‘If I had to go to Paris again …’ and the Revision of the

In 1923, Charles Hardinge, the recently have realised as being opposed to every retired British ambassador in Paris and former principle of national life and existence’. permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Hardinge offered the angry former Prime Office, told David Lloyd George that the 1919 Minister some unspecified examples of their Treaties of Versailles and St Germain with impracticalities. ‘He said nothing for about ten Germany and Austria ‘contained provisions minutes and then remarked in a friendly way, which anybody with any knowledge of “If I had to go to Paris again I would conclude foreign politics or of European affairs would quite a different treaty.”’1 By Alan Sharp.

30 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘If I had to go to Paris again …’ David Lloyd George and the Revision of the Treaty of Versailles

loyd George had thus more sympathetic to the enor- our signature’. He warned: ‘You joined the already consider- mous task facing the peacemakers may strip Germany of her colonies, Lable ranks of those critical after the most devastating war to reduce her armaments to a mere of the First World War settlement. that date. The settlement remains police force, and her navy to that Even before the conference ended highly controversial and, as one of of a fifth-rate Power … [but] if she there was much disquiet amongst its principal authors – something feels she has been unjustly treated participants that the treaty with which he could later conveniently … she will find means of extracting Germany was too harsh – as Lord forget – the idea of Lloyd George retribution from her conquerors.’ Robert Cecil remarked on 30 May creating an alternative treaty is Yet, as he boasted to his friend Sir 1919 during the Anglo-American intriguing.3 George Riddell, the press magnate, meeting which laid the foundations Setting to one side the obvi- on 30 March: ‘The truth is that for the Royal Institute of Inter- ous objections that he could nei- we have got our way … The Ger- national Affairs and its American ther remake the treaty without man Navy has been handed over; counterpart, the Council on For- the acquiescence of his allies, nor the German mercantile shipping eign Relations, ‘There is not a sin- could he alter the German percep- has been handed over, and the Ger- gle person in this room who is not tion that they were undefeated and man colonies have been given up.’ disappointed with the terms we hence that any settlement based on The sub-text to French premier have drafted.’ Six months after the the premise of Allied victory would ’s rejoinder to treaty was signed, John Maynard be unacceptable, there are vari- the memorandum asked what Brit- Keynes, the British Treasury offi- ous clues to the shape of his ideal ain would sacrifice of its own aims cial who had left Paris in disgust peace. These suggest that he sought (rather than those of others) to con- in early June, reinforced that dis- a stable Europe in which Germany, vince Germany that the treaty was quiet by publishing The Economic reconciled to its defeat and rec- just, but he provoked no response.5 Consequences of the Peace, a polemi- ognising the essential fairness of What might the possible allevia- cal attack on the peacemakers and the settlement, would play a posi- tions have been? Lloyd George was all their works, which gave Brit- tive and beneficial role, retaking deeply disappointed when, dur- ain a bad conscience and which its place as a major British trading ing his absence from Paris in early has shaped much of the subsequent partner. Britain could then revert April 1919, the American president, debate on the settlement.2 to what contemporaries saw as its , pressured by Others thought the treaty too traditional imperial and colonial Clemenceau, conceded a fifteen- lenient. Marshal Foch, the French themes, leaving Europe to fend for year Allied occupation of Western commander of Allied forces on the itself – such indeed was the advice Germany, much longer than he Western Front, predicted, ‘This offered by both his private secre- considered necessary or desirable. is not Peace. It is an Armistice tary, Philip Kerr, and Jan Smuts, Later, in the 1930s, the return of for twenty years.’ He was proved the South African defence minister Germany’s colonies became part wrong – by sixty-seven days – but and member of the Imperial War of an appeasement agenda, but in many later commentators have Cabinet. An additional but more 1919 this crossed no one’s mind – shared his view that the inadequa- remote aspiration would be the certainly not that of Smuts, fierce cies of Versailles created the con- reintegration of a reformed Russia critic of the treaty that he was, who ditions that made a second world into European politics.4 had no intention of relinquishing war inevitable and hence also bear Left: Lloyd George’s Fontainebleau the former German South-West some of the responsibility for its The British memorandum of 25 March 1919, Africa. Five principal areas, how- consequences and subsequent inter- Empire drafted after a weekend’s consulta- ever, stand out: reparations; disar- national turmoil. As more govern- delegation in tion with close advisers as deadlock mament; the territorial settlement ments opened their archives after June 1919; Lloyd threatened the conference, out- and Germany’s new frontiers; the the 1960s some, though certainly George behind lined ‘the kind of treaty to which so-called ‘shame clauses’ of the not all, historians have become desk, centre-left alone we were prepared to append treaty, relating to the indictment

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 31 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles of the Kaiser and members of the ‘The sub- ruled out an indemnity, as Lloyd soldiers were merely civilians in German military and political elite, George acknowledged, though uniform. Accepting this was not together with Article 231, the ‘war ject of rep- Professor Antony Lentin suggests logical, Wilson conceded because guilt’ clause; and finally, Britain’s that, from the beginning, he had he believed the Allies would com- relationship with France, linked to arations’ no intention of foregoing war costs promise on a fixed sum – not the the treaty that Lloyd George made and that the wording was a mere complete bill but an amount to but did not implement. declared ruse de guerre.8 discharge all Germany’s liabili- During the 1918 election, facing ties. Hence his decision would Thomas an unknown electorate and seeking not affect what Germany paid but Reparations to revitalise a lacklustre campaign, could allow Britain, which had suf- One candidate for revision is pre- Lamont, the Lloyd George played to the popular fered little physical destruction, to eminent: ‘The subject of repara- American gallery in Newcastle on 29 Novem- receive greater compensation. No tions’ declared Thomas Lamont, ber, declaring that ‘Germany final sum was agreed; on 5 April the American banker acting as an banker act- must pay the costs of the war’. He 1919 the decision was postponed for expert in Paris, ‘caused more trou- included an escape clause – ‘up to a Reparation Commission to deter- ble, contention, hard feeling, and ing as an the limit of her capacity’ – but in mine in1921.11 delay at the Paris Peace Conference Bristol on 11 December he stated, In his Fontainebleau memo- than any other point of the Treaty.’6 expert in ‘We propose to demand the whole randum Lloyd George suggested Resolving Germany’s responsi- cost of the war’, and hinted that that reparations should disappear bility to compensate Allied war- Paris, ‘caused Germany’s capacity was substan- with the generation that waged time losses then held centre stage tial. He won the election – though war. Yet he refused to specify any at numerous Anglo-French, inter- more trou- dependent upon a massive Tory time limit on German payments Allied and international confer- majority. Public and parliamentari- or name a total sum. He claimed ences in the early years of treaty ble, conten- ans heard what they wanted to hear he was thwarted by the excessive execution, sowing discord amongst and expected him to deliver.9 demands of his financial advis- the victors and offering Germany tion, hard It is easy to see why. The Brit- ers, Lords Cunliffe and Sumner, an opportunity to steal the moral ish Treasury estimated that victory respectively a former governor of high ground. Everyone, includ- feeling, and cost the Allies £24,000 million in the Bank of England and a Lord of ing the Germans, accepted that 1914 gold values. Great swathes of Appeal – irreverently dubbed the there was a bill to pay, but the bases delay at the Belgium and France lay ravaged by ‘Heavenly Twins’ by British del- of that reckoning, the amounts to four years of industrialised warfare egation colleagues because they be paid and the distribution of the Paris Peace and required restoration. Addition- were always together and sought receipts amongst the Allies, were all Confer- ally the Allies had borrowed heav- astronomical sums from Germany. beset by controversy. ily from the United States, which Cunliffe maintained that £24,000 Traditionally losers offset vic- ence than expected repayment. Meanwhile million was a realistic prospect. tors’ costs – after 1870–71 France Germany, suffering only minimal Lloyd George dismissed this as ‘a paid Germany 5,000 million gold any other damage to its industrial base and wild and fantastic chimera’ and francs – but in 1918 Lloyd George with no foreign war debts, posed mocked Cunliffe’s ‘strange lapse and Wilson ruled out war costs, point of the the threat of future trade competi- into megalomania’, suggesting that demanding only that Germany tion, unimpeded by the costs faced Sumner ‘himself caught the infec- restore the invaded territories.7 The Treaty’. by the Allies. The alternative, that tion.’12 These two men, he implied, restoration of such civilian dam- Allied taxpayers must foot the bill, prevented a reasonable settlement. age may conveniently be defined made it almost mandatory for Brit- Lentin argues such was not the as reparations and any additional ish or French politicians to promise case; instead, Lloyd George insisted demand for full or partial war the maximum payments possible on maintaining the maximum costs as an indemnity. Germany’s from Germany. Lloyd George’s demands, yet blamed the Twins request for an armistice in Octo- problem was that he had already so persuasively that even Keynes ber 1918, seeking to make Wilson’s contracted not to do so.10 believed him.13 1918 speeches the basis of the even- Yet, in Paris, he and Clem- Further opportunities for revi- tual peace, necessitated their precise enceau claimed their full war costs sion arose when, on 30 May and 1 definition. Lloyd George took great from Germany. Wilson resisted June 1919, the British Empire dele- pains with this section of the Allied vigorously. The ensuing crisis gation, including additional British response, sent on 5 November by was ‘solved’ by Article 231, which ministers, discussed the draft treaty the American Secretary of State, asserted Germany’s moral respon- and favoured making concessions Robert Lansing, which formed sibility to cover all Allied war to Germany. Smuts, the most vocif- the pre-Armistice agreement with expenditure but, did not, as the erous critic of the terms, proposed a Germany. Restoration meant ‘that Germans chose to believe, assign fixed sum, possibly £5,000 million. compensation will be made by Ger- sole responsibility for the war to Some ministers supported him, many for all the damage done to the Germany. It was mitigated by others favoured £11,000 million. civilian population of the Allies and Article 232, limiting actual com- Lloyd George thought the answer their property by the aggression of pensation to Allied civilian dam- might lie somewhere between but Germany by land, by sea, and from age. Lloyd George then persuaded rejected as inadequate a recent Ger- the air’. His final touch changed Smuts to convince Wilson that man offer to pay £5,000 million the original wording of ‘invasion’ pensions paid to injured soldiers (admittedly based on unacceptable to ‘aggression’ to safeguard British or their widows and orphans con- conditions). The delegation author- and imperial claims. This clearly stituted a legitimate claim because ised him to specify a fixed sum in

32 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles the treaty. When he returned to to artificially inflate the bill – as unofficial committee of experts and the Council of Four, however, he Belgian premier Georges Theu- politicians was significant – Louis resisted Wilson’s attempt to do so nis joked, they could be stuck ‘in a Loucheur, French minister for the and, according to Robert Cecil, drawer without bothering to lock devastated regions, observed ‘Lloyd was ‘curiously reluctant to make up, for no thief would be tempted George protests at these low fig- any changes’ to the reparations to steal them’.16 At the ensuing ures’. He clearly expected more and clauses.14 London conference Lloyd George preferred to postpone the issue.18 For the next three years Lloyd claimed a triumph: the Commis- He later castigated French min- George portrayed himself as seek- sion, rather than he or Aristide isters for deceiving their public ing a workable settlement rather Briand, the French premier, had about Germany’s capacity to pay, than an attractive, but impossibly reduced Germany’s bill, thus dis- yet he was never willing to disa- inflated, bill. Yet his words have arming disappointed Anglo-French buse the British people. Apart from to be set against the figures for the die-hards; Germany accepted the the obvious political risk involved, various proposals. Once the prime payments schedule; and he had he was perhaps unsure himself of mover to establish a Reparation forestalled the French from occu- what would constitute a fair set- Commission, he now attempted to pying the Ruhr basin – their pre- tlement. Historians sympathetic to circumvent it, believing that the ferred method to enforce the treaty Lloyd George suggest that the 1918 absence of the intended American or punish transgressions. election promises, his association chairman would leave Britain per- The respite proved tempo- with Cunliffe and Sumner, and the manently outvoted in a Commis- rary; the following year Germany He later inclusion of pensions, were aber- sion of four members, in which he sought a payments moratorium. rations, disguising his real aim of expected France and Belgium to Meanwhile the complicating factor castigated a reasonable settlement, and they make maximum demands. Even if of inter-Allied debts became urgent praise his success in negotiating the Britain persuaded Italy to oppose as the Americans pressed for repay- French min- 1921 London schedule of payments. them, the casting vote lay with the ment, over twenty-five years at 4.5 Others question whether his mod- French chairman – the first was per cent interest, of the £800 mil- isters for eration always came second to his the implacable Lorrainer and for- lion that Britain had borrowed to wish to achieve the best outcome mer President of the Republic, finance the Allied war effort. Brit- deceiving for Britain by whatever means, Raymond Poincaré. Lloyd George ain was owed twice this amount by however dubious, and ask whether instead tackled reparations in direct its allies, and Austen Chamberlain, their pub- his refusal to recognise the need for negotiations with various French the Chancellor of the Exchequer, radical revision of all war debts, prime ministers at inter-Allied consistently advocated the unilat- lic about in the interests of wider European conferences held in 1920 and early eral renunciation of Britain’s Euro- recovery, missed the broader pic- 1921. In July 1920, at Boulogne, pean debts, but Lloyd George and Germany’s ture. It would also be wise not to Anglo-French ministers consid- others were reluctant to forego capacity to discount Lloyd George’s moral con- ered a settlement based on German either the potential, however science, idiosyncratic as it might annuities spread over forty-two unlikely, of repayment, or of what- pay, yet he be, which suggested a need for ret- years, totalling £13,450 million. In ever political leverage the debts ribution as well as forgiveness. ‘It January 1921 in Paris they debated might offer. America resisted the was never was not vengeance but justice … a proposal for forty-two annuities Anglo-French contention that its whether we ought not to consider totalling £11,300 million together loans constituted part of an inter- willing to lashing her [Germany] as she had with a variable annuity amount- Allied war effort to which some lashed France’, he told his Cabinet ing to 12 per cent of Germany’s had contributed money and others disabuse colleagues, adding on another occa- exports. Lloyd George was trying blood. President Calvin Coolidge’s sion, ‘Those who ought to pay were to coax France and coerce Ger- dismissal of their proposal of all- the Brit- those who caused the loss.’19 many to accept the Paris plan when round cancellation was typically he learned that, contrary to expec- succinct: ‘They hired the money, ish people. tations, the Reparation Commis- didn’t they?’ Disarmament sion’s bill would be much lower. Lloyd George might have fixed Apart from Lloyd George’s political ideology He reversed course and awaited its Germany’s liability in the treaty also played an important role in report.15 and waived Britain’s European the obvious German disarmament, another sub- In May 1921 the Commission debts. There is little indication ject that dominated Anglo-French established Germany’s liability at that either course appealed to him. political risk discussions in the early post-1919 £6,600 million, of which pensions The Americans would have com- years. The Allied military advis- and other allowances represented promised on a final sum around involved, he ers in Paris disagreed on the size nearly half. Under the terms of the £6,000 million; French estimates was perhaps and recruitment of Germany’s A, B and C bonds Germany was to of an acceptable figure tended to post-war army – Foch, for France, deliver, payment beyond £2,500 be higher, but, at their lower end, unsure him- recommended 100,000 men, with million was never anticipated. not significantly so, and the Ger- long-term volunteer officers and Most experts agreed that this rep- mans did offer (with contentious self of what non-commissioned officers, and resented Germany’s capacity to pay provisos) £5,000 million.17 Lloyd other ranks conscripted for one but accepted that this would need George suggested in June 1919 that would con- year; Haig, for Britain, believed to be disguised to meet Anglo- something between £5,000 million Germany needed 200,000 or French public expectations. Hence and £11,000 million would be rea- stitute a fair 250,000 men for internal order and the C bonds, worth £4,000 million, sonable, but his earlier reaction to international defence; Bliss, for the were ‘phoney money’, designed the £6,000 million proposed by an settlement. United States, suggested 400,000.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 33 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles

They compromised on an army of By January 1921 the War Office To encourage Clemenceau to 200,000, with volunteer officers and considered that most weapons, abandon plans to increase French conscripted other ranks. 20 apart from those held by the para- security by detaching the Rhine- Lloyd George believed that militaries, were being destroyed, land from Germany he offered, peacetime conscription institu- that the German army, manned by with apparent sincerity, a British tionalised militarism. It was, he volunteers, had reached treaty lev- guarantee of assistance in the event declared in October 1920, ‘the basic els and that ‘Germany has ceased to of future German aggression, and cause of the late war’. He agreed be a military danger to the Allies the promise of a Channel tunnel with Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s for a considerable period of time’. to speed British troops to France’s Foreign Secretary in 1914, that The French continued to stress aid. In the east he used all his wiles ‘great armaments lead inevitably to legal uncertainties about recruit- to persuade Wilson that making war’. Hence he championed Ger- ment, the inadequate disarmament Danzig a free city, rather than con- man disarmament as the prelude of civilians and paramilitaries, and signing its German population to to wider international armaments concluded that the ‘German Gov- Poland, was the President’s own reduction, but, at the same time, he ernment … has put itself in oppo- idea. More directly he challenged did not wish to leave Germany so sition both to the spirit and letter a reluctant Wilson to agree that weak that it succumbed to Bolshe- of the Treaty.’ This was a typical the plebiscite on the fate of Upper vism. Nor, though this could not be divergence of views: the British Silesia, on which Lloyd George so openly professed, did he wish to concentrated on the destruction of insisted, was simply putting the leave France unchallenged on the war material and the reduction of President’s principles into practice. continent. His counter-proposal in forces and the French pursued the He may have regretted this success Paris was for a volunteer army of less tangible objectives of break- because Britain’s military forces 200,000. Clemenceau, warning that ing Germany’s ‘military spirit’ and became overstretched and, embar- the Germans would use such a pro- achieving ‘moral disarmament’.22 rassingly, had to be withdrawn fessional army as a cadre for a much Lloyd George perhaps regretted from plebiscitary protection duties, larger force (as indeed they did), not achieving a larger army for occasioning further inter-Allied conceded the voluntary principle Germany but, beyond that, it is dissension when Britain accused but insisted on a limit of 100,000, difficult to see where, or why, he French troops of favouring the Pol- which Lloyd George accepted. Ger- would have sought major changes. ish cause. The interpretation of the many had to reach this target by Although more sympathetic to 1921 plebiscite results then led to April 1920 and disband its general German difficulties, he was equally bitter Anglo-French disagreement staff. Its air force was banned and as committed as the French to uni- which could only be resolved by its once formidable navy, stripped lateral German disarmament as a involving the League.24 of dreadnoughts and submarines, first step to the wider international Lloyd George supported an reduced to 15,000 men. Equip- armaments limitation he deemed independent Poland but fiercely ment and manufacturing resources essential for peace. opposed what he deemed its exces- surplus to the requirements of sive territorial demands, telling the these curtailed forces were to be Unionist leader, Andrew Bonar destroyed.21 National self-determination If Lloyd Law, ‘I have never cared for the Unsurprisingly the German If Lloyd George blamed milita- handing over of two or three mil- government was not an eager par- rism for the last war, he believed George lion Germans to Polish rule … The ticipant in dismantling its military denial of national self-determi- Germans would never accept per- might and did its best to obstruct or nation – a phrase he used before blamed mili- manently this transference.’ His obfuscate but, by 1922, most of its Wilson – could cause the next. In successful amendment of the origi- air and naval equipment had been 1871 Germany seized the French tarism for nal Polish Commission’s recom- destroyed or surrendered. Reduc- provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, mendations achieved plebiscites ing its land forces and dismantling creating a lingering grievance in the last war, resulting in Germany’s retention its weapons industry were more European international relations, of Marienwerder, Allenstein and problematic. The British War righted only by their return in he believed a substantial part of Upper Silesia. Office thought Germany needed 1918. Throughout the conference Germans still regarded the loss of an army of 150,000 to 200,000 to Lloyd George warned of the dan- denial of territory to the Poles as unaccepta- ensure internal security and defend gers of creating Alsace-Lorraines national ble, terming their new border ‘the its frontiers and was more prepared in reverse: ‘I cannot conceive,’ bleeding frontier’, but it is hard to than the French to tolerate various he wrote, ‘of any greater cause of self-deter- see what further concessions Lloyd German paramilitary forces, total- future war than that the German George might have won.25 ling some 600,000, which it did not people … should be surrounded by mination – a In the west he was perhaps too consider an international threat a number of small States … each of easily persuaded that Germany but thought important to preserv- them containing large numbers of phrase he should forfeit the Saar region to ing order. Lloyd George did nego- Germans clamouring for reunion compensate France for the coal tiate extra time for German force with their native land.’ He fought used before production lost by German sabo- reduction but here, as elsewhere, very hard to prevent this, whether tage of its mines. This may well the question of whether Germany on Germany’s western borders in Wilson – have involved an element of dou- could not, or would not execute the the Rhineland, or, more particu- ble jeopardy, since Germany was treaty divided Britain from France. larly, in the east, where the new could cause also required to make other repara- Britain tended to see inability, frontiers with Poland were espe- tion coal deliveries to France, but, France a lack of will. cially contentious.23 the next. in general, his record on national

34 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles self-determination was good. As Lloyd George emotive issue of trying other Ger- In an ideal world, he suggested a Welshman he was sympathetic man leaders remained. The ini- to Louis Barthou, the French jus- to the aspirations of small nations, proposed a tial Allied lists named over 3,000 tice minister, America would though he tempered this with care- potential defendants, including the forego its claims on Britain and ful pragmatism. He sought borders major eco- former Chancellor, Bethmann- Europe; Britain would cancel all that would alienate as few people as Hollweg, Admiral von Tirpitz, debts owed by its European allies possible and, by providing minor- nomic and Field Marshal von Hindenburg and, together with France, aban- ity rights for unfortunate popu- and General Ludendorff. Even don its pension claims against Ger- lations finding themselves on the political when this was reduced to 835 men many. France would recoup only wrong side of revised frontiers, he and one woman, Lloyd George, the costs of restoring its devastated hoped to minimise their resent- conference despite his earlier commitment, regions. With typical insouciance ment. Given the constraints under at Genoa in stated that, placed in a parallel situ- Lloyd George admitted Keynes’s which the conference operated, ation, Britain and France would not contention that the pension claim particularly in the east, it is very . comply. He now advised seeking was fraudulent, stating, ‘If this plan difficult to envisage what different ‘the surrender of the most impor- were adopted, the position would territorial settlement in Europe he The plan tant offenders and let[ting] the rest be that … the claims against Ger- might have negotiated.26 go’. Finally, when Germany tried many would be confined to repa- was charac- forty-five people, none prominent, ration.’ Unfortunately America and the Leipzig court produced refused to participate, ‘If she had,’ War crimes teristic of acquittals or lenient sentences, he he reflected in 1934, ‘… we stood a Articles 227 to 231 of the Treaty, turned a blind eye. With hindsight good chance of clearing up all our the so-called ‘shame clauses’, caused Lloyd George he may have regretted his passion- difficulties – War Debts, Repara- deep offence to Germany. In June ate and enduring belief in prosecut- tions, Armaments …’. Poincaré, 1919 the hastily assembled German both in the ing Germany’s leaders, but these who had replaced Briand as premier government unsuccessfully tried clauses, and the parallel provisions in January 1922, would brook no to make their omission a condi- breath-tak- of the Treaty of Sèvres with the discussion of reparations. When the tion of its signature of the treaty, Ottomans, established an impor- conference met, the two pariahs of whilst later attempts to implement ing scope tant precedent for the post-Second Europe, Germany and the Soviet them threatened the survival of the World War trials in Nuremberg Union, signed a separate treaty at Weimar regime. Although it was of its vision and Tokyo and the establishment, Rapallo which effectively scup- conventional, as in Article 228, to in 2002, of the International Crimi- pered proceedings, even though the indict persons accused of breach- and the inad- nal Court.27 talks continued into May.28 ing ‘the laws and customs of war’, equacy of Faced with the failure of his it became clear that the intention grand plan Lloyd George set Arthur went beyond the prosecution of its detailed Rebuilding Europe Balfour, acting as Foreign Secretary operational crimes, requiring Ger- In his last major initiative to revise during George Curzon’s illness, many to surrender unspecified preparation. the treaties, re-energise the Euro- to explain Britain’s situation to its political and military leaders for pean economies and revive the European debtors. Blaming Amer- trial. Lloyd George was strongly flagging fortunes of his coalition ica for requiring reimbursement committed to this idea, particu- government, Lloyd George pro- from Britain, the note regretted larly where it concerned the for- posed a major economic and politi- seeking repayments from Europe, mer emperor, Wilhelm II. During cal conference at Genoa in April which would be limited to cover- the British election campaign there 1922. The plan was characteristic of ing the American debts. Despite were calls to hang Wilhelm and, Lloyd George both in the breath- serious misgivings from senior col- although Lloyd George did not taking scope of its vision and the leagues, the Balfour Note, which endorse this popular idea, he did inadequacy of its detailed prepara- Lloyd George claimed as his own, privately suggest shooting him, tion. He believed that if Russia was was despatched on 1 August 1922. publicly calling for his indictment opened to world trade and offered Although excellently drafted and to deter future leaders from waging lucrative reconstruction contracts, with obvious political attractions, war. It required all his remarkable this would enable Germany to it was an international disaster. Pil- powers of persuasion to convince prosper and pay reparations to Brit- lorying the Americans left them his Cabinet and international col- ain and France, who could then little room for manoeuvre over the leagues to abandon their strongly repay their American debts. Ger- debts; any reduction in German held objections to trying a head of many’s reconciliation to the new reparations meant French taxpay- state. Article 227 arraigned Wil- order would abate France’s security ers contributing more to discharge helm ‘for a supreme offence against fears, thus relieving Britain of its their British debts; it wrecked any international morality and the most pressing European responsi- slim chance of a successful repara- sanctity of treaties’, to be tried by bilities. Bolshevism would wither tions conference in London that an international criminal court of as Russian prosperity increased month. The implications for Brit- five Allied judges. and Russia could be restored to the ain’s prestige were alarming. Sir Perhaps fortunately for the European comity of nations, fill- Edward Grigg, Lloyd George’s pri- Allies, and certainly for Wilhelm, ing the void left by its absence at vate secretary, was aghast: ‘How the Netherlands, to which he fled, the peace conference. Unemploy- can we demean ourselves so much refused to surrender him – though ment in Britain would fall and the as to range ourselves with the piti- Lloyd George was still pursuing coalition would triumph at the next ful European bankrupts and to this as late as March 1920 – but the election. declare our credit dependent on

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 35 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles theirs?’ Two months later the Tory The key responsibilities for enforcing the was no agreement, just a reluctant rank and file revolted, the coalition treaty was greeted with ambiva- recognition that they were bound collapsed and Lloyd George left question, lence by British ministers. They in a rather sad partnership where office for ever.29 were disappointed to lose a poten- each did just enough to thwart the however, tial partner in moderating the set- other’s policies.33 tlement, but not sorry to see this Lloyd George might have pro- The art of the possible is whether retreat beyond the Atlantic of a moted a stronger Anglo-French Politics, international or domes- rival hegemon.31 relationship, had he chosen to tic, is the art of the possible. Lloyd any adjust- America’s withdrawal high- do so, but he could have had lit- George had to make peace as part lighted the centrality of the Anglo- tle influence on Wilson’s ill-health of two victorious coalitions, whose ments to the French relationship to the new and political ineptitude, the conse- constituents both limited his free- treaty that international order. In Paris Lloyd quences of which caused America dom. He was the most sympathetic George had carefully made his to withdraw from treaty enforce- of the peacemakers to reaching an Lloyd George guarantee offer to France depend- ment. The key question, however, agreement with Russia, even if that ent on America honouring its par- is whether any adjustments to the meant dealing with the Bolsheviks, might have allel obligation. When America treaty that Lloyd George might but Clemenceau in Paris, and the reneged, Britain was left with only have made, even had he wished Tory die-hards, abetted by his Lib- made, even a moral commitment, and had to and been able to do so, would eral colleague Winston Churchill decide whether, and on what terms, have substantially altered Ger- at Westminster, precluded any- had he to provide a substitute. The ques- many’s attitude to a settlement that thing but the most tentative of tion divided the British establish- it believed had been imposed by approaches to Lenin and his com- wished and ment. Advocates of a pact suggested trickery and false pretences. Prob- rades. Lloyd George’s later attempts that a greater sense of security ably not: naming £6,000 million to engage with the Bolsheviks pro- been able would encourage French generos- as the reparations bill; allowing duced, despite deep mutual suspi- ity in their treatment of Germany. Germany to retain conscription cion, an Anglo-Soviet trade treaty, to do so, Opponents argued that, confident and a larger army and navy; fur- but his more ambitious plans for of British support, France would be ther minor alterations to the Pol- Genoa were again thwarted by a would have more, not less, intransigent. Most of ish frontier; the retention of the combination of international and the Cabinet were undecided, shar- Saar and a shorter occupation of the domestic reluctance.30 substan- ing Curzon’s sentiment: ‘I earnestly Rhineland; the abandonment of Clemenceau had witnessed two hope’, he wrote in December 1921, the ‘shame clauses’; even the return German invasions of France and tially altered ‘it will not be proposed to give the of some of its colonies, would still was determined to avert a third. Germany’s guarantee for nothing’. Yet, in the mean, in German perceptions, a His policies – the detachment of same paper, he admitted ‘As a result treaty predicated on an unaccepta- the Rhineland and Saar from Ger- attitude of the war there remain only two ble Allied presumption of German many, the over-generous transfer of really great powers in Europe – defeat. Such a premise would be territory to Poland, and the over- to a settle- France and ourselves … a definite fundamental to any treaty negoti- zealous prosecution of minor issues and publicly announced agreement ated in 1919. So, even if he had gone – often clashed with Lloyd George’s ment that between the two countries to stand to Paris again … vision. France was also an impe- by one another in case either were rial competitor, and the settlement it believed attacked would offer a guarantee of Alan Sharp is Emeritus Professor of reflected the need for compromises, peace of the strongest kind.’32 International History at the University not just in Europe but worldwide. had been It is here that Lloyd George of Ulster, where he was previously Head There were the added complica- needed to rethink his policies. An of the School of History and Interna- tions of the aspirations of the Japa- imposed by Anglo-French consensus was essen- tional Affairs and Provost of the Col- nese and the Italians, which were tial to either executing or amend- eraine campus. He has recently edited often at variance with the interests trickery and ing the Versailles settlement. When and contributed to The Makers of the of the other great powers and with they worked together, as at the Spa Modern World (Haus Publishing), Wilson’s philosophy. false pre- conference in June 1920, Germany a 32-volume series on the Paris Peace In Paris Wilson was a consid- complied, but, too often, was able Conference. erable presence, contributing to tences. Prob- to play the victors against each a treaty very different to one that ably not … other. There were various moments 1 Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old the European powers might have when an Anglo-French alliance Diplomacy (John Murray, 1947) p. created. Wilson’s high-minded seemed possible, but both suggested 240. I would like to thank Profes- aspirations made it easy for those that the pact was of greater value sors Tom Fraser, Antony Lentin and seeking hypocrisy to discover it to the other and hence each sought Sally Marks for their comments and in the inevitable compromises the maximum price for its sup- encouragement and the three anon- reached after principles met reali- port. For Britain some points were ymous reviewers for their helpful ties or unshakeable positions, but negotiable – an alliance rather than suggestions. like Clemenceau’s commitment to a unilateral guarantee, the dura- 2 Cecil quoted by Antony Lentin, French security, Italian and Japa- tion of the pact – while others, like Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From nese expansionist ambitions, and the extension of the treaty to cover Versailles to Hitler (Palgrave Macmil- the demands of his Dominion eastern Europe, where the French lan, 2001) p. 69; See also Lentin, ‘The partners, they were facts of Lloyd believed the first German assaults Worm in the Bud: “Appeasement” George’s life. America’s subsequent on the treaty boundaries would at the Peace Conference’ ibid., pp. abnegation of its international occur, were not. In the end there 67–88. John Maynard Keynes, The

36 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles

Economic Consequences of the Peace ‘George thinks he won the elec- vols. Nouvelles Editions Latines, (2006), pp. 301–21. (Macmillan, 1919). tion. Well, he didn’t. It was the 1947) vol. I, pp. 547–60 and pp. 23 Cmd 2169, p. 79. 3 Alan Sharp, ‘The Versailles Set- Tories that won the election, and 593–600. Marc Trachtenberg, 24 Lentin, Lost Peace p. 6 and pp. tlement: The Start of the Road he will soon begin to find that out.’ Reparation in World Politics: France 47–64. to the Second World War?’ in Diary entry 5.3.19., F. Steven- and European Diplomacy, 1916–1923 25 Sharp, Versailles Settlement pp. Frank McDonough (ed.), The son, Lloyd George: A Diary (ed. (Columbia, 1980) pp. 136–44; 127–31. Origins of the Second World War: A. J. P. Taylor) (Hutchinson, Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War: The 26 Ibid pp. 123–24; Sharp, David An International Perspective (Con- 1971), p.169. See John Vincent Politics, Economics and Diplomacy Lloyd George: Great Britain (Haus, tinuum, 2011), pp. 15–33. On his (ed.), The Crawford Papers: The of Reparations 1918–1923 (Oxford, 2008), pp.112–42. convenient memory see Stella Journals of David Lindsay twenty- 1989), pp. 374–75; Leonard 27 James Willis, Prologue to Nurem- Rudman, Lloyd George and the seventh Earl of Crawford and tenth Gomes, German Reparations, 1919– berg: The Politics and Diplomacy Appeasement of Germany, 1919– Earl of Balcarres 1871–1940 during 1932: A Historical Survey (Palgrave of Punishing War Criminals of the 1945 (Cambridge Scholars Pub- the years 1892 to 1940 (Manches- Macmillan, 2010) pp. 47–71. First World War (Greenwood lishing, 2011) p. 210. ter, 1984), entry for 28.12.18, p. 16 Stephen Schuker, American ‘Repa- Press, 1982); Gary Bass, Stay the 4 For example his war aims 399. Speeches reported in The rations’ to Germany, 1919–1933: Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of speech, 5.12.18; the Fontaineb- Times on 30.11.18 and 12.12.18. Implications for the Third World Debt War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, leau memorandum, 25.3.19; The Treasury suggested Ger- Crisis (Princeton, 1988), p. 46. 2002 ed.); Sharp, Consequences of the British Empire Delegation many could pay £3,000 mil- 17 Sharp, Versailles Settlement pp. Peace. The Versailles Settlement: meetings, 30.5 and 1.6.19; his lion; a committee headed by the 81–105. Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2010 Cannes memorandum 4.1.22; the Australian premier, William 18 Louis Loucheur, diary 14.3.19 (Haus, 2010) pp. 161–69. plans for the 1922 Genoa con- Hughes, estimated, on grounds Carnets secrets de L. Loucheur 28 Conversation 29.4.22 in E.L ference. Kerr to Lloyd George, that its members admitted to be (Brébol, 1962), p. 71. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.), 2.9.20, F/90/1/18, Lloyd George hazy, £24,000 million. Sharp, 19 Kenneth Morgan, Consensus and Documents on British Foreign Papers [LGP] in the Parliamen- The Versailles Settlement: Peace- Disunity: The Lloyd George Coali- Policy, 1919–1939 [DBFP], (First tary Archives, London; Smuts, making after the First World War, tion Government 1918–1922 (Clar- Series, HMSO, 1947 onwards) 24.6.21, at the Imperial Confer- 1918–1923 (Palgrave Macmillan, endon Press, Oxford, 1979), Vol. XIX, p. 625; Stevenson, ence, E6 in CAB 32/2 in The second ed., 2008), p. 86. pp.139–42; Martin Pugh, Lloyd Lloyd George: A Diary 7.4.34, p. National Archive, Kew [TNA]. 10 See the comment by Sally Marks George (Longman, 1988), pp. 266; see Carole Fink, The Genoa 5 David Lloyd George, The Truth that, in such circumstances ‘… 132–34 and p. 138;Trachtenberg, Conference: European Diplomacy, about the Peace Treaties (2 vols. German economic dominance Reparation pp.46–48; Michael 1921–1922 (Syracuse, 1993), and Gollancz, 1938), Vol.1, p. 404; would be tantamount to vic- Fry, And Fortune Fled: David Lloyd Stephen White, The Origins of Papers respecting negotiations for an tory. Reparations would both George, the First Democratic States- Détente: The and Anglo-French pact 1919–1923 (Cmd deny Germany that victory man, 1916–1922 (Peter Lang, 2011), Soviet-Western Relations, 1921– 2169, HMSO, 1924), p. 79 and and spread the pain of undoing pp. 354–93; Lentin, Lost Peace pp. 1922 (Cambridge, 1985). pp. 90–93; John McEwen (ed.), the damage done.’ in ‘Smoke 39–43; Sharp, ‘Lloyd George and 29 Chamberlain memorandum, The Riddell Diaries 1908–1923 and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Foreign Policy 1918-1922. The 12.5.20 , CP1259 in CAB.24/105 (Athlone Press, 1986), entry Rooms in the Galerie des Glaces’ ‘And yet …’ Factor’ in Judith and discussions in Cabinet 25 30.3.19, p. 263. in Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Loades (ed.), The Life and Times (20), 21.5.20 in CAB 23/21, TNA. 6 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemak- Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser of David Lloyd George (Headstart Lloyd George, The Truth about ers: The Paris Conference of 1919 (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A History, 1991), pp. 129–42; Cabi- Reparations and War Debts (Heine- and Its Attempt to End War (John Reassessment after 75 Years (Cam- net 491B, 26.10.18 in CAB.23/14, mann, 1932), p. 111; Grigg, note, Murray, 2001), p.191. bridge, 1998), p. 338. TNA; BDFA Vol.4, p.111. 6.7.22, LGP F86/2/4; Trachten- 7 ‘There is no demand for a war 11 Sharp, Versailles Settlement pp. 20 Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American berg, Reparation pp. 257–58; Kent indemnity such as that imposed 90–98. Relations at the Paris Peace Confer- Spoils pp. 188–89. on France by Germany in 1871.’ 12 Lloyd George, Peace Treaties ence of 1919 (Princeton, 1961) pp. 30 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Lloyd George, 5.1.18, Lloyd Vol.1, p. 461 and p. 474. 166–75. Relations, 1917–1921: Britain and George, War Memoirs (2 vol. edi- 13 Lentin, Lost Peace pp. 23–46; 21 David Stevenson, ‘Britain, the Russian Civil War, November tion, Odhams, 1938), Vol. 2 p. Keynes wrote to the Sunday France and the Origins of Ger- 1918 – February 1920 (Princeton, 1513; ‘There shall be no … contri- Times 30.10. 38, ‘I can confirm man Disarmament, 1916–1919’, 1968) passim. butions, no punitive damages …’ his claim that he never honestly Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, 31 Fry, And Fortune Fled pp. Wilson, 11.2.18, H. W. V. Tem- believed in the advice given him No. 2 (2006), pp. 195–224; Sharp, 295–348. perley (ed.), A History of the Peace by Lord Cunliffe, Lord Sumner ‘Mission Accomplished? Britain 32 Lentin, ‘Lloyd George, Clem- Conference of Paris (6 vols. Oxford, and Mr Hughes …’. and the Disarmament of Ger- enceau and the elusive Anglo- 1920–1924), Vol.1 p. 437. 14 British Empire Delegation Meet- many, 1918–1923’ in K. Hamilton French guarantee treaty, 1919 “A 8 Minutes, Imperial War Cabinet ings 32, (30.5.19) 33, and 34 (1.6.19) and E. Johnson (eds.) Arms and disastrous episode”’ in Sharp and , 6.11.18, CAB23/44/12 TNA; in Michael Dockrill (ed.), Brit- Disarmament in Diplomacy (Valen- Glyn Stone (eds.), Anglo-French Lloyd George, Peace Treaties Vol.1, ish Documents on Foreign Affairs: tine Mitchell: 2007), pp. 73–90; Relations in the Twentieth Century; p. 490. Lentin, Lost Peace p. 20. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 Fry And Fortune Fled pp. 82–83. Rivalry and Cooperation (Rout- 9 Coalition Unionists won 335 [BDFA] (6 vols., University Press 22 Report, 21.1.21 DBFP, Vol. XVI, ledge, 2000); Curzon Memoran- seats, Lloyd George’s Coalition of America, 1989) Vol. 4, pp. p. 611, n.1; report, 18.12.20, DBFP dum, 28.12.21 DBFP Vol. XVI, Liberals 133. David Butler and 91–116; Cecil quoted by Lentin, Vol.X, p. 487; Andrew Bar- p. 869 and p. 862. Jennie Freeman British Politi- Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George ros, ‘Disarmament as a Weapon: 33 Sharp, ‘Anglo-French Rela- cal Facts 1900–1967 (second ed., and the Pre-History of Appeasement Anglo-French Relations and the tions from Versailles to Locarno, Papermac, 1968), p. 141. Wal- (Methuen, 1985) p.96 Problems of Enforcing German 1919–1925. The quest for secu- ter Long, the Tory First Lord 15 Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Répa- Disarmament, 1919–28’, Journal rity’ in Sharp and Stone, Anglo- of the Admiralty, remarked, rations Allemandes et la France (3 of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, No. 2 French Relations pp. 120–38.

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