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Market Information – Glossary of Terms Centrifuge. A perforated appliance which spins inside a casing to separate sugar crystals from molasses. Sugar that has come through a centrifuge is centrifugal sugar. Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Established in 1848, it is the oldest financial futures and options exchange in the world and situated in Chicago, Illinois. In 2007, the Chicago Board of Trade merged with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to form the CME Group. Some its commodity futures prices (such as wheat, soya beans and maize) form the principal world price benchmarks. Contract expiry. The date at which trading a particular futures contract ends and becomes either physically or cash settled. For the New York No. 11 raw sugar contract this is the last trading day of the month prior to the delivery month. For the London No. 5 white sugar contract it is sixteen calendar days before the first day of the delivery month. Free on Board (FOB). A term requiring the seller to deliver goods on board a vessel designated by the buyer. The seller fulfils their obligation to deliver when the goods have passed over the ship's rail. Generally, a seller has an obligation to deliver goods, and assume the costs of delivery to a named place for transfer to a carrier, such as a ship. EU sugar regime. In 2006 a major reform achieved simplification and greater market orientation of the EU's sugar policy. The total EU production quota of 13.5 million tonnes of sugar is divided between nineteen Member States, of which the UK’s share is 1.056mt. Around 3.5mt is imported into the EU, mainly for refining and to complete the EU’s requirements. Production in excess of the quota (e.g. ICE or surplus in the UK) is known as "out-of-quota" sugar and strict rules govern its use. In 2007 the World Trade Organisation (WTO) placed a limit of 1.374 million tonnes of sugar that could be exported from the EU. There is also a small quota of 0.72 million tonnes for the competing sweetener isoglucose (also known as High Fructose Corn Syrup, or HFCS). EU sugar regime reform 2017. All production quotas will end on 30 September 2017. At this point the classification and reporting of sugar for ‘quota’ (i.e. for human consumption) and ‘industrial’ purposes will cease. Exports of sugar produced in the EU will now be allowed although imports will still be limited at the existing levels. The minimum beet price of €26.29 and the reference price of €404/t for white sugar will also end. EU white sugar price. The average white sugar price as reported by sugar companies across the EU and reported by the EU Commission. It is published approximately two months in arrears and shows prices for white sugar and industrial white sugar. As a result the EU sugar price is not a spot price. It is an average of all prices for sugar delivered across the EU for the period in question. As some of these prices may have originated in contracts up to a year old, the EU sugar price tends to lag the major sugar price indices. Futures contract. An agreement to buy or sell a fixed amount of a commodity at a fixed price and at a fixed date in the future. For a futures contract to exist, one party has to agree to buy and take delivery while the other party has to agree to sell and supply the commodity. This obligation may be discharged by a reverse paper transaction (with some other person in the market). The futures market may be used for hedging or for speculative purposes. For sugar two major contracts set the world prices for raw and white sugar - New York No. 11 for raw and London No. 5 for white. Prices for these contracts are usually quoted up to about 18 months ahead. High Fructose Corn Syrup (Isoglucose). HFCS is a glucose-fructose sweetener that has a starch based origin (usually maize). It is converted into glucose and fructose by the use of enzymes. It is a direct competitor with sugar in the USA, where its principal use in soft drinks began in the 1980s. Its use in the EU (where it is known as isoglucose) is limited to a 0.7mt annual quota. International Commission for Uniform Methods of Sugar Analysis (ICUMSA). A world-wide body which brings together the activities of the National Committees for Sugar Analysis in more than thirty member countries. ICUMSA is the only international organisation concerned solely with analytical methods for the sugar industry. The ICUMSA colour scale (polarisation) is used to measure the grade and quality of the sugar. The colour of sugar directly relates to the degree of refining – raw sugars being dark brown in colour while highly refined sugars are white in colour. International Sugar Organisation (ISO). An intergovernmental organization, based in London, which was established by the UN following the International Sugar Agreement of 1968. It seeks to promote the trade in and consumption of sugar by gathering and publishing information on the sugar market, research into new uses for sugar and related products and as a forum for intergovernmental discussions on sugar It does not have the power to regulate the international sugar trade by price- setting. Membership consists of 87 countries and represents 86% of world production. London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). Europe's leading futures and options trading exchange. Established in 1982 as London International Financial Futures Exchange, in 1992 it merged with the London Traded Options Market (LTOM) and changed its name but retained the same acronym. It is now part of the Intercontinental Exchange Group (ICE). The London No. 5 white sugar futures contract is traded on the London ICE. London Sugar No. 5. A futures contract for white crystal cane or beet sugar at a minimum of 99.8 degrees polarisation (=99.8% sucrose). The contract is traded on the London LIFFE exchange (part of NYSE Euronext) for delivery in March, May, August, October and December. Contract size is 50 tons and pricing is displayed in US$ per tonne. Delivery is on a Free on Board basis in 50kg polyurethane bags. New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). Founded in 1870, The New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) and renamed ICE Futures US in September 2007, is a physical commodity futures exchange located in New York City. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). The New York No. 11 raw sugar futures contract is traded on the NYBOT/ICE. New York Sugar No. 11 . A futures contract for raw centrifugal cane sugar from 29 different countries at a minimum of 96 degrees polarisation (=96% sucrose). The contract is traded on the ICE Futures US exchange in New York (formerly NYBOT) for delivery in January, March, May, Jul and Oct. The contract specification is for 50 tons and pricing is displayed in US¢/lb. Delivery is on a Free on Board basis. This is the price generally quoted as the “world sugar price.” Open Interest. Refers to the total number outstanding of derivative (i.e. futures) contracts that have not yet been settled by physical delivery or closed out prior to contract expiration. Polarisation (or pol). The apparent sucrose content expressed as a mass percent measured by the optical rotation of polarized light passing through a sugar solution. Raw sugar is usually specified at 96 degrees polarisation, with white sugar at 99.8 degrees polarisation (=99.8% sucrose). Raw sugar. Brown cane sugar produced in a raw sugar mill generally destined for further processing to white sugar in a refinery. VHP sugar means Very High Polarisation raw sugar that is typically in excess 99.3% sucrose. White sugar. Refined sugar of a beet or cane origin that has been processed to contain almost pure sucrose (generally 99.8% sucrose). Raw cane sugar is processed into white sugar during refining. Beet sugar factories produce white sugar as part of the process (i.e. there is no intermediate raw sugar stage). White sugar premium. A futures market term referring to the difference between the price of the London No. 5 White sugar contract (As sold on the London ICE exchange) and the New York No. 11 Raw sugar contract (unrefined sugar sold on the New York ICE exchange). It relates to the refining cost to refine raw sugar. A widening premium indicates shortage of refining capacity or supply (or increased demand) for white sugar and vice versa. The premium affects the profitability and sometimes the viability of sugar refiners who convert raw sugar into white sugar. World sugar balance. The totals of sugar production and consumption netted against each other when accounted for changes to world stocks. A surplus phase indicates that production exceeds consumption and a deficit phase is where consumption exceeds production. The world has been in a surplus phase since 2010/11. .
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