David Lloyd George 1863–1945 Kenneth O

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For the study of Liberal, SDP and Issue 77 / Winter 2012–13 / £10.00 Liberal Democrat history

Journal of LiberalHI ST O R Y

David Lloyd George 1863–1945 Kenneth O. Morgan Lloyd George and leadership The influences of Gladstone and Lincoln Alan Sharp ‘If I had to go to Paris again …’ Lloyd George and the revision of the Versailles Treaty Stella Rudman Lloyd George and the appeasement of Germany, 1922–1945 Peter Clarke ‘We can conquer unemployment’ Lloyd George and Keynes David Dutton The wonderful wizard as was Lloyd George, 1931–1945 Liberal Democrat History Group 2 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Journal of Liberal History Issue 77: Winter 2012–13 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. ISSN 1479-9642 David Lloyd George, 1863–1945 4 Editor: Duncan Brack Kenneth O. Morgan introduces this special edition of the Journal. Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Lloyd George and leadership 6 Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, The influences of Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln; by Kenneth O. Morgan York Membery Lloyd George, nonconformity and radicalism 12 Patrons Ian Machin examines Lloyd George’s career and beliefs from 1890 to 1906 Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; Professor John Vincent Lloyd George’s coalition proposal of 1910 18 Editorial Board and its impact on pre-war Liberalism; by Martin Pugh Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Ian Cawood; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr David Dutton; Prof. David Gowland; Prof. Richard Lloyd George’s war rhetoric, 1914–1918 24 Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; Dr Alison Richard Toye analyses Lloyd George’s rhetorical skills at the height of his powers Holmes; Dr J. Graham Jones; Dr Tudor Jones; Tony Little; Prof. Ian Machin; Dr Mark Pack; Dr Ian Packer; Dr John Powell; Jaime Reynolds; Dr Andrew Russell; ‘If I had to go to Paris again …’ 30 Dr Iain Sharpe Lloyd George and the revision of the Treaty of Versailles; by Alan Sharp Editorial/Correspondence Lloyd George and the appeasement of Germany 38 Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and Stella Rudman looks at Lloyd George’s stance on Germany, 1922–1945 book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to: ‘We can conquer unemployment’ 46

Duncan Brack (Editor) Lloyd George and Keynes; by Peter Clarke 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN email: [email protected] The wonderful wizard as was 54 All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History. All Lloyd George, 1931–1945; by David Dutton rights reserved. The Beaverbrook Library 64 Advertisements A. J. P. Taylor and the rise of Lloyd George studies; by Chris Wrigley Full page £100; half page £60; quarter page £35. Discounts available for repeat ads or offers to readers (e.g. discounted book prices). To place ads, please Lloyd George archives 68 contact the Editor. J. Graham Jones surveys manuscript sources

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Printed by Kall-Kwik, For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues 18 Colville Road, London W3 8BL of the Journal, and archive and other research sources, see our website at: January 2013 www.liberalhistory.org.uk. Chair: Tony Little Honorary President: Lord Wallace of Saltaire

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 3 david lloyd george, 1863 – 1945

his special issue of the Journal commemorates the T150th anniversary of the birth of David Lloyd George, arguably our greatest Liberal in peace and in war, certainly our most radical Prime Minister. Lloyd George was always to be linked with his almost native Wales, although his birth actually took place in New York Place, Manchester, which allowed LG opportunities, as appropriate, to declare himself to be a ‘Lancashire lad’. It was an astonishing life, packed with crisis and controversy. This was captured in February 1934 by the Daily Express cartoon- ist, ‘George’ Strube, who always depicted his subject accompanied by a pheasant and a mangold wur- zel, thereby never allowing him to forget a famous agricultural error from one of Lloyd George’s speeches in his pre-1914 land campaign. Strube’s cartoon is on the theme of one man in his life paying many parts. Two columns of Lloyd George effigies are lined up. The one on the left depicts, among First World War in 1918. The pre- a party regular, to his ultimate cost. others, the Birmingham Police- sent writer covers his subject’s ideas Richard Toye illuminates a cen- man, the Ratcatcher of Limehouse of leadership and the influence tral asset of Lloyd George’s politi- and the Munitions Minister; the upon them of two transcendent cal style, his command of rhetoric, one on the right includes the Welsh statesmen: Gladstone, still a great never displayed to more powerful Bard, the Wizard, the Court Jester. figure in the Commons when Lloyd effect than during the First World The two lines of effigy meet at the George entered parliament at a War. end with the simple depiction ‘The by-election in April 1890, and that Four other contributions deal Man who won the War’. But these other country lawyer, Abraham with the years after 1918, the time many characterisations only hint Lincoln. of fleeting international greatness at the rich variety of a glittering Ian Machin shows how central and ultimate marginalisation. Alan career that, as Churchill so memo- to Lloyd George’s earlier ventures Sharp examines the post-war peace rably proclaimed in the Commons in Liberal politics was popular settlement when Lloyd George, one in March 1945 at the time of his old nonconformity, but how never- of its architects, came to advocate a friend’s death, did so much to shape theless it enabled him to straddle fundamental revision, and discusses the domestic and international his- the Old Liberalism of civic democ- what the components of that revi- tory of Britain in the early twenti- racy and the New Liberalism of sion might have been. Peter Clarke eth century. social reform. Martin Pugh recalls recalls the fascinating relationship Many of these aspects are cov- Lloyd George’s unique contribu- between Lloyd George and May- ered by the distinguished team of tion to the Liberalism of welfare in nard Keynes, a bewildering story scholars who have contributed to the Edwardian years, but also how that moves from Keynes’s power- this special issue. Four of the essays his partisan Liberalism could be ful indictment of Versailles in a broadly cover Lloyd George’s ear- shunted aside by ideas of coalition, famous tract to their brilliant coop- lier career down to the end of the as in 1910. Lloyd George was never eration in proposing remedies for

4 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 david lloyd george, 1863 – 1945

long-term depression and unem- the political, social and economic A third and decisive phase has ployment, and finally to the savage history of Britain, and of Wales. completely changed the approach. dénouement when Keynes’s Essay It helped carry his fellow citizens, The 1960s were marked by a new in Biography created the legend of to quote Adlai Stevenson, kicking politics (with men like Macmil- Lloyd George as purposeless, a man and screaming into the twentieth lan, Wilson and Foot, who greatly ‘rooted in nothing’. Stella Rudman century. admired Lloyd George) and of describes Lloyd George as an advo- Lloyd George’s reputation has course they were ‘swinging’ and cate of appeasement towards Ger- gone through many historical their moral climate more liber- many and dangerously emollient phases, with many highs and lows. ated. Most important, the treasures towards Hitler, though in the end a Down to the end of the First World of the Beaverbook Library meant fearsome critic of Chamberlainite War, he was hailed as the great that the release of new sources foreign policy who helped to bring democratic social reformer, a bril- enabled Lloyd George’s career to down his old foe in 1940 in his last liant boy from a poor home in rural be explored with a new serious- great speech. David Dutton illus- Caernarfonshire who moved up, ness, and his importance for Brit- trates how throughout the 1930s in the title of an early biography, ain and the world in the twentieth the ageing Lloyd George remained ‘from Village Green to Downing century to emerge with new clar- a formidable front-line politician, Street’, as his hero Lincoln had pro- ity and depth. He now seems rel- though increasingly marginalised gressed from log cabin to President. evant to our world as never before. in his last years. Controversy con- In 1918 Bonar Law observed: ‘He There are, at present, 443 biog- tinued to dog Lloyd George in the can be Prime Minister for life if he raphies and other studies of him years after his death, and Chris likes’. My view recorded in the Bodleian catalogue Wrigley, finally, describes how the After the coalition of 1918–22, remains in Oxford. Almost all the recent opening up of the Lloyd George which left a sour taste, the vic- ones, including incomplete multi- archives in 1967 in the Beaver- tory of his enemies Baldwin and much the volume works by my late friends brook Library under the incompa- MacDonald saw a total reversal. John Grigg and Bentley Gilbert, rable direction of Alan Taylor led The popular hero turned univer- same as it take a far more positive view of to a new, far more creative phase in sal scapegoat, as Asquithian oppo- their subject’s achievements and his Lloyd George studies. nents denounced him for splitting, was then: visionary qualities, the high road There are other important almost destroying his party, and of national and global politics as contributions here as well: two for the evil record of the Black and the judge- well as the low road of coalitionist relevant book reviews and an Tans in Ireland, Labour condemned manoeuvres. authoritative archival study by him for betraying the miners over ment of my This issue of the Journal of Liberal John Graham Jones of the National coal nationalisation, and Conserva- History, I hope, will take the process Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, on tives despised him for corrupting old mentor further. I am immensely grateful the MS materials on which research the Lords through cash for peer- to Duncan Brack for asking me to on Lloyd George can continue to be ages, for dangerous liaisons with Alan Tay- be the guest editor, a great honour, pursued. Hitler and the Soviet Union, and and to all my colleagues for their All these admirable contribu- for being, in Baldwin’s illuminat- lor, another efficiency and enthusiasm for the tions, of course, offer only a part ing description, simply ‘a dynamic project. David Lloyd George was of the myriad themes of Lloyd force’, which was ‘a very danger- famous ‘trou- the subject of my very first book, George’s extraordinary odyssey. ous thing’. Worse still, many stud- a short biography published fifty Others could include such immense ies, including one by his eldest son, ble-maker’, years ago in February 1963. I wrote topics as war strategy, labour rela- Richard, saw Lloyd George con- that Lloyd then as an immature enthusiast. I tions, Irish independence, women’s demned as an immoral libertine. do so now tempered by age, expe- suffrage, empire, Welsh devolution, The nadir came after the end of George was rience (and a little ermine). But my his role as the first modern Prime the puritanical, hypocritical 1950s, view remains much the same as Minister, his radicalism towards when Earl Lloyd-George’s book our great- it was then: the judgement of my parliament, party, the civil ser- coincided with the Lady Chatter- old mentor Alan Taylor, another vice, the City, the Crown. But this ley trial and Mervyn Griffith Jones, est ruler famous ‘trouble-maker’ (in a fore- is only to reinforce the point that another chapel-bred Welshman, word to another book of mine) Lloyd George, like Walt Whitman, inquiring of the Old Bailey jury since Oliver that Lloyd George was our greatest contained multitudes. His influence whether it was a proper book for ruler since Oliver Cromwell. penetrated almost every aspect of their wives or servants to read. Cromwell. Kenneth O. Morgan

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 5 Lloyd George and Leadership The Influences of Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln

Lloyd George believed in leadership. His heroes in history were strong leaders like Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon, Theodore Roosevelt – and, alas! Hitler. When he first cast eyes on the House of Commons in November 1880, his mind led him, approvingly, to the leadership style of William the Conqueror. ‘I will not say but that I eyed the assembly in a spirit similar to that in which William loyd George’s own moment powerful influences on his vision the Conqueror eyed of conquest came when of leadership were William Ewart Lhe emerged as the nation’s Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln. England on his visit to leader at the height of wartime in The bicentenary of both in 2009 1916. Thereafter his highly per- may afford an opportunity to Edward the Confessor, sonal style and method of lead- examine what kind of influences the region of his future ership led to his own downfall they actually were. nearly six years later: hence Bald- As far as Gladstone is concerned, domain.’1 Kenneth O. win’s disapproving judgement he and Lloyd George could not on Lloyd George as ‘a dynamic have been more different. Glad- Morgan analyses the force’.2 Hence also Lloyd George’s stone came from a wealthy mer- impact on Lloyd George inability to work in government cantile family who had profited with another great egoist, Win- from sugar and tobacco plantations of two powerful leaders: ston Churchill, in 1940. But Lloyd (and slave labour) in Demerara and George, the self-styled ‘cottage- Jamaica; he was a product of Eton William Gladstone and bred man’, saw himself as a special and Christ Church, Oxford. Lloyd Abraham Lincoln. kind of leader, a democratic leader, George, whose father died when an instrument of populism. Two he was one year old, grew up in

6 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Lloyd George and Leadership The Influences of Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln

a shoemaker’s home in the small of the people of France, whom he Wales in slapping John Morley and Caernarfonshire village of Llanys- considered more intelligent than Mr Gladstone in the face’.8 Lloyd tumdwy. He went to the small local the English, and looked forward to George also showed a tiresome National school, but his education stronger contacts with them after independence of outlook on other came primarily from the university the construction of a Channel Tun- ecclesiastical and agrarian issues. of life. In contrast to Gladstone’s nel (of which Sir Edward Watkin In return Gladstone tried to bully devout high Anglicanism, Lloyd was a fervent advocate). him, somewhat pointlessly, chal- George was an aggressive radical Gladstone was present in the lenging him on how many chapels nonconformist, a Campbellite Bap- House in June 1890 when Lloyd there were in Wales in 1742, a point tist located on the further reaches of George gave his maiden speech, a on which Lloyd George was igno- dissent. His youthful hero was the lively affair dealing with the taxa- rant.9 (The answer, apparently, was Unitarian, Joseph Chamberlain, tion of landlords’ licences, a favour- 162.) along with Michael Davitt, the ite theme of Lloyd George and his Lloyd George was not impressed Irish nationalist and quasi-socialist colleagues. Lloyd George excitedly with Gladstone’s last govern- land nationaliser. Even so, Glad- told his wife how the old man was ment of 1892–94. He thought it stone had to come to terms with the ‘delighted’ with his performance.5 far too conservative and unable to strange young apostles of Cymru For his part Lloyd George told Lord do enough for ordinary working Fydd (‘Young Wales’) after the Lib- Riddell years later how impressed people or for the national needs of eral schism on Irish home rule in he was by Gladstone as a parliamen- Wales. He told his brother, Wil- 1886.3 It was part of his growing tary speaker and presence: ‘Head liam George, minding the shop involvement with the radicalism and shoulders above anybody else for the family solicitor’s firm back of the Celtic fringe, so-called, that I have ever seen in the House of in Portmadoc, that there were too helped to turn him into ‘the Peo- Commons’, in gesture, language, many ‘mangy old hacks’ around ple’s William’. In that process he fire and, latterly, wit. He had tre- Gladstone. It was a ‘combination came into contact with the young mendous power, though at times of ineptitudes’. One junior minis- Lloyd George. he tended to go on too long.6 Like ter, Kay-Shuttleworth, was ‘fodder Elected to parliament in the others, he was in awe of the riveting for the undertaker’.10 Lloyd George Caernarfon Boroughs by-election effect of Gladstone’s eye. His fellow had very mixed feelings when his of April 1890 (a Liberal gain by Welsh backbencher, Sam Evans, Welsh colleague, Tom Ellis, agreed just eighteen votes), he had sev- once told him that he wished Glad- to become junior whip (later Chief eral encounters with Gladstone as stone ‘would take that terrible eye Whip) when Rosebery succeeded a young MP. In his War Memoirs, off us’.7 Gladstone in 1894, and there was over forty years later, he described But the young Lloyd George evidence of tension between the a conversation he had had with and the Grand Old Man soon came Left: two Welshmen on whether Ellis’s Gladstone at the home of Sir into conflict. They clashed over History repeats alleged ’grasping the Saxon gold’ Edward Watkin in 1892, when the the Clergy Discipline (Immoral- itself was or was not a betrayal of the Liberal leader gave an inspirational ity) Bill, a measure in which Lloyd The Premier: ‘Yes, needs of Wales.11 address at Cwmllan.4 It does not George had no direct interest at all, Mr Lincoln, we Gladstone was irritated in read now as an intellectually chal- but which allowed him to raise the have practically return. First, he was, as a Church- lenging exchange of views. Glad- topic of the establishment of the the same task man, far more hesitant about dis- stone seems to have rambled on Church of England. Gladstone was that you had: to establishment in Wales, as opposed about the decline of rural drunken- profoundly irritated by the Welsh fight for human to Ireland where he had disestab- ness, the price of sugar candy and backbencher’s impertinent remarks, freedom – to lished the Church in 1869, and only the qualities of corrugated iron including an observation that spare life by came to accept it for Wales, with roofing. More interestingly, he then drunken parsons were more agree- losing it.’ some reluctance, in 1893. The four launched a paean of praise of the able than sober ones. Stuart Rendel Western Mail, 13 Welsh dioceses, after all, were an intellectual and political qualities was infuriated by ‘the madness of February 1917 organic part of the province of

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 7 lloyd george and leadership: the influences of gladstone and abraham lincoln

Canterbury. Secondly, Gladstone Gladstonian finance, and launched In many In 1862 he declared that Jefferson was anxious to show, as he put it quite new principles of public tax- Davis, President of the Confed- in 1892 when arguing against having and spending policies that ways Lloyd eracy, ‘had made a nation’.16 It was ing a Royal Commission on Welsh endured down to the regime of a view which he later regretted and Land, that ‘it was not the Irish case Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. George was a had to recant. Lloyd George, by all over again’, in political or agrar- Secondly, Lloyd George was a contrast, was always a fervent devo- ian terms,12 and that home rule for good deal less devout on free trade lifelong fol- tee of Abraham Lincoln. In time he Wales was not a practical or desir- than the Grand Old Man had been. turned some of his animus towards able objective. His measures while at the Board lower of the Gladstone against his son Her- Lloyd George, for all his pop- of Trade in 1905–08, especially bert Gladstone – ‘the finest living ulism, was somewhat relieved the Patents and Merchant Ship- Gladstonian embodiment of the Liberal princi- when Rosebery and not Sir Wil- ping Bills, showed a remarkable cause … he ple that talent is not hereditary’. liam Harcourt succeeded Gladstone casualness for a Liberal minister And yet in many ways Lloyd as Prime Minister in March 1894, towards protectionist tendencies. inherited George was a lifelong follower of since Rosebery appeared to be more Lloyd George’s peacetime coa- the Gladstonian cause. Of course, sympathetic to the nonconformist lition of 1918–22 made marked many of his he split his party in 1918, as Glad- viewpoint. He then led a brief four- inroads into tariff reform, nota- stone had done over Irish home rule man revolt against a tottering gov- bly the Anti-Dumping Bill of 1921 fundamen- in 1886. But, more importantly, he ernment on the issue of the primacy with its protective attitude toward inherited many of his fundamen- to be accorded Welsh disestablish- key industries and ‘collapsed tal princi- tal principles from his venerable ment, which had stood second in exchanges’. He did not object to the leader. the Liberals’ Newcastle Programme imperial preference introduced at ples from his First there was a strong commit- in 1891. His backbench manoeu- the Ottawa conference in 1932. On ment to political reform. He took vres, which led to the Liberals’ free trade, as in religion, he was a venerable Gladstone’s views on the House majority falling in committee to free thinker. of Lords, that is, focusing on the only seven, perhaps helped towards And, thirdly, on Church ques- leader. powers of the upper house rather the ignominious fall of the govern- tions Lloyd George’s inclinations than fussing about its composi- ment on the trivial ‘cordite vote’ in as a belligerent nonconformist led tion. Lloyd George’s stance during June 1895. The Home Secretary at him inevitably in new directions. the debates on the Parliament Act the time, Herbert Asquith, was not He led the onslaught on Church in 1910–11 was identical with that enamoured of the Welsh freeboot- schools in the 1902 Education Act of Gladstone at the time of his res- er’s views on party and personal and organised the mass passive ignation in 1894, when he tried in loyalty then or later. He told Tom resistance by Welsh local authori- vain to get his younger colleagues Ellis that ‘you showed rather too ties against it. He fiercely defended in government to reduce decisively great a tendency to whitewash him Church disendowment in 1912 and the power of the Lords to delay or [Lloyd George], after the under- accused Unionist critics of it as wreck Irish home rule. His casu- hand and disloyal way in wh[ich] he themselves ‘dripping with the fat of alness in awarding titles during undoubtedly acted’.13 H. H. Fowler, sacrilege’. And it was under Lloyd the so-called ‘honours scandal’ in one of Asquith’s former Cabinet George that the Church in Wales 1918–22 showed how little the qual- colleagues, shared this view. In fact, was finally disestablished and disen- ity of the composition of the upper the quasi-nationalism of Cymru dowed in 1920. house meant to him. He told J.C.C. Fydd in Wales at this time was not Not surprisingly, therefore, Davidson that it ‘keeps politics far compatible with the approach of Lloyd George’s later reflections on cleaner than any other method of the Liberal government, or any Gladstone were generally nega- raising funds’ to sell titles rather mainstream British political party. tive. He told Frances Stevenson, than to sell policies, as happened in Until Cymru Fydd collapsed in Janu- ‘I admired him but I never liked the United States.17 Again, Lloyd ary 1896, riven by internal divi- him.’14 He said much the same to George’s government in 1918 passed sions, it was the most erratic phase Riddell. He claimed that Gladstone a major Reform Act, the first since of Lloyd George’s career. ‘hated nonconformists’, especially Gladsone’s in 1884. There was, of Thereafter Lloyd George’s Lib- Welsh nonconformists. He also course, a crucially important extra eralism followed a very different ‘had no real sympathy’ for the poor ingredient with the inclusion of path from that of Gladstone, espe- or for the working class. He told votes for women, which Lloyd cially after the Welshman became a his close Welsh ally, Herbert Lewis, George always supported and government minister after Decem- that Gladstone ‘was always a Tory which Gladstone had resisted. ber 1905. First, the New Liberal- at heart’ with the bogus aristocratic Lloyd George inherited a good ism of social reform, with which pretensions of the worst of the mid- deal – though far from all – of Lloyd George was strongly iden- dle class.15 The temperamental and Gladstone’s passion for Ireland, tified at the Treasury from April ideological gulf between them with the important difference that 1908 onwards, meant an expanded came out clearly in their attitudes Lloyd George was always swayed role for the central state and a pro- towards the American Civil War. by Joseph Chamberlain’s concern gramme of progressive, redistribu- Gladstone from the start sympa- for protection of the Protestant tive direct taxation far beyond thised with the South and its plan- minority in Ulster. In 1921, he what Gladstone would have ever tation owners (his own inherited turned decisively from a shameful countenanced. The People’s Budget wealth from the slave system in policy of ‘retaliation’ to pursuing of 1909, and even more that of Jamaica was something on which Gladstonian policies again in Ire- 1914, marked a total contrast with he tended to remain notably quiet). land, and entering into successful

8 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george and leadership: the influences of gladstone and abraham lincoln negotiations with the leaders of despite many arguments, and cer- not in English, and a Welsh radi- Sinn Fein. The Free State Act of tainly enjoyed a closer relationship cal like the journalist-bard William January 1922, which partitioned than did Churchill and de Gaulle in Rees (‘Gwilym Hiraethog’) gave the island, amalgamated Glad- the Second World War.19 So did the its message of human equality mas- stone’s and Chamberlain’s perspec- British Premier with Aristide Bri- sive publicity. There was a famous tives, giving Ireland a far greater and in the conferences of post-war. Lincoln enthusiast, the Unitarian meed of independence than Par- In the 1919 Paris peace confer- innkeeper-bard William Williams, nell had advocated, and it achieved ence, Lloyd George promoted a who held pro-Federal sessions an enduring settlement in Ireland, broadly Gladstonian agenda, and nightly in his inn ‘The Stag’. Wil- which neither of them had man- shared some of Gladstone’s pref- liams enjoyed the bardic name aged to do. erences on national issues, nota- Carw Coch (the stag) as a result. Lloyd George’s early approach bly in the Balkans. Above all, By the time the war came to its towards imperial questions was at Lloyd George, like Gladstone, was end, portraits of Gladstone and of first distinctly Gladstonian, espe- strongly anti-Turk and pro-Greek Lincoln hung side by side in many cially during the South African on the strategic issues of the east- a humble cottage, the Grand Old War, when he emerged as a formi- ern Mediterranean. The confron- Man and Honest Abe in libertarian dable critic of Chamberlainism. tation with the Turks at Chanak partnership. Indeed, he had earlier condemned in August 1922 resulted from the One passionate enthusiast for Gladstone’s own ventures into British Prime Minister’s intem- Lincoln was Lloyd George’s Uncle imperialism, notably his inva- perate and impractical support for Lloyd, and his nephew followed sion and subsequent occupation the vast territorial designs in Asia him avidly. A portrait of Lincoln of Egypt in 1882. Like Gladstone, Minor of the Greek Prime Minis- still is to be seen today in the tiny Lloyd George was always wary ter, Venizelos. This led directly to living room of the old shoemaker’s of the Liberal Imperialist ten- the ultimate crisis of the Coalition home, ‘Highgate’, in Llanystum- dency, embodied by Asquith and and the backbench Tory rebellion dwy. To Lloyd George, Lincoln Grey amongst others. However, against Austen Chamberlain on symbolised the common man come it should be added that he himself 19 October 1922 which resulted in good – the great democrat though became distinctly more sympa- Lloyd George’s resignation. Even not necessarily, as will be seen, the thetic towards imperial objectives Bonar Law turned against his old great emancipator. Like the young in later life, notably in the Middle ally. Sir Alfred Mond, still a Lloyd Lloyd George, he was a country Eastern settlement that followed George Liberal, told his leader after lawyer taking on the vested inter- the First World War. In the debates the election of the ‘enormous sup- ests in his society. The Log Cabin over Indian self-government in the port from all our old Liberal non- theme was made much of by Lloyd 1930s, Lloyd George was an unhelp- conformists for the protection of George’s biographers, as in From ful presence. Winston Church- Christian minorities and of women Village Green to Downing Street by J. ill had asked Brendan Bracken to from the hands of the Turk’, but it Hugh Edwards and Spencer Leigh ‘make Lloyd George take a decent was not enough.20 The abiding Bal- Edwards, in 1908. Lloyd George line over India’, and the latter often kan legacy of Gladstone thus led also compared himself to Lincoln in expressed sympathy for the reac- Lincoln, one to Lloyd George’s exclusion from more personal ways, as in a shared tionary views of his old ally. ‘We power for the rest of his life. liking for women. He quoted Lin- should keep a free hand in India’, may sur- coln as regarding meeting women Lloyd George observed in 1934. He ~ to be rather like eating gingerbread added, ‘so long as the natives stick mise, was a – ‘I like it very much but I never get to rice, we shan’t have much trou- Abraham Lincoln was assassi- any’ (which, in Lloyd George’s case, ble’. If their diet changed to wheat, more appeal- nated when Lloyd George was only may well be doubted).23 They both, there would be problems.18 two years old. But he became an so Lloyd George believed, endured Finally there was much that ing model immense personal hero and life- difficult marriages. He saw Lin- was Gladstonian in Lloyd George’s long inspiration. Lincoln enjoyed coln as a deeply human man and, governing principles in foreign for him as a generally heroic status in Wales. as such, far more interesting than affairs. Like Gladstone he began as a The Protestant Welsh had been George Washington. ‘Lincoln’, he strong sympathiser with republican head of gov- strongly anti-slavery and over- told Riddell in 1920, was a much France. He saw the French as a great whelmingly supported the North bigger man than Washington who democracy and a civilised force in ernment, in the American Civil War.21 Over was always so correct that he was the world, and warmly welcomed 90 per cent of the Welsh who had uninteresting’.24 the Entente Cordiale of 1904. This since Lloyd emigrated to America resided in Lincoln, one may surmise, was remained an abiding view despite George’s the northern states; a Welsh radi- a more appealing model for him as his New Liberal endorsement of the cal like Samuel Roberts of Llan- head of government, since Lloyd social welfare policies of the Ger- own style as brynmair, who founded a Welsh George’s own style as Prime Minis- man empire in the later Bismarck- settlement in the slave state of Ten- ter was distinctly presidential, with ian period. France, the cradle of Prime Min- nessee and appeared to sympathise his Cabinet secretariat, his bevy revolution in 1789, which had actu- with the Confederate cause, virtu- of special advisers in the ‘Garden ally disestablished its own Church ister was ally destroyed his reputation in his Suburb’, and his highly personal in 1905, embodied the Old Liberal native land for so doing.22 Harriet approaches to business, the trade in him always. During the war, distinctly Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin unions and journalists. As head of Lloyd George and Clemenceau was first published in Britain in the a Conservative-dominated coali- gave the Entente a new buoyancy presidential. Welsh language (in magazines), tion in 1916–22 he would have been

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 9 lloyd george and leadership: the influences of gladstone and abraham lincoln impressed by Lincoln’s skill in recon behalf of victory and uncon- death’. He was ‘one of those giant onciling the viewpoints – and the ditional surrender, and cited this figures who belong to mankind.’ strong egos – of such Cabinet min- precedent to American journalists Lloyd George had exhibited some isters as William H. Seward, Edwin who questioned the curtailment rare nervousness beforehand about M. Stanton, Salmon B. Chase and of civil liberties in wartime Brit- this speech, since he would be shar- Edward Bates, and making this ain. They had both found it neces- ing the stage with such eminences ‘team of rivals’ into an effective sary to make serious inroads into as Elihu Root and James Bryce, executive, with the President him- the legal principle of habeas corpus. former US Secretary of State and self very much first among equals. Lloyd George also made free, and British Ambassador to Washington Lloyd George’s Cabinet colleagues historically doubtful, compari- respectively, but his was the speech in 1919–21 would have sympathised son between the threat of seces- that endured in the public mem- with Seward’s comment on Lincoln sion from the Confederate South ory.32 It is fitting perhaps that Lloyd – ‘There is but one vote cast in the and from Sinn Fein and republicans George’s own statue, the only non- Cabinet and that is cast by the Pres- generally in Ireland.28 Above all, Conservative British Prime Min- ident’.25 By contrast, Gladstone’s Lloyd George praised Lincoln as the ister there, now stands tall in the methods as Prime Minister would great reconciler, out to bind up the Square close to that of his hero. have appeared casual and idiosyn- nation’s wounds, at the end of the In 1923 Lloyd George visited the cratic, with a personal bias towards Civil War. His purpose was above United States for the first and last aristocratic Whigs like Granville all to avoid a vindictive, Carthag- time. It was arranged by Welsh- and Spencer and too much ‘count- inian peace. Most significantly, Americans of the ‘Gorsedd’ (bardic ing of noses’ in his Cabinets. Of Lloyd George did not praise the society) in Ohio state and was an course, Lloyd George, an obses- great emancipator at all, and criti- immense, gruelling tour covering sively political individual of fleet- cised the radical Republicans like 6,000 miles and thirty meetings, in ing cultural interests, could never Sumner and Wade for their partisan Canada as well as the United States. have allowed his prime ministerial extremism in the latter stages of the The £30,000 he earned for syn- energies to be diverted into such war. He never showed enthusiasm dicated newspaper columns mas- arcane pursuits as Homer, Horace for the idea of turning a civil war sively boosted his income.33 Lloyd or the origins of Christianity. fought to defend the Union into a George was hailed by Americans Lincoln added another dimen- crusade on behalf of racial equality as ‘the most famous man in the sion to Lloyd George’s vision of for disinherited black Americans. Lincoln’s world’, to which he responded with leadership – that of war leader. He Lincoln’s name often cropped career due modesty. He met celebrities emphasised Lincoln’s transcendent up during the peace conference from President Coolidge to Charlie qualities in this respect in his Lin- in Paris in 1919. Lloyd George provided Chaplin. But Lincoln and his abid- coln’s Day message to the American exchanged views with Woodrow ing message provided the central people in February 1917. Whether Wilson (a conservative Southerner the basis focus. The highlight was a visit to Gladstone would have made a great whose hero was Gladstone and who Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln’s one- leader in war he was privately less gave highly conciliatory interpre- for Lloyd time home. Here Lloyd George laid certain.26 tations of the Civil War so as not to a wreath on Lincoln’s tomb and met Lloyd George made many com- upset southern opinion) and Clem- George’s his son, Robert Todd Lincoln. In parisons between Lincoln’s experi- enceau (who visited the United his speech in Springfield, his praise ence of war and his own. He praised States in 1865 shortly after Lin- international was remarkably effusive. Lincoln Lincoln’s firm handling of his gen- coln’s death, crossed the Atlantic was: erals during the Civil War, as in his eight times in all, and actually mar- message dismissal of Meade, the victor of ried an American woman).29 Lloyd … the finest product in the Gettysburg, for failing to follow up George greatly preferred Theodore in 1923. He realm of statesmanship of Chris- his victory and allowing Robert E. Roosevelt, pioneer of the New tian civilisation, and the wise Lee’s defeated Confederate forces Nationalism, to his rival Woodrow spelt out two counsel he gave his own people to escape south over the River Wilson, spokesman for the New in their day of their triumph Potomac. Lincoln had sacked Gen- Freedom. He noted with horror supreme pri- he gives today to the people of eral McClellan for insubordina- Wilson’s extreme coldness on hear- Europe in the hour of their vic- tion, much as he himself had sacked ing of Roosevelt’s death during the orities after tory over the forces that menace Robertson, his Chief of the General Paris conference. ‘I was aghast at the Great their liberties.34 Staff. He also commended Lincoln’s the acrid detestation which flowed choice of Grant as commander in from Wilson’s lips.’30 Lincoln, he War. They He then took time off to visit Civil chief and compared it with his own felt, was far superior to Wilson War battlefields in Virginia and support for, and ultimate satisfac- in every way. He had the human were the rec- meet some aged Confederate veter- tion with, Marshal Foch in 1918.27 touch and was also a far more deci- ans there.35 He was presented with Always he noted his own wartime sive President. ‘Wilson’s philan- onciliation of a copy of Nicolay and Hay’s biog- difficulties with his own military thropy was purely intellectual, raphy of Lincoln in the course of commanders, especially Haig and whereas Lincoln’s came straight a shattered his visit. Robertson. It was emphasised that from the heart.’31 Lloyd George In fact, Lincoln’s career provided the strategic judgement of the civil- elaborated further on Lincoln’s vir- continent the basis for Lloyd George’s inter- ian Lincoln was almost always tues at the unveiling of the Saint national message in 1923. He spelt superior to that of the military. Gaudens statue of Lincoln in Par- and faith in out two supreme priorities after He also hailed Lincoln’s con- liament Square in 1920. Lincoln, he the Great War. They were the rec- stant and uncompromising stance declared, ‘had lost his nationality in democracy. onciliation of a shattered continent

10 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george and leadership: the influences of gladstone and abraham lincoln and faith in democracy – ‘Recon- Gladstone principles, style and rhetoric. Glad- Humphreys-Owen, 28 May 1892 cile the Vanquished’ and ‘Trust the stone embodied his belief in the (National Library of Wales, Aberyst- Common People’, as Lloyd George and Lincoln values of Liberalism and nationality wyth, Glansevern MSS., 596). put it.36 Both were drawn from the overseas. But Gladstone, the friend 9 Roy Hattersley, David Lloyd George: message of Lincoln of 1865. Both are both piv- of Whigs who described himself as the Great Outsider (Little Brown, were used to press the United States ‘an out and out inequalitarian’ and 2010), p. 59. not to be too isolationist in its for- otal to Lloyd cherished the landed aristocracy as 10 William George, op.cit., p. 100. eign policy and not to encourage the basis for social leadership,39 was 11 J. Arthur Price to John Edward a punitive peace settlement with George’s never a natural democrat. Lincoln Lloyd, 14 Oct. 1892 (UW Bangor, Germany. He attacked ‘vindic- political prin- it was, therefore, who stood out Lloyd Papers, MSS. 314, no. 449). tive men who wanted to trample for Lloyd George as the symbol of 12 Gladstone to Stuart Rendel, 12 Nov. on the defeated South’ in 1865, and ciples, style his faith in democracy and popu- 1892 (British Library, Gladstone he warned against a similar atti- lar sovereignty in times of peace, Papers, Add. MSS. 44549, f. 39). In tude of vengeance towards the and rhetoric. and of defending them in times of fact, Gladstone was persuaded to set defeated Germans. There was need war with a terrible swift sword. up a Royal Commission after all, and for ‘the Lincoln touch’ – in peace, Lloyd George’s vision of leader- not a mere Select Committee. magnanimity. ship straddled them both. Both 13 Asquith to Tom Ellis, 30 Nov. 1895 Lloyd George’s views reflected were absorbed by Lloyd George, (NLW Aberystwyth, Ellis papers, the last phase of British admiration and both were essential parts of his 74). for Lincoln. Wales and Britain fol- greatness. 14 Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: a Diary, p. lowed a different course thereaf- 291 (16 Nov. 1934). ter. Lincoln remained as an abiding Kenneth O. Morgan is Visiting Pro- 15 Lord Riddell’s War Diary, pp. 66–67 symbol of the need for sustaining fessor at King’s College, London, and (7 March 1915); diary of Sir Herbert the enduring links between the Honorary Professor, University of Lewis, 27 Dec. 1907 (NLW, Aberyst- two ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers, and Swansea. He was Fellow and Praelector, wyth, Lewis Papers). the desirability of some kind of The Queen’s College, Oxford, 1966–89 16 Speech at Newcastle, 6 Oct. 1862. ‘special relationship’ based on kin- and vice-Chancellor in the Univer- 17 Memorandum by Davidson, 1927, ship and shared values. A famous sity of Wales 1989–95, elected Fel- printed in Robert Rhodes James, sentimental play by John Drink- low of the British Academy in 1983, Memoirs of a Conservative (Weidenfeld water emphasised this theme.37 Its became a Labour peer in 2000, made a and Nicolson, 1969), p. 279. conclusions were reinforced by bard at the Welsh Eisteddfod in 2008 and 18 Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: a Diary, the popular reception of the biog- received a gold medal for lifetime achieve- p. 257 (21 February 1934); Richard raphy of Lincoln by Lord Charn- ment in 2009. His thirty-two works of Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill: wood. But the distinctly Liberal history include six on aspects of Lloyd Rivals for Greatness (Macmillan, Lon- values identified with Lincoln’s George. don, 2007), p. 289. name after 1865 were receding into 19 See Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘The Goat history. Lincoln was far less of a 1 Diary entry of 12 Nov. 1880, quoted and the Tiger: Lloyd George and hero for the British left now since in William George, The Making of Clemenceau’, in Ages of Reform (I.B. the Labour movement tended to Lloyd George (Faber, London, 1976), p. Tauris, London, 2010), pp. 93–104. see the US and all its Presidents as 101. 20 idem, Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd harbingers of capitalism. Aneurin 2 Speech at the Carlton Club, 19 Oct. George Coalition 1918–1922 (Oxford Bevan never mentioned Lincoln 1922. University Press, 1979), pp. 348–51; in his speeches. The Liberal MP, 3 See Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in Sir Alfred Mond to Lloyd George, 5 Isaac Foot, bracketed Lincoln with British Politics, 1868 – 1922 (University Nov. 1922 (Parliamentary Archives, his revered Cromwell as a mighty of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1963), pp. House of Lords, Lloyd-George of champion of liberty. His son, the 76ff. Dwyfor Papers, G/14/5/2). socialist Michael Foot, less sympa- 4 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 21 For this theme, see a fuller discussion thetic to the United States, did not Vol. I (Odhams, London, 1938 edn.), in Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Abraham – his hero was the distinctly Atlan- pp. 2–3. Lincoln and Wales’, in Richard Car- ticist figure of Thomas Jefferson, 5 David Lloyd George to Mrs. Lloyd wardine and Jay Sexton (eds.), The apostle of the European enlighten- George, 14 June 1890, quoted in Ken- Global Lincoln (Oxford University ment.38 The decline of the Liberal neth O. Morgan (ed.), Lloyd George: Press, New York, 2011). Party saw Lincoln move away from Family Letters (University of Wales 22 Y Cronicl, 1863, pp. 78–86. centre stage amongst British poli- Press, Cardiff and Oxford University 23 Colin Cross (ed.), A.J. Sylvester: Life ticians, perhaps until the election Press, 1973), p. 29. with Lloyd George (Macmillan, 1975), of that other representative of Illi- 6. Lord Riddell’s War Diary (Nicolson pp. 82–83 (10 November 1932). nois, Barack Obama, in 2008. For and Watson, 1933), p. 33 (7 March 24 Lord Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Lloyd George and his generation, 1915); Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of Peace Conference and After, p. 226 (24 the inspiration of Lincoln and his the Peace Conference and After, 1918– July 1920). That did not prevent him values was an eternally dominating 1923 (Gollancz, 1933), p. 158 (1 Janu- describing Hitler, disastrously, in theme, but times were changing. ary 1920). 1936 as ‘the George Washington of 7 A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: a Germany’ (Daily Express, 17 Sept. ~ Diary by Frances Stevenson (Hutchin- 1936). son, 1971), p. 306 (17 April 1935). Gladstone and Lincoln are both 8 Morgan, Wales in British Poli- concluded on page 74 pivotal to Lloyd George’s political tics, p. 117; Stuart Rendel to A.C.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 11 david Lloyd George Nonconformity and Radicalism, c.1890 – 1906

David Lloyd George took a natural place in both radical and nonconformist traditions, on account of his family background and his upbringing in Wales. Ian Machin examines his story from 1890 to 1906. In particular, he traces how Lloyd George’s performance in relation to the Education Bill of 1902 and its aftermath was of pivotal significance in his career, building his political position in time for the Liberals’ lthough born in Man- David and his sister (a brother, return to office in chester, Lloyd George William, was born posthumously) December 1905, which Awas taken to Wales by his were then taken by their mother to Welsh parents when he was two live at Llanystumdwy, near Cric- in turn enabled him to months old, in 1863. They lived in cieth in south Caernarfonshire, at Pembrokeshire, his schoolmaster the home of her brother Richard demonstrate his striking father William’s native county, Lloyd, a lay preacher for the Dis- abilities in subsequent where William took the lease of a ciples of Christ and owner of a smallholding for health reasons, small shoemaking business. ‘Uncle years. but died from tuberculosis in 1864. Lloyd’ acted as a father to his

12 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 david Lloyd George Nonconformity and Radicalism, c.1890 – 1906

sister’s three children and greatly Nineteenth-century noncon- became in Britain, and one of their influenced them. formity used radical methods and most prominent later members When David was born, modern support to seek the abolition of was Ronald Reagan). Uncle Rich- British radicalism – having a cen- Anglican privilege in regard to ard Lloyd’s chapel at Criccieth had tral aim of franchise extension and education, payment of church rates previously belonged to the Scotch reform, and further aims, especially and tithes to help maintain parish Baptists (founded in Edinburgh in nonconformist ones, to advance churches, the use of parish burial 1765, and owing their establish- equality – was about a hundred grounds, and an established posi- ment in North Wales to a sea jour- years old; and nonconform- tion as a state church. By 1880 these ney from Glasgow to Caernarfon ity – avowing and demonstrating aims – though not disestablishment by missionaries). Before joining religious separation from the estab- or abolition of tithes – had been the Scotch Baptists the chapel had lished Church of England, and to largely attained; and disestablish- belonged to the main British Bap- a lesser extent that of Scotland – ment in general was encouraged by tist denomination, the Particular was about three hundred. The two the passage of that reform for Ire- Baptists. Successive secessions by often formed a natural partnership, land in 1869, though further hopes the chapel from both the Particular though this was by no means an of achieving it were disappointed Baptists and the Scotch Baptists had exclusive one – many radicals were in Parliament in the early 1870s resulted from a search for pure and not Dissenters, and many Dissent- and in the general election of 1885.1 pristine Christianity. The secession ers were not radicals. Wesleyanism had initially provided from the Scotch Baptists and union Radicals never formed an organ- a variation from this radical-non- with the Disciples took place in ised political party of their own, or conformist connection by inclin- 1841, when Richard Lloyd’s father even an organised section within ing towards Toryism, but by the (David Lloyd George’s grandfa- a party, though radicals who sup- later nineteenth century Wesleyans ther) was minister. The Disciples, ported a particular reform quite were coming to have more political although maintaining the practice often formed an association to work resemblance to the Congregation- of adult baptism, were not at that for it by political means (for exam- alists and Baptists, which (together time Baptist by affiliation, though ple the Anti-Corn Law League, the with the Quakers and Unitarians the Welsh ones became so much Chartists, and the Anti-State Church and some Methodist and Presby- later when they joined the Welsh Association, which was founded in terian denominations) were the Baptist Union in the 1930s. As well 1844 and known as the Liberation strongest radical elements among as holding to adult baptism, the Society from 1853). Radicals had nonconformists. Disciples believed in the literal been loosely attached to the Whig His upbringing seemed to make truth of the Bible, had no formal party before 1830, and generally Lloyd George a radical of the radi- creeds and no ordained and salaried became part of the broadening Lib- cals and a nonconformist of the ministry, and eschewed the ‘elitist’ eral Party, as the Whigs were coming nonconformists, impressive in title of Reverend. to be known by the mid-1830s. How- the pronounced religious separa- Thus David’s early environment ever, there continued to be some tism in which he was reared. His was intensely religious. As a boy, marked differences between Whigs sect, the Disciples of Christ, or he and his family walked two miles and radicals, and between some radi- Campbellites, had been founded in each way to and from his uncle’s cals and other radicals, in the Liberal America by Alexander Campbell chapel at Criccieth, three times Party. This was still the case, to a earlier in the nineteenth century Left: on Sundays and once on Wednes- reduced extent, after the party split (they were much more numer- David Lloyd days. As a fourteen year-old at the over Irish home rule in 1886. ous in the United States than they George in 1903 National (Anglican) elementary

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 13 david lloyd george, nonconformity and radicalism, c.1890–1906 school at Llanystumdwy he organ- champion, and was shortly followed the National Free Church Coun- ised a refusal to recite the Apos- by his selection as Liberal candidate cil founded in 1896 (representing tle’s Creed on an important formal for Caernarfon Boroughs.5 a great many local Free Church occasion; and this revolt, although In these early years the main councils, mostly commenced in the failing at first, ultimately succeeded thrust of Lloyd George’s radical 1890s). He addressed the assemblies in gaining some local concessions activity was opposition to the privi- of the Congregational and Baptist for Dissenting pupils. It was his first leged position of landowners and Unions, and initiated the formation known radical action, the first of the Established Church, chiefly in a of the Nonconformist Parliamen- his repeated challenges to the Estab- rural context such as his home area. tary Council in 1898.7 He always lished Church, and the first of his But he also looked for the support of retained membership of his family many involvements in disputes over radicals in the large towns. Noncon- chapel at Criccieth, and joined Bap- religious education. It also brought formity was strong in many of these, tist congregations in London (after him his first taste of fame, if only as and whereas questions of tithe, 1890 he seems to have been gener- yet in Llanystumdwy.2 denominational education, and ally regarded as a Baptist). By 1884, when he was twenty- churchyard burials flourished more It appears, however, that one and newly launched as a in a rural environment, disestablish- beneath all this public religious solicitor in Criccieth, David was ment and temperance were at least as commitment and activity he might developing promising powers of strong in the towns as in the coun- not have had a consistent Christian eloquence and organisation as a try. Lloyd George could also hope to faith. During his teenage years he champion of radical causes which ally with urban reformers through had an extended period of doubt, were largely (though not exclu- an interest in the general question of leading him into strong sympa- sively) nonconformist – such as social reform. In a speech of Febru- thy with Positivism, though by disestablishment, temperance, ary 1890 he said of disestablishment, the time he was twenty he had opposition to the levy of tithes, land and drink reform: ‘however returned to Evangelicalism.8 But undenominational education, and drastic and broad they may appear he was restless, critical and indi- the right of non-Anglicans to burial to be, they after all simply touch vidualistic in personality, and prob- in parish churchyards. These causes the fringe of that vast social ques- ably continued to speculate about – though none of them required tion which must be dealt with in his religion, perhaps having fur- any kind of religious commitment the near future’.6 Thus, two months ther periods of doubt – though he from their supporters, and all of before his election to Parliament, did not give posterity many clues them had some radical Anglican he revealed his concern with allevi- about this matter. Some of his biog- support – were notably strong in ating the living and working con- raphers, for example Ffion Hague, Wales because of its nonconformist ditions of society. Later, referring have suggested that he lost his faith majority which, through suffrage to his own birth in a major indus- In these early as a youngster and did not get it extension and the introduction of trial city, he proclaimed himself ‘a years the back.9 On the other hand, one of the secret ballot in 1872, enjoyed Lancashire lad’ to audiences in his his daughters, Lady Olwen Carey rapidly increasing political strength native county. However, the gen- main thrust Evans, tended to present him as a from the general election of 1868 eral reform of living and working consistent believer in adult life.10 onwards.3 The number of noncon- conditions was probably not among of Lloyd The matter might be more com- formists returned for Welsh con- his major concerns before he entered plex and variable than is suggested stituencies rose strikingly, from government in 1905. George’s radi- by either of these opinions. Perhaps none in 1865 to twenty-two (out of Lloyd George’s attachment another biographer in the fam- a total of thirty-four MPs) in 1892.4 to radicalism was not questioned cal activity ily, his estranged elder son Rich- This period coincided with Lloyd before 1906 (when this article’s ard, who succeeded him as Second George’s childhood and youth. In main treatment ends), but there- was opposi- Earl Lloyd-George but was cut out 1892 he was, though now an MP, after it became in time subject to of his will, was accurate in saying still under thirty – an aspiring suspicion and doubt, especially tion to the that ‘my father’s religious beliefs young politician who was strongly when he took to proposing, and fluctuated, and there were peri- identified, as a radical nonconform- later joining and leading, coalition privileged ods in his life when he lost faith’.11 ist, with a very marked contempo- governments with the Conserva- The Baptist Union Assembly was rary trend in Welsh politics. Behind tives. More knowledge about his position of perhaps over-optimistic (and was his return to Westminster in 1890 lay personal life and beliefs might have not quite accurate in regard to his several years of assiduous local radi- produced earlier doubts about his landown- early denominational connection) cal activity on his part. He had been loyalty to nonconformity. In pub- in saying of him just after his death: secretary of the South Caernarfon- lic he always appeared as a sure ers and the ‘They rejoice that in his days of shire Anti-Tithe League and of the and leading Dissenter, a sound Established power and in those of retirement local branch of the United King- and loyal product of the faith, and he never renounced his early faith dom Alliance (the main temperance even perhaps the morality, which Church, but remained loyal to the denomi- organisation). As a solicitor he suc- he had been taught. After his elec- nation in which he first heard and cessfully vindicated nonconform- tion to parliament this image was chiefly in a confessed it’.12 ist claims under the Burials Laws extended from Wales to England. More clearly than over the Amendment Act of 1880 by winning In England he became a commit- rural context uncertain matter of his beliefs, the Llanfrothen burial case in 1888. tee member of the fifty-year-old Lloyd George stood apart (in prac- This highly controversial case made Liberation Society (Society for such as his tice if not in theory) from non- his name widely known in North the Liberation of Religion from conformist moral teaching. The Wales as a radical nonconformist State Patronage and Control) and home area. problem here was his behaviour

14 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 david lloyd george, nonconformity and radicalism, c.1890–1906 in private life. The difficulty did The division Almost immediately after his mar- The concern over his candidacy not occur over drink, as the ardent riage in 1888 he was seeking social created by the ‘Mrs J’ affair having young temperance campaigner between companionship elsewhere, and been surmounted, Lloyd George seemed to retain his hatred of over- soon became involved with ‘Mrs stood for Caernarfon Boroughs in indulgence in alcohol for the rest Lloyd J’, a young widow living in Caer- a by-election in April 1890. Some of his life. This was one of the rea- narfon who was attached to his local nonconformist ministers were sons for his strained relations with George’s political and social circles. In 1889 prominent among his support- his son Richard, who in his view she gave birth to a son, rumoured to ers. He defeated his Conservative became too fond of drink. He conduct and be Lloyd George’s.15 If David was to opponent by only eighteen votes, denounced in trenchant evangelical keep the parliamentary candidacy but held the seat for fifty-five years terms the Unionists’ mild Licens- the moral for Caernarfon Boroughs for which without a break, until he was made ing Bill of 1904 (which eased finan- injunctions he had been selected the previous an Earl a few months before his cially the situation of publicans), year, it was essential to prevent any death in 1945. saying that ‘the arm of the Most he received proof of the rumour from com- There was a long, largely frus- High is uplifted against it’.13 He also ing out. Another pressing neces- trating period before Lloyd George commented in a letter home on one in youth sity was that no word about the gained a handsome reward for of Asquith’s (when Prime Minis- rumour should reach his recently much striving and struggle as a ter) occasionally rather inebriated occurred married wife. Fortunately, ‘Mrs backbencher by the conferment of entries to the House of Com- J’ had David’s political and fam- a Cabinet post when the Liberals mons: ‘The Prime Minister came over his sig- ily interests at heart. She agreed, in took office in December 1905. Dur- to the House last night in a very return for an annuity, that no docu- ing this period his radical objec- drunken state [to attend a debate nal failure to mentary or photographic evidence tives – whether they had a strong on the Protestant succession to the of her son’s existence should ever nonconformist tinge or not – had throne]. The Tories behaved very fulfil the role reach the public eye. David’s mar- little chance of success. He had to honourably … Lord Hugh Cecil riage and parliamentary candidacy contend with a Conservative gov- said privately to Churchill, “I do of a model were both saved. Probably no other ernment until 1892; a shaky Lib- rather object to settling the fate of entry of a future Prime Minister to eral government from 1892 to 1895, the Protestant Succession with the husband and parliament was preceded by such possessing a majority of only forty aid of a drunken Christian and two fraught circumstances. which was dependent on keeping sober Jews [Herbert Samuel and family man The rumours about Lloyd the support of the Irish Home Rule Rufus Isaacs]”.’14 George’s fatherhood could not end party; and, for ten years thereafter, Rather, the division between which was at this point, however. ‘Mrs J’s’ a strong Conservative and Liberal Lloyd George’s conduct and the expected of a son was born within a few months Unionist coalition which came into moral injunctions he received in of David’s eldest legitimate child, office with an overall majority of youth occurred over his signal fail- leading non- Richard, and as time went on it 152 in 1895. ure to fulfil the role of a model hus- could not fail to be noticed that These were clearly unfavourable band and family man which was conformist. there was a strong physical resem- conditions for the passage of radical expected of a leading nonconform- blance between them. The Lloyd legislation, and Lloyd George saw ist. He was genuinely attached to George children apparently came little success for his efforts in parlia- his first wife, Margaret Owen, to to believe that they had a half- ment. Some of the Conservatives’ whom he was married for fifty- brother living in Caernarfon, and reforms, notably the introduction of three years until she died in 1941, Richard (no doubt David too) was compulsory elementary education and with whom he had five chil- anxious in later years that he and in 1891 and the passage of a Work- dren from 1889 to 1902. But theirs his half-brother should not appear men’s Compensation Bill in 1897, seemed a marriage of opposites. together in public and exhibit the appealed to radicals. So too did two David was restless, gregarious and resemblance.16 measures passed by the Liberal gov- adventurous, probably happier with Margaret Lloyd George seems ernment of 1892–95 – a bill of 1894 a varied metropolitan kind of life eventually to have become resigned establishing additional elected local (and with continental holidays with to her husband’s repeated infideli- government councils and Sir Wil- a fellow-MP from the Welsh party) ties, but his behaviour caused frac- liam Harcourt’s budget of that year than with a domesticated exist- tious relations with his children, introducing death duties. But Irish ence in rural Wales. Margaret was notably with Richard and later home rule was defeated in 1893 by comparatively passive and home- with Megan (his youngest child). the House of Lords, and hopes for loving, seemingly much more These relations worsened after he the passage of Welsh disestablish- interested in life in Criccieth than took a permanent mistress, Frances ment in the two succeeding years life in London. Consequently they Stevenson, in 1913. It is difficult came to nothing.17 The Liberals had lived apart for long periods. Marga- to avoid the conclusion that Lloyd one success in opposing Union- ret spent much of her time in Cric- George was disregarding in pri- ist bills – their defeat of an ill-sup- cieth while David was absorbed in vate the nonconformity, indeed the ported Elementary Education Bill of his parliamentary life in London. In Christianity, which he upheld in 1896, which sought to strengthen the these circumstances it was not alto- public. Perhaps in regard to faith, funding of denominational schools gether surprising that he became and certainly in regard to morality, (which were mostly Anglican or involved in a series of amorous rela- the most prominent and powerful Roman Catholic). As well as the tionships in the capital. Dissenter since Oliver Cromwell resistance of Liberals, there was con- But his tendency to do this (in terms of political influence) was siderable Unionist opposition to this began in Wales, not in London. a weak and wavering Christian. bill. The government was forced to

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 15 david lloyd george, nonconformity and radicalism, c.1890–1906 withdraw it, and a diluted substitute Lloyd George for Welsh radical issues, including coming to be seen as a potential was passed the following year.18 home rule, but had achieved noth- candidate for high office. This was a tale of consider- had cam- ing. He had become known as ‘the The Boer War brought Lloyd able frustration for Lloyd George. MP for Wales’ on account of all George a valuable increase in fame He had no success, moreover, in paigned his efforts for his country; and he at the price of much unpopularity his efforts to give more weight to might have continued in this role and violent onslaughts on him. He Welsh radical claims, by making assidu- for the rest of his life, had not his was physically attacked at meetings Welsh Liberal MPs more independ- political involvements and pros- in Glasgow, Liskeard (Cornwall), ent of the other Liberal members ously in the pects rather dramatically broad- Birmingham, and even at Bangor and supporting a Welsh home rule ened at the beginning of the new in his own constituency. The Bir- campaign. In 1894, claiming that 1890s for century. On the other hand, had mingham affray, in December 1901, a statement by Harcourt, leader Welsh radi- home rule for Wales been obtained brought him the most notoriety. of the House of Commons, that a he might have become First Min- A crowd of at least 30,000 tried to Welsh disestablishment bill would cal issues, ister in a Welsh Government, and storm the building where he had be introduced that session was not the wider Britain would have been come to address a meeting. Inside a definite pledge, Lloyd George including deprived of his services as outstand- the hall missiles were thrown at began to talk of the need for more ing social and democratic reformer, him on the platform; two deaths independent action by the Welsh home rule, war leader, Prime Minister and occurred in the rioting, and Lloyd radical MPs. They should ‘stand world statesman. George might have been a third on the ground of independency but had Lloyd George’s aims might have mortality if he had not been smug- and tell the Government that they achieved little in the 1890s, but he gled out of the hall disguised as a would not receive Welsh support achieved had spoken and campaigned widely policeman.22 It was a traumatic bap- to break their pledges to Wales’. and the vigour of his comparative tism of fire for the future premier. Two other Welsh MPs (Frank nothing. He youth was seen as a desirable asset. In A few months after this, Lloyd Edwards and D. A. Thomas) sup- 1901 Dr Joseph Parker, Chairman of George’s new fame was reinforced ported Lloyd George, followed by a had become the Congregational Union of Eng- by intense and protracted disputes third (Herbert Lewis), but no more. land and Wales, said in relation to a over education policy. The Union- The majority of Welsh Liberal known as current need to strengthen the Lib- ist government, having been foiled MPs isolated them by remaining eration Society: ‘a strong infusion in its attempt to pass a substantial loyal to the party whips, and Lloyd ‘the MP for of Lloyd Georgeism would do us a bill in 1896, and having consoli- George’s effort was known some- world of good, and by Lloyd Geor- dated its rule by another decisive what pityingly as ‘the Revolt of Wales’ on geism I simply mean high spirit, election victory in 1900, revived the Four’. It was clearly not an ade- account of all hopeful courage and invincible its effort in the session of 1902 to quate foundation for an independ- determination’.20 ‘A strong infusion carry a major education measure. ent Welsh party, similar to the Irish his efforts for of Lloyd Georgeism’ in the form of Their bill, applying to England and Home Rulers, which Lloyd George Lloyd George himself was what Lib- Wales, sought to ease the financial had said he wanted to create before his country. eralism was about to get. He shortly position of denominational schools the next general election. made a mark in two episodes – in the by allowing (later, after an amend- The Revolt of the Four did first he had a dramatic experience ment, compelling) the education inspire a recently-formed Welsh outside parliament which brought committees of local councils – to Home Rule League, Cymru Fydd him to widespread notice, in the which local authority for education (Young Wales).19 This was origi- second he engaged in persistent par- would be transferred – to give aid nally inspired by Tom Ellis, MP for liamentary debating on a controver- from the local rates to those schools Merioneth, but Lloyd George led sial issue which considerably raised without requiring that they control it after Ellis became a Liberal whip. expectations of him. them (apart from some supervision The league broke down at a meet- The first episode was the Boer of their secular teaching). Lloyd ing at Newport, Monmouthshire, War, which caused bitter divi- George was initially rather ambiv- in January 1896, through friction sions amongst Liberals, including alent in his view of the bill, and between North and South Wales nonconformists.21 Lloyd George approved of its proposed adminis- delegates. The South Wales Liberal opposed the war, one of a small trative arrangements. But the fact Federation, not wanting to dam- minority in his party. The second that the bill considerably reinforced age its region’s increasingly valu- episode was a long parliamentary the influence of clergy over educa- able economic links with England, conflict over the Education Bill of tion caused him to take his familiar refused to join the North Wales 1902, which he also opposed. He line of strong opposition to such a Liberal Federation in a national succeeded in neither policy. The policy. One of his sentences in the home rule organisation; and, in Boer War continued to be waged parliamentary debates on the ques- consequence, Cymru Fydd col- regardless of his opposition. The tion showed both anti-Ritualism lapsed. Yet a third disappointment Education Bill got through in spite – though he was happy to welcome for Lloyd George in his quest for an of his emphatic condemnation, and the anti-erastianism which was pre- independent party for Wales came in spite of very wide admiration of sent in the current Ritualist trend in 1899, when he failed to persuade his parliamentary performance (if in the Anglican Church – and fears the Welsh Liberal MPs to declare not of his arguments) among MPs. for national security at a time of themselves an autonomous branch Though defeated, he was a much increased foreign hostility to Brit- of the Liberal Party. better known and a more effec- ain on account of the Boer War. At Thus Lloyd George had cam- tive politician after these episodes such a time especially, he indicated, paigned assiduously in the 1890s than before, and after 1902 he was he could only deplore the bill’s

16 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 david lloyd george, nonconformity and radicalism, c.1890–1906 proposal to advance the influence of Church, but also to give a fresh leg- the 1820s; Disraeli; the rise of democracy the parson and the priest by means islative sanction to the State Church in Britain from 1830 to 1918; the Lib- of public aid to church schools: ‘For principle.’ Nonconformists were eral governments from 1905 to 1915; and the sake of teaching dogmas to chil- ‘resisting the establishment of a British Churches and social issues in the dren who cannot understand them, State Church School as an annexe twentieth century. we in the midst of our difficul- to the existing State Church’.26 ties and the rocks that surround us The controversy over educa- 1 There is an extensive literature propose to put the chaplain on the tion in 1902–04 greatly helped to on these developments, including bridge … It is a mad proposal’.23 reunify the Liberals after their divi- G.I.T. Machin, The Rise of Democracy In the Commons he was the sions over the Boer War. This made in Britain, 1830–1918 (Basingstoke, leading opponent of Arthur Bal- them a much more effective threat 2001); G.I.T. Machin, Politics and the four, who was in charge of the bill. to the Unionists when the latter Churches in Great Britain, 1832 to 1868 In marathon debates at the com- began, in 1903, to be weakened (Oxford, 1977) and Politics and the mittee stage, which lasted for over by their own divisions over tariff Churches in Great Britain, 1869 to 1921 five months (from June to Decem- reform (a new protectionist pol- (Oxford, 1987); D.W. Bebbington, ber 1902), Lloyd George spoke 160 icy which the Liberals opposed in The Nonconformist Conscience: chapel times, and his relentless bulldog defence of free trade). The Union- and politics, 1870–1914 (London, 1982); determination won an unexpected ist coalition was driven to resign His perfor- K.O. Morgan, Wales in British Poli- tribute from Balfour: though in December 1905, and Campbell- tics, 1868–1922 (Cardiff, 1963, and later his views were unacceptable, he Bannerman undertook the forma- mance in editions); S. Koss, Nonconformity in was undoubtedly ‘an eminent tion of a Liberal government. Lloyd Modern British Politics (London, 1975); parliamentarian’.24 George then reaped the fruits of his relation to M. R. Watts, The Dissenters, vol. II: Never before, indeed, had Lloyd impressive political activities since The Expansion of Evangelical Nonconfor- George so impressed himself on his first return to parliament in the Educa- mity (Oxford, 1995); J. Munson, The parliament, despite the failure of 1890, and especially those of the last Nonconformists: in search of a lost cul- his attack on the bill, which moved few years, by being advanced to the tion Bill of ture (London, 1991); G.I.T. Machin, rapidly through its later stages and Cabinet. He reached this position ‘Disestablishment and Democracy, became law on 18 December. The not directly through his opposition 1902 and c.1840–1930’, in E.F. Biagini, ed., education dispute rumbled on for to the 1902 Education Bill – which Citizenship and Community: Liberals, many years. Straight after the bill’s the Liberal minority in the Com- its after- Radicals and Collective Identities in the passage, local councils containing mons united in trying to reject but British Isles, 1865–1931 (Cambridge, nonconformist majorities (most of which the Unionist majority suc- math was 1996), pp. 120–47. them were in Wales) began to refuse cessfully passed – but through his 2 K.O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd George and to meet their new obligation to sup- opposition to tariff reform, which of pivotal Welsh Liberalism’, in Judith Loades, port denominational schools out of the united Liberals successfully significance ed., The Life and Times of David Lloyd the rates. The government coun- resisted because the Unionists were George (Bangor, 1991), pp. 2–4; G.I.T. tered this ‘Welsh Revolt’ by passing divided over it. in Lloyd Machin, ‘Lloyd George and Noncon- a Default Bill in 1904, providing However, his performance in formity’, ibid., p. 35; W.R.P.George, for reduction of the state grant to relation to the Education Bill of George’s The Making of Lloyd George (London, councils which refused to pay their 1902 and its aftermath was of piv- 1976), pp. 17–20, 26–27, 75–76; P. due to denominational schools. otal significance in Lloyd George’s career, for Rowland, Lloyd George (London, But ‘passive resistance’ – refusal career, for the bill was of direct 1976), pp. 14–15. by individuals to pay their rates – importance to England as well as the bill was 3 K.O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics, continued as a protest against the Wales. He emerged from the edu- 1868–1922 (2nd ed., Cardiff, 1970), pp. 1902 measure. In 1904–05 a remark- cation dispute in a more prominent of direct 1–119. Fifty years after its first edition ably strong, though brief, religious political position. Thereafter, on in 1963, this book remains the fullest revival in Wales (led by the ex- account of the Liberals’ return to importance and most authoritative treatment of miner Evan Roberts, with whom office in December 1905 and their its subject. Lloyd George became acquainted) decisive election victory in the fol- to England 4 Ibid., pp. 18, 119. added 82,000 members to noncon- lowing month, he was able to build 5 On the Llanfrothen case see R. Hat- formist chapels there – strength- on this position to demonstrate his as well as tersley, David Lloyd George, the great ening, as long as it lasted, the will striking abilities through a vari- outsider (London, 2010), pp. 40–42. to resist the new education policy ety of outstanding achievements in Wales. He 6 W.R.P.George, op. cit., p. 166. as well as lending new force to the subsequent years. 7 W.R.P.George, Lloyd George, Back- cause of disestablishment.25 emerged bencher (Llandysul, 1983), pp. 128–30; It was not only in Wales that the Ian Machin is an Emeritus Professor from the D.W. Bebbington, The Nonconformist disestablishment cause was cur- at the University of Dundee, where he Conscience (London, 1982), p. 75. rently enjoying some revival. The taught modern British history from 1964 education 8 G.I.T. Machin, ‘Lloyd George and struggle over educational reform, to 2002. His research and publishing Nonconformity’, in Judith Loades, wrote Guinness Rogers, a leading activities have ranged from the Napole- dispute in a ed., The Life and Times of David Lloyd Congregational minister in Lon- onic Wars to the late twentieth century. George (Bangor, 1991), p. 36; W.R.P. don, ‘has really gathered round the His main publications have been two more promi- George, The Making of Lloyd George, central idea of a State Church. The volumes on politics in relation to Church p. 104ff.; William George,My Brother practical issue of the government questions from 1832 to 1921. His shorter nent political and I (London, 1958), pp. 75–79, policy has been not only to grant books have comprised studies of Catholic 271–72. a new endowment to the State emancipation as an issue in the politics of position. concluded on page 74

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 17 Lloyd George’s Coalition Proposal of 1910 and Pre-War Liberalism

‘England does not love coalitions’. Disraeli’s famous comment on the 1852 Aberdeen Coalition was not one of his most perceptive. It is more accurate to say that many politicians do not love coalitions but that many voters do appreciate attempts by the parties to settle major issues by agreement and compromise. At all events, since 1852 Britain has had twelve coalition governments, not to mention several abortive attempts at coalition conducted through private negotiations and interparty conferences.1 Martin Pugh examines Lloyd George’s coalition proposal of 1910.

18 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Lloyd George’s Coalition Proposal of 1910 and Pre-War Liberalism

here have also been peri- Churchill and even the Chief aftermath of the election in Janu- ods of close understanding Whip, Alexander Murray, among ary. Among Liberals it had been Tbetween two parties, such the Liberals, partly due to their widely assumed that if they won as between Gladstone and the Irish more detached view of their own the election not only would the in 1886 and the Liberals and Labour colleagues. Privately Lloyd George Budget – rejected by the peers by in 1906–14, that fell short of coali- complained about the ‘glorified 350 votes to 75 – be passed, but the tion. To this extent coalitionism has grocers’ on the Liberal benches Cabinet would also proceed with been a formative element in British as much as the ‘backwoodsmen’ legislation to curtail the powers political history, though national among the Tories.3 And leading of the House of Lords; Asquith mythology has it that, unlike the Edwardian Unionists such as F. had declared he would not hold Italians and the Germans, we don’t E. Smith, Austen Chamberlain office without ‘safeguards’ to really do coalitions. and even the party leader, Arthur ensure the passage of legislation. In this context the initiative Balfour, felt content to collaborate However, it transpired that this taken by Lloyd George to launch with their opponents if the terms was not quite true for the King, a coalition in the summer and were right. Contemporaries Edward VII, was reluctant to cre- autumn of 1910 was not as eccentric noticed that personal relations ate the five hundred new Liberal as it appears at first sight. The previ- between the controversialists were peers required to force a House of ous coalition had ended as recently surprisingly warm. ‘On the whole Lords reform bill through parlia- as 1905 and the next one was to the Opposition are very fond of ment without a second general begin in 1915. Yet it has always [Lloyd] George’, commented Lucy election. Though ready to accept seemed an odd episode both for Masterman. ‘He amuses Arthur the advice of his elected govern- Lloyd George himself and for the Balfour by his quickness and ment, he was well aware that the Edwardian Liberal Party. As a result acuteness’. But she also described Liberals had emerged from the of the controversy generated by Lloyd George as ‘absolutely election with just 275 seats to 272 Lloyd George’s ‘People’s Budget’ of hypnotised by Arthur Balfour, by for the Conservatives, so that a 1909 and the early general election his charm, his quickness, and his working majority rested on the 40 fought in January 1910 to overrule undeniably very clever intellect’.4 Labour and 82 Irish members, the the peers’ rejection of it, politics However, the personalities were latter being distinctly unreliable. had become unusually polarised only part of the explanation. The As a result the government did not and party passions were inflamed to attempts at coalition in 1910 can be enjoy a very emphatic mandate. such an extent that the prospect of understood at two levels: short- In any case the Cabinet had not the leaders getting together looked term manoeuvring for advantage in actually decided what precisely to highly improbable at least to those the aftermath of the January elec- do by way of reforming the upper outside the Westminster elite. Some tion, and the underlying critique chamber, whether to reduce its of the leading politicians genu- about the failure of British govern- powers, change its composition, inely held each other in contempt; ment and party politics to arrest impose joint sittings or even opt even in the crisis of wartime Wal- national decline. The events of 1910 for abolition. The vague refer- ter Long commented: ‘I loathe the only make sense when placed in the ences in the King’s Speech in Feb- very idea of our good fellows sit- context of the debates that had pre- ruary exposed this embarrassing ting with these double-dyed trai- ceded them around the turn of the situation. In April the government tors [the Liberals]’.2 century and what followed during reached agreement with the Irish However, even at the height the First World War. Left: to ensure the passage of the Budget of the controversies others felt The immediate context for Lloyd George and passed resolutions dealing with the attraction of collaboration, the initiatives of 1910 lay in the and Winston restrictions on the peers’ pow- including Lloyd George, deadlock that developed in the Churchill in 1910 ers over money bills and ordinary

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 19 lloyd george’s coalition proposal of 1910 and pre-war liberalism legislation; attention then focused kept the talks as private as possi- At the meet- Such were the immediate on the constitutional issue. It was in ble. The Irish were less than happy motives and calculations. But much these circumstances that politicians about the conference because ings Lloyd of the momentum behind the talks began casting around for ways out they believed that they – and thus during the summer and autumn of the impasse. home rule – were being sidelined George of 1910 reflected a more profound Then in May the King sud- at a moment when they held the reaction against party govern- denly died, thereby thrusting his balance of power in parliament. apparently ment that had been brewing since successor, George V, into a major Many leading Liberals found their the 1890s and had reached a climax political crisis. Several initiatives reliance on Irish votes an irrita- acted as during the South African War in quickly emerged. Lord Curzon tion, and saw that the removal of 1899–1902. The impact of the mili- had already floated the idea of a the peers’ veto would force home the guard- tary disasters had been comple- two-party conference under the rule to the top of the agenda once ian of party mented by revelations about the Speaker’s chairmanship. Another, again. Lloyd George himself was poor health and education of the inspired by J. L. Garvin, editor of lukewarm about home rule in that, interests, men who had volunteered and led the Observer, and his circle, took though sympathetic in principle, to a wider critique of British par- the form of an appeal for a ‘Truce he did not regard it as a priority, adopting the liamentary government. Critics of God’, in effect a meeting of the rather as a complication for other argued that the Salisbury Cabinet party leaders with a view to defus- Liberal reforms. By promoting a aggressive was stuffed with the Prime Minis- ing the crisis. But Murray, the Lib- coalition he implicitly sought to ter’s relatives; parliament attracted eral Chief Whip, also argued that evade the commitment so that the approach nimble speakers and skilled tac- politicians should avoid putting Irish could be ‘left to stew in their ticians who were incompetent pressure on the new King by devis- own juice’. Certainly, if the Tory that was his in matters of administration; at ing a compromise among them- leaders were to be recruited to both national and local level the selves. As a result a five-month his scheme they had to have some trademark, demands of party politics margin- political truce began during which reassurance about Ireland. Under alised the experts and professionals a constitutional conference took a coalition home rule might be so much in favour of amateurs and wirepull- place including Asquith, Lloyd embodied in a wider reorganisa- ers. From these complaints there George, Lord Crewe and Augus- tion of the empire, much favoured so that he emerged a demand for promoting tine Birrell for the Liberals, and by some Tory imperialists, and ‘National Efficiency’. This involved Balfour, Chamberlain, Lord Lans- gain a parliament along with Scot- nearly broke increasing the role of experts, downe and Lord Cawdor for the land and Wales, a solution widely bringing successful businessmen Unionists. At the meetings Lloyd known as ‘home rule all round’. up the con- into government and dispensing George apparently acted as the Privately the Tory leaders recog- ference by with narrow party rule in favour guardian of party interests, adopt- nised that the Union was a lost of some form of national governing the aggressive approach that cause and were therefore ready to the end of ment drawn from the best men in was his trademark, so much so that cooperate with the government ‘if all parties and in none. In the crisis he nearly broke up the conference they [are] prepared to defy the Irish July. of the Boer War it seemed briefly by the end of July.5 and their own extremists’.6 possible that such an administration In fact the twenty-one meet- However, Birrell, the Liberal might emerge led, perhaps, by Lord ings simply left him frustrated and Chief Secretary for Ireland, reas- Rosebery, a former Liberal Prime bored. As a result, by August his sured the Irish MPs that he ‘attaches Minister but one whose support for fertile mind was casting around for no importance to the conference. It imperial expansion and scepticism an alternative means of bypassing will be informal and above all not about home rule made him appeal- the deadlock. He had earlier spoken binding’.7 This is corroborated by ing to some Tories. to some colleagues about an alliance Asquith’s view of the situation. A Although the mood soon gave of Radical Liberals, Labour and the secret Cabinet memorandum refer- way to normal party warfare, espe- Irish, and to others about a govern- ring to ‘the most cogent of all rea- cially the controversies over the ment of progressive businessmen. sons’ explained that the Liberals 1902 Education Bill and free trade At home in North Wales he com- needed time before facing another versus tariff reform, the idea of posed the ‘Criccieth memorandum’, general election.8 Asquith accepted National Efficiency proved to be a more sweeping proposal designed that he could not reasonably potent and, indeed, has resurfaced not to resolve the controversy over demand guarantees from the King periodically in British politics ever the House of Lords but to create a in the current parliament. Moreo- since. In particular, the attainment coalition government as a way of ver, by postponing the decision for of National Efficiency through a circumventing the party contro- a time the government would be coalition was promoted by J. L. versies that were holding things up. seen to be magnanimous in spar- Garvin and a circle of acolytes Consequently, the summer of 1910 ing an inexperienced King from a including Lord Milner, F. S. Oliver saw two related but separate devel- major controversy. As for Balfour, and L. S. Amery. Inspired by the opments: formal negotiations about he had already taken risks by trying ideas of Joseph Chamberlain, they the House of Lords issue and infor- to persuade the old King to defy his sought some form of imperial feder- mal talks about a wider agenda to Liberal ministers and appoint them ation backed by a tariff and a coher- be implemented by a coalition. to office, a dangerously unconstitu- ent defence policy; they accepted It was thus not entirely clear tional idea that would have thrust the need for state intervention in what was going on. As both party the monarchy into party contro- social affairs; and they saw the reso- leaders felt apprehensive about the versy. For both sides it was wiser to lution of the Irish Question in a reactions of their followers they pull back from the brink. home-rule-all-round strategy.

20 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george’s coalition proposal of 1910 and pre-war liberalism

However, as Rosebery was by patriotic-imperialist external strat- embarrassing dictation of extreme now a marginal figure, an alterna- egy; but his position in Wales, one partisans, whether from National- tive Liberal exponent of National of the most Gladstonian parts of ists or Orangemen’.13 Perhaps most Efficiency seemed essential. Lloyd Britain, had helped him to resist surprisingly he offered a more effi- George was the outstanding can- the temptation to join Chamberlain cient policy for national defence didate. His term at the Board of and later the Liberal Unionists. through the adoption of compul- Trade (1905–08) had surprised It is possible to infer a good deal sory military training designed to and impressed his political oppo- about Lloyd George’s motives and raise an extra 500,000 men to sup- nents for his ability to ‘command intentions from the memoran- port the regular army. There is no the confidence of men of business’ dum he produced, dated 17 August doubt that the Conservatives were and to draw vested interests into 1910, which spelt out a programme surprised, even shocked, by these compromises.9 Though they rec- for a coalition government, and suggestions. ‘We were astonished ognised that Lloyd George was from the way he handled it. Ini- at George’s concessions’, admitted publicly committed to free trade, tially he told Churchill, a natural Chamberlain. ‘What will his peo- they interpreted his actions in safe- enthusiast for coalition, and Mur- ple say of him ?’14 But the memo- guarding British commercial inter- ray, who was sympathetic, but kept randum gained credibility in their ests as those of a protectionist. Nor Asquith in the dark until October eyes because it went a long way to did they see him as anti-imperial when Crewe, Birrell, Sir Edward confirming the impression some of or anti-military despite his record Grey and Richard Haldane were them had already formed of about during the Boer War. He had also informed. Among the Tories his politics. objected to that particular war, but, he first invited F. E. Smith to talk On the other hand, in the first in the words of Lord Esher, ‘he is In the first it over at Downing Street before half of the memorandum Lloyd plucky and an imperialist at heart, holding a private dinner with Bal- George set out the ideas more if he is anything’.10 This seemed half of the four whom he assured that their likely to attract Liberals. ‘It is a to be corroborated by his record meeting would be confidential: clever document but a strange one’, at the Exchequer where, despite memoran- ‘The servants are Welsh and could Crewe told the Prime Minister.15 It some stiff arguments with succes- not follow the conversation’.12 included improved housing, tack- sive First Lords of the Admiralty dum Lloyd By agreement Balfour then con- ling the problem of alcoholic drink, about the cost of building Dread- sulted his three colleagues who introducing insurance against ill- noughts, he ‘does not care a bit for George set sat on the conference as well as health and unemployment and economy’ and invariably found the Andrew Bonar Law with whom reforming the Poor Law. It is this money required for naval building. out the ideas Lloyd George had enjoyed a good list that throws most light on Lloyd In effect the Conservatives increas- relationship since his time at the George’s constructive approach ingly believed that in Lloyd George more likely Board of Trade. Meanwhile Garvin to politics. Though not an intel- they had found a second Joseph to attract agreed to give the idea favourable lectual, he was always attracted by Chamberlain, a politician who publicity in the newspapers. novel ideas, as was Churchill, and started as a partisan radical noncon- Liberals … The second half of the memo- almost invariably became impatient formist Liberal who would evolve randum was devoted to propos- about finding immediate solutions into a national statesman, promot- It included als blatantly designed to tempt to pressing problems. This attitude ing imperial development and class the Conservatives. He dropped a was reflected in his unorthodox collaboration. For his part Lloyd improved broad hint about a compromise on working methods, his refusal to be George evidently believed that the free trade, to be attained through restrained by civil service caution, situation in 1910 was similar to that housing, an enquiry guided by ‘intelligent his fondness for talking through prevailing during the Boer War. He and judicial impartiality’. He made policies and schemes with friends, contemplated an alternative gov- tackling the a bid for the imperial federation- his habit of bypassing official chan- ernment incorporating such figures ist support by advocating uniting nels and seeking his own sources of as Alfred Mond and Sir Christo- problem of the empire by ‘concentrating its information and ideas. In 1910 the pher Furness, who were Liberal resources for defence as for com- problem that had begun to absorb MPs and successful entrepreneurs.11 alcoholic merce’. And he appealed to those him was the preparation of a com- He himself would fill the Chamber- Tories who favoured state inter- pulsory scheme of national insur- lain/Rosebery role by leading the drink, intro- ventionism by suggesting raising ance for both health – or infirmity national administration. the school-leaving age to enable as it was then known – and unem- Many historians, while rec- ducing insur- Britain’s labour force to compete ployment. This topic occupied ognising Lloyd George’s detach- with Germany and the United more space than any other in his ment from regular party politics, ance against States and promoting more effi- memorandum and it seems prob- have considered the interpreta- ill-health cient large-scale farming with able that in composing his coalition of him as a social imperialist state subsidies. All these questions, tion proposals it was the resolution as an exaggeration or even mis- and unem- Lloyd George claimed, could be of national insurance reform that representation. Yet the expecta- resolved much more easily by a most moved him. For the attempt tions of the Edwardian National ployment non-party approach which would to legislate for the introduction of Efficiency advocates were not carry greater weight than any nor- insurance stirred up angry nests of entirely lacking an empirical basis. and reform- mal government. Similarly, the vested interests, notably the medi- As a young man in the 1880s Lloyd Irish question would be suscep- cal profession, the private insurance George had felt the attraction of ing the Poor tible to non-party treatment, as companies, and the trade unions Chamberlain’s politics: a combina- the government could deal with who resented the imposition of tion of domestic radicalism and a Law. it ‘without being subject to the extra compulsory contributions

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 21 lloyd george’s coalition proposal of 1910 and pre-war liberalism on their members. Conscious that memorandum towards the end of The obvious explanation for it was comparatively easy to enact October designed to be seen by failure is that Lloyd George evi- such a reform in Germany, he com- Liberals only.17 In fact, several sen- dently thought it feasible to use plained: ‘but here one would have ior Liberals, including Grey and the methods he had employed suc- to encounter the bitter hostility Crewe who were rather defeatist cessfully at the Board of Trade in of powerful organisations like the and lacked the impetus to tackle talking separately to the two sides Prudential, the Liver, the Royal radical reforms at this stage, seem with a view to finding the common Victoria, the Pearl, and similar to have welcomed the prospect of a ground. But in 1910 the participants organisations, with an army num- deal with their opponents.18 How- were more sceptical. And rightly bering scores, if not hundreds of ever, this is not true of Asquith who so because he was telling a different thousands, of agents and collectors was an altogether tougher politi- story to the two parties. If the par- who make a living out of collecting cian. It seems almost certain that ties had been able to resolve their a few pence a week from millions of Asquith never realised how far differences over House of Lords households’.16 Lloyd George was going in his talks reform there would have been some He felt strongly that the current with the Tories, sketching out the logic in going on to the coalition system of private insurance ‘ought membership of a coalition, suggest- as the threat of an election would to be terminated at the earliest pos- ing Balfour as Leader of the Com- have been lifted, but Lloyd George sible moment’. The costs of admin- mons, elevating himself as Prime had nothing new to offer on that istration of the private schemes Minister – and despatching Asquith subject, only a plea to circumvent it absorbed half of the total receipts; to the House of Lords. altogether. some companies were so badly run The negotiations reached a cli- For his part Asquith seems to that they faced bankruptcy; the max on 2 November, when Balfour have regarded the whole coali- agents sometimes sold their books and Lloyd George met privately. At tion proposal with detachment, to make a profit for themselves at By October, that stage the Tory leader under- even amusement, from the outset. the expense of the contributors; and stood that he was being asked A more orthodox party politician, the typical ‘death benefit’ was of with the con- to concede home rule all round he appreciated the damage to Lib- little help to the widows and chil- in return for a measure of tariff eral morale that would result from dren left behind by the loss of their stitutional reform, compulsory military ser- reneging on traditional commit- breadwinner. Lloyd George here vice and naval expansion; but he ments on free trade and voluntary articulated the modern Liberal view conference felt unable to accept and the effort recruitment; this view was cor- that the state could perform such was abandoned. Balfour was doubt- roborated from the other side by F. essential functions more efficiently reaching less influenced by the lack of pro- E. Smith, who believed a coalition and effectively than a multitude of gress made at the constitutional agreement would have smashed private, profit-making bodies. But deadlock, conference which also collapsed a the Liberal organisation for a dec- he anticipated that such legislation Lloyd George few days later, though this was not ade. In any case, any deal that com- was likely to be a major electoral made known until 10 November. promised home rule threatened to liability because of the reactions of pushed hard Why did the initiative to form disrupt the electoral alliance with the vested interests, especially the a coalition fail? With hindsight it the Irish and even Labour that had collectors who visited homes on a for the coa- is tempting to assume that Lloyd sustained the Liberals through elec- weekly basis. After a meeting with George’s proposals for a coalition tions in 1906 and January 1910; this the representatives of the insurance lition alter- programme were simply unreal- was indeed to be the eventual result companies in August he felt con- istic because he had incorporated of the formation of the wartime vinced that their hostility would native by so many major measures into his coalition with the Conservatives in prove fatal. In this context national document. On the other hand, 1915. Asquith’s main object in talk- insurance epitomised the case for talking sepa- there was some logic in this. Dead- ing to the opposition had always coalition government as a means of lock between the parties was some- been to buy some time and to show circumventing and defeating the rately to the times resolved by being ambitious George V that he had done his best sectional interests that so often frus- rather than cautious. In 1884–85, to find a way out of the Lords’ con- trated reforms that were necessary two sides. for example, the Liberals’ limited troversy; once this was seen to have in the national interest. proposals to extend the vote had failed the King was left with little By October, with the constitu- While the been blocked by the peers but were option but to acquiesce in his gov- tional conference reaching dead- later enacted when they agreed to ernment’s desire for the creation of lock, Lloyd George pushed hard Conserva- include a scheme to redistribute new peers. By the autumn the party for the coalition alternative by the constituencies; the same thing was preparing for a further battle talking separately to the two sides. tives were occurred in 1917–18 with even with the Tories and to back down While the Conservatives were intrigued more comprehensive proposals to unexpectedly would have been intrigued and excited, the Liberals reform the male and female fran- very damaging to morale. required more reassurance which and excited, chise, redraw constituency bounda- The other key reason for failure he provided by extemporising; to ries and make many other changes lay in Lloyd George’s inability to Crewe, for example, he explained the Liber- to the electoral system. When the win the complete confidence and that Liberal nonconformists would parties disagreed it proved easier cooperation of Balfour. With hind- have to have guarantees on edu- als required to go for a sweeping measure of sight Lloyd George claimed that cation and church disestablish- reform in which everyone gained he had enjoyed the support of the ment – topics that had not actually more something they wanted and con- leading Conservatives in 1910 but been mentioned in the memoran- sequently swallowed things they was thwarted by the reactionar- dum. He even composed a second reassurance. disliked. ies such as Lord Londonderry and

22 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george’s coalition proposal of 1910 and pre-war liberalism

‘the less capable and therefore more Party remained united, a second The 1910 in translating into concrete form narrowly partisan members of his general election became inevita- the ideas of the National Efficiency party’.19 However, these remarks ble and Asquith played his ace: the negotiations school. It diluted the party element reflected his post-war experience royal guarantee of new peers. The in government by incorporating in being rejected by rank-and-file victory in December’s poll resulted also had con- businessmen and experts, sidelined Tories in 1922 while retaining the in the enactment of the Parliament the old Cabinet by a five-man War backing of Smith, Balfour and Act in 1911 and the lasting curtail- siderable Cabinet, instituted a cabinet sec- Chamberlain. In 1910 only a hand- ment of the House of Lords’ role in retariat to promote efficiency, and ful of Conservatives were actually government and in British politics longer-term employed the Milnerites in the consulted and Balfour was suspi- generally. Prime Minister’s personal secre- cious because Lloyd George used F. Lloyd George promptly significance tariat. Even in the reaction against E. Smith, a highly opportunistic, reverted to type by throwing him- in that for Lloyd George’s style of government freewheeling figure, as his inter- self into the election, which became in the 1920s some of this apparatus mediary. Nor did Balfour appre- almost a referendum on the upper Lloyd George survived, and the ideal of a non- ciate until later in October how chamber; he mocked the peers as party or national government con- many concessions Lloyd George descendants of ‘French filibusters’ they pro- tinued to resurface at intervals in required from the Tories. Moreo- and ‘the ennobled indiscretions of British politics. ver, although Balfour’s attitude kings’. But he found himself forced vided a vir- Lloyd George may have been the towards his own party was lordly back into the trying negotiations first ‘Presidential’ Prime Minister and detached, he could not take over the National Insurance Bill. tual dress but he was not the last. Churchill liberties with his followers on such Although it was passed in 1911 he carried forward both the ideas of issues as Ireland. ‘I cannot become was frustrated by not being able rehearsal for the Edwardian era and a marked another Robert Peel in my party’, to include widows’ pensions as he habit for working with more than he explained.20 As a result of the had intended. As he had foreseen, his wartime one party. Mrs Thatcher, who controversy over tariff reform the Bill offered easy targets for the frankly admitted she would have launched in 1903 by Joseph Cham- Tories and as a result several Liberal government. preferred to be president, was very berlain the Conservatives had seats were lost in by-elections dur- sceptical about many members of become very divided and neither ing 1912–13. But the episode also her own party and attracted by faction regarded Balfour as reliable. damaged him in the wider party as outsiders with business experience. He had been promptly denounced reports of his scheme leaked out, Tony Blair, equally detached from by Leo Maxse of the National leaving him a more isolated fig- his own party, was positively Lloyd Review for even talking to the Lib- ure by 1914; his natural allies in the Georgeian in his habit for appoint- erals: ‘Those who begin negoti- Cabinet had already concluded that ing men from outside the party to ating with Mr Asquith will find he had crossed sides on defence and provide alternative advice to that themselves sold to the Molly Magu- foreign policy. offered by his official ministers. ires before the end of the chapter.’21 On the other hand, Balfour, Admittedly Lloyd George hoped to who had kept his party firmly in Martin Pugh’s latest book, Britain: bring Balfour round on Ireland by mind in backing away from coali- Unification and Disintegration, is offering a federal or home-rule-all- tion, earned himself little grati- available from Authors-OnLine and round solution. But Garvin failed tude. Supporters of coalition saw through Amazon in paperback and as to convince the Tory leader that his conduct as typically indecisive. an e-book. See www.martinpughhisto- this could be done without splitting But critics from the ‘Radical Right’ rian.com. the party, and the federalists had like Leo Maxse also condemned not thought through such a major him for engaging in talks as proof 1 Admittedly there is some room scheme sufficiently. In effect, while that he could not be relied on to for argument about how, say, the Lloyd George wanted the Tories to uphold Tory principles. When he National Government is counted, but accept the idea of coalition and sort lost the December election, his by my count there were coalitions out the details later, Balfour pre- third consecutive defeat, the crit- in 1852–55; 1855–58; 1859–65; 1895– ferred to have the details first. ics launched a vituperative ‘Balfour 1905, 1915–16; 1916–18; 1918–22; Yet although it proved to be a Must Go’ campaign which resulted 1931–35; 1935–37; 1937–40; 1940–45; failure the coalition initiative of in his resignation in 1911. 2010–. 1910 was not without some signifi- The 1910 negotiations also had 2 Walter Long to Edward Carson, 25 cance. Among Liberal opinion the considerable longer-term signifi- May 1915, quoted in Ian Colvin, The demise of the conference came as a cance in that for Lloyd George they Life of Lord Carson (1936), vol III, pp. relief. ‘There are people who talk provided a virtual dress rehearsal 50–51. glibly of the existing parties hav- for his wartime government. 3 Lucy Masterman, C. F. G. ing done their work and seen their Despite his failure in 1910 he saw Masterman: A Biography (1939), p. 200. day, and dream of a great “national that the leading Conservatives took 4 Ibid., pp.142, 164. party”’, scoffed the [Liberal]West - his ideas seriously and, given the 5 John D. Fair, British Interparty minster Gazette. ‘This idea will right circumstances, would be pre- Conferences (1980), pp. 88–89. never prevail as long as there is life pared to take risks with the party. 6 A.J.Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, and strength in parliamentary insti- Of course his path was made easier 24 October 1910, Balfour papers Add. tutions and a wholesome interest by Asquith’s decision to form a coa- Mss. 49736. in public affairs among the mass of lition in 1915. But the Lloyd George 7 Denis Gwynne, The Life of John the people.’22 The immediate con- coalition that followed it in Decem- Redmond (1932), pp. 179–80. sequences were that the Liberal ber 1916 was qualitatively different concluded on page 74

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 23 Lloyd George’s War Rhetoric, 1914 – 1918

Lloyd George’s reputation as a master rhetorician is well deserved. Never keen on writing, the spoken word was his perfect medium.1 When he was at the height of his powers, he was as effective in winning over opponents face to face in private as he was at making emotive, populist appeals to large crowds and at winning over MPs in the House of Commons. Richard Toye demonstrates the importance of Lloyd George’s rhetorical skills during the First World War, and analyses how his speeches combined ethos (character), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic or discourse).

Toye concludes by uring the First World maintain him as Prime Minister at calling for a more War, Lloyd George’s rhe- times of political vulnerability; and Dtorical skills were impor- they helped secure his massive vic- systematic study of the tant for a variety of reasons. They tory in the general election of 1918. helped him justify the war to the They were, furthermore, an impor- origins, delivery and British public and to international tant component of the ‘prime min- reception of the rhetoric audiences; they helped establish his isterial’ or ‘semi-presidential’ form own reputation as a dynamic war of government which he pioneered, of a brilliant war leader. leader, paving the way for his entry in contrast to earlier, more collec- to 10 Downing Street; they helped tive styles of Cabinet government.2

24 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Lloyd George’s War Rhetoric, 1914 – 1918

Surprisingly, though, Lloyd by the culture of the music hall, afternoon they would clash with George’s war rhetoric has received hence his ability – noted by Mor- the foot-ball news L.G. said rather little scholarly attention, cer- gan – to move swiftly between ‘when would you like them – tainly by comparison with Church- moral injunction and knockabout 11 o’clock in the morning?’ On ill’s during the Second World War.3 humour.8 their saying ‘yes’ he did his best Of course, his many biographers When he became an MP, in to ensure that he should speak in have written about his speechmak- 1890, Gladstone was still Liberal some conference or at the lay- ing, often to excellent effect, and leader. In old age, he recalled: ‘I ing of some memorial stone or in there is plenty of other literature learned from Gladstone that to be some great factory at that hour that touches upon it, at least in effective in attack you must confine on Saturday; furthermore, he passing. His pre-war and post-war yourself to one subject on a nar- undertook to provide them with rhetoric has been discussed in a use- row front.’9 And, for a long time, it a draft of his speech the previous ful way by Iain McLean.4 Ken- was attack that he was best at. This day, subject only to the variation neth O. Morgan’s recent lecture was true, of course, of his eloquent which new events or new inspi- on Lloyd George as a parliamen- denunciations of the Boer War. ration might bring forth.12 tarian contains many important It was also true of his subsequent insights into his rhetorical skills.5 peacetime career as a Cabinet min- Lloyd George’s rhetorical meth- However, in spite of valuable con- ister. Peel had used the technique of ods generated much suspicion, of tributions by L. Brooks Hill and ‘government in Opposition’ – the course. His famous speech in the David R. Woodward, we lack a responsible pose of the would-be Limehouse district of East London systematic account of his rhetoric Prime Minister. Lloyd George and in defence of his tax-raising Budget throughout the 1914–18 period as a his fellow Liberal Winston Church- of 1909 was seen by opponents as whole.6 That is a much larger task ill instead performed ‘Opposition an effort to stir up class warfare; than can be attempted in an article in government’, launching scath- ‘Limehousing’ became a byword of this length. It is, however, pos- ing attacks on the landed elite in for rabble-rousing and demagogu- sible to examine some key devel- order to whip up support for radical ery. During the war, however, the opments and episodes which cast social policies. It was the former, sense that he was authentically in light on broader themes. In exam- arguably, who was the more effec- touch with the mood of the peo- ining these, it is helpful to bear in tive of the two. Robert Roberts, ple gave him a public ethos that mind the three Classical rhetorical chronicler of working-class life in many other politicians lacked. appeals: to ethos (character), to pathos Salford, recalled how his father and Similarly, as a former pro-Boer (emotion, or the emotional char- a friend idolised Lloyd George but (although never actually a pacifist) acter of the audience), and to logos thought little of Churchill: ‘Unlike Lloyd George was in some ways (logic or discourse). Considering their hero, the orator supreme, they an unlikely advocate of war. This how Lloyd George’s speeches made considered him a shifty and medio- could also be turned into a strength, use of varying combinations of cre speaker with a poor delivery.’10 though. Having consistently these appeals helps us to understand On the other hand, Lloyd George’s opposed large-scale arms spending his undoubted rhetorical success. brilliant efforts, which contained before 1914, and having been con- By the time that war broke out, elements of improvisation, were verted to British intervention on Lloyd George was, of course, an thought to lack the literary qual- the Continent only at the very last extremely experienced orator, ity needed to read well in the papers minute, no one could reasonably with nearly twenty-five years in the next day.11 Reputedly, it was accuse him of being a warmonger. parliament behind him. Much of his eminence grise, News of the World Nor, in fact, was it easy to accuse what he knew about public speak- proprietor Lord Riddell, who per- Left: him of hypocrisy. His famous ing came from the nonconform- suaded him to reserve his most Lloyd George warning to Germany at the time of ist chapel tradition. Although he important speeches for Saturdays during the First the Agadir crisis in 1911 stood as a was no conventional Christian, his to ensure that they would receive World War marker of his willingness to defend unselfconscious use of religiously coverage in the Saturday evening (Photograph by the European balance of power and infused language was an asset for papers, the Sunday papers, and the kind permission the British national interest. His a radical politician who wanted Monday ones too: of Llyfrgell brand of Liberalism was also associ- to establish a reputation for high- Genedlaethol ated with the defence of the rights minded moral fervour, and his war When newspaper report- Cymru/The of small nations, which the German speeches too had an evangelical ers appealed to L.G. that if National Library invasion of Belgium seemed to vio- flavour.7 But he was also influenced the speeches were made in the of Wales.) late spectacularly.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 25 lloyd george’s war rhetoric, 1914–1918

In the first autumn of the war, name. Britain’s treaty commitment In the first to fight sat uncomfortably with then, Lloyd George’s carefully cul- to Belgium represented a solemn his private desire to keep his own tivated public character was almost duty. The alternative to fulfilling autumn of sons out of harm’s way. He used perfectly pitched. He could be seen it was to adopt the German view of his influence to get them posi- as someone who had pursued peace treaties as mere scraps of paper that the war, tions as aides-de-camp to generals up to the final moment, but who could be violated if they conflicted (although they both later under- had reluctantly concluded that par- with national interest. The Times then, Lloyd took more dangerous service).17 ticipation in the war was necessary, report shows how he used a com- Had this become known at the in line with his known commit- bination of humour and rhetorical George’s time it would have seriously dam- ment to use force, in extremis, to questions to work up his audience aged his ethos – as indeed would protect Britain’s honour. Who bet- to fever pitch: carefully cul- the knowledge that his secretary ter, then, to win over waverers, for tivated pub- Frances Stevenson was also his if even he supported the war, who The whole house burst into mistress. else could possibly object? And laughter when Mr. Lloyd lic character That, of course, was a closely there was, perhaps, more of a need George asked: ‘Have you any £5 guarded secret at the time, although to convert doubters than has tradi- notes about you; or any of those was almost Stevenson’s name did gain some tionally been allowed. The stand- neat little Treasury £1 notes?’ public prominence as the editor (or ard picture of August 1914 is of But the mood changed when perfectly ‘arranger’) of a volume of Lloyd widespread war enthusiasm, with he went on to exclaim:- ‘If you George’s speeches published in men rushing mindlessly to join have burn them; they are only pitched. He 1915. By the time the book came up before it was all over. Catriona scraps of paper!’ And there were out, he was well established in his Pennell has recently shown, how- fierce cheers in response to his could be seen new position as Minister of Muni- ever, that things were much more telling questions and answers:- tions. That post had been created in complex, with people often taking ‘What are they made of? – Rags. as some- May that year as part of the politi- weeks to mull over what they knew What are they worth? – The cal shake-up triggered partly by were momentous, life-changing whole credit of the British one who the shortage of shells and partly by decisions.13 This means that, in the Empire.’15 Churchill’s problems at the Admi- early weeks, leading public fig- had pursued ralty. With a coalition government ures had a potential role to play in The speech’s peroration was domi- now in place, Lloyd George’s role in cementing public attitudes. nated by pathos. It centred on a peace up increasing production augmented His speech at the Queen’s Hall in metaphor from his Welsh boyhood. his reputation as a man of drive and the West End on 19 September 1914 He had, he said, known a beauti- to the final determination – but without his was a landmark. It was printed and ful valley between the mountains moment, speeches his administrative abil- circulated widely and was received and the sea, ‘sheltered by the moun- ity might have counted for less with great enthusiasm by the press. tains from all the bitter blasts’ of but who had with the public. One contempo- The audience consisted primarily of the wind, and therefore snug and rary commentator described Lloyd the London Welsh and the purpose comfortable, but ‘very enervating’. reluctantly George’s lifetime technique – appli- was recruitment. Lloyd George was The British people had, he said, cable in both war and peace – as able to deploy ethos by playing on been living in a sheltered valley for concluded follows: his own Welsh background, which generations. also served another purpose. As that par- Provide a cry which is, or can be Bentley Gilbert has pointed out, he We have been too comfortable made, popular. was in the midst of a battle to per- and too indulgent, many, per- ticipation in Promote a popular suade Kitchener, the War Secretary, haps, too selfish, and the stern movement for its effective to allow the creation of a specifi- hand of fate has scourged us to the war was prosecution. cally Welsh army corps: ‘A strong an elevation where we can see Inspire that movement with response to his call for men would the everlasting things that mat- necessary. enthusiasm by a great platform be proof that an appeal for Welsh ter for a nation – the great peaks campaign.18 recruits could be made on a national we had forgotten, of Honour, basis.’14 The speech was an attempt Duty, Patriotism, and, clad in The contrast with the Prime Min- to demonstrate that the war was glittering white, the towering ister, H. H. Asquith, was striking. being fought on behalf of Liberal pinnacle of Sacrifice pointing Asquith did not merely appear (per- values, including the rights of the like a rugged finger to Heaven. haps somewhat unfairly) as a weak ‘little nations’, specifically Belgium We shall descend into the val- hand on the tiller and an advo- and Serbia, but also, by implica- leys again; but as long as the cate of ‘wait and see’; he also failed tion, Wales. Lloyd George also men and women of this genera- to articulate as clearly as Lloyd sought to show that the war could tion last, they will carry in their George the moral case for war. not have been avoided ‘without hearts the image of those mighty Lloyd George’s speeches in favour national dishonour’. This could be peaks whose foundations are of conscription in the winter of seen, superficially as a purely emo- not shaken, though Europe rock 1915-–6 accentuated the differences tive appeal; but he also used logos in and sway in the convulsions of a between the two men (although it order to argue that national hon- great war.16 should also be noted that his address our was fundamental to the proper to munitions workers on Clydeside working of international relations, As John Grigg has pointed out, on Christmas Day met such hostil- notwithstanding the fact that many Lloyd George’s claim that he envied ity that he attempted to suppress crimes had been committed in its young people their ‘opportunity’ news of what had happened.)19 In

26 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george’s war rhetoric, 1914–1918 a famous Commons speech he said press in Britain did not disguise its Liberal MP who spoke next, is that the words ‘too late’ were ‘two contempt. According to the Labour interesting: ‘The right hon. Gentle- fatal words of this War’: Leader: man has stated his case with all his accustomed dexterity, and he has Too late in moving here. Too Mr. Lloyd George may soon find made an appeal to the emotions of late in arriving there. Too late in it convenient to resign his pre- the House, an appeal which no man coming to this decision. Too late sent position of responsibility is able to make with greater skill in starting with enterprises. Too for one of greater freedom, in and greater irrelevance than him- late in preparing. In this War As Prime which he will tell the world how self.’25 Lloyd George did indeed use the footsteps of the Allied forces he could have achieved victory pathos when he argued that the con- have been dogged by the mock- Minister for if he had been allowed to direct troversy was undermining national ing spectre of ‘Too Late’; and the whole world according to unity and impeding the war effort: unless we quicken our move- the final his plans. But he cannot relieve ‘I really beg and implore, for our ments damnation will fall on the two years himself of responsibility. He common country, the fate of which sacred cause for which so much has been a Minister during the is in the balance now and in the gallant blood has flowed. I beg of the war, whole war, and he became Prime next few weeks, that there should employers and workmen not to Minister a year ago with practi- be an end of this sniping.’26 He also have ‘Too Late’ inscribed upon Lloyd George cally the powers of a Dictator, used ethos, both when he presented the portals of their workshops: under a promise to reorganise himself as a busy man being forced that is my appeal.20 needed his the conduct of the war for vic- to deal with a dangerous distrac- tory. He may say that he under- tion, and when he assaulted the Although couched as an injunction rhetorical took an impossible task, but he character of Sir Frederick Mau- to both sides of industry, this pas- cannot transfer his responsibility rice, the dissident General who had sage could also be seen as an oblique skills as much to others.23 breached military discipline by tak- attack on Asquith’s laid-back leading his allegations to the press. He ership style. Had Asquith himself as ever. As Although he would ultimately be pointed out, devastatingly, that the been a more effective rhetorician of hailed as ‘The Man Who Won the disputed figures had been provided war he might have been less vulner- the head of War’, during the conflict itself he by Maurice’s own department. The able to the Westminster intrigues was often subject to heavy criti- combination of techniques was that eventually drove him out of a new coali- cism, which often focused on highly effective, and the govern- Downing Street. his ‘dictatorial’ ways. This was a ment won the vote by a big major- As Prime Minister for the final tion, he was charge which resulted in part from ity. Cecil Harmsworth, an MP who two years of the war, Lloyd George his neglect of parliament. Hansard was a member of Lloyd George’s needed his rhetorical skills as much dependent records him as having spoken there personal secretariat, noted in his as ever. As the head of a new coali- on the Con- on only twelve days in 1917, which diary: ‘Ll.G. in first-rate fighting tion, he was dependent on the Con- was massively less active than trim, reduces the Opposition to servatives for a majority; and, with servatives Asquith had been as Prime Minister speechlessness.’ Harmsworth added disgruntled Asquithians waiting the previous year. presciently: ‘One unhappy result to pounce on any mis-step, he was for a major- However, Lloyd George could may be the definite splitting of the always potentially vulnerable to still put on a stellar performance Liberal Party.’27 any new crisis that might emerge. ity; and, with there when the occasion demanded. It is usual to regard war rhetoric Lloyd George was helped by From the point of view of his polit- from the point of view of domes- Asquith’s seeming unwillingness – disgruntled ical survival, probably the most tic political management and of or inability – to strike effectively in dangerous moment of his pre- maintaining the morale of the citi- debate. He recalled: ‘When Asquith Asquith- miership was the famous ‘Maurice zenry. Yet speeches had another used to attack me on a wide front, I debate’ of May 1918. He had been function too, that of international knew I was well away, and just sat ians waiting publicly accused of misleading par- diplomacy. This was not only a back and waited my time. Later, I liament about troop levels in France question of appealing to allies and picked out what subjects suited me, to pounce prior to the Ludendorff offen- neutrals for support. Public rheto- dealt with them at great length and sive that began in March. Asquith ric was a way of speaking to the apologised for not dealing with the on any mis- demanded a Select Committee enemy, either in an effort to intimi- rest because of lack of time.’21 He investigation, but made his case in a date them psychologically, or to was also subject to assault from the step, he narrow, legalistic way. In his reply, put out peace feelers. The latter left, which may have seemed par- Lloyd George made use of statistical had to be done in such a way as to ticularly threatening at a time when was always evidence that was arguably dubi- avoid showing weakness, given that Russia was in the throes of revo- potentially ous; at the very least he was highly speeches were ripe for propaganda lutionary turmoil. In November selective about what he chose to exploitation by the other side. 1917, he made a speech in Paris ‘of vulner- present.24 Regardless of whether Lloyd George’s efforts to carry out perhaps brutal frankness’, as he put or not the numbers were right, his this balancing act can be seen in his it himself. He said that the creation able to any speech was ostensibly based heav- War Aims speech of 5 January 1918. of the new Allied War Council had ily on logos, with much discussion The context for this was provided been delayed by ‘national preju- new crisis of which officials knew what when, by the peace negotiations between dice’ and considerations of pres- and whether or not a Select Com- the Bolsheviks and the Germans tige among the Allies.22 Although that might mittee was the right place to judge at Brest-Litovsk. Count Czernin, this was seen by many at the time such a question. But the comment Austria-Hungary’s foreign minis- as refreshingly honest, the Labour emerge. of William Pringle, the hostile ter and spokesman for the Central

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 27 lloyd george’s war rhetoric, 1914–1918

Powers, had suggested that they the agreement of both Asquith by his appeals to pathos, as when would be prepared to make ‘a gen- and former Foreign Secretary Sir he said that those who had started eral peace without compulsory Edward Grey for his initiative. He the war ‘must pay to the utter- annexations and without contribu- claimed to be ‘speaking not merely most farthing, and we shall search tions’ (i.e. indemnities). This type the mind of the Government but their pockets for it (laughter and of language was acceptable to the of the nation and of the Empire as a cheers)’. The reservations faded Bolsheviks, but Czernin’s condi- whole’. There was also much use of into the background.37 Churchill’s tion was that Russia’s allies also logos, in the form of detailed argu- later verdict was that ‘In the hot agreed.28 Even though it did not ment about what kinds of terms squalid rush of the event he [Lloyd appear to be a bona fide peace offer, would be acceptable. But there was, George] endeavoured to give sat- it was not a statement that the Brit- of course, also pathos, with justifica- isfaction to mob-feeling and press ish could allow to pass without tions for Britain’s past and present chorus by using language which comment. As Lloyd George put it actions being wrapped up in emo- was in harmony with the prevail- shortly before his speech: tive language. The Germans, at the ing sentiment, but which contained outset, had ‘violated public law’ and in every passage some guarding We ought to take advantage ‘ruthlessly trampled’ on treaty obli- phrase, some qualification, which of it to issue such a declaration gations. ‘We had to join the strug- afterwards would leave statesman- of our own war aims as would gle or stand aside and see Europe ship unchained’.38 This aspect of maintain our own public opin- go under and brute force triumph the campaign, then, represented an ion, and, if possible, lower that over public right and international unsuccessful effort at expectations of the enemy. In fact, the view to justice.’33 As Lloyd George had pre- management that would have seri- which the War Cabinet inclined dicted, the Germans viewed his ous repercussions during the Ver- was to issue a declaration of our proposed terms as unacceptable. sailles conference and after. The war aims which went to the They seem to have found the sup- seeds of disillusion were sown at the extreme limit of concession, and port of Labour’s Arthur Henderson moment of Lloyd George’s greatest which would show to our own for the speech to be a particularly triumph. people and to our Allies, as well bitter blow.34 But as Lloyd George In conclusion, it is appropriate as to the peoples of Austria, Tur- must have hoped, his approach to draw some comparisons with key, and even Germany, that was warmly received in Amer- Churchill in the Second World our object was not to destroy the ica. Although he spoke a few days War. None of Lloyd George’s war enemy nations.29 before President Woodrow Wilson speeches have entered popular revealed his celebrated ‘Fourteen memory, unlike Churchill’s great Woodward has suggested that Points’, the broad outlines of Wil- orations of 1940. In part, this may Lloyd George appeared to at least son’s approach to the peace were Some simply because we lack record- entertain ‘the idea of a compromise already known. Some unnamed unnamed ings that can be repeated over and peace with the enemy based on the US officials quoted by theNew York over again on documentaries. This sacrifice of Russia’, although this Times ‘noted that even President US officials fact reminds us that Lloyd George ‘did not dominate his thoughts dur- Wilson’s ideas were developed more was operating in a more primitive ing this period’.30 This is plausible sharply [by Lloyd George] than he quoted by technological environment. If he but, overall, the speech should be himself had expressed them’.35 had been able to broadcast to the seen more as a public relations gam- Immediately after the war’s end, the New masses he might well have done bit than a genuine effort at peace. Lloyd George faced the challenge so successfully, but in practice he Lloyd George did not believe that of a general election. The future York Times was always addressing the bulk of the Germans could accept terms treatment of Germany and the the British population – and inter- of the kind that the British were extent to which the Allies might ‘noted that national opinion – indirectly, via bound to insist upon. His state- extract reparations were key issues the press. This may have required ment, then, ‘should be regarded in the campaign. As Kenneth O. even Presi- a different rhetorical approach. It rather as a war move than as a peace Morgan has argued, Lloyd George is certainly true that Churchill’s move’.31 To his confidants, he said cannot be convicted of pure and dent Wilson’s speeches have a literary quality that afterwards ‘I went as near peace as I sustained rabble-rousing jingo- Lloyd George’s lack, but we should could’, explaining that the speech ism.36 During a speech at Bristol ideas were not therefore rush to the conclusion ‘was a counter-offensive against the on 11 December 1918, for example, that their political utility was supe- German peace terms with a view he said that ‘Germany must pay developed rior. As Morgan puts it, ‘Church- to appealing to the German people to the utmost limit of her capac- ill spoke to history; Lloyd George and detaching the Austrians’.32 ity’, but also – using logos – stressed more sharply spoke to his listeners.’39 Nor should The speech was made to trade that there were limits to that capac- [by Lloyd we put Churchill’s speeches on a union delegates at Central Hall, ity and it was unlikely in prac- pedestal and assume that – as legend Westminster. This choice of audi- tice that Britain could expect to George] would have it – practically every- ence allowed Lloyd George to receive every penny. His ethos as one who heard them was thrilled reach out to his left-wing critics, he presented it here was that of a than he and inspired. In fact, they were the including those who were demand- man who throughout the whole subject of more criticism and dis- ing progressive peace aims, by war had ‘never misled the pub- himself had sent than is generally believed.40 appearing to take them into his lic’ and who did not want to raise And if Churchill had more conspic- confidence. In terms ofethos , he false hopes. But however hard he expressed uous triumphs than Lloyd George, presented himself as the leader of worked to establish this, it is clear he also had more flops and failures. a united nation, who had secured that the crowds were most affected them’. Lloyd George made no equivalent

28 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george’s war rhetoric, 1914–1918 of the 1945 ‘Gestapo’ broadcast; Even if they University Press, 2001), Chapters 6 & Dec. 1915, col. 121. unlike Churchill, he won his gen- 7. 21 Cross, Life with Lloyd George, p. 213 eral election. have not 5 Lord Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’, lec- (entry for 26 July 1938). We do not, however, have the ture of 11 Jan. 2011, in Philip Norton 22 ‘Allied War Council. Mr. Ll. George same type of survey evidence for gained the (ed.), Eminent Parliamentarians: The On Strategy’, The Times, 13 Nov. the First World War as for the Sec- Speaker’s Lectures (Biteback, 2012). 1917. ond; therefore popular reactions to plaudits 6 L. Brooks Hill, ‘David Lloyd George 23 Quoted in D.J. Shackleton, ‘The Lloyd George are harder to judge. as Minister of Munitions: A Study Labour Situation: Report from the Nonetheless, it seems fair to say of poster- of His Speaking Tour of Industrial Ministry of Labour for the week that, even if they have not gained ity, Lloyd Centers’, Southern Speech Journal, Vol. ending the 21st November, 1917’, the plaudits of posterity, Lloyd 36, Issue 4 (1971), pp. 312–23; David GT 2176, CAB 24/33, The National George’s speeches served their George’s R. Woodward, ‘The Origins and Archives, Kew, London (hencefor- immediate purposes in a way that Intent of David Lloyd George’s Janu- ward TNA). many politicians would envy. It is speeches ary 5 War Aims Speech’, The Histo- 24 John Grigg, Lloyd George: War Leader, to be hoped that this article may rian, 34 (1971), pp. 22–39. 1916–1918 (Penguin, 2003), p. 494. serve as a call for a more system- served their 7 Hill, ‘David Lloyd George as Minis- 25 Parliamentary Debates, House of atic study of the origins, delivery ter of Munitions’, p. 322. Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 105, 9 and reception of the rhetoric of an immediate 8 Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’. May 1918, col. 2374. Emphasis added. undeniably brilliant war leader. 9 Colin Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd 26 Parliamentary Debates, House of purposes in George: The Diary of A.J. Sylvester Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 105, 9 Richard Toye is Professor of Modern 1931–45 (Macmillan, 1975), p. 213 May 1918, col. 2374. History at the University of Exeter. a way that (entry for 26 July 1938). 27 Cecil Harmsworth diary, 9 May His books include Lloyd George 10 Robert Roberts, A Ragged Schooling 1918, Cecil Harmsworth Papers, and Churchill: Rivals for Great- many politi- (Flamingo, 1984), p. 52. University of Exeter. ness (2007), Churchill’s Empire: 11 Jon Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: 28 ‘Czernin Makes the Offer’,New York The World that Made Him and the cians would The Hustings in British Politics from Times, 28 Dec. 1917. World He Made (2010), and Rheto- Hogarth to Blair (Oxford University 29 War Cabinet minutes, 3 Jan. 1918, ric: A Very Short Introduction (to envy. Press, 2009), p. 55. 11.30 a.m., CAB 23/5, TNA. be published in 2013). 12 Frank Owen to Thomas Blackburn, 30 Woodward, ‘The Origins and 6 Aug. 1952, Thomas Blackburn Intent’, p. 35. 1 In a letter to President Wood- Papers, University of Exeter. Owen 31 War Cabinet minutes, 3 Jan. 1918, 5 row Wilson of 22 February 1917, – who was writing a biography of p.m., CAB 23/5, TNA. US ambassador Walter H. Page Lloyd George – was reporting infor- 32 John M. McEwen, The Riddell Diaries wrote that Lloyd George ‘has been mation from Frank Whittaker, who 1908–23 (Athlone Press, 1986), p. 212 called the illiterate Prime Minister, had worked with Riddell after the (entry for 5 Jan. 1918). “because he never reads or writes.”’ First World War. 33 ‘British War Aims: Mr. Lloyd This was obviously an extreme com- 13 Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom United: George’s Statement’, The Times, 7 Jan. ment, or a joke, which no one can Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the 1918. have imagined to be literally true, First World War in Britain and Ireland 34 ‘Berlin Surprised Over Hender- but Lloyd George did prefer con- (Oxford University Press, 2012). son’, New York Times, 10 Jan. 1918. In versation to reading as means of 14 Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert,David August 1917, Henderson had lost his obtaining information, and was Lloyd George: A Political Life: Orga- seat in the War Cabinet on account quite reluctant to put pen to paper. nizer of Victory 1912–16 (B.T. Batsford, of his support for Labour Party par- B. J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of 1992), p. 117. ticipation in an international socialist Walter H. Page, Vol. III (Heinemann 15 ‘British Honour: Stirring Speech By congress in Sweden, at which Ger- 1925), p. 371. Mr. Lloyd George’, The Times, 20 mans were to be represented. 2 Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’s Sept. 1914. 35 ‘Officials Silent on Premier’s Speech’, Premiership: A Study in “Prime 16 The speech is reproduced in Frances New York Times, 6 Jan. 1918. Ministerial Government”’, Historical Stevenson (ed.), Through Terror to 36 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Journal , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), Triumph: Speeches and Pronounce- Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition pp. 130–57. ments of the Right Hon. David Lloyd Government, 1918–1922 (Clarendon 3 See especially: Manfred Weidhorn, George, MP, Since the Beginning of the Press, 1979), pp. 39–41. Churchill’s Rhetoric and Political Dis- War (Hodder & Stoughton, 1915), pp. 37 ‘Prime Minister On Conscription’, course (University Press of Amer- 1–15. The Times, 12 Dec. 1918. ica, 1987); David Cannadine, In 17 John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace 38 Winston S. Churchill, The World Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past to War, 1912–1916 (Penguin, 2002), p. Crisis, Part IV: The Aftermath, in in Modern Britain (Penguin, 2003), 171. The Collected Works of Sir Winston Chapter 4; Jonathan Charteris-Black, 18 Beriah G. Evans, ‘Mr. Lloyd George Churchill, 34 vols. (Library of Impe- Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive as Minister of Democracy’, Fort- rial History/Hamlyn, 1973–76), p. Power of Metaphor (Palgrave, 2005), nightly Review, Nov. 1915, pp. 884–96, 49. Chapter 2; and Peter Clarke, Mr at 896; Hill, ‘David Lloyd George as 39 Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’. Churchill’s Profession: Statesman, Ora- Minister of Munitions’, p. 313. 40 This is one of the themes of my forth- tor, Writer (Bloomsbury, 2012). 19 Gilbert, David Lloyd George, pp. coming book The Roar of the Lion: 4 Iain Mclean, Rational Choice and Brit- 246–50. The Making of Churchill’s World War II ish Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and 20 Parliamentary Debates, House of Speeches. Manipulation from Peel to Blair (Oxford Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 77 20

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 29 ‘If I had to go to Paris again …’ David Lloyd George and the Revision of the Treaty of Versailles

In 1923, Charles Hardinge, the recently have realised as being opposed to every retired British ambassador in Paris and former principle of national life and existence’. permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Hardinge offered the angry former Prime Office, told David Lloyd George that the 1919 Minister some unspecified examples of their Treaties of Versailles and St Germain with impracticalities. ‘He said nothing for about ten Germany and Austria ‘contained provisions minutes and then remarked in a friendly way, which anybody with any knowledge of “If I had to go to Paris again I would conclude foreign politics or of European affairs would quite a different treaty.”’1 By Alan Sharp.

30 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘If I had to go to Paris again …’ David Lloyd George and the Revision of the Treaty of Versailles

loyd George had thus more sympathetic to the enor- our signature’. He warned: ‘You joined the already consider- mous task facing the peacemakers may strip Germany of her colonies, Lable ranks of those critical after the most devastating war to reduce her armaments to a mere of the First World War settlement. that date. The settlement remains police force, and her navy to that Even before the conference ended highly controversial and, as one of of a fifth-rate Power … [but] if she there was much disquiet amongst its principal authors – something feels she has been unjustly treated participants that the treaty with which he could later conveniently … she will find means of extracting Germany was too harsh – as Lord forget – the idea of Lloyd George retribution from her conquerors.’ Robert Cecil remarked on 30 May creating an alternative treaty is Yet, as he boasted to his friend Sir 1919 during the Anglo-American intriguing.3 George Riddell, the press magnate, meeting which laid the foundations Setting to one side the obvi- on 30 March: ‘The truth is that for the Royal Institute of Inter- ous objections that he could nei- we have got our way … The Ger- national Affairs and its American ther remake the treaty without man Navy has been handed over; counterpart, the Council on For- the acquiescence of his allies, nor the German mercantile shipping eign Relations, ‘There is not a sin- could he alter the German percep- has been handed over, and the Ger- gle person in this room who is not tion that they were undefeated and man colonies have been given up.’ disappointed with the terms we hence that any settlement based on The sub-text to French premier have drafted.’ Six months after the the premise of Allied victory would Georges Clemenceau’s rejoinder to treaty was signed, John Maynard be unacceptable, there are vari- the memorandum asked what Brit- Keynes, the British Treasury offi- ous clues to the shape of his ideal ain would sacrifice of its own aims cial who had left Paris in disgust peace. These suggest that he sought (rather than those of others) to con- in early June, reinforced that dis- a stable Europe in which Germany, vince Germany that the treaty was quiet by publishing The Economic reconciled to its defeat and rec- just, but he provoked no response.5 Consequences of the Peace, a polemi- ognising the essential fairness of What might the possible allevia- cal attack on the peacemakers and the settlement, would play a positions have been? Lloyd George was all their works, which gave Brit- tive and beneficial role, retaking deeply disappointed when, dur- ain a bad conscience and which its place as a major British trading ing his absence from Paris in early has shaped much of the subsequent partner. Britain could then revert April 1919, the American president, debate on the settlement.2 to what contemporaries saw as its Woodrow Wilson, pressured by Others thought the treaty too traditional imperial and colonial Clemenceau, conceded a fifteen- lenient. Marshal Foch, the French themes, leaving Europe to fend for year Allied occupation of Western commander of Allied forces on the itself – such indeed was the advice Germany, much longer than he Western Front, predicted, ‘This offered by both his private secre- considered necessary or desirable. is not Peace. It is an Armistice tary, Philip Kerr, and Jan Smuts, Later, in the 1930s, the return of for twenty years.’ He was proved the South African defence minister Germany’s colonies became part wrong – by sixty-seven days – but and member of the Imperial War of an appeasement agenda, but in many later commentators have Cabinet. An additional but more 1919 this crossed no one’s mind – shared his view that the inadequa- remote aspiration would be the certainly not that of Smuts, fierce cies of Versailles created the con- reintegration of a reformed Russia critic of the treaty that he was, who ditions that made a second world into European politics.4 had no intention of relinquishing war inevitable and hence also bear Left: Lloyd George’s Fontainebleau the former German South-West some of the responsibility for its The British memorandum of 25 March 1919, Africa. Five principal areas, how- consequences and subsequent inter- Empire drafted after a weekend’s consulta- ever, stand out: reparations; disar- national turmoil. As more govern- delegation in tion with close advisers as deadlock mament; the territorial settlement ments opened their archives after June 1919; Lloyd threatened the conference, out- and Germany’s new frontiers; the the 1960s some, though certainly George behind lined ‘the kind of treaty to which so-called ‘shame clauses’ of the not all, historians have become desk, centre-left alone we were prepared to append treaty, relating to the indictment

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 31 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles of the Kaiser and members of the ‘The sub- ruled out an indemnity, as Lloyd soldiers were merely civilians in German military and political elite, George acknowledged, though uniform. Accepting this was not together with Article 231, the ‘war ject of rep- Professor Antony Lentin suggests logical, Wilson conceded because guilt’ clause; and finally, Britain’s that, from the beginning, he had he believed the Allies would com- relationship with France, linked to arations’ no intention of foregoing war costs promise on a fixed sum – not the the treaty that Lloyd George made and that the wording was a mere complete bill but an amount to but did not implement. declared ruse de guerre.8 discharge all Germany’s liabili- During the 1918 election, facing ties. Hence his decision would Thomas an unknown electorate and seeking not affect what Germany paid but Reparations to revitalise a lacklustre campaign, could allow Britain, which had suf- One candidate for revision is pre- Lamont, the Lloyd George played to the popular fered little physical destruction, to eminent: ‘The subject of repara- American gallery in Newcastle on 29 Novem- receive greater compensation. No tions’ declared Thomas Lamont, ber, declaring that ‘Germany final sum was agreed; on 5 April the American banker acting as an banker act- must pay the costs of the war’. He 1919 the decision was postponed for expert in Paris, ‘caused more trou- included an escape clause – ‘up to a Reparation Commission to deter- ble, contention, hard feeling, and ing as an the limit of her capacity’ – but in mine in1921.11 delay at the Paris Peace Conference Bristol on 11 December he stated, In his Fontainebleau memo- than any other point of the Treaty.’6 expert in ‘We propose to demand the whole randum Lloyd George suggested Resolving Germany’s responsi- cost of the war’, and hinted that that reparations should disappear bility to compensate Allied war- Paris, ‘caused Germany’s capacity was substan- with the generation that waged time losses then held centre stage tial. He won the election – though war. Yet he refused to specify any at numerous Anglo-French, inter- more trou- dependent upon a massive Tory time limit on German payments Allied and international confer- majority. Public and parliamentari- or name a total sum. He claimed ences in the early years of treaty ble, conten- ans heard what they wanted to hear he was thwarted by the excessive execution, sowing discord amongst and expected him to deliver.9 demands of his financial advis- the victors and offering Germany tion, hard It is easy to see why. The Brit- ers, Lords Cunliffe and Sumner, an opportunity to steal the moral ish Treasury estimated that victory respectively a former governor of high ground. Everyone, includ- feeling, and cost the Allies £24,000 million in the Bank of England and a Lord of ing the Germans, accepted that 1914 gold values. Great swathes of Appeal – irreverently dubbed the there was a bill to pay, but the bases delay at the Belgium and France lay ravaged by ‘Heavenly Twins’ by British del- of that reckoning, the amounts to four years of industrialised warfare egation colleagues because they be paid and the distribution of the Paris Peace and required restoration. Addition- were always together and sought receipts amongst the Allies, were all Confer- ally the Allies had borrowed heav- astronomical sums from Germany. beset by controversy. ily from the United States, which Cunliffe maintained that £24,000 Traditionally losers offset vic- ence than expected repayment. Meanwhile million was a realistic prospect. tors’ costs – after 1870–71 France Germany, suffering only minimal Lloyd George dismissed this as ‘a paid Germany 5,000 million gold any other damage to its industrial base and wild and fantastic chimera’ and francs – but in 1918 Lloyd George with no foreign war debts, posed mocked Cunliffe’s ‘strange lapse and Wilson ruled out war costs, point of the the threat of future trade competi- into megalomania’, suggesting that demanding only that Germany tion, unimpeded by the costs faced Sumner ‘himself caught the infec- restore the invaded territories.7 The Treaty’. by the Allies. The alternative, that tion.’12 These two men, he implied, restoration of such civilian dam- Allied taxpayers must foot the bill, prevented a reasonable settlement. age may conveniently be defined made it almost mandatory for Brit- Lentin argues such was not the as reparations and any additional ish or French politicians to promise case; instead, Lloyd George insisted demand for full or partial war the maximum payments possible on maintaining the maximum costs as an indemnity. Germany’s from Germany. Lloyd George’s demands, yet blamed the Twins request for an armistice in Octo- problem was that he had already so persuasively that even Keynes ber 1918, seeking to make Wilson’s contracted not to do so.10 believed him.13 1918 speeches the basis of the even- Yet, in Paris, he and Clem- Further opportunities for revi- tual peace, necessitated their precise enceau claimed their full war costs sion arose when, on 30 May and 1 definition. Lloyd George took great from Germany. Wilson resisted June 1919, the British Empire dele- pains with this section of the Allied vigorously. The ensuing crisis gation, including additional British response, sent on 5 November by was ‘solved’ by Article 231, which ministers, discussed the draft treaty the American Secretary of State, asserted Germany’s moral respon- and favoured making concessions Robert Lansing, which formed sibility to cover all Allied war to Germany. Smuts, the most vocif- the pre-Armistice agreement with expenditure but, did not, as the erous critic of the terms, proposed a Germany. Restoration meant ‘that Germans chose to believe, assign fixed sum, possibly £5,000 million. compensation will be made by Ger- sole responsibility for the war to Some ministers supported him, many for all the damage done to the Germany. It was mitigated by others favoured £11,000 million. civilian population of the Allies and Article 232, limiting actual com- Lloyd George thought the answer their property by the aggression of pensation to Allied civilian dam- might lie somewhere between but Germany by land, by sea, and from age. Lloyd George then persuaded rejected as inadequate a recent Ger- the air’. His final touch changed Smuts to convince Wilson that man offer to pay £5,000 million the original wording of ‘invasion’ pensions paid to injured soldiers (admittedly based on unacceptable to ‘aggression’ to safeguard British or their widows and orphans con- conditions). The delegation author- and imperial claims. This clearly stituted a legitimate claim because ised him to specify a fixed sum in

32 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles the treaty. When he returned to to artificially inflate the bill – as unofficial committee of experts and the Council of Four, however, he Belgian premier Georges Theu- politicians was significant – Louis resisted Wilson’s attempt to do so nis joked, they could be stuck ‘in a Loucheur, French minister for the and, according to Robert Cecil, drawer without bothering to lock devastated regions, observed ‘Lloyd was ‘curiously reluctant to make up, for no thief would be tempted George protests at these low fig- any changes’ to the reparations to steal them’.16 At the ensuing ures’. He clearly expected more and clauses.14 London conference Lloyd George preferred to postpone the issue.18 For the next three years Lloyd claimed a triumph: the Commis- He later castigated French min- George portrayed himself as seek- sion, rather than he or Aristide isters for deceiving their public ing a workable settlement rather Briand, the French premier, had about Germany’s capacity to pay, than an attractive, but impossibly reduced Germany’s bill, thus dis- yet he was never willing to disa- inflated, bill. Yet his words have arming disappointed Anglo-French buse the British people. Apart from to be set against the figures for the die-hards; Germany accepted the the obvious political risk involved, various proposals. Once the prime payments schedule; and he had he was perhaps unsure himself of mover to establish a Reparation forestalled the French from occu- what would constitute a fair set- Commission, he now attempted to pying the Ruhr basin – their pre- tlement. Historians sympathetic to circumvent it, believing that the ferred method to enforce the treaty Lloyd George suggest that the 1918 absence of the intended American or punish transgressions. election promises, his association chairman would leave Britain per- The respite proved tempo- with Cunliffe and Sumner, and the manently outvoted in a Commis- rary; the following year Germany He later inclusion of pensions, were aber- sion of four members, in which he sought a payments moratorium. rations, disguising his real aim of expected France and Belgium to Meanwhile the complicating factor castigated a reasonable settlement, and they make maximum demands. Even if of inter-Allied debts became urgent praise his success in negotiating the Britain persuaded Italy to oppose as the Americans pressed for repay- French min- 1921 London schedule of payments. them, the casting vote lay with the ment, over twenty-five years at 4.5 Others question whether his mod- French chairman – the first was per cent interest, of the £800 mil- isters for eration always came second to his the implacable Lorrainer and for- lion that Britain had borrowed to wish to achieve the best outcome mer President of the Republic, finance the Allied war effort. Brit- deceiving for Britain by whatever means, Raymond Poincaré. Lloyd George ain was owed twice this amount by however dubious, and ask whether instead tackled reparations in direct its allies, and Austen Chamberlain, their pub- his refusal to recognise the need for negotiations with various French the Chancellor of the Exchequer, radical revision of all war debts, prime ministers at inter-Allied consistently advocated the unilat- lic about in the interests of wider European conferences held in 1920 and early eral renunciation of Britain’s Euro- recovery, missed the broader pic- 1921. In July 1920, at Boulogne, pean debts, but Lloyd George and Germany’s ture. It would also be wise not to Anglo-French ministers consid- others were reluctant to forego capacity to discount Lloyd George’s moral con- ered a settlement based on German either the potential, however science, idiosyncratic as it might annuities spread over forty-two unlikely, of repayment, or of what- pay, yet he be, which suggested a need for ret- years, totalling £13,450 million. In ever political leverage the debts ribution as well as forgiveness. ‘It January 1921 in Paris they debated might offer. America resisted the was never was not vengeance but justice … a proposal for forty-two annuities Anglo-French contention that its whether we ought not to consider totalling £11,300 million together loans constituted part of an inter- willing to lashing her [Germany] as she had with a variable annuity amount- Allied war effort to which some lashed France’, he told his Cabinet ing to 12 per cent of Germany’s had contributed money and others disabuse colleagues, adding on another occa- exports. Lloyd George was trying blood. President Calvin Coolidge’s sion, ‘Those who ought to pay were to coax France and coerce Ger- dismissal of their proposal of all- the Brit- those who caused the loss.’19 many to accept the Paris plan when round cancellation was typically he learned that, contrary to expec- succinct: ‘They hired the money, ish people. tations, the Reparation Commis- didn’t they?’ Disarmament sion’s bill would be much lower. Lloyd George might have fixed Apart from Lloyd George’s political ideology He reversed course and awaited its Germany’s liability in the treaty also played an important role in report.15 and waived Britain’s European the obvious German disarmament, another sub- In May 1921 the Commission debts. There is little indication ject that dominated Anglo-French established Germany’s liability at that either course appealed to him. political risk discussions in the early post-1919 £6,600 million, of which pensions The Americans would have com- years. The Allied military advis- and other allowances represented promised on a final sum around involved, he ers in Paris disagreed on the size nearly half. Under the terms of the £6,000 million; French estimates was perhaps and recruitment of Germany’s A, B and C bonds Germany was to of an acceptable figure tended to post-war army – Foch, for France, deliver, payment beyond £2,500 be higher, but, at their lower end, unsure him- recommended 100,000 men, with million was never anticipated. not significantly so, and the Ger- long-term volunteer officers and Most experts agreed that this rep- mans did offer (with contentious self of what non-commissioned officers, and resented Germany’s capacity to pay provisos) £5,000 million.17 Lloyd other ranks conscripted for one but accepted that this would need George suggested in June 1919 that would con- year; Haig, for Britain, believed to be disguised to meet Anglo- something between £5,000 million Germany needed 200,000 or French public expectations. Hence and £11,000 million would be rea- stitute a fair 250,000 men for internal order and the C bonds, worth £4,000 million, sonable, but his earlier reaction to international defence; Bliss, for the were ‘phoney money’, designed the £6,000 million proposed by an settlement. United States, suggested 400,000.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 33 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles

They compromised on an army of By January 1921 the War Office To encourage Clemenceau to 200,000, with volunteer officers and considered that most weapons, abandon plans to increase French conscripted other ranks. 20 apart from those held by the para- security by detaching the Rhine- Lloyd George believed that militaries, were being destroyed, land from Germany he offered, peacetime conscription institu- that the German army, manned by with apparent sincerity, a British tionalised militarism. It was, he volunteers, had reached treaty lev- guarantee of assistance in the event declared in October 1920, ‘the basic els and that ‘Germany has ceased to of future German aggression, and cause of the late war’. He agreed be a military danger to the Allies the promise of a Channel tunnel with Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s for a considerable period of time’. to speed British troops to France’s Foreign Secretary in 1914, that The French continued to stress aid. In the east he used all his wiles ‘great armaments lead inevitably to legal uncertainties about recruit- to persuade Wilson that making war’. Hence he championed Ger- ment, the inadequate disarmament Danzig a free city, rather than con- man disarmament as the prelude of civilians and paramilitaries, and signing its German population to to wider international armaments concluded that the ‘German Gov- Poland, was the President’s own reduction, but, at the same time, he ernment … has put itself in oppo- idea. More directly he challenged did not wish to leave Germany so sition both to the spirit and letter a reluctant Wilson to agree that weak that it succumbed to Bolshe- of the Treaty.’ This was a typical the plebiscite on the fate of Upper vism. Nor, though this could not be divergence of views: the British Silesia, on which Lloyd George so openly professed, did he wish to concentrated on the destruction of insisted, was simply putting the leave France unchallenged on the war material and the reduction of President’s principles into practice. continent. His counter-proposal in forces and the French pursued the He may have regretted this success Paris was for a volunteer army of less tangible objectives of break- because Britain’s military forces 200,000. Clemenceau, warning that ing Germany’s ‘military spirit’ and became overstretched and, embar- the Germans would use such a pro- achieving ‘moral disarmament’.22 rassingly, had to be withdrawn fessional army as a cadre for a much Lloyd George perhaps regretted from plebiscitary protection duties, larger force (as indeed they did), not achieving a larger army for occasioning further inter-Allied conceded the voluntary principle Germany but, beyond that, it is dissension when Britain accused but insisted on a limit of 100,000, difficult to see where, or why, he French troops of favouring the Pol- which Lloyd George accepted. Ger- would have sought major changes. ish cause. The interpretation of the many had to reach this target by Although more sympathetic to 1921 plebiscite results then led to April 1920 and disband its general German difficulties, he was equally bitter Anglo-French disagreement staff. Its air force was banned and as committed as the French to uni- which could only be resolved by its once formidable navy, stripped lateral German disarmament as a involving the League.24 of dreadnoughts and submarines, first step to the wider international Lloyd George supported an reduced to 15,000 men. Equip- armaments limitation he deemed independent Poland but fiercely ment and manufacturing resources essential for peace. opposed what he deemed its exces- surplus to the requirements of sive territorial demands, telling the these curtailed forces were to be Unionist leader, Andrew Bonar destroyed.21 National self-determination If Lloyd Law, ‘I have never cared for the Unsurprisingly the German If Lloyd George blamed milita- handing over of two or three mil- government was not an eager par- rism for the last war, he believed George lion Germans to Polish rule … The ticipant in dismantling its military denial of national self-determi- Germans would never accept per- might and did its best to obstruct or nation – a phrase he used before blamed mili- manently this transference.’ His obfuscate but, by 1922, most of its Wilson – could cause the next. In successful amendment of the origi- air and naval equipment had been 1871 Germany seized the French tarism for nal Polish Commission’s recom- destroyed or surrendered. Reduc- provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, mendations achieved plebiscites ing its land forces and dismantling creating a lingering grievance in the last war, resulting in Germany’s retention its weapons industry were more European international relations, of Marienwerder, Allenstein and problematic. The British War righted only by their return in he believed a substantial part of Upper Silesia. Office thought Germany needed 1918. Throughout the conference Germans still regarded the loss of an army of 150,000 to 200,000 to Lloyd George warned of the dan- denial of territory to the Poles as unaccepta- ensure internal security and defend gers of creating Alsace-Lorraines national ble, terming their new border ‘the its frontiers and was more prepared in reverse: ‘I cannot conceive,’ bleeding frontier’, but it is hard to than the French to tolerate various he wrote, ‘of any greater cause of self-deter- see what further concessions Lloyd German paramilitary forces, total- future war than that the German George might have won.25 ling some 600,000, which it did not people … should be surrounded by mination – a In the west he was perhaps too consider an international threat a number of small States … each of easily persuaded that Germany but thought important to preserv- them containing large numbers of phrase he should forfeit the Saar region to ing order. Lloyd George did nego- Germans clamouring for reunion compensate France for the coal tiate extra time for German force with their native land.’ He fought used before production lost by German sabo- reduction but here, as elsewhere, very hard to prevent this, whether tage of its mines. This may well the question of whether Germany on Germany’s western borders in Wilson – have involved an element of dou- could not, or would not execute the the Rhineland, or, more particu- ble jeopardy, since Germany was treaty divided Britain from France. larly, in the east, where the new could cause also required to make other repara- Britain tended to see inability, frontiers with Poland were espe- tion coal deliveries to France, but, France a lack of will. cially contentious.23 the next. in general, his record on national

34 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles self-determination was good. As Lloyd George emotive issue of trying other Ger- In an ideal world, he suggested a Welshman he was sympathetic man leaders remained. The ini- to Louis Barthou, the French jus- to the aspirations of small nations, proposed a tial Allied lists named over 3,000 tice minister, America would though he tempered this with care- potential defendants, including the forego its claims on Britain and ful pragmatism. He sought borders major eco- former Chancellor, Bethmann- Europe; Britain would cancel all that would alienate as few people as Hollweg, Admiral von Tirpitz, debts owed by its European allies possible and, by providing minor- nomic and Field Marshal von Hindenburg and, together with France, aban- ity rights for unfortunate popu- and General Ludendorff. Even don its pension claims against Ger- lations finding themselves on the political when this was reduced to 835 men many. France would recoup only wrong side of revised frontiers, he and one woman, Lloyd George, the costs of restoring its devastated hoped to minimise their resent- conference despite his earlier commitment, regions. With typical insouciance ment. Given the constraints under at Genoa in stated that, placed in a parallel situ- Lloyd George admitted Keynes’s which the conference operated, ation, Britain and France would not contention that the pension claim particularly in the east, it is very April 1922. comply. He now advised seeking was fraudulent, stating, ‘If this plan difficult to envisage what different ‘the surrender of the most impor- were adopted, the position would territorial settlement in Europe he The plan tant offenders and let[ting] the rest be that … the claims against Ger- might have negotiated.26 go’. Finally, when Germany tried many would be confined to repa- was charac- forty-five people, none prominent, ration.’ Unfortunately America and the Leipzig court produced refused to participate, ‘If she had,’ War crimes teristic of acquittals or lenient sentences, he he reflected in 1934, ‘… we stood a Articles 227 to 231 of the Treaty, turned a blind eye. With hindsight good chance of clearing up all our the so-called ‘shame clauses’, caused Lloyd George he may have regretted his passion- difficulties – War Debts, Repara- deep offence to Germany. In June ate and enduring belief in prosecut- tions, Armaments …’. Poincaré, 1919 the hastily assembled German both in the ing Germany’s leaders, but these who had replaced Briand as premier government unsuccessfully tried clauses, and the parallel provisions in January 1922, would brook no to make their omission a condi- breath-tak- of the Treaty of Sèvres with the discussion of reparations. When the tion of its signature of the treaty, Ottomans, established an impor- conference met, the two pariahs of whilst later attempts to implement ing scope tant precedent for the post-Second Europe, Germany and the Soviet them threatened the survival of the World War trials in Nuremberg Union, signed a separate treaty at Weimar regime. Although it was of its vision and Tokyo and the establishment, Rapallo which effectively scup- conventional, as in Article 228, to in 2002, of the International Crimi- pered proceedings, even though the indict persons accused of breach- and the inad- nal Court.27 talks continued into May.28 ing ‘the laws and customs of war’, equacy of Faced with the failure of his it became clear that the intention grand plan Lloyd George set Arthur went beyond the prosecution of its detailed Rebuilding Europe Balfour, acting as Foreign Secretary operational crimes, requiring Ger- In his last major initiative to revise during George Curzon’s illness, many to surrender unspecified preparation. the treaties, re-energise the Euro- to explain Britain’s situation to its political and military leaders for pean economies and revive the European debtors. Blaming Amer- trial. Lloyd George was strongly flagging fortunes of his coalition ica for requiring reimbursement committed to this idea, particu- government, Lloyd George pro- from Britain, the note regretted larly where it concerned the for- posed a major economic and politi- seeking repayments from Europe, mer emperor, Wilhelm II. During cal conference at Genoa in April which would be limited to cover- the British election campaign there 1922. The plan was characteristic of ing the American debts. Despite were calls to hang Wilhelm and, Lloyd George both in the breath- serious misgivings from senior col- although Lloyd George did not taking scope of its vision and the leagues, the Balfour Note, which endorse this popular idea, he did inadequacy of its detailed prepara- Lloyd George claimed as his own, privately suggest shooting him, tion. He believed that if Russia was was despatched on 1 August 1922. publicly calling for his indictment opened to world trade and offered Although excellently drafted and to deter future leaders from waging lucrative reconstruction contracts, with obvious political attractions, war. It required all his remarkable this would enable Germany to it was an international disaster. Pil- powers of persuasion to convince prosper and pay reparations to Brit- lorying the Americans left them his Cabinet and international col- ain and France, who could then little room for manoeuvre over the leagues to abandon their strongly repay their American debts. Ger- debts; any reduction in German held objections to trying a head of many’s reconciliation to the new reparations meant French taxpay- state. Article 227 arraigned Wil- order would abate France’s security ers contributing more to discharge helm ‘for a supreme offence against fears, thus relieving Britain of its their British debts; it wrecked any international morality and the most pressing European responsi- slim chance of a successful repara- sanctity of treaties’, to be tried by bilities. Bolshevism would wither tions conference in London that an international criminal court of as Russian prosperity increased month. The implications for Brit- five Allied judges. and Russia could be restored to the ain’s prestige were alarming. Sir Perhaps fortunately for the European comity of nations, fill- Edward Grigg, Lloyd George’s pri- Allies, and certainly for Wilhelm, ing the void left by its absence at vate secretary, was aghast: ‘How the Netherlands, to which he fled, the peace conference. Unemploy- can we demean ourselves so much refused to surrender him – though ment in Britain would fall and the as to range ourselves with the piti- Lloyd George was still pursuing coalition would triumph at the next ful European bankrupts and to this as late as March 1920 – but the election. declare our credit dependent on

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 35 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles theirs?’ Two months later the Tory The key responsibilities for enforcing the was no agreement, just a reluctant rank and file revolted, the coalition treaty was greeted with ambiva- recognition that they were bound collapsed and Lloyd George left question, lence by British ministers. They in a rather sad partnership where office for ever.29 were disappointed to lose a poten- each did just enough to thwart the however, tial partner in moderating the set- other’s policies.33 tlement, but not sorry to see this Lloyd George might have pro- The art of the possible is whether retreat beyond the Atlantic of a moted a stronger Anglo-French Politics, international or domes- rival hegemon.31 relationship, had he chosen to tic, is the art of the possible. Lloyd any adjust- America’s withdrawal high- do so, but he could have had lit- George had to make peace as part lighted the centrality of the Anglo- tle influence on Wilson’s ill-health of two victorious coalitions, whose ments to the French relationship to the new and political ineptitude, the conse- constituents both limited his free- treaty that international order. In Paris Lloyd quences of which caused America dom. He was the most sympathetic George had carefully made his to withdraw from treaty enforce- of the peacemakers to reaching an Lloyd George guarantee offer to France depend- ment. The key question, however, agreement with Russia, even if that ent on America honouring its paris whether any adjustments to the meant dealing with the Bolsheviks, might have allel obligation. When America treaty that Lloyd George might but Clemenceau in Paris, and the reneged, Britain was left with only have made, even had he wished Tory die-hards, abetted by his Lib- made, even a moral commitment, and had to and been able to do so, would eral colleague Winston Churchill decide whether, and on what terms, have substantially altered Ger- at Westminster, precluded any- had he to provide a substitute. The ques- many’s attitude to a settlement that thing but the most tentative of tion divided the British establish- it believed had been imposed by approaches to Lenin and his com- wished and ment. Advocates of a pact suggested trickery and false pretences. Prob- rades. Lloyd George’s later attempts that a greater sense of security ably not: naming £6,000 million to engage with the Bolsheviks pro- been able would encourage French generos- as the reparations bill; allowing duced, despite deep mutual suspi- ity in their treatment of Germany. Germany to retain conscription cion, an Anglo-Soviet trade treaty, to do so, Opponents argued that, confident and a larger army and navy; fur- but his more ambitious plans for of British support, France would be ther minor alterations to the Pol- Genoa were again thwarted by a would have more, not less, intransigent. Most of ish frontier; the retention of the combination of international and the Cabinet were undecided, shar- Saar and a shorter occupation of the domestic reluctance.30 substan- ing Curzon’s sentiment: ‘I earnestly Rhineland; the abandonment of Clemenceau had witnessed two hope’, he wrote in December 1921, the ‘shame clauses’; even the return German invasions of France and tially altered ‘it will not be proposed to give the of some of its colonies, would still was determined to avert a third. Germany’s guarantee for nothing’. Yet, in the mean, in German perceptions, a His policies – the detachment of same paper, he admitted ‘As a result treaty predicated on an unaccepta- the Rhineland and Saar from Ger- attitude of the war there remain only two ble Allied presumption of German many, the over-generous transfer of really great powers in Europe – defeat. Such a premise would be territory to Poland, and the over- to a settle- France and ourselves … a definite fundamental to any treaty negoti- zealous prosecution of minor issues and publicly announced agreement ated in 1919. So, even if he had gone – often clashed with Lloyd George’s ment that between the two countries to stand to Paris again … vision. France was also an impe- by one another in case either were rial competitor, and the settlement it believed attacked would offer a guarantee of Alan Sharp is Emeritus Professor of reflected the need for compromises, peace of the strongest kind.’32 International History at the University not just in Europe but worldwide. had been It is here that Lloyd George of Ulster, where he was previously Head There were the added complica- needed to rethink his policies. An of the School of History and Interna- tions of the aspirations of the Japa- imposed by Anglo-French consensus was essen- tional Affairs and Provost of the Col- nese and the Italians, which were tial to either executing or amend- eraine campus. He has recently edited often at variance with the interests trickery and ing the Versailles settlement. When and contributed to The Makers of the of the other great powers and with they worked together, as at the Spa Modern World (Haus Publishing), Wilson’s philosophy. false pre- conference in June 1920, Germany a 32-volume series on the Paris Peace In Paris Wilson was a consid- complied, but, too often, was able Conference. erable presence, contributing to tences. Prob- to play the victors against each a treaty very different to one that ably not … other. There were various moments 1 Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old the European powers might have when an Anglo-French alliance Diplomacy (John Murray, 1947) p. created. Wilson’s high-minded seemed possible, but both suggested 240. I would like to thank Profes- aspirations made it easy for those that the pact was of greater value sors Tom Fraser, Antony Lentin and seeking hypocrisy to discover it to the other and hence each sought Sally Marks for their comments and in the inevitable compromises the maximum price for its sup- encouragement and the three anon- reached after principles met reali- port. For Britain some points were ymous reviewers for their helpful ties or unshakeable positions, but negotiable – an alliance rather than suggestions. like Clemenceau’s commitment to a unilateral guarantee, the dura- 2 Cecil quoted by Antony Lentin, French security, Italian and Japa- tion of the pact – while others, like Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From nese expansionist ambitions, and the extension of the treaty to cover Versailles to Hitler (Palgrave Macmil- the demands of his Dominion eastern Europe, where the French lan, 2001) p. 69; See also Lentin, ‘The partners, they were facts of Lloyd believed the first German assaults Worm in the Bud: “Appeasement” George’s life. America’s subsequent on the treaty boundaries would at the Peace Conference’ ibid., pp. abnegation of its international occur, were not. In the end there 67–88. John Maynard Keynes, The

36 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘if i had to go to paris again …’ david lloyd george and the revision of the treaty of versailles

Economic Consequences of the Peace ‘George thinks he won the elec- vols. Nouvelles Editions Latines, (2006), pp. 301–21. (Macmillan, 1919). tion. Well, he didn’t. It was the 1947) vol. I, pp. 547–60 and pp. 23 Cmd 2169, p. 79. 3 Alan Sharp, ‘The Versailles Set- Tories that won the election, and 593–600. Marc Trachtenberg, 24 Lentin, Lost Peace p. 6 and pp. tlement: The Start of the Road he will soon begin to find that out.’ Reparation in World Politics: France 47–64. to the Second World War?’ in Diary entry 5.3.19., F. Steven- and European Diplomacy, 1916–1923 25 Sharp, Versailles Settlement pp. Frank McDonough (ed.), The son, Lloyd George: A Diary (ed. (Columbia, 1980) pp. 136–44; 127–31. Origins of the Second World War: A. J. P. Taylor) (Hutchinson, Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War: The 26 Ibid pp. 123–24; Sharp, David An International Perspective (Con- 1971), p.169. See John Vincent Politics, Economics and Diplomacy Lloyd George: Great Britain (Haus, tinuum, 2011), pp. 15–33. On his (ed.), The Crawford Papers: The of Reparations 1918–1923 (Oxford, 2008), pp.112–42. convenient memory see Stella Journals of David Lindsay twenty- 1989), pp. 374–75; Leonard 27 James Willis, Prologue to Nurem- Rudman, Lloyd George and the seventh Earl of Crawford and tenth Gomes, German Reparations, 1919– berg: The Politics and Diplomacy Appeasement of Germany, 1919– Earl of Balcarres 1871–1940 during 1932: A Historical Survey (Palgrave of Punishing War Criminals of the 1945 (Cambridge Scholars Pub- the years 1892 to 1940 (Manches- Macmillan, 2010) pp. 47–71. First World War (Greenwood lishing, 2011) p. 210. ter, 1984), entry for 28.12.18, p. 16 Stephen Schuker, American ‘Repa- Press, 1982); Gary Bass, Stay the 4 For example his war aims 399. Speeches reported in The rations’ to Germany, 1919–1933: Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of speech, 5.12.18; the Fontaineb- Times on 30.11.18 and 12.12.18. Implications for the Third World Debt War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, leau memorandum, 25.3.19; The Treasury suggested Ger- Crisis (Princeton, 1988), p. 46. 2002 ed.); Sharp, Consequences of the British Empire Delegation many could pay £3,000 mil- 17 Sharp, Versailles Settlement pp. Peace. The Versailles Settlement: meetings, 30.5 and 1.6.19; his lion; a committee headed by the 81–105. Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2010 Cannes memorandum 4.1.22; the Australian premier, William 18 Louis Loucheur, diary 14.3.19 (Haus, 2010) pp. 161–69. plans for the 1922 Genoa con- Hughes, estimated, on grounds Carnets secrets de L. Loucheur 28 Conversation 29.4.22 in E.L ference. Kerr to Lloyd George, that its members admitted to be (Brébol, 1962), p. 71. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.), 2.9.20, F/90/1/18, Lloyd George hazy, £24,000 million. Sharp, 19 Kenneth Morgan, Consensus and Documents on British Foreign Papers [LGP] in the Parliamen- The Versailles Settlement: Peace- Disunity: The Lloyd George Coali- Policy, 1919–1939 [DBFP], (First tary Archives, London; Smuts, making after the First World War, tion Government 1918–1922 (Clar- Series, HMSO, 1947 onwards) 24.6.21, at the Imperial Confer- 1918–1923 (Palgrave Macmillan, endon Press, Oxford, 1979), Vol. XIX, p. 625; Stevenson, ence, E6 in CAB 32/2 in The second ed., 2008), p. 86. pp.139–42; Martin Pugh, Lloyd Lloyd George: A Diary 7.4.34, p. National Archive, Kew [TNA]. 10 See the comment by Sally Marks George (Longman, 1988), pp. 266; see Carole Fink, The Genoa 5 David Lloyd George, The Truth that, in such circumstances ‘… 132–34 and p. 138;Trachtenberg, Conference: European Diplomacy, about the Peace Treaties (2 vols. German economic dominance Reparation pp.46–48; Michael 1921–1922 (Syracuse, 1993), and Gollancz, 1938), Vol.1, p. 404; would be tantamount to vic- Fry, And Fortune Fled: David Lloyd Stephen White, The Origins of Papers respecting negotiations for an tory. Reparations would both George, the First Democratic States- Détente: The Genoa Conference and Anglo-French pact 1919–1923 (Cmd deny Germany that victory man, 1916–1922 (Peter Lang, 2011), Soviet-Western Relations, 1921– 2169, HMSO, 1924), p. 79 and and spread the pain of undoing pp. 354–93; Lentin, Lost Peace pp. 1922 (Cambridge, 1985). pp. 90–93; John McEwen (ed.), the damage done.’ in ‘Smoke 39–43; Sharp, ‘Lloyd George and 29 Chamberlain memorandum, The Riddell Diaries 1908–1923 and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Foreign Policy 1918-1922. The 12.5.20 , CP1259 in CAB.24/105 (Athlone Press, 1986), entry Rooms in the Galerie des Glaces’ ‘And yet …’ Factor’ in Judith and discussions in Cabinet 25 30.3.19, p. 263. in Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Loades (ed.), The Life and Times (20), 21.5.20 in CAB 23/21, TNA. 6 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemak- Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser of David Lloyd George (Headstart Lloyd George, The Truth about ers: The Paris Conference of 1919 (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A History, 1991), pp. 129–42; Cabi- Reparations and War Debts (Heine- and Its Attempt to End War (John Reassessment after 75 Years (Cam- net 491B, 26.10.18 in CAB.23/14, mann, 1932), p. 111; Grigg, note, Murray, 2001), p.191. bridge, 1998), p. 338. TNA; BDFA Vol.4, p.111. 6.7.22, LGP F86/2/4; Trachten- 7 ‘There is no demand for a war 11 Sharp, Versailles Settlement pp. 20 Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American berg, Reparation pp. 257–58; Kent indemnity such as that imposed 90–98. Relations at the Paris Peace Confer- Spoils pp. 188–89. on France by Germany in 1871.’ 12 Lloyd George, Peace Treaties ence of 1919 (Princeton, 1961) pp. 30 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Lloyd George, 5.1.18, Lloyd Vol.1, p. 461 and p. 474. 166–75. Relations, 1917–1921: Britain and George, War Memoirs (2 vol. edi- 13 Lentin, Lost Peace pp. 23–46; 21 David Stevenson, ‘Britain, the Russian Civil War, November tion, Odhams, 1938), Vol. 2 p. Keynes wrote to the Sunday France and the Origins of Ger- 1918 – February 1920 (Princeton, 1513; ‘There shall be no … contri- Times 30.10. 38, ‘I can confirm man Disarmament, 1916–1919’, 1968) passim. butions, no punitive damages …’ his claim that he never honestly Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, 31 Fry, And Fortune Fled pp. Wilson, 11.2.18, H. W. V. Tem- believed in the advice given him No. 2 (2006), pp. 195–224; Sharp, 295–348. perley (ed.), A History of the Peace by Lord Cunliffe, Lord Sumner ‘Mission Accomplished? Britain 32 Lentin, ‘Lloyd George, Clem- Conference of Paris (6 vols. Oxford, and Mr Hughes …’. and the Disarmament of Ger- enceau and the elusive Anglo- 1920–1924), Vol.1 p. 437. 14 British Empire Delegation Meet- many, 1918–1923’ in K. Hamilton French guarantee treaty, 1919 “A 8 Minutes, Imperial War Cabinet ings 32, (30.5.19) 33, and 34 (1.6.19) and E. Johnson (eds.) Arms and disastrous episode”’ in Sharp and , 6.11.18, CAB23/44/12 TNA; in Michael Dockrill (ed.), Brit- Disarmament in Diplomacy (Valen- Glyn Stone (eds.), Anglo-French Lloyd George, Peace Treaties Vol.1, ish Documents on Foreign Affairs: tine Mitchell: 2007), pp. 73–90; Relations in the Twentieth Century; p. 490. Lentin, Lost Peace p. 20. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 Fry And Fortune Fled pp. 82–83. Rivalry and Cooperation (Rout- 9 Coalition Unionists won 335 [BDFA] (6 vols., University Press 22 Report, 21.1.21 DBFP, Vol. XVI, ledge, 2000); Curzon Memoran- seats, Lloyd George’s Coalition of America, 1989) Vol. 4, pp. p. 611, n.1; report, 18.12.20, DBFP dum, 28.12.21 DBFP Vol. XVI, Liberals 133. David Butler and 91–116; Cecil quoted by Lentin, Vol.X, p. 487; Andrew Bar- p. 869 and p. 862. Jennie Freeman British Politi- Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George ros, ‘Disarmament as a Weapon: 33 Sharp, ‘Anglo-French Rela- cal Facts 1900–1967 (second ed., and the Pre-History of Appeasement Anglo-French Relations and the tions from Versailles to Locarno, Papermac, 1968), p. 141. Wal- (Methuen, 1985) p.96 Problems of Enforcing German 1919–1925. The quest for secu- ter Long, the Tory First Lord 15 Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Répa- Disarmament, 1919–28’, Journal rity’ in Sharp and Stone, Anglo- of the Admiralty, remarked, rations Allemandes et la France (3 of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, No. 2 French Relations pp. 120–38.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 37 Few studies of Lloyd George have focused on the period after his fall from office in the autumn of 1922, yet he remained very Lloyd George and the active in politics almost until his death in 1945, engaging in fierce Appeasement of Germany, 1922 – 1945 debate on important questions, especially those involving Europe. He himself made clear his intention to remain in the forefront of politics. ‘The burden is off my shoulders’, he declared after being forced to resign, but ‘my sword is in my hand’.1 Although he never returned to high office, at times it seemed possible that he would and, as John Campbell points out in a rare appraisal devoted to some of Lloyd George’s later years, he was still thought – usually with dismay by his successors – to be capable of shaping both public and political opinion.2 Stella Rudman examines the role Lloyd George played in the appeasement of Germany after 1922, and his fascination with Adolf Hitler.

38 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Lloyd George and the Appeasement of Germany, 1922 – 1945

ne particular reason over Lloyd George soon became a and he became more concerned with why Lloyd George’s later determined appeaser of Germany. the state of the British economy Ocareer is worthy of more At the Paris Peace Conference in than with collecting money from attention is his link with the Ver- 1919, while taking a strong line Germany. His wish for Germany to sailles Treaty, whose enforcement on reparations, he argued against return to her pre-war role as chief and revision were at the heart of stripping Germany of territory consumer of British goods and his Britain’s European policy in the and placing ethnic Germans under belief that a more even Franco- inter-war years. The treaty under- foreign rule, which, he believed, German power balance would fos- pinned relations with Germany would be the kind of penalty most ter stability in Europe meant that and fertilised the ground in which likely to make her vengeful. After he wanted to see a German eco- appeasement was to thrive, and as the conference, when Germany nomic revival, which huge repara- one of its co-authors, Lloyd George seemed set to defy the peace settle- tions payments would inhibit. He had the means to speak more ment, there were still times when he now accepted Germany’s argument authoritatively on the subject than argued for harshness, not only on that the amounts being sought were almost anyone in the country. reparations but also on German dis- beyond her capacity. He was prob- As Sir Martin Gilbert has argued, armament. Towards the end of his ably encouraged in this view by the during the inter-war years the word time as Prime Minister, however, Left: growing influence, first on intellec- ‘appeasement’ meant different economic depression and the advent Hitler welcoming tuals and then on the general public things to different people at different to the French premiership of Ray- Lloyd George attitude, of John Maynard Keynes’s times.3 For most of the period, as mond Poincaré – whom he regarded to the Berghof, book, The Economic Consequences of a European policy, appeasement as the archetypal French chauvinist, Berchtesgaden the Peace. The book, published in was taken for granted as being a aiming to establish French hegemon 4 September late 1919, was a highly articulate and good thing. It was accepted as the ony in Europe – inclined him to 1936. To Lloyd stinging attack on the peace set- selfless wish to arbitrate fairly in the become more appeasing, even on George’s left tlement in which Keynes argued interests of all and to remove the reparations. Increasingly suspicious is Joachim von that attempting to extract the huge causes of future wars. Politicians of French ambitions, he became Ribbentrop, sums being demanded from Ger- proclaiming a desire to achieve an more sympathetic to Germany’s sit- Hitler’s roving many would dislocate the Euro- appeasement regarding almost any uation and more complacent about ambassador, pean economic and financial system diplomatic issue – including those her treaty violations. and between and cause Germany’s collapse. For involving Germany – were unlikely After his premiership came to Lloyd George these reasons Lloyd George became to be criticised. By the mid-1930s an end Lloyd George’s advocacy of and Hitler is increasingly insistent that repara- however, with the rise of the Nazis appeasement grew even stronger Professor T. P. tions payments should be seriously and Hitler’s growing stridency, – and more public. By now he Conwell-Evans, reduced. attitudes had begun to turn ardently believed that, despite Ger- secretary of the When, in early 1923, France led negative. Appeasement now seemed many’s continued failures to fulfil Anglo-German an incursion into the industrial to a growing number of people to be the terms of the Peace Treaty, it was Fellowship. Ruhr basin to try to wrest repara- about robbing the weak and friendly in Britain’s interests to stop pester- (Photograph by tions from Germany, Lloyd George to pay the strong and hostile. ing her. He saw British unemploy- kind permission portrayed Germany as the near- ment, which was high and growing, of Llyfrgell innocent victim of French aggres- ~ as the equivalent of the damage Genedlaethol sion and attacked the Conservative done to France by the German Cymru/The government’s policy of ‘benevo- Despite having been ‘the man who army. British trade, he kept repeat- National Library lent neutrality’ as being much too won the war’, once the fighting was ing, was Britain’s ‘devastated area’, of Wales.) benevolent to France. Forgetting

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 39 lloyd george and the appeasement of germany, 1922–1945 his own earlier confrontations with had then quickly retreated into iso- German disarmament. Neverthe- unyielding German leaders at a lation. This, and their failure to join less, once the treaties were finalised – succession of conferences, he now the League of Nations, had added at Locarno in October 1925 – Lloyd spoke of Germany as the embodi- greatly to the difficulties of execut- George emphatically endorsed a ment of co-operation and contri- ing the Versailles Treaty. Their statement by the Foreign Secre- tion, implying that the occupation determination to hold their Euro- tary, Austen Chamberlain, that they was the sole cause of resurgent Ger- pean allies to account on war debts should mark the beginning, not the man militarism: greatly compounded the problem. end, of appeasement. Unhappy that As Lloyd George said, ‘they have the European military balance had The national spirit of Germany the gold of the world locked in their swung heavily against Germany, he which for four years I saw hum- chests, and they are suffering from began calling for speedy progress bled, broken, its great states- indigestion … They have a moral on universal disarmament, without men coming and saying, ‘What responsibility. They helped to cre- which, he insisted, Locarno would would you like us to do?’ – that ate the situation.’6 simply be ‘a slobbering melodrama’. spirit which was humiliated is He did, however, have a spe- He claimed that the Allies, particu- for the first time since the Armi- cial reason for trying to entice larly France, had broken a ‘solemn stice aroused by this action.4 the Americans back into Europe. pledge’ to Germany because they He wanted French influence to be had not disarmed in accordance with He liked to think that the Ruhr diluted in disputes over reparations, the wording of the peace settlement, crisis would never have come about to Germany’s benefit. He hoped which said that Germany’s disarma- if he had still been Prime Minister. that American bankers would agree ment would be the precursor to a He told his friend Lord Riddell, with him that German economic general arms reduction. the proprietor of The News of The recovery was more important to It was a reduction in French World, that ‘he [L.G.] had managed the bigger economic picture than arms that he most wished to see. ‘It to keep the French from going into the restoration of France’s devas- is no use having pacts and securi- the Ruhr; and that if B.L. [Bonar tated areas. To help them to come ties and arbitration’, he declared, Law] had adopted the same tactics, to this view, during a highly suc- ‘as long as nations are building he might have done the same’.5 Yet, cessful tour of North America in submarines to sink our ships, and actually, he had contributed sig- the autumn of 1923, he portrayed aerodromes are being planted on nificantly to the development of French reparations policy as vindic- the shores of the English Channel’.8 the crisis in the first place, as many tive and short-sighted and argued He also championed Germany’s commentators pointed out. At the the German case with gusto. At the demand for the early evacuation of Peace Conference he had greatly end of his visit President Calvin the remaining Allied troops from swelled the reparations account Coolidge declared a willingness for He dismissed the Rhineland, despite warnings by the addition of servicemen’s America to get involved in repara- Austen from the Allied military experts in allowances and war-widows’ and tions negotiations. The British, and Berlin that she was still not com- orphans’ pensions, to boost Brit- even the French, accepted the offer, Chamberlain, plying with the peace treaty’s dis- ain’s share. He had then become and the result was the Dawes Plan, armament clauses and press reports the leading critic of France for try- which – as Lloyd George had hoped whose deep of collaboration on arms manufac- ing to ‘make Germany pay’. He – allowed Germany’s reparations ture between the Soviet and Ger- had alienated France by constantly burden to be greatly reduced. affection man armies. That Germany was sniping at her, by his evasion of an In the second half of the 1920s becoming more demanding despite Anglo-French military alliance Lloyd George’s appeasing tenden- for France recent concessions did not dampen promised at the Peace Conference, cies grew. He was increasingly con- his enthusiasm. His twin desires of and by refusing to consider effec- vinced that France’s European policy and long- conciliating Germany and scupper- tive controls on German finances had created the need for appease- ing French designs strengthened his to secure reparations payments. ment in the first place. In early 1925 standing support for universal disarmament France’s fears for her safety had the Germans, fearing (wrongly) that and his impatience with the British grown as Lloyd George’s sympathy an Anglo-French security pact was suspicions government. Indeed, his criticism with them had declined, and this imminent, produced an alterna- of the government was sharpest had only increased her determi- tive proposal for a Rhineland Pact of German when he thought he detected Brit- nation to prolong her position of in which Germany would honour ish deference to French policy. He superior strength over Germany. her existing western boundaries sincerity dismissed Austen Chamberlain, More immediately, because of and sign arbitration treaties with whose deep affection for France and his strident support for a German Poland and Czechoslovakia. Lloyd made him a long-standing suspicions of Ger- request for a reparations morato- George was very enthusiastic, call- most unsat- man sincerity made him a most rium during 1922, Lloyd George ing it a ‘very remarkable proposal’ unsatisfactory appeaser, as ‘an ele- had encouraged Germany to cry representing ‘an invaluable offer’.7 isfactory gant ditto to Monsieur Briand’.9 poverty and continue to evade her During negotiations for the agree- Whether appeasement was the treaty obligations. ments Britain and France made appeaser, as right policy depended on whether On a more positive note, dur- important concessions to Germany. Germany could be satisfied peace- ing the crisis Lloyd George played For instance, British troops occupy- ‘an elegant fully and harmoniously. From the an active part in luring the United ing the Cologne zone of the Rhine- mid-1920s, despite Locarno, evi- States back into European affairs. land in accordance with the peace ditto to Mon- dence suggested that she could not. The Americans had been a leading treaty were to be withdrawn with- Field Marshal Paul von Hinden- party to the peace settlement, but out waiting for the completion of sieur Briand’. burg, one of the Weimar Republic’s

40 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george and the appeasement of germany, 1922–1945 bitterest enemies, was elected as its The appoint- and repeating his point about the because they helped to fuel Anglo- president in April 1925. Meanwhile, Allies having broken a solemn French rivalry, which made France the composition of the Reich- ment of pledge to her. The treaty stated that all the more determined to stick to stag was growing more extreme, following Germany’s disarmament her guns. and the voices of Republicanism Hitler as Ger- the Allies would reduce their own By 1934 it was known that Ger- more muted. Although Germany’s arms ‘to the lowest point consist- many was rearming, and scepticism appeasement was still generally man Chancel- ent with national safety’; but with about appeasement was growing seen as a noble aspiration in Britain, the Rhineland evacuation most of in Britain. Lloyd George’s tone the level of appeasement that Lloyd lor did not Germany’s neighbours felt that that now changed slightly. He accepted George advocated was becoming a point had already been reached. that Britain should not be reducing dangerous gamble, because it would make Lloyd Neither were they convinced that her defences ‘to a limit where we assist Germany’s rise to domi- George more Germany was as disarmed as Lloyd should be powerless against attacks’, nance in Europe. A dominant Ger- George liked to think. and that Germany’s air force was many was unlikely to be friendly cautious. He When British leaders prevari- a potential danger to Britain. He to those who had gained territory cated and back-tracked on interna- nevertheless argued that there was from her. But would she, at least, be blamed the tional disarmament he rightly took ‘no need for precipitate action’, friendly to Britain, who had helped them to task for their duplicity. Yet because Germany was arming for her regain her strength? Her hos- British gov- he did not criticise their failure to defence and had no heavy guns. tility to the peace settlement and tackle French security, even though Despite admitting that, with the the bad grace with which she usu- ernment’s he must have known that France Nazi government working up a bad ally received its ameliorations, sug- would not consent to a significant press against itself, it was becoming gested that she would see all her old incompe- reduction in her army – or those difficult to put the German case, he adversaries, including Britain, in the of her eastern allies – until she was managed to do it: same light as before. Lloyd George tence and assured that Britain would come to seemed blind to these considera- her aid if attacked. For fourteen years they waited tions, being stubbornly fixed on two French The appointment of Hitler as for a redemption. They had a main themes. One was that France German Chancellor did not make succession of the most pacific should be prevented from domi- intransi- Lloyd George more cautious. He ministers in the world … They nating Europe. The other was that blamed the British government’s entreated the great Powers to Germany had just grievances which gence for ris- incompetence and French intransi- begin redeeming their bond. needed to be addressed. gence for rising German national- They were mocked by a suc- By 1932, although Britain had ing German ism. Although he acknowledged cession of pacts. … meanwhile received little from Germany in nationalism. ‘the abominable treatment of Jews every country except Britain reparations, most Britons shared in Germany’, he was more con- increased its armaments … . Lloyd George’s relief when, at an cerned to stress the ‘abomina- Can you wonder that at last they international conference in Laus- ble treatment of Germany by the were driven into revolution anne, it was agreed that payments Allies’ regarding universal disar- against … the chronic deception could cease provided Germany mament: ‘It is ill provoking a brave of the great countries? paid one final sum. There was also people by the imposition of a fla- general support for disarmament grant wrong … First we drive them He then predicted that soon, despite growing German mili- to frenzy by an injustice and then because of their fear of commu- tarism and the evacuation of the we make that the excuse for not nism, ‘Conservative elements’ in remaining Allied troops from the redressing the wrong. That is not Britain would be ‘welcoming Ger- Rhineland in 1930. What distin- British fair play.’11 many as our friend’.13 This, at least, guished Lloyd George from the Ironically, his strident sup- was a perceptive comment. While majority was his unflagging support for Germany only made her Labourites and Liberals were grad- port for Germany’s standpoint. appeasement more unattainable, ually losing faith in appeasement, With the Nazis gaining ground because it encouraged the German the Conservatives were soon to rapidly in German elections, people to think that they were being embrace it more unequivocally. Churchill was arguing against unfairly treated and that Hitler was Lloyd George’s appeasing stance pressing France, whose defensive right to defy the peace treaty. Hit- was reserved almost exclusively for position had been seriously weak- ler understood this and ensured that Germany. During the mid-1930s ened by the Rhineland evacuation, they were aware of Lloyd George’s he began attacking the govern- to reduce her arms. ‘We must not views. Film clips of speeches in ment for its complacent attitude forget’, he warned, ‘that … the con- which he stated that there could be towards the belligerent adventures tingent of youth arriving at mili- ‘no peace until the pledge to disarm of other dictators. He argued that tary age each year [in Germany] is is redeemed’ were shown in Ger- Britain should take a tough line at the present moment double that man cinemas, and posters quoting against aggression, support its vic- of France.’ A strong French army his sympathetic pronouncements tims, and provide a strong lead in would be ‘a stabilising factor, and appeared on the streets, conclud- the League of Nations. During the one of the strongest, apart from ing with such statements as: ‘Any Abyssinian crisis, although Brit- the general hatred of war.’10 Lead- German is a blackguard who does ish leaders spoke of their commit- ing Labour figures were also los- not demand what an Englishman ment to League principles and of ing sympathy for Germany. Lloyd concedes to be his right’.12 Lloyd standing up to Mussolini, their George, however, was still focusing George’s attacks on France also actions said otherwise; and there on meeting Germany’s demands damaged the appeasement cause, were covert Anglo-French attempts

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 41 lloyd george and the appeasement of germany, 1922–1945 to buy Mussolini off at Abyssinia’s When Hit- to Mussolini – that adds enor- German women and children. Yet expense. Lloyd George rightly mously to the obstacles in the now, ‘we fall on our knees, we bow attacked the government for its ler praised path of a friendly accommoda- our foreheads in the dust, and we say hypocrisy and lack of support for tion of the troubles of Europe. “Heil Hitler”‘.20 Austen Chamber- a fellow-League member, insisting him as ‘one Mussolini is temperamentally an lain and Churchill also prophesied that Britain was ‘under an obliga- aggressor. I have never thought worse to come. But on this crucial tion to enter with other countries of the very that Herr Hitler was … ’17 issue British opinion was generally into a combined effort to prevent in tune with Lloyd George. Both this danger’.14 few people He continued making excuses failed to grasp that Hitler’s coup had When, with Mussolini’s victory, for Hitler’s actions. Even though done enormous damage to Anglo- the government announced that, in England two of the severest treaty provi- French security. The fact that he since Abyssinia no longer existed, today who sions – the Rhineland occupation had not invaded a foreign country, the (belated and ineffective) League and reparations – had been prema- as Mussolini had, obscured the dan- sanctions might as well be lifted, an has shown turely swept away, he maintained gerousness of his action. enraged Lloyd George responded that ‘the harshest conditions of the Six months later Lloyd George with a dazzling speech – which was any real peace treaty had been enforced’, went to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden. described by Churchill as ‘one of while the more equitable provisions He thought that, as Hitler was the greatest Parliamentary perfor- appreciation had been ‘trampled upon’.18 Hence, reputed to hold him in high regard, mances of all time’. He lambasted when German troops marched he could bring an Anglo-German the government for trying to pin of my task’, into the demilitarised zone of the accord a little closer. Conwell- the blame on the League for Mus- Rhineland in early 1936 he was not Evans, an intimate of Ribbentrop, solini’s victory, when it had been a delighted unduly concerned. Like the gov- acted as an intermediary in organ- Britain’s and France’s lack of lead- ernment and the press, he preferred ising the trip, and Thomas Jones, ership and double-dealing that had and emo- to focus on the peace proposals the Deputy Cabinet Secretary – been at fault. He ended by referring that Hitler announced at the same who had been urging Baldwin to to a recent proclamation on Abys- tional Lloyd time. He argued against supporting meet Hitler and had recently done sinia that Neville Chamberlain had France in her bid to expel the Ger- so himself – was also of the party. made. Chamberlain had said: George recip- man troops, and tried to assure MPs During the visit Lloyd George that the situation was very different encountered much talk of ‘the Bol- The choice before us is whether rocated by from that in 1914: shevik menace’ and heard many we shall make a last effort at calling his complaints about Czechoslovakia, Geneva for peace and security or Germany small; Germany with which was, according to Hitler, ‘a whether by a cowardly surrender host ‘the no allies; Germany with France, positive danger on account of her we shall break all the promises Russia, part of Austria against alliance with Russia’. His enthu- we have made, and hold our- greatest Ger- her. The air force that could be siasm to prove his friendship for selves up to the shame of our chil- brought in would overwhelm Germany predominated, leading dren and our children’s children. man of the anything which Germany could him to speak unwisely and indis- produce. That is why when they creetly. When Ribbentrop com- ‘Tonight’, declared Lloyd George age’. offer a twenty-five years’ guaran- plained that the Czech government to a packed and hysterical chamber, tee of security I believe them … was seriously oppressing its Ger- ‘we have had the cowardly surren- man population in the Sudeten- der, and there’, he cried, flinging He would not question who was to land, Lloyd George replied that out an arm to the government front blame for the invasion, he said, as he ‘did not trust Beneš [the Czech bench, ‘are the cowards!’15 As so if this were a matter of dispute. But President] in his sight, let alone out often, Lloyd George had articulated he did not think that ‘France was in of it’. Although he tried to persuade the sentiments of fellow-minded a position to point a finger of scorn Hitler to remain neutral regarding politicians more brilliantly than at Germany on the ground of treaty the Spanish Civil War, which had they could themselves. Govern- breaking’.19 He also objected to the begun two months earlier, and told ment leaders were ‘cowed before his Anglo-French military talks that Ribbentrop that Britain would not onslaught’.16 Britain offered to France in com- join in an anti-Bolshevik front, he When it came to Germany, pensation for refusing to act against was highly critical of a British cabi- however, Lloyd George got things Germany. net minister (Alfred Duff Cooper, hopelessly wrong. He saw Hitler as There were a few cautionary the War Secretary) for having one who, let down by the western voices in Parliament. Sir Edward recently spoken of the urgent need democracies, had been reluctantly Spears reported that on the Conti- for Anglo-French co-operation. He induced to seek friends elsewhere. nent they were saying that, having also sympathised with Hitler over As he wrote to T. P. Conwell- taken the Rhineland and offered the Rhineland invasion; and by Evans, secretary of the Anglo-Ger- twenty-five years of peace, Ger- agreeing that a new Locarno pact, man Fellowship, in late 1937: many would take Austria and offer which the British government was fifty. Next would be Memel and naively hoping for, should be lim- I have never doubted the funda- seventy-five years. We could then ited to the West, he encouraged the mental greatness of Herr Hit- look forward to eternal peace once idea that Britain had little interest ler as a man, even in moments France and England had disap- in Eastern Europe. of profound disagreement with peared. Harold Nicolson recalled When Hitler praised him as his policy … It looks as if the that in 1918 there had been oppo- ‘one of the very few people in Führer has committed himself sition to sending food to starving England today who has shown

42 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george and the appeasement of germany, 1922–1945 any real appreciation of my task’, head of the German Government’.23 us, and ourselves – talked quite a delighted and emotional Lloyd He denounced non-intervention as frankly, brutally if you like George reciprocated by calling ‘a tragic mockery’, rightly accus- … these three great Powers his host ‘the greatest German of ing the government of tacitly sup- together have such a force that the age’. So besotted was he that porting the Nationalists by their there is no-one in Europe that he convinced himself that this strict adherence to it while Italy could stand up against them.28 extreme right-wing nationalist and Germany supported Franco. dictator, leading a party steeped in He also warned of the security risk He appeared to appreciate that a the paraphernalia of militarism and of a Fascist victory, which could Fascist victory, and Britain’s obvi- turning his country into a fight- prevent British naval access to the ous lack of concern for its victims, ing machine, had a repugnance for Mediterranean. had made a European war more war. He told his private secretary, The appointment of Neville likely. Yet he was quite unper- A. J. Sylvester, that Hitler was ‘not Chamberlain as Prime Minister turbed when, in March 1938, Nazi in favour either of rearmament or also contributed to Lloyd George’s troops marched into Vienna and conscription’. He was more inter- change in attitude. The two men overthrew the Austrian govern- ested in ‘roads, agriculture and pro- disliked each other intensely. Dur- ment. It was, he believed, ‘a natural ductive measures generally’.21 ing the Great War Lloyd George had sequence of events’. Even when he On his return home he argued dismissed Chamberlain as Director realised that the so-called Anschluss that Germany was arming purely of National Service. He had then had been a brutal take-over, he for defence: criticised him in his War Memoirs. When Brit- managed to blame Mussolini more This unfriendly treatment rankled than Hitler – for having stood aside The idea of a Germany intimi- with Chamberlain and, once the ish seamen and allowed Hitler to have his way. dating Europe with a threat that tables were turned in the 1930s, he He disapproved of Hitler’s meth- its irresistible army might march made a point of blocking any oppor- began losing ods, but his judgement remained across frontiers forms no part of tunity of Lloyd George’s taking clouded by his belief that Germa- the new vision … the establish- office.24 Chamberlain’s dedication to their lives ny’s ambitions were reasonable. ment of a German hegemony appeasement was in itself a strong He was not so sanguine regard- in Europe, which was the aim incentive for Lloyd George to find off the Span- ing the Czech crisis, however. and dream of the old militarism, fault with it. Although his belief that Czecho- is not even on the horizon of When British seamen began los- ish coast as a slovakia was a mistaken creation, Nazism.22 ing their lives off the Spanish coast coupled with his low opinion of as a result of Italian and German result of Ital- Beneš, caused him to sympathise Soon, however, Hitler’s involvement attacks, Chamberlain’s govern- with the Sudetenlanders – as Ger- in the Spanish Civil War was giv- ment did next to nothing about it. ian and Ger- man minorities living under for- ing him cause for second thoughts. Lloyd George was disgusted. The man attacks, eign sovereignty – on the eve of the Once he realised that Hitler had Cabinet were ‘behaving like a bevy Munich conference he wrote to the no intention of remaining neutral, of maiden aunts who have fallen Chamber- South Wales Liberal Federation: despite having entered into a non- among buccaneers’.25 The govern- intervention agreement with Brit- ment’s ‘twittering little protests’ lain’s gov- We can hardly abandon the ain and France, the scales appeared were becoming ‘the joke of the Czechs, who acted upon our to fall from his eyes. Although he world’. 26 ernment did counsel – not without dishon- still regarded Mussolini, who gave He even started expressing sym- our to ourselves … If war is to the greatest support to Franco, as pathy for France. This was surely next to noth- be avoided, what is required is trouble-maker-in-chief, in a rare evidence of a shift in perspective! a clear statement by the British moment of humility he admitted in Whereas Britain leant towards ing about it. Government that the Czechs Parliament that he might have been Franco, France favoured the Spanish have, in their opinion, gone to wrong about Hitler: government, for whom non-inter- Lloyd George the limit of reasonable conces- vention was seriously detrimental. ‘I sion … and that if there is any … when I was Prime Minister, am sorry for the position that France was dis- attempt to crush the Czech and afterwards when I was a has been put into’, he declared. Republic by force the British private member of this House, ‘France with her noble tradition of gusted. The Government would side with I always pleaded for fair treat- always going to the help of nations France and other countries to ment for Germany … But I am fighting for liberty, for right and for Cabinet were resist aggression.29 bound to say that the difficulties independence. The French people which used to come from France have made great sacrifices for that. ‘behaving He had not abandoned appease- in the way of any scheme which No country in Europe has made like a bevy ment – only what he regarded as appeared to promise appease- greater’. 27 This rare tribute was Chamberlain’s ‘cringing’ kind ment, which gave justice and fair made as if from one who had been of maiden – but he was now worried about treatment to Germany – those an unequivocal champion of France Britain’s weakening position rela- difficulties now are made by all along. Having denounced her for aunts who tive to Germany’s, and saw that it Germany herself. forging a mutual assistance pact with should only be tried from a posi- Russia in 1936, he now talked about have fallen tion of superior strength, which There was ‘a lack of straightfor- joining forces with them both: meant forming an alliance with wardness in the whole business’, he among France and Russia – which Stalin conceded, which ‘I frankly would If the great Powers – France was soon to offer. This had the sup- not have expected from the present and Russia that are acting with buccaneers’. port of Liberal and Labour leaders,

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 43 lloyd george and the appeasement of germany, 1922–1945 but the Conservatives were, with a sceptical: ‘So far, we do not seem Winston is bust’, again implying a few exceptions, unsurprisingly the to have done anything on land or wish to step in and settle with Hit- most reluctant to embrace commu- in the air except scatter a few mil- ler when all else failed.39 nist Russia. Knowing Chamber- lion unconvincing tracts on Ger- On 7 May 1941 when Lloyd lain was averse to cooperation with man soil’.34 Once Russia invaded George bemoaned government Stalin, Lloyd George, who had Poland he began to think the war ‘blunders’ in parliament, Churchill long favoured dealing positively was unwinnable, and his attitude likened his attitude to that of Mar- with Soviet Russia, now began a changed dramatically. He started shal Pétain.40 Yet, it must be said vigorous pro-Russian campaign. denigrating Polish leaders and talk- that, although talking pessimisti- Russia had the world’s strongest ing about making peace with Hitler cally, Lloyd George was still argu- army, he argued, and the only one – ‘if only for the purposes of gaining that Britain should be fighting that could get to Poland, which ing time’. He reverted to his ear- much more aggressively. ‘Here we everyone knew Hitler had in his lier view of Hitler as a reasonable are in the fourth year of war’, he sights. When, in parliament, an MP man and even talked of a further said at the beginning of 1943, ‘and reminded him of Stalin’s purge of revision of the Versailles Treaty, we have hardly tackled our main officers he merely replied: ‘It’s news including ‘the very important ques- enemy, Germany, at all’. Later, he to me that getting rid of Generals tion of the colonies’. ‘You have accused the government, quite rea- is always a bad thing for an army’.30 to settle all the problems that are sonably, of delaying an invasion of Two months later, with no sign menacing the peace of the world, Europe, leaving Russia to do most of a rapprochement he declared: including the claims of Italy’, he of the fighting. He only admitted ‘The supreme diplomatic imbecil- said.35 Most MPs disagreed. So did feeling confident of victory when ity of snubbing Russia ought to be Chamberlain. he heard about the D-Day landings repaired without loss of time. The Lloyd George did, however, on 6 June 1944. By then he had been peril is great and it is imminent.’31 also continue to argue for a more diagnosed as suffering from cancer. When German troops marched active war strategy. ‘Why aren’t we He died on 26 March 1945. into Bohemia in March 1939, Hit- attacking?’ he kept asking. ‘Ger- ler’s claim that he wished only to many is producing far more arms ~ recover what was legitimately Ger- than we. Delay only widens the Once Rus- many’s was exposed as a lie. With gap’.36 This was a perfectly rea- During the inter-war period the public opinion having already sonable criticism. Having given a sia invaded merits of pursuing an appease- turned against appeasement, Cham- guarantee to Poland, Britain had ment strategy changed with the berlain announced a guarantee to declared war on Germany, but had Poland he ever-changing circumstances. Poland. Lloyd George thought this then done little else. In the early years, with the Kai- madness without first securing sup- By May 1940 growing dis- began to ser’s militarist regime having been port from Russia, especially as no satisfaction with Chamberlain’s think the war replaced by a democratic republic, obvious preparations were being leadership led to rumours that there were good reasons for helping made to honour it. He now urged Lloyd George might succeed him, was unwin- Germany, whose fighting capac- the government to introduce con- although he himself hinted that ity had been greatly reduced, to scription.32 Although Chamberlain he wished to wait until the peril nable, and thrive and demonstrate a commit- eventually agreed to negotiations grew, presumably thinking he ment to peace. The appeasement with Russia it was clear he did could step in to salvage something his attitude of later years was another matter. not want them to succeed. Lloyd after the government had failed. By the time Hitler had started to George was rightly incensed: In Parliament on 8 May Chamber- changed dra- rearm and take the law into his own lain appealed for sacrifice. Lloyd hands, appeasement had become Mr Chamberlain negotiated George responded: ‘I say solemnly matically. He a dangerous gamble. It had also directly with Hitler. He went that the Prime Minister should give become immoral because, once rep- to Germany to see him. He and an example of sacrifice, because started deni- aration claims were dropped, there Lord Halifax … went to Rome, there is nothing which can contrib- were few concessions that Britain drank Mussolini’s health, shook ute more to victory than that he grating Pol- could make that were not at the his hand, and told him what a should sacrifice the seals of office’.37 expense of others. Lloyd George fine fellow he was. But whom Two days later Chamberlain was ish leaders paid little attention to these facts. have they sent to Russia? … a replaced by Churchill. Martin Pugh argues that, clerk in the Foreign Office … It Relieved, Lloyd George and talking because of his visit to Hitler in 1936, was an insult.33 appeared to shake off his defeat- Lloyd George has been ‘somewhat ism – but not for long. He was about mak- misrepresented’, and that he was ‘a When negotiations broke down in soon talking of returning Ger- ing peace resolute opponent of fascism and mid-August the Russians signed many’s colonies.38 Peeved because appeasement’.41 This is not true. a non-aggression pact with Ger- his advice was not sought, he even with Hitler He was certainly a strong oppo- many. Germany attacked Poland began grumbling about Churchill’s nent of Mussolini and Franco, but on 1 September, and two days later leadership. Churchill, it seemed, – ‘if only for he continued to favour Germany’s Britain was at war. preferred to surround himself with appeasement even after Hitler’s At first Lloyd George was opti- ‘duds and mutts’ rather than ‘men the purposes rise. After the Great War he quickly mistic. He pinned his hopes on with understanding minds’ like adopted – and never really aban- Poland holding out until help himself. When eventually Church- of gaining doned – the view that Germany arrived. He expected the help to be ill offered him a Cabinet post, he had justifiable grievances which forthcoming, but he soon became said he preferred to ‘wait until time’. partly excused her behaviour,

44 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george and the appeasement of germany, 1922–1945 blaming Britain and France for the While under- French, who were simply terrified 16 Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George: A rise of Nazism. Although he hard- of a resurgent Germany, as aggres- Diary (London: Hutchinson, 1971), ened towards Germany during the estimating sive and militaristic. It is possible p. 324. Spanish Civil War and later cham- that this was less the result of objec- 17 Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd pioned an anti-German alliance Germany’s tive miscalculations – Lloyd George George Papers, LG/G/6/14/3, 27 with Russia, he failed to appreciate knew the facts and figures as well December 1937. the enormous damage to Anglo- inherent as anyone – than the workings of a 18 HC Debates, 5, vol. 304, col. 558, 11 French security inflicted by the troubled mind. A. J. P. Taylor actu- July 1935. Rhineland coup and the Anschluss. strengths ally argues that guilty conscience 19 HC Debates, 5, vol. 309, cols 2034– It was only after Munich that he and expan- was the main reason for appease- 36, 10 March 1936. really began to lament Britain’s ment’s appeal in the inter-war 20 HC Debates, 5, vol. 310, cols 1469– weakening strategic position rela- sionist drive, years.44 Lloyd George’s brother Wil- 71, 1508–10, 26 March 1936. tive to Germany’s. While he was liam was convinced that the slaugh- 21 A. J. Sylvester, The Real Lloyd George prejudiced against France – because Lloyd George ter of the Great War – followed by (London: Cassell, 1947), pp. 202–03. he thought she was wrong about the unsatisfactory peace – had a deep 22 Daily Express, 17 September 1936, p. 12. Germany – he admired Hitler’s portrayed the effect on Lloyd George, who clearly 23 HC Debates, 5, vol. 325, cols 1592–93, ‘guts’ and was eager to excuse Ger- came to believe that Britain, if not 25 June 1937. man transgressions. This meant French, who he himself, had cause to feel guilty 24 Antony Lentin, Lloyd George and the that he tended to overlook the dam- about Germany.45 His misconcep- Lost Peace (Basingstoke, Palgrave, age done to Anglo-French security were simply tions regarding France and Ger- 2001), p. 108. by Hitler’s early adventures. Once many seem to reflect a subconscious 25 HC Debates, 5, vol. 337, cols 1010–11, the Second World War began, these terrified of wish to tip the scales in Germany’s 21 June 1938. traits led him to underestimate favour in an attempt to atone for 26 The Times, ‘Cringing Before Dicta- what others envisaged would be the a resurgent what he came to see as the injustices tors’, 7 June 1938, p. 14. disastrous consequences of a Nazi- inflicted on Germany after the war. 27 HC Debates, 5, vol. 337, col. 1015. dominated Europe. Even in 1940 he Germany, 28 HC Debates, 5, vol. 325, col. 1599, 25 was talking of appeasing Hitler. On Stella Rudman recently obtained a PhD June 1937. 13 March he told Benjamin Sum- as aggres- in history at the Open University. She 29 The Times, ‘Mr Lloyd George on the ner Welles, Roosevelt’s emissary, is the author of Lloyd George and the Crisis’, 28 September 1938, p. 7. that there was no reason ‘why Ger- sive and Appeasement of Germany, 1919– 30 HC Debates, 5, vol. 341, cols 170–73, many should not unite under one militaristic. 1945 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cam- 178–80, 9 November 1938. government the Germanic peoples bridge Scholars Publishing, 2011). 31 The Times, 20 January 1939, p. 13. of Central Europe, or why Ger- 32 HC Debates, 5, vol. 345, cols 2505–11, many should not obtain and enjoy 1 The Times, ‘Mr. Lloyd George’s Cam- 3 April 1939. a special economic position in Cen- paign’, 21 October 1922, p. 12. 33 The Times, ‘Negotiations with Rus- tral Europe, and at least in part, in 2 John Campbell, The Goat in the Wil- sia’, 31 July 1939, p. 6. South-eastern Europe’.42 derness, 1922–1931 (London: Jonathan 34 Sunday Express, ‘No Surrender Then there is the view that Lloyd Cape 1977), p. 3. Poland’, 17 September 1939. George was an appeaser in the inter- 3 Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appease- 35 HC Debates, 5, vol. 351, cols 1870–71, war years, but that this stemmed ment (London: Weidenfeld & Nicol- 1874, 3 October 1939. ‘partly out of a strong fear of com- son, 1966), pp. xi, 186–87. 36 Robert Boothby, I Fight to Live (Lon- munism as a greater danger’.43 This 4 House of Commons Debates, Series don: Gollancz, 1947), pp. 195–97. is not true either. When he warned, 5, vol. 160, col. 702, 19 February 1923. 37 HC Debates, 5, vol. 360, cols 1280– in 1934, that British Conservatives 5 Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of the Peace 83, 8 May 1939. would soon look to Germany as a Conference (London: Gollancz, 1933), 38 A. J. Sylvester, Life with Lloyd George: bulwark against communism, this p. 403. The Diary of A. J. Sylvester, 1931–45, was not a reflection of his own fears. 6 HC Debates, 5, vol. 160, col. 705, 19 ed. by Colin Cross (London: Mac- He did, after all, argue strongly for February 1923. millan, 1975), p. 263. an Anglo-Soviet alliance. 7 HC Debates, 5, vol. 185, cols 1585-86, 39 Sylvester, Life with Lloyd George, pp. Like other appeasers at the time, 24 June 1925. 268, 281. Lloyd George was preoccupied with 8 HC Debates, 5, vol. 188, col. 420, 25 40 HC Debates, 5, vol. 371, col. 929. Germany and her grievances. This November 1925. 41 Martin Pugh, ‘The Liberal Party and led to a tendency to diminish the 9 Thomas Jones, Lloyd George (London: the Popular Front’, English Historical fears and claims of smaller nations Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 227. Review, 121 (December 2006), p. 1332, such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia 10 HC Debates, 5, vol. 254, cols 963–64, note 24. and Poland, and to see France as a 29 June 1931. 42 Kenneth O. Morgan, The Age of Lloyd nuisance who provoked Germany 11 The Times, ‘Germany and the Crisis’, George (London: Allen & Unwin, by her unreasonable determination 17 May 1933, p. 9. 1971), pp. 222–24. to enforce the peace settlement. This 12 The Times, ‘Nazis and Mr Lloyd 43 Richard S. Grayson, Liberals, Interna- view was, however, largely based on George’, 1 November 1933, p. 12. tional Relations and Appeasement (Lon- an error of judgement about the rela- 13 HC Debates, 5, vol. 295, cols 906, don: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 114. tive potential power and military 910–12, 917–20, 28 November 1934. 44 A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914–1939 ambitions of France and Germany. 14 HC Debates, 5, vol. 304, cols 517–20, (Oxford University Press), 1975, p. 417. While underestimating Germany’s 11 July 1935. 45 William George, My Brother and I inherent strengths and expansionist 15 HC Debates, 5, vol. 313, cols 1223, (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1958), pp. drive, Lloyd George portrayed the 1230–32, 18 June 1936. 245–46, 273–75.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 45 When Winston Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons as Prime Minister of ‘We Can Conquer Unemployment’ the wartime coalition government, paid his well-wrought tribute on Lloyd George’s death in March 1945, he did not simply hail a fellow war Lloyd George and Keynes leader. Instead he singled out the significance of his old colleague’s career in opening up a social and economic dimension for Liberal politics. ‘The stamps we lick, the roads we travel, the system of progressive taxation, the principal remedies that have so far been used against unemployment – all these to a very great extent were part not only of the mission but of the actual achievement of Lloyd George,’ so it was claimed. And claimed with good reason. It is natural, then, that Lloyd George’s name should be linked with an agenda for twentieth-century politics that we now customarily describe as ‘Keynesian’. Peter Clarke examines the relationship between David Lloyd George and John Maynard Keynes.

46 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘We Can Conquer Unemployment’ Lloyd George and Keynes

he linkage between Lloyd to the Ministry of Munitions. put it, ‘had no aesthetic sense for Georges and Keynes- Instead, Keynes’s rise to a position the formalisms, and no feelings Tian ideas was never more of influence within the Treasury for its institutional aspects’. 2 Lloyd important than in the Liberal cam- came under Reginald McKenna, George was simply not a man to paign promising to ‘conquer unem- like himself a Liberal who naturally be put down by what he saw as the ployment’ in the general election of gravitated towards Asquith. McK- condescension of an alien elite. 1929: an episode in Lloyd George’s enna upheld the traditional Treas- In 1915–16 the Treasury was later career that is clearly worth ury orthodoxies, established in inevitably at the heart of an intense closer examination. ‘His long life Gladstone’s day: balanced budgets, conflict over what sort of war to was, almost from the beginning to free trade, the Gold Standard and as fight, how to fight it, and how to almost the end, spent in political little interference as possible in the pay for it. In a total war, as Keynes strife and controversy’, Churchill market. Moreover, he had no more was later to argue from a position of went on to acknowledge in his obit- ardent supporter than Keynes, at great influence during the Second uary speech. ‘He aroused intense and the time more of a Treasury insider World War, the whole resources sometimes needless antagonisms.’1 than he always cared to admit. of the nation could and should be Here, too, the general comment has The young man’s wartime cap- mobilised towards a single end. a particular pertinence to the com- tivation by the atmosphere of the After 1940, he thus helped redefine plex relationship that developed, Treasury was as much cultural as it the question of how to pay for the over the course of a couple of dec- was purely intellectual. He reacted war within a command economy ades, between David Lloyd George with the sensibility of a connoisseur that temporarily departed from the and John Maynard Keynes. to his surroundings. He regarded norms of peacetime finance. Cur- It was indeed political contro- the traditional Treasury ethos rency controls became an integral versy that first linked their names with some awe and quickly devel- part of this system. in the popular consciousness. The oped an appreciation of its aus- But in the First World War, as publication at the end of 1919 of tere charms. ‘Things could only he saw in retrospect, exchange con- Keynes’s polemical tract, The Eco- be done in a certain way, and that trol ‘was so much against the spirit nomic Consequences of the Peace, made made a great many things impossi- of the age that I doubt if it ever its author a public figure. Still ble, which was the object aimed at’, occurred to any of us that it was under forty, he emerged at a bound he wrote after the war. ‘And sup- possible’. The Gold Standard set from his academic background as ported by these various elements, it ‘the rules of the game’ for a fixed an economist at Cambridge into the became an institution which came exchange rate, and the Treasury spotlight of international political to possess attributes of institutions unblinkingly supported the Bank attention, and was determined to like a college or City company, or of England’s commitment to back stay there. A crucial transition, of the Church of England.’ Passages it. ‘They had been brought up’, course, was his wartime service as a like this remind us that, although Keynes wrote, as though admiring civil servant in the Treasury, a role Keynes’s family background was officers who dutifully went over the which, at the end of the war, pro- rooted in nonconformity, he was top in the trenches, ‘in the doctrine vided his ticket for a front-row seat himself the product of a privileged that in a run one must pay out one’s at the peace conference in Paris. education at Eton and King’s Col- gold reserve to the last bean.’3 So Keynes had joined the Treasury lege, Cambridge, where he had Britain did not formally go off gold in January 1915. His initial appoint- Left: become a Fellow, imbued with until 1919 and meanwhile clung ment was at a junior level, while Cover of We what could be called ingrained to a sort of shadow Gold Stand- Lloyd George was still Chancel- Can Conquer common-room loyalties. Little ard, financing its military effort by lor of the Exchequer; but there had Unemployment, wonder that Lloyd George, with his loans from the United States within been little significant interaction the booklet totally different Welsh background, the parameters of market impera- between them in the months before published by felt so little affinity – social, aca- tives. This meant satisfying Wall the formation of the First Coalition Lloyd George in demic, traditional or whatever Street that all the bills could be met in May, which took Lloyd George March 1929. – for this milieu, and, as Keynes on the due dates.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 47 ‘we can conquer unemployment’: lloyd george and keynes

McKenna sternly defended this As one old- on the politics. What he subse- it ‘harder to de-bamboozle this old view, which Lloyd George derided quently wrote distilled his views on Presbyterian than it had been to at the time and later mocked in his fashioned both. As his book’s title sufficiently bamboozle him’ over the previous War Memoirs. His account there of proclaimed, it was the economic con- long weeks of the conference.5 the arguments in the autumn of 1915 Liberal put sequences of imposing heavy repa- These were phrases with a deadly identifies Keynes as ‘more alarm- rations on Germany that primarily sting. They were often repeated and ing and much more jargonish’ than it, Lloyd concerned him. As an economist, long remembered by readers who even the Permanent Secretary to he could see that making Germany never struggled through the sev- the Treasury, the austere Sir John George’s will- responsible for the costs of the war enty-page chapter on reparations. Bradbury. Their case, that it was was easier said than done. For this And in the book’s indictment of only just possible to struggle on ingness to was not just a financial transac- the iniquity and folly of the treaty, until the end of the financial year, 31 rethink party tion, still less a simple question of Wilson could be seen as victim as March 1916, did not impress Lloyd shaking the money out of German much as perpetrator, Clemenceau George as Minister of Munitions, policies had pockets, or squeezing the Germans could likewise be largely excused nor subsequently as Prime Minis- till the pips squeaked, or finding as a loveable rogue from Central ter. In his War Memoirs, he invoked ‘undoubtedly some stash of German gold that Casting, but Lloyd George was Churchill’s satirical rendering of the could handily be shipped to the revealed as the truly culpable fig- Treasury position: ‘Put the British interested, Allies. In all the subsequent contro- ure. All this, of course, played to the Empire at one end of the scale and versies about Versailles, although stereotypes of the progressive left the 31st of March at the other, and occupied, there have always been some writ- in Britain, whether Asquithian or the latter would win every time’, ers who stoutly maintain that Ger- Labour, equally susceptible to this he jested. ‘That was Mr McKenna’s propitiated many had a greater capacity to pay nicely updated dose of Gladstonian view.’ Naturally Lloyd George felt than the tender-minded Keynes moralising. Keynes’s rise to fame vindicated when ‘the hour of indi- – dare I add, alleged, the central thrust of his thus came at the expense of a Prime cated doom struck’ in 1916 and original case has never been suc- Minister whose own wickedness the British economy survived.4 bamboozled? cessfully refuted. For this was that had naturally led him into coalition Though McKenna faced politi- the rhetoric of ‘making Germany with the Conservatives. In blight- cal exile in December 1916, once – a large pay’ lacked a grasp of the processes ing relations between them, all that the Second Coalition was formed of the real economy, in which all was lacking – for the time being under Lloyd George, Keynes stayed number of transfers are ultimately made in the – was the publication of Keynes’s at the Treasury, as gloomy as ever form of flows of goods and services, draft of an even more biting per- in his forecasts. On 31 March 1917, able Liber- not merely through the book-keep- sonal sketch of Lloyd George, omit- the hour of doom struck again, and als who liked ing of financial transactions. ted from The Economic Consequences Britain again survived (this time It was not the exposition of this in 1919 on the prudent advice of the with the aid of the German U-boat neither his economic logic, however, that made author’s mother. campaign that brought the United The Economic Consequences into a True, the sequel that Keynes States into the war). record nor his bestseller on both sides of the Atlan- published in 1922, A Revision of the To Keynes, this seemed like tic. Instead, it was the human inter- Treaty, tartly acknowledged that sheer uncovenanted good luck. He ways.’ est of its third chapter, which, in the ‘revisionists’ now included the continued to think that his own fewer than twenty pages, depicted British Prime Minister. ‘The deeper caution had been justified at the the machinations of the Big Four at and the fouler the bogs into which time. His view of Lloyd George the Paris conference. And whatever Mr Lloyd George leads us, the more was inevitably coloured by the the reaction in France to Keynes’s credit is his for getting us out.’6 This Treasury spectacles through which half-admiring aphorisms about the background helps in understand- he had looked at such issues, defin- world-weary cynicism of Clem- ing some of the difficulties that ing them rather narrowly as those enceau, or the offence created in the beset later dealings between Lloyd in which canons of financial pru- United States by the author’s feline George and Keynes. It is the rea- dence should prevail – the strain of characterisation of Woodrow Wil- son why there were so many raised small-c conservatism in Keynes’s son as a naïve Presbyterian preacher, eyebrows when the two men joined complex make-up. Personally he the main impact on British pub- forces in the mid-1920s in making got on surprisingly well with the lic opinion came through what the unemployment into a salient politi- two Unionists who subsequently book said about Lloyd George’s role. cal issue. To partisan contemporar- served as Chancellor under Lloyd It suggested that ‘the poor Presi- ies, we must remember, it seemed George: first Bonar Law and later dent would be playing blind man’s remarkable that the author of The Austen Chamberlain. Keynes thus buff in that party. Never could a Economic Consequences should now went to Paris in January 1919 as man have stepped into the parlour a indulge in his own peacemaking Chamberlain’s principal assistant, more perfect and predestined victim with a man whom he had recently and was himself to resign in June – to the finished accomplishments of excoriated. As one old-fashioned and in disillusionment. the Prime Minister.’ With mordant Liberal put it, Lloyd George’s will- disdain, Keynes thus went on to ingness to rethink party policies had attribute the puncturing of Wilson’s ‘undoubtedly interested, occupied, Bamboozled? idealistic New World innocence to propitiated – dare I add, bamboo- Keynes’s time in Paris had given the Old World wiles that ensnared zled? – a large number of able Lib- him a privileged vantage point on him. So that in the end, when Lloyd erals who liked neither his record the process of peace-making: on George made a belated pitch for ‘all nor his ways.’7 So there were some the economics, of course, but also the moderation he dared’, he found sharp questions that Keynes could

48 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘we can conquer unemployment’: lloyd george and keynes not avoid during the 1929 general Exchequer might find a role for the that were in some respects inco- election campaign. ‘The difference Sinking Fund in ‘replacing unpro- herent. As with Roosevelt in the between me and some other people,’ ductive debt by productive debt’.9 mid-1930s, so with Lloyd George in he responded, ‘is that I oppose Mr As Keynes quickly recognised, such the mid-1920s, Keynes was equally Lloyd George when he is wrong and talk excited alarm among believers ready to take a cue from a politi- support him when he is right.’8 in the traditional axioms of sound cal leader whose extraordinary public finance – so this time he had powers he recognised. It was the the moral force of the Gladstonian benign aspect of the non-rational ‘A drastic remedy for tradition against him. gifts, already reluctantly acknowl- unemployment’ Keynes retreated on this par- edged in the portrait printed in This personal détente was a sig- ticular issue but failed to clarify The Economic Consequences, which nificant development, not only in exactly what he proposed. Since had observed ‘the British Prime giving Lloyd George momentum he was usually such a master of Minister watching the company, in his leadership of a reunited Lib- lucid exposition, the best explana- with six or seven senses not avail- eral Party but in prompting Keynes tion is that he was not really quite able to ordinary men’.11 Keynes was to formulate his economic ideas. sure himself – or not yet sure. As himself never a prisoner to formal There have been many attempts to an economist, it should be remem- logic, instead prizing intuition and explain Keynes’s own sudden con- bered, he was still writing with creativity in his own trade of eco- cern with the problem of unem- a strong sense of his intellectual nomics, and a fortiori in the field of ployment at this juncture. It has inheritance from the great Alfred politics. often seemed intellectually plau- Marshall. In the Marshallian sys- Chancing his arm in 1924, sible to point to his opposition to tem, there were certainly many Keynes already outlined an Britain’s return to the Gold Stand- allowances for imperfections in approach to policy-making that ard in April 1925, since the effect of the workings of the economy, but retains its cogency. Admittedly, we an over-priced pound was indeed its tendency towards an equilib- can find loose ends and inconsist- to make British exports (like coal) rium, with full employment of all encies in the economic detail. But too expensive abroad, thus mak- factors of production, was a basic we also find propositions that were ing workers in the export trade assumption. to become central to his agenda, (like miners) unemployed. Keynes It was in A Tract on Monetary not only in economic policy but in repeatedly made such links him- Reform (1923) that Keynes had theory too. He had not yet come self – but only subsequently. For the uttered one of his most famous up with a formal analysis that we fact is that it was not in 1925, but phrases, endlessly repeated and would recognise as Keynesian in instead fully a year before the return misrepresented ever since. Yes, he the sense of his General Theory, not to gold, that Keynes first broached conceded, there were indeed self- published until 1936. Instead, we his characteristic arguments about righting forces in the economy, see his policy hunches outrunning the need for an economic stimulus. provided that market forces were his theoretical thinking, leading He did it in an article in the Liberal allowed free play – and allowed As with him to conclusions that he could weekly paper, the Nation, under the also enough time to do their job. only later justify with the requisite title: ‘Does unemployment need ‘But this long run is a misleading Roosevelt academic rigour. drastic remedy?’ He was prompted guide to current affairs’, Keynes We can see this in his 1924 to do so, moreover, in response to suggested. ‘In the long run we are in the mid- response to Lloyd George, urging an initiative by Lloyd George in all dead.’10 The moral is, of course, the ‘drastic remedy’. What is central April 1924, thus inaugurating their not that (irresponsible) short-term 1930s, so with to Keynes’s approach is ‘the princi- period of cooperation. policies should prevail but that the ple that prosperity is cumulative’, and Why, then, had Keynes decided true irresponsibility is to abstain, Lloyd George he reiterates it as the merest com- in 1924 that Lloyd George was on doctrinal grounds, from reme- mon sense. ‘There are many exam- now on the right track? It was not dial action that can do good. In in the mid- ples of cumulative prosperity, both because either of them, at the time, principle, Keynes thus declared in recent and in earlier experience,’ had worked out detailed proposals himself a pragmatist, refusing to 1920s, Keynes he says, citing alike the nineteenth- for job creation. Nor was it because rule out government intervention century British railway expansion of any sudden surge in the level of where the case could be made for its was equally and the French post-war recon- British unemployment. This was social benefits. Yet at this point, as struction programme and the cur- actually falling rather than rising at regards unemployment, he was not ready to take rent American boom in the motor the time, though it was admittedly in a position to offer Lloyd George industry. The problem is thus to stuck around 10 per cent of the reg- either practical blueprints or theo- a cue from supply the initial impetus. ‘We have istered labour force, as compared retical cover for the ‘drastic rem- a political stuck in a rut’, he says. ‘We need with a norm of about half that edy’ that each considered necessary. an impulse, a jolt, an acceleration.’ before the war. Yet both men now Theirs was essentially a temper- leader whose Now we should not jog Keynes’s agreed that unemployment needed amental affinity in favour of action, elbow by supplying his later theo- ‘a drastic remedy’, even though rather than timid quietism or doc- extraordi- retical concept of the ‘multiplier’ they were floundering when they trinaire inertia. Like Franklin to define and specify the dynamic tried to say exactly what this might Roosevelt when he later launched nary pow- effects; but the line of thinking is comprise, as Keynes’s own contri- his ‘New Deal’, an instinctive belief suggestive in a pragmatic vein. It is bution to the discussion revealed. that there was nothing to fear but ers he thus common sense to see that there In particular he got into trouble for fear itself can be seen as the defin- are ‘stimulating medicines which hinting that the Chancellor of the ing political ingredient in policies recognised. are wholesome’, and to recognise

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 49 ‘we can conquer unemployment’: lloyd george and keynes that ‘there is no way in the world of chiefly for his ground-breaking This is the econometric answer. achieving these better alternatives studies of poverty. Keynes wrote But another sort of answer is more but by confidence and courage in none of it himself but offered imme- relative, more disputable, more those who set enterprise in motion.’ diate polemical support in March contentious, more temperamental, Public investment, in short, 1929, contesting the ‘Treasury and more political than simply eco- must come to the rescue when View’ that no large-scale stimulus of nomic. If as many as 600,000 new the market fails to do so. Keynes the economy was possible. In May, jobs proved impossible, how about accordingly proposes that the three weeks before polling day, 400,000 or so? Supposing Lloyd Treasury should promote expendi- Keynes and his colleague Hubert George was more than half right ture of the order of £100 million a Henderson published their own about what could be achieved – and year – about 2.5 per cent of current pamphlet, Can Lloyd George Do It? maybe three-quarters right – was it GDP – for ‘the construction of cap- Their answer was a resounding Yes. still worth doing something rather ital works at home, enlisting in var- The answer of the electorate, how- than nothing? Keynes’s own answer ious ways the aid of private genius, ever, was a faltering No, with only had been laid out at the start of this temperament, and skill’. Then, 59 Liberal seats to show for a vote argument, back in 1924, when he confronting the obvious question of 23.6 per cent. There was to be no had concluded his initial plea for a of where the money is to be found, return to office by Lloyd George, no drastic remedy for unemployment: he goes out on a limb: ‘Current sav- British New Deal, no bold experi- ‘Let us experiment with boldness ings are already available on a suf- ment with a Keynesian agenda. on such lines – even though some of ficient scale – savings which from the schemes may turn out to be fail- lack of an outlet at home, are now ures, which is very likely.’14 drifting abroad to destinations Can we conquer The nub of the argument, in from which we as a society shall unemployment? many ways, was not about the gain the least possible advantage.’ Was it ever reasonable to suppose impact of public works on job crea- The priority is currently for ‘capi- that Lloyd George could ‘do it’? tion but about where the money tal developments at home’. Such a The pledge that he gave in 1929 was was to come from in financing such programme, Keynes asserts, ‘will to put in hand an ambitious pro- a programme. Some of it might inspire confidence’, thus reinforc- gramme of public works which come from abroad, by somehow ing ‘the stimulus which shall initi- would, within a year, reduce unem- diverting the net outward flow of ate a cumulative prosperity’.12 The ployment to the level normal before British investment, which only circular nature of the argument is the First World War. What was then created new British jobs ‘in the thus its strength – once the political considered normal was a level of long run’. So this was one possible courage has been shown to provide about 5 per cent, whereas the unem- short-term expedient. Nobody at the stimulus. ployment figures in 1929 (before the this time talked of simply running The discussion to which Keynes world slump hit Britain) stood at a budget deficit. Despite his subse- contributed in 1924 was published in about 10 per cent. So was it possible quent reputation, Keynes believed the Liberal weekly, the Nation, and to create nearly 600,000 jobs? in the principle of balancing the some of the themes were then devel- Modern estimates of what was budget, certainly in good times oped through the Liberal Summer feasible, of course, enjoy the benefit Lloyd George when it was proper that all current Schools. Both of these served as of applying the Keynesian ‘multi- government expenditure should be institutional means through which plier’. They differ mainly over the succeeded to covered by current taxation. In bad Lloyd George was to become rec- value specified for the multiplier, times, however, a loan might be onciled with many Liberal intel- that is, over how much an initial the extent of necessary to finance public works; lectuals in the mid-1920s, with investment would increase final so the question was whether such Keynes playing a prominent role in income. Keynesians were once determining a loan could indeed be raised and each forum, as he did subsequently hopeful – too hopeful – that the whether the net effect upon the in the Liberal Industrial Inquiry. multiplier might be 2 or higher; the agenda economy of the new investment The Inquiry’s eventual report, Brit- modern scepticism suggests a range would be positive. ain’s Industrial Future (1928), became between 1.25 and 1.75. The statistics in the gen- The Conservative claim was known as the ‘Yellow Book’. It that emerge from such analysis are essentially the traditional Treasury articulated, albeit at ponderous fairly clear and consistent. With a eral election View: that any new spending on length, the rationale for the ambi- floating exchange rate, like sterling public works could only be found tious policy that Lloyd George, now today, the upper estimate of new of 1929. The at the expense of private enter- Liberal leader, made the basis of his jobs might be as high as 744,000; prise elsewhere in the economy. own big push for power. but not even Keynes was contem- publication This model postulated a zero-sum Lloyd George succeeded to the plating leaving the pound to float of his mani- game, which robbed prudent Peter extent of determining the agenda in 1929, and it was not until 1931 in order to pay profligate Paul. Its in the general election of 1929. The that Britain was forced off the Gold festo, We force was essentially as a moral publication of his manifesto, We Standard. With a fixed exchange argument masquerading as an eco- Can Conquer Unemployment, made rate, then, the number of jobs likely Can Conquer nomic law. a great impact. Drawing upon the to be created by a programme on We Can Conquer Unemployment Yellow Book, it seems to have been the scale proposed by the Liberals Unemploy- offered the Liberal riposte, deny- drafted mainly by the businessman in 1929–30 would have been in the ing that all resources were at pre- and philanthropist Seebohm Rown- range 346,000 to 484,000. 13 So, even ment, made a sent being utilised for investment, tree, then working at Liberal head- if elected, Lloyd George could not and instead talking about the ‘fro- quarters and today remembered have done it. great impact. zen savings’ that accumulated in a

50 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘we can conquer unemployment’: lloyd george and keynes depression. The most prominent Thus we has not diminished some eighty cause entrusted to him; his incapac- advocate of this view was actually years later. For, on this analysis, the ity for loyal leadership and control Reginald McKenna, now chair- see a fully real priorities are hardly just finan- of the instrument of government man of the Midland Bank (and an cial. If the economy fails to produce itself …’. But the rest of the 1919 unlikely recruit to Lloyd George’s reciprocal its full potential, there will indeed draft was now published as ‘a frag- cause). He was concerned about be shortfalls, not only in produc- ment’, with a footnote explain- the idle deposits in bank accounts. process, in tion and in employment but in gov- ing that, although the author still But this encouraged the notion that ernment revenue too. felt ‘some compunction’ over what there were piles of money lying in which Lloyd had been written ‘in the heat of the the vaults that could, with some moment’, he now took a different juggling of the balance sheet, ‘pay’ George’s ‘Intense and sometimes view about publication – ‘These for public works – a sort of eco- political cam- needless antagonisms’? matters belong now to history.’16 nomic fallacy all too like the simple The period in office of Ramsay Lloyd George initially took a arguments for German reparations. paign did MacDonald’s minority Labour similarly lofty view. Keynes’s book Keynes’s own argument was government from 1929 to 1931 was had hit the headlines in such papers different. Admittedly, he tried to not simply to prove frustrating. Lloyd George as the Daily Mail, naturally sensing minimise any differences with his persistently explored opportuni- a partisan opportunity to stoke the Liberal allies for tactical reasons, draw upon ties for policy initiatives on which quarrels of two prominent Liber- once he was directly drawn into the he thought Labour and Liberals had als. Lloyd George at first scornfully partisan debate, but he never used Keynes’s eco- common ground; Keynes exploited told a reporter that all this had been the term ‘frozen savings’. Instead his status as an economist to chan- written in 1919; but then he evi- he reframed the whole argu- nomic ideas nel economic advice to govern- dently read the new version in print. ment about where the money was ment, through both the Macmillan The phrase that the press seized to come from by pointing, with but actu- Committee on Finance and Indus- on was the image of ‘this syren’, increasing confidence, to the falla- try and the Economic Advisory with its dictionary derivation from cious nature of the Treasury View ally stimu- Council. But the inherent weak- Greek and Latin myth as one who itself. And he first developed this ness of the government made it into ‘charms, allures or deceives’, which analysis not in his theoretical writ- lated their an all too compliant victim of the was hardly likely to inspire politi- ings but on the hustings. mounting world depression that cal trust. ‘Lloyd George is rooted Keynes’s newspaper article enti- gestation in overtook it. in nothing; he is void and without tled ‘Mr Lloyd George’s Pledge’ It was in this context that the content’, Keynes’s fragment con- appeared in the Evening Standard significant Conservatives climbed back to tinued, in a vein that was damag- on 19 March 1929. ‘The ortho- respects. power. Taking office in 1931, they ing, not because such things had not dox theory assumes that everyone lured not only MacDonald but also been said often before, but mainly is employed’, Keynes contended. most of the Liberals into a coalition because they now came from an ‘If this were so, a stimulus in one government. Its ostensible ration- ostensible supporter. direction would be at the expense ale was to serve the national interest The real offence lay elsewhere. of production in others. But when amid a great crisis that demanded Keynes’s development of his image there is a large surplus of unused stern financial rectitude and unpop- – ‘this goat-footed bard, this half- productive resources, as at present, ular policies. Its tenure of office human visitor to our age from the the case is totally different.’ Here more obviously served the inter- hag-ridden magic and enchanted was his knock-down argument est of the Conservative Party itself. woods of Celtic antiquity’ – had the against the Treasury View, as he Neither Lloyd George nor Keynes timbre not of any classical allusion put it a couple of months later, that was numbered among the support- so much as an ethnic slur. There fol- it ‘would be correct if everyone were ers of the National Government lowed other phrases, identifying employed already, but is only correct from 1931; but their own moment ‘that flavour of final purposeless- on that assumption’.15 of common sympathy and activity ness, inner irresponsibility’ and his Thus we see a fully reciprocal was now to close – quite soon and ‘cunning, remorselessness, love of process, in which Lloyd George’s quite abruptly. power’, that were more politically political campaign did not simply In March 1933 a new book by charged. But it was surely Lloyd draw upon Keynes’s economic ideas Keynes appeared: no economic George’s alleged ‘existence outside but actually stimulated their gesta- treatise but his much more popular or away from our Saxon good and tion in significant respects. For in Essays in Biography. Many of these evil’ that again slyly reverted to the 1929 Keynes, amid the day-to-day piquant essays had been previously stereotype of a Welsh outsider, con- pressures of an election campaign, published, including that on the veyed with a sneer of over-educated clearly identified the central flaw ‘Council of Four’, taken from his English condescension.17 It was the in the argument that government Economic Consequences. But Keynes culture clash of the wartime Treas- spending always displaces equiva- then exhumed the half-dozen pages ury arguments all over again. lent private resources. Moreover, that he had originally composed on How could Keynes not have in 1924 he had already developed Lloyd George, cut from the original foreseen the public impact of such his view that, since prosperity is edition. Admittedly, Keynes still words? He found out soon enough cumulative, an initial stimulus can refrained from publishing a com- when, in October 1933, the rele- produce a dynamic impact upon the ment from the 1919 draft, referring vant volume of Lloyd George’s War economy. Put these two concepts to ‘those methods of untruthful, Memoirs was published. His dispute together and the implications are indeed shameless, intrigue which with the Treasury over war finance surely significant, with a force that must lead to ultimate ruin of any was inevitably discussed. Lloyd

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 51 ‘we can conquer unemployment’: lloyd george and keynes

George did not minimise the role As Keynes of Keynes: ‘It seems rather absurd The Keynesian Revolution in the of Keynes, who had been ‘for the when now not even his friends – Making, 1924–36 (Oxford Univer- first time lifted by the Chancellor pithily least of all his friends – have any sity Press, 1987), Keynes: the twen- of the Exchequer into the rocking longer the slightest faith in his tieth century’s most influential chair of a pundit’, but had proved asserted judgments on finance.’20 Thus Lloyd economist (Bloomsbury, 2009) and Mr ‘much too mercurial and impulsive George scored his point against Churchill’s Profession: statesman, a counsellor for a great emergency’. in a radio Keynes in 1933 by implicitly siding orator, writer (Bloomsbury, 2012). Lloyd George made the most of his with financial orthodoxy. privileged opportunity to quote a broadcast in Consciously or not, each had 1 Winston S. Churchill, Victory 1915 memorandum by ‘the volatile January 1933: reversed his earlier position. It was (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, soothsayer who was responsible for Lloyd George who had first intui- 1946) pp. 114, 116 for the quotations this presage of misfortune’.18 He ‘Look after tively grasped the fact that real from his speech of 28 March 1945. duly mocked Keynes’s prophecies resources are what matters; it was 2 Donald Moggridge (with Austin of doom. True, the fact that Keynes the unem- Keynes who had come to abandon Robinson), The Collected Writings of was officially forbidden to quote the classical doctrines in which he John Maynard Keynes, 30 vols. (Cam- from the same memorandum led ployment, had been schooled. The affinities bridge University Press, 1971–89), him to complain in The Times of between the outlook of Keynes vol. xvi, pp. 299–300 (hereafter cita- sharp practice; but Lloyd George and the and Lloyd George were thus often tions in the form, JMK with vol.) was surely entitled to defend his eclipsed in their own era by imme- This magnificent edition is indis- own record and his own honour, budget will diate, and often transient, political pensable, as is Moggridge’s, Maynard as Keynes conceded in publicly developments. Each coined memo- Keynes: an economist’s biography (Lon- acknowledging their exchanges as look after rable phrases about the other, with don: Routledge, 1992) and Robert ‘perhaps as inexcusable on the one a mutual talent for polemics that Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, 3 side as on the other’.19 itself.’ we can all relish. It would be a pity, vols. (London: Macmillan, 1983– Yet a highly significant point however, if such gibes were all that 2000). My own arguments can be fol- was missed in these personal is remembered of their relation- lowed up in my scholarly study, The polemics. For the real reason why ship, which was unusually fruitful Keynesian Revolution in the Making, Lloyd George had been proved in generating a policy agenda that 1924–36 (Oxford University Press, right by events in supposing that surely still has relevance today. 1988) and my more accessible recent Britain could survive the strains By 1933, as his new pamphlet, book, Keynes: the twentieth century’s imposed on it in 1915–17 was surely The Means to Prosperity, shows, most influential economist (London and that the full capacity of the econ- Keynes had a confident grasp of the New York: Bloomsbury, 2009). omy had been crucially under-esti- analysis that was formally elabo- 3 JMK, xvi, pp. 210–11. mated by the Treasury mandarins. rated three years later in his Gen- 4 David Lloyd George, War Mem- They had supposed too readily eral Theory. Since investment is the oirs, popular edition, 2 vols. (Lon- and dogmatically that the limits motor of the economy, he saw that don: Odhams Press, 1938), vol. i, pp. on domestic production had been an initial stimulus could create the 409–10. reached, without realising that the necessary savings to finance it. The 5 JMK, vol. ii, pp. 26, 34. cumulative force of expansion itself new resources are precisely those 6 JMK, vol. iii, p. 115. created further resources by tak- that are not being used so long as 7 Charles Mallet, Mr Lloyd George: a ing up the slack in the economy. unemployment persists. As a rem- study (London: Ernest Benn, 1930) p. Why else did the raising of great edy for unemployment, drastic cuts 306. conscript armies still allow the in government spending are thus 8 Thomas Jones, Lloyd George (Oxford economy to expand by ten per cent? counter-productive – not because University Press, 1951) p. 229. In short, what was needed to com- deficits are a good thing but because 9 JMK, xix, p. 222. prehend this process was a Keynes- economic growth is the way to cure 10 JMK, iv, p. 65. ian multiplier effect – a concept them. As Keynes pithily asserted in 11 JMK, ii, p. 26. of which, in the days when he was a radio broadcast in January 1933: 12 JMK, xix, pp. 219-223. McKenna’s rocking-chair pundit, ‘Look after the unemployment, and 13 See Roger Middleton, Govern- Keynes himself was oblivious. the budget will look after itself.’21 ment versus the Market (Cheltenham: In this perspective, some of the The real deficits that should worry Edward Elgar, 1996) p.388. gratuitous gibes in Lloyd George’s us may thus be those created by 14 JMK, xix, p. 223. War Memoirs read very ironically. self-fulfilling processes of finan- 15 JMK, xix, pp. 807, 823. Keynes is described as ‘an enter- cial stringency, which can drag the 16 JMK, x, pp. 20–21 n.; and see n. 5 taining economist whose bright economy into a downward spiral, above. but shallow dissertations on finance with little promise of early respite. 17 JMK, x, pp. 23–4; and see R.F. Har- and political economy, when not And under such conditions, it may rod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes taken too seriously, always pro- be prudent rather than irresponsible (London: Macmillan, 1951) pp. vide a source of merriment for his to remember that in the long run 440–41. readers’. This dart was thrown at we are all dead. 18 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, vol. i, just the moment when Keynes had pp. 409–10. specifically formulated the con- Peter Clarke is Professor Emeritus of 19 JMK, xxx, pp. 18–19. cept of the multiplier, in argu- Modern British History at Cambridge 20 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, vol. i, p. ments that supported key aspects University and former Master of Trin- 410. of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Lloyd ity Hall, Cambridge. He is a Fellow of 21 JMK, xxi, p. 150. George concluded his indictment the British Academy. His books include

52 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 53 The Wonderful Wizard As Was Lloyd George, 1931 – 1945

David Lloyd George enjoyed an unusually long political afterlife following his ejection from the premiership in October 1922.1 Only 59 years old when he left Downing Street, he remained a member of the House of Commons for twenty-two years before accepting a peerage in the autumn of 1944. In the history of the twentieth- century premiership only Arthur Balfour exceeded Lloyd George’s experience, resigning as Prime Minister in December 1905, but remaining active in politics until shortly before his death in 1930. David Dutton tells the story of Lloyd George’s last years.

54 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 The Wonderful Wizard As Was Lloyd George, 1931 – 1945

alfour’s later career arithmetic, despite their relega- a largely helpless observer of the included a ministerial rein- tion to third-party status in 1922. events which led to the formation Bcarnation. Appointed For- Indeed, on two occasions, follow- of the National Government in eign Secretary at the formation of ing the general elections of 1923 August, a government from which Lloyd George’s own government and 1929, the Liberal Party held the it would have been almost impos- in December 1916, he also filled balance of power in the House of sible to exclude him had he been fit. a number of non-departmental Commons. And there was always Had Lloyd George been in a posi- posts in the Conservative govern- the possibility that electoral reform tion to lead the Liberal Party in the ments of the 1920s. By contrast, might further entrench its posi- inter-party negotiations, it seems Lloyd George’s career after leaving tion as a crucial force in national probable that he would have driven Downing Street was spent entirely politics. Some historians have even a harder, and for Liberals more in the ranks of opposition. written the political history of advantageous, bargain than proved In October 1922 few informed these years with Lloyd George at to be the case, including perhaps observers would have foreseen the very centre of the stage, while the introduction of the Alterna- this outcome. While some said other leaders, with larger party tive Vote. It is even possible that he he would be back in office in six forces behind them but lacking the would have shown the flexibility months, others in two years, Welshman’s dynamism and intel- to negotiate a compromise agree- Lloyd George himself suggested lectual energy, worked out how ment with the Conservatives on that the Tories would now be in best to keep him consigned to the tariffs.5 As it was, even the margin- power for twenty years.2 Notwith- political wilderness. According to alised Lloyd George seemed to rank standing two brief interludes of Kenneth Morgan, ‘it is clear that among the political heavyweights. Labour government, it proved to the politics of the 1920s were in MacDonald wrote to express his be a remarkably accurate predic- large measure a reaction against dismay at Lloyd George’s indispo- tion. But if Lloyd George never Lloyd George, a reaction in which sition and came to Churt to seek returned to power, he was at least a the Conservative and Labour par- his endorsement. Herbert Samuel, major player in the political game ties made common cause’.3 the acting Liberal leader, and Lord over the following decade. Unable The situation after 1931, how- Reading, Liberal leader in the to overcome the political handi- ever, was completely different. Lords, also made their way to the cap, which had begun in 1916, of That year witnessed a dramatic Welshman’s country home, ostensi- not having behind him a political change in Lloyd George’s per- bly to ensure that they were in step party – or at least one large enough sonal fortunes. In the spring he with his wishes. Less benignly, the to return him to office by conven- appeared still to be the arbiter of Conservative backbencher, Cuth- tional means – Lloyd George ben- national politics, on the verge of bert Headlam, judged it imperative efitted from the peculiar electoral an astonishing comeback into gov- that the government should go to and parliamentary circumstances ernment. Though the surviving the country under MacDonald’s that characterised the 1920s. For a documentary record is fragmen- leadership. Otherwise it would be brief period of transition Britain tary, it appears that Lloyd George said that the Tories had broken the experienced a genuine three-party was in secret negotiations with National Government, and ‘LG and system, very different from the Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour gov- his friends would once again get duopoly which existed during the ernment, which might have led to away with it – and anything might rest of the century. Such a situation Left: his appointment as Leader of the happen. What an unmitigated curse encouraged calculations of politi- Lloyd George Commons and Foreign Secretary to the country LG is.’6 cal movement and realignment at his farm at or Chancellor in a Lib-Lab coa- The National Government’s which left the Liberals a significant Bron-y-de, Churt, lition.4 But Lloyd George’s sud- decision to follow Headlam’s factor in the country’s electoral during the 1930s den illness in the summer left him wishes and fight an election in

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 55 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945

October transformed Lloyd He recog- full-time writer. His main task was North Wales than he was to engage George’s position. He recognised to produce his long-anticipated War with the contemporary political that the likely Conservative major- nised that Memoirs, but before that he com- scene. Thomas Jones, accompany- ity would not only lead to the pleted what was originally intended ing him on his notorious trip to introduction of tariffs, but also the likely to be a long memorandum for sub- Germany in 1936, noted him ‘fight- destroy the residual power which mission to the international confer- ing the campaigns of the Great he and the Liberal Party enjoyed in Conserva- ence on reparations at Lausanne. In War all over again with great ani- a hung parliament. He was particu- fact, it developed into a short book, mation’.14 Almost subconsciously, larly opposed to the idea of a deal tive majority The Truth about Reparations and War Lloyd George seemed to be lay- with the Conservatives – ‘he would Debts, which was published at the ing the foundations of a later myth sooner have half the present num- would not end of March 1932. Thereafter his about his own career, that the ber of Liberal MPs than have an only lead to attention turned to his magnum politics of the 1930s were all about arrangement with the Tories’7 – and opus. Progress was rapid. Two vol- those lesser men, scarcely worthy never forgave Samuel and his col- the intro- umes covering Asquith’s wartime of attention, who had excluded leagues for giving in to Conserva- government in just over 1,000 pages him from office but who could not tive pressure. Lloyd George used a duction of were published in September and stand comparison with the figures radio broadcast during the election October 1933. A further two of of an earlier, nobler era when Lloyd campaign to complain that ‘under tariffs, but 1,500 pages, dealing with 1917, fol- George himself had been at the the guise of a patriotic appeal a lowed in September and October peak of his powers. Tory majority is to be engineered. also destroy 1934, with a final two volumes of It was also striking that Lloyd Patriotism is everywhere exploited comparable length detailing the last George began in the 1930s to take for purely party purposes.’8 His the residual year of the war appearing in 1936. It extended holidays in such distant worst forebodings proved justified. was hardly surprising, then, to find locations as Ceylon and Jamaica. The election produced a Conserva- power which Lloyd George in September 1932 Rather like French governments tive majority unmatched in the writing of his wish to be ‘free to get in the dying years of the Third entire twentieth century. Sixty- he and the on with my work’ and not wanting Republic, he developed something eight Liberal MPs were swamped to ‘throw myself into active politics of a reputation for not being in by the massed Tory ranks and in Liberal Party before 1934’.11 place at moments of political crisis. any case teetered on the verge of a Once the War Memoirs were out His absence abroad was not uncon- decisive split between the follow- enjoyed of the way, Lloyd George turned nected with his literary preoccupa- ers of Herbert Samuel and those almost immediately to his account tions. Lloyd George increasingly of John Simon. Meanwhile, Lloyd in a hung of the Paris Peace Conference of found it necessary to remove him- George stood at the head of a tiny parliament. 1919, published in two substantial self physically from the distractions band of just four MPs – himself, volumes in 1938 as The Truth about of British politics in order to give his children, Megan and Gwilym, the Peace Treaties. It amounted in his full attention to his writing. and Gwilym’s brother-in-law, total to an astonishing literary out- Frustration with the domes- Goronwy Owen. He was under- put on the part of a man now in tic political scene also encouraged standably bitter: his eighth decade. Nor was Lloyd a growing interest in agriculture. George’s involvement in the pro- There was a political dimension When I was stricken down … ject purely nominal. The books here. His interest in the land, and we had complete control of were not ghost-written. Though his belief that in it lay the solution the Parliamentary situation … his staff were employed to col- to most of the nation’s troubles, We had over 5,000,000 of elec- lect, sort and assemble the mas- went back to the earliest days of his tors. Where are they now? I sive body of documentation upon political career. ‘He says he has the have never seen a case of more which they were based, the writ- land in his bones’, noted Frances complete disaster following ing itself bore Lloyd George’s own Stevenson in March 1934.15 By that promptly on fatuous and pusil- unmistakable imprint. As Frances time there was some suggestion lanimous leadership.9 Stevenson recalled, ‘the work went that he might be brought into the on apace … He could never do any- National Government as Minister If Lloyd George had now taken the thing except with the whole of his of Agriculture, and a variation of opportunity to turn his back on the energy, and we were hard put to it the same idea resurfaced during the whole political scene, no one could to keep pace with his output.’12 first months of the Second World have blamed him. He had, after Lloyd George’s writing about War.16 But Lloyd George’s interest all, achieved everything in terms the past was symptomatic of a in the subject was also increasingly of personal ambition to which a deeper characteristic of the man domestic and personal, focused politician could reasonably aspire. at this time. The diaries of his two on the experimental farm which One of his many biographers has indispensable secretaries, Frances he cultivated in Surrey. ‘The farm described the 1920s as a period in Stevenson and A. J. Sylvester – itself was becoming to him more which Lloyd George was ‘genu- though their services to Lloyd and more important and more and inely seeking work’.10 In the fol- George were inevitably very differ- more of a solace against the bitter- lowing decade, however, was this ent – reveal someone with a strong ness of politics.’17 He once remarked any longer the case? disposition to live in the past.13 that he was infinitely more inter- At all events, it would be diffi- Lloyd George often seemed hap- ested now in apples than he was cult to describe the Lloyd George of pier to reminisce about his strug- in politics or even in his writing.18 the 1930s as a full-time politician. gles with Field Marshal Haig or his Even during his visit to Hitler On occasions he seemed more like a roots in the politics and religion of in 1936, Sylvester received daily

56 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945 telephone reports from Churt on Returning from a winter trip that the Tories would simply make the progress of Lloyd George’s fruit to Ceylon, Lloyd George made his use of his name to bolster their farm – ‘the weather, the yield of first appearance in the new House own fortunes up to the next elec- honey, the price got for fruit, sold of Commons on 17 March 1932, tion. ‘After the election they would at Harrods or Covent Garden, the but did not speak there for a further throw him over, and his plans, and takings of his shop in the village three months. He was still capable he would be left high and dry with and so forth’.19 At one level there of a stinging thrust at the expense no sort of political future whatever was something admirably balanced of his political opponents. ‘The – much less than he has now.’32 about all this. But it also serves as a government’, he concluded at the Yet, after that election, the situ- revealing barometer of the extent end of a wide-ranging survey of ation might be different. Anticipat- of Lloyd George’s commitment to the political scene on 12 July, ‘is the ing a greatly reduced government the British political scene. most abject picture I have ever seen majority, Lloyd George began to These preoccupations and dis- of statesmanship in a funk.’26 But Anticipat- think about consolidating a small tractions must be noted. But poli- there were obvious limits to what he block of progressive opinion. tics were also deeply ingrained in could achieve in a chamber where ing a greatly Twenty or thirty MPs might be Lloyd George’s make-up. There the government held around 90 per reduced gov- enough to have a decisive impact. was a side to him which bitterly cent of the seats. Those who until Then Lloyd George, ‘with his little resented his exclusion from the cor- recently had feared his impact upon ernment party, would be all powerful and ridors of power and from the sheer British politics could now afford to could dictate policy, which is just excitement of political life. En treat him with something approach- majority, what he would like’.33 The approach route to the East at the end of 1931, ing contempt. ‘LG is fair game for of the election, and mounting evi- he wrote to his old friend, Herbert almost anyone in these new days’, Lloyd George dence that the government was Lewis: ‘As you know, I have always noted Cuthbert Headlam. ‘How not confident of victory, served to found it difficult to keep out of a odd it seems when one remembers began to revive Lloyd George’s appetite for “scrap”, more particularly so when his position ten years ago!’27 the political fray. In the autumn I find causes in which I am inter- A chance meeting with Stanley think about of 1934 he set up a new economic ested being so inadequately and Baldwin in March 1933 left Lloyd enquiry to produce a plan for a ineptly defended.’20 Similar senti- George with the impression that consolidat- wide-ranging reorganisation of ments lay behind remarks recorded the Conservative leader would ‘like the British economy, designed to a year later by the diarist, Harold to work with him’.28 For the time ing a small eliminate unemployment, then still Nicolson. ‘One is never well out of being, however, nothing came of standing at more than two million. it’, insisted Lloyd George. ‘One is this. Indeed, a year later, by which block of ‘The whole scheme is a bit loose and just out of it.’21 Stevenson encour- time he believed that Lloyd George vague at present’, admitted Frances aged him to bide his time. ‘Things had taken ‘the wrong track’ as progres- Stevenson, ‘but I expect it will are obviously going to get much regards policy towards India, Bald- materialise before the Election.’34 worse’, she predicted in December win told the editor of the Man- sive opinion. But Lloyd George could never 1931, ‘and they will want you then.’22 chester Guardian that, although he Twenty or fully escape from the absence of But she and Lloyd George appear liked the ‘little man’, he could not party support. Conversations with to have underestimated both the work with him. But the heart of the thirty MPs his former ministerial colleague, Dr government’s competence and its matter, as Baldwin conceded, was Addison, in November led to hopes hold over public opinion. ‘I am sure that ‘he does not, of course, count might be of an electoral deal with Labour, it will not be very long’, she reiter- for much in this present House but these were soon dashed when ated the following May, ‘before the of Commons’.29 Despite her ear- enough to the Labour leader, George Lans- people discover that this Gov. is not lier encouragement, Frances Ste- bury, failed to persuade his party going to get them out of the mess – venson began to doubt whether have a deci- to come to a national agreement.35 then they will turn to someone or Lloyd George would be glad of Briefly, a dramatic intervention in something else.’23 At the time of the the offer of a place in the National sive impact. a Commons debate on defence later general election, Lloyd George had Government and, more impor- in the month restored Lloyd George decided upon a strategy ‘to support tantly, whether he could ‘sustain Then Lloyd to the political limelight. ‘Some Labour, but not definitely and delib- physically a job … which demands say that an entirely new political erately, but by speeches in the House concentration and continual atten- George, ‘with situation has been brought about’, which will make them come over tion’.30 Reading the recently pub- suggested Stevenson with forgiv- to him, rather than him to them’.24 lished diary of Lord Esher, with its his little able exaggeration. ‘They speak Now, however, Labour itself was account of Lord Rosebery’s trou- of a possible combination of S.B., reduced to a rump of just 52 MPs, bled retirement, helped reconcile party, would Winston and D[avid].’36 But Bald- constituting the weakest parliamen- Lloyd George to his own, ‘which win knew that such a conjunction tary opposition of modern times. is so much happier and so full of be all power- would result in ‘the resignations At the same time, Lloyd George interest’. The young Conserva- ful and could of half the Cabinet on my hands’. seemed determined to cut his formal tive, Harold Macmillan, many of Lloyd George was ‘not a cohesive links with the Liberal Party. On 3 whose progressive ideas chimed dictate pol- but a disintegrating force’.37 As soon November 1931 he wrote to Samuel with Lloyd George’s own, sought as the Conservative leader secured to let him know that he would not an interview at Churt, but Lloyd icy, which is an overwhelming vote in favour of be attending the meeting at the start George was ‘not very interested’.31 his Indian policy at a meeting of the of the new parliamentary session Nothing, he told Macmillan, just what he Conservative Central Council on and declining to hold any further would induce him to take office in 4 December, any immediate need offices in the party’s ranks.25 the present government. He feared would like’. to go cap in hand to Lloyd George

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 57 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945 disappeared. ‘They’re safe now to implement at least some of his of that would be to help the return till ’36’, declared Lloyd George. plans, while the Conservative- of Labour in many constituencies.’ ‘And that suits me.’38 But in real- dominated government could help Indeed, ‘he himself might secure a ity it didn’t. Time was against him. revive its credentials as a truly following sufficiently numerous to Lloyd George now approached his ‘National’ administration, while reduce the Conservative majority seventy-second birthday. consolidating progressive opinion to so narrow a margin as to make As he prepared to launch his behind it in the run-up to the elec- the life of the next Parliament very British ‘New Deal’, his critics tion. But there were dangers too. arduous and uncertain’.48 remained sceptical. After listen- Lloyd George’s return to govern- In effect Baldwin, who succeeded ing to this ‘tiresome little man’ in a ment would be bitterly opposed as the ailing MacDonald as Prime debate on the Depressed Areas Bill, an unnecessarily divisive step by Minister on 7 June, called Lloyd Cuthbert Headlam judged that his a large number of Tories, not least George’s bluff. It became clear that plan would be ‘very much on the the extremely influential Chan- As he pre- negotiations with the cabinet com- old lines … splash about as much as cellor of the Exchequer, Neville pared to mittee would not lead to the Welsh- possible – spend money like water, Chamberlain.43 Meanwhile, in his man’s return to government. The etc., etc. … He clearly anticipates gloomier moments, Lloyd George launch his meetings were ‘studiously pleasant’, a state of things after the next elec- feared that ‘they will immediately he noted, ‘but they knew in their tion of a similar character to 1929 have an election and then, having British ‘New hearts that they were going to knife and hopes to be in a position to been returned for five years with me’. Ominously, he added: ‘What be able to control the situation.’39 my assistance, they will politely Deal’, his crit- they did not know was that I too had Speaking in Bangor on his birth- tell me to go to Hell’.44 After con- a dagger in my sheath for them.’49 day, 17 January 1935, Lloyd George siderable debate – and disagree- ics remained Without waiting for the final meet- launched his proposals. Stressing ment – inside the government, ing of the committee, Lloyd George that he now stood above party, he Prime Minister MacDonald invited sceptical. issued a statement to the press, a called for the creation of a national Lloyd George to submit his plans ‘Call to Action’. Prompted by a Development Council, with repre- for the relief of unemployment After listen- ‘number of well-known Noncon- sentatives from commerce, indus- to a high-powered cabinet com- formists’, he proposed a national try, finance, academia and the mittee, consisting of MacDonald ing to this campaign to ‘rouse public opinion workforce, with the power, via a himself, Baldwin, Chamberlain, on the issues of peace and unem- ‘Prosperity Loan’, to implement John Simon, Lord Hailsham, J. ‘tiresome ployment’.50 The result was a mass schemes of investment in housing, H. Thomas, Walter Runciman, gathering of some 2,500 delegates at roads, the land and the regenera- Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Walter little man’ the Central Hall, Westminster, on tion of depressed industries. The Elliot, Ernest Brown, Kingsley 1 July. It was avowedly non-party, government should be headed Wood and Godfrey Collins. Six in a debate but in practice all-party, attracting by a small cabinet of five minis- meetings were held with Lloyd on the the initial support of Conservatives ters, mostly without departmental George between 18 April and 15 such as Macmillan and Lord Cecil of responsibilities and reminiscent of May. ‘They have given D[avid] Depressed Chelwood, Labour’s George Lans- the War Cabinet he had created in such a chance’, judged Stevenson, bury and Lloyd George’s old Liberal 1916. Frances Stevenson was con- ‘that with his political flair he will Areas Bill, colleague, Lord Lothian. But, ever vinced that the speech marked a have the situation at his feet.’45 In conscious of his own weakness in turning point in her master’s for- mid-April the journalist, Collin Cuthbert terms of organised party politics, tunes, with ‘much fluttering of the Brooks, heard that Chamberlain Lloyd George also looked to the Free political dovecotes as to D[avid]’s was now reconciled to the idea of Headlam Churches as the best available vehi- position, now and in the future’. Lloyd George’s membership of the cle to secure his political resurrec- There was no doubt, she insisted, Cabinet and that Simon would have judged that tion.51 The convention voted to set that Lloyd George’s words had to be elevated to the Woolsack to up the Council of Action for Peace ‘caught on in the country. We are make room for him.46 Lloyd George his plan and Reconstruction to advance his overwhelmed with approval from himself got the impression that the proposals. In one sense the Coun- every quarter, and of every politi- government wanted to make terms would be cil was innovative and forward- cal complexion.’40 Lloyd George with him, but that ‘of course they looking, anticipating the non-party himself was ‘staking everything on want as cheap terms as possible’.47 In ‘very much political activism of more recent the results of the next few months. conversation with Thomas Jones, times. But in its emphasis upon the If he fails, he will devote himself to which he knew would be reported on the old Free Churches, Lloyd George was the farm and his writing for the rest to Baldwin, he stressed that he was relying on a force that was already of his life.’41 Others, though, were less concerned with office for him- lines … in decline. It was clear, noted the less enthused. Much of what Lloyd self – ‘I should find the day-to-day splash about government minister Leslie Hore- George had said merely reiterated responsibilities of office rather irk- Belisha, that he was ‘assuming the his proposals of the 1920s. One some now’ – than with the adop- as much as existence of a “Nonconformist sceptic wrote dismissively of ‘the tion of his programme. But he was vote” of the old kind’.52 Yellow Book with Trimmings’.42 ready to play such cards as he held possible – Seeking confirmation and Nevertheless, Lloyd George’s as skilfully as he could, making it encouragement from historical restoration to front-line politics clear that his political fund was in spend money parallels – Gladstone at seventy had was a live issue in the first months a healthy state and that, should his fifteen years of active political life of 1935. There would be advantages proposals be rejected, he would be like water, ahead of him when he launched for both sides. Lloyd George in in a position to field up to 300 can- his Midlothian campaign – Lloyd office would have the opportunity didates at the election. ‘The result etc., etc.’ George began to contemplate

58 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945 an unlikely return to power. No In the wake ‘knowing that all the guns and rejoined the mainstream Liberal longer was it just a question of ammunitions are with the other Party. But Lloyd George showed no forcing his way into a reorganised of the elec- side – and the poison gas, too’.55 interest in resuming the leadership National Government. Labour, Asked about the prospect of Coun- of what was now a relatively unim- he calculated, might win as many tion Steven- cil of Action or specifically Lloyd portant parliamentary rump. as 290 seats at the election and the George candidates, Herbert Samuel In the wake of the election Ste- Liberals 40, leading to the govern- son found thought there ‘might be a few, but venson found him ‘very cheerful’ ment’s defeat: only a few’.56 In the event, Lloyd and intent on carrying on with the him ‘very George concentrated on sending Council of Action. It was possible, Under those circumstances cheerful’ and out a questionnaire in an attempt she claimed, that in two years time … I would form a Govern- to ascertain which candidates from he would have become a political ment with Lansbury as nominal intent on car- all parties supported his propos- force again. Yet her remarks also Prime Minister, but retaining als. The campaign did not go well suggested an element of make- the active leadership for myself. rying on with for Lloyd George. Chamberlain believe. The Council gave him ‘a I would then proceed to formu- ridiculed his pretensions, insisting semblance of activity and so long as late a devastating progressive the Council that he represented only himself he has this he will be happy’.59 The programme, and go to the coun- and could safely be ignored. Then crisis over the Hoare-Laval Pact at try again immediately upon it of Action. It the defection from the Council of the end of the year left him fulmi- with a terrific campaign, and Action of the Methodist leader, nating against Baldwin as ‘a fraud return with a majority of 150.53 was possible, Dr Scott Lidgett, only days before and a humbug’ who had deceived polling, came as a bitter blow. ‘hundreds of thousands of decent In practice, contemporaries – she claimed, Lidgett now urged his followers Liberals’.60 Objectively, however, it Lloyd George and cabinet minis- to support the National Govern- was difficult to escape the conclu- ters included – greatly exaggerated that in two ment. Cuthbert Headlam, hesitat- sion that the Prime Minister, whose the electoral perils confronting the ing over whether to take any notice position now seemed unassailable, National Government. A number years time of the questionnaire, expected that had outwitted his old rival. An of by-election setbacks created an Lloyd George was ‘going to give us ill-judged telegram sent by Lloyd atmosphere of near-panic in Con- he would a lot of worry’.57 His concern was George to the Duke of Windsor servative Central Office which was largely unwarranted. Lloyd George at the end of the Abdication Cri- scarcely justified. Over no sustained have become had the capacity to irritate, but lit- sis caused Headlam to seethe with period were these defeats on a scale tle more. The Conservatives had contempt: to suggest the loss of the general a political wanted to campaign on a proposal election itself. Indeed, modern force again. to put 100,000 men to work on the Always supposed to be a politi- psephologists might have pointed land over five years; Lloyd George cal wizard, he has proved him- out that the size of the govern- Yet her talked in terms of a million. The self quite incapable of playing ment’s victory in 1931 was such as Tories concluded that ‘fantastic his cards correctly. An old man to render most unlikely a complete remarks also though [Lloyd George’s] proposal in a hurry to regain power, he reversal of fortunes over a sin- is, it nevertheless seems to preclude found himself up against a much gle parliament. Furthermore, the suggested an us altogether from coming out now more astute politician in the man ‘National’ label continued to count. with a policy aimed at placing only whom he so foolishly under- The government was still able to element of 10 per cent of this number on the rated and despised – Mr B has attract much of the ‘Liberal vote’ land during the next five years’.58 beaten him to a frazzle.61 won over in 1931, partly through its make-believe. Out of a total of 1,348 can- ongoing partnership with Simon’s didates standing at the election, In the autumn of 1936 Lloyd Liberal Nationals and partly as a 362 received Council of Action George made his infamous visit result of the ‘liberal’ credentials endorsement and of these 67 were to Germany where he met Hit- of Baldwin’s own centrist brand victorious at the polls – 11 Con- ler at the Berghof. This strange of Conservatism. In this situation, servatives, 21 Liberals, 34 Labour episode is discussed in detail else- Lloyd George’s hopes were never and one Independent. It was a mea- where in this issue of the Journal.62 likely to be realised. Even Steven- gre return for the £400,000 Lloyd Many at the time thought the trip son soon concluded that the Coun- George was said to have spent from ill-judged, and it appears more so cil of Action lacked the necessary his political fund. Furthermore, with the passage of the years. Lloyd roots of popular support.54 neither at the election nor in the George emerged from the meet- The nonconformist bandwagon resulting parliament did these MPs ing in a state of elation, convinced failed to materialise. Many clerics, constitute a political grouping. Just that the Fuhrer was a man of des- recognising that Lloyd George’s as importantly, the election con- tiny. True, it was Hitler’s domes- actions were directed against the firmed the National Government in tic achievements which prompted government and therefore politi- power. Granted the scale of the 1931 Lloyd George’s admiration rather cally motivated, soon withdrew landslide, some loss of ground to than his ideology. But more per- their support. When the general Labour was inevitable. But, with an ceptive observers understood the election was called for November, overall majority in the new House impossibility of assessing the Ger- Lloyd George was not ready for it. of Commons of almost 250, its posi- man leader without reference to Drawing a parallel with the plight tion remained secure. It was diffi- the sort of regime which he had of Abyssinia in the face of Italian cult to see how Lloyd George could created. The visit seemed to jus- aggression, he claimed a rapport make any further progress. With tify Robert Boothby’s statement to with the beleaguered Africans, the election he and his family group the Commons a few months earlier

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 59 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945 that, however admirable his contri- ‘Personally, unthinking conviction that mat- war two days later. Chamberlain butions to Britain’s social services, ters had been better handled when tried, but failed, to construct an Lloyd George had been a calam- I believe LG he was in charge. A pointed passage all-party coalition. In conversation ity as an international statesman.63 in Chamberlain’s speech during with the former Cabinet Secretary, In the present context it is worth is fast on a debate on conscription in April Maurice Hankey, he even discussed noting that Lloyd George’s perfor- 1939 got to the heart of the matter: the possibility of including the war mance in Germany was only likely the down- leader of 1916–18 in his adminis- to alienate many of those progres- It is a fixed part of the practice of tration.73 In the event no offer was sive young politicians who might hill grade … the Right Honourable Gentle- made. In all probability it was one otherwise have been inclined to He acts the man to belittle or pour contempt which Lloyd George would have rally to his standard. on everything that this Govern- declined, even though he was dis- In the last years of the decade part of a vir- ment does. The further in time appointed not to receive it. With Lloyd George’s attendance at West- the Government gets from the the outbreak of hostilities, Lloyd minster became ‘a positive chore’.64 ile, strong period when he himself was George offered the government one When he made the effort, he could Prime Minister, the worse it gets of his infrequent gestures of sup- still put in a commanding perfor- man when in his estimation. I do not know port. The government, he argued, mance. An attack on the govern- whether he is going to speak ment in June 1936 for abandoning he is in the in this debate. If so, it will be could do no other than what sanctions against Italy prompted interesting to know whether he they have done. I am one out of Churchill to speak of ‘one of the House. He is in favour of a larger measure tens of millions in this country greatest Parliamentary perfor- of conscription, or against con- who will back any government mances of all time’, while a vis- walks quickly scription altogether. I am sure that is in power in fighting this ibly shaken Baldwin was obliged that he is agin the Government struggle through, in however to congratulate the Member for on purpose whatever they propose.69 humble a capacity we may be Caernarfon Boroughs on a speech called upon to render service to which showed that he had ‘not lost to create Lloyd George made no response. our country.74 the least atom of vigour’ compared He was by this time perhaps pri- with thirty years before.65 Three an impres- vately aware that his own powers Before long, however, he reverted years later, convinced that Neville were failing. In July 1936, when to his more typical stance. ‘I would Chamberlain’s post-Prague foreign sion. But put he was seventy-three, he told his be happier’, noted Sylvester, ‘if I policy made no strategic sense, he future biographer, Malcolm Thom- could see some drive in him, some told the Commons that without a him at a dif- son, that ‘executive Ministers’ fixity of purpose, some definite Russian alliance the government’s ficulty, face should not be much over sixty.70 policy. His [attitude to the govern- guarantees – or as he put it, ‘the Headlam, disgusted by Lloyd ment] is merely guerrilla warfare demented pledges’ – to Poland, him with an George’s attacks on Chamberlain with no application.’75 Hostility Romania and Greece represented and convinced that this ‘horrid lit- towards Chamberlain seemed to ‘the most reckless commitment important tle man’ was already in his dotage, blind him to the perils facing the that any country has ever entered wished that he could be ‘removed country. ‘What he really wants’, into’.66 But more commonly, Lloyd situation and to another world, where he could judged Sylvester, ‘is to bring this George tended to duck out of mak- go on telling all and sundry how Government rolling down in the ing promised speeches and no a speech: he much abler, and wiser, and braver muck.’76 By October he was trying longer seemed capable of delivering he had been on earth than other to tap into the significant, but still the rapier-like responses in parlia- funks it. He men’.71 A. J. Sylvester was naturally minority, opinion in the country mentary debate that had once been more sympathetic, but his assess- in favour of an early peace. While his trademark. ‘My summing up of is full to the ment was not entirely different: Chamberlain was making it clear LG’s feelings these days’, concluded that there could be no further nego- Sylvester, ‘is one of helplessness.’67 brim with an Personally, I believe LG is fast tiations with Hitler, Lloyd George At times he even seemed to have on the downhill grade … He staged a meeting of the Council of lost his nerve. He decided against inferiority acts the part of a virile, strong Action at the Caxton Hall, West- attending the debate on the Munich man when he is in the House. minster, where he suggested that settlement in October 1938, pos- complex.’ He walks quickly on purpose Hitler should be invited to state sibly because he was reluctant to to create an impression. But his peace terms, a move which reveal his broad support for the deal put him at a difficulty, face him prompted a stinging rebuke from which Chamberlain had brought with an important situation and the Sunday Pictorial.77 The reaction back from Germany, and he backed a speech: he funks it. He is full caused him to tone down a speech out of a debate on foreign affairs in to the brim with an inferiority to his constituents on the same July 1939, spending the day instead complex.72 theme and thereafter his emphasis playing with Jennifer, his presumed turned to maximising food pro- daughter by Frances Stevenson.68 Ageing and isolated, Lloyd George duction from domestic agriculture. Such interventions as Lloyd was trapped in a state of political In private, however, he remained George did make appeared to be irrelevance. Only a crisis of monu- convinced that the basis of a satis- motivated by an increasingly nega- mental proportions could possibly factory settlement with Germany tive mindset, especially once his restore him to power. That crisis, could still be found, as was appar- arch-enemy, Chamberlain, became of course, arrived with Germany’s ent in an interview with Sumner Prime Minister in May 1937. He invasion of Poland on 1 September Welles, the American Under-Secre- was moved by little more than an 1939 and Britain’s declaration of tary of State, in March 1940.78

60 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945

At a meeting in December 1939 strongest force in the House of at the end of 1917 after a string with Churchill, now restored to Commons. But the crisis did at least of lesser politicians had tried and office as First Lord of the Admiralty, afford Lloyd George the opportu- failed to bring France to victory Lloyd George got the impression nity to deliver his last great parlia- in the First World War. Yet a more that he might be brought into gov- mentary performance. He was at accurate comparison was perhaps ernment when ministerial changes first uncertain whether or not to with Marshal Pétain, with Lloyd were made. Privately, however, he speak in the debate but, prompted George playing the role of the real- was deeply pessimistic about Brit- by his daughter Megan, Boothby ist who would step in to secure the ain’s prospects in the war. A peace and the independent Liberal MP, best possible terms for his country move in 1942 or 1943 might be the Clement Davies, amongst oth- once it was recognised that victory only alternative to military defeat: ers, Lloyd George returned to the was unattainable. ‘He is very con- Commons chamber to deliver scious of his achievements in the People call me defeatist, but a very pointed coup de grace. In a last war’, noted the newspaper pro- what I say to them is this: Tell speech which, as one observer put There was prietor, Cecil King, after meeting me how we can win! Can we it, lasted only ten minutes but con- Lloyd George on 6 June, ‘and con- win in the air? Can we win at tained the accumulated hostil- no place for siders he will inevitably be called sea, when the effect of our naval ity of twenty-five years, he called on sooner or later in this one, even blockade is wiped out by Ger- upon the Prime Minister to make Lloyd George if it is only to sign the treaty of sur- many’s connections with Russia? the ultimate sacrifice and give up render to Germany.’86 Stevenson How can we win on the land?79 the seals of office.83 His parliamen- in Churchill’s and Sylvester both continued to tary majority in the subsequent encourage Lloyd George. ‘Keep Logic may have been on his side, vote reduced to 81, Chamberlain War Cabinet. yourself fit’, wrote the former on but things did not work out in resigned on 10 May, to be succeeded 26 September, ‘for the time when the way Lloyd George envisaged. not by Lloyd George but by Win- Hopes that it becomes quite clear that you Nonetheless, the relative inactiv- ston Churchill. will have to take a hand in things ity of the so-called Phoney War There was no place for Lloyd he might be – which time is not so far off, I feel gave rise to increasing feelings that George in Churchill’s War Cabi- sure.’87 But with hindsight she con- the war effort was not being effec- net. Hopes that he might be put put in charge cluded that he had never intended tively conducted and some critics in charge of food production also to take part in the wartime govern- looked to the dynamic leader of came to nothing, not least because of food pro- ment.88 Somewhat sooner, Sylvester earlier years to provide an alterna- Lloyd George let it be known that realised that Lloyd George was tive, not least because he seemed he would want to retain the right duction also never going to act: ‘he is just put- the best placed figure to bring the to criticise the overall war effort – a ting off, putting off. It used to be Labour Party into a genuinely virtually impossible condition for came to because Neville was in; now he is National Government. But Lloyd the new premier to accept. Lloyd nothing, not waiting, still waiting. Tactics, tac- George himself remained cautious. George claimed not to be disap- tics, tactics.’89 ‘It would have to be made perfectly pointed, making the composi- least because The somewhat unedifying spec- clear’, he advised Sylvester, ‘that tion of Churchill’s government, in tacle of Churchill trying to coax I could not bring about a decisive which Chamberlain retained high Lloyd George Lloyd George back into office victory, as I did last time. We have office as Lord President and virtu- came to an end when the latter, made so many mistakes that we are ally prime minister of the Home let it be ostensibly on his doctor’s advice, not in nearly as good a position.’80 Front, his explanation. ‘I would declined the offer of the Washing- As the ill-fated expedition to simply be there fretting and fum- known that ton embassy after the sudden death Norway hastened the crisis of ing and having no real authority … of Lord Lothian in December 1940. Chamberlain’s premiership, the Neville would have infinitely more he would A final line was drawn with a bitter usually well-informed National authority than I would have, and exchange between the two men in Labour MP, Harold Nicolson, he would oppose everything I pro- want to the Commons the following May. A noted that people ‘are talking of posed.’84 When, at the end of May, characteristically defeatist contribu- Lloyd George as a possible P.M. Churchill did offer him a posi- retain the tion from Lloyd George was greeted Eden is out of it. Churchill is tion in the War Cabinet, subject to by the Prime Minister’s suggestion undermined by the Conservative Chamberlain’s agreement, Lloyd right to criti- that it was ‘the sort of speech with caucus.’81 A lunch with J. L. Garvin George again took offence. Even which, I imagine, the illustrious of the Observer and the Tory MP, when Chamberlain’s agreement cise the over- and venerable Marshal Pétain might Nancy Astor, was designed, as the appeared to have been obtained, well have enlivened the closing days latter put it, to test Lloyd George’s Lloyd George still declined to serve all war effort of M. Reynaud’s Cabinet’.90 Com- ‘fitness to return to the helm of the in a government in which the for- – a virtually ing from his oldest political associ- ship of state’. But Thomas Jones mer Prime Minister was a senior ate, indeed friend, these words were got the impression that his former member. By the time that illness impossible meant to hurt Lloyd George; almost boss ‘preferred to await his coun- forced Chamberlain’s own resig- certainly they did. try’s summons a little longer, but nation in October, Lloyd George condition Lloyd George died on 26 March … expected to receive it as the had decided that he would prefer to 1945.91 The cancer which killed peril grew’.82 In reality, the poli- ‘wait until Winston is bust’ before for the new him had probably been weaken- tics of the situation demanded that taking office.85 ing his constitution for some time. any replacement for Chamberlain The historical parallel he drew premier to ‘He faltered a lot in his conversa- should come from the Conservative now was with Georges Clem- tion’, reported Cecil King as early Party as still the overwhelmingly enceau, who had only taken office accept. as October 1941, ‘lost the thread of

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 61 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945 his remarks, fumbled for the right contributes regularly to the Journal of 1971), p. 262. word, and spoke very slowly.’92 Liberal History. 16 Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 123. Until January 1945 he had remained 17 F. Stevenson, The Years That Are Past a constituency MP, albeit an 1 The phrase ‘the wonderful wizard as (London, 1967), p. 253. increasingly detached one, for the was’ was coined by William Barkley 18 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, pp. Caernarfon Boroughs seat which in the Daily Express, 9 May 1940. 99–100. he had represented since 1890. But 2 M. Thomson, David Lloyd George: The 19 Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 255. in his later years Lloyd George’s Official Biography (London, 1948), p. 20 Owen, Tempestuous Journey, p. 722. appearances in his constituency 23. 21 N. Nicolson (ed.), Harold Nicolson: became increasingly rare. Sylvester 3 K. Morgan, Lloyd George (London, Diaries and Letters 1930–1939 (London, noted discontent in the autumn 1974), p. 170. See also J. Campbell, 1966), p. 123. of 1938 that he had not addressed Lloyd George: The Goat in the Wilder- 22 Stevenson to Lloyd George 16 a political meeting there since the ness (London, 1977), passim. December 1931, Taylor (ed.), Darling election campaign of 1935.93 Some 4 F. Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd Pussy, p. 166. of his parliamentary performances, George His Life and Times (London, 23 Ibid., 19 May 1932, Taylor (ed.), Dar- such as his vote in support of con- 1954), p. 717; Thomson, Lloyd George, ling Pussy, p. 180. scription in 1939, did not go down pp. 405–06; Campbell, Goat, pp. 24 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, p. well among radical Welsh non- 293–94. 41. conformists.94 Indeed, the fear that 5 For an imaginative, but thoughtful, 25 Rowland, Lloyd George, p. 693. Lloyd George, even if fit enough to assessment of what might have hap- 26 Ibid., p. 698. campaign, might be unable to hold pened had Lloyd George not been 27 Ball (ed.), Headlam Diaries 1923–1935, his seat in a post-war general elec- indisposed, see J. Reynolds, ‘What if p. 233. tion was a factor in his decision to Lloyd George had done a deal with 28 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, p. accept a peerage to guarantee a new the Tories in 1931’ in D. Brack and 93. platform for his opinions on the I. Dale (eds), Prime Minister Boris and 29 A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Off the Record: coming peace settlement. other things that never happened (Lon- W.P. Crozier Political Interviews 1931– In political terms the last dec- don, 2011), pp. 27–46. 1943 (London, 1973), pp. 26–27. ade and a half of his life had proved 6 S. Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in 30 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, pp. relatively barren. Yet there were the Age of Baldwin and MacDonald: The 254–55. still times, particularly in the mid- Headlam Diaries 1923–1935 (London, 31 Ibid., p. 279. 1930s, when his return to high 1992), p. 217. 32 Ibid. office seemed a distinct possibil- His influence 7 C. Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George: 33 Ibid. ity. More generally, his influence The Diary of A.J. Sylvester 1931–45 34 Ibid., p. 282. lay largely in the minds of others lay largely (London, 1975), p. 39. 35 The approach to Addison was some- – the impact he could still exert in the minds 8 Campbell, Goat, p. 302. what quixotic granted their appar- on policy, the mischief he could 9 Lloyd George to Herbert Lewis 31 ently irreparable dispute over still create – a legacy of little more of others – December 1931, cited in P. Rowland, housing policy in 1921. than memories of the supreme Lloyd George (London, 1975), p. 695. 36 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, pp. power he had once exercised. The the impact 10 Rowland, Lloyd George. 293–94. lack of a strong party base, impor- 11 Lloyd George to Frances Stevenson 37 Jones, Diary with Letters, pp. 138–39. tant since 1916, became an ever he could 23 September 1932, cited in A.J.P. 38 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. 294. greater handicap. Only excep- Taylor (ed.), My Darling Pussy: The 39 Ball (ed.), Headlam Diaries 1923–1935, tional circumstances offered any still exert on Letters of Lloyd George and Frances Ste- p. 317. chance to overcome this. In 1931 venson 1913–41 (London, 1975), p. 189. 40 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, pp. a stricken Lloyd George was the policy, the 12 Thomson, Lloyd George, p. 25. 299–300. victim of sheer bad luck. In the 13 In later years Stevenson and Syl- 41 Ibid., p. 298. exceptional circumstances of the mischief he vester (supported by their respec- 42 A. J. Cummings, cited in R. Toye, Second World War, however, he tive families) disputed their relative Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for miscalculated. His pessimism was could still importance to Lloyd George. See, Greatness (London, 2007), p. 307. in many ways justified. He did not for example, ‘Diary of a Principal 43 Animosity between Lloyd George foresee, and few could have confi- create – a Private Secretary’, BBC Radio 4, and Chamberlain went back to the dently predicted, events such as the 25 September 1984 and subsequent latter’s unhappy tenure of the post of Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union legacy of letter from Muriel Stevenson to Director-General of National Ser- and the Japanese attack on Pearl the Radio Times. In support of Syl- vice in Lloyd George’s wartime gov- Harbor, which transformed Brit- little more vester’s importance as a witness to ernment, 1916–17. ain’s strategic outlook. But Lloyd than memo- Lloyd George’s political life, it may 44 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, p. George’s willingness publicly to be noted that, as an award-winning 118. contemplate defeat, or at least a ries of the practitioner of shorthand, he was 45 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. 302. disadvantageous peace, has served well-placed to record his master’s 46 N. J. Crowson (ed.), Fleet Street, Press to tarnish his long-term historical supreme words. See also, J. G. Jones, ‘Life with Barons and Politics: The Journals of Col- reputation. It was a sad end to a dis- Lloyd George’, Journal of Liberal His- lin Brooks, 1932–1940 (Cambridge, tinguished career. power he tory, 55 (2007), pp. 28–36. 1998), p. 101. 14 T. Jones, A Diary with Letters 1931– 47 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. 307. David Dutton is the author of A His- had once 1950 (London, 1954), p. 247. 48 Jones, Diary with Letters, pp. 146–47. tory of the Liberal Party since 15 A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A 49 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. 310; 1900 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) and exercised. Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, Owen, Tempestuous Journey, p. 729.

62 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 the wonderful wizard as was: lloyd george, 1931–1945

50 The Times, 5 June 1935. Morgan (ed.), Lloyd George: Fam- p. 201. October 1967. 51 S. Koss, ‘Lloyd George and ily Letters 1885–1936 (London, 73 S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets 84 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, Nonconformity: the Last 1973), p. 211. 1931–1963 (London, 1974), p. 413. p. 261. Rally’, English Historical Review, 61 S. Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics 74 House of Commons Debates, 5th 85 Ibid., p. 281. LXXXIX (1974), p. 91. in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: Series, vol. 351, cols 299–300. 86 King, With Malice, p. 52. 52 Taylor (ed.), Off the Record, p. 49. The Headlam Diaries 1935–1951 75 Sylvester to wife, 20 September 87 Stevenson to Lloyd George 26 53 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. (Cambridge, 1999), p. 105. 1939, cited in Lentin, Lost Peace, September 1940, Taylor (ed.), 312. 62 See also A. Lentin, Lloyd George p. 113. Darling Pussy, p. 234. 54 Stevenson to F. Brett Young 7 and the Lost Peace: From Versailles 76 Ibid., 4 October 1939, cited in 88 Stevenson, Years That Are Past, p. August 1935, cited in Toye, Lloyd to Hitler 1919–1940 (Basingstoke, Lentin, Lost Peace, p. 115. 261. George and Churchill, p. 311. 2001), pp. 89–105. 77 C. King, With Malice Toward 89 A. J. Sylvester, The Real Lloyd 55 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. 63 House of Commons Debates, 5th None: A War Diary (London, George (London, 1947), p. 275. 318; Thomson, Lloyd George, p. 27. Series, vol. 310, col. 1542. 1970), p. 7. 90 Owen, Tempestuous Journey, p. 753. 56 Taylor (ed.), Off the Record, p. 50. 64 Rowland, Lloyd George, p. 746. 78 K. O. Morgan, The Age of Lloyd 91 Many aspects of Lloyd George’s 57 Ball (ed.), Headlam Diaries 1923– 65 Owen, Tempestuous Journey, pp. George: The Liberal Party and Brit- final years have been considered 1935, p. 343. 732–33. ish Politics 1890–1929 (London, by J. Graham Jones. See, inter 58 Bodleian Library, Conservative 66 Ibid., p. 743. 1971), pp. 222–24. alia, ‘Keeper of Secrets’, Journal Party Archive, CRD 1/64/12, 67 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, 79 King, With Malice, p. 13. of Liberal History, 44 (2004), pp. report of Sub-committee B, p. 219. 80 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, 24–29, and ‘David and Frances: July 1935. I am grateful to Chris 68 Ibid., p. 232. p. 256. Lloyd George’s Second Mar- Cooper for this reference. 69 Ibid., p. 227. 81 N. Nicolson (ed.), Harold Nicol- riage’, ibid., 74 (2012), pp. 30–39. 59 Taylor (ed.), Stevenson Diary, p. 70 Thomson, Lloyd George, p. 437. son: Diaries and Letters 1939–45 92 King, With Malice, p. 142. 320. 71 Ball (ed.), Headlam Diaries 1935– (London, 1967), p. 75. 93 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, 60 Lloyd George to Margaret Lloyd 1951, p. 148. 82 Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 457. p. 220. George 18 December 1935, K. 72 Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George, 83 D. Foot in The Observer, 29 94 Ibid., p. 230. Lloyd George Society Weekend School

Celebrate the 150th anniversary of the birth of David Lloyd George in the company of the Lloyd George Society 15–17 February 2013; Hotel Commodore, Spa Road, Llandrindod Wells, Powys, LD1 5ER

Friday 15 February • Dinner and formal welcome from the President of the Society, Lord Thomas of Gresford

Saturday 16 February • A tribute to Emlyn Hooson Various speakers • The UK coalition’s economic strategy: the view from the centre-right David Melding AM (Conservative, South Wales Central) Gorwel Think Tank • Britain’s changing education system Professor Chris Taylor, Cardiff University • The Lloyd George Museum at Llanystumdwy Nest Thomas, Curator • Jennifer Longford, daughter of Lloyd George? Dr J. Graham Jones, National Library of Wales • Dinner Baroness Jenny Randerson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Wales Office

Sunday 17 February • Annual General Meeting • Debate: Does the referendum on Scottish independence make it more likely that Wales will wish to break away from the UK? Baroness Randerson will debate with Syd Morgan of the Wales Nationalism Foundation • Panel session led by Roger Williams MP

For more details and costs, see http://lloydgeorgesociety.org.uk/en/; or telephone 0121 308 5950.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 63 The Beaverbrook Library, A. J. P. Taylor and the Rise of Lloyd George Studies by Chris Wrigley

.J.P. Taylor (1906–90) differ as to Lloyd George’s activi- 1914–1945, published in November played a major role in the ties in December 1916, the details 1965.7 He had taken on writing the reassessment of David of the ‘complex intrigue’ have so volume in 1957. He later recalled A 4 Lloyd George that took place in the far eluded later historians. Trevor of his wide reading for the book 1960s and after. He did so through Wilson’s far more significant study that it resulted in ‘two spin-offs: his own writings and through his published in 1966, The Downfall the Raleigh lecture to the Brit- encouragement of other people’s of the Liberal Party, painted a taw- ish Academy on Politics in the First research at the Beaverbrook Library dry picture of Lloyd George’s World War and the Leslie Stephen between 1967 and 1976. manoeuvres within the Liberal lecture at Cambridge on Lloyd When Taylor’s 1959 and 1961 Party, drawing often on the hostile George: Rise and Fall’.8 Neither lec- lectures, ‘Politics in the First World comments in the correspondence ture drew on archival research War’ and ‘Lloyd George: Rise and between Asquith’s ardent follow- When Tay- but both were based on printed Fall’ were given, the history of Lib- ers. Wilson balanced this towards diaries and autobiographies, Han- eral politics in the first half of the the end of the book by paying lor’s 1959 and sard (House of Commons Debates) twentieth century was dominated tribute to Lloyd George’s dyna- and secondary sources. Both dealt by accounts highly sympathetic to mism and daring, as a radical and 1961 lectures with Lloyd George. The lecture H. H. Asquith and his independ- as a war leader: ‘Time and again were given, on wartime politics was a dazzling ent Liberals of 1916–23.1 Not only Lloyd George proved himself to study of Lloyd George’s ascent to had Asquith published his memoirs be the necessary man.’ Neverthe- the history the premiership and the politi- and reflections first but also, after less, otherwise Lloyd George does cal circumstances that kept him his death, his papers were available not come out well. He was a man of Liberal there, giving attention to the role in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, of ‘sharp practice’ and was ‘often of backbenchers and also the press. before those of Lloyd George unscrupulous and disloyal’, with politics in He rightly judged it ‘the best lec- became generally available with his plotting in December 1916 still ture I have ever given, in form the opening of the Beaverbrook assumed.5 From 1960, Roy Jen- the first and content’.9 The distinguished Library in May 1967.2 kins used Asquith’s papers and American historian Alfred Gol- Taylor’s essays on Lloyd George also Asquith’s letters to Venetia half of the lin commented that it ‘is a con- and the politics of 1914–22 were Stanley for his 1964 biography of tribution of vital consequence … harbingers of change. In the early Herbert Henry Asquith, in which twentieth it opens up the entire subject in a and mid 1960s it was normal to a chapter is headed with Asquith’s way that has not been done by any- depict Lloyd George detrimentally illustrious sobriquet, ‘The Last of century was one else’.10 when considered with Asquith. the Romans’, presumably indi- Taylor’s most substantial reas- Perhaps the nadir of Lloyd George cating nobility in politics before dominated sessment of Lloyd George was made denigration was marked in 1963 by the advent of the barbarians. Jen- in his 1961 Leslie Stephen lecture, Donald McCormick’s The Mask kins’ biographer John Campbell by accounts which complements the earlier lec- of Merlin, a biography which usu- shrewdly observed that Jenkins’ ture. In his autobiography he wrote ally took the worst view of its portrait of Asquith presented him highly sym- that: ‘I am assured, [it] launched subject. That Lloyd George was ‘as calm, rational, unhurried and pathetic to Lloyd George studies on a new, a villain, at least in 1916, even if superior’ and ‘his magisterial view more rewarding course, which was not of the dimensions of Shake- of politics prevails over all’. This H. H. Asquith not my intention though I am glad speare’s Richard III, was taken was very much a contrast with of it.’ In this he referred, among oth- for granted in David Thomson’s Lloyd George. Jenkins was critical and his inde- ers, to Stephen Koss, who had writ- 1965 Penguin history, England in of Asquith, but later biographers ten that the lecture was a ‘tour de force the Twentieth Century, where the of Asquith were more so.6 pendent that captured Lloyd George’s incan- author wrote without qualifica- Alan Taylor came to reassess descent sparkle, his restlessness, tion that Lloyd George ousted Lloyd George as part of his early Liberals of and, not least of all, his predicament Asquith with ‘ruthless skill’ by a work for his Oxford History of as a permanent outsider in British ‘complex intrigue’.3 While views England volume on the period 1916–23. politics’.11

64 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 the beaverbook library, a.j.p. taylor and the rise of lloyd george studies

In his 1961 Lloyd George essay Alan Taylor’s eventual second wife. Taylor vis- the day after Beaverbrook’s birth) Taylor, when referring to his acces- ited her and was impressed, ‘see- and the amendment of the Public sion to the premiership in 1916, history of ing flashes of the Frances who had Records Act 1958 in 1967 so that commented that ‘even the incom- charmed Lloyd George and other most government records became parable dissection by Lord Beaver- 1914–1945 men also’.15 Frances Stevenson’s available after thirty, not fifty, years brook, which will be read as long diaries are a notably useful source (so in January 1968, papers of 1937, as men are interested in political has David for Lloyd George both ‘as a man as not 1917, were the latest for public tactics, leaves much unsaid.’ Bea- well as a statesman’, giving Lloyd inspection) gave a great boost to the verbrook had published Politicians Lloyd George George’s versions of events as told study of Lloyd George’s career. Bea- and the War 1914–16, two volumes, to an admiring much younger verbrook had bought collections of in 1928 and 1932, and Men and and Winston woman. The diaries’ value is viti- early twentieth-century political Power, 1917–18, in 1956. Alan Tay- Churchill as ated to some extent by sizeable gaps papers much as lesser mortals buy lor reviewed Men and Power in The in entries for some crucial periods.16 rare postage stamps. He had secured Observer on 26 October 1956. He its heroes, Much the same applies to the edited Frank Owen, a journalist and for- praised it as ‘equally exciting and correspondence between Lloyd mer Liberal MP, to write a biogra- equally entertaining’ as the earlier though George and Stevenson, which illu- phy of Lloyd George (with inputs two volumes but wisely added, ‘He minates Lloyd George in love as from himself and Lloyd George’s may sometimes exaggerate the part the book is well as throwing some light on widow, the former Frances Steven- that he has played in events’. While politics.17 son). He also gave the historian Rob- Beaverbrook also emphasised, and marked by Alan Taylor’s innovatory lec- ert Blake access to the Bonar Law even exaggerated, the role of his tures on Lloyd George were not Papers for a biography of Andrew political mentor, Andrew Bonar reapprais- the only important fresh work on Bonar Law. Beaverbrook gave both Law, his three books on First World Lloyd George before his papers authors access to his own papers and War politics also shone a bright als of many became available. There was to those of the subjects of their biog- light on Lloyd George, as did his much written from 1960 on Lloyd raphies, while Blake in addition had later book The Decline and Fall of leading George’s Welsh political context access to Lloyd George’s papers.22 Lloyd George (1963). Taylor tackled by Kenneth O. Morgan. In 1963 Thereafter, Beaverbrook and his the wartime politics and the role of politicians. Morgan marked the centenary of assistants quarried his archive up to Lloyd George in these two lectures Lloyd George’s birth with a superb his death on 9 June 1964. A select of 1959 and 1961 primarily because short booklet (eighty pages of text) few authors were allowed to see he was working on the early chap- in which he explored ‘the place the Lloyd George, Bonar Law and ters of English History 1914–1945 but of Lloyd George in the history of Beaverbrook Papers either at Bea- also in selecting these themes he modern Wales’ and ‘the importance verbrook’s home, Cherkley Court, was consciously following in the of his Welsh background in his near Leatherhead, Surrey, or to see footsteps of Beaverbrook, now a general career in British and world selections at the Express offices in friend and even patron in terms of politics’.18 This re-evaluation of London. These included Alfred Gol- newspaper opportunities.12 Lloyd George complemented Mor- lin, John Grigg (politician and biog- Alan Taylor’s history of 1914– gan’s seminal work on Welsh mod- rapher of Lloyd George), Arthur 1945 has David Lloyd George and ern political history, Wales In British Marder (the distinguished naval his- Winston Churchill as its heroes, Politics 1868–1922. This thoroughly torian) and Alan Taylor (after Bea- though the book is marked by reap- researched book, written before verbrook’s death). praisals of many leading politicians. either the London or Aberystwyth The main Beaverbrook Library His verdict on the Liberal divide sets of Lloyd George’s papers were collections (Lloyd George, Bonar of 1916 was: ‘Asquith in fact, not available, provided a rich, detailed Law, Beaverbrook) were so impor- Lloyd George, pursued a personal study of his Welsh political con- tant that they inevitably led to vendetta. He split the Liberal Party text, something that needed doing major work on British political and riveted on his adherents, how- since the enthusiastic, even eulogis- history of the first four decades ever unwillingly, the appearance tic, biographies written before the of the twentieth century. Taylor’s of opposing a government that was First World War and after.19 Along- involvement did not greatly affect fighting the war.’13 Taylor wrote his side these books, Kenneth Morgan this basic point. Nevertheless, the Oxford history ahead of the release published from 1960 a great many research was fostered by Alan Tay- of the British government archives articles and essays on Lloyd George lor as Honorary Director of the under the then fifty-year rule of clo- and the Welsh politics of his time, Library. His presence added to its sure. As a result he could not check twenty-six of which were later attraction. He was punctilious in many assumptions. He was often collected together in a large vol- his relationship with readers at the brilliantly right in his surmises as ume which is also essential reading archive. He enquired eagerly after to what occurred, but sometimes for Lloyd George’s career.20 Mor- the research of both the established was not.14 Nevertheless, nearly fifty gan also provided much fresh pri- academics and the newest of post- years on, the book remains influen- mary material for those interested graduates. The Library was very tial in its judgements of politics and in Lloyd George’s career and first modern, air-conditioned, with politicians of its period, not least on marriage by editing Lloyd George’s attractive display cases for car- Lloyd George and Churchill. letters to his wife, Margaret, with toons, letters and other documents, Taylor further contributed to some additional family material.21 framed David Low cartoons on the the study of Lloyd George by edit- The combination of the open- walls, Beaverbrook’s own early ing the records of Frances Steven- ing of the Beaverbrook Library on twentieth-century political history son, his long-term mistress and 25 May 1967 eighty-eight years to books on shelves below wooden

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 65 the beaverbook library, a.j.p. taylor and the rise of lloyd george studies counters around the circumference Liberal Party declined, the lead- As a result of Boyce and Paul Addison. However, of the readers’ part of the room, ing figures did nothing to stop it, the contents were different, though modern wooden tables to work on even helped it. However, they saw the presence George Boyce and Paul Addison and even Walter Sickert’s portrait to it that the whole process was did contribute to the resulting vol- of Beaverbrook within the entrance well documented!’23 He continued of such an ume, Lloyd George: Twelve Essays to this big room located above a to chair early twentieth-century (Hamish Hamilton, 1973). Taylor store for huge reels of newsprint. research papers, including some on array of dis- included most of the best Lloyd The number of researchers at Lloyd George, when, along with George papers given to his seminar any one time was limited usually John Ramsden, Martin Ceadel and tinguished between the first one by Michael to between six and eight. When I Kathy Burk, he ran a seminar at the Dockrill on 12 December 1968 worked there regularly in 1968–71 Institute of Historical Research, scholars, and one given by George Boyce on the others present included the London University, from 1977 to for young 1 January 1970. He had hopes of politicians Richard Law and Din- 1985. Many of the regular attend- editing a second volume of Lloyd gle Foot; the North American ers of the Beaverbrook Library research- George essays on foreign policy historians Louis Bisceglia, Peter seminar attended the seminars at after 1914, but this never happened. Cline, Michael Fry, Bentley B. the Institute, along with a fresh ers there As it was, the one volume added Gilbert, Alfred Gollin, Stephen cohort of younger researchers such to the seminar in disseminating Koss, W. Roger Louis, Chuck Bul- as Josie Howie, Helen Jones and was a sense research on Lloyd George. litt Lowry and Jon Sumida; older Duncan Tanner. His contribu- The period in which the Lloyd British historians Maurice Cowl- tions after seminar papers contin- of occasion George Papers were in the Beaver- ing, David Dilks, Michael Dock- ued to be stimulating. For instance, brook Library (1967–75), between rill, Roy Douglas, John Grigg, after a paper by John Ramsden on being there being located in the former cin- Peter Lowe, Kenneth O. Mor- the National Governments of the ema room at Cherkley and, since gan, Charles Loch Mowat, Henry 1930s, he observed waspishly of the and a feel- 1975, in the House of Lords Record Pelling, Keith Robbins, Peter National Liberal Party that: Office, was a notably fruitful time Rowland and Stephen Roskill; ing of the for Lloyd George research (with Australian scholars such as David It was one episode from 1922 the resulting work often published Cuthbert and Cameron Hazle- to the present day in the long desirability later). Among very notable work by hurst; and younger researchers search for Liberal voters … [T] overseas established scholars, Bent- such as Paul Addison, Michael he differences between the Sam- of upping ley B. Gilbert carried out research Bentley, John Campbell, Martin uelites and Simonites were very one’s game on his detailed biography of Lloyd Ceadel, Chris Cook, Patricia Jal- thin. Samuel, despite his air of George (two volumes). Michael Fry land, Gillian Peele, Martin Pugh, Liberal rectitude, was less radi- in writing worked on Lloyd George and for- John Ramsden, Alan Sked, John cal than the younger Simonites. eign policy (two volumes), Bruce Spiers and John Turner. As a result The Samuelites were a decay- history. Murray researched ‘The People’s of the presence of such an array of ing cause, whereas the Simonites Budget’ and R. Q. Adams wrote distinguished scholars, for young did attract young people. By the on Lloyd George and munitions.26 researchers there was a sense of late 1930s the National pretence Of well-established British schol- occasion being there and a feel- did not help the Tories but it did ars, Kenneth O. Morgan contin- ing of the desirability of upping enable the Liberals to survive. ued to publish outstanding work one’s game in writing history. The The Samuelites could return, on Lloyd George, notably on the Library and the seminar were also nearly as high, to office in the post-war coalition government, important for networking, with Grand Coalition of the Second Maurice Cowling’s major work valuable contacts and friendships World War.24 crossed Lloyd George’s politi- made. For young British historians cal career, and Michael Dock- the contacts with North Ameri- Even before the first pair of semi- rill produced important work on can historians were especially nars in December 1968 he was plan- aspects of foreign policy.27 After valuable. ning a book of essays on Lloyd the publication of two volumes Alan Taylor made the Beaver- George, based on research under- on the Campbell-Bannerman and brook Library more of a research taken in large part at the Beaver- Asquith Liberal governments, Peter centre than just an archive by run- brook Library. He wrote to his Rowland researched the archives ning a research seminar during uni- publisher, Roger Machell of Ham- for his large one-volume biogra- versity vacations from December ish Hamilton, on 14 October 1968: phy of Lloyd George.28 Among 1968 until its closure in April 1975. ‘I have had something like 150 the postgraduates who researched The quality level of the papers at researchers here during the last aspects of Lloyd George’s career the seminar was high. Alan Taylor eighteen months and should like to in the Beaverbrook Library were sat through the papers like a bird see something of their researches. John Campbell, whose subsequent resting with its head lowered on Between a dozen and twenty of book provided the best account of one side. Any notion that he had them are willing to contribute an Lloyd George between 1922 and fallen asleep went swiftly at the article (I suppose 10,000 words) to 1929, Chris Cook, who analysed end when he made usually very a Lloyd George volume.’ At that Liberal decline from 1922 to 1929, acute comments on the papers. stage he was predicting essays on John Turner, who examined Lloyd He also made impish comments Lloyd George and the 1909 budget, George’s ‘Garden Suburb’, and the which contained shrewdness. After housing, Ireland and Hitler.25 He current author, who investigated a paper by Roy Douglas, Alan may have had in mind Bruce Mur- Lloyd George’s relationship with Taylor commented, ‘Whilst the ray, Frank Honigsbaum, George labour.29

66 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 the beaverbook library, a.j.p. taylor and the rise of lloyd george studies

Alan Taylor played a substantial Chris Wrigley was Professor of Modern Press, 1980, p. 50. role in the re-evaluation of Lloyd British History at Nottingham Univer- 11 Ibid., p. 233. Stephen Koss, ‘Asquith George’s career. His publications sity, 1991–2012, and is now Emeritus versus Lloyd George: The Last were very significant in moving Professor. He earlier taught at Queen’s Phase and Beyond’ in Alan Sked away from the denigration of Lloyd University, Belfast and Loughborough and Chris Cook, eds., Crisis and George that was common well in to University. As well as books on Lloyd Controversy: Essays in Honour of A. J. the 1960s. He played a further role George, his other books include biogra- P. Taylor, Macmillan, 1976, pp. 66–89 at the Beaverbrook Library. The phies of Arthur Henderson, Winston (quotation at p. 69). collections of papers themselves Churchill and A.J.P. Taylor and others 12 On Beaverbrook’s role in Taylor’s were the major impetus to fresh on labour and economic history. He was Express contracts see Chris Wrigley, views, but Taylor added to this by President of the Historical Association, A. J. P. Taylor: Radical Historian of his presence, by his editing of the 1996–99, and was awarded an honor- Europe, IB Tauris, 2006, pp. 278–81. Frances Stevenson material and the ary doctorate by the University of East On Taylor being unduly kind to Lloyd George research essays, and Anglia in 1998. Beaverbrook’s history books, see by running a greatly appreciated Peter Fraser, ‘Lord Beaverbrook’s research seminar. 1 A. J. P. Taylor, ‘Politics in the First fabrications in Politicians and the War, However, the new evaluations World War’, Raleigh Lecture on 1914–1916’, Historical Journal, 25, 1982, of Lloyd George’s career were History, 4 February 1959, British pp. 147–66. driven primarily by the availability Academy/Oxford University Press, 13 Taylor, English History, p. 70. of private papers, not only those of 1959, and Lloyd George: Rise and Fall, 14 After the public records were opened Lloyd George and Bonar Law but Leslie Stephen Lecture, 21 April 1961, under a new thirty-year rule in 1967, also of other Welsh, English, Scot- Cambridge University Press, 1961 Taylor spoke of correcting his book, tish and Irish politicians, as well as (both reprinted in A. J. P. Taylor, but he never did (though there were the very abundant public records From the Boer War to the Cold War, minor corrections and an updated available at the Public Record Hamish Hamilton, pp197–249). bibliography in 1975). The current Office (now the National Archive). For an example of an earlier hostile author (CJW) corrected many errors, Frances Stevenson played a major biography see Sir Charles Mallet, Mr added a further updated bibliography role from 1912 – the year she started Lloyd George: A Study (Benn, 1930), and an introduction to the Folio work as Lloyd George’s secretary pp. 309–13. For Kenneth O. Morgan’s Society edition in 2000. – in ensuring that the main col- 1972 survey of writing on Lloyd 15 Wrigley, Taylor: Radical Historian, p. lection of Lloyd George’s papers is George, see his collected Welsh 314. voluminous. Lloyd George himself history essays, Modern Wales: Politics, 16 A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Lloyd George: played a big role in the expansion of Places and People, Cardiff, University A Diary by Frances Stevenson, Cabinet and related records when of Wales Press, 1995, pp. 380–99. Hutchinson, 1971, p. ix. he altered the administration of the 2 Asquith’s papers were given to Balliol 17 A J P. Taylor, ed., My Darling Pussy: Cabinet in December 1916, with Sir College in 1941 and made over to the The Letters of Lloyd George and Frances Maurice Hankey and Thomas Jones Bodleian Library in 1964. Further Stevenson 1913–41, Weidenfeld and executing these changes. papers were deposited in 1980, and Nicolson, 1975. By the 1980s Lloyd George’s given to the Bodleian in 1982. 18 Kenneth O. Morgan, David Lloyd career was more fully understood 3 David Thomson, England in the George: Welsh Radical as World than it had been twenty years ear- By the Twentieth Century, Penguin, 1965, p.47 Statesman, Cardiff, University of lier. He was not liable to be seen 4 Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘The Wales Press, 1963, p. 3. He later wrote as some mysterious being, a view 1980s Lloyd Conspiracy Myth’ in Martin Gilbert, an outstanding short biography, immortalised by the economist J. ed., Lloyd George, New Jersey, Lloyd George, Weidenfeld and M. Keynes who wrote after the George’s Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp.148–57. Nicolson, 1974, in a series edited by 1919 Paris Peace Conference, ‘Lloyd 5 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the A. J. P. Taylor. George is rooted in nothing; he is career was Liberal Party 1914–1935 (Collins, 1966, 19 Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British void and without content; he lives pp. 91, 95 and 387–88). Politics 1868–1922, Cardiff, University and feeds on his immediate sur- more fully 6 Roy Jenkins, Asquith, Collins, 1964, of Wales Press, 1970 (with later roundings …’.30 Sixty years later, second edition, 1978. Jenkins deemed editions in 1970 and 1992). This the considerable research that had understood it his best book. Roy Jenkins, A was supplemented by his Rebirth of been undertaken for two decades in Life at the Centre, Macmillan, 1991, a Nation: Wales 1880–1980, Oxford, the Welsh context from which he than it had pp. 134–35. John Campbell, Roy Clarendon Press, 1981, volume 6 of the stemmed made it very clear that he Jenkins: A Biography, Weidenfeld and Oxford History of Wales. Examples was rooted in something – Welsh been twenty Nicolson, 1983, pp.45–46. For a more of enthusiastic early biographies radical politics – and that there were years earlier. critical reassessment, see Stephen include two four-volume works by key issues, such as land reform, Koss, Asquith, Allen Lane, 1976. H. Du Parq (1912–13) and J. Hugh which mattered to him through- He was not 7 A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914– Edwards (1913) and one-volume out his career. The research under- 1945, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. books by J. T. Davies in Welsh (1910) taken in the era of the Beaverbrook liable to be 8 A. J. P. Taylor, A Personal History, and Beriah Evans (1916). Perhaps the Library, both there and elsewhere, Hamish Hamilton, 1983, p. 233. best of the pre-Second World War moved assessments of Lloyd George seen as some 9 Ibid. biographies on Lloyd George’s career on from such attitudes towards 10 A.F. Gollin to author (CJW), 4 before the First World War was by W. him as ‘the bounder from Wales’ to mysterious February 1977; quoted in Chris Watkin Davies (1939). more sympathetic and more com- Wrigley, A. J. P. Taylor: A Complete 20 Kenneth O. Morgan, Modern Wales: plex views.31 being … Bibliography, Hassocks, Harvester Politics, Places and People, Cardiff,

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 67 the beaverbook library, a.j.p. taylor and the rise of lloyd george studies

University of Wales Press, 1995. Most edition of A. J. P. Taylor, Lloyd 29 John Campbell, Lloyd George: the Goat of the essays were first published in George: Twelve Essays, Aldershot, in the Wilderness, Jonathan Cape, 1977. Welsh learned journals. The Welsh Gregg Revivals, 1993. Chris Cook, The Age of Alignment: dimension was further examined by 26 Bentley B. Gilbert, David Lloyd Electoral Politics in Britain 1922–1929, Lloyd George’s nephew, drawing on George: The Architect of Change 1863– Macmillan, 1975. John Turner, his father’s papers – W. R. P. George, 1912, Batsford, 1987, and David Lloyd Lloyd George’s Secretariat, Cambridge The Making of Lloyd George, Faber George: Organiser of Victory 1912–1916, University Press, 1980 and British and Faber, 1976, and Lloyd George: Batsford, 1972. Michael G. Fry, Lloyd Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Backbencher, Llandysul, Gomer, 1983 George and Foreign Policy: the Education Conflict 1915–1918, Yale University – and by J. Graham Jones with a of a Statesman 1890–1916, Montreal, Press, 1992. Chris Wrigley, David series of articles in learned journals McGill-Queens University Press, Lloyd George and the British Labour between 1982 and 2001, collected 1977, and And Fortune Fled: David Lloyd Movement: Peace and War, Hassocks, in his David Lloyd George and Welsh George, the First Democratic Statesman, Harvester Press, 1976, Lloyd George Liberalism, Aberystwyth, National 1916–1922, New York, Peter Lang, and the Challenge of Labour: Post- Library of Wales, 2011. 2011. R. Q. Adams, Arms and the war Coalition 1918–22, Brighton, 21 Kenneth O. Morgan, Lloyd George Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1990, and Family Letters 1885–1936, Cardiff, Munitions, London, Cassell, 1978. ‘Lloyd George and the Labour Party University of Wales Press and 27 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and after 1922’ in Judith Loades, ed., Oxford University Press, 1973. Disunity: the Lloyd George Coalition Life and Times of David Lloyd George, 22 Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Government 1918–1922, Oxford Bangor, Headstart Publications, Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew University Press, 1979. Maurice 1991, pp. 49–69. Bonar Law, 1858–1923, Eyre and Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 30 John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Spottiswoode, 1955. Frank Owen, Cambridge University Press, 1971, Biography, Macmillan, 1933, p.36. Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, His and The Impact of Hitler: British Politics 31 This sneer was used (without Life and Times, Hutchinson, 1954. and British Policy 1933–1940, Cambridge approval) by Don Cregier for the 23 Beaverbrook Library seminar, 1 July University Press, 1975. Michael title of his study, Bounder from Wales: 1971; author’s notes. Dockrill and J. D. Goold, Peace without Lloyd George’s career before the First 24 15 March 1978; author’s notes. Promise: Britain and the peace conferences World War, Columbia, University of 25 Hamish Hamilton Papers, Bristol 1919–1923, Batsford, 1981. Missouri Press, 1976. University Library; quoted in Chris 28 Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, Barrie Wrigley, ‘Introduction’ to second and Jenkins, 1975.

Lloyd George archives by J. Graham Jones

Parliamentary Archive, House of Lords At his death in March 1945, Lloyd The archive runs to no fewer Class E Secretary of State for George bequeathed to his second than 1041 boxes. They have been War, June – December 1916 (10 wife Frances, Countess Lloyd- listed, divided into nine series, boxes) George of Dwyfor, a substantial each distinguished by a letter of the Class F Prime Minister, 1916–22 archive of both political and per- alphabet; the first seven series cor- (254 boxes) sonal papers, primarily the former. respond to the main divisions in Class G 1922–45 (264 boxes) She then sold the entire archive in Lloyd George’s political career: Class H Press cuttings (390 boxes) 1949 to Lord Beaverbrook. The papers are still owned by the Bea- Political Papers Personal Papers verbrook Foundation, but since Class A Member of Parliament, Class I Personal correspondence 1975 they have been deposited at 1890–1905 (13 boxes) and papers (42 boxes) the House of Lords Record Office Class B President of the Board of (now called the Parliamentary Trade, 1905–08 (5 boxes) Also deposited at the Parliamentary Archive). Substantial numbers of Class C Chancellor of the Archive at the House of Lords is a official papers survive among the Exchequer, 1908–15 (36 boxes) substantial group of the papers of Lloyd George Papers at the House Class D Minister of Munitions, Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George’s of Lords. 1915–16 (27 boxes) secretary, mistress and eventually

68 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 lloyd george archives his second wife. Many of these are disappointingly brief and Sales advertisement relate to Lloyd George. These much less informative. papers include many photo- Other items of interest in graphs, some personal cor- this group include NLW MS respondence, and a draft of 20,443A, a stray diary kept Frances’s autobiography (pub- intermittently by Lloyd George lished as The Years that are Past between January and Novem- (Hutchinson, 1967)). There is ber 1887 when he was already also Frances’s correspondence taking a keen interest in politi- with Lloyd George (extracts cal life. NLW MS 20,444A published as A. J. P. Taylor is a diary containing only (ed.), My Darling Pussy: the Let- two entries for January 1889. ters of Lloyd George and Frances NLW MSS 20,444A–52A, and Stevenson, 1913–41 (Weiden- 20,454–55E are mainly note- feld and Nicolson, 1975)), and books and bound volumes of her diaries for the years 1914 to speech notes prepared between 1944 (extracts published as A. 1885 and the 1930s. The great J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: majority of these are in the a Diary by Frances Stevenson hand of David Lloyd George. (Hutchinson, 1971)). NLW MS 20,451A is a note- book kept by Dame Marga- ret Lloyd George and contains National Library of Wales, fairly detailed notes of a family Aberystwyth tour on the Continent during August and September 1929. Brynawelon group (NLW MSS NLW MS 20,455E comprises a 20,403–93) miscellaneous group of politi- The first major Lloyd George cal papers, a few concerning the archive to be purchased by Irish question, 1916–22 (includ- the National Library of Wales ing Asquith’s notes for a speech (in 1969) was the substantial in the House of Commons dur- group of correspondence and ing 1916), and some deriving papers, running to almost from the general election of 3,500 items, which had been October 1922. assembled at the family home NLW MSS 20,462–63C Earl Lloyd-George Papers (NLW Edward as Prince of Wales at at Brynawelon, Criccieth. By comprise a miscellaneous MSS 21,787–92, 22,514–37 and Caernarfon Castle in 1911, and far the most important part of group of 160 letters addressed NLW ex 1069) the First World War. the archive is the long series of to Lloyd George, mainly from The Library was able to just over 2,000 letters or notes politicians and other promi- purchase in 1982 and 1987 two William George Papers from Lloyd George to Dame nent individuals. Many of these groups of correspondence and The largest and perhaps the Margaret, beginning in 1886, correspondents are represented papers from the third Earl most significant of all the just before their marriage, and by only a single letter. These Lloyd-George of Dwyfor Lloyd George archives in the continuing until 1936. These volumes also include a small which he, in turn, had possession of the National have been catalogued as NLW number of drafts and cop- inherited from his father, Library became available for MSS 20,403–42. Until about ies of letters penned by Lloyd Richard Lloyd George, the purchase in September 1989 1917 Lloyd George spent long George, and a handful of let- second earl. Richard had – the magnificent collection and frequent periods away ters which simply refer to him, presumably collected these of correspondence and papers from his family, and wrote perhaps originally enclosures. papers during the course of accumulated by Lloyd George’s home almost daily, occasion- NLW MSS 20,469–71C com- his lifetime. The material only brother William George ally more than once a day. This prise three volumes of more acquired in 1982 now forms (1865–1967). Quite apart from magnificent sequence of letters than 300 letters to Dame Mar- NLW MSS 21,787–90E, the immensely rich runs of casts light on Lloyd George’s garet, mostly relating to her 21,791C and 21,792E. There are correspondence, the Wil- personality and viewpoint in social and public life. The some 200 letters and papers, liam George Papers include a number of ways. They are numerous correspondents most of these addressed to ten pocket diaries kept by the especially full (over 1,000 let- include a wide range of figures Lloyd George, together with young Lloyd George between ters) from the time of his first in English and Welsh public a few notes in his hand. The 1878 (when he was only fifteen election to Westminster in life. NLW MSS 20,475C and bulk of the correspondence years of age) and 1888, together April 1890 until the period of 20,482C are bound volumes of concerns Welsh affairs, mainly with a stray volume bearing the Boer War. From about 1902 letters to Lady Megan Lloyd the Disestablishment and but very brief notes for the onwards they become notably George. The former includes Disendowment question, and year 1892. The very informa- more episodic in character. But several letters from both her the highly contentious Welsh tive pocket diary for 1885 was the diary-like quality of the parents and, among others, Church Commission of 1906– acquired some years later. early letters is perhaps some Clement Attlee, Lady Violet 07. Some of the letters also The backbone of the Wil- recompense for the realisation Bonham-Carter, Lord Dawson refer to educational matters, liam George Papers is the that most of the later epistles of Penn and Dingle Foot. the investiture of Prince long series of 3,292 letters

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 69 lloyd george archives from Lloyd George to Wil- The letters, 1890–1942, to Frances Stevenson Family Papers Jones Ellis-Griffith, W. J. liam, spanning the years 1886 Lloyd George within NLW MS In January 2000 the National Gruffydd, E. T. John, Lord to 1943, but containing only 22,824C are not generally of Library purchased what must Morris of Borth y Gest and A. a tiny handful of letters after great political significance. be the final Lloyd George fam- J. Williams, as well as in several 1917. Many of the early let- ily archive which had hitherto items in the general series of ters to William George dis- A. J. Sylvester Papers remained in private hands: a NLW Manuscripts, including cuss legal cases in some detail In November 1990, the small residue of the papers of the Thomas Gee Papers and and the affairs of the family- National Library purchased a Frances Stevenson, the Dowa- the W. J. Parry Papers. The run legal firm Lloyd George & substantial group of the papers ger Countess Lloyd-George National Library also holds a George more generally. Again of Albert James Sylvester of Dwyfor (1888–1972). The large number of photographs the key turning points in Lloyd (1889–1989), who had served as papers had been inherited by and cartoons, many of which George’s political career are principal private secretary to Jennifer Longford, Frances’s have never been published. graphically illustrated in these Lloyd George from 1923 until daughter (born in 1929), upon The Screen and Sound Archive letters. Subsequent letters refer his death in March 1945. Class her death in 1972. of Wales, also located at the to the course of the Boer War A in the Sylvester Papers com- National Library, has among and the campaign against Bal- prises typescript drafts of his Other archives of Lloyd George its extensive holdings many four’s Education Act of 1902. diaries running from 1924 until interest at the National Library of memorabilia and recordings of The long sequence of letters 1945. There are several copies of Wales sound and television broadcasts also abounds with references to some of the diaries. These are Many other archives held concerning Lloyd George. contemporaries, notably fellow much fuller than the published within the Library include cor- Liberal politicians. version Life with Lloyd George respondence and papers relating The William George Papers which appeared in 1975, edited to David Lloyd George. This is Other sources 3302–458 comprise letters, by Colin Cross. Class B con- especially true of the personal The extensive holdings of 1887–1916, from Lloyd George sists of eighty-two subject files, archives of the politicians and the National Archive at Kew to his uncle Richard Lloyd, spanning the period from 1914 associates who were his com- include a vast amount of mate- again containing an interest- until 1948. Class C comprises rades-in-arms in the Cymru rial relating to Lloyd George’s ing intermingling of local and correspondence, including a Fydd movement between 1886 political career. The National domestic news and political long series of letters between and 1896, among them D. R. Register of Archives has refer- comment. The William George A. J. Sylvester and his wife Eve- Daniel, Thomas Edward Ellis, ences to sixty archives which Papers 3302–458 comprise let- lyn, 1914–58. There are further Sir John Herbert Lewis, Stu- include correspondence and ters, 1887–1916, from Lloyd family letters, and a substantial art Rendel, A. C. Humphreys- papers relating to David Lloyd George to Richard Lloyd, again group from various members of Owen, Glansevern, and Sir George. There is an interesting containing an interesting inter- the Lloyd George family. Samel T. Evans. miscellany of papers, photo- mingling of local and domestic For the later period of Lloyd graphs and memorabilia at the news and political comment. Viscount Tenby Papers (NLW George’s life and career, by far Lloyd George Museum at Lla- There are also many interesting MSS 23657–71 and NLW ex 1972) the most important archive in nystumdwy, Gwynedd, while letters penned by Dame Marga- The most recent major acquisi- the custody of the National the Caernarfon Area Record ret to, in turn, Richard Lloyd, tion of Lloyd George material Library is the Dr Thomas Jones Office holds some material Lloyd George and William was purchased from the third CH Papers. Thomas Jones was relating to Lloyd George, George, together with a sub- Viscount Tenby in 1996. Apart the highly distinguished dep- including speech notes, a small stantial group of letters, 1887– from correspondence and papers uty secretary to the Cabinet group of correspondence, 1912– 1926, from William George to concerning Lloyd George him- from 1916 until 1930. 16, sound interviews of some his brother (numbers 5138–556). self, there are papers relating to There are further letters of his speeches, and interviews Gwilym Lloyd-George, first from Lloyd George, papers with Lady Olwen Carey-Evans. Olwen Carey-Evans Papers Viscount Tenby (1894–1967), relating to him and references (including NLW MSS 22823–27) and to his brother-in-law Sir to him in many other Dr J. Graham Jones is Senior Olwen Carey-Evans (1892– Goronwy Owen (1881–1963), collections in the custody of Archivist and Head of the Welsh 1990) was the third child of Liberal MP for Caernarfonshire, the National Library, among Political Archive at the National David Lloyd George. This col- 1923–45. These have been desig- them the papers of Clement Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. lection, purchased in 1990, nated NLW MSS 23,657–71 and Davies, George M. Ll. Davies, includes many miscellaneous NLW ex 1972. W. Watkin Davies, Sir Ellis items relating to Lloyd George, 1898–1970, among them a large number of invitations to, and souvenirs of, national events, Wanted! Journal of Liberal History Assistant Editor while among the correspond- The Journal needs a new Assistant Editor, to: ents to Lady Carey-Evans her- • Proof and edit (on-screen) all the material published in each issue of the Journal. self are Clough Williams Ellis, • Place the text in the correct paragraph styles for lifting into the page layout programme. Dingle Foot, Michael Foot and • Upload the published articles on to the History Group’s website. Andrew Bonar Law. NLW MS Proof-reading and editing skills are essential, as is an understanding of Microsoft Word’s paragraph styles. 22,823C comprises letters writ- Knowledge of Liberal history would be a distinct advantage. Experience of website inputting would be ten by Lloyd George, mainly helpful, but is not essential – the website is easy to load material to. to Dame Margaret, 1894–1942, filling some of the gaps in the Like all the Journal’s posts, the Assistant Editor post is voluntary; but a small honorarium is payable. If you Brynawelon group of letters. are interested, please email the Editor on [email protected].

70 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 Hattersley, Mayor of Sheffield, respectively); after grammar school reviews and university educations, both became right-wing Labour MPs for Birmingham constituencies; and both were disappointed in their Hattersley on Lloyd George highest hopes for political office, Roy Hattersley, The Great Outsider: David Lloyd George while pursuing respected careers as writers on politics and history. (Little, Brown, 2010) The crucial political distinction Reviewed by Ian Packer between the two men is that Jen- kins became a founder of the Social Democratic Party in 1981, while iographies of Lloyd well-known political events? How Hattersley remained with Labour. George all face the same dif- can it say anything new? Just look- But there is a further layer of Bficulty: there is simply too ing at politics from a Lloyd Geor- interest to Jenkins’s suggestion that much information. This is partly gian perspective will not solve this Hattersley should work on Lloyd because Lloyd George left behind problem, as there have already been George. Jenkins wrote a very fine, an enormous mound of papers (now over twenty biographies of the and admiring, biography, Asquith mainly held at the Parliamentary Welshman. One way is to delve for (1964), which remains the best Archives and the National Library new information in the archives. study of Lloyd George’s great Lib- of Wales). But it is also because his But, while Hattersley has done eral rival. It is a book shot through career stretched from the late-Vic- some quarrying in the mountain with insight, which at least partly torian era through to the Second of Lloyd George papers, it is dif- derives from Jenkins’s identifica- World War, with Lloyd George ficult to spot anything that he has tion with his subject and his world- playing a central political role in found to add to previous works. view. It might almost be seen as British politics at least from the This absence is probably due to lack an indication of Jenkins’s future Boer War to the Great Depression. of time as much as anything else. political direction. In taking up Recent writers on Lloyd George Hattersley has a prodigious work- Jenkins’s suggestion to write Lloyd have tended to tackle this issue in rate, but even by his standards he George’s life, Hattersley had the one of three ways: either they have left himself little time for his book opportunity to write a response written short books that concen- on Lloyd George. After finishing to Jenkins’s Asquith, which would trate on particular themes in Lloyd Borrowed Time, his history of the not only illuminate Lloyd George’s George’s career, for instance Mar- inter-war years, in 2007, he pub- point of view, but would also offer tin Pugh’s biography of 1988, and lished another book while working Chris Wrigley’s of 1992; or they on The Great Outsider – In Search of have chronicled Lloyd George’s England (2009) – before announc- private life, as in John Campbell’s ing in 2010, even before his book If Love Were All (2006) and Ffion on Lloyd George was published, Hague’s The Pain and the Privilege that he had embarked on his next (2008); or they have embarked on big project – a history of the Dukes multi-volume studies, like those of of Devonshire, which will appear John Grigg (1973–2002) or Bentley in 2013. Gilbert (1987–92). Roy Hattersley The alternative way of say- is the first biographer, since the 872 ing something new about Lloyd pages of Peter Rowlands’s Lloyd George is to furnish a different George (1975) stretched the book- interpretation of his life, and the binder’s art to its limits, who has ‘Acknowledgements’ hold out a attempted to pack a comprehen- tantalising prospect in this direc- sive study of the ‘Welsh Wizard’ tion. Hattersley states that ‘It was into one volume. Moreover, like Roy Jenkins who, many years ago, Rowlands, Hattersley has aimed suggested that I write a biography to write a book that will have a of David Lloyd George – a politi- wide appeal, rather than just inter- cian he disliked so heartily that he est scholars. The scale of this task is could not contemplate writing the truly intimidating. book himself’ (p. ix). In some ways Hattersley’s approach also pre- this was not a surprising sugges- sents further difficulties. Lloyd tion. The urbane Jenkins may seem George’s early life has been written to have had little in common with about at length, as in his nephew, Hattersley, who has always bur- W. R. P. George’s, The Making of nished his image as a bluff York- Lloyd George (1976) and Lloyd George: shireman. But they actually share Backbencher (1983); and after Lloyd a great deal: both were the only George became a central figure in children of leading figures in local British life, how can a biography of Labour movements (Arthur Jen- him avoid just being a narrative of kins, MP for Pontypool, and Enid

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 71 reviews a contrasting interpretation of deftly handled. There is plenty here Above all, whose name will forever be associ- late-nineteenth century and early- that patient non-specialist readers ated with appeasement. One could, twentieth century Liberal politics, will find enjoyable, especially as the book therefore, be forgiven for placing from the perspective of a staunchly Hattersley varies the diet of poli- Lloyd George in the ‘anti-appeaser’ Labour historian. tics with details of Lloyd George’s lacks the per- camp along with Winston Church- However, Hattersley has complicated and controversial ill, his former Liberal colleague. declined this intriguing opportu- love life. However, there are times ceptiveness Yet, Rudman argues that Lloyd nity. He does not offer any over- when Hattersley’s lack of familiar- George ‘was the first and one of the arching interpretation of Lloyd ity with the latest scholarship on and sense of most determined appeasers of Ger- George’s career. The absence of an Lloyd George leads him astray, as many’ (p. 264). Introduction and conclusion are in his treatment of Lloyd George’s commitment Rudman joins those histori- clear indications of his determi- schemes to ‘Conquer Unemploy- of Jenkins’s ans who root appeasement long nation to concentrate on a narra- ment’ in 1926–31. before Neville Chamberlain’s pre- tive of Lloyd George’s life, which But, above all, the book lacks Asquith. The miership. Although Lloyd George begins with the Welshman’s birth the perceptiveness and sense of attempted to get the best deal pos- on page 1 and ends with his funeral commitment of Jenkins’s Asquith. Great Out- sible for Britain at the Paris Peace on page 640. This narrative is very The Great Outsider does not give Conferences, his pro-German well done, though the size of the the impression that Hattersley is sider does sympathies were already apparent. book remains a little daunting. really interested in Lloyd George. After blocking a French attempt Hattersley’s writing is clear and That he has written such a detailed not give the to annex the Rhineland, Lloyd vigorous throughout, as one would treatment of his subject is a truly George duplicitously undermined expect from such a stylish jour- remarkable testament to the energy impression Britain’s guarantee of French secu- nalist and author (this is his nine- and prolific writing powers of a rity by making it dependent upon teenth book). There are few factual senior statesman who is now nearly that Hatter- American ratification. This never errors – a situation that Hattersley eighty years old. materialised and France was left is happy to acknowledge is partly sley is really without a defensive frontier on the attributable to the book’s proof- Ian Packer is Reader in History at the Rhine or a security pact. This did reading by Lord Morgan and Pro- University of Lincoln. His publications interested nothing to calm French fears of a fessor Anthony King; and a number on Edwardian Liberalism include Lloyd German resurgence. Lloyd George of complicated political tangles, George, Liberalism and the Land in Lloyd also agreed that a preamble should like Lloyd George’s replacement (2001) and Liberal Government and be added to the peace treaty’s mili- of Asquith in December 1916, are Politics 1905–1915 (2006). George. tary clauses which maintained that Germany was disarmed ‘to render possible the initiation of the general limitation of the armaments of all nations’. When the world’s powers failed to craft a disarmament con- Lloyd George and appeasement vention, this provided Hitler’s Ger- many with a ready-made pretext Stella Rudman, Lloyd George and the Appeasement of for rearmament. Germany 1919–1945 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011) Lloyd George’s compassionate approach developed into a failure Reviewed by Chris Cooper to implement the treaty that he had helped shape. Rudman clearly lthough Lloyd George contradictions behind his multifac- explains his apparently contradic- was absent from power eted outlook and detecting a line tory, but considered, rationale. The Aafter 1922, he ‘continued to of continuity in the Welshman’s Prime Minister’s ‘deep-seated faith wield enormous influence in Brit- thinking, Rudman, through the in the German nation as a general ish politics’ into the 1940s (p. 161). prism of ‘appeasement’, explains force for good’ reasserted itself (pp. The Welshman is best remembered how the enemy of the Kaiser 82–83). He wanted Germany to as the architect of Britain’s victory became an admirer of Hitler with- be able to pay reparations, resist a in the First World War and for his out any fundamental change in Bolshevik revolution, restore the role in splitting the Liberal Party outlook. European balance of power, and after 1916. Dr Stella Rudman’s con- As peacetime Prime Minis- help revive international trade. So- verted doctoral thesis charts Lloyd ter, Lloyd George helped draw up called ‘appeasement’, at this stage, George’s interventions in foreign the arguably punitive peace terms reflected a pursuit of what Lloyd policy after the conclusion of the imposed upon Germany. He was George perceived were Britain’s First World War, and the develop- seen at his ‘anti-appeasing best’ national interests. When consider- ment of Britain’s ultimately unsuc- as he championed the League of ing reparations, for example, ‘he cessful appeasement of Germany. Nations when Italy attacked Abys- took a generally consistent, anti- Although Lloyd George has been sinia in 1935 (p. 214). Then, during appeasing line’ (p. 48). His Fon- the subject of numerous biographi- the celebrated ‘Norway Debate’ of tainebleau memorandum of 1919 cal studies, monographs and jour- May 1940, he delivered an indict- was lenient in warning about the nal articles, this work focuses on ment of Neville Chamberlain’s perils of placing Germans under a comparatively neglected aspect wartime ministry. The debate led foreign sovereignty but it also of his career. By untangling the to the downfall of Chamberlain, called for heavy German payment.

72 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 reviews

Lloyd George’s peacetime premier- of the Rhineland in March 1936 risky war with Italy – would have ship was also marked by his grow- the Welshman opposed retribu- stopped Mussolini or prevented a ing antipathy towards France. His tive action. Five months later the 73 strengthening of the German-Ital- conviction that the French desired year-old travelled to meet Hitler at ian axis. continental hegemony encouraged Berchtesgaden. The two men got Sympathy is also expressed further leniency towards Germany. on ‘like a house on fire’. The ‘spell- for Lloyd George’s ‘Grand Alli- Lloyd George began the process bound’ Lloyd George returned to ance’. Rudman claims that this whereby Britain’s position changed London believing the Fuhrer was was ‘more realistic’ than Neville from an ally of France against Ger- ‘the greatest living German’ and Chamberlain’s approach. R. A. C. many to that of a mediator between dismissing suggestions that Hitler Parker’s conclusion, that an anti- them. planned large-scale conquests (pp. Nazi system embracing the Soviet After the collapse of his pre- 224–27). Union should have been forged, miership in 1922, Lloyd George’s The Spanish Civil War (1936– is reaffirmed (p. 241). Yet, this is a pro-German outlook became more 39) marked a defining moment in complex issue. Stalin harboured pronounced. During the delibera- Lloyd George’s outlook. The shift suspicions of capitalist Britain tions over the future of Upper Sile- in the Welshman’s thinking related and France, the Soviet Union had sia he wanted to construct a strong to France. After over a decade of recently purged its General Staff Germany rather than an enlarged suspicion, he now applauded the and its military limitations out- Poland. This, he hoped, would help French for assisting the Spanish side its own frontiers were readily Germany pay reparations. Dur- government. Nonetheless, he did exposed during the Russo-Finnish ing the remainder of the 1920s he not oppose Germany’s annexa- Winter War of 1939–40. After the advocated arbitration treaties so tion of Austria in March 1938, and Prague coup, it was a simple geo- that Germany’s territorial demands his response to the Munich Agree- graphic fact that a ‘Grand Alliance’ could be met. He believed that Ger- ment was ambivalent. His new- to restrict German expansionism many could be satisfied and that any found faith in France, however, depended upon Polish concurrence, agreements would be honoured. allowed him to advocate an Anglo- and the Poles would not accept Giving Germany the benefit of the French-Soviet alliance to resist Soviet aid. Rudman uses Lloyd doubt while a democratic structure acts of aggression. In April 1939 he George’s advocacy to suggest that existed was perhaps understand- criticised the British guarantee for there was a better alternative to able, but the rise of Hitler’s Nazis Poland, claiming that it was use- Chamberlain’s policy. On balance, ‘did not make Lloyd George more less without Soviet involvement. the evidence suggests that there cautious’ (p. 207). Although the Nevertheless, Lloyd George still probably wasn’t. appeasement of Germany began believed that a peaceful settlement The study provides a mass of to threaten Britain’s interests, not with Germany was possible. After evidence which shows that Lloyd least the balance of power that the outbreak of war he criticised George ‘had a blind spot where Lloyd George had sponsored, he Chamberlain’s administration and Germany, and especially Hit- did not modify his stance. When was sceptical of the prospects of a ler, were concerned’ (p. 261). In Hitler ordered the remilitarisation British victory, favouring a nego- September 1939, after the parti- tiated peace. He was not alone in tion of Poland, Lloyd George his pessimism, but one gasps when still thought the Fuhrer had ‘lim- reading that he refused office in ited ambitions and was a man of Churchill’s reconstructed gov- his word’ and, even in 1940, he ernment preferring to ‘wait until ‘still believed that Hitler could Winston is bust’, so that he could be appeased’ (pp. 252, 255). It is, arrange peace with Hitler (pp. therefore, surprising that Rudman 257–58). sustains the argument of Anthony Rudman’s account is readable Lentin, her PhD supervisor, that and generally well-reasoned. Her if Hitler had offered peace terms discussion of the Hitler years, 1933– Lloyd George could have made 45, is the most original part of the a lasting peace with the Fuhrer. study but it draws upon an increas- If negotiations began, Rudman ingly narrow source base and occu- holds that Lloyd George ‘might pies seventy pages, only a quarter well have been the best man for of the book. Lloyd George’s impor- the job’ (p. 263). The evidence in tant intervention in the ‘Norway this study, however, implies that Debate’ is afforded just one para- the deluded 77 year-old negotiat- graph. Rudman also offers a num- ing with Hitler would have been ber of debatable conclusions. Few a frightening prospect. The terms allowances are made for Britain’s of such an agreement would surely policy during disarmament negoti- have been intolerable and Lloyd ations or in the Abyssinian crisis. In George’s previous experience of the latter instance it is not immedi- negotiating a peace treaty had not ately obvious from Lloyd George’s been a resounding success. At this remarks or Rudman’s coverage stage Lloyd George was living in what alternative course – short a fantasy world. It is a pity that of provoking an unpopular and Rudman does not say so.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 73 reviews

Although the ex-Prime Rudman’s conclusions may be David Lloyd George, Nonconformity and Radicalism Minister’s influence is difficult challenged, her thought-pro- Continued from page 17 to assess, this study shows that voking study identifies more Lloyd George’s support for motives for appeasement and 9 Ffion Hague,The Pain and the Lloyd George to his wife, 3 May Hitler’s disregard for existing is a welcome addition to the Privilege: the women in Lloyd 1894 (Lloyd George Papers, agreements did nothing to halt historiography. George’s life (London, 2008), p. 31. National Library of Wales the Fuhrer’s progress or reduce 10 Lady Olwen Carey Evans, Lloyd 20412C, fo.425); K.O. Morgan, the likelihood of war. Lloyd Dr Chris Cooper was recently George was my Father (Llandysul, Wales in British Politics (second George was an appeaser, not awarded his PhD at the Uni- 1985), pp. 70–71. Cf. F.Owen, ed.,Cardiff, 1970), p. 140ff. ; because he was compelled by versity of Liverpool. His doc- Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd P. Rowland, Lloyd George, pp. Britain’s dwindling resources toral thesis analysed the political George, his life and times (London, 102–11; J. Grigg, The Young combined with the multitude career of Douglas Hogg, 1st Vis- 1954), pp. 30–31. Lloyd George (London, 1973), pp. of threats facing the British count Hailsham (1872–1950). He 11 Richard, Second Earl Lloyd- 146–49. Empire, but through a mis- has published a number of journal George, My Father, Lloyd George 18 Machin, Politics and the Churches, placed faith in German inten- articles on different aspects of mod- (London, 1960), pp. 20–21. 1869–1921, p. 212; D. Cregier, tions, whoever held power ern British history and he teaches 12 Baptist Times, 24 May 1945, p.10. Bounder from Wales: Lloyd George’s in Berlin. While some of history at university. 13 J. Grigg, Lloyd George, the peo- career before the First World War ple’s champion, 1902–11 (London, (Missouri, 1976), pp. 52–54. 1978), p. 71. 19 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 14 Lloyd George to his wife, 21 1869–1921, pp. 225–30. Lloyd George and Leadership Apr. 1911; K.O. Morgan, ed., 20 Machin, ‘Lloyd George and Continued from page 11 Lloyd George Family Letters, 1885– Nonconformity’, in Judith 1936 (Cardiff and London, 1973), Loades, ed., The Life and Times of 25 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of 31 Ibid. p. 155, including footnote 4. David Lloyd George, pp. 37–38. Rivals. The Political Genius of Abra- 32 Lord Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 15 Ffion Hague, op.cit., 104–06. 21 D.W. Bebbington, The Non- ham Lincoln (Simon and Schuster, 226 (24 July 1920). 16 Ibid., p. 106. conformist Conscience, pp. 106, New York, 2005), p. 669. 33 William D. Jones, Wales in Amer- 17 G.I.T.Machin, Politics and the 122–23; S. Koss, Nonconformity in 26 Lord Riddell’s War Diary, p. 135 (5 ica (University of Wales Press, Churches, 1869 to 1921 (Oxford, Modern British Politics, pp. 32–33; Nov. 1915). 1976), pp. 184ff.There is a file on 1987), pp. 210–16; copy of H. McLeod, Class and Religion 27 Keith Middlemas (ed.), Thomas this visit in the Lloyd George memorial drafted by Lloyd in the late Victorian city (London, Jones: Whitehall Diary, Vol. I of Dwyfor Papers (Parliamen- George, dated 26 June 1893, 1974), p. 178. (Oxford University Press, 1969), tary Archives, House of Lords, signed by thirty Welsh Liberal 22 S. Constantine, Lloyd George p. 203 (13 June 1922); Lloyd G/165). MPs and sent to Gladstone as (London, 1992), p. 21. George, War Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 34 Text of speech, Lloyd George of premier, in S.T. Evans Papers, 23 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 2014–15. Dwyford Papers, G/165. National Library of Wales, p. 1869–1921, p. 263 (and pp. 28 Keith Middlemas (ed.), Thomas 35 The Times, 31 Oct. 1923. 185; Lloyd George to his wife, 260–65). Jones: Whitehall Diary, Vol. III 36 Text of speech in Lloyd George 5 July, 7 Aug. 1893 (K.O. Mor- 24 Ibid., pp. 265–70; Grigg, Lloyd (Oxford University Press, 1971), of Dwyfor Papers, G/165. gan, ed., Lloyd George Family George, the people’s champion, p. 60 (27 April 1921). 37 Drinkwater’s play ‘Abraham Letters, pp. 60–61); Gladstone to 1902–11, pp. 25–30, pp. 32–34; 29 Merrill D. Peterson, Lincoln Lincoln’ was first performed in Stuart Rendel (MP for Mont- Bentley B. Gilbert, David Lloyd in American Memory (Oxford 1918. He followed it up with a gomeryshire), 5 July 1893 (copy George, a Political Life: the archi- University Press, New York, book, Lincoln: the World Emanci- in Gladstone Papers, British tect of change, 1863–1912 (London, 1994), pp. 178–80. For Wilson, pator (Houghton, Miflin, Boston Library Add.Mss.44549, fo.101; 1987), pp. 215–66; D.Cregier, see David W. Blight, Race and and New York, 1920). see also Rendel Papers, National op.cit., pp. 80–85. Reunion: the Civil War in Ameri- 38 Kenneth O. Morgan, Michael Library of Wales); T.E. Ellis to 25 W.R.P. George, Lloyd George, can Memory (Oxford Univer- Foot: the Life (HarperCollins, D.R. Daniel, 3 Sept.1893 (Dan- Backbencher (Llandysul, 1983), p. sity Press, New York, 1994), pp. London, 2007), p. 9. iel Papers, National Library 355. 11–14. 39 John Vincent, The Formation of Wales, 41b); Lloyd George 26 J. Guinness Rogers, An Autobi- 30 David Lloyd George, The Truth of the Liberal Party (Constable, to William George, 24 Nov. ography (London, 1903); quoted about the Peace Treaties (Gollancz, London, 1966), p. 211 on these 1893 (W.R.P. George, Lloyd Machin, Politics and the Churches, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 232. themes. George, Backbencher, p. 122) ; 1869–1921, p. 270.

Lloyd George’s Coalition Proposal of 1910 Continued from page 23

8 ‘Cabinet Memorandum: secret’, October 1910, Balfour papers 1910, Asquith papers, vol 12. 20 Ibid, p. 23. 31 May 1910, Asquith papers, 23. Add Mss.49692. 16 ‘The Criccieth Memorandum’, 21 The National Review, June 1910. 9 The Times, 13 April 1908. 13 ‘The Criccieth Memorandum’, 17 August 1910. 22 Westminster Gazette, 28 October 10 M. V. Brett, Journal and Letters 17 August 1910, in K. O. 17 G. R. Searle, The Quest for 1910. of Reginald Viscount Esher, vol. II Morgan, The Age of Lloyd George National Efficiency (1971), (1934) p. 370. (1971), pp.150–55. pp.188–91. 11 Masterman, C. F. G. Masterman, 14 Austen Chamberlain, Politics from 18 Ibid., pp. 196–97. p.160. Inside (1936), p. 293. 19 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 12 Lloyd George to Balfour, 11 15 Crewe to Asquith, 22 October vol. I (1933), p. 21.

74 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 ‘This new volume, taking a long view from the later seventeenth century to the Cameron-Clegg coalition of today, is a collective enterprise by many hands … This is an excellent book.’ Kenneth O. Morgan, Cercles

‘I had not expected to enjoy this book as much as I did, or to learn as much from it.’ William Wallace, Lib Dem Voice

‘The editors and their fourteen authors deserve congratulation for producing a readable one-volume history of Liberal politics in Britain that is both erudite but perfectly accessible to any reader interested in the subject.’ Mark Smulian, Liberator

Written by academics and experts, drawing on the most recent scholarly research, Peace, Reform and Liberation is the most comprehensive and most up-to-date guide to the story of those who called themselves Liberals, what inspired them and what they achieved over the last 300 years and more. An essential source for anyone interested in the contribution of Liberals and Liberalism to British politics.

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Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 75 A Liberal Democrat History Group / Labour History Group evening meeting the progressive coalition that never was lessons from the Ashdown–Blair ‘project’

Between 1994 and 1999, Paddy Ashdown and Tony Blair led a process of collaboration between the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party, with the aim not merely of defeating the Conservatives but of establishing clear common ground between the progressive parties in British politics.

Some of the outcomes of this process – ‘the project’, in Ashdown’s phrase – were public, such as the programme of agreed constitutional reforms drawn up by Robin Cook and Robert Maclennan. Far more were secret: covert electoral collaboration in marginal seats during the 1997 election, attempts to agree a programme for government, talks about coalition – and hints of a more permanent alliance.

In the end, the size of Labour’s majority in 1997 destroyed the case for coalition, and the main outcome was a Joint Cabinet Committee between the two parties. What it achieved is not clear, and it was abandoned by Ashdown’s successor Charles Kennedy.

Now, in a period of cooperation between political parties very different from that envisaged by Ashdown and Blair, what can we learn from ‘the project’? What did it achieve? What could it have achieved under different circumstances? And what can it tell us about the desirability and achievability of collaboration between progressive forces?

Speakers: • Paddy Ashdown, Rt Hon Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE, Leader of the Liberal Democrats 1988–99 • Roger Liddle, Lord Liddle, special adviser to Bill Rodgers 1976–81; member of the SDP and then Liberal Democrats 1981–94; member of the Lib Dem Federal Policy Committee; special adviser to Tony Blair 1997–2004 • Rt Hon Pat McFadden MP, adviser to Donald Dewar 1988–93, to John Smith 1993–94 and to Tony Blair 1994–2005

Chair: Steve Richards, Chief Political Commentator, The Independent

7.00pm Tuesday 22 January 2013 Attlee Suite, Portcullis House, House of Commons, SW1A 2LW (allow 10–15 minutes to pass security)