Moderator’s introduction to the workshop

Afghanistan and China are close neighbors. is regarded as the heart of Asia and is an important part of the ancient Silk Road, with a very important geostrategic value. The Afghan war has lasted for 40 years, which has made it the home of several transnational terrorist forces. The long-term competition among world powers in Afghanistan has complicated its domestic political and social relations. There was a turning point in 2020. On February 29, 2020, the and the US reached a peace agreement, and on September 12, the Afghan internal reconciliation process was officially launched. In this context, relevant experts and scholars were invited to participate in this workshop to review the history of political reconciliation in Afghanistan, analyze current major issues, and look forward to the prospects for peace. Regarding the current situation in Afghanistan, the participants believed that the change of American attitude was the key driver of the US-Taliban agreement. The reasons for the change of attitude are as follows: adjustment of national security strategies, exhaustion caused by long-term war, the high cost of troops, and so on. The US adjusting its strategy to Afghanistan is for its own interests, not for peace in Afghanistan. At present, the reconciliation process among Afghans has begun, but the negotiations have not yet officially started, and the negotiation

1 procedures are still being discussed. There are serious differences between the Taliban and the government. There are two key points of contention. First, the Taliban advocates the establishment of Shariah rule based on the Hanafi school, and the Afghan government objects to this in the name of “inclusive peace.” Second, the Taliban claim that the US-Taliban agreement is the basis for intra-Afghan reconciliation, but the Kabul government does not agree. Experts believe that the Afghan government’s position amid the current political reconciliation is very embarrassing. The main problem facing the government itself is a fierce factional struggle and severe corruption. The future stability and development of Afghanistan require distinguished leaders, effective government administration, and strong military and police forces, as well as the development of the economy, culture and education. Afghan political and cultural conditions determine that it will not completely rely on any country in international relations, but will try to maintain its neutrality and independence. Afghan issue has never been simple. Most of its problems are caused by foreign countries, and solutions also require foreign help. Regarding the future of the situation in Afghanistan, the participants believe that, first, if Trump is re-elected, the withdrawal of US troops will be a foregone conclusion. The US will not leave Afghanistan. But it is not interested in the specific

2 details of the future political system of Afghanistan. It only hopes that the future Afghan government can cooperate with the implementation of US strategy. There are many difficulties impeding reconciliation among the Afghan people. The solution is to find a power distribution plan accepted by all parties, with the international community continuing to provide support and assistance. Second, peace talks are better than war, but peace talks are not yet true peace. The current peace talks may not reach an agreement. Even if a peace agreement is reached, it does not mean that peace can be achieved. Since 2019, the ISKP and Al-Qaida have reorganized and their strength has grown significantly. Third, the friendly relations between China and Afghanistan should be further developed, and people-to-people exchanges and commercial exchanges should be promoted. Participants proposed that the Chinese media should help Afghanistan build a positive image in the international community and facilitate peace in Afghanistan. The US and regional powers have their own interests in Afghanistan. Attention must be paid to the negative effects of the US.

Qian Xuemei October 13, 2020

3 The 38th Broadyard Workshop

Road to Peace in Afghanistan: Its History and Future

October 12, 2020

Qian Xuemei, an associate professor at the School of

International Studies of Peking University, moderated the first part of the workshop. Zhang Min, the former chargé d’affaires of the Chinese

Embassy in Afghanistan, gave a presentation on “Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan.” His lecture included the following 13 points.

First, Afghanistan’s political structure has been relatively loose since its founding. In different historical periods, the western, southeastern, and northern parts of Afghanistan belonged to the

Persian Empire, the Indian Empire, and to various dynasties of Central

Asia. Persian, Indian, and Central Asian cultures have therefore strongly influenced these regions. In 1747, Ahmed, a young officer born in the Pashtun tribe, extricated Afghanistan from the Persian

Empire and established a unified country. It was a tribal union maintained by fearsome military power. The people’s sense of unity was relatively weak, but their national identity and tribal concepts were very profound. In the past 200 years of living together, various ethnic groups have merged to a certain extent. However, since the

1980s, the war has alienated the different ethnic groups.

Second, it has been a glorious tradition of the Afghans to pursue independence and resist foreign invaders. In the struggle against invaders, the Afghan people have shown their independence, courage,

4 and love for freedom. They have protected their homeland with their lives and show their gallant character.

Third, at the end of the 19th century, Emir Rahman determined the territory of today’s Afghanistan and established an autocratic monarchy. He forcefully suppressed and carried out bloody extermination of the rebellious Pashtun and non-Pashtun uprisings, and finally realized the relative peace and stability of this country for more than half a century, and, at the same time established a strong national army.

Fourth, from 1973 to 2001, Afghanistan experienced regime changes through military means four times. During this period, the

Soviet Union implemented a military occupation of Afghanistan to expand its influence. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a large-scale armed conflict broke out in Afghanistan, causing a lot of civilian casualties.

Fifth, in 1996, the Taliban defeated the Mujahideen and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They exercised strict religious rule and practiced fundamentalism, which further deepened ethnic contradictions. The Taliban’s actions caused other ethnic groups to establish alliances with each other, resulting in the isolation of the

Pashtuns.

Sixth, in 2001, the US and its allies sent troops to overthrow the

Taliban regime and implemented Western parliamentary democracy in

Afghanistan. Under this system, Afghan government departments were allocated proportionately according to ethnic and political

5 factions. The Tajiks of the Northern Alliance controlled the three most important departments of national defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs. They excluded the Taliban and some moderates. The reorganized Taliban regarded the new government as a puppet of the

US. They continued to call themselves the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan. Their activities covered more than half of the country’s territory, and they infiltrated their forces into Kabul, launched terrorist attacks on the US military, and prepared for the next step.

Seventh, the US must be involved in any peace plan for

Afghanistan. The US spent about $750 billion in Afghanistan over 19 years, and the number of its soldiers killed and wounded reached more than 2,000. However, it has gained nothing for it. At present, in the context of the global contraction of US forces, and the strengthening of its Indo-Pacific strategy, it is almost certain that the US will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The US initially identified the

Taliban as a terrorist organization, but it now has had to have face-to-face talks with them. This change shows that the US military is eager to get out of Afghanistan. Although the Taliban are eager to drive foreign troops out of Afghanistan from their territory, at the same time they have been insisting on their terms and are striving to let the US make enormous concessions.

Eighth, in theory, Afghanistan will begin the peace process after the US withdraws its troops. The prolonged war has destroyed the relatively stable social pattern and structure of Afghanistan and deepened and solidified its original social contradictions and problems.

6 To avoid new large-scale conflicts, all parties must sign an agreement after the US withdraws its troops.

Ninth, Afghanistan needs a distinguished leader and an effective government in the future. The distribution of power after peace is a universal problem, especially in Afghanistan. In the past 100 years, aside from King Zahir, none of Afghanistan’s top leaders have died a natural death. Since the Mujahideen came to power in 1992, they began to distribute the power of various government departments according to ethnic faction. In the distribution, the Taliban had big ambitions and put forward the demand that it should control all key government departments. However, the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and other ethnic groups also want to be in power and participate in politics.

They do not want to allow the to monopolize power.

Tenth, the main tasks of the current military and police forces in

Afghanistan are as follows: maintain domestic peace and stability, and deter and weaken the formation of local warlords and tribal forces.

However, due to the difficult reality of the lives of the individual soldiers and policemen, the collective will of those forces is not firm.

The government needs to improve the benefits it gives to the army to build a mighty national army in the future. Of course, this also requires funds, so the government needs to make a proper budget.

Eleventh, religious fanatics such as Al-Qaida and ISIL fighters in

Afghanistan must be dealt with severely. They are the main force that poses a threat to national security.

Twelfth, the problems of Afghanistan have all been caused by

7 outside countries. There is at least one state behind each of the factions vying for power in Afghanistan. The Afghan peace process cannot exclude those external countries. They should promote peaceful resolutions to the conflicts by convening different forms of international conferences. In this process, they should also be alert to the negative role of the US.

Thirteenth, China and Afghanistan are neighbors, and peace in

Afghanistan would be of great benefit to China. China should therefore actively advance the peace process in Afghanistan.

The second presenter was Xi Meng, director of the Pashtu

Language Department of China Media Group, whose presentation was titled, “The influence of intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations on

Afghanistan’s long-lasting peace.” He first pointed out the difference between his usage of “dialogue” and “negotiation,” saying that intra-Afghan negotiations referred to an Afghan negotiation mechanism that included the Afghan government, the Taliban and the main political parties in Afghanistan, while “dialogue” generally referred to the dialogues between the Taliban and some former Afghan dignitaries held in Moscow and Doha in February and July 2019.

Next, Xi Meng introduced the dialogues in Moscow and Doha.

He pointed out that, although the dialogue held in Moscow was opposed to by Kabul for its failure to invite the participation of any

Afghan government staff member, the dialogue still held positive significance in that, through the dialogue, the Taliban gave a clear signal that they were willing to solve the Afghan issue through

8 political negotiations. It demonstrated the Taliban’s positive efforts to realize Afghanistan’s internal reconciliation following the future withdrawal of the US army. The main fruits of the dialogue in

Moscow were as follows:

1. Affirmation of the principle of realizing reconciliation through dialogues and decided to hold the next dialogue in Doha;

2. Both the Taliban and the US showed their solid support of the progress of reconciliation;

3. Reaffirmation of the requirement for the withdrawal of foreign troops, stance against terrorism, opposition to outside interference in internal affairs and hope that the international community would continue its support of Afghanistan’s peaceful reconstruction;

4. Emphasized that the future political reconstruction of

Afghanistan should be based on Islam and the principles of broad tolerance.

The Afghan government made positive remarks on the fruits of the dialogue in Doha, which has laid the foundation for the direct dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Besides further clarifying the achievements of the dialogue in Moscow, all parties reached consensus in the dialogue in Doha on the following aspects. Both sides promised:

1. To not to use strong words against each other;

2. To avoid attacks on civilian industrial facilities and

institution staff;

3. To provide security to religious minorities;

9 4. To fully confirm the Islamic background of the future

political structure of Afghanistan.

The negotiations in Doha (as of October 12, 2020) had not made any breakthrough.

Xi Meng further pointed out that the strategic failure of the US, the Afghan government’s failure in state governance, and the Taliban’s extremism all contributed to the lasting unevenness of the Afghanistan peace progress. The US’s irresponsible deeds have left Afghanistan in a mess, while the Afghanistan government is complicated in its constitution and has weak implementation capacity and authority. In addition, the Taliban has not prepared itself for power-sharing or giving up fundamentalism. In Xi Meng’s opinion, the Taliban essentially comprise a complex of nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. To maintain its existence and development, it must continue to hold high the banner of Islam and establish what it understands as a “pure Islamic system” in Afghanistan.

Xi Meng finally expressed his belief that the key for Afghanistan to realize lasting peace lay in balancing the distribution of post-war interests, eliminating corruption in state governance, and coordinating the pace of foreign aid.

Wang Shida, deputy director of the Institute of South Asian

Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International

Relations, made a presentation titled, “The background for launching intra-Afghan dialogue and each party’s standpoint.”

Wang Shida pointed out that the peace agreement reached

10 between the US and the Taliban on February 29 and the launch of intra-Afghan negotiation on September 12 were two major milestones of progress made in the Afghanistan peace progress in 2020.

Wang Shida expressed his belief that the biggest backdrop to starting intra-Afghan negotiation in 2020 was the exhausted frame of mind of each party after dozens of years of war as well as the perception that it would be difficult to thoroughly defeat the other on the battlefield through military means. The biggest driving force behind it was the attitude of the US. Wang pointed out that the Afghan war has ran through three US administrations. The Bush government did not propose any policy toward the Afghan peace progress, which resulted in the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan as well as the deterioration of the security situation. Different from the Bush administration, the Obama administration distinguished “good” and

“bad” Taliban, and helped the good Taliban’s military actions through political means. But it still did not achieve its goals. The strategy of the Trump administration, although it unveiled a new Afghanistan and

South Asia strategy, is to some extent similar to the strategy of Obama administration in basic content, which did not achieve its hoped result either. Compared with the Obama administration, the major characteristic of the Trump administration was the level of strategic adjustment, namely, the new strategy unveiled in August 2017 was adjusted quite a bit at the end of 2018. Reasons behind the US’s change of attitude amid the Afghan peace progress were as follows. (1)

Trump believed that the return on investment on the battlefield in

11 Afghanistan was too low, so he switched to seeking alternative solutions besides continuing the warfare; (2) Trump thought that fulfilling his 2016 campaign promises would help Trump win the US presidential election in November 2020; and (3) The US national security strategy has undergone substantial adjustments, in that the administration no longer believes that terrorism is the number one threat to US national security, and US foreign strategy should focus on its game with the big powers, including dealing with the rise of China.

Therefore, the root cause of the breakthrough made in the Afghan peace process in 2020 was the Trump administration’s strong desire to extricate itself from the war in Afghanistan through political means.

In terms of the standpoints of the two sides during the negotiation,

Wang Shida opined that the US was more interested in pushing the

Afghans to reach internal political agreement as early as possible to realize a “decent” withdrawal of its army, while showing little interest in Afghanistan’s future political arrangement. He opined that the

Taliban aimed, on the one hand, to end the “foreign occupation” and, on the other hand, establish an Islamic system based on Hanafi school, one of the four Sunni schools of religious law. To this end, the Taliban makes use of both peace negotiations and military pressure. In contrast, the Afghan government hoped that, through negotiation, the

Taliban would agree to a ceasefire before the US withdrawal and then it would include the Taliban into some sort of political power sharing arrangement. However, since the government did not participate as a signatory in the peace agreement between the US and the Taliban, and

12 the agreement did not require the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire before the US withdrawal, the Afghan government’s position became more and more awkward as the US withdrawal accelerated.

Wang Shida pointed out that the Afghanistan peace progress has been a long journey full of challenges, and the key to it lay in finding a way of distributing power between the Afghan government and the

Taliban.

During the discussion session that followed the presentations, the attendees discussed the difficulties encountered during the Doha negotiation and the US’s attitude amid the negotiation.

The fourth presenter was Yu Minghui, the director of the China–

Arab Economic and Trade Promotion Committee, whose presentation was titled, “The essence and practice of Sino-Afghan relations.” In

Yu’s opinion, the essence of Sino-Afghan relations is like a relationship of relatives connected by mountains and rivers. China should join in the reconstruction of Afghanistan as soon as possible, participating in evidence-based practice in various fields.

Yu Minghui then introduced the objective environment for research and practice in Afghanistan. He pointed out that, politically, ever since Afghanistan started experiencing wars over the past 20 or even 40 years, more and more political arguments and criticism against the government are being heard, with public opinion starting to play an increasingly important role in the country’s political ecology; economically, Afghan society has undergone dramatic changes in peoples’ life habits and in the consumer market since 2001.

13 For instance, the newly promulgated investment law welcomes foreigners to invest in factory-building in Afghanistan, allows foreigners to hold 100 percent of the shares, and facilitates visa processing for investors. The Ministry of Commerce of Afghanistan also eagerly hopes for more Chinese enterprises to do market research in Afghanistan and get to know its industry and agriculture. To this end, he stressed the importance of understanding the new changes and strengthening economic, trade and cultural exchanges with

Afghanistan under the new situation.

According to Yu Minghui, all classes of Afghans have a relatively good impression of Chinese people. Chinese investment in factory-building in Afghanistan has realized reciprocity and mutual benefit, solved many livelihood problems, and deepened the Afghan people’s understanding of Chinese society. At present, the reason why

Chinese companies are struggling to survive in Afghanistan continues to lie in the difficult living conditions, which is also the most important factor that makes local people dissatisfied. The reason why the Afghans have maintained hope in the Taliban is that they think the

Taliban can help improve their lives, ensure employment and personal interests, and solve the problem of corruption. The biggest problem with the Taliban is that the people think that they only restrict their freedoms and have not done a good job in improving the economy. It can be seen that economy occupies a very important part of the production and life of the Afghan people. Therefore, China should strengthen cooperation and ties with Afghanistan, improve the

14 economy by solving employment problems, and bring benefits to the local people.

The fifth presenter was Zhu Yongbiao, director of the Afghan

Studies Center of Lanzhou University, who made a presentation titled,

“The prospect and constraints of the intra-Afghan peace talk progress.”

His presentation focused on the following six key words.

1. Decoupling. Zhu Yongbiao expressed his belief that besides the “decoupling” of China and the US, “decoupling” has been also very much part of Afghan issues. One is the decoupling of the US withdrawal and progress on the Afghanistan peace talks. The other is the decoupling of Afghanistan’s security situation and progress on the peace talks—that is, progress on the peace talks has not led to a clear improvement in the security situation.

2. Compelled. Zhu Yongbiao described the intra-Afghan peace talks as being like Chinese-style “match-making” and “forced marriage.” He pointed out that Trump, Pompeo, and Zalmay Khalilzad were the most active ones in the peace talks. However, the US

Department of Defense, the military, and the intelligence community could not come to a consensus on this issue. In addition, this issue seriously damaged the authority of the Afghan government, and the

Taliban obtained huge benefits at almost zero cost, all of which stemmed from Trump’s pushing. In this context, a recognized, decent, and responsible withdrawal that the US initially pursued has since devolved into a plausibly decent withdrawal.

3. Timing. Zhu Yongbiao opined that peace talks at an

15 inappropriate or immature timing would not help Afghanistan’s long-term stability and development. Up to now, no party has truly prepared for intra-Afghan peace talks and long-term peace in

Afghanistan, or made clear arrangements for international assistance after the withdrawal of the US army.

4. Question type. Will the withdrawal of the army be a single choice question, a judgment call, a short answer question or an essay question for Trump or the next US president? Is it a regular question, a bonus question, or a “life-saving question”? There will be huge variables to consider between the general election in November 2020 and January 2021.

5. Future. Zhu Yongbiao pointed out that the problem with the peace talks process in Afghanistan lies in their failure to fundamentally solve many structural contradictions (such as the divergences between the Taliban and Afghan parties over the Afghan political system, regime form and structure), which cannot be resolved in a short period of time. In addition, the differences between the parties on the status of women and the status of media have not been resolved either. Due to each party’s differences in terms of negotiation motivation, resources, objectives, and pace, it will be a long process to achieve reconciliation within Afghanistan, and it is likely to be ultimately fruitless. Emphasis should be given to the Taliban, but the strength of the Taliban should not be exaggerated.

6. Reference. Zhu Yongbiao pointed out that the US withdrawal can be compared with its withdrawal after the Korean War and

16 Vietnam War, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan: What is the background? What is the goal? How should it be done?... By comparison, the prospects for the US withdrawal are clearer. A limited long-term military presence may be more in line with US interests.

However, it is also possible that Trump will insist on withdrawing troops in his seek for better odds for being re-elected.

Wang Xu, executive deputy director of the Center for South

Asian Studies, Peking University, gave a presentation titled, “Analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan.”

Wang Xu analyzed the overall situation of Afghanistan, pointing out that the most important change was that the US adjusted its anti-terrorist policy and its policy toward Afghanistan. The US has implemented a unilateral policy on the issue of the peace talks in

Afghanistan and implemented double standards and a “selective anti-terrorism” policy in counter-terrorism, leading Afghanistan to face a more severe terrorist threat, which can be seen in the following two points:

1. The political legitimacy of the Taliban regime has been further enhanced;

2. International terrorists have been active, which is affected by the following two points: First, uncertainty exists in the separation of the

Taliban from religious extremist ideologies. Although the Taliban promised to cut off ties with Al-Qaeda in the agreement signed with the US, in fact there is no effective monitoring mechanism in place.

With the withdrawal of the US troops, the pressure on the Taliban by

17 the US has further weakened. Second, the strength of the Islamic State in Afghanistan has recovered. The Afghan government forces and the

Taliban intend to compete on the battlefield in order to seek the political initiative.

Wang Xu then analyzed the current security situation in

Afghanistan mainly from the following aspects.

1. The crackdown on the leadership of the Islamic State in

Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has been effective, but the return of the

Islamic State and the Islamic State-ization of regional extreme violence and terrorist organizations are also accelerating. First, the

IS-KP, which has long been entrenched in Nangarhar Province, has been hit hard. Leaders at all levels have tended to transfer to, expand and reorganize in Jawzjan Province, and Kabul; second, the shift from drone strikes to urban arrests; Third, the

“beheading” effect is obvious, with the number of attacks decreasing significantly; Fourth, the activity area of the IS-KP has shrunk in size, and is concentrated in the southern parts of Nangarhar Province,

Kunar Province and Kabul.

2. The future of the IS-KP has the following issues worthy of attention: First, it remains to be seen whether the new foreign leaders can bridge internal factional conflicts, be accepted by local members, and accelerate their return. Wang Xu believes that there are three reasons for sending Arabs to be the leader of the IS-KP. One is that non-Afghan leaders can help coordinate conflicts between different factions, especially between local factions; another is that foreign

18 leaders can use their networks in Iraq and Syria to strengthen the

IS-KP. Due to their influence and traditional network in the Middle

East, the advantages of Arab leaders would be far beyond that of a local Afghan leader or a Pakistani leader; Still another is that the new leaders are originally members of Al-Qaida and can use both the

Islamic State network and their original relationship. Second, the membership of the IS-KP has changed to be mainly non-Pashtun middle-class intellectual youths. One of the reasons for the change is that these young people are dissatisfied with their situation, believing that the Islamic State’s extreme religious ideology may be more authentic; another is that the locals value the “equality” in the Islamic

State, namely, that it pays no attention to ethnicity and religion. In addition, the fundamental reason lies in the profound changes in the social and economic structure of Afghanistan since the 1970s. The process of urbanization has led to the emergence of a lot of urban proletarians. Still another is that the Islamic State-ization of regional violent terrorist organizations shows two convergences, namely, the convergence of religious ideology and attack methods; also, the threat of the cross-border movement of the Islamic State is increasing, and the security situation interaction between Pakistan and Afghanistan has become closer. The trend of two-way agents and two-way cross-border terrorist attacks has increased significantly.

During the following discussion session, attendees talked about the internal structure of the Islamic State and the Taliban. Wang Xu pointed out that, inside the Islamic State, organizations that swear

19 loyalty, different from those that swear support, must accept the direct leadership of the Islamic State. Some scholars expressed their views that the Taliban has been undergoing changes in its structure already for more than 10 years. The new generation of leaders diverge in their attitudes toward new things and extremism, but those with extremist thoughts are still influential. It is hard to negotiate with them in that what they seek for is not money but power.

The second half of the workshop was moderated by Zhang Min,

Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan. Zhao

Yishen, former chief reporter of the Kabul branch of Xinhua News

Agency, gave a presentation titled, “Exploring the role played by the media during the Afghanistan peace progress.” His presentation included the following perspectives:

First, the current situation of the Afghan media. Zhao Yishen pointed out that the media in Afghan has three features. One is the large number of news agencies and the extent of their opening-up.

Despite the incomplete infrastructure, there is no management of or restrictions on most websites. There is Afghan media in multiple languages, including Pushtu and Dari. Another is that the media is not highly qualified, and has little influence. The influence of Afghan media is basically limited within the country, or even within a certain province or area, unable to reach the other parts of the world, or South

Asia and the Middle East. Still another is its narrow content and lack of positive reports. Afghan media focuses on explosions, massacre and death, among other breaking news, as well as people’s miserable life.

20 But the fact is that the Afghan society has achieved great progress in political, economic and military aspects. Zhao Yishen opined that, while in the process of reporting on factual news, the media should take a greater role in demonstrating the positive side of Afghan, giving confidence to the international community and local people and changing people’s stereotypes of Afghanistan.

Second, the media’s impact on politics. Zhao Yishen pointed out that there are five main influences of the media on politics: (1) information dissemination; (2) political socialization; (3) influencing public opinion; (4) supervising the government; and (5) setting issues for discussion. What’s worth noting is political socialization — that is, the media can popularize ideas and thinking in society in a subtle way by setting out issues or stating them directly, so as to promote the formation of social consensus and increase social groups’ acceptance of this idea or thought.

Third, how can the media promote peace and development in

Afghanistan? Zhao Yishen pointed out that the media can make a difference in the following four aspects by: (1) Promoting national unity. The current politics and economy of Afghanistan are still grounded on ethnic nation or tribe. The national consciousness of the

Afghan people needs to be improved, and Afghanistan needs to appear on the world stage with a united image. (2) Shaping the image of the country. Current news in Afghanistan is still dominated by breaking news and news about terrorists and violence. In the future, the media

(whether local or international) should consider helping Afghanistan

21 change its negative image. (3) Serving public diplomacy. As a part of public diplomacy, the media can do some complementary things that do not exceed their duty. Afghanistan-based Chinese media’s foreign publicity has enhanced China’s international image and promoted the friendly relations between the governments and peoples of the two countries. The relationship between the nations lies in the closeness of its peoples, and the closeness of the peoples lies in the communication of hearts. The media can do a lot in this regard. (4) Raising international attention. Although Afghanistan is a country rich in

“topics,” it lacks influence in the international community. The media should assume social responsibility and contribute to the promotion of national unity in Afghanistan and the development of relations between China and Afghanistan.

Fourth, the Chinese media will make the following future efforts:

(1) continuously improve quality and quantity; (2) localize media production and broadcasting; (3) make full use of new media; (4) follow the steps of the development of 5G technology and use advanced technology to realize the full integration of traditional media and new media.

Shan Dan, a lecturer from the Communication University of

China, gave a presentation titled, “The possible impact of ethnic and religious conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan on the ‘Belt and Road’ construction & reflections on countermeasures.”

Shan Dan pointed out that the reason for researching both

Afghanistan and Pakistan is that they are both important countries in

22 China’s construction plan for its western neighboring countries and

Belt & Road Initiative, they are similar in humanities and are geographically connected, and the “three forces” (ethnic separatist forces, violent terrorist forces, and religious extremist forces) pose a serious threat to the construction of the two countries. In addition, both countries are Islamic republics, and multi-ethnic countries with acute and complex ethnic conflicts. Overall, the internal threats to the

“Belt and Road” construction in the two countries are mainly the serious ethnic conflicts, rampant religious extremist forces, and an unstable political, economic and social situation.

Shan Dan then introduced the two countries’ position in the BRI.

She stressed that the construction of Gwadar Port, the key to the

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, could provide Afghanistan and the five countries of Central Asia with access to the sea, which would have important significance. In the 2014-2015 fiscal year, China became Afghanistan’s third largest trading partner and largest source of investment. A group of strong and reputable Chinese companies have invested in Afghanistan and made contributions to the local development. China’s investment in Afghanistan mainly involves mining, communications and road construction.

She then analyzed the ethnic conflicts and separatism threats to the security of the two countries. The ethnic issues of the two countries include cross-border ethnic issues, ethnic separatism issues, and the power struggle between the majority and minority ethnic groups. Pakistan has implemented an ethnic federal system, but the

23 issue of ethnic minority national identity has not been fundamentally resolved since its independence. Although Afghanistan implements a unitary system, each ethnic group has its own settlement. The

Pashtuns, the biggest ethnic group, and the Tajiks, the second biggest ethnic group, are always vying for the dominance of the country. In addition, most of the rural areas in the two countries are closed tribal societies, presenting a structure of “nation – large tribe/group – small tribe/family.” The internal affairs of the tribes are in the charge of their leaders, with the tribal elders as leaders of the local grass-roots government who are responsible for resolving conflicts. Therefore, most villagers of the two countries live in the tribal areas to which they belong; the influence of tribal elders is stronger than that of the central government, and the identification and obedience of tribal members to the tribe is higher than to the central government.

Although Afghanistan has established a democratically elected government, the national structure has not changed much. The tribe is still the cornerstone of society, and central government and local administrations are suspended above tribes. Therefore, it is difficult to expand the Afghan administration’s policies to areas other than big cities, and the tribes can hardly feel the blessings brought about by

China’s BRI project. Instead, they may even mistakenly think of it as an external force plundering their living space.

Shan Dan opined that the security threat from religious extremism to the “Belt and Road” construction in the two countries is mainly manifested in the Taliban organization and its

24 pan-regionalization.

Shan Dan put forward some thoughts and suggestions for the

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and Belt and Road construction.

One was to establish the concept of “corridor zone,” set up security protective guard, build a safe corridor zone or program security zone, and implement special security management and intelligence management to ensure the coordination and arrangement of China’s relative programs. Another was to prevent the permeation of terrorist forces and strengthen anti-terrorist cooperation. Still another was to establish a communication mechanism and social connections with minority ethnic tribes. Fourth, provide development opportunities and strive to win the heart of the people and build a good reputation. Fifth, hasten the steps to cultivate talent in local languages instead of using

English as the lingua franca. Also, avoid “over-consumption” of

China-Pakistan relations and China-Afghanistan friendship.

Fu Yuhong, from Jilin University, gave a presentation titled, “The road to peace in Afghanistan: A Lack of opportunities and driving forces.”

Fu Yuhong first talked about , the head and founder of . She pointed out that Hekmatyar was from the

Kalot area in the northern Kunduz province of Afghanistan.

Hekmatyar was a Pushtun from a branch of the Kharoti tribe that had resettled in the northern province of Kunduz. Influenced by the

Muslim Brotherhood, he established Hezbi Islami in the 1970s. In

1979, the Hezbi Islami split, with Hekmatyar leading a larger faction,

25 namely the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. In the battle against the Soviet

Union in the 1980s, the organization led by Hekmatyar was the most famous, radical, and disciplined organization, and was also the one that received the most military and financial aid. He served as the prime minister of Afghanistan for a short term and was internationally condemned for launching a rocket attack on Kabul during the civil war in the 1990s. After the September 11 attacks, Hekmatyar declared a “jihad” against Western forces and formed a loose alliance with the

Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and was designated as a terrorist by the US.

Hekmatyar mainly acted in central Afghanistan and tribal areas in northwestern Pakistan.

Fu Yuhong attributed the motivation for reconciliation between the Hezbi Islami and the Afghan government to the following four aspects: First, Hezbi Islami’s efforts in both military and politics.

Second, the fight against the Taliban. The enhancement of the

Taliban’s strength and other countries’ support for the Taliban prompted Hezbi Islami’s military leaders to change their long-term strategy and maintain their position by entering the political realm.

Third, the promotion of the Afghan government. After Ashraf Ghani came to power, in 2014, due to the deterioration of the domestic security situation, the government began to vigorously advance reconciliation with the Hezbi Islami in order to relieve pressure on it, while promoting the Taliban and other opposition organizations to join the peace process. Last, the support of the international community.

Thanks to the efforts of the Afghan government, the United Nations

26 lifted its sanctions on Hekmatyar, and the US military withdrawal plan and actions in 2014 also encouraged the Hezbi Islami to join the peace negotiations.

Fu Yuhong expressed her belief that the positive side of reconciliation lies in sending positive political signals to other opposition forces, while the negative side is mainly as follows: on the one hand, the people oppose the granting of judicial immunity to the

Hezbi Islami and maintain a deep sense of distrust of the former warlord forces; on the other hand, the return of Hekmatyar may deepen the existing division of the government.

Fu Yuhong finally pointed out that the role of credible figures in the negotiating team was very important; negotiations were long-term and complex, as were the negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban; while combating opposition forces militarily, efforts should also be made to promote their transformation in order to achieve their joining the political mainstream. For

Afghanistan, it should contact and have dialogue with other armed groups. To this end, it was necessary to further understand the internal relations of the Taliban against the backdrop that the people show no support and its hostile relations with various groups have not fundamentally changed, even if the government and the Taliban reached a certain agreement, it would not mean that Afghanistan would truly achieve peace. The needs and interests of minority groups and ordinary people were equally important for lasting peace; (5) the dual role of former warlords and other local political powerhouses in

27 Afghanistan should be noted.

During the discussion session, the participants carried out more discussion on the media in Afghanistan, and the belief was expressed that some opposition organizations, including the Taliban, had a high level of media propaganda, and this was something that deserved more attention.

The fourth presenter was Mansoori Mohammad Ramin, a PhD student of PKU’s School of International Studies. His presentation was titled, “The development and evolution of Jamayat-E-Islami

Afghanistan.”

Ramin first introduced the reasons behind the establishment of

Jamayat-E-Islami Afghanistan. It was established by Burhanuddin

Rabbani in 1978, and its current leader is his son Salahuddin Rabbani.

Jamayat-E-Islami Afghanistan promotes communitarianism. It belongs to moderate Islam, and advocates Afghanistan to implement a cabinet system rather than a presidential system.

Ramin then explained the role played by Jamayat-E-Islami, one of the most powerful of the mujahideen groups, on the political stage.

He pointed out that the establishment and early development of

Jamayat-E-Islami was related to the geopolitics of Afghanistan. The main reasons behind its becoming a Tajik-dominated political force included: (1) The contradiction between Hekmatyar, Rabbani and

Massoud (a Tajik anti-Soviet military leader) and the ethnic composition of Afghanistan; (2) the political participation of the Tajiks before the Daoud Khan’s coup in 1973; and (3) the fact that the

28 political and military alliance between Rabbani and Massoud brought development opportunities to the Tajiks in Afghanistan.

Jamayat-E-Islami plays a very active role in the mujahideen groups.

Jamayat-E-Islami united the Tajiks, strengthened Tajik awareness, changed the political status of Tajiks, and broke the tradition of

Pashtun rule of Afghanistan. In addition, the political goals of

Jamayat-E-Islami have been adjusted many times. Its leadership is not bound by religion, but will make appropriate adjustments to the goals according to political interests.

Ramin finally analyzed the test faced by Jamayat-E-Islami on the political stage. He expressed his belief that it is facing a three-fold test: intra-party conflicts, domestic political dilemmas (including the threat of the Taliban and the conflicts with the government), and how to manage its relations with Pakistan. A leadership crisis and internal conflicts are important factors that threaten the Jamayat-E-Islami.

However, Jamayat-E-Islami itself is also developing. Ramin expressed his belief that the Jamayat-E-Islami has great influence in the political field of Afghanistan. In the future, it may more represent the Tajiks, improve relations with Pakistan, and occupy a relatively stable position in the political field of Afghanistan.

Qian Xuemei, an associate professor in PKU’s School of

International Studies, gave a presentation titled, “A historical review of the political reconciliation of Afghanistan: From 1979 to 2019.”

Qian pointed out that the characteristic of reconciliation in

Afghanistan is that it is always accompanied by war, and

29 reconciliation is a product of war. She then gave a brief review of

Afghanistan’s efforts to realize peace over the past four decades.

During the war against the Soviet Union, the negotiations at the international level were the Geneva negotiations, whose main promoter was today’s Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In 1980, the UN General Assembly decided to request the UN Secretary

General to send a special envoy to mediate and advance the negotiations. What were conducted at that time were indirect negotiations. In addition to mediation, the UN special envoy mainly acted as a “voice box” for both parties in the negotiations. The negotiations began in 1982. Only after Gorbachev met Reagan, in

1985, and the Cold War cooled down did the two sides in the negotiations decide to fully reach détente. At the end of 1985, the

Soviet Union began to increase its pressure on Kabul and asked Kabul to make more concessions in the negotiation. After deeming that

Babrak Karmal was “disobedient,” the Soviet Union replaced him with Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, who, in 1986, implemented the national reconciliation policy proposed by Gorbachev. The agreements reached in the Geneva negotiations had four parts: (1) the

Soviet Union was to withdraw its troops; (2) Pakistan and Afghanistan were not to encroach on each other; (3) the US and the Soviet Union were to ensure that Pakistan and Afghanistan do not encroach on each other; (4) and the refugee problem had to be solved. She further pointed out that the national reconciliation promoted by Najibullah at the will of the Soviet Union had a characteristic, that is, he was

30 willing to form a coalition government with the mujahideen under the precondition of ensuring the dominant position of the People’s

Democratic Party. But it failed due to the problem of power distribution. The Soviet Union’s support for Afghanistan ended after the withdrawal of its troops and its disintegration, and a civil war broke out in Afghanistan.

Qian Xuemei expressed her belief that the Afghans originally had the desire for reconciliation, so the reasons and details of why it could not be fulfilled need to be studied. The reason for the twists and turns of the negotiations was that, on the one hand, both two sides took the peace talks as a means but did not take peace as their goal. Another reason was that the US dominated international public opinion on the matter.

Finally, Qian Xuemei elaborated on some of her thoughts on

Afghanistan:

First, peace talks and war always go hand in hand. As far as

Afghanistan is concerned, peace talks are the continuation of the war.

Participants tried to turn the advantages on the battlefield into political dividends, or wanted to cover up the disadvantages on the battlefield and minimize losses through political negotiations. Peace talks are part of the war, but better than pure war.

Second, historically, reconciliation between Afghan and other countries has been successful, but domestic reconciliation has not been successful so far. Domestic reconciliation always depends on reconciliation between countries, and the latter is a prerequisite for

31 domestic reconciliation.

Third, we must define the terms ‘peace talks,’ ‘peace treaty’ and

‘peaceful order.’ “Peace talks” are just an action, which may become part of or coexist with war; a “peace treaty” (or truce) must be an internal component of peace talks; and a “peaceful order” needs not only a political peace treaty, but also needs to determine the distribution of basic power, establish a government, and set up the measures needed to develop economy, culture, and education.

Shao Xuecheng, a distinguished research fellow of Dunhuang

Academy China, gave a presentation titled, “The Latest Developments in Afghan Archaeological Art.” Shao first emphasized the damage to cultural heritage caused by war, pointing out that, compared with

Chinese cultural history, Afghanistan’s is characterized by very few written records. But it is closely related to Chinese history. In his travels, the famous Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang passed through

Bamiyan around 629 AD and 630 AD.

Shao took Bamiyan as an example to give a further introduction.

He pointed out that Bamiyan was a typical city because it suffered from terrorism and wars, manifested the development of Afghan archaeology over the past 20 years during its post-war reconstruction, and could test and verify many events since the establishment of

Afghanistan, in 1919. The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western

Regions (大唐西域记) and the documents in the Dunhuang Buddhist scriptures cave record the changes of Bamiyan over an approximately

100-year period, from 629 to 720 AD. Between 580 and 620 AD, the

32 world’s tallest Buddha statue was in Bamiyan. Why it appeared was a question that concerned many scholars in the field of art history.

Shao Xuecheng emphasized that the US did not play a significant role in the study of ancient Afghan civilization. France, followed by

Japan, have been playing the biggest role in this field. Afghanistan currently has two world cultural heritage sites, one is the minaret and archaeological remains of Jam, and the other is the cultural landscape and archaeological remains in Bamiyan Valley. In 2012, after

UNESCO entrusted all the cultural heritage of Afghanistan to it, Japan gained rich connections through donations. In addition, in 2016,

France and Afghanistan signed a treaty agreeing that France would continue to help Afghanistan draw archaeological maps and develop cultural exchanges with it over the following 10 to 20 years.

Shao Xuecheng pointed out that, in the field of archaeology, the influence of Chinese archaeologists in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries was far less than that of Japanese archaeologists, and

China’s participation has been far less than that of Japan and France.

China’s archaeologists lack both conditions and corresponding capabilities, as well as relevant research experience in this field in these regions. In the field of archaeological art, apart from linguistics, the only books published in China were Afghanistan Culture and

Society by Zhang Min and De la Grèce à la Chine by French scholar

René Grousset and translated by Chang Shuhong. It was far from the large number of reports published by French and Japanese scholars.

According to Shao Xuecheng, Japan invested a lot in the restoration

33 work of the Bamiyan Buddhas, and Germany arranged its first overseas troop deployment in Afghanistan, with the reason that they had plenty of experience in post-war reconstruction as a defeated country of World War II, and they could share their experience with

Afghanistan and help Afghanistan restore its cultural relics.

Shao Xuecheng also said that the destruction of the Bamiyan

Buddhas was indeed a tragedy, but, at the same time, it gave rise to many opportunities for using the latest archaeological equipment and analytical equipment, which allowed scientific and technological archaeologists to obtain the most important samples of the history of

Central Asia and even the Silk Road.

Qian Xuemei delivered the closing remarks for the workshop.

She pointed out that Afghanistan had gone through hardships and many wars in its history, but war was not Afghanistan’s own choice, but could be said to be its geopolitical destiny. Afghanistan was the heart of Asia and was subject to various factors which could be summed up by the term “political ecology.” Peace in Afghanistan could not be separated from the efforts of the international community, but changes in the attitudes of the major powers and transnational terrorism will add more variables to the peace in Afghanistan.

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