HERACLITUS SEMINAR 1966 / 67
Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink
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1
11
Translated by Charles H. Seibert
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA PRESS (Jniversily, Alabama ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CONTENTS The translator g^tefully acknowledges permission to quote from copv- nglm-d works as follows: (i) from G. S. Kirk, H.ractuJ; The Cos.ic7Z edited w,th an In.roduaion «. and Ck,mmentary (Cambridge' CaX bndge Un-versuy Press, 1970): (2) from G, S. Kirk and J. E. Raven rl PresocraUc Pktosophers: A Cntical Hutory u,ith a SdecHon of Texts (Cambr dge Translator's Foreword Cambridge Un.yers.ty Press. vu 1957); (3) from Friednch Holderlm: PaeJis fV«^«.«(i translated by Michael Hamburger Preface (Ann Arbor: University oi to the German Edition M,ch,gan PresM966); and Jdii ,4) from AU.ic Poe^. by Friedrich hSi/ n-anslated by Eh^beth Henderson, Mode of Procedure.—Beginning copyright © 1962 by Eli.^beth 1 with Fragment 64 (Correlated Henderson, published by Oswald Wolff (Publishers) Fragments: 41, 1,50,47) Ltd.. London. 3
Hermeneutical 2> Circle.—Relatedness of gv and ndvra (Correlated Fragments: 1, 80, 7, 10. 29, 30, 41, 53, 90, 100, 102, 108, 114) 15
JiavTa-6Xa. jtavta O fivro—Different Exposition of Fragment 7 (Correlated Fragment 67).—jiav kQn^6\ (Fragment 1 ).— 1 Maturation Character of the Seasons (Fragment 1 00) Library 27 of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Heracliius Seminar, 1966/67.
Translation of Heraklit, which is a summary of the papers from the Heracliius Seminar held at the University The Pioblem of Freiburg 5 of a Speculative Explication.—jiijo i. Br., during the winter semester AeCttoov and 1966-1967. time? (Fragment 30) ^g Heracliius. 1. of Kphesus—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. I-ink, Eugen, joint author. 11. Title B223.H4.113 182'.4 6 nvQ and Jidvra (Correlated 78-27261 Fragments: 30, 124, 66, 76, 31) 61 ISBN 0-8173-6628-8
Difference of Interpretation: Truth of Being (Fragment 16) or Cosmological Perspective (Fragment 64).-Heraclitus and the .'' '^''*, Mat erofTh.nkmg.-The Not-Vet-Metaphysical and the No-Unger-Metaphysical.-Hegel's Relationship to the Greeks.-JiuQog Tpojiat and Dawn. (Correlated Fragments: i^t Translated into English from Herahlit 31, copyright © 1970 by Vittorio Klosterinann Verlag. 71 English translation and addenda Copyrighi © 1979 by The 8 Inntertwitjing of Life University of Alabama Press and Death (Correlated Fragments: 76 36 All rights reserved ^^'"" "* ""'"^"^ ^"'l ^^ods (Correlated Fragments: 62,' 67 88) •J""*'' States of America 8 2 O^^'^'^'J""^'' "l}^'-' TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD
y Immortal: Mortal (Fragment 62).—6v t6 ooqxSv (Correlated Fragments: 32, 90) 97
The fragments of Heraclitus have, from the beginning, attracted and influenced philosophical thinking. It is hoped that this translation will XO The Standing Open of Gods and Humans (Fragment 62). The allow access by English-speaking readers to the "Speculative" in Hegel/—Hegel's Relationship to continuing attempt at interpretation. Heraclitus.— Life - Death (Correlated Fragments: 88, 62) 108 The two principal contributors to these conversations are Martin — Heidegger and Eugen Fink. Of the two. Heidegger is certainly the better XX The "Logical" in Hegel. "Consciousness" and known to English-speaking readers. His readers will find a familiar voice "Dasein."—Locality of Human Beings between Light and Night. here. His interpretation of Heraclitus continues to take its orientation (Correlated Fragments: 26, 10) 122 from the fragments that deal with X6Y05 and with dXTJOeia.' These themes have recurred in Being and Time, Section 44, An Introduction to Metaphysics, What is Called Thinking?, the "Logos {Heraklil, Fragment 50)" J.ft Sleep and Dream—Ambiguity of fijiTeoOai (Correlated and "Aletheia {Heraklit, Fragment 1 6)" essays in Vortrage und Aufsatze, and Nietzsche, II, Section Fragments: 26, 99, 55) 137 IX. In addition to continuing Heidegger's interpre- tation of Heraclitus, the present work is the occasion for interpretation of other thinkers and poets, notably Hegel and Holderlin, as well as self-interpretation by Heidegger. XtJ Reference to Death, Awaiting - Hoping (Correlated Fragments: Fink, the other principal 27, 28). —The "Contraries" and their "Transition" (Correlated Eugen contributor, is less familiar in the Fragments: ill, 126.8,48.51).—Closing Question: The Greeks English-speaking philosophical world. This book is the first translation of Fink's work into English, His role in these conversations as a Challenge 150 is to provide a preliminary interpretation of the fragments that will give the discussion a "basis and a starting place for a critical surpassing or even destruction, and [will enable] us to establish Notes 163 a certain common ground appropriate to inquiring discourse." Throughout the book, the conversations lake their Glossary 166 sustenance from Fink's lead.
The pervading theme of interpretation is the relatedness of hi [the Page Guide 171 one] and xa Jidvra [the many]. This relatedness is exemplified in many different instances in the conversations of this book. Moreover, the con- versations as a whole might well be underst«x»d as one more instance of
this fundamental theme in Heraclitus' thinking. For, while there is a tension between the multiple interpretations of Heidegger, Fink, and the seminar participants, the interpretation is nonetheless unified at
important points of agreement. While it is nut a translator's place to
rehearse the details of a text, it may be helpful to alert the reader to passages in which the cnnversants speak foi themselves about their agieements and differences.
Regarding the multiplicity of interpretations, it may be worth noting that the present book records conversations, and is not the finished work of a single author. Not only does the conversational origin of the book set It apart from other recent interpretive attempts, it also accounts, at least in part, for the imaginative and experimental character of the in- terpretations. In conversations, we can rarely anticipate the responses of VIII IX
with those whom we talk. And if an interlocutor disagrees with us, we are tion. This is perhaps most explicitly shown in the opening considerations often forced to take an imaginative, experimental step into areas about of seminar session five. There Fink indicates that the method of in- which we have not previously thought. What in results the present case is terpretation consists in the attempt to pass from the concrete state of a mixture of premeditated consideration of the text and imaginative, affairs presented in the fragments over to an unsensuous, though not extemporaneous response. Of course, not all the experiments work, as transcendent, domain.^ Again, Fink speaks of the attempt lo com- Fink himself predicts in the opening remarks and affirms at times prehend macrocosmic relations from the microcosmic relations which throughout the text. are directly presented in the fragtnents.^ And finally:
Regarding more specific points of disagreement, it may not be acci- dental that cites Heidegger Fragment 1, with its concern for the Xoyog, When 1 speak of thoughtful transposition into another dimension, that is soon after Fink begins his interpretation with a reference to Fragment only a first attempt tocirtumscribe the manner of our pnKcdure. because 64, which deals with xteawv6c; [lightning] and ra JiAvta. But perhaps the we still do not know what it means lo go over into another dimension. Ifwe wish to speak of an analogy in this clearest summary of the differences of interpretation of Heidegger and conneciion, then we must think it in a specific way. In this analogy, only one side is given to us, namely the Fink is elicited by Heidegger from one of the participants in the begin- phenomenal one. As we hold selectively to specific phenomenal structures, ning of the seventh seminar session. In contrast to Fink's "surprising" we translate them into large scale in an adventurous attempi.' and "unusual" beginning, Heidegger makes clear his different begin- ning fiom the X^YOS and from iX^eeia, While the participants record Readers who are familiar with recent English-language scholarship diversity of opinion at many points, perhaps the most general expression and interpretation of Heraclitus may find the speculative method of of difference is the remark that, "More is said in the interpretation of the these conversations injudicious or lacking in caution. Some may object Fragments than stands in them."^ Regarding this difference of opinion, with one of the participants that, "More is said in the interpretation of more is said bek»w. the fragments than stands in them." Or the reader may, with Heideg- The unity that binds the multiplicity of the Heraclitus interpretations ger, regard the speculative treatment as "venturesome" or even is indicated by Heidegger toward the end of the sixth seminar session, "hazardous."'* The more fragmentary the evidence, it might be argued, Hesays,"Bothof us are in agreement that ifwe speak with a thinker, we the more cautious we should be, and the more we must eschew specula- must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which way tive Rights of imagination. leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive But before dismissing this interpretation just because it is speculative, step."^ This observation marks not only a unifying theme in these conver- we ourselves must be a bit more cautious. Professor Fink goes to some sations, but also a unifying theme in Heidegger's own method of think- lengths to explain how and why he departs speculatively from the spe- ing alx)ut the tradition. As early as Kant and the Problem of Melaphysks cific content of a given fragment. And it may also be argued that, given (1929), Heidegger says: the very nature of these fragments, no interpretation, cautious or uncau- tious, can remain only with what is immediately given in the fragments. Nevfrthflcss, an inteipietati
Within the context of recent interpretive and critical scholarship on and death, becomes in a distinctive sense the clue for understanding of the
Heraclitus, one of Fink's particular interpretive strategies is noteworthy. entirety of the opposing relatedness of £v and ndvxa.* This strategy may be most easily indicated by reference to some remarks in the preface to G. S. Kirk's Heraclitm: The Cosmologicat Fragmenli. On Again at the end of seminar session eight, Fink summarizes the interpre- page xii of the preface. Kirk writes: tive struggle with TQony| [turning] in the following words.
In the present study only about half the total number of extant fragments We came to no result, and perhaps we will come to no final result at all. But receive detailed consideration. "The cosmic fragments" are those whose the all too familiar explicaii individual fragments. It remains true that Heraclitus to(>k a synoptic view thinking. Fink's method of employing one set of fragments to interpret of the problems he was facing, and that his answer to any one of them another would seem to strengthen the interpretation. Despite many im- cannot be entirely dissociated from his answers to all tlic others; in particu- plicit and explicit references to other, later thinkers, Fink's interpretive lar, his views on the constitution of the soul and its means of contact with strategy may allow some assurance that in the long run Heraclitus' the outside world bear upon the nature of the l^gos, and vice versa. The thought is interpreted as an integral whole, and is not interpreted by author has had the anthropocenlric fragments in mind when considering means of reference to a foreign scheme of thought. the cosmic ones; and since most of his readers are likely lo be familiar with This translation is not the product of one person working alone. My all the extant fragments, the dangers of misunderstanding are slight. aim has lx.'en to hear the book with two sets of ears, one English and one derman, hoping thereby to lose or distort as little as possible of the Against the background of these remarks, two passages in Fink's in- original. The help of Professor Manfred S. Frings, editor of the Cierman terpretation stand out. In seminar session 7, while attempting to under- edition of the CoUecled Works of Max Scheler, has been crucial in pursing stand the TCVQog i^ojiat [transformations fire], says: words of Fink this aim. Because his native tongue is (ierman, he has frequently been the needed supplement that allowed retrieval of nuances that would We do not understand the turning over of fire into what i.s not lire in ihc oihenvise have been lost. 1 remain indebted to him, and thankful for his sense of a chemical change or in the sense of an original substance which senience-by-sentencc reading of the text. changes (aXXoiwoi;) oi in the si-nse of an original element which masks Other people have consulted ilsell through its emanations. Rather we will view the entire ran^e which been regarding various portions of the binds fire, sea, earth, and breath ol flie in connection with life ami dcaih. manuscript. John Cody of the Classics department of Northwestern .'Apparently, we rcveit to ;nithri>(>iil<)giral fragmcnls in opposition lo cos- University has read the manu.wript with a concern for correcting my glt>ss mological tiaginenis. In iiulli. however, it is not a qtiestioii of ^i resiiicLion of Cieek w(»rds and translation of Creek phrases. The IxKik has to human phenomena; rather, what pertains to being human, such as life surely benefitted from his checking of my Greek "homework." F. Joseph XII PREFACE TO THE Smith was consulted on points of particular difficulty, and he has read GERMAN EDITION some of the chapters in their entirety. The advice and encouragement of these men are greatly appreciated. Ultimately, however, I am alone re- sponsible for this translation and for any defects it may contain. All footnotes of the original book are retained in the present transla- In the Winter Semester of 1 966/67, a Heraclitus seminar tion. Footnotes of the was held at the translator are followed by "(Tr.)." To facilitate University of Freiburg i. Br., organized mutually access to the text, the by Martin Heidegger first occurrence of each Greek work is accom- and Eugen Fmk. The summary text of the seminar is herewith panied by an English gloss within square brackets, submit- provided none is ted. It was planned to continue the interpretation over a series of semes- given by the authors. A glossary of Greek is terms at the back of the ters, but this plan cannot be realized. The present publication book. A page guide correlating the page numbers of is a torso, a this translation and fragment concerning fragments. those of the German edition is also provided. Freiburg im Breisgau Winnetka, Illinois Eugen Fink Charles H..Seibert April 1970 I HERACLITUS I Mode of Procedure.—Beginning with Fragment 64 (Correlated Fragments: 41, 1, 50, 47). Fink: 1 open the seminar with hearty thanks to Professor Heidegger for his readiness to assume spiritual leadership in our common attempt to advance into the area of the great and historically important thinker Heraclitus. Herachtus' voice, like that of Python, reaches us over a thousand years. Although this thinker lived at the origin of the West, and to that extent is longest past, we have not overtaken him even now. L'd From Martin Heidegger's dialogue with the Greeks, in many of his writ- ings, we can learn how the furthest becomes near and the most familiar becomes strange, and how we remain restless and are unable to rely on a sure interpretation of the Greeks. For us, the Greeks signify an enor- mous challenge. Our seminar should be an exercise in thinking, that is, in reflection on the thoughts anticipated by Heraclitus. Confronted with his texts, left to us only as fragments, we are not so much concerned with the philological I problematic, as important as it might be,' as with advancing into the matter itself, that is, toward the matter that must have stood before Heraclitus' spiritual view. This matter is not simply on hand like a result or like some spoken tradition; rather, it can be opened up or blocked from view precisely through the spoken tradition. It is not correct to view the matter of philosophy, particularly the matter of thinking as Martin Heidegger has formulated it, as a product lying before us. The matter of thinking does not lie somewhere before us like a land of truth into which one can advance; it is not a thing that we can discover and uncover. The reality of, and the appropriate manner of access to, the matter of thinking is still dark for us. We are still seeking the matter of thinking of the thinker Heraclitus, and we are therefore a little hke the p<»or man who has forgotten where the road leads. Our seminar is not concerned with a spectacular business. It is concerned, however, with serious-minded work. Our common attempt at reflection will not be free from certain disappointments and defeats. Nevertheless, reading the text of the ancient thinker, we make the attempt to come into the spiritual movement that releases us to the matter that merits being named the matter of thinking. Professor Heidegger is in agreement that I should firsi advance a preliminat7 interpretation of the sayings of Heraclitus. This interpreta- tion will give our discussion a basis and a starting place for a critical /'^ surpassing or even destruction, and il will enable us to establish a certain kind. We make the tacit assumption that xd Jidvio, in the sense of the common ground appropriate to inquiring discourse. Perhaps a preview many in entirety, forms the entirely of finite bounded things. The stone. of the particular language of Heraclitus' sayings is premature before we for example, is part of a mountain. We can also speak of the have mountain as read and interpreted them individually. The language of Heracli- thing. of a Or is it only a linguistic convention to call what has a determi- tus has an inner ambiguity and multidimensionality, so that we cannot nate outline a thing? The stone is found as rubble on the mountain; the give it any unambiguous reference. It moves from gnomic, sentential, mountain belongs in the mountain range; the latter on the and ambiguous-sounding earth's crust; expression to an extreme flight of thought. the earth itself and as a great thing that belongs, as a gravitational center! As assigned text in our seminar, we will work with Fmgmenle der Vor- in our solar system. sohaliker by Hermann Diels.^ For our part, we choose another arrange- Heidegger: To begin, wouldn't it perhaps be appropriate ment. This to ask should cast light on an inner coherence of the fragments' whether Heraclitus also speaks of xd Jidvxa in other fragments, in order meaning, but without pretending to reconstruct the original form of to have a specific clue from him about what he understands by xd ndvxa? Heraclitus' lost writing, Ueqi (pijoEW? [On Nature]. We shall attempt to In this way we get closer to Heraclitus. That is one question. The second trace a thread throughout the multiplicity his of sayings in the hope that question I would like to put under discussion is what lightning has to do a certain track can thereby show itself. Whether our arrangement of the with xd Jidvxa. must We ask concretely what it can mean when Heraclitus fragments is better than that adopted by Diels is a question that should says that lightning steers xd Jidvxa. Can lightning steer the universe at remain unsettled. all? Without further preliminary considerations, we shall proceed directly Participant: If we begin by taking lightning only as a phenome- to the midst of the matter, beginning our interpretation with Fr. 64: xa non, then we must wonder that it should steer the universe, since light- 6e Jiavra otaiti^ei xE^auvog. This sentence is clearly intelligible to nmg as a phenomenal entity, as a sensuously perceptible, luminous ap- everyone in what it appears to mean. Whether it is also intelligible in pearance, still belongs together with all other endties in the universe. what this meaning concerns, however, is another question. But first, we Heidegger: We must bring lightning into connection with the ask what this sentence means. As soon as we reflect on it somewhat more, phenomenon of nature, if we wish to understand it "in Greek." T"^ we immediately depart from the easy intelligibility and apparent famil- Fink: Lightning, regarded as a phenomenon of nature, means the iarity of the sentence. Diels' translation reads: "Lightning steers the uni- outbreak of the shining lightning-flash in the dark of night. Just as verse." But is "universe" the fitting translation of t6 ndvra? After due lighinmg in the night momentarily flashes up and. in the brightness of deliberation, one can indeed come to equate xii ndvra and "universe," the gleam, shows things in their articulated outline, so lightning in a But first all. of xb. irdvia names "everything" and signifies: all things, all deeper sen.se brings to light the multiple things in their articulated of what is. Heraclitus speaks of xa niivTa vis-a-vis KEpawdg [lightning]. gathering. In so doing, he enunciates a connection between many things and the Heidegger: I remember an afternoon during my journey in one of lightning. In the lightning bolt the many, in the sense of "every- Aegina, Suddenly 1 saw a single bolt of lightning, after which no more thing," fiash up, whereby "everything" is a plural. If we first ask naively followed. My thought was: Zeus. about xd jidvxa, we are dealing with a quintessential relatedness. If we Our task now consists in looking with Heraclitus for what xd Jidvxa translate xd jrdvxa as "all things," we must first ask, means. what kinds of things It is an open question how far a distinction was already there possible are. At the outset, we choose the way of a certain tactical naivete. with him between "everything" in the sense of the sum of individuals On the one and hand, we take the concept of thing in a wider sense, and then everything" in the meaning of the embracing allness. The other task, we mean alt is. that On the other hand, we also use it in a narrower which is sen.se. first posed fbr us by Fr. 64. is the connection between xd Jidvxa It we mean things in the narrower sense, then ind we can distinguish be- lightning. We must also bring Heraclitus' lightning tween into connection such things as are fiom nature ((pijOEi 6vxa) and such with lire as are the (JtiiQ). It is also essential to observe who has handed product of Fr. 64 down human technics (x^x^il 6vza). With all the things of E<' us. It is the Church Father Hippolytus who died roughtly A.D. 236/37. nature—with the inanimate, like stone, and with the living, like plant, rruni Heraclitus' time approximately eight hundred years pass Ijefore beast, and human (in ,so far as we may speak of a human as a thing)— <'ur fragment we is cited by Hippolytus. In the context, Jivp and mean only such things xdonog as are individuated and have determinate out- la.smos] are also mentioned. But we do not wish to enter here into lines. have the We in view the determinate, individual thing that, to be sure, philological problematic that emerges in view of the connection of the also has a particular, common character in itself, as being of a certain ''agment and the context of Hippolytus. In a conversation that I held with Carl Reinhardt in 194 1, when he stayed here in Freiburg, I spoke to Fink: If I have spoken of hiiii about the movement, we must distinguish, on the middle ground between pure philology, which intends to one hand between the find the real Heraditus movement that lies in the lighting of lightning, in with its philological tools, and the kind of philosophizing the outbreak of brightness, and on the other hand, the movement in xd that consists in thinking without discipline and thereby assuming too much. Between Jtdvra, in things. The movement of brightness of lightning corresponds these two extremes there is a middle the ground concerned to movement that goes out from fv to oo(p6v and continues on in the with the role of the transmission of understanding, of many things in entirety. Things are sense as well as interpretation. not blocks at rest; rather, they are With diversified in movement. Hippolytus we find not only TriJe but also iKitvQOiaig [confiag- Heidegger: Td ndvta raiion], which for has are thus not a whole, present in front of us, him the meaning of the end of the world. If we now ask what but entities in movement. On the other hand, movement does not occur xti jidvta, lightning, and also steering mean in Fr. 64, we as x£vTtai5 [motion] in Heraditus. must at the same time attempt to transfer ourselves into the Greek world Fink: If movement does not also with the clarification of these belong among the fundamental words. So that we can understand Fr. 64 in words in Heraditus, it still always stands in the horizon a genuine manner, I would of problems of propose that Fr. 41 be added to it: elvaiyitQ his thinking. gv t6 ooqxSv, ^£0100601 yvMnnv, 6t^ IkuP^qvtjoe Jidvra 6i(i JiAvrtuv. Heidegger: Diets To Frs. 64 and 41, we now add Fr. 1: tou bk Xdyou translates: "The wise is one thing only, to understand the thoughts TOTJfi' ^6vT05 de£ d^TJvexoi that steer everything Y^vovrai dv9eo)Jioi ital KQdadev f\ dxoijaat xal through everything." Literally translated. Jidvxa dxoTJoavxes Td JtQUTOV. vivoti^cov ytxQ jtdvTOJv xoTd t6v Xdyov T6v6e bia 3t(ivxo>v means: everything throughout everything. The importance dneieot-oiv kolxaai, JteiQt&n^voi xal of this saying lies, on the kn^tov xal ggyojv ToioiiTOJv, dxoiitfv one hand, in Itv to tro(p6v [the wise is one thing t/(j) 6LT^yEU^aL xaTd qnioiv SLaLQ^on- onlyj and. on the other, Ixaorov xaL (ppd^tov 6x105 ^xei. Toiig in iHivra 6ia n&vxurv. Here above all we must 6e dUou5 dveQcbnou; XavSdvEi take into view the connection 6x6aa ^vEee^vTEg jtotovaiv, dxtuojiEQ of the beginning and the end of the sen- tence. 6x6oa efi6ovTE5 kniKavBavovzai.' At first, only YivofiEvtov yaQ jidvTtuv xoTd t6v ^ov t6v6e interests us. We translate, "For Fink: There is a similar connection, on the one although every- hand between the thing oneness happens according to this X6yog [reason, speech, word]." If Hera- of the lightning-Hash, in the brightness of which the many show ditus speaks here of themselves yLvon^cov [coming into being], he is, nevertheless, in their outline and their articulations, xit Jidvra, and and, on talking the of movement. other, between the oneness of ootp6v [the wise] and jrAvxa bih Fink: In JidvTCuv. As Yivo|4ivo)v yiiQ jidvtaiv [coming into being of everything], Kepawo; relates to td jidvta. gv to oocpov relates analo- we are dealing with things being gously to jidvta 6td Jtdvxtov. moved within the cosmos, and not with the movement that issues from X6yo<;. Heidegger: I certainly grant that lightning and gv to ao(p6v stand Heidegger: ywo\ib/byv in a relation to one another. belongs to yeveaig [genesis]. When the Bible But there is still more to notice in Fr. 41. In speaks of Yeveois, it means by this the Creation, Fr. 64 Heraditus speaks of tq Jtdvra, in Fr. 41 of jrdvxa in which things are 6id Jtdvrtov. In brought Parmenides into existence. But what does yiveai^ signify in Creek? 1/32 we also find a similar phrase: 6id JidvTog Jidvra Participant: YevEot^ is also JiE0(DVTa. In the phrase jidvTa no concept in Heraditus. 6id jrdvruv, the meaning of 6id is above Heidegger: Since ail to Ije questioned. when do we have concepts at all? To begin, it means "throughout." But how should we understand Participant: Only since Plato and Aristotle. We even have -throughout:" topographically, spatially, causally the first or how philo.sophical else? dictionary with Aristotle. Heidegger: Plato Fink: Fr. While manages to deal with concepts only In 64 Td JidvTO does not mean a calm, static multiplicity, with difficulty, we see that Aristotle but rather a deals with them more easily. The word dynamic multiplicity of entities. In Td Jidvra a kind of Ytvonevwv stands movement in a fundamental place in Fr. I. is thought precisely in the reference back to lightning. In the Fink: Perhaps we brightness, specifically can add a comment to our di.scussion. We find the clearing which the lightning bolt tears open, YfVEOig in an easily understood sense with living TO jrdvra Hash up and step into appearance. 1 he being moved beings, phenomenally of id seen. Plants spring Jtdvra is also thought up from seeds, beasts from the pairing of parents. in the lighting up of entities in the deariim " of and humans from sexual Mghuiing. union l>etween man and woman. Y^eoig is also native to the phenomenal region of ihc vegetative-animal. HEiDKGGtR: Al first, let us leave aside words Coming into like -clearing" and existence "brightness." (YtyvEoeai) in this region is at the same time coupled with passing away (tpeetpEa6ai). If we now refer yeveol; also to the region of 8 g lifeless things, we operate with an expanded, more general, sense of this Fink: If we now start out from coming-forth. word. For if we refer veveoi; to ra jravra, we expand coming-forth-to- the sense of ^ipp^Y^ncc [Zum.yorsch,in-Kommen]. V^veois beyond the phenomenal region wherein you see the Greek in which the Renesis- ing mean- of YiVo,.^c«v as thought in y^Eatg, phenomenon is otherwise at home. then we al«> have a reference the brightness and gleam "o Heidegger: What of lightning in which the you understand by the phenomenal sense individual thing of the stands and flashes up. Then we would word yeveaig we can also label as ontic. have the following analogic"! correlation: as lightning on a dark Fink: We also meet night lets us see everything the widening of the original, phenomenal indivX in Its specific outline all at once, meaning of Y^veois so this would be in a shTrt time m common language, for example, when we speak span the of same as that which happens perpetually the world's coming into existence. in ^^ de(^aK,v [ever-living fne] We use specific images and domains Fr. m 30. The entry of entities in their of ideas in our representations. determinateness is thought With ylvohevwv, in the | in Fr 1 we are con moment of bnghtness. Out cerned with the more general of Fr. 64 comes ta Kdvra: out sense of yiveaig. For ta jrdvxa does not of Fr Jl' come into existence like that entity which comes into existence in accor- Xoyov. Larlier we tried to discern the dance with yiyeaig in the narrower sense, movement of lighting in the lightn- and also not like living beings. bolt. ng Now we can say that it It IS is the movement of another matter when, in the coming-in to-existencc of brin^ging forth o- things, manu- appearance. But brmging-forth-to-appearance, facture and production (zixw\ which lightning accom- and nolr\ai<;) are also meant. The jrottioig plishes n entities, is also a steering intervention of phenomena is, however, in the moving of something other than the yevEOi^. The jug themselves. things Things are moved in the does not come into existence manner of advancing and by means of the potter's hand like the man ing, waxmg and S waning, of local movement IS begotten by parents. and alteration The move- ment of hghtnmg corresponds Heidegger: to the moving of gv x6 ooaxiv. Let us once again clarify for oursevles what The steer our task is mg movement is not thought We ask what does id n&vxa with respect to the lighu^ing : mean or in Fr. 64; and n6^na 6ia JidvTajv in Fr with 4 1 and vivoiiEvtov yixQ nAvxov in ; Fr. 1 ? xoto t6v Xoyov [according to the bringing-forth-to-appearanc'e Logos] in Fr. I corresponds with gv to ao^>6v in Fr. 41 and XEpain'6c in nnues and^con ^ ?nuttT:;hto effect things. Thexl'"'^movement Fr. 64. ^ of steering intervention in the moving of things happens Fink: In in accord with the \6yog. The vivon^wv the sense of y^eoig is used in widened manner. movement of '" "^"'"'"^ Heidegger: But can one actually speak of a '."^'""^ "' ^^'^ wisdomlirnaTu^' widening here? I mean that'ru'rha must, T""however,'tbe that we should distinguished from the try to understand "steering." "eveiything throughout movement that issues everything," and now the movement that is thought in vlvoh^ojv in a of the one and the many that appear m the one, genuine Greek sense. I but also with the agree that we may not take the meaning ol^the efficacy of one in reference to td V^veoig in yivon^vojv narrowly; ^dvta, which comes to expression rather, it is here a matter of a general 6ta .dvxcov^ innd^a ,t could be that Axiyo; in Fr. expression. Fr. is 1 is another word 1 considered to be the beginning of Heraclitus' writing for ^^In Smething fundamental is said in it. But may we now refer WAEttog IS ywon^wv the ndviiov Baaike^g (king thought in YEveoi; in a wide of everything], the sense, to coming-forth [Hen>orkomwnP In war^hat de ^""'"'^^' ""'^^'"^"' °f anticipation, we can say that we must keep "^'"^^ ^-^^ -"^ the Iphe'e in view the fundamental trait ^^:ZT:. - tf ot what the Creeks called being. Although I do not like to use this word Heidegger: Do you wish to any more, we now say that what is meant take ii up nevertheless. When Heraclitus by y^eaic in thinks y vo,W YO^ ^rdvxcv serves ygVEOi; in Yivotifvojv, he does to determine more clo^ly the not mean "becoming" in the modern "^ Do you then iTofFr ' understand 6id causally:^ sense; that is, he does not mean a process. But thought in Greek, yiysaic rneans -to come into ^ ''°"''' ""'>' ^'^^ ^« ^^y 'hat lightning, l>cing," to come forth in presence. We now have oi^nT'A '"l""/^^: which tears three different ^"''- concerns, drawn out of Frs. ^ '" ''' ''^"^^ "P ^"'^ ''^'-" -<5-idu 64, 41, and 1. to which we " ; t sin : t^hf f'1- must hold ourselves, """" " "^"^ '^"^ '""''"^ power if we wish to come into the clear concerning tq -nanntr fT- . !^ of y^eoic i„ ,he ^6vTa. Let us also draw "'' '"" 'he on Fr. 50: oix ^(loO, dUa tou k6yov AxouoavTac P--^ movemen s of i.r ^IrTu''Sh'"'ng. the't'^-"^^-"-^ Wyo5 of Fr. I also 6m.o>.oyeiv oocpov ^oTiv gv itdvra ftvai. Diels' relates to xd ^dvta. The translation runs, "Listening movSiln^ '^J- not to me hut "^''^ '-"'S-fo-'h and establishes, to the I^gos (X6yog), it is wi.^e steers and de- to say that everything is TZl" r'- one. Before all else, this saying centers '"^' ^"""P*'"^^ '" 'he lightning movement that on gv. n6vza, and dHoXoyeiv. 'Sngs forth 10 11 Participant: The relationship of the lightning movement and the Fink: One can also subsume steering under movement. But with movenrient of entities is no relationship of effect. When it was said that Heraclitus, the steering of lightning is that which stands face to face the hghtning movement that brings-forth-to-appearance with passes into the all movement in entities like the lightning stands face movement of things, to face with that no causal relationship is intended between the which shows itself in its light. Thus, steering movement that brings-forth does not have the character and the movement of what is brought-forth of being moved like entities, but rather the character of bringing move- Rather, that which stands here in the problem-horizon is the difference ment forth in entities. Add to this that steering, which between movement in concerns xit being and movement in entities, specifically be- n&vxa, is no steering of individual things, but of the quintessential tween movement in unconcealing and whole movement in what is uncon- of entities. The phenomenon of cealed. steering a ship is only a jumping off place for the thought which thinks the bringing-forth of the whole of Fink: We distinguish the lightning outbreak of light, as movement entities in the articulate jointed-whole. As of bnnging-forth, the captain, in the movement and the coming-forth in it of every specific entity in its of the sea and winds to which the ship is exposed, brings a course to the movement. The mstantaneousness of lightning is an indication of an movement of the ship, impermanence. so the steering bringing-forth-to-appearance of We must understand lightning as the briefest time pre- lightning gives to all entities not only their cisely as outline but also their thrust. the mstantaneousness that is a symbol for the movement of The steering bringing-forth-to-appearance bnngmg-forth, is the more original move- not itself in time but allowing time. ment that brings to light the whole of entities in their manifold being Heidegger: Isn't lightning eternal, and not merely momentary? moved and at the same time withdraws Fink: into it. The problem of the movement that brings-forth, in its rela- Heidegger: Can one bring the steering tionship to of Fr. 64 (otaxfCiEL) and of the movement of what is brought-forth. we must think in the Fr. 41 (^XTjp^evT)OE) into association with 6iA? If so, what then results as nexus of lightning, sun, fire, and also the seasons, in which time is the meaning of 6idt? thought, rhe fiery with Heraclitus must be thought in more aspects for Fink: In 6ia a transitive moment is thought. example, the fire in the sun and the transformations of fire (jivqoc, Heidegger: What meaning does "everything throughout every- ZQ07zai.y Fire, which underlies everything, is the bringing-forth that thing" now have? withdraws Itself m its transformations as that which is brought-forth 1 Fink: I would like to bring Jidvra &ia jr Heidegger: In the experiment The Greeks did which we undertake, there is no not have faith in their gods. There is—to recall Wilamo- question of wanting to conjure up Heraclitus himself. Rather, he speaks witz—no faith of the Hellenes. with us and we speak with him. At present, we reflect on the phenome- Fink: However, the Greeks had myth. non of steermg. This phenomenon Heidegger: has today, in the age of cybernetics, Nevertheless, myth is something other than faith.— ( become so fundamental that it occupies But to come back and determines the whole of to noncoercive steering, we could ask how things stand natural science and the behavior with genetics. of humans so that it is necessary for us Would you also speak of a coercive steering there? to gam more clarity about it. You said first that Fink: Here one steering means "bringing must distinguish between the natural behavior of something mto a desired course." Let us genes, which can be attempt a still more precise interpreted cybernetically, on the one hand, and the description of the phenomenon. manipulation of factors of inheritance, on the other, Fink: Steering is the bringing-into-control [In-die Gewalt-Bnngen] of Heidegger: Would you speak of coercion here? a movement. ship A without rudder and helmsman is Fink: Even if coercion is felt a plaything of the not by the one overpowered, it is still waves and winds. It is forcibly brought coercion. Because into the desired course only one can today coercively intervene and alter the through be- steenng. Steering is an intervening, havior of genes, it is transfiguring movement possible that one day the world will be ruled by that compells the ship along a specific course. It has the character of druggists. violence m itself. Aristotle distinguishes the movement that is native to Heidegger: Regarding genes, the geneticist speaks of an alphabet. things and the movement that is of a store of forcibly conveyed to things. information, which stores up in itself a definite quantity of Heidegger: Isn't there information. also a nonviolent steering? Does the charac- Does one think of coercion in this information theory? ter of violence belong intrinsically to the phenomenon of steering? The Fink: The genes that we discover are a biological finding. However, phenomenon of steering is as soon as ever and again unclarified in reference to one comes to the thought of wanting to improve the human Heraclitus and to our present-day distress. race through an altering That natural science and our steering of genes, it is thereby not a question of | life today become ruled by compulsion cybernetics in increasing measure is not acci- which brings pain, but indeed a question of coercion. dental; rather, it is foreshadowed in the Heidegger: historical origin of modem Thus, we must make a two-fold distinction: on the one knowledge and technology. hand, the information-theoretical interpretation of the biological; and Fink: The human on the phenomenon of steering is characterized by the other, the attempt, grounded on the former, to moment actively steer. of coercive and precalculated regulation. It is What is in question is whether associated with the concept of coercive steering is in place calculative knowledge and in cybernetic coercive intervention. The steering of Zeus is biology. something else. When he steers Fink: he does not calculate, but he rules ef- Taken strictly, one cannot speak here of steering. fortlessly. There tends to be noncoercive steering Heidegger: At issue is in the region of the whether an ambiguity presents itself in the gods, but not in the human region. concept of information. Heidegger: Is there really an essential connection Fink: Genes exhibit between steering a determinate stamping and have, thereby, the and coercion? character of a lasting stock [Un^spekkem]. A human lives his life, which Fink: The helmsman of a ship is he a man of skill. He knows his way apparently spends as a free being, through genetic conditioning, about in the tides and winds. He t-veryone is must make use of the driving wind and determined by his ancestors. One also speaks of the learning tide in correct ability manner. Through his steering he removes the ship coei- of genes, which can learn like a computer. cively from the play of wind and waves. Heidegger: To this extent one must thus see But how do things stand with the concept of informa- and also posit the tion? moment of coercive acts in the phenomenon of steer- ing. Fink: By the concept of information one understands, on one Heidegger: Isn't present day cybernetics itself also hand, injai-mare. the stamping, steered? impressing of form; and on the other, a Fink: If one would think of E[^ae^lEvrl [destiny] in this, or even fate. lerhnique of communication. Heidegger: Isn't this steering Heidegger: noncoercive? We musi look at vari- If genes determine human behavior, do they develop ous phenomena of steering. 'he Steering can be, on the one hand, a coercive information that is innate to them? holding in line, on the other hand, the noncoercive fiNK! In steering of the gods. some measure. As to information, we are not dealing here The gods of the Greeks, however, have nothing to do with religion. with the kind of information that one picks up. What is meant here is 14 ihat he behaves as if he were to get a command from the genetic stock. I-iom this point of view, freedom is planned freedom. Hermeneuticai Circle. Relatedness of Iv Heidegger: — Information thus implies, on the one hand, the stamp- and Jidvxa (Correlated Fragments: i, 7, ing and, on the 80, 10 other, information-giving, upon which the informed being reacts. The 29,30,41,53,90, 100. 102. 108, 114). human mode of behavior becomes formalized through cybernetic biology, and the entire causal structure becomes converted We need no philosophy of nature; it suffices, rather, if we clarify for ourselves where cybernetics comes from and where it leads to The gen- eral charge, that philosophy understands nothing of natural science and Fink: As a result of Fr. 64, we are driven to the difficulty of elucidating always hmps along behind it, we take can without being perturbed It is the expression xa Jtdvta. I intentionally do not speak the important for us to say of concept of to natural scientists what they are in effect ' Tct iidvTa in order to avoid doing. the idea of a Heraclitean technical vocabu- lary. The expression xa Jtriivra have has shown itself to us in Fr. 64 as that on We now seen a multitude of aspects in the phenomenon of steer- which lightning comes to bear in ing. a steering way. Lightning, as the open- KEQavwdz, gv, oo(p6v, Xoyo;, nvQ, "HMog, and n6\E^oz, are not one ing light, as instantaneous fire, brings xa and the same, 7i6vxa to light, outlines each and we may not simply equate them; rather, certain rela- thing in its form, and guides the movement, tions hold sway change, and passage of all between them which we wish to see, if we want to become which belongs in xd n&vza. In order to focus clear to ourselves more sharply the question about the phenomena. Heraclitus has described no of what or who xa n6.vxa are, whether individual things or elements phenomena; rather, he has simply or seen them. In closing, let me recall Fr counter references, we began with a preliminary look at other fragments 47: iii] elxfi jzeqi xojv \ityi(nwv ODjipaUwueea. Translated, it says: con- that also name xh it&vxa. if we disregard what we have already brought cernmg the highest things, let us not collect our words out of the blue into relation to Fr. 64, fifteen text citations follow in which we wish to that IS, rashly. This could be a motto for our seminar. examine how far, is, that in what respects xit n&via are addressed. In Fr. 64 it has been indicated that lightning is the steerer. It is not a question of an immanent self-regulation of Jidvxa. We must distinguish lightning as the one from the quintessential many of ndvxa. Participant: If the steering principle does not lie within the whole, must it be found outside or above the whole? But how can it be outside the whole? Fink: If we press it. the concept of the whole means a quintessence that allows nothing outside itself; thus, it apparently does not allow what you call the steering principle. But with Heraclitus, it is a question of a counterreference, at present still not discernible by us, between the &v of ighining and xa jidvxa. which are torn open, steered, and guided by lightning. As a formal logical quintessence xd ndvxa signifies a concept of "everything," which allows nothing outside itself. It is, nevertheless, questionable whether the steering is something external to xd Jidvxa at all. Here a very peculiar relatedness lies before us, which cannot be expressed at all with current relationship-categories. The relatedness in 'luesiion, between the lightning that guides td jidvxa and td ndvxa itself, IS the relatedness of one to many. It is not. however, the relationship of Ihe singular to the plural, but the i elatedness of a still unclarified one to the many in the one, whereby the many are meant in the sense of quin- 'essence. Heidegger: Why do you reject Diels' translation of xd Jidvxa as Universe? 16 17 Fink; If, in Fr. t6 iiav Heidegger: Wittgenstein 64, [the whole] were to stand in place of xa says the following. The difficulty in Jtdvxa, It would be justifiable to which thinking stands translate with "universe." xii n&vxa do compares with a man in a room, from which he not form the universe; rather, gel out. first, they form the quintessence of things wanis lo At he attempts to get out through the window, but found in the world. The universe is is loo high for him. not xit ndvxa; rather, lightnins itself it Then he attempts to get out through the chimney, IS world-forming. In the is too for gleam of lightning, the many things in entirety which narrow him. If he simply turned around, he would see come into differentiated that the door was open all appearance, xa JtdvTa is the realm of dif- along. ferences. Lightning as gv, ourselves are however, is not contrasted with xa Jidivia as We permanemly set in motion and caught in the her- one neighlwrhood against another or as cold against warm. meneutical circle. Our difficulty now consists in the fact that we search Heidegger: clue about On your interpretation, are lightning and universe for a the meaning of xa Jidvxa in central Heraclitean frag- thus the same? ments without having already involved ourselves in a detailed interpreta- Fink: I would like to formulate it tion. For this reason our search for otherwise. Lightning is not the the meaning of Heraclitus' xa Jidvxo universe, but it is as the world-forming. must also remain provisional. It is only as world-form. What is to be understood here Participant: by world-form must be elucidated more precisely If we attempt to make clear to ourselves the meaning Heidegger: I myself would like to of xd Jtdvia starting from a fragment, can't revert add a supplement to what I we to Fr. 50 in which it explained during the last session is said, "Everything is one?" concerning cybernetics, i don't want to allow a misunderstanding Heidegger: everything to arise from my allusion to modern cyber- But we have of Heraclitus' fragments is not netics in the course of the discussion the whole, is not the whole Heraclitus. about what steering is. Misun- derstanding would arise if Fink: I don't imagine that we restricted ourselves to what is said about one can jump at Heraclitus' obscure steering in saying Frs. 64 and 41, and if we constructed a connection between as a maxim for interpretation. Likewise, we cannot appeal to Fr. Herachtus and cybernetics. This connection between Heraclitus and 60, which says that the way up and the way down are one and the same, cybernetics lies much deeper for an understanding of is, hidden and is not so easy to grasp. It goes what a way for instance, a way in philosophy in another direction or a way through that we could not discuss in the context of our the fragments of Heraclitus. Here Heraclitus does not present awareness express the customary of Heraclitus. Nevertheless, the meaning of cybernet- understanding of way. It also pertains to the ics lies the origin of that hermeneuiical difficulty m which prepares itself here with Heraclitus in mentioned by us that each fragment remains the fragmentary in relatedness of tv and xa Jidvxa. its explication, and in connection with all other frag- Fink: If we now make the ments, it does not yield the whole of Heraclitus' attempt to look at how x6 n&vxa is men- thought. tioned in other Heidegger: In the fragments, we still intend no explication of the separate course of our seminar we must make the at- tempt fragments. to come through interpretation into the dimension required by Heidegger: If Heraclitus. Indeed, the question I have postponed a question put by one of the par- emerges how far we implicitly or ticipants, it has explicidy interpret, that is. how far happened under the constraint of a fundamental diffi- we can make the dimensions of culty in Herachtus visible which we now find ourselves. Wlierein lies this difficulty? from out of our thought. Philosophy can only speak Participant: and say, but it cannot paint The questions thus far touched on can only be an- pictures. swered Fink: Perhaps also when we have won a deeper understanding of whai our consid- it can never even point out. erations have referred Heidegger: There is to up to now. But above all: we are supposed to an old Chinese proverb that runs, "Once know at the very pointed out is better than beginning, as well as after consideration of a fragment, a hundred times said." To the contrary, phi- what xa Jtdvxa means. losophy is obligated to point out precisely However, we can understand the meaning nf tci through saying. Fink: Jidvxa only in the context all We begin with the passages in Jidvra of the fragments in which xa Ji6vxa is which are mentioned in mentioned. order to look at On (he other hand, how ndvxa are spoken of. begin with I we can work out the contextual whole We Fr. , which has only through already concerned a step-by-s(ep procedure through individual fragments, us. The phrase which alone now interests us runs: which already presupposes Yivojifvcov ydg Jidvxuv a prior understanding of what is meant by xct xatd xov X670V. We ask in what respect ndvxa are n naxft t6v Wyov. Jidvra are moved in accord with Wyog. VLv6|xeva ndvta viduality of ndvxa that, at the same time in Fr. 1. are spoken of as moved, and stand in a relationship to humans who become uiicom^ moved, that is, in accord with the XoYog. prehending (d^uvetoi yCvovxai fivepwiioi). who do not understand the Heidegger: Following the overall sense of Fr. 7, ndvta X6Y05 in accord with which Jtdvta happen and are moved. are thus Heidegger: related to yviboiq [inquiry], to grasping humans. Let us also include among xata xov ^^yov the t6v6e. Fink: yvcbaig with respect Fink: The demonstrative to ndvxa is possible, however, only in so t6v6e means: in accord with this Xoyog, far as jrdvra are distinct in themselves. Jidvta which then is discussed in what follows. are moved in accord with XoYo;. Ill their movement, Participant: in their change and passage, which lightning Isn't it more appropriate to translate d|iJvEToi steers, they are at the same time YLVovxai not with "becoming distinct by themselves. The movement uncomprehending," but with "prove to be of the outbreaking lightning gleam lets Jidvra u ncom prehe nd i ng" ? come forth as distinct by themselves. Fink: When 1 translate vivovxai with "become," and put it in a Heidegger: Yet with the preliminary relationship to ylvoji^vcov orientation, concerning the yag JcdvTtov. I understand by it only a colorless way Tct Jidvra are addressed by becoming. Heraclitus. you have already landed us in :m entire philosophy. Heidegger: The beginning of our consideration was Fr. 64, in Fink: But I still want to stick to the which we view the relatedness point that the essential thing in of steering lightning to xa n&via. that is. Fr. 7 is the reference of ndvra the relatedness back to yvfooig and tuAyviooi^. of gv and irdvta. Further fragments should now show us Heidegger: While Jidvta in Fr. m what manner in 1 are seen in their reference to and what respects this relatedness is mentioned. h.)yo<;, which is not of human character, Fink: In Fr. they are mentioned in Fr. 7 in 1, in which jidvta are spoken of as moved, their their reference to human cognizance. Subsequently. movement is related to ^^ayog. In the same 6iavoEia9ai [think fragment, the relationship of through] and biaUyzaQai [dialogue] then develop themselves humans to Xoyog is also mentioned out of in so far as humans do not under- biayiyvo3ox2iv [distinguish], diavvoiev is an indication stand the \6yo<; in its that Jtdvra are moving relatedness to the moved Jidvra. From Fr. characterized as what is distinguishable, but 1 , would like to not what is already distin- 1 move to Fr. 7: navia ' d m Svra xajwo; yevolto. ^iVEg &\ guished. 6iaYVOLev.^ In what manner are TOvta spoken of here? Do 6vTa [things Participant: U X6yog is discussed in Fr. that actually I, and 6idYva.oi; is dis- exist] elucidate Jtdvta or is Jtdvra meant as an indetermi- cussed m Fr. 7, can't then nate one refer the yvwots of jrdvra to X6yos? number of a quintessential kind, so that we must translate: every Heidegger: You assume too much thereby. You Svxa? 1 believe that rtdvta are understood pursue the con- here as distinction. nection between human yvwotg and XoYog. But we want first to Heidegckr: That they are distinct emerges from dtayvoiev [would get acquamted with the different ways discriminate]. in which Heraclitus speaks of td Jtuvta. Fink: In Fr. a familiar 7, phenomenon is mentioned, a phenome- Participant: non which But isn't the ontic being [Sfiendsfin] of jidvia, which disguises differences, namely, smoke. In smoke, to be sure, comes to speech in 6vta. a quality of jidvxa which is a necessary presup- distinctions become eliusive, but it does not eliminate those distinction.s posiiion for ^Ldyvtooi;? which become evident in ftioYVoiEV. Above all. the moment of being Fink: I concede that the ontic being of Jtdvra is a necessai^ distinct is to be noticed in the word combination piesup- irrdvia td fivra. I>'>sition for the discerning human cognizance. But fivia is no quality Heidegger: How is ndvia thus to be comprehended? of TOvta. We must, however, keep Fink: Jidvia in mind that flvra is added to the con- xit flvta does not mean an enumeration of 6vTa and tent of navza in Fr. 7 as hitherto treated. does not signify 'all which is," but the ndvia which are, are set off from Heidegger: But do we then know what td Svra means? would one another, are distinguished, ndvra, collectively as 6vTa, are We the corre- only come closer to the matter, if we would l>e concerned late of a fttayvcooLg [diagnosis]. The diagnostic character with the nose of a distinguish- ttif eyes, and with hearing. ing is sharpened in regard to smoke as a distinction-obscuring phenom- Fink: In our context, the phrase xai Yivofieva enon. Thus. ndvTO in Fr. 7 arc viewed as distinct. Jidvia xqt' ?0iv xai Xetwv m Fr. 80 now interests us.= Here Heideggeh: What information concerning also ndvta Yivoufva are named' ndvxa does Fr. 7 give us '".w however, not Hard tov Xoyov t6v6i; as in Fr. vis-a-vis Fr, I ? I. but mt' fptv coiding [ac- to strife]. At first, we Fink: In Fr. the emphasis leave out of account the phrase jcal XPetw 7, lies on the distinctness, on the indi- laccordmg to obligation]. Now jidvta and their mannei of movement 20 21 are referred not to Wyog, but to strife. In Fr. 80, Jidvra enter into a Fink: In Fr. 10. a relatedness is articulated between Jidvxa, in the context of meaning with strife. It is reminiscent of n6kE\ioc,- Fr. 53, to — sense of many in entirety, and the one. and a relatedness of the one to which we will yet turn.—From Fr. 10, we single out the phrase: ex the many in entirety. Here, the one does not mean a part. JidvTiov gv xai i% tvoq mivTa.* Here also we meet with a becoming, but Heidegger: Our German word Eins [one] is fatal for the Greek 6v. not with what is meant by the movement of individual entities; rather, we To what extent? meet with the becoming of a whole. Fink: In the relatedness of h/ and ndvxa, it is not only a matter of a Heidegger: If we view it naively, how could hi K&vztav Iv be lounterreference, but also of a unification. understood? Participant: I would like to understand h/ as something complex Participant: Read naively it would mean that a whole gets put in opposition to a numerical conception. The tension between §v and together out of all the parts. navTCi has the character of a complex. Heidegger: But the second phrase, ki, ^vo; Jidvxa, already indi- Fink: ^v is lightning and fire. If one wishes to speak here of a cates to us that it is not a question of a relationship of a part and a whole complex, one can do so only if one understands by it an encompassing which is composed of parts. unity that the many in entirety gather in themselves, Fink: In Frs. I and 80, Jidvra yLyvoneva are mentioned. Their Heidegger: We must think Ev. the one [das Eine], as the unifying. being moved was referred on one hand to X6yoS and on the other hand To be sure, the one can have the meaning of the one and only, but here to strife. In accord with Xxiyo? and strife means: in accord with the it has the character of unifying. If one translates the passage in question movement of Xoyo^ and strife. We have distinguished this movement from Fr. 10. "out of everything, one; and out of one, everything," this is from the being moved of Ji6vTa. It is not the same kind of movement as a thoughtless translation. £v is not by itself a one that would have nothing the movement of Jidvra. In Fr. 10, movement is brought up, but in the to do with Jtdivta; rather, it is unifying. sense of how one comes out of everything and everything comes out of Fink: In order to make clear the unifying unity of Ev, one can take one. as a comparison the unity of an element. However, this is not enough; Heidegger: Which movement do you mean here? rather, the unifying unity must be thought back to the qne_oOigh.tDi_ngi tr. Fink: The world-movement. With this, nevertheless, too much has which, in its gleam, gathers and unifies the many in entirety in their been said. have noticed We that one can understand ky, JtAvutov Iv distinctness. naively as a relationship of part and whole. That one comes out of many Heidegger: Ev runs throughout all philosophy till Kant's Tran- is a familiar phenomenon. However, the same thing does not allow ex- scendental Apperception. You said just now that one had to consider Iv pression in reverse manner. Many does not come out of one, unless we in its relatedness to K&vxa, and Jidvra in its relatedness to h/ in Fr. 10, mean only bounded allness in the sense of a multiplicity and a set. xa together with Xdyog and strife in its reference to ndvra in Frs. I and 80. nAvra is, however, no concept of bounded allness. no concept of set, but However, that is only possible when we understand \dyog as gathering a quintessence. We must distinguish the concept of allness, in the sense and Sgig [strife] as dismantling. Fr. 10 begins with the word oxivdiJiLES of quintessence as it is given in la ndvra, from the numerical or generic [contact]. How should we translate this? allness, that is, from a concept of relative allness. Participant: I would propose: joining-together [Zusammenjugen]. Heidegger: Do all the books that are arranged here in this room Heidegger: In this, we would be concerned with the word "to- constitute a library? gether." Accordingly, Iv is that which unifies. Participant; The concept of a library is ambiguous. On one hand, Fink: Fr. 29 seems at first not to belongin the series of fragments in it can mean the entire set of books lying here before us; but on the other which Jidvra are mentioned: aleeuvrai yiiQ gv dvrL djidvTOJv oE dQioroi, hand, it can also mean the equipment other than the books, that is, the xWo; devoov Ovtitwv.' For here Jidvra are not mentioned directly in a room, the shelves, etc. The library is not restricted to the books that s[K'cific respect; rather, a human phenomenon is mentioned, specifi- belong to it. Also, when some books are taken out, it is still a library. call) that , the noble minded prefer one thing rather than all else, namely Heidegger; If we take out one book after another, long does it how everlasting glory rather than transient things. The comportment of the remain a library? But we see already that all the individual books to- uoble minded is opposed to thai of the jioXXol, the many, who lie there gether do not make up a library. "All," understood as summative, is quite like well-led cattle. And here, nevertheless, the reference in question of different from allness in the senseof the uniiy^of the peculiar sort that is £v and Jidvxa is also to be seen. According the prima facie "" to meaning, Iv -- not so easy to specify at first. IS here the everlasting glory that occupies a special place vis-a-vis all else. I 22 23 But the hagmeiil expresses not only the compoitnient of ihe noble the same for all beings." By beings, he evidently understands living minded in reference to glory, (ilory is standing in radiance. Radiance, beings. We wish, however, to translate i3in;6via)v: for the entirety of however, reminds us of the light of lightning and fire. Glory relates itself ndvra. lo all other things as radiance to dullness. Fi . 90 also belongs here in so Hkidecger: tov aiixov djidvxiov stands only in Clement of Alexan- far as it speaks of the relationship oi gold and goods. Gold also relates dria, and is missing in Plutarch and Siinplicius. Karl Reinhardt strikes it. itself to goods as radiance to dullness. I would like to mention him once again, because I would like to refer to Heidegger: Fr. 29 also names the jroUof next to the 6qiotol [the his essay, "Herahlih Lelire vom Feuei" (first published in Hermes 77, 1 942, l>est]. In Fr. 1, the JtoWxji are compared with the djieCeoioiv, with the pp. 1-27), which is especially important in methodological resjiects." It untried, who are contrasted with ky comportmeni. There, however, it was discerning cognii^ance. In Fr. 29, ments. We must ask whether cracpov is only a property of ev as unifying Jiavia are also .seen in their leference back to a human comporiment. unity, or whether it is not preci.sely the es.sence of £v. But it is not a question of a knowledge relationship; rather, ii is a ques- HEinKc;<;KR: Then we could put a colon between ev and oocpov. ^v: tion ot a relationship of preference of one thing over another. Glory, OOfpOV. however, is not distinguished by degiees from othei- jxjssessions; rather, Fink; oocpcW. as the es.sence of the unifying ^v, grasps ev in its com- it has the character of distinction in opposition to all other rhings. Ii is plete fulltie.ss of sense. If h/ up lill innv appears lo us to withdraw, we not a question of ]3iefereiice for ovei' one another, but of preference of have in Fr. 41 the first more accurate characterization as a kind of evcool^ the only ini])ortaiu matter as against all others. As the noble minded [imiflcation], alth<)Ugh this concept is laden with Neoplatonic meaning. picfer the only important matter, the radiance of glory rather ihan all Ilt.iDKCitiKK: fv runs through all of metaphysics; and dialectic is also other things, so the thinkei- thinks on ihe linifyiiig one of lightning, in not to Ix' th()ughl without ev. ibehghi of which :TdvTa come to appearance, nol only aboiil JittVTu. .\nd Fink: In Fr. .5:^, lo which we have already alludcft in connection just as the many transient prefer things to the radiance of glory, so with Fr. HO. itdvta gets placed in relationship to ;ioX,E|ioc. Ihe fragment humans, the many, do not understand ihe unifying ev (which includes has the following word order: FloXruoc irdvxtuv (itv jTUTTjy EOti. jrdvrCDV Jiltvia in theii- distinction) but only ihe tovtu. the many things. fir (ktoi>.EiJ5, Jttti Toijc; ^iev Beouc; e6el^e tou^ 6f dvftywjtot'c;, lotig (ttv In Kr. 'M). the focus of ih<)uglit is <)rientei:l lo the relationship of mivTa 6o>jX.o\j5 fJtoftioe TOi'g bk ^"KEvQiQovc,. Dieis translates: "War is the father and Kooiinc;. The citation whith alone is now inieresling to us runs: ''W<\ king of all ibings. He established some as gods anil the others as x6o|iov t6v6e, tov oiitov 6jidvT0)v, Diels translates: -"rhis world-oider. luiinans; some he made slaves and the others free." The rcfeicnce of 24 25 jidvra to jroXtno; has already indicated itself to us in Fr. 80, where egig is ful, good, and just; but humans have assumed some to be unjust and mentioned. Now war, that is, strife, is named lather and Iting oJ all others to be just." In Fr. 7, ndvia were related to human grasping. Now things. As the father is the source of children, so is strife, which we must Heraclitus speaks not only from the human but also from the divine think together with ?v as lightning and fire, the source of ndvia. Ihe reference to Jidvra, Kverything is beautiful, good, and just for god. Only conneciionofn:6>^Hoc;asfaihcr to ndvia repeats itself in aceriain way in hiunans make a distinction lietween the just and the unjust. The genuine the relationship of JioXeno? as sovereign to navza. We must hring and true view on Jidvra and ev is the divine; the human is ingenuine and [kingj Paodeii; into association with the steering and directing ol light- deficient. In F"r. 29, we see a similar double relaiedness of Jidvta and ^v. ning. As lightning tears open the field of ndvro and w Fink: I am concerned with the very connection between them. But judicious one make himself .strong in a deeper sense with the ^v, which is we must still leave open how time and bringing are here to Ix- thought. m company with Jidvta. Hi.:iot:(:<;ER: Bringing is an important moment which we must later HEinEG<;t:H; After ^uvdv [common] we must put a big (juestion heed in the cjueslion concerning dialectic in 0U|i(pEe(.i|itvov [something mark, just as we do after XEXtogiofievov. Ihe question mark, however, that is brought logelhei] ' and 6iatpE06|ievov [somelhing that is brought means that we must set aside all familiar i therewith. Nevertheless, in passing through the many citations whai xa nAvxa means h^is not Different l>ea,me t leaie> to us. Rather, the expression ta jidvia-oXov, ndvTa-ovra— Jiavta has Income n.oie (|ues[i<»u.ble in reference to the cases evhibiied Kxposition of Fragment 7 (C^orrelated Fragment 67). It has become more questionable to us what jrcivia are. wh;.t their com- jidv EQJiexov (Fragment 1 1). ing to appearance is, and how the reference ol Jiavta and i:v must l)e Maturation Character of the Seasons (Fragment thought and where 100). this reference belongs. When we say cuesti<.nable" [fragi^mrdig], ,t means that the emerging questions [Fr/.gen] are worthy lu'uidig] ot being asked. ' Participant; Frs, 50 and 66 also l^elong in the series oC enumer- ated fragments that (real oljidvra. Heideggeh: Let us look back to the theme of the last seminar. Hkidk(;(;kh: Fr. 66 is disputed by Clement, whom Karl Reinhardl Participant: In passage through the fragments in which id jrdvra characterizesas the Greek Isaiah. For Clement sees Heradituseschaiolog- is mentioned, we attempted to view the respects in which the phra.se tq ically. Again, 1 emphasize that it would is be of inestimable value il Kail jidvxa sptjken by Heraclilus. These respects are the reference of navru Reuihardt's commentary, oriented toward tradition and history had to Xoyoc. to strife, to war as father and king of Jidvxa, to the unifying ev, come down to us. r. u-. Reinhardl was no professional philo.sopher but to xooiioc,, to the exchange of the, to ooqxW, to XEXflJi-OMi'vov, to the he could think and see. .seasons, moreover, to the human comportment of discerning cogni- zance, to the preference for one rather than all else, to stiengihening oneself with what is common to all, and to the different divine and human relation to iravra. Heidec;(;er; Have we yet extracted what id nidvta means from these manifold references? Participant: Provisionally, we have interpreted xd Jidvxa as the quintessence of what is individual. Heide(;(;er: But where do you get the individual from? Participant: In all the fragments, the view is oriented toward the individual, which is taken together in the quintessence, xd jrdvxa. Heii)E(;<;er: What does "individuar' mean in (ireek? Participant: gxaorov. Hilidec;ger: In passage through a series of fragments, we have viewed the reference of id Jidvxa to ?v and that which belongs lo ev. Bui in pursuit of the manifold references in which xd Jidvxa are mentioned, we aie still not successful in characterizing more closely the phrase xd Jidvxa. xd Jidvxa are also spoken of as dislingui.shed within themselves. How is that lo Ix.- understood? Pari icipant: "Fhc entirety of Jidvxa can l)e addressed as x6 oXov. I his entirely is the quintessence of self-distinguishing Jidvxa. Heidec;ger: Bui whai is the quintessence? Doesn't it mean the whole? Participant: The quintessence is thai which incloses. Heiok(;(;er: Is there something like an inclosing quintessence with llcra ])rebeiiding is already by itself un-Cieek. With Heraclilus, there is no concept. .And also with Aristotle, theic still are no concepts in the pro[x.-r sense. When does the concept arise for the first lime? 28 29 Participant: When Xoyos, specifically the stoic xaTdX»)Tpig (direct of things, or than the wholeness of a summative kind. ?v is also not to be apprciiensionj, gets transhiicd ami iindcrsKKxl as conceplus [concept]. understood like the xdojiog in Ti^aioz, [Timaem], which Plato specifies as Hhideggkk: talk To of the concept is not (ireeit. It is not consonant a living being with extremities turned inside.'-' The wholeness of hi with what we will treat in the next seminar. Ihere wc niusi also deal means the totality which we must rather think as £(paipog [sphere]. Thus cautiously with the word "quintessence." we must discriminate the manifold of things and elements, the quintes- Fink: Wiien I speak of quintessence, I would like to lay the em- sential entirety of ndvca, and the totality thought in hi, which lets the phasis on auvExov [keep together]. When the paiticipani said that I have entirety of ndvra come forth to appearance, and which surrounds it. explained ta ndvta as ihe quinie.ssence ol the individual, he has claimed Hf.idec;ger: What do you mean by entirety? Once one has arrived more than I have said. I have precisely not decided whether la ndvra at entirety in thinking, the opinion may emerge that one is at the end of means an entire constellation of what is individual, or whether this thinking. Is that the danger which you .see? phrase does not rather refer lo the elements and the counte preferences. Fink: At this point. I would like to speak of a double ray of thought. .\i first, I understand xd n&vza only as the entire region to which noth- We must di,stinguish the thought of things in the whole and the thought ing is lacking; to which region, nevertheless, something is opposed. That that thinks the universe, the totality, or hi. I would like thereby to avoid to JidvTQ which stands in opposition, however, is not alongside them; TO Jidvxa, which are referred back to ev as lightining, becoming under- rather, it is wjmcthing in which jrdvxa are. Thus seen. KeQawvo; is no stood as a universe closed in itself. longer a phenomenon of light among others in the entirety of xh Heidegger; If we speak of wholeness in reference to td Jidvra. the Jidvra, We do not deny that in the entirety of what there is, lightning too danger then consists in ?v becoming superfiuous. Therefore, we must is included in a pre-eminent manner which points in the direction of a speak of entirety and not of wholeness with regard to Td Jtdvra. The siimmvm ens [supreme entity]. Perhaps Kepawog as thought by Hera- word "entirety" means that Jidvxa are in entirety not as in a box, but in rlitus is. however, no em [entity] which belongs with id Jidvra. also no the manner of their thorough individuality. We choose the word "en- distinci ens, hut something which stands in a relationship, still unclear to tirety" on two grounds: first, in order not to run the danger that the last us, lo Jidvra. id We have first formulated this relationship in a simile. As word be spoken with "the whole"; and second, in order not to under- lightning tears open light, and gives visibility to things in its gleam, so stand Td Jidvxa only in the sense of Exaora. lightning in a deeper sense lets ndvta come forth to appearance in its Fink: In a certain manner xd Jidvxa are the many, but precisely not clearing. Jidvxa, forth coming lo appearance, are gathered in the bright- the many of an enumerated .set; rather, of a quintessential entirety. ness of lightning. Because the lightning is not a light phenomenon inte- Heidegger: The word "quintessence" is on the one hand too static, rior to the entirety of ndvca, but brings Jtdvra forth to appearance, the and on the other it is un-Greek in so far as it has to do with grasping. In lightning is in a certain sense set apart from jtdvra. Lightning is, there- Greek, we could speak of negiexov [embrace]. But ix^\.\ [to hold] does fore, the Kfeatjv65 ndviorv xex'^Q'-aufvoc. But as thus set apart, light- not mean grasping and grip. What comes into play here, we will see from ning is in a certain manner also the joining and again the dismantling in the following fragments. reference to itdvia. td rtdvia means not only the entirety of individual In order to return now to the fragments which we went through in the things. Precisely when one thinks from out ofmigoc; XQOKai [transforma- last seminar: we have seen that they speak of xd jxdvxa in different ways. tions of fire], it is rather the transformations of fire throughout the great For example, Fr. 7 is the only one in which Heraclitus speaks of Jidvxa as number of elements flvxQ, which makes up the entirety of individual things. and in which 6vxa is used at all. Precisely translated, it runs: If IiKlividual things aie then \iiv.x(i, that is, mixed, out of the elements. everything which is were smoke, noses would discriminate. Here Hkideggkr: In what would you see the distinctitm between entirety 6iaYiYva)oxELV is mentioned. We also speak of a diagnosis. Is a diagnosis and wholeness? also a distinguishing? Fink: We speak of wholeness in the whole structure of things which Participant: .A diagnosis distinguishes what is healthy and what is we can address as sick, 6J,a, and of the entirety i>f things, of the 6Xov, in which what is conspicuous and what is not conspicuous in relation to everything distinguished is gathered and set apart in a specific ordering. sickness. HKini':(;<-.HR: Do you understand entirety as flXov oi- xae6>Lov Pariicipant: To speak in the terminology of the physician: the [universal]? physician seeks specific symptoms of sickness. The diagnosis is a passing I- INK- Biufi^-ov. the entirety of Jidvxa, is derivative from ev, which is through the body and a precise, distinguishing cognition of sympt means, first of all, a running through and a going through the entire Fink: I understand smoke as a phenomenon that veils the distinc- body in order to come then to a distinguishing and a decision. tions of n6.vxa, From this without the distinctions disappearing entirely. For it is we ah-eady observe that the bLaYLyvtiJoxeiv is not only a distinguishing. the nose that, in passing through the veil of JHivra, cognizes distinctions. must, We therefore, say: If everything that is were smoke, noses Heidegger: would Thus you take 6id as "throughout the smoke. " To the have the possibility to go through them. contrary, I understand 6i.d as "along the smoke." ftiaYiyvtooKEiv here Participant: The distinguishing of entities would then happen by means that the possible manifold, immanent to the smoke, can be gone means of the sense of smell. through and cognized. HEiDtxiGER: But can the senses distinguish at all? This question will Fink: Whereas, on my preliminary interpretation, smoke veils a still occupy us later with Heiaclitus. But how does Heraclitus come to multiplicity, on your explication smoke is itself a dimension of multi- smoke? The answer is not difficult to find. Where there is smoke, there is plicity. The question about xa 6vi;a depends on the way we understand also fire. smoke. 6iaYiyvci)cn(eiv in the sense of distinction and decision presup- Fink: If Heraclitus speaks of smoke in Fr. 7, then it means that the poses the ftid in the sense of "throughout" (minced). smoke makes 61(115 l^'ghi] more difficult in reference to n&vxa xix Svxa, Participant: If all things would become smoke, then isn't every- that, nevertheless, in passing through the concealing smoke a thing one, without distinction? bmy\.fjii>av.>L\y is possible by way of ^ivtc [the nostrils]. We must also Heidegger: Then noses would have nothing more to do, and there observe that Heraclitus does not say something like: If everything that is would be no bi6.. Fr. 7 denies precisely that everything that is would becomes smoke. Rather, he says: If everything which is would become Income homogeneous smoke. If that were the statement of the frag- smoke, ment, then no tliayvoiev could follow. We have brought Fr. 67 into play Heidk<;gkr; We must understand the YLVeoSai [coming into exis- precisely ix^cause it contains an allusion to the fact that smoke is filled tence] in Yt'VoiTO [would lx.'ComeJ as 'coming-forth." If everything that is with a manifold. would come forth as ... smoke In the fragment, the Jidvia xa. ovra are Fink: Our attempt at interpreting the fragments of Heraclitus straight away allied with a biavvwoi;. In the background, however, they began with Fr. 64. Although we have already discussed a number of are spoken of in respect to a charactei that is connected with fire. other fragments, this was above all because we wanted to learn in what Fink: You bring smoke into connection with fire. Smoke stands in respects xa ndvra are mentioned. From Fr. 64, with which we Ijegan our relation to the nose. That would mean that the nose also stands over the sequence of fragments, we now turn to Fr. II. It runs: Jictv yoq ^ginETov smoke in a relation to fire. However, is ii not precisely the 6^115 which is JtXriYti vt-HETQi, I^ils translates: "Everything that crawls is tended by the most fire-like in meaning? I would suppose that the sunlike natuie of (god's) (whip)blow." What can be the reason for arranging this fragment. sighi can receive the firey more the than nose. Additionally, smoke is which declares that all crawling things are driven to pasture with a blow, something derivative from fire. Smoke is, so to speak, the shadow of fire. liebmd the Keeauv6;-liagment? Approaching from another viewpoint, One must say: If everything which is would is it also become smoke, as that which declared here how lightning steers and how it guides ndvia; or is derivative from fiie, then is noses could cognize what is by means of something entirely different aimed at in this fragment? Let us proceed resistance. However. I would in suppose that 6i|)L5, rather than the nose, is the explication of this fragment from the word nhc\yi\ [blow]. Diels allied with fire. translates: with god's whipblovi,'. True, god is mentioned in the context, HEiDKtiCiF.R: but Nevertheless, I Ix'lieve that something else is meant by not in the fiagment itself. We attempt an explication of the saying the nose smoke. and Let us look at Fr. 67. There it says, among other without ibeieijy putting it in the context. ihiiigs: dUoioiJTaL bi So)otoq {kvq). bnmav av\i^iyf[ Qvui\ia.ai\, Heidegger: You wish not to include the god. But with Aeschylus 6v language, a grazing herd is spoken which is of, driven forward and carved out of id Jiavia. nav ^qjietov means everything which crawls. tended by means of ihe blow of ihe whip. But if we now refer the blow to Here it is not a question of the grammatical singular, but of a singular the hghining Ixjlt, then the blow is also thunder, which resounds that means a plurality: everything that crawls. Is the sphere of land through the wide spaces, the voice of hghtning, which drives forward creatures that crawl outlined in opposition to creatures which live in the and guides all crawhng things. ve(ieiv means on one hand to drive to air and in the water? Is the manner of movement of land creatures pasture, lend and feed; the other, however, on lo dispense and allot. We characterized as crawling in contra.st to the quicker flight of birds or the can then say: everything which crawls is alloted by as the blow the voice quicker swimming of water creatures? I would like to answer the ques- of lightning. tion in the negative. My hunch is that with Jiav ^qhetov we are not Heid£(;g£r: v^HEtaialso refers to NenEOLg [goddess of retribution]. concerned with a bordered region, but rather with the entire region of Fink: NenEoig. however, does not have only the meaning of alloting xif. Jidvra; that is, from a specific aspect that specifies JiAvxa in entirety as and dispensing. crawling. Jiav ^q71Ex6v must then be read xa iriivTa djg tgKExa [everything Participant: VEHctai refers equally to v6(W)g law]. [custom, as crawling]. In that case, Fr. 1 1 speaks of Jiavxa in so far as they are Fink: vojjoc regulates for all the citizens of the city the dispensing of crawling. To what extent? What crawls is a conspicuously slow move- what is appropriate to them. obvious image, is, The which however, no ment, the slowness of which is measured by a quicker movement. Which allegory, means that everything which crawls is put to pasture with a quicker movement is meant here? If we bring Jidv ^giretov, or Jitivxa the, blow being allotted to it. In ventTai the coerciveness of what befalls one §QjiExd into connection with n\r\Y{\. it is the unsurpassably quick move- (being driven forward by a blow) connects with the tranquility of graz- ment of the lightning boll by which the movement of n&vxa as crawhng ing. We must hear many things together in ve^etaL: guiding, pursuing, must be measured. and steering of the blow and being driven. To the latter there also Heidegger: If we no longer understand the lightning bolt only belongs a tending and being steered. Allotment also belongs to the tran- phenomenally but in a deeper sense, then we can no longer say of its quil sense of grazing. Grazing as allotment is protection as well as getting movement that it is quick or quicker than the movement of Jidvxa. For steered in the sense of being forced. "quick" is a speed characteristic that only pertains to the movement of Heideggur: 1 would like to read a few verses from Holderlin's JldvTCl. poem, "Peace." Fink: The talk about "quick" in relation to the lightning bolt is Unyielding and unvanquished, you strike ahke inappropriate. Measured by the quickness of lightning, everything that The lion-hearted. Nemesis, and the weak. comes to appearance in the brightness of lightning, and has its pas.sage And from the blow your victims tremble and change, is crawling. Seen in this way, Jidv tQKExdv is also a statement Down to the ultimate generation. alK)ut xd ndvxa. Now, howevever, td Jidvxa are looked back at from You hold the secret power to goad and curb lightning. The crawling of ndvra is a trait that we could not immediately For thorn and reins are given into your hands, attribute to them as a qualitative determinalion. The manifold (Stuttgart edition, vol. 13-18)''' 2, 1, p. 6, lines movements that Jidvra in entirety went through are a lame movement as Fink: strophe from Holderlin's A poem, "Voice of the People" (first compared to the movement of the lightning blow that tears open lighted edition), also belongs here: space. as the And, eagle pushes his young and throws Heidkgger: In order to bring lo mind again the course of the in- Them from the ne.si, to look in the fields for prey. terpretation Fr. 1 of 1 , just now put forward, we ask ourselves how the too. tile So, sons of man are driven fragment is, therefore, to be read. Out and by the away God's own kindness Participant: The explication, the purpose of which was to relate (Stuttgart edition, vol. 2, 1, p. 50, lines S.^-Sfi)" JTdv eqkexov to xd Jidvxa, began not with Jidv eqjtetov, but with Ji\jyYf\ The kindness of the gods unites in itself the grace and the coercion and VEHExai. which we must li.sien for in vejieTm in Fr. 11. Therewith we have a Hkidegger; That means that the saying is to l>c read backwards. preliminary orientatitm concerning that which JlXTiyfj and VEHfiai mean. How it is possible that we can read nav kgnexov as Jtdvxa tbg tQTtExa, But does the blow, which guides allots, developed and refer generally to xa Jidvxa? out of JiX,T|Yti and vE^iExai. From Jtdv ^pJieTtW alone, we cannot In the saying iiself, xa navxa are not mentioned. Instead of this, it learn the extent to which ndvxa are also mentioned with Jidv ^pjtEXOV. mentions jrav fepnExov. li would seem as though a specific field were Bui by means of Jtkf]Yf\ and vtjiexai, which refers back to the lightning- 34 35 fragment, it becomes understandable why ndv ^QJietcW must be under- ning to glow faintly and become dim. If, now, "HX105 in the sense of the stood as xa navia. long enduring lightning lM>lt replaces lightning, then we must not forget Participant: I would like to ask a foolish question. C^an one really that this fire not only illuminates, but also measures the times. "HXiog is understand Jiav ^gneiov as xa itdvia? For only the living being is spoken the clock of the world, the world -clock; not an instrument that indicates of in Jidv fegntnW, but xd Jtdvta also encompasses the inanimate. times, but that which makes the seasons possible, which brings all. We Heiduggek: 1 1 with the word Ihe t-xplication of Fr. began it^-TiYri cannot understand the seasons in the sense of fixed spells of time or as that was referred to the lightning lx>lt Ihat steers id Jidvxa, as is said in stretches in homogeneous time, but as the times of days and of years. Fr. 64. The cxplicaiion was directed to ^v. In starting from ev in the These limes of years are not the lingering but the bringing. Jidvxa are specific form of the lightning boll, it was made clear that and how Jidv not so gathered that ihey are contemporaneous, but they are in the fQJiExov is to be comprehended as xd n&vza. Your question about the manner that they arrange themselves xax' eqiv and Kuxct xov \6yov. inanimate which would also belong to tovto is in fad foolish, because a jidvta rise, act. and are steered by the begetting, fulfilling, and produc- specific domain is therewith marked off in opposition to another do- ing seasons. main. present explication of F'r. 1 1, however, has shown that with The Heidegger: Let us try to clarify the extent to which time is men- il is not matter of a demarcated domain but of something jtdv EQiTEXov a tioned in Fr. 100. What are seasons? .Alongside the three Hesiodic universal. sca.sons, Exivo|iLa, Alxt), and EleiivT) [Good Order, Justice, and Prosper- Fink: We must read jidv ^0JtEt6v as Jidvta (1)5 ^Qntid. Crawling '^ is ous Peace], there is also OoXXttJ, A-0|6, and Kapjiti). SoXKo) the , living things does not mean here a property of specific things, namely on springtime, which brings the shoot and blossom. Aii|(!) means summer, crawling is character of itdvxa in entirety, which the earth. Rather, a ripening and maturing. KaQJTio means autumn, picking of the ripe fruit. does not reveal itself immediately, but only in relation to the suddenness These three seasons are nttt like three time periods; rather, we must lets xci jtdvra in its brightness. In of the lightning which appear understand them as the whole maturation. If we want to speak of of the lightning Iwilt that tears light, comparison to the suddenness open movement, which form of Aristotlian movement would come into ques- the movement of ndvxa that are gathered in the brightness of lightning tion? First of all, what are the four forms of movement with Aristotle? crawling movement. Between the suddenness of lightning and the is a Partigipant: ofi^Tiai; and cpBioic [growth and wasting away], is no relationship as Ixrtween the extratemporal crawling of Jidvxa, there YEVeoig and tpOogd [genesis and corruption], tpopd and as fourth it is also not a the and the intratemporal. On the other hand, matter of d?J.OLC0OL5 [productiveness and alteration].'* relatiimship of Achilles and the torioise. F.verything that moves about in Hkidegger: Which form of movement would be most appropriate brightness is driven by the blow. In this Ix-ing lightning's dimension of to the seasons? driven, Jidvro gain the character of crawling in reference back to light- Participant: aO^tioi? and (pBiois as well as Yeveoig and (ffJoQd. 1 1 not a shepherd who, turning out to pasture, ning. Fr. does mention Heideg<;er: dXXoiwatg is contained in these forms of movement. distributes and guides. Fr. 1 1 says nothing of a giiider, but mentions Spring, summer and autumn are not intermittent, but something con- struck and l>eiiig the subject vis-a- jidvxa in the character of their being tinual. Their maturation has the character of continuity, in which an lx)lt. Fr. 1 1 not relate to Fr, 64 as a partial domain vis the lightning does dWLo(ajoig is contained. to the entirely of Jtavia. Much more, it expresses something about the Fink: "Ihe movement of hfe in nature is, however, growth as well as drives guides. relationship of jrdvra to naked power which and withering. The first part is an increasing to dx^l^ [acme], the second part of Fr. II puts before us the ([uestion Heidegger: Kxplication ^1 withering, whether Ji^ilY»l and veiietcil actually allow a reference to the lightning Huoeggek: Do you understand fruit as being already a stage of boll, so that :idv ^qjietov is to be understood, not regionally as a single decline? aiea within the entirety of Jidvxa, but as the eiitiiety ot Jidvxa itself. Fink: The life of a living lieing forms a lising and falling Iwaw. Fink: We turn to Fr. 100: fygaq, at Jidvxa tpeeovot. Diels translates: Human life is also a steady but arching movement, in its successively "the seasons, which bring everything." In the context "H>,i05 is men- foUtming aging. tioned, which is another name for fire as well as lightning. In ibis fiag- Ih.iDEtif.KK: .Age corresjxtnds to fruit in the sense of ripening, ment there is a connection Ix-tween "HXioc;, light and time. We can ask which I understand not as a declining but as a kind of self fulfillment. If oin-seivc-s lightning isn't i>nly a lire in contrast to whether momentary lime comes into play with the seasons, then we must let go of calculated "HA.105, which is a fire of greater constancy, il not everlasting, but Ijegin- lime. We must attempt to understand from other phenomena what time 1 36 means here. Also, we may not separate the content of time from the form of time. The character of bringing l>el<>ngs to lime. In our lan- "HXiog, Daylight—Night, jiexga-xeQuaTa guage we also say: lime will tell.'" So tongas we understand time as bare (Correlated Fragments: 94, 120, 99. 3, 6, 57, 106, 123). succession, bringing has no place. Fink: In order to win an understanding of the maturation charac- ter of the seasons, we must disregard homogenous time, which one represents as a line and as bare succession and in which the time content is abstracted. Such an abstraction is impossible with the seasons. Fink: In the last seminar session we have let some questions stand un- HEiDEtiGER: Fr. 100 places us before different questions. To what masicred. Today we are still not in a p(»sition to somehow bring the extent may one take the seasons together with K&vxa? How must time be openness of the explication situation to a decision. After discussion of thought, if one wishes to speak of it here, especially if one saysof it that it the "HXioc;- fragment [sun fragment] we attempt to come back to Frs. 1 brings. We must simply get clear to ourselves in what .sense time brings. and 100 in which Jiav ^gjiextiv and tIJQai [seasons] are mentioned. Fink: In this, it is necessary not to think time as a colorless medium We have seen that cb@ai, the hours and the limes, are not to be taken as in which things swim about. Rather, we must seek to understand time in a stream of time or as a temporal relation that, subjected to metric reference to the yiYV^oQai of ndvra. leveling down, is measurable and calculable. Hours and times are also Heidegger: We must think time together with (pvoL?. not to be taken as the empty form in contrast to the content of time, but Fink; Pre.senily, we stand before the question whether Fr. 100 is as tilled time which begets and produces each thing in its' own time. a>Qai able to give us still further references to the matter that we attempt to are no hollow forms, but rather the times of the day and of the season. think, or whether it is not more appropriate to revert first to Fr. 94. The limes of day and seasons apparently stand in connection with a fire HeideG(;er: The 2500 years that separate us from Heraclitus are a that does not, like lightning, suddenly tear open and place everything in perilous affair. With our explication of Heraclitus' fragments, it requires the stamp of the outline, but that holds out like the heavenly fire and, in the most intense .self-criticism in order to see something here. On the the duration, travels through the hours of the day and the limes of the other hand, it also requires a venture. One must risk something, because season. The heavenly fire brings forth growth. It nourishes growth and othei^wise one has nothing in hand. So there is no objection to a specula- maintains it. The light-fire of "HXiog tears open—different from tive interpretation. We must therefore presuppose that we can only have lightning—continually; it opens the brightness of day in which it allows a presentiment of Heraclitus, when we ourselves think. Yet, it is a ques- growth and allows time to each thing. This sun-fire, the heaven- tion whether we still can measure up to this task. illuminating power of "HXiog, does not tarry fixed at one single place, but travels along the vault of heaven; and in this passage on the vault of heaven the sun-fire is light- and life-apportioning and time measuring. The metric of the sun's course mentioned here lies before every calcula- tive metric made by humans. If we now turn to Fr. 94 in which the talk is explicitly about this heaven-fire, then we remain on the trail of fire, which we have already trod with the Kegaiivig-fragmen t. Fragment 94 runs as follows: "HXL05 yag oiix iiJieeprioeTai (lexga' ei 6b iif\, 'Egiviieg ^iv Aixeg 'ejcixoueoL e^ewQtiooiJOLV. Diels translates: "(For) Helios will not overstep his mea- sures; otherwise the Frinyes, ministers of Dike, will find him out. " If we let this fragment work upon us without particularly thorough prepara- tion, what is expressed in it, supposing that we be permitted to take the sayings of Heraclitus as a model of a thematic statement? Kiist of all, the word \ie.XQO. [measure] is problematic. Which measure does the sun have or set up? Does the sun it.self have measures in which it travels along the vault of heaven? And if the sun sets up measures, which measures are these? Can we determine more closely this distinction be- 38 39 tween the measures that belong to the sun itself and those that it sets up? is one in another sense. That would also be a going astray of the sun; First, we tan understand ttetga in reference to the passage and course of now, however, not in the manner of deviation from the sun's path, but in the sun. "HX105, as the tire that travels the heaven, has specific measures the manner of a breaking into the nightly abyss to which "HXioc; does not in its course like the measures of morning light, of midday heat and of Ijelong. subdued of twilight. If we look only toward the phenomenon the sun's In order to bring this thought somewhat nearer, let us include frag- course, we see that "HX,io5 exhibits no even, homogeneous radiation, but ment 120 in which XEgiiaxa [boundaries] and not ^teTQa are mentioned: rather timely differences in the of lieing luminous. Al the same time, way f\ov<; xaL tajtEQac, TEgnaxa f| fipxtog xaL Aviiov xr\q &Qy.xov oipog aEepiou however, by the measures through which the sun passes in its passage, Aujg. Diels' translation runs: "The boundaries of morning and evening; the nourishing fire is apportioned in various ways to the growth of the The Ijear and, opposite the !x;ar the boundary stone of radiant Zeus." earth that is found in the sun's brightness. The second meaning of [lexQa My question now is whether the domain of the sunny is encircled by the lies therein: the measures of light and warmth which the sun apportions xEpftaxa (which with XEenaxC^Eiv = to confine, lo connect), that is, encir- to growth. We can on one hand distinguish the measures which are cled on one hand by morning and evening, and on the other hand by the exhibited by the course of the sun itself, and on the other hand those bear and by the boundary stone of radiant Zeus, which lies opposite the measures which ihe sun sets up 10 what it shines on in the way that the bear. I identify the bear with the North Star so that the boundary stone of llery to it, iiiidcrsKMid in sun apportions the HEtgacan thus be a two-fold radiant Zeus, which lies opposite the tear, would lie in the south of the manner: the HFxpa of the sun's course and the n^XQa that works down vault of heaven. Fr. 120 implies then that"HX,Lo?, which moves across the from the sun's course to what nourishes itself from the sun's light. How- vault of heaven from morning to evening, is confined in the possibility of ever, also have in yet does the sun HEXQa a completely different sense? its deviation toward north or south by the bear and the boundaiy stone Is which is bound of its course "HXL05, to the measures and which apjKir- of radiant Zeus which lies opposite the bear. Therefore, we must think tions from there ihe nourishing fire to everything found in ihe sunlight, radiant Zeus together with "HXiog as the power of day which illuminates is this °HXlo5 squeezed into measures in Is a completely other sense? there the entirely of td Jtdvxa. This entire domain of the sun is closed in four perhaps also \i£TQa in such a manner that the entire double domain of light directions of the heaven, in which case we must under.stand xeQuaxa as is determined by measures? When Heraditus says, "For "HXiog will not theouter boarders of the domain of light in distinction from ^£TQain the overstep his measures," a natural law of "HX105 is in no way formulated sense of specific places on the familiar path of the sun. here. It is not a matter of the insight that the sun's course is subject to any Heidegger: How do you read the genetive: fjoOg kqi SontQag? inviolable natural law, for then the second sentence would have no Diels translates, "Boundaries of morning and evening,' which is to be meaning. In this sentence it says that in case "HXio? should overstep his understood as, "Boundaries for morning and evening. " But do you wish measures the Erinyes, helpers of Dike, would track him down and bring to read, "The Ijoundaries which form morning and evening"? account. But what is restriction, him to a a holding to measure of "HX105? Fink: I stick with the latter, but I ask myself whether the meaning is "HXiog will not overstep his measures. Can we imagine at all that he fundamentally changed by this difference and also by the manner of would Ix.- able to overstep his measures- We have brought to mind two reading, "Boundaries for morning and evening." if we understand ways in which he would not take the correct way across the vault of XEQuaxa as boundary places, iht morning as the east boimdary, the even- heaven. One could imagine that he suddenly stops, jierhaps at the com- ing as tile wesi boundary, ibe bear as norih l>oundarv and the boundarv of for the time in mend Joshua which Joshua waged battle against the sione opposite the bear as the south Ixnnidary, then we have, as it were, Amorites. That would l)e an overstepping of the ti^tga of his own na- ihe four coiners of the world as the field ol the sun's realm. Thus seen, ture. In such a case he would no longer be in accord with his own nature xtQ^aia would not be equated with the two meanings of n^ga just of flerv power. "The sini could her essence traveled change own if she mentioned. That which Fr. 120 says in icference to TFQuaxa would !)e a the vault along of heaven in a maimer other than in accord with nature. liiircl meaning ol hexqu that we must include with !>oih of the others in 'ihe sun could overstep her measures if she ran from north south to ordei lo take in view the full meaning of ^fTQa in Fr. 94. In this case—as instead of from east 10 wesl. However, a completely different manner of a deeper-going cxplicaiion of this fragment vvitl reveal lo us—precisely overstepping iJie lK)undary would lie siipjxtsed if "HXioc; weie lo bieak ihe third meaning plays a prominent role. "Ihe first meaning of [ifipa into a domain of w hich we could not speak further at the moment, for that we accentuated concerned the places and times through which the this domain lies beyond the Ijrigbtness of "HX105 in which the many arc '•im passes from morning through midday to evening. In a second sc'nse. gathered. Then "HXiog goes out of the sun's domain in which everything tiFTpa means the measures thai arc sent from the sun for things. A 40 41 deviation trom the measures that are sent would, for growing and living Fink: But then x^Qfiaxa would no longer have the sense of bound- things, mean that the sun is too hot, too close or too lar away. The third aries that form morning and evening. In such a view, morning and meaning of [i^XQa, which we have picked up out of Kr. 120, signifies evening liecoine almost a determination of a region that seems to me T^enaxa in which the sun's entire domain of light is enclosed. Were questionable. "HXiog to overstep the Ijoundin y tiiai is fixed by the four corners of the Participant: The translation is oriented around the idea of Orient world, the Erinyes, helpers of Dike, would find "HXloc; out. Such an and Occident, which get separated by the communication line of the overstepping would not only mean a deviation from the familiar path; North Star with the daily culmination point of the sun's passage. I myself rather, such an overstepping would mean a breaking into a nightly abyss would not follow this interpretation either, since there was not yet the to which the sun's domain does not Ijclong. idea of Orient and Occident in Heracliius' time. Rather, this idea can he Heidegger: When you grasp rioOg xal ^ontpa; as genitivm subiec- assigned only from Herodotus on. tivus [subjective genitive] then you come into proximity of the third Fink: The Kranz interpretation does away with the Ixiundary meaning of ixiiQa. chaiacier of moiningand evening. If one speaks of the one line between Fink: 1 do not want at first to maintain this as a thesis. Rather, I am the North Star and the daily culmination point of the sun's passage, then only concerned to show three possible meanings of [leTga, whereby the also the plural, tFQuata, is no longer quite understandable. Although third signifies that which Fr. 120 says about TEpnaia. the explication given by Kranz is a possible answer to the difficulty that Heidegger: In ordinary language use, we distinguish, in reference Fr. 120 presents, still it seems to me as if the lectio diffuilior [more difficult to [iEXQa, between the measure and the measured. rendition] is thereby precluded. Fink: We can understand measure in a topical and in a chronos- We have brought to mind the ambiguity of (iexqo of 'HA.105 in refer- related sense. The first significance of HEXga means the measures that ence to Frs. 94 and 120. That has been only an attempt. We must now the sun will not overstep, the measures in the sense of the places and take into consideration the other sun fragments as well as the fragments times of its path across the vault of heaven. Measures mean here, how- concerning day and night. ever, not natural laws, but they concern rather the CpVJoi? of "HX105. The Heidegger: In talking through the three meanings of the iiexQa of constancy of the sun in its daily and yearly path derives from its (pi3oig. "HXtog, you wanted to concentrate on the third meaning that you indi- "HXio? remains held in the measures of its path by its own essence. The cated at the beginning of the discussion of Fr. 120. In Fr. 94, this third second meaning of \iiixQa signifies the measures, dependent upon the meaning is given by the second sentence which is started by zl bk [iVj measures of the sun's path, in reference to the growth in the sun's field. [othei"wise], and in which Dike and the Erinyes are mentioned. Here a growth and decline is possible, afxjve all when one thinks on the Fink: Perhaps "HX105, who appintions everything, is himself con- ^XJiii0a)OL5 -teaching, on the overstepping of the sun's measures which fined by another power. The jurisdiction that finds him out in a case of consumes everything. I f "HXiog holds in his natural path, the growth that overstepping and brings him to account is Dike with her helpers. Dike is is illuminated by him has its blossoming and its proper times. The third the diety of ibe just, ihe diety who watches the boundary l»elween the meaning of jiEtQa is to be seen in the confinement of the sun's realm by domain of tlie sun's brightness and of what is found therein, and the the four corners of morning, evening, the bear and the Ixtundary stone domain of the nightly abyss that is denied to us. The guardians of this which lies opposite the fjear. Inside this encircled domain, "HXtog travels boundary are the helpmates of Dike. "Fhey watch out that "HX105 does and rules. The jurisdiction of "HXiog is closed in by the four xepnaxa. iioi over.step his own domain of power and attempt to break into the Heidegger: Then we must strike the genitive "of in Diels' transla- dark at)yss. tion. Then one must not translate, "boundaries of morning and eve- Heidegger: On this third possible meaning of hexqo you p we walk. Light, as the element of the flei-y, together with the element ol says that only a tiny, insignificant place belongs to the sun as a source of the air, lies on the earth in and a certain manner also on the (K:ean. The light with its own brightness, so that the opening power of "HXio? in the ocean also forms a boundary for the realm of light, although the ocean opened light space itself appears to be only a negligible affair. What lets in the light up to a certain depth. Its transparency is confined. The opens veils itself in a certain manner in what is opened by it, and takes a opaqueness of the earth, which leads to the Ijoundedness of the o|x^n [x)sition l>elow the things encircled by it as the light power. To the extent domain at light, is a peculiar phenomenon that is not evident to us for that the sun appears in the firmament in the width of a human f(x»t, the most part. We find ourselves on the opaque at earth, which the ascends, sinks and disappears, she is new on each day. as Fr. (i says; veoq domain of light has its l>oundary. Over us, however, light's domain of f (p T|(i,EQTi icrtiv. Heraciitus gives no scientific stipulation that each day the power extends in open endlessness. Ihe opaqueness of the earth has a sun arises new. The newness of the sun on each day does not contradict meaning for the passage the of sun. In accord with the immediate phe- the fact that she is the same sun each day. She is the same, but always nomenon. "HX105 rises out of the bowels of the earth at morning: in new. We must hold on to this thought for the question concerning the daytime he moves along the vault of heaven and he sinks again into the sun as a form of kvq iet^toov. which perpetually is, but—^as Fr. 30 closed ground of earth at evening. Thai is said as a description of the says—is kindled and qtienched according to measures, wherein the con- immediate phenomena without esoteric symlxilism. stant newness itself comes to expression. When we come to Fr. 30 the Now we turn to Fr. 99, which evidences the geneial structure; ei nr| concept of fietga will allow itself to be deteimined more precisely. f|>.io5 gvExa tfiiv ^*, aUcuv fioxQuyv et(f)Q6vr\ fi;v f|v. Diels translates: From Fr. 6 we turn to Fr, 57: 61660x0X05 ^e jiXeiotcuv 'HoioSog- 'Were there no sun. it would \->e night in spite of the other stars." "HJlio; toOtov ^nioxavtai likEima efSevat, 001:15 f|nt0T)v xai fvqjgoviiv oiix is the star that alone brings full brightness. Now, however, he is not only Eyivtuoxev- eori yag ev. Diels' translation runs, 'Hesiod is teacher of the indicated in his power, in his superiority over the other stars, hut the many. "Fhey are pursuaded by him that he knows most; he, who does not structure, which we do not see in "HXio^ himself, becomes clear in the know day and night. Yet, one is!" In what does the suppo.sed wi.sdom of other stars. The other stars are lights in the night. We have here the Hesiod consist? To what extent has he, who has written alH)ut days and noteworthy feature thai luminescence exhausts itself in its radiated light works, not known day and night? Day and night are alternating condi- space and is walled in by the dark of night. The other stars ate gleaming lionsof the sun's land in which it is bright and dark in rythmic alteration. points in the night heaven. The moon can also illuminate the night in a The darkness of night in the domain of the sun is something other than .stronger manner than the stars, but the mcMin cannot extinguish them as the closedness of the soil into which no light is able to penetrate. The alone 'HA-iog can. We must put the following question concerning the dark night is illuminated by the glimmering stars. In contrast to the in other stars the night. If "HX105 presents himself as a realm of light closedness of the earth, the dark of night has by itself fundamental above the opaque ground, and if he seems to go on in open endlessness, iliuminabitiiy. together with the sun fragments we must think the frag- can we not also understand the structine of ' HXioc and tq Jidvra in ments which treat of day and night. Fr. 57 l)elongs to these. The most the other termsof stars as lights in the darkness of night? That is, can we diffuiilf phrase in it is eori yay Ev|Yet, one is]. If day and night are to be understand the whole world of the sun as a light in the night which, it is one. then wouldn't the plural EiOL [are] have to stand in place of the true, is not certified by the phenomena? We would then have to say that singular t'ori [is]? Is the indistinguishabiliiy of day and night meant here, as stars the are a tight in the night, and as the sun's domain of light has its or else something completely different which does not show itself at first l)oundary at the closedness of earth, so the entire world of "HX,loc;, to glan night do not comprise any distinction you please, but rather the original Fink: The \iia cpitot^ of day. however, is held against a positing of form of all distinctions. The contiast of day and night also plays a role good and had. that is, propitious and unpiopitious days. The oneness of with Parmenides (nopifid^ yitg KaxifJEvro 6iJO vvwuotg 6voji(i^iv) [For (he nature of day stands against such distinction of the days. This, how- they made up their minds to name two forms].'" however, in reference ever, is not to l)e equated with the Eotl yiiQ £v in reference to day and to mortals. If one understands eotl yap fv in the sense that day and night night. The distinction of good and bad days does not have the .same are one in §v, then wouldn't the plural elai have to stand in place of ?ctti? importance as the distinction of day and night. Accordingly, §v is in each Seen grammatically, is a pluial possible here at all? For me the <]uestion case different. is whether, instead of reading, "day and night are one &v or are in t^," Heidec;c;er: Nevertheless, you are in a certain way right in connect- one must read, "there is ev." In this case, vanishing of distinctions would ing Vrs. 57 and 106, In Ixtth fragments the talk is about an ignorance have another sense. Hesiod knew his way around, but he did not know of in reference to Hesiod, The one time, he misunderstands ^v in reference &V. that it is. "For there is ^v." Thus read. ?v is not to be comprehended as to day and night; the other lime, he misunderstands the one and the predicative, but as the subject of the sentence. same cpuoi^ of each day. To this extent, ^v and nCa (pvoig do hang to- Heidecger; Then fori ydQ ¥y is to be taken absolutely. To think of gether. it differently or to believe that Hesiod did not recognize day and night Fink: Fr. 106 is, rather, only a parallel to Fr, 57. In the latter, would be an unreasonable suggestion. Hesiod is found to lie unreliable as the teacher of most people. He, who Fink: When Heraclitus says that Hesiod has not recognized day and is versed in the fundamental distinction of day and night, has not ob- night, that is an intentionally provocative statement. served that there is ^v. Heide(;ger: One does not need to be Hesiod in order to distinguish Heidegger: Most people are, for Heraclitus, they who do not know day and night. When he treated of day and night he did so in a deeper what matters. The nXEtaroi [the greatest number] are the same as the sense than in the manner of a mere distinction that each of us performs. JloXXot [the many]. We cannot translate tfvoic, in Fr, 106 with essence. Thus, Heraclitus cannot have wanted to say that Hesiod has distin- Fink: When we say "essence," it is not meant in the sense of e.isentia guished day and night, but that he has erred since day and night are one. [substance]. We cannot accept Dials' translation. "Yet, one is!" Heidegger: If we include Fr. 12-3, tpijoig xQiijireoOai ffikEi [Nature Fink: "Yet. one is!" sounds like "They are one of a kind." I am loves to hide], how then is tpijoig to l>e understood? unable to connect any sense with this translation. Day and night are Participant: In the sense of emerging. familiar to us as the changing conditions, as the basic rhythm of life, as Heidegger: The connection of cpi^oig and Ev will concern us in presence and absence of the sun in her light in the domain of the open. greater detail later. The domain of the open can be daylight or dark night. This distinction is Fink: For me. the puzzling word in Fr. 57 is ^ Hesiod has overlooked the fact that day and night form no distinction at oneness of Ixjth domains of "H>.l05 and of night, which is guarded by all. Rather, Heraclitus wishes to maintain that day and night are one in Dike and her helpmates. This new .sense of ev will first become clearer thinking back to Sv, and that within gv they are set apart as opposite tor us if we include the life and death fragments. The night meant here relations, as we can also find in Fr. 67, where it says that god is day night, is the nightly abyss by which the sun's domain is encircled at the four winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger, Heraclitus is much more Tf piiUTO as they are called in Fr. 1 20. .Apart from this interpretation, one concerned here with ev in quite another manner. could also argue as follows. If &v is mentioned in Fr. 57 in reference to PARTit:iPANT: Musn't we also take Fr. 106. in which ^(a (puo'.g day and night, it is then a question of the Sv of the land of sun in which f|[i^Qac [one nature of day] is menticmed, along with Fr. 57? the sun is present and absent in rhythmic change; and indeed in such a Heidegc;kr: How do you wish to bring Ijoth fragments into connec- manner that in the change of day and nighl the domain remains in tion? which the sun is present and absent. There is tv in so far as the structure P.\RTic:iPANr: I would think jiCa cpuoic; [one nature] together with of the vault on which (he sun moves remains, and in so far as the relation £oTi yixQ gv. of opposition to the land that lies under the sun remains, even though f 46 47 think the sun temporarily is absent and new on each new day. Thus seen, h/ and openness. The Ev which Heraclitus attempts to in Fr. 57 is the would be the vault of heaven. However, this explication is not acceptable unity of the double domain. hang together? to me. I do not understand, "there is ^v," in this sense. Heideggkh: But how do both domains He[degger: Why do you reject this interpretation? Fink: The light space of lightning or of "HXio;, in which rtdvra Fink: Because for me the unionof day and night under the vault of come forth to appearance and move into their oudine, is encircled by a the boundary set to his heaven is too easy :i reading. When Heratlitus says "there is ev" in refer- dark abyss. "HXio; is not permitted to overstep foundation, because he will be ence to day and nijrht, the land of sun is meant with the day, and the domain of power and go into the nightly guard the boundary of the dark abyss that incloses and encircles the land of sun is meant with night. brought to account by the Erinyes, who The sun'.s domain and the nightly abyss together form i'v, double domain. of one and the Heide(;(;er: Is the ev that you now have in view something like an Heidecgeri Is it here a question of two domains or this question aside for over-being that surpasses even being: I suppose that you want to get out same which is distinguished in iiseir- Ut us put again to of being with your interpretation of ev, which departs from the hitherto the moment. We will come back to it later. I would like once go existing illuminating h/ of lightning. into foTL YCtQ ?v. Can one place the plural eiol here at all? Diels sets a Participant: I do not believe that ev as the double domain of the semicolon before fori yiiQ h/. Seen purely stylistically, a period and not a land of sun and the nightly abyss surpasses l>eing. If the preceding semicolon would suitably have to be placed in Heraclitus" language. interpretation has, in starting out from the KEQauvog-fragment, focused Perhaps Diels was misled into using the .semicolon by the subsequent yoe ^v something first on the structural moment of the light character in being, the uncov- [yet]. A period is therefore called for, because in ectii yag contrasted with what has pre- ering, then the current interpretation, when the nightly abyss is men- uncommon follows which must ix sharply tioned, focuses on the structural moment of closedness in being, on the ceded. night and concealment that belongs essentially to uncovering. Therefore, the expli- Fink: Most people are familiar with the distinction of to them. But he cation does not surpass being; rather, it goes deeper into being than the day. Hesiod, who treated of day and night, also belongs did not know '%vv6v. The preceding awareness, since it lakes in view the full dimensionality of did not understand day and night because he being. l 48 of day and night tliar replaces Hesiod's differentiation of day and night The Problem of a Speculative here. Rather. Heraclitiis speaks out of the knowledge of Ev when he says Explication. jcOq dei^toov and that tlie partition of day and night tonuadicts the fundamental charac- ter of being. Time? (Fragment 30). Heiukoger: Hesiod Ix-longs to the people who are named in Fr. 72: xal olg xae' fin^gav ^yxvQoOoL, xaOxa aixoL? ^eva (paivatai. "And tliose things with which they jostle every day seem strange to them." Hesbjd jostles daily with the distinction of day and night. HiJDtGGER: When Professor Fink interpreted nvg &e01,(hov, which oc- Fink; Day and night are for him the most daily and the most curs in Fr. 11,1 asked what he was actually doing. I wanted to drive at nightly . . the question of how this attempt to think with Heraclitus should be Heidegger: . . hut il . remains strange to him in what they actually made. In this connection, there was mention of a speculative leap that are, when thought from ?v. suggested itself in a certain way in so far as we start reading the text from Fink: If we finally view the Helios and the day/night fragments the immediacy of the expressed content and, in so doing, arrive through together, we can say the following. The heaven-fire of the sun behaves the process of thinking at the expression of something that cannot be similarly toward everything that has continiience by the sun's passage, as verified by way of immediate intuition. If one thinks schematically, one the lightning toward jidvia. The sun gives light, outline and growth and can say that we go from a statement according to perception to an unsen- bi ings the time for everything that grows. The sun is determined in her suous statement. But what does "speculative" mean? passage hy \iixQa. which has to check her, because she is otherwise Participant: "Speculative" is a derivative from speculum (mirror) brought to account by the helpmates of Dike. The sun also determines and speculari (to look in or by means of the mirror). The speculative, the \ieTQa for the increase and growth of things. She will not overstep the then, is evidently a relationship of mirroring. [i£XQa bul will remain within her domain of power, which is confined by Heidegger: Presumably, the mirror plays a role. But what does the the four xepnaTa. The deeper meaning of Dike still remains obscure for word "speculative" mean in ordinary terminological use? Where in phi- the present. Till now. Dike is clear only as a power superior to the power b.sophy is Latin written and spoken? of "HXiog. Although "H>.LOg and Zeus are the highest powers on earth, Participant: In the Middle Ages. "HXio; has a power on the earth that overpowers brightness. The [lixQa Heidegger: There ex'tstimalio speculativa [speculative judgment] is ot "HX105 have been explained to us in a three-fold sense. First we distin- mentioned in distinction from existimalio praclka or also operutiva [practi- guish the HETQQ of the sun's course, second the nexga of things under the cal or operative Judgment]. Existimalio speculativa is synonymous with sun's course and third the n^xpa, which encircle the entire domain of the exhtimalio iheoretica [theoretical judgment), which is oriented toward the sun's brightness. Reference to Fr. 3 has shown us the structure of the species [type]. Species is the Latin translation of EE605 [form]. What is emplacement of "HXiog in the brightness proper to him. Fr. 6 thinks the meant here is, therefore, a seeing, a SEtoQEiv that is, a theoretical consid- daily newness and always-the-sameness c»f the sun together. The one ering. Kant also speaks of the speculative in the sense of theoretical cpiJOLg of day is the same cpuoig also with respect to the well known reason. But how does this affair stand with Hegel? What does Hegel call distinction of good and bad, propitious and unpropitious days. must We speculation and dialectic? take all these thought motifs together, without rashly identifying them. Participant; The speculative and dialectic designate Hegel's Still it l>ecomes constantly more difficult for us to hold in view the man- method of thinking. ifold of relations. This difficulty already shows itself in reference to the Parhcipant; With speculation, Hegel attempted to reach beyond differences of the immediate phenomena we have considered and the the finite into infinity. paths of thought determined by them. Heidegger; Hegel does not first start out with the finite in order then t clear that the attempt to rethink Heraclitus is not a matter of the specula- live in the proper sense of Hegel or in the sense of the theoretical. First of all, we must renounce talking in any manner about the method ac- . 50 51 coidiny to which HeriK lilus would think. On the one hand, we must see us, we must attempt to avoid being misled by the developed thought tn u—as Processor f'iiilc h;is done up to this [joini—[h;it we malce clarifi- paths of metaphysics. In order to indicate the mannerof our procedure, tations with the intention of helping ihu participants follow more clearly let us go once again into Fr. 11. Translated, it runs: Everything that and precisely the steps thai we have made thus far while reading and crawls is driven to pasture or tended with the blow. An image is men- thinking the text and that we will make later on. We can clarify the tioned there that we know from the phenomenal environment and that problem which stands Ix-hind that when Professor Fink gives us an we can easily bring to mind. In a rural region or in an agrarian state, the example. tx-ast is driven to pasture with the whip blow. We can then read iidv Fink: The manner of our reading and procedui-e is characterized EQJiExov as pasture animals. The image that Heraclitus mentions implies in that we start out fiom what is made present to us of the matter named that the pasture animals will !«; driven to pasture by the shepard with the HcnK-liius' sayings, m as though this matter were jying immediately whip blow, indeed so that they change pasture ground from time to before oui- eyes. In his fragments, Heraclitus does' not speak in any time. veiled manner like the god in Delphi, of whom Heracliius says: owTt Heidegger: Tending is a driving as well as a leading. Xeyei oute v.Qvnx£i dUa OTinaivei.'^ His manner of sjieaking cannot be Fink: For our explication of vehetqi, driving and leading are the equated with that of the god in Delphi. In reading the fragments, we meaningful moments of sense. Now, when we also hear NefieoLg in first pick up the phenomenal findings and attempt their clarification. ve|iexai as the power that allots and faiefully determines, then we have We do not. however, make the phenomenal findings clear in their full left the immecliate phenomenon ()f tending and entered thoughtfully extent; rather, our clarification is already selectively .steeied. upon the unsensuous domain. We understand veneiai no more as the Heidegger: By what is it selectively determined? driving and leading of the shepard in the sense of alloting and dispens- Fink: The selection is determined in that we always come back from ing of what is appropriate to actual pasture animals, but as an alloting Heraclitus' saying and seek each feature in the immediate phenomena and dispensing reign. Then the question suggests itself whether that that are mentioned in the fragment. An empirical phenomenology of the which is said in small scale in the fragment cannot also be said in large sun would yield an abundance of phem»menal features which would not scale. The niicrocosmic and iDacrocosmic relationship stiggcsts itself as be meaningful at all for the sense of the sun fragments. First we read the jX'rhaps a most harmless expression. The thoughtful tiansposition of Iragment with a certain naivete. We attempt to bring into relief a few phenomenal structures into another dimension, however, brings with it features in reference to ihe things which are correlates of our .sensuous a iransformalion of the structuies fiom which we first .start out. peiceptions in order, in a second step toward the features and refer- Heii>e(;c;er: Yet, the thoughtful trans[X)sition implies a specific ences thus extracted, to ask how they can be thought in a deeper sense. kind of thinking alxint the appearance of which we are still ignorant. From immediate seeing of sensuous phenomena, we go over to an un- Fink: When I speak of thoughtful transposition into another di- sensuous, though not tianscendent, domain. Here, we may not utilize mension, that is only a first attempt to cii cumscrilx; the manner of our the scheme, which we find in metaphysics, of phenomenal, i.e., sensible, procedure, because we still do not know what it means to go over into and intelligible world, and operate wiih a two-world doctrine of another dimension. 1 f we wish to s|>eak of an analogy in this coimection, metaphysics. Talk about a sensible and iniflligible domain is highly then we must think it in a specific way. In this analogy, only one side is dangerous and cloublful. given to us, namely the phenomenal one. As we hold selectively to spe- HEii>E(;(.r:K: fi would Ik; more appropriate if we designate the phe- cific phenomenal structures, we translate them into large scale in an nomenal domain as ontic . . advenutious attemjjl. In Fr, II. we translate the way and manner in fiNK: . . . and the unsensu<)us domain as allied with Ix-'ing. What is which :i her , 52 53 the large. We must disiiiiguish on one hand our attempt to rethink ilie of his sayings consists in the fact that working from the large .scale, fragments of Heniclitus and on the other h^nd the way that Heraclitus Heraclitus can also say sftmething in reference to the everyday. himseli has thought. Heidegckr: Perhaps you have already said too much. Fink: What Heraclitus thinks in large scale, he can only say in small Fink; Our starting point, however, in explicating the fragments, scale. consists in the more or less known traits of the phenomena. I want to Heidegger: Thinking and saying have their special difficulties. Is it attempt to clarify still another fragment which has already concerned us. a question of two different matters? Is saying only the expression of Fr. 99 reads in translation, "If the sun were not, it would be night on thinking? account of the other stars. " Here is pronounced not only a eulogy of the Fink: The distinction lielween inner thinking and the articulation power, of the strength of "HXioc; which drives out darkness, but we see in of thinking in language is an idea that we have fiom the hi.story of the other stars the possibility of being lights in the darkne.ss. Light shines philosophy. There is the view that philosophical thinking cannot say in the darkness. 'Ihat means that the circuit of lights is surrounded by completely everything that it thinks; so that, in a certain way, what phi- the night. l"he stars and the moon indicate the possibility of the lights to,st>phy thinks remains behind the linguistic expression. The deepest being imbedded in the dark of night. Here lies the jump-off for our thoughts are then fieeHTOv [unspeakable], ihis model does not apply to question. Could it not be that as the stars are imbedded in the night, the Heraclitus. His sayings are no hierophantic, withholding speech about open-endless domain of the sun is also imbedded in a nonphenomenal the linguistically inscrutable mystery. Heraclitus does not know the op- night? position of the linguistically open and the impenetrable mystery that gets Heidegger: When you speak of "endless," that is no Greek idea. thought as refugium or asylum ignorantiae [refuge or asylum of igno- Fink: With the expression "open-endless" I mean only the phe- rance]. It is something else when we think the mystery in a completely nomenal feature that we see no wail when l(K)king up, but rather only different manner. Heraclitus speaks in a language which does not know the character of running out and of not arriving. The phenomenal state the stark difference between inner thhiking and outward saying. of affairs addressed in Fr. 99, that lights can be imbedded in the dark of Heidec;ger: But how about thinking and saying? We will also have night, has put before us the question whether or not the sun's domain, to say for Heraclitus that there is a saying to which the unsaid tjelongs, and thus TlXiog in his reference to la mivra, can have [i^Tpa on his part but not the unsayable. The unsaid, however, is no lack and no barrier for which we cannot immediately see. In jumping-off from the phenomenal saying. imbeddedness of the stars in the night, we have attempted to take in view Fink: With Heraclitus we must always have in view the multidimen- the nonphenomenal encirclement ot the sun's domain by a nonphe- sionality of speaking that we cannot fix at one dimension. Seen from the nomenal night. We have attempted to clarify what the HEXpa of the sun immediate statement, only the pasture animals in their manner of pertain to in three ways; first, as the neTpa of the sun in her course; movement are named in Jiav epJiexov. But now we have attempted to second, as the (lEtga which are apportioned by the sun to everything read and interpret Jictv feprtExov as Jidvxa (b; ^pnExd, and we have re- lying under her; and finally, as the \iixQa. in the sense of the x^Qnata ferred nKi\Y^ to the lightning Iwlt. In this consists our jump-off into the named in Fr. 120, which encircle the sun's domain, the domain of the nonphenomenal domain. Measured by the tremendously sudden sun's brightness and the Jidvxa found in it. movement, everything thai stands under the lightning in its light-shine Heidegger; In this connection, you have spoken of the night. But and is brought into its stamp has the character of an animallike, i.e., slow how do you understand the night? movement. It is to be asked, however, whether it is a matter of two levels, Fink: The four xepnaxa confine the sunny world at its four ends. so that we can say: as in the sensory domain the animal herd is put to Ibis encircled domain is characterized by the temporary presence and pasture by the whip blow, so in the whole all things are steered by absence of the sun, from which the problem of day and night arises. As lightning. I would like to think that we may not set both these levels off seen liom the phenomenon itself, we are all of Hesiod's opinion. Im- S(j sharply in contrast from each other. If we speak of two levels, then mediate seeing indicates that day and night alternate. Against this, there is the danger that we make comparisons from the phenomenal Heraclitus formulates the provocative sentence and says: although level and l>egin to move into unrestricted analogies. If we suppose the Hesiod appears to understand mo.st alxuit human works and days, be two levels to l)e sharply distinguished, then we miss precisely their inter- has not understood that day and night are one. For our part, we have play. Heraclitus knows no fixed levels; but we must precisely notice, with asked whether ibis l)eing one is to be read directly as il is said, or whether interpretation of his fragments, that and how they interplay. The force we must avail ourselves of a more difficult rendition. In the lattei' case we . . . . 54 55 must say: Hesiod had held day and night distinguished; however, there second dimension in ^v, alongside the dimension of the sun's domain. is i\. So understood, day and night do not coincide; bul from knowledge The dimension of brightness is imbedded in this second dimension, and of ^ even the most conspicuous distinction between day and night can- death points lo it. Still, that at which death points is a domain that not in the end be accepted as such. There is the one, and if there is nolxjdy can find in life-lime. The more fragments we read, the more the success in coming into knowledge of the one {6\io\oyeiv), then that question marks accumulate for us. been said which is torn asunder in opposition is suffused by the single unity of h/. Heidegger: In connection with what has concerning lan- So far as Heraclitus thinks from out of ev, he cannot allow the demarca- guage, I would like to refer lo the lecture "Sprnrbe ah Rytkmus" ["lan- tion made between day and night by the most knowledgeable teacher. guage as Rhythm] by Fhra.sybulos Georgiades, delivered in the lecture Hehjeccier: You thus distinguish a manifold essence of night. On series "Die Sprache" ["Language"] of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts one hand, you distinguish the night from the daily day, and then you and the Berlin Academy of Arts, as well as in his book Mmik und Rylhmiis has spoken excellently about Ian- under.stand night also as the closedncss of earth, . . bei den Griechen^° In both works, he is the asks rhythm, and shows that Fink: . . . whereby the closedness of earth the boundary of gauge. Among other tilings, he about sun's domain. The realm of the sun in her reference to xa ndvra is the ^110^65 has nothing to do with ^eo) (flow), but is to be undersKxid as im- domain of openness in which day and night are in exchange, . . print. In recourse lo Werner Jaeger, he appeals to a verse of Archilochos, still in this The verse reads: 6' otog Heidegger: . , . and day and night in their exchange are Fr. 67a, where ^roiioq has meaning. YtYvotoxE another night? ^uotiog 6v9e(i)Jiou5 Exei- "Recognize which rhythm holds men." More- Fink: Perhaps. over, he cites a passage from Aeschylus' Prometheus, to which Jaeger Hkiim.gger: With my questions, I would only like lo gel at the place likewise has referred and in which the ^Oftdg or ^ue|iil;u» [bring into a from which you speak of another night. measure of time or proportion] has the same meaning as in the Ar- Fink: If I have spoken of another, more original night, of the chilochos fragment: iJ)6' ^Qeij8(tiO|iai {Prometheus 241). Here Prom- I ". 1 is nightly abyss in explication of the sun fragment, did so in preview of etheus says of himself, . . in this rhythm am bound." He, who held the death-life fragments. From there 1 have viewed the deeper sense of immobile in the iron chains of his confinement, is "rhythmed," that is, the pheni>menon of closedness of the earth and in a certain way al.so of joined. Georgiades points out that humans do not make rhythm;, rat her, the .sea as the boundary of the sun's domain. Only when we first consider for the Cireeks, the ^uBfiog [measure] is the substrate of language, the relation of life and death will we see how the realm of life is the sun's namely the language that approaches us. Georgiades understands the domain and how a new dimension breaks ojjen with the reference to archaic language in this way. We must also have the old language of the death. The new dimension is neither the domain of openness nor only fifth century in view in order to approximate understanding of Hera- the closedness of the earth, although the earth is an excellent symbol for clitus. 'fhis language knows no sentences. . the dimension of the more original night. Hegel speaks of the earth as Fink: . . . that have a specific meaning. the elementaiT individuum into which the dead return. The dimension of Heidegger: In the .sentences of the archaic language, the state of the more original night is denoted by deaih. That dimension, however, is affairs speaks, not the conceptual meaning. the light- the realm of death, which is no land and has no extension, the no-man's- Fink: We have begun our explication of Heraclitus with ning fragtnent. We have turned then to Fr. 1 1. in which it is said that land, . . is dimen- is tended by the blow, whereby we brought the Heiue(;c;f,k: . . . that cannot be traversed and that also no everything which crawls have taken the sion. 'Fhe difficulty lies in addressing the domain denoted by death. blow into connection with the lightning bolt. Finally, we the Fink: Perhaps language in its articulation is at home in the domain sun and the day-night fragments into view. Here it was above all and the imljed- that is itself articulated, in the domain of the sun. in which one ibing is three-fold sense of [ifiQa, the reference of sun and time separated from the other and set into relief against the othei. and in dedness of the sun's domain in an original night. 'Fhe lK)undaries l>e- which the individual has si^cific outline. If now, however, we under- tween the sun's domain and the nightly abyss are the four lEenaxa. In stand EV nol only in the sense of the dimension of o|x;nness, of the the sun we have seen a time-determining power which proportions the brightness of lightning and the Jidvcu found in it, but also as llie more measures of lime. 'Fhe next Iragmein in our series is Fr. 'M). MOt^ov bXK' original night, asilu- mountain range of l)eing [(/^/,< (iehiigd<-\Sehis] which TovftE, Tov ar'Tov ootavrow, ovte iig flfiuv oute dvfletimcov fjiotr|Ofv, is no counirysitle, which has n<) name and is unspeakable—although not fjv ixn xai ecttiv xal ecttqi nvQ dei^wov, dnTouFvov hetqu xai djtoapEv- in the sense of a limit of language—iben we must also take in view a vunEVov HEtya. Diels iianslates. "rbis world order, the same for all be- 56 57 ings, was created neither l»y gods nor by humans; rather, it was always Heiuiigoer: Then we must also put "the eternal living fire" as the and is and will be eternal living lire kindled in measures and quenched subject of the second half of the sentence instead of Diels" translaiitm in measures." At llrst we interpret only the second half of the fragment. "she" (i.e., the world order). Lijijhtning. we could say. is the sudden Tire, the sun is the fire in orderly Fink: When Heraclitus now says of eternal living fire that it is kin- passage of ihe coiu'se after of lime, bin kvq atil;(iK)v [eternal living fire] is dled measures and quenched after measures, that appears to con- something that we do not find in the phenomenon like the lightning and tradict the Aei [eternal], and sounds like a shocking specification to us. the sun. Heidegger; Let us at first leave this quesdon out of account. In HKinE<;(;ER: How do yon wish lo translate xoonog? order to stay with what you have first said: do you reject saying that the Fink: I would like to pass over the first half ol Fr. 30 and aiiempt to world order is the fire? interpret only the second half. If we translate x^o^o^ with woild order Fink: The world order is no work of gods and humans, but the or ornament, then we must bring that translation into connection with work of the eternal living fire. It is not, however, the work of the fire that Fr. 124, where the talk is of the most l^eautiful xoonog as a junk heap. always was and is and will Ijc, because the eternal living fire first tears When we now attempt to read and interpret Fr. 30 from the end, we open the three time dimensions of having-been, being-now, and must.also return to naivete. A phenomenal fire continues in burning. coming-to-be. Heraclitus speaks in Fr. 30 first in a denial: the HOt^io^ is conflagration The of fire is a process in lime. The fire was yesterday, is not brought forth (Diels' translation, "created," is out of place) by one of today and will be tomorrow. Now. however, my question is: are i\v dei the gods or one of the humans. We can also say: the x6o|xog is not [was always], gariv [is], and fcjiai [will be], in reference to tcvq dettcoov, brought forth to appearance byoneof thegodsor by a human. Therein, determinations of the ways of fire's being-in-time? Is the 6e£^a)ov [eter- we already hear the fiery character of fire. The k6o(io5 as the beautiful nal living] of fire thought by always-having-been. Iieing-now, and joining of JiAvta comes forth to appearance in the shineof fire. That the coming-to-l)e? Bui must we ihink the fire in terms of the familiar way xoono? as the beautiful jointed order is not brought forth to appearance that we specify duration, with only the difference that the nsual fire that by one of the gods or by a human, is first only to be understood in the is lasts ignited a while and goes out again and thus has not always been, is sense that gods and humans have a share in the power of fire among all not always, and will not always Ije? How is deC^toov to be understood? the beings of the x6onog: and they are productive. Gods and humans are Does it mean the perdurance of fire through the whole time"' Do we not productive, however, not in the manner of the most original KoCiioi^ then think the fire named here by Heraclitus too naively, if we suppose [production], which produces the kvq def^iuov. In the explication of Fr. that its distinct character would l>e that it always was. is present and will 30, however, I wish fir.st to question whether time characteristics are always be? I would rather suppose that we must think the other way asserted in the term nvQ heitfjiov. The nvg dei^owv is neither like a around. The fire is not always past, present, and coming; rather, it is fire process within time, nor is it comparable with what Kant calls the world that first tears open having-been, being-now, and coming-io-be, stuff as the basis of the constantly extant time. The fire mentioned by Heidf.cger: But what is the subject of the .second half of the sen- Heraclitus is not in time, but is itself the time-allowing time that first and tence on your inteipretatiim? For Diels it is koohoc. of which he says foremost lets ^v [was], eoxi [is] and Eatai [will be] break out; it does not thai it has been bi-ought forth neither by gods nor humans. Rather stand under these. If we tentatively take tivq iiElt,wov as the time- Moojio; always was, is, and will Ix- eternal living fire. allowing, time-opening, then dei stands in a taut relationship to t^v, eoti, Fink: I reject this translation. 1 understand nvQ [firej as the subject and eoxai, and furthermore to what the concluding phrase of Fr. 30 of the second half of the sentence. concerns, in a taut relationship to the kindling after measures and HEint:(;t;ER: Do you make a break before dU' [rather], so that the quenching after measures. following has nothing to do with the preceding? Heidegger: For me the central que.stion now is where you start out. Fink: 'Flie Do k6o[ioc a.s the Ix-'aiiiifnl joining of irdvia is that which you start out from i\v, ecttl, and eorai or rather from nvQ AeL(I,a)ov? shines in fire. To this extent the first and second halves of the sentence Fink: I start out with nvQ dEtCtoov and go from it to f|v, loii, and have much to do with one another. The fire is the productive power of eotai. If one reads word for word, the three-fold of lime is said from biin^ing-hnih. (iods and humans shine up and are brought lo uiicon- dEd^OiOV. ceale 58 59 Fink: This thought is hard to carry through. So long as we read the rather, it is the time-forming in the sense of the appfjrtioningof time for fragment naively, we niiisl say that the talk is of an eternal hving fire all that is in lime. We have previously thought this apportioning of time that always was and is and will Ix.'. in the driving lighlninglxilt and in the fire of "HU05. We may not deter- HtiDEGCKR: The ^v and fotai have no sense in reference to mine the time of fire, which forms the times for ta ndvra, in a captious Asi^wov' 1 ef erence from concepts of Ijeing-in-time back to the most original time. Fink: The J^v means what is gone; the earai means being not yet. It The easy version runs: Fire was always and is and will be. Com- is not fire that is past and will be; rather, (ire first and foremost opens prehended thus, fire is something standing, extant and merely lying the way ftjr arising in time, tarrying in time, and going under in time. there, which subsists through the course of time. This remaining is Fire as the time-allowing lime first and loremust breaks open the three charatterized by the temporal dimensions of having-been, being-now time ecstacies of past, present, and future. and coming-to-be. But then one already has time, and one brings tem- Heidegger: 'i'here is the possibility for passing, so that it itself can- poial concepts to bear on ihe time-forming fire. The more difficuli not always have been. But when you speak of time-allowing, in what version, on the contrary, runs: That the ^v, eoti, and Edtai first arise sense do you mean that? from the time-allowing of fire. Fink: In the sense of apportioning of time. Hi;ide(;ger: Fire is, thereby, not only as glow, but as light and Hkii>egger: You understand the allowing as ap|3ortioning. But how- warmth, . is time meant in the time-allowing? Fink: . . . and is, therefore, to be understood as llie nourishing. Fink: We must distinguish time-allowing and the apportioned lime Heidkgger: Afxne all. the moment of shining is important to nvQ (hat things have in such a way that they have already lx;en for a while, dei^toov. are present, and will also he yel a while. This manner of Ijeing-in-timc Fink: The fire is that which brings-forth-to-appearance. belongs only to things; ii does not, however. lx;long to the eternal living Heidegger: If we understand fire only as a fiasb in the pan, it lire which first lets the three time ecstasies break out. nvQ aet^toov is the would yield no shining. tearing open of having-lxfen, Ijeing-iiow and coniing-io-ljc. 'Fhat which Fink: From out of shining we must think back to Koatto;. It is what stands in the shine of flic receives the time apportioned to its tan-ying shines up in the shine of fire. Firsl we must ask ourselves how, by way of from this original opening of time. The fire sets measures. The hardness the innertemjxnal characteristic of ;riTJQ 6si^ox)v, can Jitie Aei^tiKJV be of the problem would disappear if one sup]H>sed that nvQ afi^wov were referred to as that which first of all releases past, present, and future determined by the tempoial evidence of !>eing-in-time. The question, from out of itself? however, is whether it is meant that the fire always was and is will and be, Heidegger: You speak of releasing. How is this usage to Ije under- or whether a productive relation is to l)e thought lx;tween fire the and stood more closely? Nature is also released with Hegel. How does jiOq tiv. eoTi. and farat. ctEL^toov release pa.st, present, and future? For me the question is Hi:ii)k<.(;er: When you speak of the time-allowing of nvQ dti^oiov. whether that which subsequently comes in any way suppoits your in- don't you mean thai in [he ordinary sense, as we sometimes .say, "some- lerpietation, or whether thai which comes makes your interpretalion allows one another time"? p()ssible. Fink: I'he time that ihe flie allows, by apportioning time to things, Fink: What troubles me is the taut relationship l>eiween det^wov is no empty lime form, no medium separated from contenl, but is. so lo and T^v, Eoxi. and eotul. 'Fhe dei of JtiJQ and the three lime delerniina- speak, lime with its toiitem, ttons don't appear lo me to go together so easily. What has Ix-en, is, and Heiih;<;(;kk: Of the thus given, lime one must say: it tarries. It is not comes to be do not refer to fire. Rathei', we must understand the spring- a depository in which things appear as dispensed; rather, time as appor- ing up of baving-l>een, iK'ing-now, and coming-to-l>e for la n&vra ii om tioned is alieady refened lo that which tarries. out of fire. Fink: 't'o wbai is individual. Heidegger: I would like to have a clue for this step of your in- Heioeggkh: Lei us le:ive aside what is indi\idual. liul do voii wish terpretation, ,So long as I do not see ibis clue, one could say that the step lo say thai we go beyond the ordinaiy comprehension of lime with yi)ur from Jiav EgntTtSv lo Jiavxa d); EpjiEid and from the nighi, which sui- interpreiaiion of lime and of lime-allowing? rounds the stars and nio 60 6 and the three time determinations toward the time forming of jivq nvQ and Jiavra (Correlated dteCtpCoov, in the sense of the letting spring up of having-been, being- Fragments: present, and coming-to-be, has no clue, and cannot, therefore, be rightly 30, 124, 66, 76, 31). carried through. Fink: For me the clue is this, that it is impossible to talk of jivq dEt^toov as within time. Otherwise, it becomes a thing that happens in the world, perhaps also the highest thing, the summum ens, which, how- The seminar began with the report of one of the participants Her- ever, on is an ens in the midst of things. Seen thus, it would be subordinate mann Frankel, "Die Zeitauffassung in der Frithgrieckuchen Literatur," to time. My question is, however, whether the determinations of being- printed in Wege und Formen friihgriechischen Denkens, I960." in-time are not subordinated to jivq det^toov. Fink: In her report, she has shown that in Homer xpovo? [time] Heideggkh: So far as I can see, there is only this clue, that kvq means the long, lingering time, the endurance of time understood in AeC^coov is no thing and that, therefore, no "was," "is" and "will be" can awaiting, or rather the time that still remains for mortals who suffer be predicated of it, . . long. Both are specific forms of time. Fink: . . . and also no perpetuity in the ordinary sense. Heidegger; It is important for us that there is no theoredcal con- Heidegger: We stand before the question of how jiijq dEi^tiK)V re- ceptual determination of time as time with Homer and Hesiod. Rather, lates itself to lime. One does not get further. In the summer semester of both speak of lime only out of experience. 1923 in Marburg, while working out Being and Time, I held a lecture on Fink: Professor Heidegger's question started out from Frankel's the history of the concept of time. As I investigated the archaic idea of expression of day as aunity of encounter, i.e., from the idea of a manner time with Pindar and Sophocles, it was striking that nowhere is time of givenness according to the encounter. The question was whether time spoken of in the sense of the sequence. Rather, time is there taken in refers to an encountering subject, or is rather to be understood as con- view as that which first grants the sequence—similarly as in the last crete lime in the sense of the different ways that we are in time, except- paragraphs of Being and Time, although the problem is there viewed ing that we encounter time. It is dangerous if we speak about the en- from Dasein. 1 look at my walch and find that it is three minutes counter of time, because it is then referred to consciousness. Then we before 7 P.M. Where is the time there? Try to find it. move into the distinction of the time of consciousness, in which we live, i and objective time, which is separated from subjectively encountered time. The question was what specific time is; whether the specificity of time is to be grasped from its encountered character or from another approach, which lies outside the distinction of subjective and objective time. Heidegger: I object to the expression "unity of encounter." When it was said by one of the participants that Homer presents a specific idea of lime, and that this specificity rests in the encounter of long tarrying and waiting, this is correct. 1 object only to the formulation. For the Greeks did not "encounter." Let us break off discussion connected with the report, because we lose too much time otherwise. But what does it nu;in when we say that we lose time? On what presupposition can we lose time at ail? Participant: Only when time is limited to us can we lose time. Heidkc;gek: Being limited is not decisive. Rather, in order to lose something, we must have it. I can only lose time, if t have time. If i say thai I have no time, how is time then characterized? Participant: I presuppose thai lime is available to me. Heide(;c;er: Regarding time, that means that it is characterized as time for .... — 62 63 " Participant: As time for this, time is not the time for something Heidegger: The "always" is then understood as "at all times else. For it is time to do this rather than something else. "permanent." In Latin one speaks of the sempilemitas [always-eternity]. Heidegger: Time, as "not the time," is the privative characteriza- That we do not really make progress here is based on the fact that in the tion of lime. The one character of time that we have emphasized is time fragment time is not spoken about thematically; nevertheless, the in- as time . terpretation attempts to take time into view in a for. . . Another character of time to which I would like to refer decisive sense. Only shows itself when 1 look at the clock and say that it is 5:45 P.M. Now I thus, I believe, can we make clear to ourselves the way of your interpre- ask, where is time? tation. While, according to the trivial rendition, the first half of the Participant: Therewith, time shows itself as clock-time or mea- sentence says that the k6o(io5 is brought forth neither by one of the gods sured lime. nor by a human, and the second half, which begins with 6XX6, says that Heidegger: When I look at the clock and say that it is 5:45 P.M., the x6a\ioq always was, is, and will be eternal-living fire, according to and ask where time is, does this question make sense at all? your interpretation the subject of the second half of the sentence is not Participant: It is a problem whether one can ask where time is. xoonog but nvQ. Heidegger: Hence, I ask you, can one ask at all where lime is? Fink: According to the smoother version, as Diels proposes, fire is a Participant: In 1962. in your lecture "Z«(M7idS«m,"you have said predicative determination of Kootio;. Yet the antecedent phrase should that time is prespatial.^^ Accordingly, that would mean that one cannot already draw attention. If we translate, "this xoonog is brought forth to ask where time is. appearance neither by one of the gods nor by a human," then Koojio^ Heidegger: On the other hand, we read off the time from the although spoken negatively—moves into view as something brought clock. I look at the clock and read that it is 5:45 P.M. Clearly something forth. Thereby, the connection to fire as that which brings forth is al- doesn't make sense here. With Hegel, we must write it on a sheet of ready given. We do not understand fire as a predicative determination paper. Bui how? We must write that now it is 5:45 P.M. In the now, we of xoanog; rather, we understand x6o(ioe from out of fire as the beauti- thus have time. I do mean time with the now. We will come back to this ful joining of zix K&vxa which is brought forth to appearance neither by question when we enter into Fr. 30 and observe the difficulty that lies in one of the gods nor by a human. There was always and is and will be the saying of f|v, eoriv, and ?cn:ai in reference to irugiieL^toov. It seems to eternal-living fire in the light-shine of which the beautiful joining of tA me that here would be the place to consider whether time is mentioned Jidvxa shines up, "It always was and is and will be" we must understand at all in Fr. 30. in the sense of "there is." Thus seen. jt6ono5 is comprehended from out Fink: Yet Heraclitus speaks of dtf ^v, Eoxl, and Imai. of fire, and not fire from out of x6o^o?. This rendition would fit in with Heidegger: If we say that Fr. 30 speaks of time, do we go beyond the trail in which we have interpreted the connection of hghtning and the text? sun lo xiin&vxa up to now. The reference of Jivg and x6o(W)s would be a Fink: But still, Heraclitus clearly used time determinations. special relationship of Ev and Jidvta, according to which id ndvTa stand Heidegger: That means, therefore, that he did not speak themati- in the light-shine of fire. The smoother rendition has the advantage that cally about lime. This observation is important in order to follow up the the subject remains the same in both halves of the .sentence. Thus, fire step that you pursue in your interpretation of Fr. 30, the step in which becomes a determination of xoono; instead of, the other way around, you determine the relationship of jiuq diei^iDov and x6a\iog. We can read >t6ono5 being brought forth to appearance in the shine of fire. Only if the fragment also trivially, if we say that f\v, Itni and Icnai are the the subject in the second half of the sentence is not x6o(io;, is there a anticipatoi-y interpretation of det^coov. In this case, what would de£ superiority of fire vis-a-vis w^onog. Here we could also point to Fr. 124: mean? fiojieg a&Q\ia elxf| xex^h^viov 6 xdW.Lcrro? (6) wapiog. Diels translates: beautiful Participant: The &t'i would be underst Heidegger: What kind of a connection is that? If we read Fr. 30 junk heap. almost trivially and understand i\v. eotl, and eotol as anticipatory in- Heidegger: One could translate xdXXioncog x6o|iog: the x6aftoc; as it terpretation of AeC, what does it then mean? Is time presupposed in can only be in general. "always"? Fink: The most l^eautiful xoo^o^, the most beautiful ordered en- Participant: The "always" can be an innertemporal determina- tirety of all Jidvta, comes forth to appearance in the shine of fire. If this tion. xoajiog is like a junk heap, we have a hard contrast between xdW-ioto?, ^1 64 65 which is referred tox6oti05, and the derogatory manner of talking about productive [poutisckel power. But this negation sounds paradoxical, be- adQiia. To what extent can the most bt-autifiil xoonog be compared to a cause it would never readily occur to anybody that a human has brought heap of scattered things? it To the extent that we compare with the nvQ forth the entire order of jrAvta. Humans do not bring forth the x6o|xo5 that brings forth. Compared with the fire that brings forth to appear- in the sense of the entire joining of Ji6vTa, except the xoonoc; in the sense ance, the most beautiful xoonoc; seems like a heap of scattered things. If of the JtoXig [city]; while the gods bring forth the K6a\ioq in the sense of we read Kr. 124 in this it way, can support our interpretation of Fr. 30, the world-rule, though in a limited manner in so far as they cannot which depends on the superiority of fire vis-a-vis the xoanog. intervene in the power of Molga [goddess of fate]. Humans and gods are Heideciger: Ii is difficult for me to comprehend that the most productive l>ecause they partake of the productive power of fire in an beautiful in xoonog stands need of yet another determination. extraordinary manner. Humans make only little xoohol and not great Fink; I understand the fragment such that the most beautiful ones, but only because they paitake in the 110(11015 of itiJQ. C^ds and xoonoq receives the negative character of a heap of scattered things in humans are distinguished beings in the xoono^, while gods are deter- reference to the £v of jitjq. mined by a still greater nearness to nvQ dEi^coov. Out of participation in Heidegger: is Thus, the question whether Fr. 124 can be used as the productive power of fire, humans have the capacity of te^vt] and of support for the explication of Kr. M). establishing states, fkjds bring forth no state, but rather world dominion, Fink: The xdU-ioiog xoonog can be characterized as a confused Ctods and humans are enfeoffed with their own productive power by the heap not only in leference to the 6v of jiOq, but also in reference to the productive dominion of fire, which overrules them, and only therefore other ev, which first comes to view with the dimension of death. can it be said of them in a denial that they have not brought forth the Hkioegger: Above all, 1 am concerned to make clear to the partici- great X60H05. Before (sXKa in Kr. 30, 1 would put a semicolon, and then pants the manner in which you proceed. You set yourself off from the translate further: but it was always and is and will be eternal-living fire. more naive, version smtxHher and prefer the more difficult version. If The jioCtjoi; of fire is the 6iax6onT)ai5 [setting in order]. What was we read Fr. 30 smoothly, then it concerns a statement about the x6a|io5 earlier spoken of as oCaxiCet and ^xv[iepVTiaE is now the producuve [hat is brought forth neither by one of the gods nor by a human, but that power of fire for the xdojiog. always is, was, and will be eternal-living fire. Then the xooiio; is some- Heidegger: Yon do not think power metaphysically. You do not thing that is. This statement is then, as yon wish to say, completely think metaphysically any longer, Heraclitus does not yet think metaphys- un philosophical. ically. Is that the same? Is it a question of ihe same situation of thinking? Fjnk: a certain philosophical element would then lie only in the Fink: Presumably not. For we, in distinction from Heraclitus, are &ei, in the eternalness of the world. stamped i>y the conceptual language of metaphysics. Perhaps, with the Heidkggkr: Vou say that, however, undei- the presupposition that fundamental ideas of metaphysics, we get scarcely beyond metaphysics. Heraclitus is a philosopher. Heraclitus' In time, however, there were as Heidegger: That is to be noticed for the interpretation, and also yet no philosophers. for the connection of the not-yet-metaphysical and the no-more- Fink: To be sure, Heraclitus is no philosopher, but he is still a iflhyg nietaphysical. which is a special, historical connection. The expression Tois aofpov, a friend of ootpov. "not metaphysical" is insufficient. We no longer interpret metaphysically Heidegger: That means thai you do not interpret Heraclitus a text that is not yet metaphysical. I n back of that a question hides that is metaphysically. As against the naive rendition, you require a philosophi- not now to l>e raised but that will be necessary in order to Ix" able to make cal rendition that is not yet metaphysical. From what herineneutical the way of youi- inlerpreiation clear. position do you attempt that? Kink: Now we can refer to the less smooth explanation to the con- Kink: It pu/zles me that nvQ &£it,wov should Ix; s(Kjken of as the cluding phiase: cuixoiisvov nctga xai dnoopfwlJuEvov, nEtga. If fire is essential predicate of xoofio;. while K6a\ioq. as the joining JttivTa, of always living, it is not quenched as such. Rather, it is kindling and steered by lightning and standing in the light-shine of "H^iog, not can ((uenthing in reference to the xoonoc, and it sets measures for day and it,self Ik.' the fire but is the work of fire. In the antecedent phrase it is said night and all things that stand in the openness of the alternation of day that this xoonoc; is brought forlh to appcaraiue neithei- by one of the and night. Tlif dn;T6|ievov \ikxQa xai 6iioa|iEwiJnFvov HExya is no de- g 66 67 iuiai also pertains to what shines up in the shine of fire. We understand [xissible through il. Herein lies a covering of the original by the deriva- the three time determinations not as temporal marks of distinction of tive. Were we lo ap[>ease ourselves with the immediate wording of the KVQ det^toov but, the other way around, from out oi the act of niiQ we fragment, and give preference to the smoother rendition, ihen nvQ understand the having been, the now, and the coming of things that dEL^toov would have past and future; and it would now no longer be come forth to appearance in the shine of fire. Things have their l)eing- what it was. and nol yet be that which it is coming to be. in-time in the manner of originating, tarrying, and disapi>earing. While Heideg(;er: We have said ihat we no longer interpret metaphysi- they tarry, they spread themselves out l)etween the now, the having cally a text that is not yet metaphysical. Is the no-longer-metaphysical been, and the coming. already included yi the not-yet-metaphysicat. Heidegger: In tlie fragment, "was," "is," and 'will l>e" are men- Fink: That would be Heraclitus interpreted by Heidegger. tioned. You, however, speak of having-been. being-present, and Heidegger: It does not concern me lo interpret Heraclitus by coming-io-l)e. Clearly, it is a matter of S()mething different. While lime Heidegger; rather, the elaboration of the reasons for your interpretation determinations are used in (he fragment, in your interpretation you take concerns me. Both of us are in agreement that if we speak with a thinker, time as such to be thematic. we must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which Fink: The always living source of time can only be addressed with way leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive names taken from xa Jiavia. step. To answer this question seems to me especially difficult in refer- HEiDEtiGEK! I agree with that, but what concerns me now is the ence lo time in Fr. 30. Consequently, I have asked about the "always." him that ^v does not mean having-been as having-been. How should we understand il? In the setting of your interpretation, Fink: 1 am ama/ed at the hard bond of iiuq ^ei^tDovand i^v, ^crtiv, what does "always" mean? If I ask you, is it the nunc slatt,\ [the standing and ?OTai. Perhaps we can say that in a certain manner it cannot be said now], and you answer no, then I ask, what is il? Here we are faced with a of jiiJQ aeC^toov that it only is, because il is not eternal. Rather, we must question mark. say thai as the brightness of the lightning and sun brings iravra forth to Fink: The special difficulty lies in the fad thai what precedes as the appearance and into the outline of its geslalt, so il is the dei of kvq that source of lime cannot be said at all in appropriate manner. In reference brings it about that Jiavta, which stand in the light-shine of fire, were, to the source of time, we find ourselves in a special predicament. are, and will be. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that the charac- Heidegger: You rightly emphasize the predicament in which we teristic of being-in-lime of Jidvta places itself back upon nvQ 6ei^(i>ov as find ourselves. The difficulty before which we stand consists not only in the s<»urce of the ways of being-in-time. Of kvq aEL^toov, however, one the step of thought but also in our rethinking. We must have sufficient cannot say that it was, is, and will Ix;, For then one comprehends il like clarity about what is to be thought in order to hear Heraclitus in the something extant. What would it mean to say that nvQ &titfaov is now? correct manner. Nevertheless we cannot resolve whal has lo be thought Does it have a specific age, so thai il is older in each moment? And what in terms of one fragment; rather, we must—as you have already said would it mean to say that il always was and will be? Always having-fjeen have all the fragments in view for the interpretation of one fragment. 1 means that it has past times behind it, just as coming-to-be means that it am again and again concerned to make clear the sequence of steps of has a future before il. Can one say of jruQ det^coov that it has past times your interpretation. Therefore, 1 have indicated that lime becomes behind il, thai it now has presence and has a coming presence in the thematic with your slep of thought, while in Fr. 30 time comes to view future? Here KVQ deC^tuov is mentioned in the manner in which things only as an understanding of time, without becoming thematic for Hera- are in time, spring forth, tarry, and disappear, have past, present, and clitus. future. Bui nvQ ^Eltfoov, on its pari, lets past, present, and coming Fink: Concerning ihe phrase. f|V dttl xai eartv xai fotui nvQ spring forth. We must be wary of comprehending nvQ dEL^orav as a ("tEi^wov [it was always and is and will lie eternal-living fire]. I will nol perpetual slock. coniend that we have within easy reach an interpretive possibility that will Heidegger: For me, the question is, what is ihe reason for this allow us to address the source of time, which is hidden by imratemporal reversed step of the interpretation. For you. the 6ei l;>ecomes the source determinations, without iniratem[x>ral deierminaiions. For that would foi i^v, t-QTiv, and eorai. mean that we would already be able lo retrieve the premctaphysical Fink: As to ihe source of the three time determinations, the reason language. for my reversed interpretive step lies in the fact ihat nvQ def^orav, which In this connection, let us glance at Fr. 66, which should l>e correlated is not itself iimeitem|x>ral, is addres.sed by means of what is fii st made now only in order lo indicate the superiority of Jiiig vis-a-vis ypa^Log and 68 69 la ntivTa. It runs: nAvxa yiig xb nvQ ejiEX,e6v kqivei xal xaiaXtiijifTai. life and death—a problem lo which we will pay attention separately. Also the words Diels Iranslales; "For fire, having come upon thtm, will judge and ap- concerning Fr. 31, we wish to use here only of Heraclitus nQtbrov OdXaooa, prehend (condemn) all things.'" In this translation it is questionable himself in our consideration: Jtneoc xptmai Qakaa 70 does water move in such a way thai half becomes earth and the other half becomes breath of fire? If we understand xeonai in ihis sense, ihen we Difference of Interpietation: Truth of Being take fire as a kind of primary substance, which assumes different forms {Fragment 16) or Cosmological o( appearance in sequence. My question, however, is whether one can Perspective (Fragment 64).—Heraclitus and the make Jiueo; XQonai clear by the changeover of aggregate states familiar Matter of Thinking. to us. The Not-Yet-Metaphysical and the Heidegger: Would you say that fire stands behind eveiyihing? — What is questionable, is No-Longer-Metaphysical.—Hegel's however, what "behind" means here; alcove all, whether fire stands iK-hind everything in the manner of a primary sub- Relationship to the Greeks.—nugog Tpojiat and stance, . . Dawn. Fink: . . . or whether one must not begin here also from the re- (Correlated Fragments: 31, 76). latedness of £v and Jidvia, and whether one must give up the thought of a basic matter. Our task here will again l>e to work out the more difficult rendition. Heidegger: Since we have interrupted our seminar for three weeks over Christmas, a short synopsis of the way of our undertaking till now might prove useful. If an outsider were to ask you what we work at in our seminar, how would you answer such a question? Participant: Discussion of the problem of time in Fr. 30 was cen- tral in the last hours before Christmas. HEiDEG(iER: In other words, you have indeed let yourself be misled by the explication of Fr. 30 which Mr. Fink has given. For—as we have emphasized again and again—time does not come to the fore at all with Heraclitus. Participant: But Fr. 30 leads to time determinations, and our ([uestion was how these ought to be understood. Heidegger: With that, you go into a special question. But if some- Ixjdy asked you what we work at in our Heraclitus .seminar, and if he wanted to hear not alxjul individual questions but alx)Ut the whole; if he asked whai we have begun with, what would your answer Ix^? Participant: We have liegun with a methodical preliminary con- under- sideration, that is, with the question of how Heraclitus is to \x stood. Heidegger: What has Mr. Fink done at the beginning of his in- K'i])retation? Pakiicipant: He has started with a consideration of xa Jidvta. Heide(;(;er: But how does he come to la navTO?— If 1 speak with you now. I ihus speak wilh everyone. PARiiciPANr: riirough Fr. M: tu 6f jiavxa oi:a>tit,fi Kegauvo;. Heidegger: In the explication, have we begun with xa ndvta or with lightning? For il is im[X)riani to distinguish thai. ourselves how za Jidvxa is to l>e Participan'i : First, we have asked translated; then, we turned to ihe iightning; and finally, we have looked at all ihe fragments in which xd ndvxa is mentioned. . . . 72 73 Heidegger: Mr. Fink has thus begun ihe explication oC Heraclitus Participan'i: . . . our taking into view the relationship between with the lightning. Is this Ix-ginning a matter of course? Is it not surpris- lightning and to ndvra. ing? Hkidkgger: What follows after that? Participant: If one considers the starting points made elsewhere, Participant: .An explication ot Fr. II. this beginning is unusual. Heidegger: But how do we come to this fragment? What is the HtiDEGGER: Mr. Fink, who l)Cgins with the lightning, is, as it were, jKTtinent motif that leads us from Fr. 64 to Fr. 1 1 ? struck by lightning. With what does Heidegger begin? Participant: What Heraclitus him.self said gave us support for this Pahticipani': With the Aoyoc [gathering-process]. transition. In Fr. 64, he speaks of xd ndvra. in Fr. 1 1 of Jidv ^qjietov, Heideg(;er: And l)eside that . , which we have understood as itdvta (i)? §QJiETd. Participant: . , . with 'A>.f|9ELa [nonconcealment].^'' Heidegger: But where lay the pertinent support for such a proce- Heidegc;er: But how does Heidegger come to 'AX.T|6ELa? dure? , PAR-nciPANT: By Fr. 16: to [iri 60v6v jiote nwg &v ti; XofWi,^'' Participant: Lightning (lightning boll) led us to n\-ff\ (blow). Heidegger: Where this fragment is used as a basis for a Heraclitus Heidegger: Besides, we saw a relevant connection Ijetween steer- explication, one must also read it as the llrst fragment. But how do Frs. ing (otax(^ci) and driving (vEHETat). Theiefore, we took up first the 64 and 16 come together, or how is Fr. 64 distinguished from Fr. 16? relationship of lightning and xd ndvra. and finally, we t»H»k up the Wherein lies the distinction l>ctween both beginnings? lelaiionship of JiX.Tiyi'i and ndv e^jtetov. Then we turned . . Participant: In Fr. 16, to \ii\ 60vov jiote [thai which never sets] Participant: ... to the sun fragments. stands at the central point; in Fr. 64, it is xepauvog [lightning]. Heidegger: The explication began with the lightning or lightning Heidegger: Are both fragments, and thus both lieginnings, identi- Ik)Ii, then turned to the sun, and after that to nvQ dEL^tuov. Later, we cal? must specify more exactly the references of lightning, sun, and fire. Participant: No. What we have thematically treated up to this point has now become HEiDEGtLERi Take Fr. 16 entire, and compare it with Fr. 64. clear. But how d(»es Mr. Fink proceed in explication of the fragments? Participant: The distinction i>etween the two fragments consists in Participant: The explication has become a problem for us. this, that only tci n&vza is mentioned in Fr. 64, while the human being Heidegger: To what extent is the explication a problem? How comes into play in Fr. 16. w(»uld you characterize the procedure of Mr. Fink? The manner of his Heidegger: We are thus concerned with a great difference. The explication is by no means to be taken for granted, but is rather to be question will be what the different starting point of Frs. 64 and 16, designated as venturesome. respectively, signifies; whether or not an opposition is displayed here. Participant; More has been said in the interpretation of the frag- We will have to ask this question explicitly. But what could one reply if it ments than stands in them. were said that the human becomes thematic in Fr. 16, while he is not Heide(;ger: The interpretation is hazardous. But Mr. Fink does mentioned in Fr. 64? not interpret arbitrarily; rather, he has his grounds for preferring the Participant; If tq jidvra comprehends all entities, then the more difficult rendition and the hardness of the problem. What is the human is co-thought as an entity. ])roblem we are concerned with heie? With what right does he prefer the it is Particihani : Fundamentally, I agree with that. But then not more difficult rendition? l^t us take Fr. 30 as an example. said in Fr. 64 how a human, in distinction to all nonhuman navxa, is and Participant: In each case we have preferred the more difficult stands in relationship to lightning. On the contrary, Fr. 16 expressly rendition so that the subject matter comes to the fore. names the way that a human behaves toward to nf) ftOvov jiote. Heide(;ger; What matter is that? Heii>i:(-(;er: A human is also named in Fi'. 64 in so far as he is and Participant; The matter is already suggested in a manifold, Ix-longs as an entity to id TtdvTa. But the questittn is whether we already perhaps most explicitly in reference lo the time <|uestion. we take him as an entity which Ixjlongs to Tct think of a human when Let us bracket Heide(;c;er; I do not allow talk aljout lime now. Jidvra like all other eiilities. whether wc must not think of him otherwise iK'ing and time now. What matter is treated that should come to the as an entity in the midst of Jtdvta. Let us. therefore, keep in mind that foie? "Fhiiik of Mr. Fink's introductory remarks. the iK-ginning of Mr. Fink's Heraclitus explication is surprising. Ihis pARTiCiHAN-r: 'Fhe matter of thinking. beginning with the lightning then leads to . . Heidegger: And the matter of iliinking is? We must say ihat the 74 75 matter of thinking is thai which we seek, that of which we still do not form a totality, and that on the other hand xd iidvxa are supposed to know. The same outsider, after he has listened to what you answer to his stand in a reference to something that does not belong to the totality. question, could reply to you that when we deal with Heratlitus we sil, as Heide(;c;er: You would say that with the totality we have every- it were, in an ivory tower. For what we are doing would have nothing to thing, that with it we are at the end of thinking. On the other hand, a do with technology and industrial society; rathei', it is nothing but manifold is mentioned that exceeds the totality. If Tdjidviais the totality worn-out stories. What would Ix' the answer here? of ovxa, what is as a whole, is there still something which leads further? Participant: It is doubtful that we are dealing here with worn out Participant: Although you have said that the word "l>eing" should stories. For we do not take Heraclitus as a thinker of the past. It is rather l>e bracketed, we cannot now refrain from naming being as what leads our intention lo bring something to the fore in the exposition of Hera- further than what is as a whole. clitus that is possibly something other or quite the same. For us, there is Heidegcer: Till now, the conversation was not about being. Being no concern for an exposition that has to do with a past matter. is something that is n<»t an entity and that does not l>elong to what is as a HKiDEtiGicR: Do we thus provide no contribution to Heraclitus re- whole. The more ditllcult rendition consists in this, that we do not read search? the fragments onticaily, as we read the newspaper, that reading of the Pa HI ic I pant: I would not say that, because our problematic can fragments is not concerned with things that become dear simply. Rather, also be helpful for research. the difficulty is that here it isobviously amatterof a kindof thinking that Heidi:(;ger: We seek the determination of the matter of thinking in lets itself into something that is inaccessible to direct representation and conversation with Heraclitus. We intend thereby no thematic contribu- thought: that is the genuine background. tion to Heraclitus research. We are not interested in this direction. Another difficulty is the following. The kind of thinking that thinks Perhaps what we are doing is also inaccessible for Heraclitus research. what is as a whole in regard to being is the way of thought of The way and manner in which we speak with the fragments and listen to metaphysics. Now we said in the last seminar that Heraclitus does not yet them is not the simple, everyday way and manner of formuig an opinion, think metaphysically, whereas we no longer attempt to think metaphysi- as when we read the newspaper. Mr. Fink forces you to think olheiwise. cally. Has the "not-yet-metaphysical" no reference at all to metaphysics? The greater difficuhy of the more difficult rendition is not only related One could suppose the "noi-yet" lo be cut off from what follows, from by degrees to our capacity of apprehension. What seems here like a metaphysics. "Fhe "not-yet" could, however, also be an "already," a cer- grammatical comparative is presumably another distinction. tain preparation, which only we see as we do, and must see as we do, pAKTit;iPANr: A comparative presupposes that .something which whereas Heraclitus could not .see it. But what about the "no-longer- stands in a context gets compared. Between the .simple, everyday think- metaphysical'"? ing and understanding and that which is called the more difficult rendi- Participant: This characterization of our thinking is temporarily tion, there is clearly a gulf ihat is worthy of emphasis. unavoidable, Ix^cause we simply cannot put aside the histoiy of HKiDKtiCEH: We have thus looked at the reference of m JioLvra and metaphysics from which we come. On the other hand, regarding what lighining, ta JidvTu and sun, to jrdvta and Hie. In Fi-. 7, jtavta xu ovia the not-yet-metaphysical" deals with, perhaps t PAKri(;iPANT: The question is whether the reference of jrdvta to cally, and indeed l)ecause we come from metaphysics. lightning, to the sun, to fire, to ^v, to n6\£\ioQ. or to Ax'iyoc is in each case Paki [cii'AN'i: .An ambiguity lies in "no-longer." On one hand, it can different, or whether the expressed multiplicity of that to which to lie (omprehended in the sense of a sujjttrficial. tempoiai Jtdvra refers is only the name of a manifoki. I hen it implies that metaphysics lies l)ehind us. On the other hand, it can nKn)E(;<;EK: The difficulty l>efore which we stand is the manifold of .ilso lie underslood such that the lx.-aringon metaphysics is maintained. ligliuiing, the sun, fii-e, t'v, war and Xoy^'S '" their relationship lo xa aliboogh nol in ilie manner of a rnelaphysical c()unier|>osiiion wiiliin jidvxa, or to xd flvxa. The manifold docs not belong to Jtdvxa or to ovxa. metaphysics. Bui lo what docs it ilien belong? HEinE(i<;KK: You wish lo sav ibat "'no-longer-metaphysical" does pAttTi<;[i'ANr: I see the ditticullv in this, that on one hand xd Jidvxa nol mean that we have dismissed metaphysics; latlier, il implies that ii , . 76 77 metaphysics still clings to us, ihal we are not free of it. Wliert- within must think the concepts new each day. We have, for example, the state- Wfstcin philosophy is the lelatioiiship of epochs to each other thought ment that this glass i.s full. Someihing is said, therewith, atx>ut what lies in most decisive manner? lK:foie us, but the reference to an 1 is not thought. When this reference Participant: With Hegel. liecomes thematic for thinking, for the I, then what lies liefore us be- Heidk(;(;er: If s;iy wf thai we no longer attempt to think metaphys- comes what lies opposite us, that is, it tecomes an object. In CJreek there ically, but remain nevertheless referred to metaphysics, then we could are no objects. What does object mean in the Middle Ages? What dttes it designate this relationship in Hegelian fashion as sublation. None of us mean literally? knows whether metaphysics will reappear. In any case, the "no-longer- Participant: What is thrown up against. metaphysical" is difficult more to s(M;cify than the "not-yet- Heidegger: The object is what is thrown up against whom? Can metaphysical." But what about Hegel and the Greeks? Doesn't he lake you throw the glass up against yourself? How can 1 throw something up them to some extent all in the same breath? against my.self without something happening? What does suhiectum Participant: With Hegel, another understanding is presented of [substance] mean in the Middle Ages? What does it mean literally? what a beginning is. Participant: What is thrown under. Heidegger: question about The the beginning is too difficult for us Heidegger: For medieval thinking, the glass is a suhiectum. which is now. The answer which 1 wish is simpler. What character, according to the translation of OnoKet(ievov. Ohieclum [representation], for the Middle Hegel, has Greek thinking for philosophy? .Ages, meant, on the contrary, what is represented. A golden mountain is Participant: character A of preparation. an object. Thus the object here is that which is precisely not objective. It Heidegger: This answer is too general. More specifically said . . is subjective. I have asked how the Greeks think according to Hegel's Participant; In the preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel interpretation. We have said thai in their thinking the reference to the says that everything depends on comprehending and expressing truth subject does not become thematic. But were the (ireeks still thoughtful? not only as substance, but as as just much subject. For Hegel, nevertheless, their thinking was a turning toward what lies Heidegger: How is that to be understood? But first: is the "Pref- l>efoie and what underlies, which Hegel called the thinking of the im- ace" you mention the preface to the Pkenomenalogy? mediate. The immediate is that between which nothing intervenes. Participant; It is the preface to the system of science, whereas the Hegel characterized all of Greek thought as a phase of immediacy. For "Introduction" is the real preface to the Phenomenology. him, philosophy first reaches solid land with Descartes, by beginning Heideggkr: The "Preface" thus pertains to the Logif. and not only with the I. to the Phenomenology of Mind. In the "Preface" Hegel says something Participant: But Hegel saw a break already with Socrates, a turn- fundamental aljout philosophy, that it should think the truth not only as ing toward subjectivity that goes along with mores, in so far as these substance, also as subject. In (ireek, but . substance means . lx:coine morality. Participant: . . . ^jioxelubvov, and what is underlying. Heidegger: That Hegel sees a break with Socrates has a still sim- Heidegger: How is substance thought by Hegel? If I say that the pler ground. When he characterizes Greek thinking as a whole as a hou.se is big or tall, how is the manner of thinking that only thinks phase ot immediacy, he does not level down inner distinctions like that substance to be characterized? What is not thought here? between Anaxagoras and Ari.siotle. Within the phase of immediacy, he Participant: The movement between the house and being tall. sees a divisittn comprehended by the same three-fold scheme of Heidegger: The Greeks, who according to Hegel think only of innnediacy—mediation—unity. He does not, thereby, apply an arbitrary substance, inoxEi[iEvov, have categories for this. scheme; rather, he thinks out of that which is for him the truth in the Participant: The movement can only come into view when yet sense of the ab.solute ceriainiy of the absolute spirit. Nevertheless, the another basis supervenes, the subject. classification of metaphysics and Greek thinking is not so easy for us, Heidegger: it is When said that the house is tall, what is not becau.se the question alxiui the deteimination off-reek thinking is some- thought therein? thing that we must first pui lo question and awaken as a question. Participant: The one who thinks. The question from ibe seminar Ijefbie last, conceiiiing what the I-lKiOEGCiER: Thus, what kind of thinking is that which simply views speculative means wilh Hegel, still remains unanswered. ino}tf[nFVov and not the subject? PAkTic:iPANr: Speculation for Hegel means the view [An\rliiiuung] Participant: I hesitate to say the overused words. of eternal iruih. Heidegger: In philosophy no word or concept is overused. We Heidegger: This answer is too general and sounds only approxi- 78 79 mate. With such academic questions, one has no recourse to an index, also reject the interpretation that thinks this phrase together with Fr. 89, but to the Encyclopedia. There the speculative is a determination of the in which it says that those who are awake have one common world, while logical. How many determinations are ihere and what are the remaining ihose who sleep turn each one to his own world. I do not understand tov ones? auTOV djidvTCJV as the same, that is, the one and common world of those Participant: In all there are three dimensions of the logical, which who are awake (xoivog x6o(i05) in opp<}sition to the private world (E6io; correspond to the three determinations already named, immediacy, x6o^u>5) of those who sleep. I interpret Sjiavxa in the .sense of id Jidvta. mediation, and unity. .Although djiavTEc; customarily refers to humans and living beings, Heidegger: Are the three deteiminations of the logical three 6JidvT(0V, just as much as Jidvrov, here means only that Heraclitus things side-by-side? Evidently not. The first moment, which corresponds speaks by reason of the flow of language, instead of from irdvttuv to immediacy, is the abstract. What does abstract mean with Hegel? 6n:dvTa>v. Participant: What is separated and isolated. HEiDEtiGER: But what then does Jidvta mean? Heidegger: Better: the thinking of one-sidedness, which only Fink; ndvxa form a Joining and come forth in the shining up of fire thinks one side. It is peculiar that the immediate should be the abstract, in their determination and character. while for us the immediate is rather the concrete. But Hegel calls the Heidegger: C;an't one also start from a plural, where xoohol are immediate abstract in so far as one looks at the side of givenness and not the many statesof an entire order of ndvTa?x6anovT6v6e would then be at the side of the I. The second moment of the logical is the dialectical, this one state in distinction to others. the third is the speculative. The Hegelian determination of the specula- Fink: But there is no passage in Heraclitus in which he speaks of tive will be significant for us, when we will be concerned at an important many xoonoi. part of the seminar with the apparent opposition of iDcginning with Heide(;ger: However, the xovfte marks a place at which a new Me0auv65 or with to \tf\ bv\6\ jiote jcu)c; fiv tlc; XdBoi. theme fjegins. On your interpretation, x6o|i05 is to be understood on- Now 1 still have a question for you, Mr. Fink, which concerns Fr. 30. tologically as much as ontically. Do I understand you correctly when you comprehend x6a|io; as identi- Fink: Heraclitus stands neither on the sideof ndvTanoron the .side cal with xa Jidvxa in your interpretation? of fire; rather, he takes up a curious position lietween them, Fink: xooiiog and id jrdvra are no! identical, but x6o|io5 does in- Heidegger: With that we can now return to Fr. 31. deed mean the jointed whole of id Jtdvra, the whole stamping, which is Fink: I attempt first to expose a thought that contains a proposal not fixed but moved. Heraclitus speaks of manifold ways of movement, for an interpretation of Fr. SI. In the last seminar we expressed our as in strife or war. doubt as to whether transformations or overturnings are meant with Heideciger: Does x6o^og then belong in the sequence of lightning, TQOJiai. If it is a questicm of transformations, then we think of the sun, and lire? d>.^o(ojOLC. of a basic substance. If we translate TQOJiai with overturnings, Fink: Not without further consideration. That could only be said if then—we could ask—do we mean the turning points in the way of the x6o|i05 were thought not as the order brought forth by fire, bui as the sun-fire in the firmament which measure time? ordering fire. If xoonog had the function of 6iaK6o[i>]aL5, then it would HEiDEGtiER: Is KUQog tgonai a frpnitiviLs subitrliis or a gfnilh'UA iibiec- also belong in the .sequence of basic words. lus (subjective genitive or objeclive genitive|? Heide(;gi-;r; In Fr. 30. xoojiov Tovfte is mentioned. If we hold that Fink: The tgoJiaC are asserted of fire. However, a difficulty lies in together wiih Mard tov VSyov t6v6E. then couldn't xoo^ov xovftt, corre- the fact that we have from ihe history of metaphysics familiar and com- sponding with ktyov T6v6e, mean the same as this xoovwig. which is still to mon ideas and developed and general ways of thought in which we are l)e treated, which is still to Ix- ihematized? always already moving, and from which we are also apt at (Irsi to inter- Fink: .\1xjvc all, the demonstrative T6v6f does not mean an indi- pret Fr. 3f. One such idea, already given to us from metaphysics, is the vidual this, not this x^onog, which is now as oppo.sed to other x6ohol. idea of an underlying substance that shows itself in many disguises. When it is said that the xoofjoc is broughl forih as ibe j<)iinecl oider, a Heide<:ger: jivqi):; is then genith'u^ obierlivus. x6ono5 ill the singula), which iK'longs to a pluiality of x6o|iOL, is not Fink: Grnitivus ohieclivii^ and \uliifclivii.\. Another .scheme pre.sents meant (hereby. Of this xoofio^ it is said: toy aOxov im&VTUiv [the same ilself to us from ancient speculation on the elements, in which one or for ail beings]. Wliellier this is Heraelilu.s' phiase, we leave aside now. another element is declared to Ix- ihe original element. Does TiVQ also Diels translates ajidvicov as "all living beings." I reject this translation. I have the f'unctiiiii of a basic element ihal converts itself thn>ugh thai . . 80 81 telligible to ourselves by starting out from the phenomenon of the break which emenates out of it? Two common schemes with which we could day, from the phentnnenonof dawnon the Ionian coast. At dawn, the attempt to interpret Jiiieck igojiai are the a>Aoi(«OL5 of an underlying of expanse of the sea flashes up out of the fire which breaks out from night substance and the emenation of an origiual t-lement. But 1 l>elicvc that drives out night; and opposite the sea there fiashesup the shore and we must entertain an extreme distrust of such conceptions. In the text it and land, and alwve the sea and land the zone of the vault of heaven which is says: ovfrtmnings of fire, first into sea. The fire turns itself over into sea, filled by the breath of fire. A deeper sense would lie in what is familiar to that is, into that which we understand as a power opposed to lire. /\t us as the break of day, if we do not now think the relationship of fire to first, we could suppose that it is a question of the sharp, ontic ()ppt>sition sea, earth, and breath of fire, namely the bringing- forth -to-appearance of fire and waler that is familiar to us. In the small domain of the human that is the basic event of fire, simply as the casting of light to and letting- environment, there is the phenomenon that water quenches fire and of that which is already determined thus and so, A deeper sense that fire can vaporize water. But such reciprocal contest and annihilation be-seen would lie in that which is familiar to us as the break of day, if we also do is only possible on the soil of earth. Clearly, the fragment does not refer understand bringing-forth in the sense of a building manufacture or to this small domain, but rather to the great domain of the wcjrid. Here not of a creative bringing-foith, but attempt to advance thoughtfully behind we have a view of fire in the heavens, the sea, and the earth—the sea that forms, ing-forth- to-appearance in the sen.se of girds the eaith. In the great domain of the world, the domain that the two expressive com technical creative achievement and casting of light. In order to win a presents itself to us in the view of the world, fire and water do not and sense the break of day, it would depend on avoiding the annihilate each other. deeper of scheme of technical bringing-forth in the sense of a material transforma- The view of the world [We/l-Anschauung] is not understood here tion and also the scheme of creative bringing- forth; and beside that, k ideologically; rather, it means the immediate view of the great relation- on taking away from the letting-shine-up in the light of ships of the heavenly stars, the sea that lies under them and the earth. would depend fire the basic trait of impotence. If we could succeed in thinking back When Heraclitus says that fire first turns itself over into sea, we suspend l>ehind the familiar schemata of making, bringing- forth, and casting the schemata of aXXottooLg and emanation, even though we are still not letting-tw-seen, then we could understand the break of day in a able to think what "turning over" means. The sea turns itself half into light or deeper sense. could then say that in the breaking of the world-day earth, half into breath of fire. Then we read that the earth is passed into We of the world area, sea, earth, and vault of heaven, sea and that earth dissolves in the measure in which sea was before, when the basic distinctions first forth to appearance. For this deeper thought we have an sea l)ecame earth. Nothing more is said in the fragment concerning come in the break of day. But nowhere do we have a whether and how the breath of fire turns further. With the breath of immediate phenomenon phenomenon corresponding to the return course of earth into sea. fire, the overturning is brought to a close. All that is spoken of is the Heidecger: would you translate TQOJtaf in your projection, turning of fire into sea and the sea's turning half into earth and half into How yourself call fantastic, but which is not at all so fantastic breath of fire, and finally of earth turning into sea. Fire turns itself over which you Ix-'cause it includes reference to immediate phenomena. into sea, this splits into earth and breath of fire, and half of the earth Fink: see the arising of fire, and in its arising the XQonai are the turns back into sea. Apparently a reciprocal exchange of water and We turnings of fire around toward that which shows itself in the fire shine. earth, of fiuidity and solidity, is mentioned. What is fitr us a familiar TQOJiai signify no material transformations . . distinction of opposites dissolves itself. No further turning and no re- I Heidegger: . . . and also no mere illumination. turning to fire is declared concerning the breath of fire. Ihe differences Fink: In announcement of the deeper sense of Jtttpo; TQonal, I was of sea, earth, and breath of fire are referred back to a common origin, to concentrating on a commonness, not known in ontic relationships, of a genesis which is posited step by step; but we still do not know the l>rin gin g- forth into visibility and letting-arise in the sense of tpiioig. That character of the genesis. If now we cannot apply the familiar scheme of is an attempt to avoid the scheme in which lire converts like an original dXXoitooi^, that is, the scheme of the original substance with its states and element over inU) other elements like water and earth. .And I attempt to modes and the scheme of emanation, then we get int<» a difficulty. How iliink this in a simile f>etween the arising of the articulated world in the then should we interpret the m^QOQ TQOJtOl? We must ask what Hera- light-shine of the world illuminating fire, and the regions of Jidvra lay- clitus has ihoughtfiilly experienced aiul taughi sighi nl. I aitempi ing themselves out. now—if you will—to give a fantastic meaning to mi(X)5 Tgojtat, which is Heide<;grr: You thus lake the phenomenon of dawn as the basis of thought as a possible answei- to the question of what Heraclitus has your interpretation . , tboughifully caught sight of. We could make the turning ol fire in- . 82 83 Fink: ... in order to avoid ihe phenomenon of transformation. that itself masks through its emanations. Rather, we will view the entire Heide(;ger: You mean thereby the dawn of the world and not of a range that binds fire, sea. earth, and breath of fire in connection with life specifit day, just as yon have in view the world-fire and not the sun. and death. Apparently, we reven to anthropological fragments in oppo- Fink: But in the sun, phenomenal we can think fire. sition to cosmological fragments. In [ruth.however.it is not a question of Heide(;ger: How should we think fire? In order to heighten the a restriction to human phenomena; rather, what pertains to being hu- difficulty, I refer to Fr. 54, in which the word Atpavfig [invisible] comes to such man, as life and death, becomes in a distinctive .sense the clue for the fore. The fire is invisible; it is the fire which does not appear. understanding of the entirety of the opposing lelatedness of ev and Kink: As have said at the wc outset: the fire is that which is not there jiavxa. in m jidvia. HEiDEtHitK; n you proceed from day to world-day. so we could think from the sun thither to fire. Fink: Nowhere do we find the sudden change of fire into sea as an ontic phenomenon. Participant: Io what is 6aXdooT|5 referred? Fink: To XQonai. For the turning over of sea into earth and breath of fire is a continuation of XQonai. Heide(;c;er: I propose that we bratkel Fr. 31. The difficulty we got into lies in this, that we have not spoken clearly enough alxjut jivq, which still we have to do. I understand neither the interpretation which is accompanied by chemical ideas nor can I follow through the attempted correspondence of day and world-day. For me, there is a hole here. Fink: The difficulty will perhaps clear itself up if we come to Fr. 76, in which fire, sea, and earth appear in repeated sequence. The most important thing there is the manner in which tqojiqC are characterized. What is named only as turning over in Fr. 31, is here spoken of as "to live the death of the oihei ." With that, ive meet a new, surprising thought. At first, it should sound noteworthy to us thai the dark formula of death, which first l>ecomcs clear to us in the domain of the living, is referred to such entities as neither live or die, like ivaler or earth. In the small domain of htnnan ambit, we know well the phenomenon that fire va- porizes water and water quenches fire. Here we can say that lire lives the destiTiction of water and water lives the desiiticiion of fire. HEiDt.cciEK: To live would mean here "to survive" . . Fink: ... to survive the passing of the other, to survive in the an- nihilation oi the other. Biil we have here only a poetic metaphor. In order to understand the tpojiii-chaiacter, we must gel away from the idea of a chemical change. .Starting from the life-death fraginenis, we must represent to ourselves what Heiaclitus thinks by life and death. From theie we can also iiTidei stand the a\Tanoi[iii, that is. ibe exchange of navxu. lor fiie and of lire foi- jravia. "Fhis is a relationship like that of gold and goods, in which connection it is more a matter of ligbi than the value oi g<)ld. We do nol understand the tuiiiing overof flie iiuo whai is not fite in the sense of a chemii.al Lliange oj in the sense of an (niginal substance that changes (dXXoiojotg) or in the sen.se of an original element . . 8 85 The predicament of finding a concept that does not refer to building, Intertwining of Life and Death creation or bare representation always presents itself with Husserl. In distinction to ancient philosophy, modern philosophy (Correlated Fragments: 76, 36, 77). does not think appearance so much from the issue of what is in the openness of a general Relation of Humans and Gods presencing, but rather as becoming an object and presenting itself for a (Correlated Fragments: 62, 67, 88). subject. In the general concept of appearance, nevertheless, self- presentatitm belongs to each entity. But each entity presents itself to everything that is, and, among others, to the entity that is characterized by cognition. Presentation, then, is a collision among what is, or a repre- us for many reasons: first, [be- sentation of what is by the one who represents. But what is cannot be Fink Fragnienl 31 remained closed to understood with the categories be a matter of dispute, on the one of attraction and repulsion. cause the plural XQonai proves itself to Heidegger: Another explaining representation the other, as a plurality of turns that manner of occurs hand as a technical le.m. and on reference to receptivity because of the resulting problem of in and spontaniety. happen in sequence; and second, the usual circle of ideas of Fink: Kant speaks of receptivity in reference to sensory data, and in whether the concept of turn can be though, in (AUoitooi;) or emanation of an a ceitain manner also in reference to the pure forms of intuition, space the transformation of an original stuff alien and time. Spontaniety is based on the categorical synthesis of tran- in its manifold appearances as original element that conceals itself the scendental apperception. that we must mobilize a mistrust of all forms 1 am of the opinion us from the conceptual Heidegger: Which moment do you see now in Husserl's doctrine usual schemes of thought that are familiar to Here, these are above all the two of constitution? tradition of metaphysical thinking. attempt to clarify Fr. 3 irom Fink: In hisconcept of constitution, Husserl means neither making schemes of oUolujol^ and emanation. The 1 Ionian coast falls short, m the charac- nor bare perception of things which are independent of consciousness. the phenomenon of dawn on the of the world regions of sea, Nevertheless, the positive characterization of the concept of constituion terization of the lelting-arise and shiiiing-up of thinkmg this neither as a remains difficult. When Husserl strove to think back behind the distinc- earth heaven, and breath of fire, of the task substance, nor as the emanation ot an tion of making and bare perception, this problem remained in the path real transformation of an original the technical or creative sense. of cognition, that is, in the relationship of the subject to an entity that is original element, nor as bringing-forth in already-existing entities by the light- already posited from the beginning. The prior question, however, is noras the impotent illumination of whether. . to go back Ixihind the distinction ot shine of fire. Perhaps it is necessary bringing-forth and of bare casting ol Heidegger: . . . objectivity necessarily belong.s . . actual manufacture and creative Fink: ... to the being of is, objectivity be- to think the shining-up of entities in an what or whether first light and illumination, if we wish fire comes a universal approach to what is in modern philosophy, with which lightning, of the sun. or of eternal living all encompassing shine of oi what another, more original approach is covered up. Heideggfr; You say that the coming-forth-to-appearance il- Heidegger: From this it follows once again that not inter- creative bringing-forth and also no bare we may is is no actual making, no lime ago referred to the pret Heraclitus from a later time. lumination. In this connection, you have some constitu- Fink: All the concepts that arise in the dispute over idealism and is hidden in Husserl's concept of fact that a similar predicament realism are insufficient to characterize the shining- forth, the coming- '°" HusseiTs phenomenology has forth-to-appearance. of what is. It seems to me more propitious to speak Fink- The problem of constitution in of of shining-forth than of shining-up. For we are easily led by the idea of subject/object-rcference. The perception [Gewohren] its place in the of being given is consti- shining-up into thinking as if what is already were, and were sub- of an object in ihe multiplicity of ways the unity sequently object. With the concept of con- illuminated. dXVi9ELa would then be only an eliciiation of what tuted in the interplay of aspects of the already is in light. is productive to avoid a complete realism and a However, the light, as ctXliBEia and fire, slitution Husserl attempts, to begin with, in a sense siill us. this "pro- perception is only a comprehen- unknown to We know only much, thai ihe idealism. Complete realism holds that independent of consciousness. clucitivity" {»( fire is neither a making noi' a generative bringing-forth nor according to consciousness of what is sion an that ihe subject makes things. ini[)otenl casting of lighi. ^s againsi this, complete idealism holds . . . 86 87 Heidegger: One could ihen say (hai coming- forth -to-appearanee is ers or whether there are shoemakers l>ecause there are shoes. To human neillier crealio [creation) nor iUuminatio [illumination] nor con- Dasein belong such things as are Ixjund up with Dasein's manner of stiltition . . being, and those are necessary things, .Alongside these, there are also Fink: . . . nor xtxvri as bringing forth. For texvij is the bringing- luxury items. Also the political orders, like stales, cities, settlements, laws, forth of a specific lorm out of the substratum of an available, though nol belong to what is. but also idols and ideals. This rough overview refers to manufactured, material . . a great many entities. We do not, however, know straight away how all Heidegger: ... in distinction . to crealio . . that we have mentioned coincides in its common feature of being which, Fink: . . . which brings-forth living creatures. We must thus bracket nevertheless, makes it different. But an ever more complete overview of out an entire catalog of current ways of thinking in order to not think all that is would never lead to uncovering ev with or alongside xd ndvra. coming-forth-to-appcarance in an inappropriate manner. But such a Rather, understanding hi in its unique character in distinction to xd procedure has only the character of a via negationis [way of negation], itdvra depends on a XQOJrl^ of our spirit. and does not lead a step nearer to an understanding of what the Heidegger: When we speak of id jrdvra, do we suppose id ovia shining.forlh of la navxa or ovia in the ev of fire, sun Ijoyoc, or means. from the start, or is there a distinction between the two? Heidegger: Coming-forth-to-appearance concerns a general ref- Fink: We think the being of what is in an inexplicit manner when erence . . we talk about xditdvra. If ihe being of what is is referred to explicitly, if Fink: ... the puzzling reference of l\ Jidvra. and This reference is xd Jtdvxa are designated as ovxa, then it can mean that they stand in the puzzling because the ev never occurs among xa jcdvra. la rtdvxa means horizon of queslionability, whether they are actual or supposed entities. all of what is. But what kind is of allness that? We know relative, specific Images, for example, which are perceived by zlxaaia [apprehension of allness like that of genus and species. For example, we think an allness of or by phantasms], are also entities, hut they are nol that which they species in the concept "all living things," za Jiavra. however, form no represent. Among things, there are gradesof being of what is. There are relative allness, but rather the allness of everything which is. Yet ev does possibilities of the appearance of things which exhibit themselves as not fall under the allness of la Jidvra. Rather, the other way around, xa other than what they are, without this appearance having to be seen as ndvia are housed in hj, but not as you have once said in — a lecture—like subjective deception. Reflection on water, for example, is such a phe- potatoes in a sack, but rather in the sense of what is in being. nomenon of appearance. But it is not easy to describe the manner of Heidegger: We must ask still more closely about xit ndvxa and being of the reflection on water. If xd ndvxa are designated as ovxa. thai fivta. How should we interpret 6vTa? What are xd Jidvra? can mean, on the one hand, that they have proved their quality of actual Fink: For one thing, we could make the attempt to enumerate being, and on the other hand it can mean that the beingof what is should whatever there is. is, What for instance, is not just nature and her things. be expressly named. We could begin an enumeration with the elements: sea, earth, heaven, Heidegger: It seems to me that still another question conceals itself Heidegger: The gods belong to is. what behind this one. Are Jidvxa xd Jidvxa in so far as they are dvia, or are Fink: But with that, you already refer to what is and is unphenom- 6vTa 6vxa in so far as they are xd Jtdvxa? enal. At first, let us stay with what is phenomenal. After the elements, we Fink: A decisive question is now raised, in which two ways of could name the things made up out of them. But there are not only philosophical thinking are indicated. When we think ovxa from out of xd things of nature. Rather, there are also artificial things that we do not Jtdvxa, we move into an explicit relation to the world, but without al- come across in nature and for which is there no pattern in nature. A ready thinking of the world. Bui if we understand xd Jidvxa from out of human shares in bringing- forth. A human begets a human, says Aristo- <)vxa, we move in an understanding of being and think toward its whole- tle. Thai means that he has a part in the creative power of nature. Beside ness. Two possible points of departure for thinking have revealed them- that, a human brings forth artificial objects. It is an open pioblem selves to us. whether the Aristotelian analysis of the things manufactured in xe^vt), Heidegger: You touched on the problem of the reflection in water with the help of the scheme of the four causes, is a sufficient determina- and the appearance connected with it. Another problem about which I tion of the artifact. Il is questionable whether artificial things have a am still not clear is the perception of the sun.set and the Copernican randoni which the whokj to_ which we always already implicitly comport our- Fink: Perception of the sunset is the right of the naively encoun- selves, suddenly flashes up. tered world as against the scientillc interpretation of the world. Through Heide(;ger: Thereby we turn our questi«ming to the reference of cultivation and indirect knowledge, a human can come to the point EV and its many forms, and to its inner reference to xa n&vza. It is always where he no longer sees what lies l«:iore his eyes, lo the point, for a difficulty for me that loo little is said about xa ndvxa in the text of instance, where he no longer sees the sunset as that which displays itselt Heraclitus. We are forced to supplement what we do not learn about xii immediately to his view, but displays itself only in the manner seen in jidvia from Heraclitus with what we know about the Greek world, and scieniific explanation. perhaps we let id Jidvxa lie expressed by the poets. Heidegger: The truth of the immediate experience of the world Fink: I said that we still do not have the possibility of declaring what disap]}ears by reason of the scientific interpretation ot the world. the coming-forth-io-appearance of to navxa is in the always living fire. Fink: In earlier times, two hundred years ago for instance, life was that In order to investigate this problem further, we cite Fr. 76, which ap- still centered in the nearby region. Information about life at time pears lo be one of the least certain fragments. 'Fhere are more versions came out of the neighboring world. That has fundamentally changed of it in which a turning (xpojiti) is thought. The Greek text handed down today in the age of world wide transmission of news. Hans Freyer, in his by Maximus Tyrius runs: !;t| jivq tov yfi^ BAvaxov Kai dtje ^r| xov Jtvpog book Theorie des gegenwdrtigen Zeilallen, describes the technical world as eAvaxov, ^t| xov d£QOC, Bdvaxov, yfj tov C6axog. Diels translates: an environment of surrogates.^'' For him, scientific knowledge of (he ^36(00 "Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives environment is a surrogate. I regard this description as an inappropriate the death of air, and the earth that of water (?)." view, because in the meantime technological things have become a new What is surprising in the fragment is that the turning of earth into fire source of human experience. Today a human exists in the omnipresence is is mentioned in the formula: to live the death of something else. What of complete global information. The world is no longer divided into disconcerting is not so much the talk of arising and birth, but rather the neighboring zones, distant and more distant zones; rather, the world pronouncement that fire lives the death of earth, air lives the death of that was once thus divided today becomes covered over by technology fire, water lives the death of air, and earth lives the death of water. The that, through its skilled intelligence service, makes it possible to live in most important thing seems to me to be that the annihilation of what the omnipresence of all information. precedes is the birth and arising of what follows. What follows comes Heidegger: It is difficult to comprehend how the world, divided forth in that it lives the death of what precedes. The fall of what pre- into near and distant zones, gets covered over by the technological envi- cedes appears to be the way on which the new and other comes forth. It ronment. For me, there is a breach here. is is not. thereby, a question of a superiority of annihilation over what Fink: To a certain extent, modern man lives schizophrenically. arising. That is of significance, l^ecause later when we consider in greater Heidegger: If we only knew what this schizophrenia meant. But detail the formula, "to live the death of something other," we will not lie what we have said up to now is sufficient to see that we are not talking able to say that it is a matter of a circular argument. For life turns into about out of the way matters. "Fhe problem for us is the reference of Sv death, but death does noi turn into life. and Jiavxa. Fmm where do we experience this reference, from Jtcivta or life what In Fr. 76, it says that the death of what precedes is the of from ?v or from the to and fro in the Hegelian sense? How would you follows. An amendment that Tocco (Sludi llal. IV 5) has made in the answer this problem with reference to Heraclitus? relation- lext, which is handed down by Maximus and which makes the Fink: The beginning of our interpretation of Heraclitus by way of ship ambiguous, runs: Fire lives the death of air and air lives the death of lightning was supjxjsed to indicate that there is the basic experience of of water. Here experi- fii-e. Water lives the death of earth, earth lives the death the outbreak of the whole. In the everyday manner of life, this the conneclions of fire and air and water and earth are posited as mutual interested in such experience. ence is hidden. In evei^day life we are not relations. In the comments of Diels-Kranz we read that d.r\Q [air| is pre- In everyday living we do not expressly comport ourselves toward the sumably smuggled in by the stoics. The following is given as a further whole, and also not when we knowingly penetrate into the distant Milky water lives the death of explicit that variant from this: Fire leaves the death of water, Way. liut a human has the possibility of letting Ixftome earth, earth lives the death of water. We have no relationship always already fire or the dealh of iniplit it relationship to the whole as which he familiar phenomena of a change over of elements. When sea and earth exists. He exists essentially as a relationship to being, to the whole. For are talked alx)Ut, ii is a matter of elements on a large scale, a matter of tlie njosi pari, however, this relationship stagnates. In the sea is also meant. In Fr. 76, a revolution of fire, air, water, and earth dedvatOL, IS Comeg tov ^xeivov Odvatov, tov perhaps mentioned. The overtumings mentioned here cannot quite 6f fxELvan- piov TEevEWtec. Diels translates: 'Immortal: mortal, mortal: be iollowed through by us. immortal, for the life of these is the death of those, and the life " in this connection, we look at Fr. 36: ajju/rioi-v Odvaiog vb saying that life lives, that death That ( 94 95 are the same; death. Is being dead a manner of ijeing? An act is mentioned in ^covxEq: young and old are the same. Heraclilus declares the same- living the death of those. That corresponds to (he formula of Fr, 76: hire ness of what seems to be different. How is xavrd [the same] to be under- lives the death of earth. st(x)d here? Heidegger: In order to clarify TESvEtoTE^, understood in the active Heidegger; We could understand it as "belonging together." sense, we are reminded of Rilkes phrase, "to achieve death." But the Fink: Indeed, each pair, living and dying, waking and sleeping. question is whether Te9vt:(i)tE5 refers to an active dying in the present or young and old. Ijelongs together. But how do living and dying, for to Ijeing dead (finished) in the perfect. example, Ijelong together in a "same"? Heidegger: In Fink: Dying in the present is the end phase of life. What is ques- reference to what is same. tionable is Fink: If Ijeing alive and being are the same, who or what lives or dies. In the phrase diOavatoi 6vTiTOt it is dead then they form a .sameness that hides not decided whether dedvaioi is a predicative determination of 6viitol itself. The di.siinctness of life and death becomes clear for the or, conversely, whether SviiToi is a predicative determination of dedvaToi. most part when they are posited as analogous to the former At first, the immortals and the mortals are confronted with one another two relationships. Sleeping and waking, as well as l>eing young and being old are familiar differences and tied up with one another. . to us, which are referred to the course of of . time lives. Heideggkh: . . and after that follows the illustration. our Waking and sleeping are alternating states in the Fink: The phrase dedvaxoi GvriToi is no enumeration. For in that course of time, being young and being old are two distinctive phases in case, the reverse formulation would not tie possible. We see that the the course of time of our lives. Against that, life and death is a relation- ship of the entire lifetime immortals and the mortals stand in a relation. The concept of the gods is to something that overshadows it but that does untouched by death and nevertheless we conjecture a relationship to not occur in the lifetime. Is death. For it is said: while they live the death of those. To what does this the saying of the thinker Heraclitus a slap in the face to the current that in.sists phrase refer? Wh;it is the subject of ^covtE?? Is it the immortals or the opinion on the distinctness of life and death as well as on the difference between waking mortals? And what is the subject of teOvEOiTEg? The gods live the death of and sleep, being young and being old? Is it a humans. The gods are spectators and witnesses who accept the death of matter of directing the thrust of his thinking against the trend toward a humans as offerings. world that is divided up in differences, and doing so with respect to a Heidegger: And humans die the life of the gods. sameness? This would not mean that phenomena would loose their dis* tinctions; Fink: I^t us also include Fr. 88: Tamo i evl t,a)v xai xEevrixog xal rather, it would mean that they are tqiixo in relation to h/. Heraclitus says that (tb) ^QTiyogo; Mui xaefOftov xai veov nal Y'lyoiov- itifte yag being alive— lieing dead, waking—sleeping, and pETCUiEOovra EXEivd iaxi xcotEiva jtoi^iv ^Exajieoovta lauTa, Diels trans- Ix'ing young—being old, are the same. He does not .say, as Dieis-Kranz translate and therewith lates: "And it is always one and the same, what dwells (?) within us: living interpret: "the same which dwells in us." i\\dv [us] is to evt and dead and waking and sleeping and young and old. For this is added [within] by Diels. It is precisely questionable whether we the changed over to that and that changes back over to this." When Hera- are place of the samenessof great oppositions of life and death or whether the place clitus says xaixo i ivi t, 96 9 KaX6v), then do we mean what is just or l>eiiig just, what is beautiful or Immortal: Mortal (Fragment 62). being beautiful? Iv TO aocpov (Correlated Fragments: 32, 90). Heidegger: Your interpretation thus goes in the direction not of understanding the three distinttions as three cases of a species, but rather in the direction of classifying the three distinctions in reference to the phenomenon of time . . constructing an analogical relationship. Fink: Mr. Heidegger cannot come today since he is prevented by an Fink: . . . and thus toward are con- important trip. He asks us. however, to continue explication of the text, Here it is not a question of fixed distinctions. Nevertheless, we cerned with differences that form distinctions. Being alive and being so that we make some further progress in oui' interpretation of the dead do not stand in a gradual relationship to one another, because fragments. By means of the summary, he will inform himself about the being dead does not allow of degrees. As against thai, we are accustomed progress of this session in order then to express an opinion. to intensifying being alive, and to distinguishing inert and high forms of I^t us bring to mind the way of thought, Ijetter. the gist of open life-performance. Waking and sleep, however, turn almost unnoticeably questionabilities, that has led us in the last session. We started out from into one another. Life and death do not form an opposition like beauti- the problem of the transformationsof fire with the question whether the ful and ugly, nor is their distinction one of degree. The nature of their change oJ an original stuff is thereby thought, or whether a relatedness being different is the problem. As soon as we attempt to be clear about of ev and jrdvra is aimed at. Finally, we arrived in Fr. 76 al the dark the all-loo-familiar dialectical interpenetralion the questionable charac- formula, difficult to comprehend, that something lives the death of ter of the text disappears. If we start from the fact that each analogy is a another. This formula is then used in Fr. 62 as a mark of the relationship likeness of what is unlike, then we could say that sleeping and waking, as of immortals to mortals, or mortals to immortals. Is it only a matter here well as being old and being young, relate in a certain sense to being dead of another domain for the employment of the problematic formula, "to live the death of something"? Is the formula also meant here in the and being alive. Perhaps it is a comparison all too full of hope, neverthe- fundamental breadth, as we have learned it in Fr. 76 in the relationship less, when we call sleep the brother of death and when we regard sleep as an in-between phenomenon. Also, regarding the question about the of the elements, fire, air, water, and earth? Is it a matter of cosmo logical references, cosmological sense of the fomula, "to live the death of something," the tying together or of counterreferences in so far as the for- mula is here applied to things that stand open in a special manner to the of life and death is the strange thing in the transitive use of "to live." It is whole, is, Is the above a matter of interpretation whether the current model can also be that to gods and humans? mentioned formula applied; so that we not only say that death lives, but also that life dies. applied here to cosmological living beings? Perhaps that happens, be- cause mortal is We came to no result, and perhaps we will come to no final result at all. the reiartonship of immortal to analogous to the refer- ence of fev in the f<»rm of lightning, of sun, and of fire, to the Jtdvra. Is Bui the all too familiar explication of TQOTtf] has wandered into the foreignncss and darkness of the formula, "to live the death of some- the fundamental relatedness, ever disconcerting to us, of Iv and jiavxa rather thing." We could perhaps think the relationship of fire to earth, to air, sayable from out of its reflection? Is the world-relatedness of £v with reference and rtdvTO rather sayable from out of the relationship of gods and hu- and t<» water rather in reference to life and death, so that, mans understand l>eing? With this, the path of our problem situa- to the difficult relationship of tension of life and death, we could come to who tion is fhst of all indicated. I^t us attempt clarify the .structure of a certain anthropological key for the nonanthropo logical foundational now to Fr. relatcdness of £v and noyxa. 62. For we cannot say that its structure has liecome clear and distinct at this point. I'he Iraginetit tuns: 68uvtiToi flvi]Toi. 6vT|tol dflcivoTOi, ^u)vtec tov ^xsivarv 66vaTov, tov fte fxEivtov [iiov xeOvEmEg. We could translate, "Immortal: mortal, mortal: immonal," Diels ihei'eby brings immortals into a relationship to mortals and mortals into a reference to innnortals. Ill addition, this lelationship is explained by the dark problem-formula thai Diels translates as follows: "for the life of these is the fleath ()f those, and the life of those is the death of these. "This translation apjxfars to me 98 99 opposite extreme perhaps in an analogy to the relatedness of Ev and to lie too free. For ii does say: ^(ovte^ tov i-neivtiyv Bavaiov. tov be — EXEivov jitov TE6vEd>Te5, "in that they live the death of those and in that ndvTa. is whether, with the admission of the they die the life of those." If we interpiel lifldvaTOL in the familiar sense The question which leads us relationship of immortals to mortals, more than just an anthropological as gods and 9vhto£ as humans, then it is a matter of" an interpretive step fire, the sun, the lightning, as special that we cannot assert with unconditioned certainty. To l>e sure, the im- clue is found for indicating how the ndvta. There is not ev and to mortals are the gods in (Jrecit myth. But there are also intermediate forms of ev, comport themselves toward another. not lie on the same plane, do not lie beings, the heroes, who are born as mortal, half gods, and are elevated to itdvia next to one They do sort, but they are unique in their l>ecome immortals. Is the milieu of immortals and mortals familiar with on a comparable plane of the usual relatedness can l>e indicated with no known relation- reliability and certainty? The problem is what is indicated by dOdvatoi. relatedness. Their it is not already thought when we think to and BvTitoi. But first we take up the mythological meaning, and com- ship, hi is not among navxa; everything that is at all. prehend the immortals as the gods and the mortals as humans. jiavra strictly and include in this quintessence ourselves Jidvxa as quintessence, it is not inclusive of The gods are also characterized in Fr. 62 from out of death. True, When we think xa manner, familiar immortals are indeed removed from death. They are not delivered over h/. It remains separated from to Jidvia, but not in the us. separated by spatial and temporal boarders or by belong- to death, but they stand open to it. As immortals they must know them- to of being separation are inappli- selves as the ones who win their self-understanding in the negation of ing to another kind of species. All usual kinds of Jidvia. But at the same dying. They know themselves as the beings who are open to death, but cable to the fundamental relatedness of ev and belonging-together of ev and who do not encounter death, the beings who observe the death of hu- time we must also say that the unique seen in the mans, and the lieings who come to know their own permanence in the Kdvta, the intertwining of what is separated, must also be tightened sight of the pas.sing away of transient humans. The mortals are humans unique separation of hi and xd itdvta. §v and xd Jtdvia are who know that they are delivered over to death in reference alone to the together in their intertwining. with manifold of similies; for example, as in gods who always are and are removed from death. Bvrixot is not some Up to now we have met a in of the lightning flash and objective designation which is spoken from an extra-human point of the night, things shine up the light-shine their relief, in an original sense, the entirety of things tomes view; it points, rather, to the self-understanding of humans in under- show so light-shine h/, thought standing that they are delivered over to death, in so far as they know forth to appearance in the outbreaking of as in sunlight shine in their themselves as morituri [those about to die]. Humans know themselves as lightning. Or again: as the things that stand up sun, so the entirety of inner-worldly things transient in view of and in reference to the everlasting gods who are imprint in the light of the sunlight. Here, things removed from death. With immortals and mortals the greatest inner- comes forth to appearance in the ev thought as do side with the sunlight, but the sunlight surrounds worldly distance is named between innerworldly beings, the taut bow not come forth side by stretching between gods and humans who, however, are nevertheless the things and is thus .separated from them and at the same time bound light. Just so, there is also an referred to one another in their self-understanding and understanding with them in the manner of an including not side by side with the light of shining- of being. Mortals know their own disappearing being in view of and in entirety of the many xd ndvxa, entirety of Jtdvra reference to the everlasting being of the gods; and the gods win their forth; rather, the light of shining-forth envelops (he it "Ixiund" with it in a manner difficult to perpetual being in contrast and in confrontation with humans who are and is "separated" from and could probably best clarify for ourselves in com- constantly disappearing in time. The distinction of immortals and comprehend, which we pari.son with the all-embracing light. Are immortals and mortals now mortals is characterized from out of death. But this distinction is not one also referred to each other like ev and xd Jldvxa with their greatest like the distinction l>ctween life and death itself. For, in iheir self- immortals as those who know understanding, the immortals and the mortals live and comport them- separation? Thereby we understand the of the temporal [x;r- selves toward the being of the other. The relationship of the gods to their own |)eipetual being only on the backgroiuid ishing of humans. An to themselves and to everything around them. Thus we under- appears to be self-coiuradictory. But one does not go especially (ar off humans live of and "to die the life of the gods" as a base with a paradoxical concept ol immortal mortals and mortal im- stand "to the death humans" the self-understanding and mortals. The gods live iho death of mortal humans. reciprocal, intertwining relationship of iniderstanding of lieing of gods and humans. The gods live the death of Does that mean that the life ol the gods is the slaying of humans? And in the sense that they could only understand themselves as on the other side, do humans die the life of the gods? Neither could we humans immortals in their perpetual lx;ing against the background of what is connect any correct sense with this rendition. I would, therefore, rathei' transient. They are only perpetual when, at the same time, they are believe that the following .suggests itself. The gods live in comparing referred to the sphere of change in time. themselves with mortal humans who experience death. They live the According to Fr. gods and humans behave precisely not as in death of mortals in that, in their self-understanding and their under- 62, Holderlin's poem, "Hyperion's Song of Fate." "You walk above in the standing of l>eing, they hold themselves over against the transience of soft floor, blessed geniil / Radiant the gods' humans and the all-too-Hnite manner in which humans understand what light, / Weightless tread a mild breezes / Gently play on you / As the girl artist's fingers / On holy is. But it is more difficult if we a.sk ourselves how we should translate Tov strings. — Fateless the Heavenly breathe / Like an unweaned infant 6e EXEivtov piov TE0VEU)Te5 [in that they die the life of those]. Could we set / Chastely preserved / In modest bud / For ever their minds / Are TcBvewTE^ [they, having died] parallel to ^cuvre; [those living]? But the asleep; flower/ their blissful eyes / Eternally tranquil gaze,/ Eternally question is whether the perfect participle has the meaning ol the perfect in And clear. — But we are fated / to find no foothold, no rest, / And suffering or whether it is to lie translated as in the present participial form like / Dwindle and fall/ Headlong from one /Hour to the next,/ dnoOvfiOKOVTEg [those who are dying]. This question can only be decided mortals Hurled like water / From ledge to ledge / Downward for years to the by the philologists. The life of the immortals is the death of mortals. The vague abyss."^* Here the domain of the gods and the domain of humans gods live the death of the mortals, and the mortals die the life of the gods are separated like two spheres that do not intertwine with each other, but or become atrophied in reference to the life of the gods. We also use the lie opposite one another without mutual reference. High above in the phrase: to die a death, to live a life. In Pr. 62, however, it says: to live the light, the gods wander without destiny, their spirit eternally in bloom, death of the other, to die the life of the other. If we wish to make clear to while lead a restless life and fall into the cataract of time and ourselves what it means that the gods live the death of humans, we could humans disappear. The way in which Holderlin here views the eternal life of the at first reject the radical interpretation according to which the gods gods indicates that the view of mortals does not necessarily belong to the would be cannibalistic beings. They do not live the death of humans in of the gods. But if gods and humans do not form two the sense that they devour them. For they do not need humans as food self-understanding domains, but rather form two domains turned toward each nor, in the final analysis, do they need the offerings and prayers of separated other, then we could apply the intertwining relationship to the begin- humans. Bui what then does the formula mean: the gods live the death ning of Fr. 62, which ties mortals and immortals together with each of humans. I am able to connect only one sense with this sentence. I say other in a hard manner. that the gods understand themselves in their own everlasting being in Pari icipant: The tying together of the gods' perpetual l>eing and express reference to mortal humans. The constant being of the gods the of wandering in time has its analogy in (loethe's signifies a persistence in view of humans' being constantly delivered over being humans thought of perdurance in o.scillation [Dauer im Wecfuel]. to time. In this manner the gods live the death of humans. .And in the Fink: There is, however, a perdurance as constancy in time. Kant, same way I am able to connect only one sense with the sentence which for example, thought the continuation of the world stuff in roughly this says that humans die the life of the gods, or that they atrophy in refer- manner. ence to the life of the gods; namely, it is thereby said that humans, by thought of perdurance in osiillaiion does understanding themselves as the ones who most disappear, always com- P.^hiicip.'^nt: (loeihe's not constancy in time, hut goes in the direction of Heraclitus' port themselves toward the permanence that the life of the gods appears mean to us to be. thoughts. Fink: Still, would first have to know to which passage of Humans die as the transient ones not only in so far as they stand in we there is also perdurance that stands throughout association with transients. They are not only the ones who most disap- CK»ethe"s you refer. For oscillation Hke, for example, the world stuff of Kant, which does not pear in the realm of what disappears, fnu rather they are at the same into being, but only appears as different. Thus, time underslandingly open to the |)ernianence <)f the gods. A funda- itself pass away or come however, think the relationship lx;tween substance and its atii ibutes. mental reference to that which never perishes belongs to the relation of we 102 103 Participant; For Goeihe, perdurance consiitutes itself first and identified with £v and itdvia, but that they represent symbolically the foremost in osciliation. relatedness of &v and Jidvta. Immortal and moital are not themselves Fink: That is also true in regard to substantial perdurance. But cosmic moments that are separated and at the same lime embraced like Heraclitus means precisely not that something endures in temporal i'v and itdvxa. Rather both are cosmological beings who understand the changing. For then we would have only the relationship of an original whole, the gods from above and humans from below. If we want to speak stuff to its forms of appearance- But that was precisely the question, here of an analogy, we must Ix- clear thai it is always thoroughly a matter whether the relationship of fire, sea, and eaiih is the relationship of a of similarity by means of unsimilarily, whereby the unsimilarity is always perduring original stuff (fire) in the oscillations of its conditions or ap- greater. Talk about humans as imago dei [image of God] does not mean pearances as alien forms, or whether it is a matter of quite another that a human is a mirror image of the Godhead and similar to the unique distinction. All inner-worldly entities the structure have of rela- Godhead like a mirror image to the original image. A human is an image tively perduring substances with changing conditions, or they belong to a of God through the infinity of distance. We have no language for the unique substance as the continuous substrate that goes on and neither purpose of addressing the relatedness of ^ Id Tct ^vta. The hi lights up pa.s,ses away nor comes into being. If we apply this scheme of thought for to us only in lightning, in sun, in the seasons, in fire. Fire, however, is not the turning over of fire, then lire behaves toward sea and earth no the phenomenal, but the unphenomenal fire, in the shine of which td differently than an original its stuff to many forms of appearance. How- jtdvxa come forth to appearance. ever, have sought after another we relationship of fire to sea and earth Because we have no language to characterize the fundamental re- that pertains to the relatedness of N and ndvxa. The relationship of latedness of ^v and Jidvia, and because we wish to keep Jtvpo^ iQonai immortal gods and mortal humans takes on an analogous representation away from the traditional blunt schemes of thought, according to which for this relatedness of b/ and n&vza. Thereby, we think gods and hu- an always extant original stuff changes its conditions or disguises itself in mans not only in reference to the opposition of power fragility, and but its forms of appearance, we have started out from Fr. 76, in which the such thai gods and humans, in order lo know their own being, have to fundamental relatedness of ^ and Jidvia is addressed in the formula, know one another, if ?v is ?v to ooq)6v [the one, which alone is wise], it "to live the death of another." From there, we turned to Fr. 62 in which can only know itself in its highest opposition to xa Jidvia and at the same the formula, "to live the death" and "to die the life" is said, not of fire, time also as that which steers and guides id ntivxa. With this, we view a air, water, and earth, but of immortals and mortals. Application of that relatedness not of the kind in which a supertemporal sphere of entities formula to gods and humans appears at first lo stand closer to our realtes itself to a temporal sphere of things. It is a not matter of a human power of comprehension. The transition from Fr. 76 to Fr. 62 is two-world doctrine of Platonic kind, but rather of a theory of the world, no narrowing of a general cosmological reference to an anthrop logical- of the unity of the §v and of the individual things found in the passage of theological relationship. Ihe anthropological-theological relationship is time. When Goethe speaks of peidurance in oscillation, he means, no reference of two kinds of beings, but rather the relationship of how perhaps, the constancy of nature over against the ap[>earances of nature. the two different kinds of beings understand themselves and that which But he thereby finds himself in the neighborhood of the thought of an is. The gods understand their own perpetual Ixiing in reference to the original stuff death of humans. If the gods did not have before them the fall of Participant: I cannot associate myself with this conception. I am humans and JidvTa into time, could they live their life, which is never of the opinion (hat Goethe's thought of perdurance in oscillation comes broken off, in blissful self-indulgence, and could they become aware of into the neighlxjrhood of youi- interpietation of Heraclitus. their divinity? C^ould cv, which is represented by the immortals, be by Fink: In Fr. 30, ilv is mentioned as jiOq dcL^awv, which is an im- itself without the view of Jtdvxa; could Jidvia, which are represented by mortal fire. The imnioital are gods the analogical keepers of the im- mortals and their understanding of l>eing, be without knowing of the nioital fire. In Fr. 100 it says: (ItQat; at Jidvxa qitoouoi [the seasons which endlessness {>f jiOg dEi^ujov? I would like to repeal again that the rela- bring all things]. Accordingly, is K&VTa. which brought forih by the tionship of immortals lo mortals is nm to lie equated with that of tv and sea,sons, is ihcrefore not perpetual, bni siMiiething thai abides in time. JidvTCi. I was only concerned to point out that one can find an index to From iheie, tv behaves toward t« Jidvia as nvQ iult,(x>ov or—since Pro- the relatedness of ev and Jtdvxa in the intertwining relati<)nshLp of gods fessor Heidegger is not present today, we could dare say—as lx;ing itself, and humans in their self-knowledge an speak of gv. All distintiions fall away in the god. Thereby, not only ' a reference, i.e., "to live the death of the other" and "to die the life of sublimity the living Iseings of god vis-ii-vis the other is expressed, but that another," to think toward the relationship of gods and humans, CkkIs do which Heraclitus l>c says al>oui the god must thought from the peculiar not live the death of humans in the sense that a slaying of humans analogous relationship god to ev to oocpov. of the Ijelongs to their life. We interpret "to live the death of mortals" as a life In Fr. following: oocpov 32, Heraclitus says the h/ to noijvov Aiyeoeai of the gods in sight of the Ijeingof living lieings who understand being in oi>K eQ^^EL )tai iOtXei Zt|v65 6vo|ia. "The one, which alone is wise, is not a finite, temporal manner. In sight of humans who are delivered over to willing and yet willing to be called by the name Zeus." In a certain death and who are not sheltered by perjielual Ijeing, the gods under- manner could think ^v in Zeus, if the surrounding ^v of the whole is we stand their dei Efvai [to be always] and arc, as it were, the hvq d^l^CX)v, also represented Zeus as the highest innerworldly being. It is by impor- even if they are never qei in the strict scn.se like nvQ dei^ojov is. Against tant, therefore, that Heraclitus says otjx ^9eA^i [is not willing] first and this, humans die the life of the gods. In understanding of the perpetual then SG^Xei [is willing]. Only after the negation can a certain analogical l>eingof the gods, they are not allowed thereby to partake of it. Humans correspondence be said of ilie god and ^v. win no share of the perpetual being of the immortals, but they under- Participant: In order to carry out your interpretation of %v, one stand themselves and their disappearance in reference to the fact that must understand £v in a two-fold meaning. On one hand, ?v is in opposi- the gods are not delivered over to death. I attempt to give one sense to tion to xa TC&vxa, and on the other, ^ is as the unity of opposites of Ev the formulas, "to live the death of mortals" and "to die the life of im- posit and Jidvta. One cannot the opposition between ev and Jiavia with- mortals," in which I interpret them as the intertwining of the self- out presupposing a bridging unity between them. Perhaps I can clarify understanding and understanding of being of gods and humans. This myself by a reference to Schelling. Schelling says that the absolute is not intertwining relationship represents the counter reference of Ev, the the unity, but the unity unity opposition. it only of and of Thereby is always living fire, and the temporally finite lieing of Jidvxa in general meant that behind each opposition stands a bridging unity, if we wish to which are brought forth by the seasons. The immortal gods are the avoid a two-world doctrine, then b^ stands not only in opposition to xd refiection, the innerworldly representations, of the always living fire as a Ji(ivxa, but we must think gv at the time as bridging unity. same form of ev. In this interpretation, I see a possibility of understanding Fink: Ev is the unity within which there first is the entirety of Ji(ivxa how the gods live the death of humans. They live the death of humans i in their manifold oppositions. You argue formally with the scheme ofcon- not in the sense of an encounter; rather, they are referred to the death'y^ from is cepts German idealism, that the absolute the identity of identity of humans in the encounter of their own perpetual fjeing. nonidcntity. relationship and This can be developed in other fashions. In the first and second versions of "Mnemosyne," Holderiin says: "For Thereby, we do not, however, come into the dimension of Heraclitus. ^3»t the heavenly ones are unable / To do everything. Namely, the mortals / ] Ev and jiiivTa form a unique distinction. It is better if we speak Reach the abyss. Thus, the echo returns / With them. I-(mg is / the time, - here of distinction and not of opposition. think all Otherwise, we too but / What is true happens." That means that the gods, those who do not easily of the usual oppositions like warm-cold, male-female, and so stand in need, nevertheless need one thing, namely mortals who pass on, and thus of reversible and irreversible oppositions. One could proj- further into the aljyss. We have a simile of ^v to the Jtdvia, which are logic ect here an entire of oppositions. Our question is directed toward ccmstantly driven a!x)ut in time, in that we see how the gods cannot, in Ev. We came onto its trace in departure from lightning. In the view of iheir perpetuity, self-suffK iently enjoy their infinity, and how they are in natural science, lightning is nothing other than a specific electrical ap- need of the counter reference to mortals. We have a simile of Ev and pearance. But Heraclitus thinks the nonphenomenal rising of the en- Jtdvxa in that we see how humans, driven atx>ut in time, are in need of tirety of Jidvxa in it. Although we have uncovered more nuances of the the counter reference to peqietiial gods for the sake of knowledge of ev-jiavxa relatedness in going through various fragments, we still cannot their own finitude. Humans and gods have the commonality that they comprehend this lelatedness completely. .After we have learned about are not only entities in the world, but thai they live in the manner of the EV in the form of lighliiing, lightning lx)lt, sun, and seasons, we also understanding relationships to lieing. Humans understand tieing in a met with the determination of ev as fire. Since we did not want to com- finite way, the gods in infinite manner. The gods exceed humans not prehend Jiugi)5 xeoJtal in a blunt physiological .sense, we had Co search only in force generally, but in the power of their understanding of what for mother comprehension. is. The Jidv is mortal innuorial. The Jiav is, however, no coincide/ilia Ill It. 7(), we learned for the flist lime the formula, "to live the death ojiposilorum. no night in which all oppositions are obliterated, to Jtdv is of something." In Fr. 62, we found the formula again as the relationship the word in which Ev and Jidvta are comprehended together. We can of immortals to mortals. We attempted with this formula of counter- apply paradoxical phrases to it alone. / 107 106 "^ and goods in their relationship of exchange will ultimately fail. Never- We turn now to Fr. 90: iri'Qoc if avTanoijlT] la JidvTa xai jiuq dndvicov theless, the relatedness of nvq deCCtiwv (fv) and Tidvxa receives a direc- OKUionEQ XQUOou ^"^i /qthacixiuv XQ^oog. Diels translates: "Al- xO'ih'**'^" tion through the failure of that simile. ternating change: o( everything for fire and fire for everything, like If one thinks here of the emjiwewOLS-doc trine, then one must charac- goods for gold and gold for goods." We appear to interrupt the line of terize ihe relationship of transposition as follows: in place of Jidvxa, fire interpretation with this fragmeni. Here the exchange relationship is steps in and—what 610x60111)015 [ordering] is about—in place of lire xd thought, which we could more or less think and which does not seem to n:dvxa step in. In this case, we would understand the relationship of fire go along with the way that gods and humans alternately understand and xd Jidvxa in a strict analogy lo the relationship of gold and goods. In themselves and Ix-ing. At Insi the fragment seems to offer no special the sense of the ^KJiiiQwoi^-docirine, in the rigid style of the Sloa, one difficulty. The fragment speaks of an alternate counterexchange, of a could say that Jrdvxa di.sappears in the exnuetootg of fire, and in the counterrelationship, where the one is replaced by the other and enters ftiaxdoiiHOL^ the fire turns into xd Jidvxa, Bui in that case we declare the the place of the other. It appears that here the relationship of jctjq and fundamental structure of a perpetual happening to be a temporal pro- n&na is sjxiken of in comparison to an event in the market. We know a cess. market of natural exchange, or else in the more developed form of the The difficulty we are confronted with in the simile of gold and goods exchange of money, in which goods are exchanged for money and in alternating relationship consists in the fact that the simile indicates money lor goods. The goods, as multitude and variety, behave toward something essential in the relationship of nvQ det^toov and ndvxa, but the single form of gold like the multitude in general behaves to that that as soon as we adopt it and comprehend it in a strict sense, il does not which is simple, but that corresponds, nevertheless, to the multitude of sound right any longer. The tivq dEC^oxjv as a form of ^ is in a constant goods. Is this relationship also a form of the fundamental relatedness of reference to td ndvxa, just as the gods stand in a constant reference to gv and JtdvTa? The ?v, as the most simple and all embracing, stands in a humans. This constant reference gets lost, if we wish to understand the relatedness of opposition to xh nuvxa. In the fragment, we read: ex- relationship of the eternal living fire to Jidvxa in terms of the change of TO nctvra for fire and of fire for fijiavia. We also understand exjitiQWOLg-doctrine, radically comprehended. The Diels translation of imavta here in the sense of K&vra as in Fr. 30, in which we have con- xd Jtdvra and djidvxuiv with "the all" is questionable. It points in the ceived finavia not as living beings, but as synonymous with Jiovra, direction of the exjitJQOJOig. Heraclitus, however, does not say x6 ndv or Heraclitus speaks of an alternating exchange of xdjidvra for fire and of Toij Jtavxoc;, but xd ndvxa and diidvxtov (Jtdvxcuv). xd ndvxa, however, fire forxd Jidvra. What we could say about the relationship of goods and apply to the entirety of entities. The exchange of fire into xd Jtdvxa and gold, nevertheless, does not hold in the same way regarding the of xd jxdvxa into fire behaves analogously to the alternate exchange of exchange-relationship of xd Jidvxa and fire. In reference to xd ndvxa the glimmering gold into goods and of goods into glimmering fire of and fire, we could not say that there, where the one is, the other will go. gold. The vendor in the market gives up the goods and receives money for The question that we must first leave open is the characterization of them. Where previously the goods were, money comes in and, the other the relatedness of 6v and Jtdvxa as a relatedness of transmutation. When way aiound, where the money was, goods come in. we try to illustrate the relatedness of ^v and jrdvxa by the example of the May we comprehend the relatedness of Iv and ndvra so bluntly? maikel, ceitain features of the fundamental relatedness in question Clearly not. The comparison becomes clearer, if we do not lake gold only come to light. Nevertheless, this relatedness eludes us throughout all as a specific coinage, as a form of gold, but if we rather notice the similes indicating comparisons, and il brings us close to the Ixiundary not glimmer of gold which is a symbol of the sunny. Then the sunny, illumi- V only of the sayable, but also of the thinkable. In Fr, 62, the intertwining nated gold behaves lo the goods like £v to xd Ttdvxa and, the oilier way relationship of gods and humans represents the relatedness of ev and around, xd navxa l>ebaves toward ev like the goods lo the sunny, illumi- JTd^^a, The gods, in their counterreference to humans, are in a specific nated gold. The glinmierof gold suggests that it is not a question here ot sense the representatives of fv in its relatedness lo jidvxa, and indeed any simile you please, in which we could replace gold with money. In our Ix-cause they understand mosi alxjul nvQ deC^wov, Finally, we could say simile il is less a matter of alternate exchange of real and token values; thai an unhappy consciousness Ix-falls us not only as the interpreters of rather, it is a matter of the relationship of the glimmer of gold to goods. ihe sayings of Heraclitus; rather, it lies above all in the sayings them- The gold stands for the glimmer of lire of JiiJe dEii^iuov, cbe goods lor xd selves. jidvTH. The 7TVQ dfi^wov and xd ndvxa in their relationship of exchange could iKii inielligibly be directly expressed. Likewise, the simile of gold — — 10 109 'cosmologital," and you speak of cosmic moments and cosmologicai en- The Stiinding Open of Gods and Humans tities. {Fragment 62). Tlic "Speculative" in Hcgel. Fink: One could bluntly conceive the relationship of gods and hu- Hegel's Relationship to Heraclitus. mans, which has been formulated in the dark formula "to live death, to Life - Death {(Correlated Fragments: 88, 62). die life," and say that the gods win the substance of their lives out of the death of humans, as humans win their life out of the death of animals ihey consume. To live the death of another would then be a process, a jx-rpelual style of the process of life. We cannot connect any meaning with the idea that the gods need the life of mortals like they need the Heidegger: 1 I was not present at the last seminar session. am asked to sacrificial animals of mortals in early religion. If one wants to disregard express myself on the course of thought. That, however, is a different the blunt idea, one must turn from a mere cosmic relationship between matter from immediate participation in the discussion. For there is the gods and humans to the cosmologicai reference of humans and gods. danger that I approach the matter from the outside. Ciods and humans are not only like other living things; rather, they are Fir.st, I like to that would touch on the difHculty was prevalent in the lx>th determined by an understanding relationship to themselves and to last session: the determination of the relationship of gods and humans in each other. The understanding relationship does not encapsulate the relation relatedness to the of £v and K&vxa. It is thus a question of a gods by themselves. The gods do not refer only to themselves; rather, relation between relationships. 1 intentionally speak formally now in ihey can experience their own perpetual being only in reference to the order to let the structure be seen that lies at the basis oi the thoughts of changeable being and being bound to death of humans. In order to the last session. If we notice the approach and the course of the sessions understand their own perpetual being in their self-understanding, they till now, the difficulty appears to me to have been to find the transition must understandingly hold themselves close to the death of humans. a relationship, still lightning, sun, seasons, from undetermined, of and Understood thus, holding close is not to be understood as ontic but as fire to TO. Jtavra, to the relationship of gods and humans in their relation ontological or cosmologicai. Vice versa, humans, who relate to their own to the relatedness of §v and Jidvra. The difficulty can be seen in the way wasting away, must understandingly hold themselves close to the per- reveals £v suddenly another character. So far as I have understood the petual being of the gods. This ontological understanding contains an course that Mr. Fink has in view for the seminar, it is that of deliberately analogy to the original relatedness of Ev and K&vxa. setting out from the fire-fragments and only then to bring into view all Heidegger: If you reject the cosmic relationship as ontic and speak that which one knows as logos-fragments and as specifically Heraclitean. of a cosmologicai relationship instead of an ontological one, then you use In this, I see the difficulty thai by the interpretation of the peculiar state the word "cosmologicai" in a special sense. In your use of the word of affairs, "to live death, to die life,"' which is said of gods and humans, a "cosmologicai," you do not mean the common meaning of cosmology as correspondence—and not an equation—becomes visable to the actual, the doctrine of the cosmos. But what, then, do you have in view? in (juestion thematic relatedness of ev and JiAvxa. When we speak of the Fink: The holding [verhaltende] Ev, which contains all ndvta, and "relatedness of ^v and Jiavxa," then it seems as if we were thinking about not the cosmos, for instance, as a sy.stem of spatial points. a connection between t>oth which we have localized concretely and for Heidegger: ^"hus, you do not use the word "cosmology" in the which relatedness we then sought a Ijow which spanned them. In the .sense of natural science. It only concerns me to see the justification on end, however, the matter stands in such a way that 6v is the relatedness, account of which you speak of cosmology. You have your grounds, l>e- and that it relates to id Jidvia by letting them be what they are. So cause you do not say "ontic" and "ontological," but rather "cosmic" and understood, ihe relatedness is, in my opinion, the decisive point that our "cosmologicai." determination must reach; thereby the idea of two terms is eliminated. Fink: The criterion lies there, where you yourself criticize ontology. Precisely this idea must henceforth be held off, even though it is not yet Heidegger: Vou speak alxnit the relatedness of Ev and jravia as a settled what all the references are which belong in the wholeness of wo rid -relation ship. navia, and wliat is all the reference of the references to ev or in £v itself". Fink: I do not thereby uiidci.stand it as a relationship ol two terms, .Something is conspicuous to me terminologically in the summary of I think the h/ as the one which lets evei7thing arise as many in the sense the last session. Viiu, Mr. Fink, make a distinction between "cosmic" and of jidvra, bui which takes them back again. J . . no III HEiDEGdtR: I don't want to tie you down to Heidegger, but cause the gods are not only distinguished from humans, but because EV-n&vxa as world-relationship indeed implies thai £v, like the world, they distinguish themselves in their own being from humans by holding worlds. themselves understandingly toward the death of mortals . . Fink: The ^v is the gathering, letting-be, and also annihilating Heidegger: . . . and l>ecause they experience themselves as per- power. Beside the moment of gathering and letting-be. the moment of petual Ijeings only in their self-distinclion from mortals. taking back again and annihilating is important for me. Fink: Only because they have view of mortals can they experience Heidegger: If" we think now of Fr. 30, which speaks of xoojiov themselves as perpetually f>eing. The immortals are those who do not T6v6e, what is the use of xoojio? here in comparison lo your use of the meet death; mortals are those who are bound to death. But Heraclitus word "cosmology"? converts this customary comprehension of Greek mythology, which lets Fink: jcoofiov tovSe does not mean the gathering of jrAvra in ^, but inortals and gods be for themselves, and which lets them turn toward rather the jointed whole of Tiayxa. each other only occasionally. He makes this occasional relationship into a HEiDt:GGER: Thus, you do not use "cosmo logical" in the sense of the relationship constituting gods and humans in ttieir own being. The im- Greek x6ofi05. But why, then, do you speak of the "cosmo logical"? mortal being of the gods is only possible if they relate themselves toward Fink: I do not think the cosmologica! from out of Heratlitus, but the mortal being of humans. The knowledge of human being bound to rather from out of Kant and from the antinomy of pure reason. Pure death constitutes the understanding of imperishable being proper, and reason attempts to think the whole. The whole is a concept that is first vice versa, the knowledge of the perpetual being of the gods constitutes oriented toward things. In this manner, however, we can never thought- the understanding of mortal being proper. Gods and humans do not fully experience the gathered whole. Kam exhibits the aporias of an form two separated spheres. It depends on seeing not the chommos attempt at thought that believes itself able to think the whole on the model [separation], but the intertwining of the godly and human understand- of a spatial thing. Because the attempt does not manage with this ap- ing of self and of being. proach, Kant subjectivizes the whole as a subjective principle in the pro- Heidegger: It is not a question of speaking in a blunt manner of cess of experience, which is complimented by the regulative idea of the gods and humans as of different living beings, of whom the former are totality of all appearances. immortal, the other mortal. Spoken in the terminology of Being and Heidegger: The justification of your use of "cosmic-cosmological" Time, immortality is no category, but rather an existenliale, a way that the in distinction to "ontic-ontologica!" is thus the allness. . gods relate themselves toward their fieing. Fink: . . . which, however, is the allness of h/. of the self-gathering, Fink: The godly knowledge of the being bound lo death of humans letting-arise, and letting- pass-away. In reference to the clamping to- is no mere consciousness, but rather an understanding relationship. gether of letting-arise and letting- pass-away, I refer to Nietzsche's motif With Athena, who appears as mentor to mortals in order to bring help to of the coupling of building and breaking, joining and undoing, of the them, il is perhaps a matter of still another theme. The epiphany of the in negation the sway of the world. gods is no actual mortal being of the gods, but a masking. When Aristotle Heidegger: I would like to touch on yet another difficulty. I share says that the life of OewQia [contemplation], which exceeds (pe6vT]ai5 your interpretation of Fr. 62. For me also it is the sole possible way to [practical wisdom], is a kind of godly life, an deavaif^eiv [to be im- interpret the formula, "lo live the death of another, to die the life of mortal] (whereby b.Qa\miXfiw is formed like fUtivi^Eiv [to be Greek]), another," in the manner you indicated. For me the question is how much that implies that in SetuQia we comport ourselves like immortals. In we know, according to the purest sources, about the gods in their rela- 9t(j)e(a. mortals reach up to the life of the gods. Correspondingly, we tionship to humans with the Greeks. In reference to your interpretation must say of the gods, that their comportmeni toward humans is a of the relationship of the gods and humans, one could bluntly say that "6avaTLt,£iv" [to be mortal], presupposing that one could form this word. you impute an existenz-ontology to the gods. According to its sense, your "Fhe emphasis lies in this, that the relationship of humans to gods cannot interpretation goes in the direction of an exislenz-ontology not Just of fx- descril>ed externally, but rather that they themselves exist as their humans in relationship to the gods, but also, vice versa, of the gods in alternate and counterrelationship. except that the gods, to a certain ex- their relationship lo humans. tent, have the more favorable existenz-ontology and humans, on the Fink: In the world of religion we find the strict demarcation be- contrary, the less favorable. The godly and human understanding of .self tween gods and humans. Professor Heidegger means to say. however, and being must project itself in mutual imder.standing. that when I ascribe an existenz-ontology to the gods, this would be be- Heidegger: In the relationship of gods and humans, it depends on . 112 113 conversation a historical question, and noijust a ques- a phenomenon ihat had not been treated till now in regard to hr and iheir we touch on history. In what sense, then, Ixjth are K&vxa: the standing open of gods and humans. You called the open- (ion concerning the study of liibingen, they joined with Schel- standing relationship between gods and humans a representative of the Hcraclileans is another question. In whole]. This relatedness of ev and ndvta. liiig in the motto Ev xai Jictv [the one and relationship stands under this common motto, later dissolved. Fink; With this, the oo(p6v-character of ev is foreshadowed. The ev among them, which Heraclitus? is gathering unity in the manner of Xayo^ and oocpov. We may not But where does Holderlin first name Participant: In "Hyperion." There he speaks of ^v fttatpeQcv interpret the oocpov-ch a ratter of ev as knowledge. In it, the moment of against itself]. understanding reference of ev to K&vxa is thought. In the light-character 6auTU» [one set distinguishes itself. Holderlin of lightning, sun, and fire, we first have a foreshadowing of the ootpov- Heidegger: The one that in itself it as the essence of beauty. At that time, however, beauty is character of ^v. But we must also warn against an explication of '^y as understands world-reason and as the absolute. for him the word for being. Hegel's interpretation of the Greeks in the direction: being Heidegger: Let me just characterize your way of thinking. You Lectures on ike History of Philosophy goes in the same as Heraclitus" word. Holderlin names no prepare the understanding of aotpov or nvQ qpg6vi(iov [sagacious fire] in beauty. With recourse to makes a fundamental declara- Fr. 64a in a departure from lightning, from sun, from the seasons, from formalistic-dialectic structure; rather, he tion. This thought has then been changed by him into a relationship of fire, light, radiance, and shine. In this manner, it is somewhat more and humans, according to which humanity is a condition of the difficult to make the transition from the thingly reference of ^ as lightn- gods ing, sun, and fire, to JiAvxa, over to the open-standing reference of gods existence of the god . . than the god. Fink: . . . humanity is nearer to the abyss and humans to each other, which the reference of ev to ootpov to n&vza and Heidegger: For that reason, the relationship of gods and humans represents. Your way of Herachtus interpretation starts out from fire relation that is not to be determined toward X6V05; my way of Heraclitus interpretation starts out from Xoyog is a higher and more difficult one, a with the terminology of customary metaphysical theology. toward fire. A difficulty is hidden behind that which is still not unraveled relationship of humans and gods is also no imago rela- by us, but which we have already touched on in various forms. For your Fink; The themselves, under- interpretation of the mutual relationship of gods and humans you have tionship in so far as mortals, in their relationship to standingly stand out into the other being of the gods, without participat- drawn upon Holderlin as a comparison, that is. firstly on "Hyperion's i between gods and humans; Song of Fate," in which the gods are separated from humans and are not ing in it. On one side an estrangement rules also prevails in referred to one another. on the other side, however, a clamping together mutual Fink: Without fate, like the sleeping infant, breath the heavenly understanding. wherein c tive Hegel. does "speculative " mean in Hegel? regard—for the conversation that othei"wise is an obscure problem. With with What 114 115 implies that the abstract Participant: The presupposition of speculative thought is the finite determination sublates itself and goes into identity of being and thinking. its opp<)site determination. Against that, the abstract thinking of under- Heidegger: Where does the speculative belong for Hegel? standing is the adherence to the determinaiion and its distinctness vis-a- Participant: The speculative is a moment of the logical. vis the other. The entire thinking, Hegel's thinking, s|>eaks fust of al! in Heidegger: What is a moment? ihe fundamental scheme of the subject -object relationship. The abstract Participant: Moment comes from movere, movimentum [to set in moment is the representation that is delivered over to the object without motion, movement]. reference back to the subject. It is the level of immediacy. The idea is Heidegger: The phase [der Moment] depends on "the moment" given over to the immediately given object without reference back to mediation. \^'das Moment"]. When Hegel says the speculative is a moment, the phase If now the object qua object is thought, that is, in reference back to the subject, unity is not meant thereby, but rather the moment. The moment is a moving then the between object and subject is thought. something which has a share in the movement of thinking, and which But why is this unity a negative one? gives an impetus. The moment becomes the impetus, and the impetus Participant: Because thinking has not yet recognized the unity as itself is the instant; it happens in a phase [in einem Moment]. Thus, the unity. moment becomes the phase. What is the first moment of the logical? Heidegger: Think historically and concretely on Kant's synthetic Participant: The abstract or intelligible. unity of transcendental apperception. It is unity in reference to objectiv- Heidegger: And the second moment? ity. For Hegel, however, it is only this whole itself, i.e., subject and object Participant: The dialectical. in their unity, which is the positive unity wherein the whole of the dialec- Heidegger: It is noteworthy that Hegel understands the dialectical tical process is deposited. The glimpse of this unity, that is, the glimpse of the abstract and dialectical in as the second and not as the third moment. And what is the third mo- moments their unity, is the speculative. ment? The speculative, as the positive-rational, comprehends the uniiy of de- Participant: The speculative. terminations in their opposition. When Hegel brings Heraclitus into Heidegger: In what connection does Hegel call the dialectical the connection with his logic, how does he then think what Heraclitus says alx>ut second and not the third moment of the logical? When he speaks, at the oppositions? How does he take up what is said by Heraclitus about end of the Lo^, of the identity of matter and method, one would indeed oppijsitions in distinction to what we attempt? He takes the opposing references think that the dialectical is the third moment. Hegel also calls the dialec- of Heraclitus—spoken from out of Kant—as a doctrine of tical the negative-rational. What does the rational mean for Hegel? We categories at the level of immediacy, and thus in the sense of an im- need all this information for our analysis of Heraclitus, even though mediate logic. Hegel does not see in Heraclitus the cosinological refer- Hegel does not speak of Heraclitus in these pages. ences as you understand them. Fink: Hegel inteiprets the Participant: Spoken from the Phenomenology of Mind, reason is the relationship of oppositions from out of sublation of the separation of subject and object. mediation. Heidegger: Where does Hegel's terminology come from? Hkideg(;kr: He understands the whole of Greek philosophy as a Participant: From Kant. level of immediacy, and he sees everything under the aspect of the logical. Fink: Heidegger: How does Hegel characterize Kant's philosophy? One could also say ihat for Hegel the thought of becoming is of Participant: As reflexive philosophy. sigiiifiiume in Heraclitus. One could also call Heraclitus the philoso- pher of (lux. For Hegel, Heidegger: And that means? the element of lliix gains 1 he characicr of a model Participant: As the division of two phases. lor undoing opposiiions. Heidegger: Which phase? What does reason mean in Kant? Hkidi-:c;gkr: Becoming is movement, for which the three momenis^ namely, Participant: For him, reason is the thinking of ihe ideas in distinc- ihe abstract, the dialeclical, and the speculative—are what gives tion to understanding as the thinking of the categories. The ideas are impetus [das Aus.stlilafrfr,-hcrnlf\. This movement, this meihod, IS regulative principles, in which reason thinks totality. the iiiacier itself for Hegel after completion of the lMi(ir. Ihe ihiid lleiaclitean, H[;ii)kgger: Reason in Kant is thus not referred immediately to lx.-side Hoklerlin and Hegel, is Nietzsche. But we would l>e going appearances but only to ihe rules and fundamental principles of under- out of our way to go into this que.stion. I have touched on all that is standing. The fundamental function of reason consi.sts in thinking the now sai 116 117 the tradition. We can speak only out of the conversation that is funda- double meaning of the Ixjw, the explication of fire as (pwg [light] and as mental for thinking, and that is fundamental above all for the way on [hat which makes oatpiq [clear], allows shining-up, and brings to light, which we move. and finally the character of ootpov and the }iOyoQ. The way of our Hera- if Perhaps it would be appropriate you, Mr. Fink, indicated the further clitus interpretation is the relatedness ot ^v and jiavxa. Our explication progress of the seminar, setting step that yon have in view for the out begins with the appearances of fire; it then goes over to the relationship from the allusion to the reference of the mutual open-standing character of life and death, to the doctrine of the contra.sts and the coincidence, to of gods and humans that characterizes the phenomenon, "'to live the the movement- fragments, the fragment about the god, and from there death of another, to die the life of another." Thus the participants will to Ev TO ootpov [ioiivov (one thing, the only wise],^' and finally to the see where the way leads us. >jJ70c;- fragments. It seems important to me fir.st of all to gain an abun- Fink: 1 believe that one must drive on from the doctrine of fire and dant arsenal of ideas and ways of thought. Heraclitus operates with the JTUQO^ TQOKai to the question of the relatedness of £v and navia, for many relationships. When he takes up a differentiation in the sleep- the fragments in the life-death rela- which we receive help from which fragments, this is not to be conceived of in the sense of copious vocabu- tionship is thought. The relationship of gods and humans is not to be lary, but of ways of understanding. His fundamental thoughts are in- equated with the relatedness of h/ and Jtdvxa. In the standing open for deed relatively easy to formulate, but the difficulty lies in the refraction one another of gods and humans, we have, as it were, a brake against of these thoughts into the many waysof thought and ideas with which he is in Fr. 90 simply as a change-over of familiar thinking what said kind, is concerned. The fundamental thought of Heraclitus is broken into a or as transformation of stuff into another form, or on the model of the great number of ways . . exchange of goods. We have indicated that in x&^od's [go'd], the glimmer Heidegger: . . . which gives an insight into TOt ii6vTa. of gold must also be thought. Here a relationship is thought between the Fink: The thinking of the one happens in a manifold manner. As light-character of fire and that into which it turns. We must not under- with Parmenides, the b/ is thought of in a great many o*inaTa [signs] so the sense stuff. stand the turning bluntly in of a change of with Heraclitus the relatedness of ^ and jrdvra is thought of in a great Heidegger: We must think the radiant, the ornamental, and the many ways of understanding. decorative element together in x6o[iog, which was for the Greeks a cus- Heidegger: Where do gods and humans belong? tomary thought. Fink: In one regard in Jidvia, and in another regard in ^v. beautiful is also, Fink: But the most xoono; when measured against Heidegger: The other regard is precisely what is of interest. the fire, a scattered junk heap. To be sure, it is in itself the most beautiful Fink: The relatedness of ^v and Jtdvra mirrors itself in the relation in to it like Joining, but reference the £v compares a junk heap. of gods and humans. Since ^ is no factual unity but rather the unity of Heidegger: 1 would .still like to add something as to the relation- Wyo?, gods and humans are those struck by the lightning of Wyog. They ship of gods and humans. I have called the mutual self-understanding belong together in the Xoyog-happening. the open-standing character. But if the gods, in their relationship to Heidegger: Gods and humans in their intertwining relationship mortals represent tv in its relationship to niivxa, then the 6v-character have a mirroring function in reference to Iv and ndrvxa. gets lost . . Fink: In Heideggerian language, we could say that humans and representatives £v, . of Fink: . . and indeed because the gods, as gods belong in one respect in what is, but in the essential respect they stand in the plural, and thus appear as foreign forms. But in his theol- belong in being. This special position of gods and humans among all that will to later, Heraclitus thinks the coincidence of ogy, which we turn is, which |x>sition does not subsume them . . oppositions in the god. In order now to clarify the further course of our is Hkidi.gger: , . . under all that which . . from the fragments interpretation of Heraclitus, we must attempt to go Fink: ... is very much more difficult to grasp. Gods and humans phe- that treat the relationship of life and death and the intermediate exist as understanding of l>eing. The godly and the human understand- nomenon of sleep over to a fundamental discussion of all oppositions ing of Ix^ing are ways of the self-clearing of Ix-ing. §V and their coincidence in (he god, and finally to Zeus, with which name Heidegger: But thai cannot l>e read in Heraclitus. TO oo(f6v is unwilling and yet willing to l)e named. Befoie this, we would Fink: We could find the light-nature of ev by means of the relation- also have to deal with the series of (lux- and movement-fragments, then ship l)etween gods and humans. with the problem of 6e|j.ovLa dfpavli^ [hidden harmony], life and death Hkii)k(;(;er: Perhaps this is the appropriate place to make the tran- in the lyre and liow, the intertwining of life and death proper in the sition to Fr. 26. . . 118 119 Fink: First, I would like lo return once again to Fr. 88: xavzo t' ^i, ji(ivTa? Are the changes-over named in Fr. 88 to be thought as mere ^d)v xai TEevT)x65 xai (to) ^Ye^'^opog xai xaSeOSov xal veov xal yriQaiov contentions about phenomena given and not given in the animal world, xASe yixQ HExajreodvxa exELvd eoxi. xaxEiva jicAlv neicoiEOOVta xaiJTa. or do they concern nvQ dei^wov? Let us leave this question open. Diels translates, '"And it is always one and the same, what dwells (?) Heideg(;er: How does ^ Fink: In Fr. . Here a taiiT^ is expressed, but not a same-being [Selbigsem] of a same 62, C<'>vte5 and TeOvetiJTeq are referred to , thing [Selhigeti] lying beCore us, not the empty identity that belongs to Heidegger: . . . the manner of l>eing of immortals and mortals; in everything there is; raiher a same-being that is referred to distinction. It Fr. 88, on the contrary, t/uiv xal XEeviiKog is referred to what is. is referred to that which .seems to us to lie most distinguished. The Fink: Not to what is, but to being alive and lieing dead, tfiyv does distinctions named here are not such as are in constant movement, but not mean a living being, but rather the living as terminm [term] for being are such as concern all living things. Being alive, Ijeing awake, and being alive, just as xeOvrixos dtres not mean something dead, but rather the young have a positive character for our customary ideas vis-a-vis being dead as terminus for being dead. The same also holds for the waking and dead, being asleep, and being old. But the fragment that expresses sleeping and for young and old. Waking and sleeping are termini for same-being speaks not only against the tustomai7 opinion of the being awake and being asleep, and young and old are termini for being superiority of living, waking, and being young vis-a-vis the dead, the young and being old. sleeping, and the old; rather, it also expresses a belonging together of Heidegger: Is tfirv in Fr. 88 only the singular of the plural ^wvieg the three groups. Being asleep, which stands in the middle, has a distin- in Fr. 62? Are gods and humans also meant in Fr. 88? guished inbetween position out of which an understanding standing Fink: ^oxv xai teOvtixo; does not refer only to gods and humans, open is possible for being dead and being old in the sense of wasting for Fr. 88 is stretched wider. But for wh(»m are being alive and being away. dead, being awake and being asleep, and being young and being old the Bui the fragment says .still more. Not only are living and dead, awake same, living beings or nvQ Aei^coov? and asleep, young and old one and the same, but this is the change-over Heidegger: Thus, in Fr. 88 something else is said than in Fr. 62. of that and that again is the change-over of this. A phenomenal change- Fr. 62 has a wider sense. over is only lo be seen in the relationship of waking and sleep. For what Fink; ^oiv and TE9viix6q are lo be understood like to xaX6v, to goes lo sleep from waking also turns again from sleep back into waking. fifxaiov. How is the article to ^Y01Y*>Q<'G ['he waking] to be understood? Only the change-over from waking into sleep is reversible. Against thai, Professor Heidegger has indicated that it is not a matter of relationships the change-over of life into death and of being young into being old is and counterreferences that would have a possessor. In the second sen- not reversible in the phenomenon. But in the fragment it is said that as tence of the fragment, Heraclitus speaks in the plural, which does not, being awake goes over into being asleep and vice versa, so also the living however, refer to facts but to the three different relationships. Of whom changes over into the dead, the dead into the living, the young into the can TaiiTO be said ai all? The coincidence thought here does not signify old, and ihe old into the young. Il treats the distinction of waking and one such as in a distinctionless indifference. What is meant is even a sleeping in the same manner as that of living and dead and of young and mutual changeover. [lEToneodvTG [things changing around] refers to Fr. old. But of whom is this reversible change-over expressed? The expres- 90, in which dvxanoiflTi is named, the exchange of gold for goods and of sion, "changing over again," recalls the avranoipii [interchange], the goods for gold. But what change over in Fr. 88 are not only things as change of gold into goods and goods into gold. There, the relationship against the gathering unity, but the harder opposition of being alive and Ixfing of the change-over is referred to the relatedness of ^v and Jidvxa as well dead. Here a sameness is mentioned that slaps in the face and contradicts as jrdvxa and 6v. The question is whether iransitions, referred to the the everyday opinion that insists on the difference Ix'iween living who are named in Fr. 88, have their place within animalia life and death. On that account, the question of where the place is, the [animals], or whether changes-over in the sense of Jtugog XQOnai are aliode, of this change-over is disconcerting. meant by it. Is ihe tqiito said of animalia, or rather of ji{iq det^OHW, HtiiDEGOER: Does being dead (teOvtixo?) mean the, same as having about which we hear that il always was and is and will be (f|V Aei eoriv xai deceased? SoTai), but which itself is no inner temporal constancy, but which raiher Fink: Ves, when XEflvriXog is said again.sl t,{i)v. It does not mean what is makes possible the having lx;en, Ijeing pieseni, and coming to Ix; of lifeless in the sense of the minerals . . 120 121 Hkidkggek: . . , thus not dead nature, A stone, for example, is not which they come into proximity to the dark passing of night and to light dead. openness. Fink; In Fr, 88, lilt- and death, which we know in phenomenon only Heidegger; We must gel clear what touching (Atpi^) actually means. in a specific domain, are rt-ferred to the whole relatedness of £v and l^ter, "the touching" appears as eiyeiv with Aristotle in the Metapkysici n&na. But let us leave this question open. For without further verifica- e 10. tion, it cannot be .said what taiiTO is. We can at fir.st only presume that the FiNK: What we have now said concerning Fr. 26 is only a same-being of life and death refers to gv. Professttr Heidegger has des- foreshadowing of the difficulty with which we must begin in the next ignated the relatedness of ev and Jiavxa as slate-of-affairs [Verkall], as session. being- and wo rid -state-ol'-affairs. When this original staie-of-affairs is mentioned in the xaixd of Fr. 88, then we have a contradiction in the phenomenon. For nol^ody dead becomes alive again. Living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old, are phenomena that in a certain manner mean all the sojourn of the living in time. Life is the whole time of a living being: death is the end of life-time. Waking and sleep form the basic rhythm during life. Being young and being old refer to being in the corrupting power of time which not only brings everything but also takes everything. The que.stion for me is whether the relatedness of hi and Ji6vTa is a relatedness of maturation. Finally, I would like to attempt an explication of Fr. 26. It runs: av90a)Jio5 b/ E-bffQovT] (poo? fiuiTEtai fauTtp (dno8avcijv) duioopeoOElg fl'^eig, t,(iyv 6e &nxExai teevEWTo^ eTJ6wv, (djtoo|iEo9el5 flifeig) EYeT|YOQ(i>5 &lTETai EiJ6ovTo;. Diels translates; "A human touches on (kindles) a light in the night, when his eyesight is extinguished. Living, he touches on death in sleep; in waking he touches on sleeping." This fragment clearly begins with a human. A human kindles a light in the night. Fr. 26 begins with the human and his capacity of kindling a light in the night, when his oijfLg is extinguished. Diels translates 6jioo- PEo6Ei,5 dy^v; with "when his eyesight is extinguished." But the meaning thus suggests itself that a human sees in his dream—and that he is in a light while in darkness during the dream. ! would rather translate the plural, ii:ioop£o9El5 flipLg, with "extinguished in his manners of seeing." A human has his uneasy place between night and light. The fragment refers to the unsteady place of a human between night and light. He is near to the light. That is indicated when he is able to lighten the night. A human is a kind of Promethean fire thief. He has the ability to make light in the night, when his manners of seeing are extinguished, i.e., not when he sleeps but when he relates to the dark. "Living, he touches on the dead in sleep; in waking, he touches on the sleeping. " Life and death are here bound to one another by the in-between position of sleep. Sleeping is a manner of being alive akin with death; waking is a maimer of lingering touching on death in the light in reference to the sleeping. Being alive and being awake, i)eing asleep and Ijeing dead are not three conditions, but three possible manners of relationship of humans in — — . 11 123 the elucidation of the three moments of the logical. But what remains to The "Logical" in Hegel. be asked, if one speaks of the three moments of the logical in Hegel? and "Dasein." "Consciousness" Participant: One could perhaps say that the dialectical and the Locality of Human Beings between Light s[)eculative moments appear as two sides of negativity. and Night. (Correlated Fragments: 26, 10). Hkideggeb: l^t us not go into negation and negativity. Participant: We have forgotten to ask about the totality of the three moments. Heidegger: How do you wish to determine thecourseof the three moments? The abstract, dialectical, and speculadve are not side by side. Heidegger: First, I must make a correction regarding the last seminar But what must we return to in order to find out how the three moments session. In reference to Hcratlitus' word 6v ftiacpegov kavxia, ai the place belong together? As I subsequently reflected on the course of our con- in the summary where it says that Holderlin interprets truth as beauty, I versation, I was alarmed about our carelessness. said by mistake that the same thought is to be found in Hegel in the Participant: We must ask where the Logic has its place in the lectures on the History of Philosophy, This thought appears, rather, in the system. Lectures on the Philosophy oj World History, in Volume III, "The Greek and Heidegger; We do not need to go so far, but we must ask . . Roman World" (I.asson edition, p. 570 ff.). "Thus, the sensory is only the Hegel. Participant: . . . what the logical means in appearance of spirit. It has shed fhiitude, and l>eau[y consists in this Heidegger; We have spoken about the three moments of the logi- unity of the sensory with spirit in and for itself" (p. 575). "The true cal, hut we have not thereby reflected on the logical itself. We have failed deficiency of the Greek religion as opposed to the Christian is that in it to ask what Hegel means by the logical. One says, for example, "that is appearance constitutes the highest form, in general, the whole of the logical" Or one can hear it said that the great coalition is logical. What divine, while in the Christian religion appearing obtains only as a mo- docs "logical" mean here? ment of the divine" (p. 580). "But if appearing is the perennial form, so Participant; In the "Introduction" to the Science of Logic, Hegel the spirit which appears in its transfigured Ix'auty is a thither side of says that the content of logic "is the depiction of God, as He is in His ." subjective spirit . . (p. 581). Here Hegel thinks the identity of appear- eternal essence before the creatitm of nature and of a finite spirit." ing and beauty that is also characteristic and essential for the early Hol- Heidegger: Let us remain at first with what the "logical" means in derlin. We cannot go into the details of Hegel's elalx>rations, but I rec- the customary sense, i.e., for the man on the street. ommend that you sometime reread his Lectures on the Philosophy World of Participant: It means the same as "conclusive in itself." History. Then you will gain another idea of Hegel, who had an inkling of Heidkgger; Thus, "consistent." But is that what Hegel means when much in (Jreek Lh<»ught when, for example, he thinks Apollo as the hes|jeaksofthe three pha.sesofthe logical? Certainly not. Thus, we have knowing god, and the god of knowledge, as the eloquent, prophesying, not made clear to ourselves what we are talking alx>ut. In paragraph 19 foretelling god, as bringing everything concealed to light, as the god of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel says, "Logic is the sci- l(H)king into (he darkness, as the god of light, and when he thinks the ence of the pure idea, thai is, the idea in the abstract element of thinking." light as what biings everything to appearance. We do not want to dwelt too long on Hegel here. I only want to make Aside from that, I have still another omission to correct. We have clear the gulf thai separates us fioin Hegel, when we are dealing with spoken of the three of the logical moments in Hegel in the last session, Heraditus. What does "science of the pure idea" mean with Hegel; what the abstract-intelligible, the dialectical, and the speculative. Hut what lor him is the idea? have we omitted thereby? Participant: The complete self-comprehension of thought. Participant: We have no longer asked alxtut what we understand Hhidi-:<;c;er; What does Hegel's concept of the idea presuppose? by the speculative in regard to our own procedure in distinction to Think alxmi Plau>'s L6Ea [form]. What has happened between the Hegel. I'or llie question al)ou[ the meaning of the speculative in Hegel Platonic idea and Hegel's idea? What has in the meantime hapiwncd tame up when one i>f the participants characlerized our attempt to think when Hegel and modern times speak of the idea? by starting out fi-om Heraditus with the expression, a s|x;culalive leap. Participant: In the meantime, Plato's ibia took the road toward HtioKGt^KK: We will talk alK)ui ihis pioblcm lalei-. For the moment, Ix'coming a concept. let us remain within Hegel's philosophy. We followed Hegel's text with Heidkgger; Von musi be somewhat more cautious. With Descartes. . 124 123 Heidegcjer: When you say that the reference of the gods to hu- the idea becomes perceptio [perception]. With that, it is seen from the is no mere consciousness, then you mean representation of the subject and thus from subjectivity. The absolute mans' being bound to death reference is no mere human representation that humans are so idea of Hegel is then the complete self-knowledge of the absolute sub- that the You said that the reference of the gods to humans is an under- ject. It is the inner coherence of the three phases in the process charac- and so. relationship, and you mean a self-understanding relationship. terizing the self- manifesting of the absolute spirit. In this absolute, standing gods can have their being only in so far as they stand Plato's thought of the idea, tbc self-showing, still plays a role, despite Fink: The mortals. Standing open for mortals and the mortals' transient subjectivity. Why can Hegel now say that the idea is thinking? That must open for be lacking from the gods. We may not understand this, seem paradoxical to us ai the fust glance at Hegel's sentence. The sen- Ijeing cannot concerning the Platonic idea however, as Nietzsche .says with Thomas Aquinas bliss- tence is only lo be understood if one observes that the paradise, that the souls will view the torment of the damned, becomes perceptio in Descartes. Piior to that, the ideas become the fulness of biissfulness more. (Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, thought of God, and gain significance for the notion of creatio. We give thereby suiting their are undoubtedly BviiToi. They know their eternal only this brief determination of the logical in Hegel in order to see what 15). The immortals viewing contemplation (OECOoia). but at the same we are talking about when we name the three moments of the logical. being not only from that in ricochet back from the transient being of mortals. They are The logical in Hegel is a rubric that has full importance and hides a time humans' being bound to death. It is difficult to find die right richness that one cannot quickly and easily comprehend. In paragraph affected by far as the term here. 19 of the Encyclopedia, it says, among other things, "But in so Whether we find Heidegger: I want to get at precisely this point. logical is the absolute form of truth, and even more than this, is the is another question. Standing is truth the terminologically appropriate form pure truth itself, it is something quite other than useful." What like a passageway. The is something like an open window or here? If one wants to understand Hegel's concept of truth, what must open not open of humans to things does not mean that there is a hole one also ihink? Think back to what we have already said, that the idea in standing for . . is being ad- humans see; rather, standing open . Descartes becomes clara and distincta perceptio [clear and distinct percep- through which dressed by [Angegangensein von] things. 1 speak about this in order to tion], and this goes together with . . understand- clarify the fundamental reference which plays a role in the Participant: . . . certiludo word "Dasein" in Being and Time. My Hkidegger: Thus, with certainty. In order to be able to understand ing of what is thought with the Dasein. question now aims at the relationship of consciousness and How Hegel's concept of truth, \ e must also think truth as certainty, as place in clarified? If you take "consciousness" as a rubric absolute self-knowledge. Only thus can we understand that the logical is that relationship to be position is the for transcendental philosophy and absolute idealism, another should \ye the pure truth by itself. This reference to the meaning of with the rubric "Dasein." This position is often overlooked or logical in Hegel will \x imporlanl, when later—though not in this thus taken noticed. When one speaks of Being and Time, one first semester—^we come to speak about the Logos with Heraclitus. not sufficiently rubric "con- spoke about thinks of the "they" or of "anxiety." Let us begin with the Now I wish to have another clarification. You. Mr. Fink, word? is Is it not, strictly speaking, a curious the fact that the godly knowledge of a human's being bound by death sciousness," referred to the state of understanding relationship. Thus you Fink: Consciousness is. slriciiy speaking, no mere consciousness, but an bemg far as the state of affairs is represented, it is a conscious contrast the understanding relationship, which we have also called stand- affairs. So knowing being. However, by consciousness we mean the ful- ing open, to mere consciousness. and not a mere consciousness of something would l>e given, for fillment of knowing. Fink: A con- speaking, it is the object of which we are that a human, as animated, knows alwut inanimate Heidegger: Strictly example, if one said iden- Consciousness, then, means as much as objectivity, which is nature. Here one can speak of a meie knowledge relationship, although scious. judgments a priori in Kant. just a consciousness tical with the first principle of all synthetic I believe that it is also a matter of more than of experience in general are at the same understanding of lieing of immortal being telongs lo The conditions of the jxissibiiity of . . . Not only the con- of the possibility of objects of experience. With of the gods, but also, as an implicit component, time the conditions the self-understanding as concerned with a knowing, and knowing is thought of being of mortal l>eing. The godly understanding sciousness, we are the understanding now with mortal representation, as for example in Kant. And bow does it stand is not a neutral kind: lalher. il is referred back to the of being of set wish to proceed pedagogically. from where must we being of humans. 1 he gods understand their blissful being in ricochet Dasein? If we back fiom the frailiv of mortals. out? . 126 127 Participant; sel from We can oul the word. The concept of "Da- ses.sion is al.so to be understood from out of this: gv is the re-latedness sein" in Kant means actuality. [Ver-halhm\ of iKivra.^* Re-laiing \Ver-halleii\ and holding mean first of Heidegger: The of actuality in concept Kant is a dark problem. all tending, keeping, and yielding in the widest sen.se. The content of this But how does the concept oJ Dasein develop in the eighteenth centui7. holding is fulfilled for us in the course of time, that is, in passage Participant: As a translation of existentia [existence]. through the fragments of Heraclitus. Mr, Fink has repeatedly alluded to Heidegger: Dasein means, then : being present now. But how is the the fact that the determinations ot ev, as lightning, sun. seasons, and fire word "Dasein" to be understood from out of the hermenueiic of Dasein are no images, but rather characteristics that characterize the holding in Being and Time? and the way and manner that xa n6.\xa are for hi, and which charac- Participant: The hermeneutic in Being and Time sets terize out from ^v itself as the unifying, gathering . . Dasein, whereby it does not understand Dasein in the customaiy Fink; . , manner . and discharging. We must contrast this relatedness of &v as present at hand. and 7i6vTa against the naive conception according to which &v is thought Heidegger; In French, Dasein is translated by el.re~la [being there], like a depository, like a pot in which all nawxa are. One cannot apply this for example by Sartre. Btii with this, everything that was gained as a new ontically lamiliar encompassing relation to the reference of ev and position in Being und Time is lost. Arc humans there like a chair is there? jidvTa. Participant: "Dasein" in Being and Time does not mean pure Heidegger: In Southern German, Topf[Y>o(\ means Hafen [port]. human factual being, That is the same word as foriEoeai [to be brought together]. The word Heidegger: Dasein does not mean being there and being here. "hawk" [Habicht] also belongs here, that is, the bird which grasps. Lan- What does the "Da" mean? guage is much more thoughtful and open than we are. But probably this Participant: Ii means what is cleared in itself. Human being, like will lie forgotten in the next centuries. Nobody knows whether one will Dasein's being is no pure thing present at hand, but a cleared being. ever come back to this again. Hkidegger: In Being and Time, Dasein is described as follows: Fink: In the last session, we began to consider Fr. 26, and to em- Da-sein. The Da is the clearingand openness of what is. as which a human phasize some elements, namely the peculiar situation of humans as fire stands out. Representation, the knowledge of consciousness, is some- kindling beings placed Ijetween night and light. thing totally different. does consciousness, How knowledge as repre- Heidegger: For me, the way in which the fragment is quoted by sentation, relate to Dasein? In this you inu.st not reflect, but rather see. Clement already creates a difficulty. When I read the context of Cle- Mr. Fink has referred to the fact that consciousness is properly the ment, it is unclear to me in which coimection and out of which motive he knowledge of the object. In what is objectivity, and that is cites 6' which repre- Fr. 26. There it says: 6oa avi nepi ijjrvou XEyouoi, id abxit xpti ital sented, grounded? jifpi aav{iTO\) ^^QKo-tJELv. EKotTego; yag br\\ol ttjv dirootaoiv ifjc U'Oxfjc;. 6 Participant: In representation. HEv naW.ov. 6 6e ^xxov. Sjieq kmi Kal jrapa 'WQa%keiTov XafJelv.^" The Heidegger: Kant, and with him the absolute idealism of the abso- first sentence says in translation, "One must also hear the same af>out lute idea, was content with this answer. But what is thereby suppressed? death as what is said about sleep." How this text should lie connected Fink: That wherein consciousness and object play. with Fr. 26 is incomprehensible to me, 1 myself can find no connection. Heidegger: "Fhus, the clearing in which something present comes Clement's text is unintelligible to me in connection with Fr. 26 Ijecause to meet something else present. Being opposite . . . to presupposes the nothing is to be found in the fragment about djt6aTaoic; xfig V^X'H? clearing in which what is preseni meets a human. Consciousness is only [departure of the soul]. Clement's text is a completely different one than [M)ssible on the ground of the Da. as a derivative mode of it. Fixmi here that of the fragment. Another difflcully for me is the following. Hera- one must understand the historical step that is taken in Being and Time, clilus says thai hmnans kindle a iighi in the night when eyesight is extin- which sets out from Dasein as opposed to consciousness. That is a matter guished. Is ihat only to Ix" ihougbt in such a way that a human kindles a that one inusi see. I have alluded to this i>ecause this relationship will still ligbi in the dark, eilbei' with a match or by pressing a button? play A role Ibi' us along side ibe oilier relatedne.ss of ev and ndvTa. Both Fink: I would suppose that the basic situation, mentioned in the lx;long logelbcr. With Heraclilus. aX,7i6tia, nonconcealment, .stands in fragment, is the human siiuaiion l>eiween night and light. .'\ human is the background, even if it is not mentioned directly. He sjx^aks on this not just like other living l^-ings lieiween nighl and light; rather, he is a ground, although it is not further pursued by him. Whai 1 said in the last living being who stands in a relationship to night and light and who is not . . 128 129 overcome by night and the dark. When his 61(115 's extinguished, he has day. The human power to clear is something other than the lighi that the capacity, as the lieing with an affinity to fire, to bring forth fire and comes with the daylight. The light kindled by the human is the little light light. A human relates himself to nighi and day. in the great dark of night. Heidegger: Let us stay al first with night and day. HEiDEGtiER: When he kindles a little light in the night, he does it so Fink: The human situation is different from that of living beings that something is still given to him in the darkness by the light. which are exposed to night and day. When it is night for a human, then Fink: The little light stands in opposition to the rhythmic, great light is extinguished. Indeed, there is a seeing of the dark, d^ig does not light of day that befalls us and that has nothing dark about it. The mean here the capacity of seeing, but the capacity of seeing in aclu [in human is the light-related l^eing who, it is true, can kindle light, but actuahiy]. When his fiipt^ is extinguished it means, therefore, when his never such as would lie able to completely annihilate the night. The light capacity of seeing is no longer in actu. The capacity of seeing as such is started by him is only an island in the dark of night on account of which not extinguished with the breaking in of darkness. We also do not say his place is clearly characterized between day and night. that a human only hears when he hears sounds. For he also hears silence. Heidegger; You emphasize night, and understand it speculatively. Heidegger; A human sees nothing in the dark. But let us remain at first with the dark: in the dark, in twilight, a human FiNKi Nevertheless everyone sees something in the dark. kindles a light. Doesn't this darkness in which he kindles a light go Heidegger: I am aiming at precisely what extinguishing means. together with the light of which you speak? Fink: Extinguishing can have two-fold meaning: first, it refers to Fink: This light that a human kindles is already an offspring. All not seeing in the dark; second, to not seeing in sleep. fires on earth, and that which is started by the fire kindling being, are Heidegger: Let us leave sleep aside. In the phenomenon, we must offsprings, as in Plato. The gods do not comport themselves in the same distinguish between "not seeing anything in the dark" and '"not seeing." way as humans toward light and night. A human has a Janus-like face; If we speak now of the extinguishing of sight, that is still not clear he is turned as much to the day as to the night. Heidegger: human, who extinguishes in reference to the possi- enough to me, Not seeing means . . A is With the open ability to see, bility of seeing, kindles a light. Now bjiod^zaQeiq fiV"'? becomes clearer. Fink: . . . that the ability to see closed. we see nothing determinate in the dark. But that is still a seeing. It thus means "when he cannot see because of darkness" but not "when Heidegger: It concerns me now to determine what is negated by he cannot see." the extinguishing of 61^115, Fink: I translate 6\^\.z, with possibility of sight. Fink: One can read Fr. 26 such that a human kindles a light in the Heidegger: I don't quite understand that. dream. Still, this way of reading appears questionable to me. When we Fink: A human kindles a little light in the dark measured by the say that a human is exdnguished in reference to fiiCiS- it can mean either great light. little light; a closing of the ability to see or a failing to find the visible on account of Heidegger: I would still like to stay with the thereby we the darkness. The latter means that the ability to see is open, but we clarify and preserve the fatito). cannot make out anything specific in the darkness. Fink: I translate feaiixui with "for himself." Heidegger: In the dark I see nothing, and nevertheless I see. Heidegger: But what does "for himself" mean? that the little light is a private light . , Fink: This is similar with hearing. A sentry, for instance, listens Participant: It means intensely into the silence without hearing something determinate. When Fink: ... as against the great one. §arT(i) [touches himself): why do I kindle a he hears no determinate sound, still he hears. His barkening is the most Heide<;«;er: fijtTEiai on intense wakefulness of wanting to hear. Harkening is the condition of candle for myself? To be sure, because the candle shows something to also be included. possibility for hearing. It is being open to the space of the bearable, me. This dimension must Fink; 1 like to accentuate the island-<:haracter of the little whereas hearing is meeting the specifically bearable. would little light in the Heidegger: If we think through what is said abtmt "seeing noth- light in which something still shows itself to me. The does not ing" and "not seeing" in the situation in which a human concerns himself [nonconcealment] is surrounded by [conceal- Heidegger: What indicates the relationship to night? limitation. AXiieeia tdfiy] ment]. Fink: At the befrjnning it says thai a human kindles a light in the Heide(;ger: In Fr. 26, 1 lay importance on precisely the relation- night. Then it says further that in sleep he touches on the dead, and in ship of standing open. waking he touches on the sleeping. Sleep is the twilight of life. A human Fink: fragment does not speak of brightness, but of light in the does not exist in the full richness ol life in so far as he touches on the The It speaks of the curious human place between hght and night dead through sleep. The dead stand in a reference to night. night. is death and referred to death through sleep. The refer- Heidegger: What does "to touch on" mean? which open to death also belongs to the understanding of those who are awake. Fink: To touch on here does not mean to touch, but aims at a ence to those are awake touch on the sleeping and the sleeping touch relationship of adjoining. And it is also im[K)rtant to notice here that it is For who not a question of simple txiardering, but of a relationship of adjoining. on the dead. Heidegger: I am still with the light in the night. ^oOavtov [dying] Heidegger: Here at the table, when I lay the chalk by the glass, we speak of a simple adjoining of Ixnh things on one another. is stricken by Wilamowitz as an annotation. the fragment moves into Fink: But when a human touches on the dead thiough sleep, he Participant: If one retains aJio9av6v. of the orphic-eleusinian world outlook. does not adjoin the dead like the chalk on the glass. In sleep, he touches the neighborhood of meaning changes. relatedly on the dark. Then the meaning of eili(Pq6vti [in the night] also Heidegger; How do you understand ^d>v (living)? Doesn't one Heidegger: Thus it is a question of an open-standing touching on. basis of t,ibv be [and living]? That goes with the fact that the kindled light also grants an open- have to strike out djioOavtJv on the Participant; duioBavtiJv is an annotation to djiooPeoeElg 61)115 standing quality to the little orbit of the room that is illuminated by the his eyesight is extinguished], candle. 1 prefer that Fr. 26, and above all the fijiiExai ^auiu), come into [when ^Jioeavtixv, djioofiEoeelg 6t[i15 then means: the dimension of open-standing reference. To me, you go much too fast Heidegger: Referred to possibility of .seeing is deprived. into the spetuhitivc dimension. after the fragment moves into the domain of a mystic Fink: In that a human relates himself to the boardered space of Fink: But then the follow. light, he relates himself at the same time to that which repels the quality assertion that I cannot Everything that follows feauxd) is puzzling to me. ! do of standing open. One must find a word in order to be able linguistically Heidegger: the fragment. What is treated in this text? &jn:ExaL to comprehend the reference of the human not only to the open but also not see the thrust of three times, and each lime in another reference. to the night thai surrounds the open. [touch on] is mentioned First, touches on (kindles) a light in the night. Then Heideg(;er: Ihe dark is in a certain sense also the openness, if a it says that a human it says that while living, he touches in sleep on the dead, and in waking he light is kindled in it. This dark openness is only possible in the clearing in dnxeiai fit in here? the sense of the Da. touches on the sleeping. How does Fink: First, Heraclitus speaks of &JT:xexai in reference to qxio; [light Fink: 1 would suppo.se thai we may think the concealment of the fire]. Touching on is also meant in fire-kindling. If a dark not only out of the relationship of clearing of the Da. There is the of the kindled between night and light, then he is also danger that one understands the dark only as lioundary of what stands human is the in-l»etwcen teing, the in-between i>eiween life and death, the l>eing who is already open, as the exterior walling of the open. I would like above all to being life, he touches on death while sleeping; in indicate that a human relates himself at the same time to the open and to near to death in hfe. In sleeping, dnxoiiai [reciprocal touching] means the concealing darkness. waking, he touches on the a mamier than just the absiract repieseniation. Sleep is Heide(;(^KR: What you say may Ijc true, but it is not directly men- more intimate the mean between life and death. Fhe sleeping have the inactivity of the tioned in the fragment. I will not contest the dimension you have in view. living. Fink: l^t us start from the situation of light in the night. Soinelx)dy dead and the breathing of the Hki»K(;(;hr: What does "awake" mean? kindles a torch in the night, li casts its shine on the way. so that one can wakeful one is he who stands fully open. orient oneself on the way. in that he moves in brightness, and relates Fink: The Hkiue(;ger: Awake is connected with "to awaken." himself to it, he relates himself at the same time to the menacing dark- Participant: In waking up, one touches on sleep. Waking up is the ness, for which he is understandingly open even though mjl in the man- of falling asleep. ner of standing open. The clearing in the concealing darkness has its counterpart . . . 132 133 Heidegger: Do you thus mean that in waking up we are at the edge Heidegger: According to Aristotle, we know nothing of sleep. of sleepf But in the fnigmeni ii is a Aristotle matter of an essential reference of Fink: I would like to contest that. What says in this way waking' and sleep of sleep and and death. . about sleep does not spring from a phenomenological analysis of sleep, ! ink: . . . and it is not a matter of what is accidentally given. Here it which—as I believe—is still undone today. is a matter of the human as the one who is belween-night-and-day. Heidkggek: I don't contest the possibility of experiencing sleep as Heidkg(;er: For me, the in-l)eiween is still not the da. Also, we sleep, but I see no access. sometimes call a wakeful a bright, &;n:eoeai human lively one. His attention is Fink: When Heraclitus speaks of the of those who are directed toward something. He exi.sts in that his bearings are directed awake in reference to those who are asleep, that cannot mean the ex- toward something. terior appearance. Touching on ... is a coming into nearness (6v- Fink: relationship The between waking and sleep is similar to that XLpaoiT]), a form of approach that does not happen only objectively, but between gods and humans. Comportment toward the sleep that per- which includes a dark mode of understanding. meates all wakefulness l>elongs to the self-understanding of being awake. Heidegger: If we now summarize the whole, we can say that you Heidegger: Being waked up includes in itself the reference to have already foreshadowed where you place 6jnea6aL. The three man- sleepiness. Naturally, that is not meant in Fr. 26. It is not a question her« ners of ftjireoflai are relationships that a human encounters . . of external relationships but of inner references. As understanding Fink: ... but a human as distinctive elucidation of the basic refer- comportment toward the mortal being of humans belongs to the self- ence. As the counterreference of gods and humans was thematic before, understanding of the gods, so also the understanding reference to sleep now a human becomes thematic in the midst of oppositions. A human is belongs to the self-understanding of those who are awake. Something of the twilight, fire-kindling being in the counlerplay of day and night. It is the meaning of sleep in the life of humans shows itself here. the basic situation of humans to be placed in an extraordinary manner in Fink: The countertension to sleep belongs to being awake. Bui the the counterplay of day and night. A human does not come forth like the sleepei touches on death. Sleep is the way of being engulfed and being other living beings in this counterplay; rather, he comports himself to- untied from all that is many structured. said in Fr. about and Thus seen, the sleeper ward it, is near fire and related to aocp6v. What is 26 comes into the neighborhood of the dead, who have lost the domain of references, belongs in discussion of the counterplay of opposites. What the di.slinctions of Kavxa, ^v holds apart and together is thought in the image of the god, in the Heidegger: For the Hindu, sleep is the highest life. image of bow and lyre and in &et»ovta acpavTJg. There the countertum- Fink: That may lie a counterturn- Hindu experience. Sleeping is a manner of ing is taken in view. But herein Fr. 26, it isnot a matlerof being alive, as waking is the concentrated and proper manner of being ing, but of what is opposed . . alive. Those who are awake do not immediately together. touch on the dead, but Heidegger: . , . which belongs only indirectly through and sleep. Sleep is the middle part between waking Fink: A human is not only exposed to the counterplay of day and l>eing dead. Being is dead viewed from sleep. night; rather, he can understand it in a special manner. But the many do Heidegger: relatedness of §v Do you say that the experience of sleep is the condition not understand it; rather, only he who understands the of possibility of the experience of death? and ndvia. I- ink: I That would Ixr saying t«x) much. Sleep is a way of being simi- Heidegger: With the difficulty that Fr, 26 creates for me, lar to l>eing difficulty only dead, but a way that does not occur only in an objective could—above all in order to clarify aJiTExai—.solve the biological sense. For in the xai ^^a ov^.- under.standing of sleep we have a twilight when I t(H»k Fr. 10 into consideration: ouvcivie^ SXa oux understanding of Ijeing iv. gv xai k^ ivoz dead. In a certain manner it is true that like is cpegonEvov 6ia 134 135 stood in the sense of a familiar wholeness. The usual idea of wholeness is . f Fink: ... of what holds . oriented toward joining together. But in the fragment it says: wholes and Heidegger: . . . visible. The fragment does not say that one de- not wholes. Thus, it is a matter of otivdipiEg, not only of simple moments velops out of everything combined, but that the unifying Sv becomes into a whole, but of wholes and not wholes, as well as of harm<»nies and visible in the allness, from out of the allness. Is it a question here only of not harmonies. the mlio cognoscendi [inder of knowledge] or the ratio essendi [order of Heidegger: We tan bracket the Jtai between 6\a and oiix SXa. being]? Fink: The fragment then says further: ex jiovtcuv ev xai e§ iv6i^ Fink: Of the ratio e.\sendi. JiAvta [out of everything one and out of one everything]. Heidegger: But how? We understand the £% fvo^ Jidvra, but the ex Heidegger: is surprising What is that jiAvTa and flXa occur at the nctvtojv h/ has not occurred up till now. same lime. Fink: We already came across tx ndvrtov ev in the relationship of Fink: flX,a are in Jidvra. goods and gold. The Jidvta as the many in entirety, which stand fastened HEiDEt:GER: Thus, TO fiXov does not mean the world. by 2v, refer to the one. All 6vxa are already from the beginning held in Fink: The fragment speaks in the plural of wholes . . the care, in the guard, of EV. Heidegger: . , . that are not to be understood, however, in the Heidegger: I cannot follow thai through sufficiently. sense of things. Fink: The words au|npEe6[iEvov diaqjEponevov [concord and dis- Fink: Ai first, one thinks it is a matter here of oppositions on the cord] sound very hard. The phrase brings us up short, which is its level. same But at the close of the fragment it is said that it is not a matter express intention. But at the same time, it is taken back in the aitvdT|iiEg. of the union of opposites; rather, everything can be thought only from Heidegger: The reference of ndvxa and itv must be specified dif- out of the relatedness of bf and ndvxa. ferenlly than the reference of ^v and jxdvra. To l>e sure, both references Heidegi;er: How do you understand the kK [out of]? lielong together, but as distinguished. The e^ tvog jrdvra is not equal to Fink: out of From ouvd^nec;. That is a form. ex ndvTorv §v, but it is the same in the sense of belonging together. The Heidegger: Do you mean a form or the form? difficulty that has shown itself again and again in the course of the Fink: The form. You have interpreted the relatedness of Ev and seminar lies in the methodological starting point, the Justificalion of K&vxa state affairs, as of which I certainly do not want to contest. So long as one does not have Heidegger: Is fx Jtdvrojv [out of everything] the same as ^^ h/6q Xoyog in view, it is hard to get through the text, and Heraclilus reads [out of one]? with difficulty. For that reason, it seems to me that one must lake Fr. 1, Fink: Here the ouvdipLEg is in Ixjth taken view from sides, the one which is regarded as the l>eginning of Heraclilus' writing, as also the lime as relatedness of itdvxa and ^v, the other lime as relatedness of 6v basis for the lx;ginning of the explication of Heraclilus. With the phrase and Jidvra. ex jrdvT(i)v ev, the question we have po.sed in reference to the relatedness Heidegger: But we must determine that more precisely, because of J;v and Jidvxa comes into play again, namely, how the relatedness is to the basic relatedness of 'i\ and jrdvra lies at the basis of Fr. 26 on a be determined, if it is neither a matter of a making nor of a casting of scale. smaller light. What is ihe basic character of jrdvra as itdvia in ev, ndvra as Fink: I cannot see it there. reined in by 6v? Only when «me sees this aspecl can one determine the ex Heidegger: When one reads ex jrdvrtuv ev at Fust reading, just as it ndvTOJV §v. ouvdipLE^ is probably the key to understanding this. stands there, ihen il says that the one is put together out of everything. PARnciPAN'r: If we may alsoconsider the context of Fr. 10, we find Fink: lie, That would then, an ontic process—which, however, is the word arvfiTt'ev [concord] in il. not in the meant fragment. Heidec;ger: There il says that nature brought about the first con- Heide(;ger: But what is the meaning of Ix and then e^? ^ 's indeed ford by the union of opposites. The fragment does nol, however, say the re-laiedness of Jidvia, but ndvta are m»t on tJietr pari the re- that the fv ixxurs oui of the many. latedness of ?v. Fink: I would understand ouvd»|>iE5 verbally. ^"lNK: The ex must in each case l>e thouglii differenlly. The Tidvxa HEiDF.ciGEK: I lay great importance on the word ouvdijueg in refer- in a\ivdT|)iEg in are refeience to the ev. They are held from out of ev; they ence to Fr. 26. Here, everything is siill dark. I am concerned only to see are ovvfjtjtxoufva [fastened]. what is que.Mionable in llic matter, if one avoids operating from the i.s HEn>EGGER; Out of their Iwing fastened the holding . . Ixiginning on the level of things. . 136 I 12 Participant: The word oiiv(lii|)ie? has, among others, also lieen conlested. Sleep and Dream—AiiilMguity of &TXEa9at Participant: Instead of ot)v6h|'1£5, ouW-dipifg [taking together] is a (Correlated Fragments: 26, 99, 55). possible rendition, which is to be understood from ouWxipfi [what holds or is held together]. Heidegger: ouXXatipdvetv [to gather together] and ouvditteiv [to join together] are not so far from one another. move into a metaphorical manner of speaking, when we Participant: ovX^dipLEg would be simpler to understand, and Fink: We speak of sleep as the brother of death. Someone who wakes up out of a means taking-together. The context gives examples of it. deep sleep and reflects on sleep says, "I have slept like a dead man." Ihis Heidegger: What is puzzling is the ouv, whether we now remain metaphorical interpretation is doubtful. with owaTpieg or aDXXdijJie^. The avv comes first before ountpepotiEvov Heidegger: A second difficulty is expressed with the question 6LaqpEe6nEvov. cruvdiines means the belonging-together of CRincpEeojievov whether all sleeping is also dreaming. Is sleeping to be identified with and 6ia(pEedn£vov. dreaming? Today, psychology maintains that all sleeping is also dream- Fink: oiivdiltLEg means no simple clasping together, but the ing. clasping-logether of what is clasped-together and what is not clasped- Fink: In dreaming, we must distinguish the one who dreams and together. That allows itself to be understood, however, first from the a the dreamed I. When we speak of a light in the dream, this light is not relatedness, of ?v-Ji6vTa. otrvdyieg, thought verbally, means not only the for the dreamer, but rather for the dreamed I of the dream world. The condition of what is clasped-together, but a happening, a constant coun- sleeper, or the sleeping I, is also the dreaming I, who is not the I o( the lerplay . . dream world who is awake and sees in the dreams. In the dream world, Heidegger: ... a continuous bringing-ioward-one-another. Think- I. the the 1 of the dream world behaves similarly to the wakeful While ing in Greek, we can say that everything plays here in nonconcealmcnt finds itself in a dreaming I sleeps, the dreamed i of the dream world and concealing. We must also see that from the beginning, because oth- of wakefulness. What is important, however, is that the light of erwise everything becomes opaque. condition the dream world is a light not for the dreaming or sleeping I, but for the vary dreamed I. The 1 of the dream world can have different roles and indi- in its self- relatedness. A phenomenological analysis of the dream cates that not the sleeping, but the dreamed 1 kindles a light. Although the sleeper does not see, still, as a dreamer, he has a dreamed 1 that has encounters. Heideggck: Thus one cannot identify sleeping and dreaming. Fink: Sleeping is a vivid form of human absorption. Dreaming is a of mode of the real I. while being awake in the dream world is the mode an intentional I. The relationship of the sleeping 1 to the dreamed I, or recollection. of the real I to the intentional 1, one can compare with The rctolletior is not the subject of the recollected world. We must also distinguish here between the recollecting and the recollected 1. While I, or the recollecting 1 belongs in the actual surroundings, the recollected wt>rld. Only the I of the recollected world, is referred to the recollected Ix-cause we customaiily do not make the distinction between the say that the sleeping-dreaming I aii ing to see and not being able to .see in the night, employs his power of tween the sleeping and the dreamed 1 will be ()veikK)ked and, on thet kindling fire, he touches the power of light. Kindling fire other hand, the human siiiiation, aimed al (in my opinion) in the frag- on is also a touching on. Touching on the power of light is a kindling. In contrast, ment, of standing tietween light and night gets lost. Dreaming is not the touching on the night has anothei' character. fire essential distinction ol humans vis-a-vis animals. Animals also dieam, for Human kindling is a example, the hunting dog, when they make noises in their sleep. There projection of a light brightness in which many, that is, the multiplicity of itoXXd are lit up. I intentionally speak of noXXa now and not of JtdvTa. is also something like a dreamed dog-world. I myself reject the interpre- The finite, small light-shine of human fire is also a Ev in the sense of a tation according to which the human position lx;tween night and light is brightness in which many things show up. Here the relatedne.ssof and a matter of dreaming. Indeed, it is a possibility of interpretation, hut one ^ jidvxa repeats itself in the relationship of gv must ask what philosophical relevance such an interpretation has in the reduced manner as (in the sense of the brightness of the fire kindled by a whole context of the fragments. human) and Ko>Ad (that is, the things that show brightness). HEiDEGGKR: We must notice that the thesis "no sleep without up in each bounded Heidegger: When you speak about kindling fire, do you mean fire dream" is an ontic di.scovery that supprcs.ses the existential distinction of only in the sense of brightness and not also in regard to warmth? the sleeping and the dreamed I and only claims that all sleeping is also dreaming. Fink: Helios brings forth the seasons, which bring everything (jrdvxa). structure of ?v, as the brightness of the sun, Jtdvta, as Fink: The same thesis also levels down the distinction Ix'tween wak- The and the in entirety which forth to appearance in the sun"s bright- ing in reality and the dreamed waking in the dream world. many come ness, a repetition in in the relationship Heidegger: The phenomenological distinction between sleeping has moment of reduced manner of ev as the brightness of the fire kindled by a human and no'Kkd. which and dreaming is lacking in that thesis which identifies sleeping with show up in this finite brightness. Human fire cannot illuminate every- dreaming. It is always an advantage to save the unity of the text, which is thing (jidvxa), but only many things (noXkA). the contrary, the philologically always a principle to be positively valued. There are phases On brightness of the sun-fire surrounds eveiything (jidvxa). in philology in which everything is dropped and cancelled, and then Heidegger: Does the distinction between the brightness of fire again, phases in which one iiies to save everything. When I came to projected by humans and the brightness of Helios consist in the fact that Marburg in 1923, my friend Bultniann had stricken .so much out of the one is restricted, while the latter is referred to ail? New Testament that scarcely anything remained. In the meantime, thai has changed again. Fink: Yes. Heidegger; Is there brightness of fire without the light of Helios? The whole of Fr. 26 is difficult, especially because of dntEtai. Perhaps Fink: No. Rather, the brightness of fire projected by humans is more clarity in this regard will come if we now proceed. derivative from the sun's brightness. Fink: I would like to say at the outset that the entire interpretation Heioeggeh: We must also emphasi/e that the candlelight does not that I now give of Fr. 26 is only an attempt at interpretation. When we show anything for itself, and that a human is not a seer for himself alone. proceed from the fact that a human kindles a light in the night, he is The candlelight only shows something, and a human sees what is self- spoken of as the fire kindler, that is, as the one who holds sway over the showing ill the light-shine of the candle only in so far as he stands always TOHTlOL^ of fire-kindling. We mu.st recall that it was a decisive step in and already in what is cleared. Openness for the light in general is the human cultural development to gain power over fire—which otherwise condition for his seeing something in the candlelight. was peiceived only, for example, as liglitning-—to get coinmand and use Fink: The candlelight is an insulai' light in the night, such that we of fire. A human is distinguished fr<»m all animals by the heritage of can distinguish lietween brightness and daikness. Ihe brightness of the Prometheus. No animal kindles fire. Only a human kindles a light in the candlelight disperses it.self in the dark, while the brightness of Helios is night. Nevei theless he is not able, like Helios, to kindle a world-fne that no longei' exj>erienced as biighlness in the nighl. The brightness of the never goes out. thai diives out the nighi. Fi-. 90 said that if Helios were sun ill general makes possible and su])ports human seeing and ihe visual not. it would l)e night despite the remaining stars. The moon and stars ability to relate to what shows itself. In the brightness that a human are lights in the night. Helios alone drives out the night. Helios is no brings forth, in the lighl-shine kindled by him, there emerges a relation- island in ihe nighl, but has overcome the insular nature. A human is not ship of grasping human to gias]x-d state ol affairs in his surroun iween the grasps by seeing and what is grasped. This disianiial seen. There is a constitutive distance between seeing and whai is seen in one who understanding. Contrary to the unity of the overarching light that llhiminates and makes visible. distance is a fundamental way of that would l)e understanding grounded in a being-in-the-proximity in the sense Heidegger: Here we can draw on Fr. 55: Socov Stpi^ 6,Koi\ fi&Gx\aii^, an is understanding TaiiTO eyia ngoxmeu}. I of immediate louthing on. Touching on an that does out the survey, out the expanse, or out of the region Fink: oiiii^ and ^koVj, sight and hearing, are both distance senses. not come of of toward what is grasped. The one is a relationship to the hght-space, the other a relationship to the space of sound. Heidegger; But what about when 1 now give you my hand? Fink: That is an immediate touching of hands. In jieqi Vi'CTS [On Heidegcer: The Diels translation, "Everything of which there is of the sense of touch. But a sight, hearing, learning, that do I prefer," is inverted if you equate oijii^, the Soul], Aristotle calls flesh the medium objection here, because flesh is not the dxofj, and fiAerioi? [learning], and do not understand 6^1? :>nd Ako^ as phenomenological must be made medium in the proper sense for touching and what is touched. Seeing is |i.d6T)ois. From this we must say: "Everything of which there is learning referred to a visible thing, to a visible object, which, however, meets us from sight and hearing, that do 1 prefer. What one can see and hear, that gives learning." out of a region. Encounter out of the open ambit, which is cleared by the distinctive special of grasping that consists in Fink: It is thus a matter of nav6 understood region. If 1 have understood you coriedly, you have em- louthing on which shows itself in feeling \Tasien\. Here there is an im- ployed the phenomenological distinction Ijetween distance sense and mediate proximity between feeling and what is felt. This proximity is not thai is, lx.'tween (he region out of which the seer en- transmitted through the medium of distance in which the seer and what proximity sense, counters the seen and the hearer encounters the heard, and the im- is seen, or the hearer and what is heard, are set apart from one another. proximity of feeling and felt, as springboard for a speculative In seeing, the grasping in light is separated from what is grasped. In the mediate different ways of understanding tieing unity of the light that surrounds ihe one who grasps and the grasped, ihought according to which two out from the immediate touching of feeling the manifold of noXkd. shows up. A distantial di.slance holds sway be- are distinguished. Setting . . . . . 142 143 is prior to the light, not be and what is fell, you go over to the touching of the waking on the mental character of the clearing, that it will sleeping and the touching of the sleeping on the dead. seen. heir the fire thief, has the possibility of Fink: I must make a slight correction of that. 1 am not so much Fink: A human, as the of starting out from a phcnomenological investigation of seeing but more bringing forth light in a certain sense, but only because there is a in reference to the structure of brightness. A small, finite fire is also a clearing . , in the clearing . . . stands unity that is not alongside things. The brightness of the Fire kindled by Heidegger: . . because a human nature. only does the occurrence of humans is not only the radiance on things, but the space-and-time-fiUing Fink: . . . and indeed by Not clearing, but also the grasping oc- light in which not only many things but many kinds of things show up. things belong to standing within the for the most part simply in- The way that the one who grasps is in the brightness is the way of currence of the human who, however, is the light in which things dislantial perception. If finxExaL cauxu) is pleonastic when seen linguisti- stalled among things, and who does not think stands in the light, but it does not properly cally, I would not reject the pleonism. For one can say that a human are grasped. (Irasping indeed the grasped things. kindles a fire that is for him in contrast to the fire that is for all and in grasp the light; rather, it remains turned only toward shin- which, from the l>eginning, all humans reside as in the brightness of the The task of thinking, therefore, is to think that which itself makes day-star. A human kindles for himself a light that illuminates him as the ing up and grasping possible . . belongingness of the light to . kind one who is off the track and helpless. I started out from this phenome- Heidegger: . . and also the of is distinctive thing. non, and I have then characterized not only the relationship of 6v (in the the clearing, and how the light a sense of the brightness cast by a human) to KoXXd, but also the human Fink: No better analogy shows itself for the special position of hu- dwelling in brightness as a distantial reference. Fire kindling cancels the mans in the midst of xdndvxa than that they, different from all other living the fire moment of immediacy of touching because the fire in itself is cast over a beings, are light-nigh. Touching on the power of fire is way of distance. kindling. One can now interpret the phenomenal features mentioned only as the light Heidegger: Somebody kindles a candle or a torch. What is pro- ontologically in that one understands the light not the light or as the light-nature of ooqxiv, duced with the kindling of the torch, the flame, is a kind of thing . . perceptible by the senses, but as toward oocptiv is it . . human comportment Fink: . . . that has the peculiarity that shines which makes all oacp^?. The original clearing, a touching being-nigh Heidegger: . . . not only shines, but al.so allows seeing. human standing within the things in their Fink: It makes a shine, casts out brightness and lets what shows oo(p6v in the manner of an understanding explication of itself be seen therein. essence. The danger here is that the clearing or brightness itself is not There is no Heidegger: This thing at the same time has the character that it fitsJ thought. In the brightness many and various things show up. brightness, many itself into the openness in which humans stand. The relationship of light] brightness in which there is only one thing. In the their boundedness is outlined, and and clearing is difficult to comprehend. things set themselves off. In the light, seer sees himself distin- Fink: The source of light is first seen in its own light. What isj they have boundaries against one another. The from the other things noteworthy is that the torch makes possible its own being seen. guished from the ground on which he stands, and Heidegger: Here we come up against the ambiguity of shine. We on the ground and round about him. But there is also no brightness in brightness, not only say, for example, the sun shines. which only one kind of thing would l>e given. In the kinds, for example, Fink: If we think in terms of physics, we speak of the sun as light a great number show up. but also many and various alongside natural things also source and of the emission of its rays. We then determine the relation- stone, plant, animal, fellow-human, and the same kind, ship of clearing to light such that the clearing, in which the sun itself is artificially made things, etc. We do not see only things of human, in the brightness brought seen, is derivative from the light as the sun. We must put precisely this but also rliffeient kinds of things. A the midst of the derivative relationship into question. The light of the clearing does not ab<»ut by him, is as the finite refiection of ocxptW in understanding in the light precede but, the other way around, the clearing precedes the light, A entirety that is the articulated joining. Human this understanding is at the light is only possible as an individual l>ecause it is given individually in happens as an understanding of inoUti. and accoicling to kind and species. JioUA are the clearing. The sun is seen in its own light, so that the clearing is the same time variously articulated multiplicity according to more original. If we trace the brightness back only to the source of light, not only a multiplicity of numlx-r but also a the brightness, we skip over the fundamental cbaiacter of the clearing. kind. In contiast to this articulated understanding in understanding that is not articulated Heid£(k:ek: So long as one thinks in tei nis of physics, the funda- there is perhaps a manner of dark . . . . 144 145 and that does not happen in the shine of brightness thai sets apart and Heidegger: But what do you understand by the ontic proximity? joins together. The dark understanding is a kind of nightly touching on When you say proximity, do you not then mean a small distance? which tan be characterized as the neighborhood of ontic relation. In the Fink; Fhe ancients knew two principles of understanding; tike position of Being and Time, a human is regarded as the entity that is cogni/ed through like and unlike cognized through unlike. A human is unique in the constitution of its being. Although he is onlically disun- distinguished from all of what is. Nevertheless, that does not preclude guished from all of what is, and customarily understands him.self es- him from understanding and determining all the rest of what is in its tranged from other entities, he has the understanding of the manner of,, being. Here the principle functions that unlike is cognized by unlike. But being of all domains of things ... ill in so far as a human is a living being, he also has still another character of with . being which he reaches Heidegger: . . and indeed precisely on the ground of the ontJc into the nightly ground. He has the double distinctness. character: on the one hand, he is the one who places himself in the Fink: The ontic distinctness of nonhuman entities is no barrier for clearing, and on the other, he is the one who is tied to the underground human understanding of the manner of being, but precisely goes to- of all clearing. gether with it. But a human is not only a cleared being; he is also a Heidegger: This would become intelligible first of all through the natural being and as such he is implanted in a dark manner in nature. phenomenon of the body . . There is now also a dark understanding that presupposes not the onuc Fink: ... as, for example, in the understanding of Eros. difference, but precisely the ontic proximity, an understanding, how- Heidegger: Body is not meant ontically here . . . , . ever, that lacks clarity and historical investigation. One such dark under- Fink: and also not in the Husserlian sense, . . standing of the nightly ground is also meant with the &nx£xa\. in refer- Heidegger: . . . but rather as Nietzsche thought the body, even ence to eOcpQovi], and in the manner that the waking touch on the sleep- though it is obscure what he actually meant by it. ing and the sleeping touch on the dead. This dark understanding is no Fink: In the section "Of the Despisers of the Body," Zarathustra ." kind of distantial understanding, but an understanding that stands in, says, "'Body am I entirely, and nothing else; . . Through the body and that rests on, the ontic proximity, but that exhibits no ontological abun- the senses a human is nigh to the earth. dance. A human is predominantly a light kindler, he who is delivered Heidegger: But what is ontic proximity? over to the nature of light. At the same time, however, he also rests on Fink: Human lack of ontological affinity with other entities belongs the nightly ground that we can only speak of as closed. The sleeping and together with the ontological understanding of his manner of being. But the dead are figures indicated by human belonging in living and dead if a human exists between light and night, he relates himself to night nature. differently than to light and the open, which has the distinguishing, Heidegger: The concept of ontic proximity is difficult. There is joining together structure. He relates himself to night or to the nightly also an ontic proximity l>etween the glass and the book here on the table. ground in so far as he belongs bodily to the earth and to the flowing of Fink: Between the glass and the book there is a spatial proximity, life. The dark understanding rests as it were on the other principle of but not a proximity in the manner of being. understanding according to which like is cognized through like. Heidegger: You indeed mean an ontological and not an onti Heidegger: Can one isolate the dark understanding, which the proximity. IxKlily belonging to the earth determines, from being placed in the clear- Fink: No, here it is precisely a matter of an ontic proximity. We can ing? make clear what the ontic proximity implies on the opposite .structure. Fink: True, the dark understanding can be addressed from the As Dasein, a human is distinguished from the rest of what is, but at the clearing, but it doesn"i let itself l>e brought further to language in the same time he has the ontological understanding of ail of what is. Aristo- manner of the articulated joining. tle says: i\ ijiuxn t« fivxa jrwg iaxi jrdvta. The soul is in a certain sense all Heidegger: When you say ontic proximity, then no small distance is things (jiepi \^njxf|5, FS, 431 b21). That is the manner in which a hmnan meant in what you call proximity, but a kind nf openness . . comes nigh to ao((niv, to Xciyog, to the articulated joining of the xooftog. Fi.nk: . . . hut a twilight, dark, reduced openness thai has no history Because he himselt belongs in the clearing, he has a limited ligliting ofconcepts behind it, to which we may have to come sometime. A human capacity. As the one who can kindle fire, he is nigh to the sunlike and the has his place between heaven and earth, Ixjiween the openness of .wpkati -like. (iXi'iGfia and ihe closedness of XtjOti. Nevertheless, we must say that all 146 147 comportment toward the dark ground is lo lie experienced as torrfport- on the sleeper and the sleeper's touching on the dead. How is the rela- be ment when a residue of clearing remains, because in the absolute night tionship of the wakeful lo the sleeping lo determined? The wakeful not only all cows are black, but also all understanding is obliterated. one has a knowledge of sleep that is more than simply a memory of knowledge Heidegger: A human is emlxtdied [leihl] only when he lives [lebt]. having slept, falling asleep, and waking up. The of the wake- body in is manner of the dark flux of life where the I is The your sense is lo be underst Participant: all easily afxjul metaphysical entities. Wittgenstein says an astounding thing in thfi we speak too Tractalus. language is the extension of the organism. Heidegger: When you speak of the uncleared, is that to be under- Fink: The only question is how "oiganism" is lo be understoc stood as privation or as negation? the cleared. be here, whether biologically or in the manner that human dwelling in the Fink: The uncleared is not privative in regard to To midst of what is is essentially determined by Ijodiliness. sure, we understand the uncleared from out of the cleared. But we are Heidegger: One can understand organism in the sense of Uexkiills concerned here with an original relationship to Xr|0Ti, Out of the situa- or also as the functioning of a living system. In my lecture, which you tion of an essence determined by SXiieELa, the human has at the same dtXi)6eia; rather, mentioned, I have said that the stone is worldless, the animal world- time a relationship to ^.tjOtj. He does nol always stand in poor, and the human world -forming. he stands in rhythmic oscillation between waking and sleeping. The Fink: It is thereby a question whether the world-poverty of the night, which he touches on in sleep, is not only to be understood priva- is as an autonomous moment alongside the animal a deficient mode of world-forming transcendence. It is ques- tively, but is to be understood he relates in waking. As tionable whether the animal in the human can be undeistood at all when moment of day or of the brightness to which a is not only a Heidegger: Ihe bodily in the human is not something animalistic. Heidegger: Is \i\Q^ to be identified with night? The manner of understanding that accompanies it is something that Fink: Night is a kind of Xr|0Ti, uncleared? you metaphysics up till now has not touched on, Ontic proximity fiolds of Heidegger: How do you undersland the When [privation]. many phenomena from which you want to comprehend &JiTtiai. speak of reduced openness, that .sounds like aicgTioig the possibility of Fink: ajntxai appears at first to be spoken from a clinging to and Fink: Being awake is, in its tautne.ss, suffu.sed by Sleep is touching on, from the sense of touch. In touching on ihe dark power, a ihc sinking away of tension and the extinguishing of all interest. into the proximity of !x;ing dead, and is not neigh Ijorhood of proximity holds sway; while touching on the light is a a way in which we come Perhaps must also treat phenomena standing in the light. What is in the light has in itself the moment of merely a metaphor for death. one distantiaiity. against w hich, however, it is no objection thai a human also like dying ontologically sometimes. the re- touches on ihe power of light of ooqxW, PARTiGiPANr: I believe thai we must distinguish between Heii>eg<;er: How do you now understand "louching on"? duced clearedness of the daik iindeislanding. lor example, of ihe in sleep, and ihe dark ground itself, Fink: Touching on the power of light of oocptW is a distanced touch- understanding of the dark ground Ihe understanding of the dark ing on. To the coniiary, louching on the dark power is a dislanceless which is uncleaied pure and simple, itself, is half cleared. touching on. Such a dislanceless touching on is the awake one's louching ground, and not the dark ground . . . 148 149 differentiation of understanding. For I^ibni/, being Fink: A human as a torch in the nighi implies that he is allied to the grades of receding representatitm. still manner of life, thai is. of undifferentiated light-brightness of day and to the night which extinguishes all distinc- dead is a speaking, the monads cannot die. Thereby, he interprets tions and the possibility of sight. since, strictly of death in terms of an extreme weakness of conscious- Heidegger: The experience of sleep does not imply a mere re- the seriousness of ness. interprets sleep, impotence, and death in reference to a stale membering that I was falling asleep. The experience does not refer to He regression of differentiation of living representation of the lower sleep as a mere occurrence . . monads. Fink: ... in conscious life, . . observation Heraclitus' Fr. 26. however, is not concerned with an con- Heidegger: . . . but signifies a manner of my being in which I am through waking and sleep. cerning life and death and their mediation implicated . . essence of humanity. A human, as the one in but with a statement on the Fink: . . . and that still determines me being awake. The bright- touch on the able to kindle fire and as the one who is able to ness of being awake always stands upon the dark underground. who is able to touch on the light, is at the same time also the one who is Heidegger: Do you mean that in the actual [aklnellen] sense? power of the death. But what is the meaning of touching on Fink: Similarly to the way the gods relate understandingly in their dark in sleep and in what is which does not have the distaniiality of one who grasps and own life, by relating at the same time to the transient being of mortals, so dark expres- within the brightness? Here we cling to the trouble.some we relate ourselves wakefully to the manifold, ordered cosmos which is a grasped proximity. are concerned with the philosophical prob- joining. Thereby, we know at the same time in a dark manner about the sion of onlic We relationship of the human with ihe relationship to ability to be extinguished in sleep. lem of the double grasps in fire, which is a distanlial understanding of one who Heidegger; But this knowledge is not necessarily actual [aktueli]. light and to what he grasps, and with ihe undeistanding which is Fink: No. Perhaps this knowledge may be characterized from the reference to immediacy of StPl; [touching] in which the distinctions problem of thrownness as being abandoned to that which a human has oriented to the and grasped escape us. We have here only the modes to be, and which does not belong to reason. As soon as one speaks of between grasping absorption, and we cannot say more because otherwise we understanding of the dark ground as a relationship, one already means a of escape and into a speculative mysticism. distanlial understanding. easily decline relationship lo death includes the question about Heidegger: When we speak of the relationship to sleep, that is an Heidegger: The sleep. We cannot circumvent the problem of inadequate manner of speaking. Is sleep the genuine understanding of the phenomenon of life and occurs in the fragment itself. We cannot come to the dark ground? death, liecause death problem independently on the basis of sleep alone. Fink: Not the sleeper, but the awake one relates himself to sleep. grips with the Heidegger: Concerning this reference, is there still another on- tological possibility? Fink: If l>eing awake is the intensity of the process of life, the taut- ness is supported by the possibility of being able to let loose the tension of all fixation, of distinction and contrast in relationship to things and to the brightness. Someone could say that we are dealing here with an ob,servation to the effect that life relates to death like waking to sleep, or like sleep to being dead, and that these analogical relationships would be spoken externally. But with that, one misses our real problem, which concerns the manner in which ihe awake one touches on sleep and the living sleeper touches on the dead. Touching on is our problem, and not the everyday observation or everyday philosophy according to which sleep is the brother of death, and life and death aie regarded as mediated through the link of sleep. In l^ibniz, we find the philosophical tendency to attempt to understand the being of the lower monads through dieamlcss sleep, impotence, and death, which is no death for him in the strict .sense. The three phenomena mentioned are for him . 13 151 of the attempted explication, and I will in closing make an observation Reference to Death. Awaiting - Hoping on what has transpired thus far. like to relate to Fr. (Correlated Fragments: 27, 28).— Fink: I go to Fr. 27, which I would 26. The text aKoQav6vxa<; dooa ovv. The "Contraries" and their "Transition" runs: dveQtbJioug nevet EAjiovrat ovbk 60KEOUOLV. Diels translates: "When they are dead, what awaits people is (Correlated Fragments: 111, 126, 8, 48, 51).— not what they hope or imagine." Closing Question: The Greeks as a Challenge. We can start the explication with the question of what ^^[^(o [to hope] or Djii,<; [expectation] means. People are not related only to what is immediately present, to what lies Ijefore them in their grasping ap- prehension. They are not dependent only upon what they can get hold perceptible environment; rather, people are, as acfive beings in Fink: Till now, we have come across humans only in relationship to the of in the the encounter with what is present, projected into an anticipation of the gods (Fr. 62). Fr. 26 de;ils with the human being alone, but without future. This projection happens, among other instances, in hope. In ignoring the other references. &iTeTai is the fundamental word of the [The Lam] (I 644 c 10—644 d I) Plato distinguishes two forms of fragment. There is, however, a difference between ftjiiexai in reference N6noL fear {cp6|io;) and confidence (e 152 153 / Heidegger: Hope meuns "to concern oneself wiih something very Meinong and with which Hus.serl struggled. ftoxEiv is here not mere intensely," while there is an adjoining with what is to come in awaiiing. imagining, but an accepting grasp. Hope at the same time includes an aggressive moment; aivaiiing, on the Fink: Later on, in Plato, bo^a has predominantly the sense of opin- contrary, includes the moment of restraint. It is in this that 1 see the ion. But ogQi] 66^a [correct opinion], which has no negative sense, is also distinction of the two phenomena. found in Plato. Fink: In Greek, eXjilc; encompasses both. In Notiot, a human is de- Heidegger; We also come across 6oxelv. in the significance which termined by X,ujiTi [pain] and fibovfi [pleasure]. Exijeciation (eXjif^) of we have drawn upon for Fr. 27. in Parmenides. when he speaks of ^iirij is tpojiog; expectation (fXjtCg) of if|6ovT| is OaQQog. boKovvza. HEn)Ec;GEH: Roth altitudes fix themselves on that to which they Fink; Thus, in conclusion, we can translate Fr. 27; "When they are refer. But expectation isihe attitudeof restraint and of adjoining oneself dead, something waits for people that they do not arrive at through hope what is to coming. and accepdng grasping." That means that a human is repelled by the Fink: Expectation is the philosophical attitude. A human does not inaccessibility of the domain of death. relate himself'only to the future of his life, but he also reaches hopefully Finally, we go to Fr. 28: fioxEovra ydg 6 bo-iii,\uhxaTOC. Yivuaxei, Ijeyond the threshold of death. But death is what is closed, indetermi- fpu^dooEt- xal [levroi xal Alxt| xaxaX,T|T[tEtaL aliEv6uxv XEtixovaq xal tiitQ- nate, and incomprehensible. Therefore, the cjuestion is whether there is TVQaq. Here again, we must not understand 6oxeovxa in the negative a land fiehind Acheron or a no man's land. sense of imagining. HEmEGf;ER: Mozart said a quarter of a century before his death, Heidegger: Snell understands Sox^ovxa as that which is only a "The grim reaper speaks to me." view. I cannot connect this translation with the fragment in any sense. Fink: also The grim leaper commissioned his Requiem. Rilke's Fink: I would like to suggest an interpretation as a kind of support lielongs epitaph also here. "Rose, () pure contradiction, desire, / to tie no for the nonimaginary 6okeiv of Fr. 27. The SoxifiiinaTo? is he who one's sleep among .so many / lids." The rose is the simile of the poet who grasps most, the one who has the greatest power of grasping. in lids, many songs, or under his is no more he who wrote songs, but who Participant: The 60x1^0)10x05 's also the one most tested. Perhaps has lost himself in the sleep of no one. An exjKJctant attitude lies in the we must view tx>th meanings together. characterization of death as no one's sleep, a refusal to project what lies Heidegger: How does Diels translate Fr. 28? i>ehind Acheron. In eXjiig, human comportment is determined by a pre- Fink: "(For) what the most credible witness cognizes, retains, is view, indeed either in preview and of the future of life or of the what is only believable. But certainly Dike will know and also seize the threshold of death in reference to a postmortal life. Herarlitus says, fabricators of lies and witnesses." Instead of "what is believable" one however, that when they are dead, something awaits people that they do would rather expect "what is untielievable." I am not of the opinion that not for. Diels translates hope boHiovai'v with "imagine." A derogatory 6oxeovTa has the sense of what is merely posited and not verified. 66^a false connotation of opinion lies in imagining. But 1 fjelieve that Soxeiv in (ireek by no means signifies only mere opinion. There is also the b6h,a does not mean imagine here, but means "grasp." When they are dead, of a hero and of the commander. Here b6'E,a means the manner of such things await people as they do not arrive at through anticipatory standing in sight of something and not, for example, having an illusion. hope, such things as they do not grasp. The realm of death repels from Participant; bomyivnaToq is also the one of highest repute . . itself every premature occupation and cognition. the thinker. Fink; . . . but not with the many; rather, with regard to Hf.ideggek: We must elucidate fioxetv still more closely. The 6oKL[i morning." "To accept" here means. I tolerate. I accept what will Ix- given grasps the most receives the many entities and joins them. The noXkoi to me. We aie dealing here with the moment of toleration, l>ecause are also related to boxtovxa in grasping, but they are given over to othenvise 6oxeiv means an incorrectly held opinion. We must therefore ftoxEOVta and lost in them. They are not able to see the unification, the translate boxEOUOiv as to accept and to grasp. .Xccepiing does not mean light, in which the 6oxeovxa shine up. The 6oxLHC0TaTOc; is referred to here supposition, for example, the supposition that is made thematic by the appearing things, and he holds them together. He watches over the 154 155 ftoxtovra ill thai he refers thein to the Sv. He is not only oriented to the imagining, then the assertion has a harder specification. Also in this many that show themselves in the shine of light, but at the same time he, world, grasping does not suffice. We always move in a correct and incor- as light related, has the power to join them, and he sees what makes the rect grasping. There is error and illusion in life. Heraclitus, however, Soxeovta possible. says that the grasping that we are acquainted with and place in the Heidegger: Thus, you interpret cpuXdooEtv as holding together. service of our life conduct is not sufficient for the jxistmortal domain. Fink: That is, the holding toj^cther of things on what holds them There is no grasping capable of penetrating into the no man's land. together; re-latedness. said. as you have The one who grasps most I go to Fr. Ill: V0O005 i&yieltiv ^iioir|OEV i\bv xal 6.ya(i6v, Xino; xogov, grasps what shines up in a joining relatedness. The SoxtuwTaxog is, x and have grasped feoxEovxa only as such, but do not grasp the appearing said that sickness makes health pleasant, is it then as simple as when in the light of ev. Dike watches over the right grasping attitude, over the Socrates says in the Pkaedo that, after he is freed from the painful guardianship of the ftoxt^utaxog, who hold 6oxtovxa together. shackle, he now feels the pleasant sensation of scratching? Here the HeideG(;er: xaTai,an|iavo» also means to take in. pleasant feeling comes out of the past discomfort. Heraclitus says that Fink: Here in the fragment, however, still more is meant. Dike will sickness makes health good and sweet. Either the past or the following find guilty those who lie. She is the watching power who behaves in health can be meant thereby. Sickness-health is no distinction of a fixed accord with the 60x1^6x0x05 when the latter hold 6vTa together as the and opposing kind, but a phenomenon of contrast of such a kind that many in the one. The counterconcept to the ftoxifKoxaTog is the noXXoC, health can develop out of sickness. The same holds for hunger and lost in who are merely the many, and do not see the joining power of satiety, and for toil and rest. It is a matter of a procedure of opposiles light. To be sure, they see the shining up in light, but not the unity of goingover into their counterpart, of the phenomenal yoking of contrasts light. In so far as they miss a fundamental human possibility, they are in transition, ^bv [pleasant] and fiyaOov [good] are not specified as qual- fabricators of lies. Their lies or their falsehood consists in their mere ities in themselves, but are specified as coming out of a negative state reference to ftoxeovxa, without grasping this in reference to the unifying from their counterpart, which is left behind and abandoned. Past riches one. Dike is the inspiring power to the thinker who watches over the make the following poverty bitter and, conversely, past poverty makes unity of itdtvia gathered in h/. Whether one can still refer [idexvpag the following riches pleasant. These relationships of opposites are famil- [witnesses] also to tliEuStuv [false] is a philological question. The nag- iar to us. What is important here is only that a.yaB6\ and f|6v are TVQaz are witnesses who perceive the 6oKEOvxa, but only these, and not specified only out of the contrast. also the brightness lire itself. of the With this. I go to Fr. 126: xa »(HJXQa eepExai. Oepnov y^vfsxai, iiyeov Heide(;(;er: This explanation is phiiologically more elegant. a^aivExai, xagtpoXeov voxt^exai. Diels' translation runs: 'Clold things be- Fink: By witnesses would be meant those who appeal to what they come warm, the warm c 156 157 that a phenomenally unfamiliar that Heraclitus sptaks once in the plural (xa \\>vxqA) and three limes in whether a background lies therein, such otherwise fixed contraries is the singular (Segfiov, iiygov. KUQ 158 159 problematical coincidence of l)einf^ cold with being warm is something understood correctly what is meant, strictly speaking, by to dvTi|ovv. else. A still more dilficuit problem is the sameness of Hades and Rather, the word is to be understood backwards, from ovmpeeov [har- Dionysus ((buxo; 6e 'ACdric xal Aiovitooc). monizing]. Heidegger: Can one bring the distinction of cold and warm into Fink: to 6.vxi^,ovv means wha! struggle apart, what struggle against relation to the distinction of life and death? each other, but not like two living beings; rather, like something rebel- Fink: Life and death is a much harder distinction . . lious that resists power. What struggle against each other is rebellious Heidegger: . . . wiih which there is no comparison. self-confrontalion. What struggle apart are at the same time what collect Fink: 1 he distinction Ijetwcen being cold and being warm is a dis- themselves and bring themselves together, if we start with the second tinction which resides only in life. half of the fragment, the first half l)ecomes readable. The most beautiful Heidegger: 1 he distinction of cold and warm belongs in the do- harmony proceeds out of what is Iwrn apart. Contrary to the customary main of thermodynamics, . . . opinion that struggling apart is something negative, what struggle here . . together. Fink: . while ihe distinction of life and death does not allow itself in opposition are at the same time what bring What struggle to be grasped in a going over such as from cold into warm. The cold and against each other harmonize in a manner such that out of them, as what the warm are substantivized qualities. The cold can mean at once the is born apart, as the counterstruggling division, ihe most beautiful har- cold thing or Ixring cold as such. The matter stands in a similar fashion mony grows. With that. Heraclitus thinks programmatic ally beyond with TO 6v. On the one hand, il means what is, what comes to being, and what we previously encountered in Fr. 1 1 1, namely, the fact that cold on the other, the being of what is. The ambiguity holds for the cold, the things can become warm and vice versa. warm, the wet, the dry. If one reads Fr. 126 without seeking a deeper Heideggf-r: But where does the "most beautiful harmony" belong? sense, then it is a matter only of thermodynamic phenomena, which Is it the visible or the invisible harmony? concern the going of cold things over into warm things and vice versa. Fink: That does not allow of saying right off the bat. Fr. 48 also One runs into the piobleni of dXXoftooig, but it apparently contains no Ijelongs in the group of fragments which deal with the contraries: xw o^v provocative meaning, which wc otherwise know of in the Heraclitean xo^tp 6vo[ia (iio5, ^qy^v 6e Bdvaxog. "The name of the bow is life, but its disturbance of the standing opposites. If we read the fragment in the work is death." This fragment refers not only to the absurd idea that sense that it brings to view a going over of lacing cold as such into being there is a misrelation between matter and name. warm as such, then il brings the contrary, which othei-wi.se remains as the Participant: Fr. 51 also belongs in this context. "They do not fixed structure of the phenomenal world with all change of things, not understand how what is lx>rn apart agrees with itself: struggling union, indeed into 6enov(ii cpavEgi^ [visible harmony], but into the 6qhov(t) like that of the bow and the lyre." dtpavT|5 [hidden harmony]. Fink: In order to be able to explicate this fragment, one must first striving Heidegger: 1 see the difficulty in the fact that one does not know in 1 have read Fr. 48. The bow unites in itself the contrariness of the which Heraclitean context Fr. 126 is found. Thus you do not mean the and the domain of dealh. The lyre is the in.strumenl which celebrates the It going over, iamiliar lo us, of a cold entity into a warm eniily, and you festival. It is also a unifying of what is at first struggling in opposition. also do not mean the determination of the character of Ijeing of this unifies the community of the festival. Fr. 51 views not only the relation^ the relationship of going over, but . , ship of the lyre and the community festival, but also situation distin- Fink: . . . the sameness of being cold and l>eing waim which we the dead. l~he work of the bow is death, a fundamental termed provocative. guished from Ihe festival. Death and ihe festival are linked logether, but Heide(;<;er; C'an one approach this .sameness from the distinction imi only as ihe Ik»w ends are tautened by the string, bul in the manner of because of being cold and l)cing warm, and not just from ihc contrariness of life manifold counterrelaiionships. Still, we must bieak off here, and death? these fragments require a fundamental consideration. Fink: 1 would slil! like U> go into Fr. H: to avxi^ouv oi!|i(pegov xal k'X T(j)v 6Latpfe 160 Hil "advancing toward the matter itself, that is, to the matter" that must have Heidegger: And then? stood "before the spiritual view of Heraclitus." Fink: Wc must begin in a new sense. Fink: The question is whether, out of our historical situation, Heidegger: Where does the challenge lie for you? freighted with twenty-five hundred years of further thinking, we have Fink: In that we have come in the course of the history of thinking generally removed ourselves from the Greeks and their understanding to an end in which a richness of tradition becomes questionable. Our of being and world; and whether, nevertheless, we remain inheritors of question is whether, not in a new turn toward what the Greeks have j the Greek ontology in all connections. thought, we can encounter the Greek world with our new experience of Heidegger: When you speak of the challenge of the Greeks, you being. We must ask ourselves whether we already have an experience of mean a challenge in thought. But what is it that challenges? being that is not stamped by metaphysics. Fink: We are challenged to turn about the entire direction of our Heidegger: Is that to be thought such that our experience of being thinking. This does not imply the mending of a historical tradition. matches up to the Greeks? Heidegger: Aren't the ancients also a challenge for Hegel? Fink: This depends on the truth of our situation, out of which we Fink: Only in the sense of the sublation and further thinking of the can ask and speak. We can only speak with the Cireeks as nihilists. thoughts of the Greeks. The question, however, is whether we are only Heidegger: Do you think so? the extension of the Greeks, and whether we have come to new problems Fink: That does not mean that a finished program lies in nihilism. and must give an account of three thou.sand years, or whether we have Heidegger: But what if there had been something unthought in lost, in an ominous manner, knowledge of how the Greeks dwelled in the the Greeks, something which determines precisely your thinking and truth. what is thought in the whole history? Heidegger: Is our concern only to repeat Heraclitus? Fink: But how do we catch sight of this? Perhaps this glimpse only Fink: Our concern is a conscious confrontation with Heraclitus, results from our late situation. Heidegger: But we find this with Hegel. He also stood under a Heidegger: The unthought would be that which shows itself only to our view. But the question is how far we understand ourselves. I make challenge by the Greeks. Only he can be challenged who himself. . the unthought is Ai.fiGeia. In all of Greek philosophy, there is Fink: . . . has a readiness to think. a proposal: Heidegger: In what regard are the Greeks a challenge for Hegel? nothing to be found concerning iiXr|9eLa as AXiieELa. In paragraph 44 b Fink: Hegel had the possibility to gather up, sublate, and change of Being and Time, it is said regarding 6->.Vi0Eia that, "Translation by the the tradition in his language of concepts. word 'truth', and above all the theoretical conceptualization of this ex- Heidegger: What does his language of concepts mean? Hegel's pression, covers up the sense of that which the Greeks made "self- u.se di>.Ti8eia as a pre- thought is the thought of the Absolute. From out of this thought, from evidently' basic to the terminological of philosophical understanding." (Being and Time, 7lh unrevised edition, the fundamental tendency of mediation, the Greeks appear for him . . 1933, 2fi2 = H 219.) Fink: ... as giants, but as precursors . . p. nothing do with "truth"; rather, it Heide(;ger: ... as the immediate and still not mediated. All im- ^f|9£La thought a.\ &kf[Qcia has to in about 6>ti^9eLa mediacy depends on mediation. Immediacy is always seen already from means unconcealment. What I then said Beingand Time as unconcealment had already mediation. Here lies a problem for phenomenology. The problem is already goes in this direction. dXriQELa "truth" came inlieiween. 6Xti9eLa as whether a mediation is also behind what is called the immediate phe- occupied me, but in the meantime unconcealment heads into the direction of that which is the clearing. . nomenon. In an earlier session we have said that need is a fundamental last lime that the clearing does not 'rubric in Hegel. For Hegel's thinking—which now is meant not in the How alKjut the clearing? You said vice versa. clearing and light have anything ' personal but in the historical sense—need consisted in the fulfillment of presuppose the light, but Do not. "Clear" implies: to clear, to what is thought, whereby fulfillment is to be understood liierally as the at all to do with each other? Clearly Cv' that where the clearing reconciliation of the immediate with the mediated. But how about us? weigh anchor, to clear out. That does not mean free, the open. At the Do we also have a need? clears, there is brightness. What is cleared is the ilself. may not under.siand Fink: To be sure, we have a need. I>ut not a ground as in Hegel. We .same lime, what is cleared is what conceals We clearing from i>ut of light; rather, we must understand it from the do not have a conceptual world at our disposal, into which we . . . the Greeks. Light and lire can first fhid iheir place only in the dealing. In HEiDECiGER: . . . can integrate the Greeks, . . . essay, "On the Essence of Truth," where 1 speak of "freedom," 1 Fink: . . . rather, we must put aside the impliments of this tradition. the 162 NOTES have the clearing in view, except thai here truth always walked hehind.f The dark is, to be sure, without light, hut cleared. _Our concern JSJ.o ^xgeoeiice-unconeealineiil as clearing. That is what isuiithoughi in what Translator's Foreword is thought in the whole history of thought. In Hegel, the need consisted '"i plight. as "reason," "speech," or , in the satisfaction of thought. Fjjlus. the contrary, the of.wJiat ininslated into English 1 Xovos is customarily the word "names that ^ ILisuathou^Lin-what is thought reigns. "word " However. Heidegger says in ilic "U>gos" ess:iy that and lets it present itsell." Fink; Professor Heidegger has already officially ended our seminar which ealhers everything present into presence, into t-nslish as "truth," hui Heidegger specili- with his words. I l>elieve I can also speak on behalf of all the participants nXiiOna is cnsiomari'ly nanslated equivalent. W,,b>heit. and uses Unverbor^mkett. which when I thank Professor Heidegger in warmth and admiration. The work cally rejecis the (lerman a.s "nontontealmcnt." of thought can be like a towering mountain range in stark outline, like may be translated below. 'the safely built Alps." But we have here experienced something of the 2. Page 73 67 below. which, as a subterranean force, raises up the mountains 3. Page flowing magma 11-. .l^iiesS.Chui-chill 4. Manin Heidegger. K«n(«Hrf(A^PTOW"no/'WW«/<'(>.s'r.S of thought. 206. (Bloominston: University of Indiana Press. 1962), p. Heidegger: At the close, I would like the Greeks to be honored, 5. Page 50 below. and I return to the seven sages. From Periander of Corinth we have the 6. Page 51 below. sentence he spoke in a premonition: (leWxa to Jictv. "In care, take the 7. Lo< . cit. Another word that also comes from him is this: cpiJoeiJ)? whole as whole." 8. Page 73 below. c*^ xaxayoQla. "Hinting at, making nature visible." 9. Pages 82 f. 10. Page 96 below. Heraclitus paititipants. piedominandy of a philological 1. Comments of the seminar kind, are not included for copyright reasons. fre-Soemtie Pkilasophen: A CompUU 2 See Kathleen Freeman, Amilia to the Frngmmlf der Vov^okraUher (Cambridge: Har- Tum^htioo 0} the F,< sion and ril)lig;ilioii." . and o.u ol one, iveryltung 6 Diels iranslates: "out ol everyihing, one; thing wlii< h ihe Ih'si prefer to all else, 7. Diels translates: "(For) there is one eternal glory railiet ilian nansicnl things." umranslated. (Tr.) K lleiadiliis' leadiing on Fire," wise is one ihmg only, lollowing word oidei ; -Fhe <) Dk-ls n..iislauun luis ihe winch stcei evciyihmg tliunigli rvei ydiing- to understand the diouglus 164 165 10. DiL-ls [lansiiitcs: "Alieniutc (liansc: iif everything ftn iirc and of fire for Heidegger's usage. But without (piaiilication, it could be misleading. For the everything." prefix "re-" carries quite different meaning honi the (ierman "ver-." English 11. Diels iranslates: "rhc wise is set apait from everything." '!«-" means "again" or "back," meanings that are carried by Carman "wider-," 12. ,Sce Karl Ja,s]H.TS, Tlif (.real Philosophers, trans, Ralph Manheim (New hut not by "ver-." "Ver-" has a range ol meanings deriving from Latin and Yoik: Haraniii. Brace & World. Inc.. 1966), Vol. II, p. 20. (Tr.) CK)tbic. The [xassibility on which Heidegger seems here to depend is thai of 1,1. See Timiieus 30 a ff. (Tr,) intensifying or heightening the meaning carried by the stem halten, meaning to 14. From Alcaic Poi'ni.\ hy Kriediich Holclerlin, translated by Kli/abeth Hender- keep or hold. For more information, see C^ T, Onions. Ttie Oxford Dictionary of son, 1962 by Kli/abeth Henderson, published by Oswald Wolff © (Publishers). Engluh Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). and C^orge O. Ltd., London. ( Tr.) Curme, A Grammar of the Genntm Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publish- 15. These are ihe offspring of Zens and Themis [Law], See Hesiod, Tkeogony, ing Co., 1960), (Tr.) translated, with an Introduction, hy Norman (). Brown (New York: Bobbs- 29. One must also hear the same about death as what is said about sleep. For Merrill Cb., 1953), p. 78, (Tv.) each shows the departure of the soul, the one more, the other less, which it is 16. Regarding growth, see Ari,>-Iotle, Melupkysirs 1069'' II; regarding wasting possible to get from Heraclitus. (Tr.) away, see Hislaiy iij Aiiimid\ 582" 2, and Genemlion oj AnimaU 767^ 4; regarding 30. Diels translates: "Connections: wholes and not wholes, concord and dis- gene,sis and ceasing to be. see On Generation and Cormption, piiisim; legarding cord, harmony and dissonance, and out of everything one and out of one every- productiveness, see Phyiics 243" 8, and Generation ayid Corruption Sigi" .32; and thing." regarding alteration, see Pfiysirs 226' 26. (Tr.) ", 17. , . dif y.eit hrinff mil \irh hzw, die Zeit wird e.\ hringen." Literally, "time brings with itself, that is, time will bring it." (Tr,) 18. Parmenides, Fragment 8, line 53, The alxwe tianslation is taken from C. S. Kirk and J. ¥.. Raven, The Prrsarratie Philosnplu'r.s: A Critical History with a Selection Texts of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p, 278. 19. Dicis translates; he "does not say and does not conceal; rather he gives a sign." (Fr. 93), 20. A search o( the Library oJ Congress and National Union Catalogue and the General Catalogue oj Piinled Books of the Hrilish Museum reveals no English transla- tion of this Ixiok, (Tr.) 21. Wfge und Formen frOhgriechischen Denkens; liiemrisrhe und philosophieges- chichttiche Studien. Mrsg, von Franz Tiet/e, 2 erweiterte Autl, Munchen. Beck. 1960. The Ixmk is not translated. (Tr,) 22. See Martin Heidegger, Zur Sachr da Denkens (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. 1969), pp. 1-25, esp, p, 15. See al.so Martin Heidegger, On Time, and Being, trans, Joan Statnbaugh (New York: Harper Sc Row, 1972), pp. 1-24, esp. p. 14. 23. Regarding Aoyo; and AXi^Belq in Heidegger's thinking, sec "Logos (Hcraklit, Fragment 50)" and "Aleibeia (Heraklii, Frajrmeni 16)" in Martin Heidegger. Viirlr/ige und Au/salze (Pfullingen: Verlag (iunther Neske, 1954). (lY.) 24. Dieis translates: "How can one hide from that which never sei.s?" 25. The Ixiok. published in 1955 by Deutsche Verlags-Anstali, Stuttgart, is not translated, (Tr,) 26. Thisiran.sialion is from Friedrich Hiitderlin: Poems and Fragmenl\. translated hy Michael Hamburger (.Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), p. 79. (Tr.) 27. Ibis translation is taken from (1. S. Kirk, Herat lilus: The Cosmic Fragments. edited with an introduction and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1970), p. 393 O. (Tr.) 28. Separation oi' the English prefix "re " seems necessary to acknowledge GLOSSARY 167 rectly concluded that he was an "elitist" in the sense often criticized by modern (esj>e- cially leftist) political and so- cial critics. The countereon- The following glossary serves ilie Iwsit Itmciion of any glossary, namely, to cept is poltoi, the many. See provide a partial list oi' the more he<]ueiitly occiiriing imimrtiint words, wiih emi7 twenty-six below, some explanation oitheir ine.inin^. However, some (lualifleutions tniisi Ije made. 3. ii^i\ (irrhe ultimate principle. Though First, the reader should niidersiaiid that the meanings given to the various variously characterized, Hera- Greek words are sometimes an English translation of the German used by clitiis seems to hold that Heidegf^cr and Fink. Knglish meanings ttiil The are necessarily those given, for the ultimate principle in the insiantc. in l.iddell and Stolt, A Greek Unglish Lexirnn. changing kiismoi is logos. Hcc Second, not all words oiilic glossed are Clreek. Because it is important, special entries fifteen and seventeen reference is made to the German word Dn. below. Third, the glossary is highly selective. Many more words could have been 4. ytveoig genesis genesis. included. This selectivity is partly due to the fact that the fnst occurrence of each grtoM inquiry. ,See entry seven be- Greet word in the text is accompanied !iy English gloss an in S(]uare brackets, low. provided none is given by Heidegger or Fink. The selectivity of the glossary also 6. Da This (Jerman word means, results from other motives. literally, "here" or "there," The glossary has been constructed with the intent of helping the reader gain However, in Chapter 11 of better access to the text. First, 1 have tried to include some of the more important the present book Heidegger Greek words. But the glossary may be supplemented with such other works as: inierpreis Da in terms of Seidel, Miittin Hadtg^er G.J. and the Pit'-Samilics (Univcrsiiy of Nebraska Press, Liehlung, which may be trans- 1964); Martin Heidegger, K/niy Greek Tliinkini^ (Harper Sc Row, 1975). and lated by "clearing." The p<)int William Richardson, S. Heidei^get: Through Phennmemilojry to J., Thoufihl (Maninus is that a "here" or a "there" Nijhoff, 1963). Second, the glossary may to gain be used some grasp of ihe Greek can l>e manifest to us only language. The English transliteration, for Ije example, may used in learning how within a "clearing" which is to sound the various Greek words. Effort in handling the (Ireek will !x- aided by primordial to the particular reference to such lM)oks as: .Stephen Paine, Bi-^iniiiiig Greek (Oxford University "hei-e" or "there." Interpreta- Press, 1961), Francis Fohes, Pliito\opliiail .-Sii Intnulnrtioii Greek: (University of tion of Da as "clearing" is Chicago Press, 1957). and F. E. Peters Greek Pkilo.yophiciil Tenns: A Hi-.Uirical helpful in understanding the Itilrudtulion (New York University Press, I9(>7). Using an inductive method, the w(n-d Daseiii. Duidn is the reader can gradually extend understanding to include words and phi^ses noi word Heidegger u.ses to indi- treated in the present giossaiy. cate the kind of being {.\ein) unique lo humans. 7. ftitiYvtooig diagnoM This is tlie same as entry five, I, dXi'iflfia iileOieia nonconeealment. See the except lor addition of the Ti aiislaior's Foreword, espe- prefix "dlo." As is ])i)inted oin cially the first footnote. early in t:hapter I . this prefix 2. figioTot inisUii the best. Heradilus was tra- means "throughout," or ditionally said to have l>eeR perhaps "ihorooghly." Thor- Ixirn into a patrician family. ough inc|ulry leads to a *lhis iH'stowed uprxi him ccr- diagnosis. [all! ]><>liiLi(il aufl religions said, 8. tivui eiiiii! to be. As Heidegger has privileges which he neverthe- the central question of his less rejeited. Hence, when he thinking is the question ol the refers to "the Ix-st" among meaning of Ix'lng. No single humans, it may not Ik' di- win k of Heidegger's exhausts HS8 169 distinguishes ihc "onlic" from this C|iiesii(in. The iraiisl;itor the "ontological" in Hemgiiiid has lijurid ihe hilroduclton to Time. See entries thirty Metaphysics helpful. and thirty-two l>elow. 9. l\ Afn the one. The tounter- 22. jrdvra pniil/i all things, the universe. See concepl, with which ken is al- entry nine above lor the ways associated in Heracliius, coiinierconccpt, hen. Is panUi, the many. .See entry poiesii production, twenty-two below. See also 23. itoiiioi? the Translator's Foreword. 24. ]t6>,eno5 polemoi war. poli\ city. 10. HXiog Helios Ihe Sun. Along with light- 25. n6U<; the many. The counter- ning, fire, and other images, 26. iioUot polloi concept is "the best," aiisloi. the Sun is a visible analogue See entiy two above. An in- of hen. By providing an il- teresting essay is yet to be luminating clearing, the Sun written comparing Hera- brings the many things of the cliius' expression polloi with univei'se (panla) together for Heidegger's analysis of das a unified (hen) perception. Man, "the they," in Being and 11. 6avaT05 thanatos death, Time. 12. Ibia idea idea. pur fire. See items ten and thir- 13. KEgauv65 keraunoi lightning. See entry ten 27. TtVQ alH)ve. above, teen ootpov sophon wisdom. 14. xCvt^ol; kinesis motion. 28. termata boundaries. See entry nine- 15. x6o(io^ kosmos cosmos. The word carries the 29. leeiiata teen alxive. sense of a beautiful, ordered products of human technics. whole. 3(1. x^x^ 6vTa lechne onta See enti7 twenty-one alxivc. 16. kf\^ lelhe forgelfulness. In mythology, The countcrconcept is listed Lethe is the river of forgel- in entry thirty-two lielow. fulness which separates the transformations, changes, underworld from the world 31. X(X>Jtai tropai pkysei onta things which are from na- of the living. In the present 32. (ptioEL Avia ture. See entries twenty-one book, lethe indicates conceal- and thirty above. ment. Note the relation to 33. ipvoi; pkysi\ nature. alelheia, nonconcealment. See 34. ckronos time. Note that lime is crucial entry I above. xeovog to Heidegger from Being and 17. Wvo5 logos reason, speech, word. For Time to [he essay "Time and more on logo.\, see the works Being." referred to in the Translator's soul. Foreword. 35. ^vxfi psyche 18. nfxapoXi^ metiiMe change. 19. nFTpa THftni measures. See entry twenty- niru- Ik.'I()w. 20. vonoc nomos custom or law. 21. Svra nnSii things which are. The West- ern uadiiion derives its word "i)nI<)logy'" from this (ireek wold. Heidegger builds on (he (^rcck word as well as the Western tradition when he I PAGE GUIDE find passages of parUtular interest in '1 hi- lollowing may liclp ihc reader to ihe German original. English (1