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NR E IO HANDLING INDICATOR STAT! TO Lh i FOO Department o£ State AIO 1 Sep 18 ID XX AH 1971 —^ INFO « I Amembassy ROME Amembassy SANTIAGO Amembassy BUENOSRXk&E&J Amembassy BRASILIA Amembassy AS*tt&WS n M n u i COM FBB IN T FROM Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: 9 Sept 1971 - A B TAR T R XMB SUBJECT The Catholic Church in Brazil,

ARMY NAVY OSD First Half of 1971 r ' 3 1 3/ REF Rio's A-1059 of September 20, 1968, ^r.d 1 +J;*' A^ ISIA NSA CIA Rio's A-492 of November 10, 1970. (p ?/3 •v, : 3 r j SUMMARY: The first quarter of 1971, roughly^anuary through March, witnessed an unusually intense series UtffcESTED DISTRIBUTION of events and news coverage dealing with the Brazilian Catholic Church and its relationship with the Brazilian State. Unlike a similar series that ^ook place in late 1970 (see A-492), some of these ^ 3 not confrontations between the two institutions. Many dealt with internal Church affairs. Each even- was occasion for the press and other observers to revive POST R 3UTING speculation, often of the wildest sort, about the TO: Action Info. Initials direction of the relationship. Each was interpreted MB/ O and reinterpreted, not in the context of being a »CM separate and perhaps unique act, but as a piece of a OL jig-saw puzzle needing perhaps but a few more pieces :CON for the overall picture to become apparent. The ONS precarious equilibrium of the relationship apparently DM dictates that any new ingredient is viewed with

ID /.trepidation by both sides.

ISO fAJ9 Enclosures: 1. Dom Waldyr Letter 2. CNBB Officer List

:ILE kction Taken:

)ate: FORM _„ CONFIDENTIAL For r'e3.-."rTient os** Crtiy nltlals: 10.64DS-323 Drofted by: rafting Date: one No.: (Contents and Classification Apptyf&z b^; y: TH7 POL:WGW£tijk^r:ksk 8J/31/7 1 444 DCM:CABoonstra /fa^ CI oranc.s: p0L/B C SloWU^SsubstanceU ) CONFIDENTIAL Rio A-357

2

Although the events of the first quarter seemed to indicate more to come, the past four months have been surprisingly calm, at least on the surface. It is perhaps too early to predict the long-term trend, but it appears that the tendency of the two hierarchies to seek accomnodation one with the other will probably continue. It is always possible, nonetheless, that a new event might precipitate a serious confrontation with altogether different results. * * * *

The following is a summary of the major events in Church- State relations from January to July:

DOM WALDYR ISSUES CHARGES OF GOB TORTURE - January 22, 1971

Dom Waldyr Calheiros is the progressive Archbishop of Volta Redonda and perhaps the bishop with the best chance of being singled out by the GOB for specific juridical prosecution. He is currently the subject of an IPM (Military Police inquiry) for anti-Revolutionary acts.

On January 22, Dom Waldyr sent a circular letter (attached as Enclosure I) to his fellow Brazilian bishops which was an appeal to read a compendium of four cases of alleged torture and brutal treatment of arrested priests and lay workers. The appeal was intended to, and did, provoke discussion at the later meeting of the National Council of Brazilian Bisnops (CNBB).

ARCHBISHOP ARNS AND THE SAO PAULO TORTURE CHARGES - January 27- February 6, 1971

On January 27, twelve days before the scheduled opening of the national CNBB conference in Belo Horizonte, a young Italian priest, Father Guilio VICINI, and a young female social assistant, Yara SPADINI, were arrested by the S3o Paulo DEOPS (State Social and Political Police). They were charged with mimeographing "subversive" pamphlets which denounced the death of a member of the metalurgist's union, allegedly at the hands of the S2o Paulo police.

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The Archbishop of S3o Paulo, Dom Paulo Evaristo ARNS, learned of the arrests the following day. Arns at tne cime had less than three months experience as archbishop, having replaced Cardinal Angelo ROSSI when the latter left to assume a high Curia post. Faced with the first major incident of his incumbency, Dom Evaristo reacted in a vigorous man er. Perhaps he saw it as an opportunity to stake out a ''progressive" stand vis-a-vis the Government. He thus could demonstrate to the clergy of his archdiocese, reputedly the youngest and most radical in the country, that he was no Rossi, i.e., he was not going to compromise his clerics' rights in order to reach accommodation with the state or national governments.

Whatever his motives, Arns moved quickly into a position that invited confrontation. He went to DEOPS headquarters and demanded to see the prisoners. Permission was immediately given. As the archdiocesan newsletter 0 S3o Paulo put it, "both prisoners unhesitatingly confirmed to the Archbishop that they had been tortured." The same article said the torturers were identifiable.

Arns left this encounter and went directly to see the then-Governor of Sao Paulo, Abreu SODRE. Arns demanded and received permission to have a doctor examine the prisoners. When the Archbishop accompanied the doctor to DEOPS, however, they were told the extended permission had been rescinded. The excuse was that the prisoners were being held incommunicado.

On February 4 Arns went on the offensive. He returned to the Governor to insist that he be allowed to visit the prisoners. Failing in that, he issued a "personal note" which, in the strongest language, declared that he personally had verified that the priest and social worker had "been tortured in an ignominious manner by the S3o Paulo DEOPS." The Arch• bishop ordered that his note be posted on the door of every parish church in his archdiocese.

The response was immediate. The S3o Paulo press carried Arns1 denunciation and the 0 Estado do Sao Paulo editorialized with the following forceful plea:

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"The silence of the Government (in the face of Arns' charges) would be the equivalent to a confession of guilt, or, equally serious, of indifference...This time it is not a case of another of those defamatory news articles printed overseas to downgrade Brazil's image. Nor is it an Archbishop Helder Camara coming forth to accuse the Government with his demagogic diatribes. The accuser is a bishop respected throughout the country. We believe the Justice Minister will feel it a right and a duty to say the words the nation is waiting for."

Other papers and almost all Church leaders publicly proclaimed similar support for Arns.

A very different reaction, albeit more private, was one of fury by Governor Abreu Sodre and by the just-named commanding officer of the Second Amy, General Humberto Souza MELO. The latter was reported "ready to go to the mat" with Arns. When the DEOPS issued an explanatory note of February 11 presenting their side of the story, however, it was clear that cooler heads (probably in Brasilia) had prevailed. The official statement merely said that there would be a "serious investigation" of the charges of torture and that, if found to be true, those responsible would be punished.

The public aspect of these events in Sao Paulo terminated when the spotlight moved to Belo Horizonte and the CNBB national conference on February 9. All observers c^reed that Archbishop Arns and the Vicini-Spadini arrests would come up in the conferences' discussions. (Some observers, mostly among the security forces, speculated that Arns had deliberately exploited the Vicini case to assure himself a prominent role at the meeting.)

CNBB CONFERENCE IN BELO HORIZONTE - February 9-18, 1971

The CNBB met in full session with anywhere from 170 to 200 of Brazil's 242 bishops attending the various sessions. The principal formal business on the agenda was the election of new CNBB officers. The election had been precipitated by the

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CONFIDENTIAL 5 resignation of the previous president, Dom Angelo ROSSI, upon leaving for the Vatican.

Electioneering for the various offices occupied a good deal of the first five days. Although there were no official "candidates", there was little doubt which of the clerics were and which were not seeking office.

The presidency was won by Dom Aloisio LORSCHEIDER, Bishop of Santo Angelo and incumbent Secretary-General of the CNBB, Dom Aloisio had been generally considered to be a "moderate" within the hierarchy. In October 1970, however, he gained the somewhat ill-fitting mantel of "progressive" when he was detained for six hours by Guanabara military security forces. The detention was the result of his attempts to assist 15 church workers at the Rio Institute of Brazilian De~ alopment (IBRADES) while it was undergoing a military police raid for possible "subversive affiliations." Lorscheider won the CNBB presidency by defeating (105 to 65 votes on the third ballot) Dom Vicente SCHERER, Cardinal-Archbishop of Porto Alegre. Dom Vicente was the moderate-conservative candidate.

Dom Aloisio's cousin, Dom Ivo LORSCHEITER, Auxiliary Bishop of Porto Alegre and thought to be somewhat politically to the left of Aloisio, was elected to replace his cousin as Secretary- General. Dom Avelar BRANDAO, then Archbishop of Teresina (later transferred to Salvador) and President of CELAM (Latin American Episcopal Council) was chosen CNBB Vice President. At the same time the 29 regional representatives of the CNBB and a new, six member Episcopal and Pastoral Council (apparently designed to act as a "senate" of the Brazilian Church) were elected. (See Enclosure II for full lists of CNBB officers.)

The other major accomplishment of the conference was the issuance of several documents. The first was a conference proclamation presenting the basic orientation of the Church in today's Brazil. Of more importance was the issuance of open letters of "fraternal support" to three of their number in difficulties with the security authorities. Archbishop Arr.s received one for his previously described confrontation with

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CONFIDENTIAL 6 the SSo Paulo DEOPS and General Melo. Another recipient was Dom Waldyr for his efforts to denounce torture in V Iti Redonda and withstand official pressures against him, The last went to the head of the Dominican Order in SSo Paulo, several of whose younger priests have been accused anc imprisoned for aiding, abetting, and even participating in terrorist activities. The letters were emphatic in their support and were issued over the signature of Cardinal Scherer, acting CNBB president.

This support of three churchmen, who in the public mind at least were thought to represent active opposition to and confrontation with the State, was interpreted by many observers at the time as a signal that the CNBB was ready to move Into an open position of greater opposition to the Government. The elections of more liberal CNBB officers seemed to confirm this hypothesis. So did the convention's selection of a representative to give the closing statement to the assembled press corps. In a blunt challenge to the GOB, Dom Helder CAMARA, Archbishop of Olinda and Recife and outspoken leader of the progressive wing of the hierarchy (whose very name is anathema to the GOB), broke three years of silence vis-a-vis the Brazilian press. He did so dramatically by presenting a summary of the meeting and the various manifestos.*

This popular interpretation of the political significance of the CNBB conference, i.e., a notification by the Church that it would no longer be expected to accommodate itself to certain

* Dom Helder has received little other publicity during the period covered by this airgram. A government-directed campaign against him (described in referenced Airgram A-492) subsided in late 1970. His name has virtually disappeared from the Brazilian press, probably the result of 1) his spending a considerable part of the last six months outside of the country and 2) a deliberate smothering of news about him by the GOB. The few times his name has appeared have been in connection with efforts by various entities to promote him for the Nobel Peace Prize. *(See Recife memcon dated March 17, 1971, which gives Dom Helder1s extensive travel plans for the year).

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GOB practices, however much in conflict they might he with the best interests and ideology of the Church, is probably incorrect. Embassy discussions with various participants and other evidence indicate that such was not the intent, nor the accomplishment of the meeting. Those who attended, from Cardinal Dom Eugenio SALES, Primate of Brazil and a spokesman for the broad center of the Church hierarchy, to Dom Jc°e Maria PIRES, Bishop of Jo2o Pessoa and a leading figure in the "progressive" wing, have agreed in subsequent discussions with Embassy officers that, contrary to press speculation, there was no struggle between the so-called "progressive", "moderate" or "conservative" factions. Participants were unanimous in describing the conference as the "most harmonious" in recent years, completely relaxed in nature and with a genuine lack of aggressiveness or hostility on the part of the Church leaders, either against each other or towards the government. The over-all impression was that for the first time since the days before the 1964 Revolution, considerable harmony existed within the Church hierarchy. Dom Jose Maria Pires summed it up when, in a private conversation, he castigated the press and outside observers for always describing events in the Church in terms of a "progressive vs conservative" straggle. He stated that it would be preferable to describe any struggle that may exist as between "the younger clerics, more fervent and more impatient to obtain results, as opposed to the older ones, perhaps more prudent, but equally interested in

Along these lines, the selection of the new CNBB officers should not be interpreted, according to some who participated in the selection, as a victory for one or the other political philosophy or as any indication of a Church move towards increased liberalness o*" predilection to confront the GOB. According to Cardinal Sales and others, Aloisio Lorscheider was selected President on the basis of an understanding reached during the last CNBB election when he accepted the Secretary-Generalship with the assurance that he would move up when Rossi moved on.

Most of the conferees were said to have accepted unqueStion- ingly Bishop Arns' and Waldyr's charges against the G03 security

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forces. They agreed on the need to denounce those responsible. Thus the strong letters of support. There was reportedly no opposition from conservative members to the tone or wording of these notes. Those who accepted the necessity to issue the letters saw the act not as confrontation with the GOB per se. but rather as calling attention to specific acts by specific subordinate government officials.

FOLLOW-UP EVENTS IN SAO PAULO - February 19-April 1971

The final day of the CNBB conference coincided with the lifting of the incommunicado status of Father Vicini and Miss Spadini in S2o Paulo. A preliminary hearing was conducted on February 26 before a military tribunal. Archbishop Arns attended. The local press, originally sympathetic to Arns* demands for investigation of the torture charges, reported the priest and social worker less than convincing as witnesses. On the same day, the Commander of the Second Army, General Melo, made a speech to a reserve officer class in which he openly espoused the toughest of attitudes towards "subversive" elements in the Church. As he said:

"We are in a real unlimited war with no quarter given. The major bulwark against this Communist attack is our Christian faith. It is consequently most alarming to find our beliefs and traditions under attack by some of the Churches' own priests... It has even reached the point that two archbishops, in 1968, proposed the adoption of a Yugoslav-type Communist regime In Brazil."

On March 3, Archbishop Arns responded. While he admitted that a few of Brazil's more than 14,000 clerics perhaps had "been diverted from their Christian mission", he pointed out that "hundreds of military personnel, including officers, similarly have deserted their country and banded together in subversion and terrorism". Arns flatly denied the General's charges pertaining to the "two archbishops".

On March 7, Arns again said he had personal and certain knowledge that the Italian priest and his social assistant had been tortured. While denying that the Church was in

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CONFIDENTIAL 9 opposition to the Brazilian Government, he said it would continue to "criticize all that is not right". Arns denounced terrorism, although he said he understood the motives of those who practiced it in the name of social justice, and he pro• hibited priests in his diocese- from cloaking any of their "political acts" with the mantel of the Church, Arns finished by saying he would convey his proof in the Vicini case directly to Pope Paul.

On March 31 the military court brought in a decision which ended the Vicini case. The Italian priest was found guilty. He received a sentence of six months, reduced to four since it was his first offense.* The social worker was acquitted of all charges.

The trial results were uniformly praised by Churchmen and government officials. First, it was conceded that the priest was essentially guilty of proscribed political activities. Second, the case had been expeditiously and, in its final phase, properly handled. And lastly, both sides were thankful that such a potentially explosive affair had been settled with neither of the participants1 hurt.

ROTATING ARCHDIOCESES

Immediately following the CNBB conference, an event occurred which had no political significance in itself - a man died - but it set off a personnel reshuffle within the Church hierarchy* The full significance and consequences of these changes are still unknown.

Cardinal Dom Jaime de Barros Camara, Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro and among the most respected and powerful of the conservative prelates, died on February 18. An immediate flood

* On August 7, the Supreme Military Tribunal met in secret session and reversed the lower court's decision and absolved Father Vicini of the charges.

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CONFIDENTIAL 10 of speculation began as to who would be the Pope's choice to succeed Dom Jaime in Brazil's most important archdiocese, and why the Pope would so choose. The eventual selection was almost disappointing in its obviousness. Dom Eugenio Sales, Cardinal-Archbishop of Salvador, an ecclesiastic and political moderate, a brilliant administrator and proven diplomat in dealings with the GOB, was shifted to Rio. That left Salvador, the Primacy of Brazil, open. It was filled by moving Dom Avelar Brandao from Teresina, thus virtually assuring him the red cardinal's cap soon.

Dom Eugenio assumed his post at the end of April. The only notable occurrance connected with the Sales transfer was a petition, signed by 67 priests of the archdiocese, pro• testing his selection. The petition claimed that the signers had nothing against Sales per se, but that his selection was clearly an imposition by the Vatican of a selectee who was clearly not the candidate of church leaders within the arch• diocese. According to the petition, a democratic vote among the Rio clergy had conclusively shown that Dom Aloisio Lorscheider was the local choice. This petition received no official answer and Sales assumed his post without further embarrassment.

The months of April, May, and June were conspicuously free of Church-State tensions. In Rio, Cardinal Sales spent his first months in office getting a good grasp of the problems, personalities, and possibilities of his new base. There are few important political figures in Guanabara who have not paid at least a courtesy call on the new Archbishop. In S3o Paulo, Archbishop Arns has been cut off the front pages, either by choice -- in an effort to repair some of the damage done by the Vicini affair, or by accident -- he was injured in a bad auto crash in May.

The headlines that have been generated by Church figures have mostly had to do with recently active moral issues. Almost all Church leaders have strongly supported the recent GOB drive against narcotics and drug abuse. Sales, Arns, et al have spoken out in press statements, pastoral letters, and over

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CONFIDENTIAL 11 their radio-TV programs against the Esquadroes da Mcrte ("Death Squads") and the recent imposition of the death penalty against a young Bahian terrorist (since commuted). The Church hierarchy has also gone on record as being vehemently opposed to Guanabara MDB Senator Nelson CARNEIRO's proposals for loosening the marriage/divorce laws. Thus what statements have come forth in the past three months have not been in areas where conflict and confrontation with the Government was likely.

COMMENT: It is difficult to extract much of predictiv value from Church-State events over the last six months. About the only thing that can be said is negative - that the 1971 evidence demonstrates that predictions based on evidence of previous years were, for the most part, exaggerated in that they indicated a much more rapid evolution of a Church-State conflict than in fact has occurred.

Two years ago there was widespread expectation that the Church would evolve into a unifying core around which broad opposition to the present Brazilian political system would form. The essential logic of this prediction centered on the actions of the so-called "progressive" wing of the clergy who, until the imposition of Institutional Act No. 5 in late 1968, appeared to be ever more willing and able to push their social and economic demands. Although the progressive push produced a backlash led by the generally older more traditional bishops, many observers thought that time was on the side of those demanding reform. The Vatican, in the person of both Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, brought the full weight of its authority to the campaign against the social problems of the underpriviledged masses. Events in other countries reflected a general dissatisfaction against complacent acceptance of social and economic injustices. For these and other reasons, most observers would have agreed with the prediction of Rio's A-1059 of September 20, 1968, that the Brazilian Church hierarchy, as a whole, would move in a direction more and more critical of the regime.

Such has not been the case, at least not at anything approaching the speed and inevitability predicted. An evolution is still taking place in the direction of a generally more

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CONFIDENTIAL 12 liberal clergy, but the pace of lhat movement has visibly slackened during 1971. There are various factors which might explain this. First would be the very size and disorganization of the Brazilian hierarchy. Church "policy" is formula-ed and applied by a group which is by no means homogeneous» The central hierarchical institution, the CNBB, has neither the mandate to dictate policy nor can it lead individual members in any given political direction. As Dom Ivo Lorscheider puts it, the CNBB can "only attempt to bring a very limited 'moral force1 to bear on the individual dioceses". Within each diocese, the local bishop and his personal philosophy remain supreme. Since the VAft majority of the country's 240 bishops are elderly men, of limited educational background, and susceptible to the blandishments of the Government, it is not surprising that the CNBB*a "limited moral force" most often does not inspire its membera to confrontation.

Much of the"smoke" created two years ago - only wisps of which remain today - resulted from the disproportionate attention given by the press and outside observers to individual, colorful spokesmen of the progressive cause (the best example being Dom Helder Camara). Possibly for this very reason, many bishops who might have counted themselves as belonging to the moderate center and who appreciated the need of social reform in Brazil, voted with the traditionalists in the CNBB since they felt the attention-getting antics of the progressives were too much, too soon.

None of the foregoing overturns the almost certain expectation that the future will see more Church-State misunderstanding and confrontations. Nor does it necessarily rule out the fulfillment of earlier predictions concerning the inevitability of the Church becoming ever more militant and insistent in its quest for social reform. The accommodation and quiet of the last three months only demonstrate that we cannot discount the alternative possibility of less rather than more confrontation, of the Church deciding that for a plethora of reasons it must accom• modate itself to working with a Brazilian Government that at times offends some of its younger clergy and older tenets.

ROUNTREE

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CIRCULAR LETTER FROM DOM WALDYR

Dear Sir* Volta Redonda, 22 January 1971

I wish to pass the attached report to your hands. Copies were sent to all of our brother tishops. This is simply to inform you of the situation in which we live. We still do not know how we are going to get out of it. What we have done so far is to contact some of our brothers in order to discuss the best way out, in loyalty to Christ and the people He has entrusted to us. Many thanks for your attention and let us pray that the Holy Spirit may show us what God wants from us at the moment.

Your brother,

D. Waldyr

Report on the treatment given to Father Natanael de Morals Csmpos and the members of the Catholic Labor Youth (JOC) who were arrested with him by the IBIB in Barra Mansa, starting on November 2, 1970.

The narration of the facts is done with the least enthusiasm possible by those who went through the drama. Some were afraid to talk. Others were humiliated by what had been done to them. They were all in a state of emotion and high nervous tension. Some have not talked yet because they are still in prison. We believe that the testimonies which follow are sufficient to show the high degree of repression which is being carried out.

PHASE I - After the arrest of some national JOC members in Rio, some present and former members of JOC in Volta Redonda began to be arrested also. This started on November 2, 1970, when many other people were put in prison in Rio and Sao Paulo, before the elections.

The total number of present and former JOC members arrested was 30. Page 2 of 8 Encl. No. 1 Rio A-357

The time they stayed in prison, during this phase, varied from days for some people to hours for others.

Those who were released immediately did not complain about the treatment they received.

PHASE II - From the 30 people arrested, six were in prison until Christmas, including Father Campos, advisor to JOC members,

The treatment these six received was inhuman, despicable and humiliating.

Preventive arrest has been officially decreed for Father Campos, but Jo3o Candido and Helio are still in prison illegally (without a decree of preventive arrest).

TESTIMONIES

CASE I - a youngster - he stayed in prison from November 4 until December 15 (41 days).

He was questioned on the day following his arrest. During the questioning he was given electric shocks to his hands and feet.

During another period of questioning, he was given similar electric shocks, in which one wire was connected to his hands and another to his genital organs. The torturers laughed at the youngster's contortions.

At the end of the torture, while one of the youngster's friends was sitting in the next room, a torturer, Lieutenant Tenorio (who is now a captain), said: "Let us give him a stronger shock to make him yell and frighten his friend who is coming in now." They gave him a strong shock. He screamed loudly. Lt. Tenorio then said: "That was good. It's enough."

On the same day, he was taken to a dark room called a "submarine" which had no light, water to drink, shower, or air. Captain Giacomo, who accompanied him, said: "Ycu are now going to enter the 'Tribunal of Inquisition'. Remember Page 3 of 8 Encl. No. 1 Rio A- 357

that the priests themselves thought up that name and repeated it several times."

This youngster had worked for Siderurgica National for seven yeare. When he returned to work after being released, he was dismissed "in the best interests of the company"'. This was done without any trial or evidence of guilt against him. He was, therefore, prevented from earning his living.

CASE II - a girl - She was in prison from November 3 to December 30, 1970 (56 days).

She was questioned immediately after she arrived at the military unit. Because she did not want to accuse her colleagues, they began to torture her.

Lt. Tenorio and Cezar ordered her to take off her dress. She said she would not do it.

Lt. Cezar picked up a knife and cut off the sleeve of her dress, throwing her blouse away. They then took off her brassiere, leaving her naked to the waist. He tore off her dress, throwing it aside, and finally, her panties also.

They left her completely naked and exposed to the sight and mockery of her torturers during the whole questioning period. It went on from 11 P.M. of November 3 to 4 A.M. of November 4, i.e. during five hours. From then on they only called her "Eve".

Lt. Tenorio then picked up a duster and hit her knees, breasts and face with the handle of the duster. He even threatened to stick it into her vagina.

Lt. Cezar continuously struck her with his hands and feet and pulled her hair until it came out.

After that, they threatened to bring in a stray black man to have sexual intercourse with her in front of them. This was what frightened her most. Page 4 of 8 Encl. No. 1 Rio A- 357

They began to insist that she was not a virgin anymore because a JOC member had confessed that she was his lover as well as Father Campos1. She maintained she was a virgin.

The JOC member was brought in for confrontation with her. When questioned whether he had had sexual intercourse with her, he asked her to pardon him because he had been forced to say yes under electric shocks.

At approximately 4 A.M., they took her to her cell. Lt. Cezar told her to take off her torn dress and wait in the bathroom until the dress was sewn. At about 7 A.M. Lt. Cezar brought in the dress fixed.

During another questioning Lt. Tenorio ordered that one wire be connected to her leg and another to her vagina. One of the torturers said that she would not stand the shock. The second wire was then connected to her groin.

She said that only a superior force, which made her remember the passion of Christ, enabled her to stand the sufferings. This thought comforted her.

During the last questioning they took her from her cell at 11 P.M. and put a hood on her head. They connected a wire to one of her legs and another to her groin and told her to say who the "good guy" (barra limpa) was. This was a name they found in a letter written by a JOC member when he made a reference to the Bishop (presumably D. Waldyr). Since she knew about it and said who it was, Lt. Tenorio told the others that the shocks were no longer necessary. She recognized the lieutenant by his voice. She also had to yell to complain that the hood was suffocating her.

The officer who applied the shocks was Sargeant Pires.

On the day she was released, Lt. Tenorio recommended that she should not tell anyone about what they did to her. Other• wise, they said, she would be arrested again and she would see what would happen to her.

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This girl is 27 years old. She is almost engaged. She is now afraid that her boyfriend and his family will not accept her anymore. She did not have courage to tell him what happened to her, fearing that he would not believe that things did not go beyond that.

Her legs were temporarily burned where they connected the electric wires. After that, she started suffering from varicose veins. She left prison in a state of extreme nervous tension and is presently under medical care.

CASE III - a youngster - he was in prison from November 4 to December 23 (49 days).

He was immediately taken to a dark room, called a "submarine". It did not have light nor air and he spent eight days in it.

He left the dark room for the first time after eight days in order to be questioned. He received electric shocks in the legs and below the knees several times.

During another questioning, they connected one wire to his leg and another to his genital organs. His torturers, Lt. Tenorio, Sargeant Pires, and Isaac laughed at his contortions.

Besides the shocks, he was severely punished with punches to the stomach, kidneys, neck and face. He was slapped on the ears until he fell down, dizzy. While he was in this position, one of them picked up a waste basket with cigarette stubs, pieces of paper, etc., and dumped it on his head.

He was all dirty when he left the place. This called the attention of his colleagues who tried to console him. One of the torturers then told him to go and have a bath.

During the tortures one of the soldiers brought him a pill to take. Another said that he did not need it, yet. He does not know what kind of a pill it was.

Lt. Tenorio said that he did not have to read the trans• cription of his testimony because what was written there was exactly what he had said. The youngster noticed it was no Page 6 of 8 Encl. No. 1 Rio A- 357 use to object and signed the document without reading it.

This boy has an ulcer in the stomach. He had worked for the Companhia Siderurgica Nacional for five years. When he returned to work, he had been dismissed "in the best interests of the Company".

CASE IV - Father Natanael de Morais Campos - he was arrested on November 6, 1970, and is still in prison under preventive arrest decreed by the 2nd Air Force Court.

He is an advisor to JOC members.

Two days before his arrest he was operated on in the clavicle. He was injured with a triple fracture during a car accident. Until November 17, he received visitors, mail, etc.

On December 18 he was transferred to a hot room without windows, water to drink, bath, air, light or sun. He stayed there until January 7, 1971, i.e., for 20 days. He stayed there during Christmas and New Year.

On the night of January 3 he was taken, without shirt, to a room where a friend of his, Edi, was. This boy was naked, had wounds in several parts of his body and was being given electric shocks and being beaten.

They connected him to Edi, through electric wires tied to their fingers, and switched on the machine which gave them shocks simultaneously.

The shocks would occasionally make them fall down. The torturers would then give them more shocks to make them stand up.

While Sargeant Isaac controlled the electric machine, soldier Alberto and Sargeant Pires punched him in the stomach and slapped his ears. Lt. Tenorio demanded that he admit he was a socialist-marxist and that he did not have faith any longer.

One should note that Father Natanael has still a metal plate in his clavicle and that he is not well yet. These Page 7 of 8 Encl. No. 1 Rio A-357 successive falls, caused by shocks, were at least dangerous to his cure.

Being a priest, they organized what they called"a procession", in which his colleague, who was naked, and he were tied together by handcuffs and electric wires. They were taken to the patio of the military unit. It was dark, and while Sargeant Pires accompanied them with the electric machine giving them electric charges, soldier Alberto sang the song "Jesus Christ ....I am here". They walked for about 40 meters and returned to the room.

During the testimony he gave on January 5, he was given electric shocks to his feet and hands twice.

He was thirsty. He would ask for water and Sargeant Isaac would deny it to him.

The doctor, Lt. Dr. Erico, went to examine him. He told the Captain (presumably Lt. Tenorio) that the father could not stand it physically any longer. The Captain told the doctor to put the father in condition to take more shocks. The doctor said that this would not be possible.

Father Natanael was simply worn out. Those who visited him, found him a human rag. During the time he was being tortured, his family could not visit him.

The electric shock machine was a camp telephone.

THESE ARE THE FACTS. WHAT TO DO?

Brazilian Bishops have already condemned them publicly in Brasilia. The Central Committee was equally strict in its last extraordinary meeting. Several Bishops have denounced such tortures privately. What do we see? Priests and JOC members being mistreated even after they were visited by Cardinal Scherer in Rio, and after it became known that the Central Committee was meeting because of their arrest.

In view of this, what should I do as the Bishop of this Diocese? This is a matter which is in the sphere of the Page 8 of 8 Encl* No. 1 Rio A-357

Diocese. What to say to Father Natanael's colleagues who, knowing the facts, were revolted? What to say to Father Natanael's parishoners when they start spreading the word that their vicar confessed that he was a socialist and marxist and that he did not have faith anymore} etc., when we know what is actually happening?

What to say to our active church members who have been cruelly beaten? How to believe in their testimonies and signatures?

It should be noted that I did not go into the reasons behind an investigation against these people. What we are concerned with is how the investigation is being conducted. They are not bank robbers or terrorists. They are not kidnappers. They are youngsters and a priest of the Church.

The situation is delicate, particularly because it deals with this Diocese whose Bishop is already "quemado" (slang: in this case "in the dog house") for having denounced tortures applied to a worker; for having supported two heads of families who were arrested for working with the bishop and, finally, for being himself, together with 16 other priests, involved in an IPM.

I do not ignore the delicacy of the matter. I am sure, however, that if I became unable to defend my priests or the members of this Diocese, because of these facts, I would not be in condition to direct the Diocese.

My only commitment is with Christ and his Church, that is with God's people who live in this Diocese.

I would like to ask our Regional Secretary and my brothers to help me understand the situation better. I have contacted the Secretary General of the National Conference of Bishops (CNBB) and I hope to talk with the President as well as other brother Bishops.

I will accept any suggestion, so that with my ministers and the people we may, inspired by the Holy Spirit, find out what God wants from us at the moment. Bishop

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Officers Elected by CNBB - General Meeting Feb. 17, 1971

PRINCIPALS President Dom Aloisio Lorscheider (Bishop of Santo i Angelo, RGS) Vice President Dom Avelar Brand3o Vilela (Archbishop of Teresina) General Secretary Dom Ivo Lorscheider (Auxiliary Archbishop of Porto Alegre, cousin of Dom Aloisio)

MEMBERS OF THE EPISCOPAL COUNCIL (created by the new regulations

t of CNBB) Dom Walfredo Tepe (Bishop of Ilheus) Dom Luciano Duarte (Archbishop of Aracaju Dom Clemente Isnard (Bishop of Nova Friburgo) Dom Alberto Ramos (Archbishop of Belem) Dom Mario Gurgel (Auxiliary Bishop of S3o Paulo)

REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF CNBB North I (17 bishops) Dom Jo3o de Sousa Lima (Archbishop of Manaus) Dom Diocondo Grotti (Prelate of Acre) North II (12 bishops) Dom Tiago Ryan (Prelate of Santana, Para) Dom Angelo Frosi (Prelate of Abaete do Tocantins, Para) Northeast I (22 bishops) Dom Jose Freire FalcSo (Bishop of Oeiras, Piaui) Dom Pascasio Retler (Bishop of Bacabal, Maranhao) Northeast II (21 bishops) Dom Helder Camara (Archbishop of Olinda and Recife) Dom Nivaldo Monte (Archbishop of Natal) Dom Manuel Pereira (Bishop of Campina Grande) Northeast III (18 bishops) Dom Eugenio Sales (Cardinal-Archbishop of Salvador) Dom Climerio Almeida (Bishop of Vitoria da Conquista) Center (4 bishops) Dom Jose Newton de A. Batista (Archbishop of Brasilia) Center-West (13 bishops) Dom Fernando Gomes dos Santos (Archbishop of Goiania) Dom Tomas Balduino (Bishop of Goias) Far-West (9 bishops) Dom Antonio Barbosa (Bishop of Campo Grande)

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East I (13 bishops) Dom Jaime de Barros Camara (Cardinal-Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro) Dom Adriano Hipolito (Bishop of Nova Igua§u) East II (27 bishops) Dom JoSo de Re2ende Costa (Archbishop of Belo Horizonte) Dom Geraldo Maria de Morais Penido (Archbishop of Juiz de Fora) Dom Luis Gonzaga Fernandes (Auxiliary Bishop of Vitoria) South I (28 bishops) Dom Gabriel Bueno Couto (Bishop of Jundiai) Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns (Archbishop of Sao Paulo) Dom Antonio Alves de Sigueira (Archbishop of Campinas) South II (17 bishops) Dom Pedro Fedalto (Archbishop of Curitiba) Dom Geraldo Fernandes (Archbishop of Londrina) South III (14 bishops) Dom Vicente Scherer (Cardinal-Archbishop of Porto Alegre) Dom Angelo Mugnel (Bishop of Bage) South IV (10 bishops) Dom Afonso Nieuhes (Archbishop of Florianopolis)

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHURCH IN BRAZIL AT THE SYNOD IN ROME (Elected in same meeting) \ Dom Eugenio Sales (Cardinal-Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro) Dom Vicente Scherer (Cardinal-Archbishop of Porto Alegre) Dom Vaifredo Pepe (Bishop of Ilheus) Dom Aloisio Lorscheider (Bishop of Santo Angelo)

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Authority