, Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Englands, Italiens, Spaniens und der toral thesis of 1941, Hahlweg had already explored the close link between the Nassau Schweiz vom Jahre 1589 bis zum Drei- reforms and the tactics employed by the ancient Greeks and Romans. Hahlweg now ßigjährigen Kriege (Berlin 1941). maintained that the struggle for survival waged by the Dutch in their revolt against the 5 Werner Hahlweg, ‘Die Oranische Heeresreform. Ihr Weiterwirken King of Spain forced them to create an entirely new army. He agreed with Oestreich that und die Befreiung und Etablie- the introduction of drill and the emulation of the ancients were an essential part of this rung der Niederlande. Studien transformation, but he no longer saw these as the core of the reform. ‘Sie [the army reform] und Betrachtungen’, in: Nassauische Annalen, ¨©©© (1969) ist vielmehr ein totaler Umformungs- oder Schöpfungsvorgang, der mehr oder weniger 137 – 157, at 139. alle Bereiche des Heeres- und Kriegswesens erfaßt.’ According to Hahlweg the Nassau 6 Werner Hahlweg, ‘Aspekte und army reforms consisted of seven parts: (1) systematized drill; (2) a modern general sta; (3) Probleme der Reform des nieder- ländischen Kriegswesens unter organized military-supply; (4) the moulding of a professional o·cers corps; (5) practical Prinz Moritz von Oranien’, in: use of natural sciences (pyrotechnics); (6) modern command structures (‘zahlreiche Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreende Befehlshaber, systemisierte Hierarchie’); and finally, (7) high mobility and flexibility in de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, ¨©©©°ª (1971) 161 – 177, at 164. tactical manoeuvres. According to Hahlweg all of these changes were implemented in 7 Werner Hahlweg, Die Heeresreform just one decade: between 1590 and 1600. Hahlweg did not eschew superlative terms to der Oranier. Das Kriegsbuch des Grafen explain this phenomenal development. According to him the Dutch Revolt was a ‘totale[r] Johann von Nassau-Siegen (Wiesbaden 1973) introduction Widerstandskrieg’, which necessitated the application of all ‘Kräfte der Nation in einem 1 – 54, at 9. zeitweiligen Existenzkampf.’ 8 David Parrott, Richelieu’s army. War, The importance that Hahlweg attributed to the Nassau army reforms seems to vindi- government and society in France, 1624 – 1642 (Cambridge 2001), cate Roberts’s concept of a military revolution in the period 1560 – 1660. However, Hahl- 100 – 111. weg’s thesis is not wholly convincing to the reader. Firstly, the vehemence of the Spanish attacks on the Dutch rebels subsided in the last decade of the sixteenth century because of the Spanish intervention in the French civil war. Secondly, Hahlweg incorrectly insists that Maurice and William Louis were responsible for the creation of a modern o·cer corps, the implementation of new command structures and the development of a logisti- cal support system. As David Parrott points out in his study on Richelieu’s army (2001) early modern states were unable to aect structural changes except when forced to do so by ex- ternal forces. Contrary to Hahlweg’s assertion, the Dutch were not fighting a battle for survival in the 1590s. Hahlweg’s idea that an ‘Existenzkampf’ occasioned structural changes is, however, fully applicable to the 1670s. Indeed, the Year of Disaster (1672) saw the birth of the Dutch standing army, the build-up of a modern o·cer corps and the reali- zation of the magazine system of supply. What importance do the Nassau army reforms
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