R ' 3 1 3/ •V, : 3 A-35: Sep 18 ID XX AH 1971
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CEFT. DISTRIBUTION R1GI i/AC TION DEPARTMENT OF STATE REP { ARA b • i Original to p . i *a r TtrdSized piles. ± MLS ^ESIGNAT.Oh N E A CU A-35: NR E IO HANDLING INDICATOR STAT! TO Lh i FOO Department o£ State AIO 1 Sep 18 ID XX AH 1971 —^ INFO « I Amembassy ROME Amembassy SANTIAGO Amembassy BUENOSRXk&E&J Amembassy BRASILIA Amembassy AS*tt&WS n M n u i COM FBB IN T FROM Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: 9 Sept 1971 - A B TAR T R XMB SUBJECT The Catholic Church in Brazil, ARMY NAVY OSD First Half of 1971 r ' 3 1 3/ REF Rio's A-1059 of September 20, 1968, ^r.d 1 +J;*' A^ ISIA NSA CIA Rio's A-492 of November 10, 1970. (p ?/3 •v, : 3 r j SUMMARY: The first quarter of 1971, roughly^anuary through March, witnessed an unusually intense series UtffcESTED DISTRIBUTION of events and news coverage dealing with the Brazilian Catholic Church and its relationship with the Brazilian State. Unlike a similar series that ^ook place in late 1970 (see A-492), some of these ^ 3 not confrontations between the two institutions. Many dealt with internal Church affairs. Each even- was occasion for the press and other observers to revive POST R 3UTING speculation, often of the wildest sort, about the TO: Action Info. Initials direction of the relationship. Each was interpreted MB/ O and reinterpreted, not in the context of being a »CM separate and perhaps unique act, but as a piece of a OL jig-saw puzzle needing perhaps but a few more pieces :CON for the overall picture to become apparent. The ONS precarious equilibrium of the relationship apparently DM dictates that any new ingredient is viewed with ID /.trepidation by both sides. ISO fAJ9 Enclosures: 1. Dom Waldyr Letter 2. CNBB Officer List :ILE kction Taken: )ate: FORM _„ CONFIDENTIAL For r'e3.-."rTient os** Crtiy nltlals: 10.64DS-323 Drofted by: rafting Date: one No.: (Contents and Classification Apptyf&z b^; y: TH7 POL:WGW£tijk^r:ksk 8J/31/7 1 444 DCM:CABoonstra /fa^ CI oranc.s: p0L/B C SloWU^SsubstanceU ) CONFIDENTIAL Rio A-357 2 Although the events of the first quarter seemed to indicate more to come, the past four months have been surprisingly calm, at least on the surface. It is perhaps too early to predict the long-term trend, but it appears that the tendency of the two hierarchies to seek accomnodation one with the other will probably continue. It is always possible, nonetheless, that a new event might precipitate a serious confrontation with altogether different results. * * * * The following is a summary of the major events in Church- State relations from January to July: DOM WALDYR ISSUES CHARGES OF GOB TORTURE - January 22, 1971 Dom Waldyr Calheiros is the progressive Archbishop of Volta Redonda and perhaps the bishop with the best chance of being singled out by the GOB for specific juridical prosecution. He is currently the subject of an IPM (Military Police inquiry) for anti-Revolutionary acts. On January 22, Dom Waldyr sent a circular letter (attached as Enclosure I) to his fellow Brazilian bishops which was an appeal to read a compendium of four cases of alleged torture and brutal treatment of arrested priests and lay workers. The appeal was intended to, and did, provoke discussion at the later meeting of the National Council of Brazilian Bisnops (CNBB). ARCHBISHOP ARNS AND THE SAO PAULO TORTURE CHARGES - January 27- February 6, 1971 On January 27, twelve days before the scheduled opening of the national CNBB conference in Belo Horizonte, a young Italian priest, Father Guilio VICINI, and a young female social assistant, Yara SPADINI, were arrested by the S3o Paulo DEOPS (State Social and Political Police). They were charged with mimeographing "subversive" pamphlets which denounced the death of a member of the metalurgist's union, allegedly at the hands of the S2o Paulo police. CONFIDENTIAL RiO A- 357 CONFIDENTIAL 3 The Archbishop of S3o Paulo, Dom Paulo Evaristo ARNS, learned of the arrests the following day. Arns at tne cime had less than three months experience as archbishop, having replaced Cardinal Angelo ROSSI when the latter left to assume a high Curia post. Faced with the first major incident of his incumbency, Dom Evaristo reacted in a vigorous man er. Perhaps he saw it as an opportunity to stake out a ''progressive" stand vis-a-vis the Government. He thus could demonstrate to the clergy of his archdiocese, reputedly the youngest and most radical in the country, that he was no Rossi, i.e., he was not going to compromise his clerics' rights in order to reach accommodation with the state or national governments. Whatever his motives, Arns moved quickly into a position that invited confrontation. He went to DEOPS headquarters and demanded to see the prisoners. Permission was immediately given. As the archdiocesan newsletter 0 S3o Paulo put it, "both prisoners unhesitatingly confirmed to the Archbishop that they had been tortured." The same article said the torturers were identifiable. Arns left this encounter and went directly to see the then-Governor of Sao Paulo, Abreu SODRE. Arns demanded and received permission to have a doctor examine the prisoners. When the Archbishop accompanied the doctor to DEOPS, however, they were told the extended permission had been rescinded. The excuse was that the prisoners were being held incommunicado. On February 4 Arns went on the offensive. He returned to the Governor to insist that he be allowed to visit the prisoners. Failing in that, he issued a "personal note" which, in the strongest language, declared that he personally had verified that the priest and social worker had "been tortured in an ignominious manner by the S3o Paulo DEOPS." The Arch• bishop ordered that his note be posted on the door of every parish church in his archdiocese. The response was immediate. The S3o Paulo press carried Arns1 denunciation and the 0 Estado do Sao Paulo editorialized with the following forceful plea: CONFIDENTIAL Rio A-357 CONFIDENTIAL 4 "The silence of the Government (in the face of Arns' charges) would be the equivalent to a confession of guilt, or, equally serious, of indifference...This time it is not a case of another of those defamatory news articles printed overseas to downgrade Brazil's image. Nor is it an Archbishop Helder Camara coming forth to accuse the Government with his demagogic diatribes. The accuser is a bishop respected throughout the country. We believe the Justice Minister will feel it a right and a duty to say the words the nation is waiting for." Other papers and almost all Church leaders publicly proclaimed similar support for Arns. A very different reaction, albeit more private, was one of fury by Governor Abreu Sodre and by the just-named commanding officer of the Second Amy, General Humberto Souza MELO. The latter was reported "ready to go to the mat" with Arns. When the DEOPS issued an explanatory note of February 11 presenting their side of the story, however, it was clear that cooler heads (probably in Brasilia) had prevailed. The official statement merely said that there would be a "serious investigation" of the charges of torture and that, if found to be true, those responsible would be punished. The public aspect of these events in Sao Paulo terminated when the spotlight moved to Belo Horizonte and the CNBB national conference on February 9. All observers c^reed that Archbishop Arns and the Vicini-Spadini arrests would come up in the conferences' discussions. (Some observers, mostly among the security forces, speculated that Arns had deliberately exploited the Vicini case to assure himself a prominent role at the meeting.) CNBB CONFERENCE IN BELO HORIZONTE - February 9-18, 1971 The CNBB met in full session with anywhere from 170 to 200 of Brazil's 242 bishops attending the various sessions. The principal formal business on the agenda was the election of new CNBB officers. The election had been precipitated by the CONFIDENTIAL Rio A-357 CONFIDENTIAL 5 resignation of the previous president, Dom Angelo ROSSI, upon leaving for the Vatican. Electioneering for the various offices occupied a good deal of the first five days. Although there were no official "candidates", there was little doubt which of the clerics were and which were not seeking office. The presidency was won by Dom Aloisio LORSCHEIDER, Bishop of Santo Angelo and incumbent Secretary-General of the CNBB, Dom Aloisio had been generally considered to be a "moderate" within the hierarchy. In October 1970, however, he gained the somewhat ill-fitting mantel of "progressive" when he was detained for six hours by Guanabara military security forces. The detention was the result of his attempts to assist 15 church workers at the Rio Institute of Brazilian De~ alopment (IBRADES) while it was undergoing a military police raid for possible "subversive affiliations." Lorscheider won the CNBB presidency by defeating (105 to 65 votes on the third ballot) Dom Vicente SCHERER, Cardinal-Archbishop of Porto Alegre. Dom Vicente was the moderate-conservative candidate. Dom Aloisio's cousin, Dom Ivo LORSCHEITER, Auxiliary Bishop of Porto Alegre and thought to be somewhat politically to the left of Aloisio, was elected to replace his cousin as Secretary- General. Dom Avelar BRANDAO, then Archbishop of Teresina (later transferred to Salvador) and President of CELAM (Latin American Episcopal Council) was chosen CNBB Vice President. At the same time the 29 regional representatives of the CNBB and a new, six member Episcopal and Pastoral Council (apparently designed to act as a "senate" of the Brazilian Church) were elected.