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David Lloyd George and the Revision of the Treaty of Versailles

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David Lloyd George and the Revision of the Treaty of Versailles ‘IF I HAD TO GO TO PARIS AGAIN …’ DAVid LLOYD GEORGE AND thE REVISION OF thE TREATY OF VERSAillES In 1923, Charles Hardinge, the recently have realised as being opposed to every retired British ambassador in Paris and former principle of national life and existence’. permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Hardinge offered the angry former Prime Office, told David Lloyd George that the 1919 Minister some unspecified examples of their Treaties of Versailles and St Germain with impracticalities. ‘He said nothing for about ten Germany and Austria ‘contained provisions minutes and then remarked in a friendly way, which anybody with any knowledge of “If I had to go to Paris again I would conclude foreign politics or of European affairs would quite a different treaty.”’1 By Alan Sharp. 30 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘IF I HAD TO GO TO PARIS AGAIN …’ DAVid LLOYD GEORGE AND thE REVISION OF thE TREATY OF VERSAillES loyd George had thus more sympathetic to the enor- our signature’. He warned: ‘You joined the already consider- mous task facing the peacemakers may strip Germany of her colonies, Lable ranks of those critical after the most devastating war to reduce her armaments to a mere of the First World War settlement. that date. The settlement remains police force, and her navy to that Even before the conference ended highly controversial and, as one of of a fifth-rate Power … [but] if she there was much disquiet amongst its principal authors – something feels she has been unjustly treated participants that the treaty with which he could later conveniently … she will find means of extracting Germany was too harsh – as Lord forget – the idea of Lloyd George retribution from her conquerors.’ Robert Cecil remarked on 30 May creating an alternative treaty is Yet, as he boasted to his friend Sir 1919 during the Anglo-American intriguing.3 George Riddell, the press magnate, meeting which laid the foundations Setting to one side the obvi- on 30 March: ‘The truth is that for the Royal Institute of Inter- ous objections that he could nei- we have got our way … The Ger- national Affairs and its American ther remake the treaty without man Navy has been handed over; counterpart, the Council on For- the acquiescence of his allies, nor the German mercantile shipping eign Relations, ‘There is not a sin- could he alter the German percep- has been handed over, and the Ger- gle person in this room who is not tion that they were undefeated and man colonies have been given up.’ disappointed with the terms we hence that any settlement based on The sub-text to French premier have drafted.’ Six months after the the premise of Allied victory would Georges Clemenceau’s rejoinder to treaty was signed, John Maynard be unacceptable, there are vari- the memorandum asked what Brit- Keynes, the British Treasury offi- ous clues to the shape of his ideal ain would sacrifice of its own aims cial who had left Paris in disgust peace. These suggest that he sought (rather than those of others) to con- in early June, reinforced that dis- a stable Europe in which Germany, vince Germany that the treaty was quiet by publishing The Economic reconciled to its defeat and rec- just, but he provoked no response.5 Consequences of the Peace, a polemi- ognising the essential fairness of What might the possible allevia- cal attack on the peacemakers and the settlement, would play a posi- tions have been? Lloyd George was all their works, which gave Brit- tive and beneficial role, retaking deeply disappointed when, dur- ain a bad conscience and which its place as a major British trading ing his absence from Paris in early has shaped much of the subsequent partner. Britain could then revert April 1919, the American president, debate on the settlement.2 to what contemporaries saw as its Woodrow Wilson, pressured by Others thought the treaty too traditional imperial and colonial Clemenceau, conceded a fifteen- lenient. Marshal Foch, the French themes, leaving Europe to fend for year Allied occupation of Western commander of Allied forces on the itself – such indeed was the advice Germany, much longer than he Western Front, predicted, ‘This offered by both his private secre- considered necessary or desirable. is not Peace. It is an Armistice tary, Philip Kerr, and Jan Smuts, Later, in the 1930s, the return of for twenty years.’ He was proved the South African defence minister Germany’s colonies became part wrong – by sixty-seven days – but and member of the Imperial War of an appeasement agenda, but in many later commentators have Cabinet. An additional but more 1919 this crossed no one’s mind – shared his view that the inadequa- remote aspiration would be the certainly not that of Smuts, fierce cies of Versailles created the con- reintegration of a reformed Russia critic of the treaty that he was, who ditions that made a second world into European politics.4 had no intention of relinquishing war inevitable and hence also bear Left: Lloyd George’s Fontainebleau the former German South-West some of the responsibility for its The British memorandum of 25 March 1919, Africa. Five principal areas, how- consequences and subsequent inter- Empire drafted after a weekend’s consulta- ever, stand out: reparations; disar- national turmoil. As more govern- delegation in tion with close advisers as deadlock mament; the territorial settlement ments opened their archives after June 1919; Lloyd threatened the conference, out- and Germany’s new frontiers; the the 1960s some, though certainly George behind lined ‘the kind of treaty to which so-called ‘shame clauses’ of the not all, historians have become desk, centre-left alone we were prepared to append treaty, relating to the indictment Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 31 ‘IF I HAD TO GO TO PARIS AGAIN …’ DAVid llOYD GEORGE AND THE REVISION OF THE TREATY OF VERSAillES of the Kaiser and members of the ‘The sub- ruled out an indemnity, as Lloyd soldiers were merely civilians in German military and political elite, George acknowledged, though uniform. Accepting this was not together with Article 231, the ‘war ject of rep- Professor Antony Lentin suggests logical, Wilson conceded because guilt’ clause; and finally, Britain’s that, from the beginning, he had he believed the Allies would com- relationship with France, linked to arations’ no intention of foregoing war costs promise on a fixed sum – not the the treaty that Lloyd George made and that the wording was a mere complete bill but an amount to but did not implement. declared ruse de guerre.8 discharge all Germany’s liabili- During the 1918 election, facing ties. Hence his decision would Thomas an unknown electorate and seeking not affect what Germany paid but Reparations to revitalise a lacklustre campaign, could allow Britain, which had suf- One candidate for revision is pre- Lamont, the Lloyd George played to the popular fered little physical destruction, to eminent: ‘The subject of repara- American gallery in Newcastle on 29 Novem- receive greater compensation. No tions’ declared Thomas Lamont, ber, declaring that ‘Germany final sum was agreed; on 5 April the American banker acting as an banker act- must pay the costs of the war’. He 1919 the decision was postponed for expert in Paris, ‘caused more trou- included an escape clause – ‘up to a Reparation Commission to deter- ble, contention, hard feeling, and ing as an the limit of her capacity’ – but in mine in1921.11 delay at the Paris Peace Conference Bristol on 11 December he stated, In his Fontainebleau memo- than any other point of the Treaty.’6 expert in ‘We propose to demand the whole randum Lloyd George suggested Resolving Germany’s responsi- cost of the war’, and hinted that that reparations should disappear bility to compensate Allied war- Paris, ‘caused Germany’s capacity was substan- with the generation that waged time losses then held centre stage tial. He won the election – though war. Yet he refused to specify any at numerous Anglo-French, inter- more trou- dependent upon a massive Tory time limit on German payments Allied and international confer- majority. Public and parliamentari- or name a total sum. He claimed ences in the early years of treaty ble, conten- ans heard what they wanted to hear he was thwarted by the excessive execution, sowing discord amongst and expected him to deliver.9 demands of his financial advis- the victors and offering Germany tion, hard It is easy to see why. The Brit- ers, Lords Cunliffe and Sumner, an opportunity to steal the moral ish Treasury estimated that victory respectively a former governor of high ground. Everyone, includ- feeling, and cost the Allies £24,000 million in the Bank of England and a Lord of ing the Germans, accepted that 1914 gold values. Great swathes of Appeal – irreverently dubbed the there was a bill to pay, but the bases delay at the Belgium and France lay ravaged by ‘Heavenly Twins’ by British del- of that reckoning, the amounts to four years of industrialised warfare egation colleagues because they be paid and the distribution of the Paris Peace and required restoration. Addition- were always together and sought receipts amongst the Allies, were all Confer- ally the Allies had borrowed heav- astronomical sums from Germany. beset by controversy. ily from the United States, which Cunliffe maintained that £24,000 Traditionally losers offset vic- ence than expected repayment. Meanwhile million was a realistic prospect. tors’ costs – after 1870–71 France Germany, suffering only minimal Lloyd George dismissed this as ‘a paid Germany 5,000 million gold any other damage to its industrial base and wild and fantastic chimera’ and francs – but in 1918 Lloyd George with no foreign war debts, posed mocked Cunliffe’s ‘strange lapse and Wilson ruled out war costs, point of the the threat of future trade competi- into megalomania’, suggesting that demanding only that Germany tion, unimpeded by the costs faced Sumner ‘himself caught the infec- restore the invaded territories.7 The Treaty’.
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