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The Great Financial Crisis : Lessons for Financial Stability Policies the Great Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Design of Central Banks Jaime Caruana

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The Great Financial Crisis : Lessons for Financial Stability Policies the Great Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Design of Central Banks Jaime Caruana RISIS C THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS IAL C AT FINAN AT E HE GR T LESSONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MONETARY POLICY NTRAL BANK AN ECB COLLOQUIUM E HELD IN HONOUR OF AN C E LUCAS PAPADEMOS EUROP 20–21 MAY 2010 ILITY B THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND STA CE N E RG E ONV C S E R STAT BE M E U M E W E LESSONS FOR N E FINANCIAL STABILITY TH AND MONETARY POLICY NTRAL BANK AN ECB COLLOQUIUM E HELD IN HONOUR OF AN C E LUCAS PAPADEMOS EUROP 20–21 MAY 2010 © European Central Bank, 2012 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 D-60311 Frankfurt am Main Germany Postel address Postal 16 03 19 D-60066 Frankfurt am Main Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Internet http://www.ecb.europa.eu Fax +49 69 1344 6000 All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. ISBN 978-92-899-0635-7 (online) CONTENTS WELCOME ADDRESS Jean-Claude Trichet ..............................................................................................6 SESSION 1 the great financial crisis : lessons FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY POLICIES The great financial crisis: lessons for the design of central banks Jaime Caruana .....................................................................................................1 4 Comment by Paul Tucker ...................................................................................2 2 Macroprudential regulation: optimizing the currency area Markus K. Brunnermeier ....................................................................................29 Comment by Jürgen Stark ..................................................................................3 6 Panel discussion Mario Draghi �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4 2 Stanley Fischer ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������46 Charles Goodhart ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 0 Philipp M. Hildebrand ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 3 Erkki Liikanen ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������57 José Viñals ..........................................................................................................6 0 DINNER SPEECH Benjamin M. Friedman .......................................................................................65 SESSION 2 the great financial crisis : LESSONS FOR MONETARY POLICY The monetary pillar and the great financial crisis Jordi Galí �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 4 Comment by Axel A. Weber ..............................................................................96 Monetary policy lessons from the crisis Athanasios Orphanides �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 0 2 Comment by Lucrezia Reichlin ........................................................................1 3 0 3 Panel discussion Joaquín Almunia ...............................................................................................1 4 2 Donald L. Kohn ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 45 Christian Noyer .................................................................................................1 5 1 PROGRAMME ................................................................................................1 54 4 Lucas D. Papademos and Jean-Claude Trichet 6 WELCOME ADDRESS JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INTRODUCTION The subject of this colloquium – “the great financial crisis” – could be no other since Lucas Papademos’ tenure will be remembered for the immense challenges for financial stability and monetary policy that have arisen since the trigger of the subprime crisis in 2007. Lucas played a key role at both the global and European levels in tackling these challenges. He was among those who were prescient about the considerable build-up of risks in the years before the crisis. He placed significant efforts in developing and adapting financial stability analysis to the fundamental and far-reaching changes in the financial system we have witnessed in the past decade, particularly as a result of increasing financial integration and innovation. When the crisis unfolded, Lucas was one of the foremost policy-makers in devising the actions required to stabilise the financial system. He also played a substantial part in setting the ground for regulatory reform, namely through his participation in the Financial Stability Forum, later Board, and in several European and Eurosystem fora, a number of which he chaired himself. I am therefore delighted that we were able to organise this colloquium with such a set of distinguished speakers, all of which have their exceptional professional standing deeply associated with the financial crisis, either as policy-makers, crisis managers, academics or proponents of regulatory initiatives. My introductory remarks this afternoon are organised around the title of this colloquium. My aim is to review policies in the last few years and draw some policy conclusions. I will first touch upon some of the lessons for financial stability, where Lucas’s contribution was especially important, as responsible for the financial stability function, and then turn to the experience with monetary policy. LESSONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY The financial crisis erupted in August 2007, when off-balance sheet vehicles that had been set up by banks to manage portfolios of complex structured credit securities ran into funding liquidity problems. Although initially a liquidity squeeze, concerns about counterparty credit risks quickly spread as uncertainties intensified about the nature and extent of exposures of banks to what we now call “toxic assets”. And, as we know, these escalating tensions culminated in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, an event which triggered an unprecedented surge of volatility across mature-economy financial markets and a broad-based decline of asset prices. With this, an adverse feedback between the condition of the financial system and real economic performance was unleashed, contributing to a sharp economic slowdown across the developed economies. Now we are observing renewed tensions, as the costs of supporting financial 7 sectors, fiscal stimulus and automatic stabilisers brought the focus to public finances across many countries both within and outside the euro area. With hindsight, the financial crisis has reminded us that the seeds of financial instability are often the same: balance sheet mismatches, high leverage (on or off balance sheets) and very rapid growth of financial institutions. Essentially all of these elements were at play in one form or another in this episode. Now what are the lessons for financial stability monitoring and assessment frameworks as implemented by the responsible authorities? A first observation I would like to make in this respect is, that we, as other central banks, had been drawing attention in our semi-annual Financial Stability Review, which Lucas was overseeing for many years, to the risks that were building up. For at least two years before the turmoil began, we issued clear warnings about vulnerabilities that were building up on account of an increasingly aggressive hunt for yield which was underpinning significant under-pricing of risks across a variety of asset classes, not only credit derivatives. And, I should also say that, the same warnings were communicated by several other central banks. A second observation is that in parallel with our financial stability assessments, we also repeatedly warned euro area governments of the risks of not consolidating fiscal positions in accordance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Although in many respects the crisis that unfolded in 2007 and 2008 can be seen as the direct result of vulnerabilities and imbalances which had been growing steadily and which had been identified fairly early-on, they combined in such ways that few would have anticipated their potential severity for the functioning of the financial system. This notwithstanding, we and other major central banks reacted swiftly to mitigate the stresses in the functioning of money and other affected markets. Against this background, to build a safer financial system it is of paramount importance that the responsible authorities enhance their financial sector surveillance while at the same time financial institutions play a decisive role by enhancing their risk management practices. A key challenge for policy- makers will be to design appropriate responses to enhance the stability of the financial system – including improving the detection and understanding of risks and vulnerabilities and translating these into concrete risk warnings and policy recommendations – without imposing restrictions that would unnecessarily hamper financial innovation and reduce the efficiency of the system. Many improvements, including the new Basel II Capital Accord, were already under way when the crisis erupted, and they address several of the weaknesses that have been identified. However, the ferocity of the financial turmoil and its fall-out which spread well beyond the financial sector call for more far-reaching reforms in the area of macro-prudential supervision. In this context, a key initiative is the proposal
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