USAID Evidence Summit Development to Analysis for Development Counter

Evidence Packet Dampening Processes of Radicalization at the Individual and Societal Level

This paper describes theories that such as contextual emotive instance, more educated individuals explain why individuals participate response and economic are, in some cases, more likely to in politically violent groups. Some opportunities can explain the support and possibly participate in theories suggest that individuals decision to participate in extreme . For development turn to radical means, such as forms of behavior, such as violence. practitioners, these non-findings violence, because they possess and nuanced findings are important One commonality of this certain characteristics and/or have because they can inform the design literature is that it tends to rely undergone particular experiences, of effective programs. most heavily on surveys and which make them more prone to interviews of active or former employ political violence. Other Characteristics and members of violence-producing theories suggest that an individual’s Experiences as Drivers of groups, as well as biographical data ideological beliefs, level of on these individuals. Studies based Political Violence education and income affect on these theories are useful in participation in groups that employ Theories from psychology suggest formulating profiles of individuals political violence. It is important to that individuals who undertake and groups that employ political note that most of the theories political violence have identifiable violence. However, it is difficult to described below are about why psychological characteristics that draw testable conclusions from individuals participate in extremist predispose them to violence and to their findings. Furthermore, as . In several instances joining groups that carry out Helmus (2009) notes, studies that we highlight findings about why violence. Theories from explore the characteristics of civilians might support but not propose that individuals employing violence-producing individuals and necessary participate in a political political violence are shaped by the groups generally do not reveal how violence-producing group. environments and social they differ from their non-violent circumstances in which they live. The literature on individual counterparts, because Theories of group process, which processes of radicalization derives counterfactuals are not introduced draw from social psychology, insights from a wide array of in most studies. emphasize the role of group academic disciplines. Theories from While rigorous empirical testing is dynamics in inducing an individual sociology, economics and political still required, a large portion of this to employ violence; the concepts of science explore factors such as an literature has uncovered that radicalization and deradicalization individual’s relative position vis-à-vis common assumptions about what emanate from these theories. others in the , the makes an individual likely to There also are theories suggesting opportunity cost of soldiering, participate in extremist that an individual’s ideological material and non-material benefits organizations are largely beliefs, level of education, and provided by groups, and the unsubstantiated. That is to say, income affect participation in presence of resources able to be factors like education and religion groups that employ political captured or “rents,” including do not seem to have a violence. This section provides an political power. The literature on straightforward relationship with overview of these theories before criminology suggests that factors participation or support. For commenting on their advantages

1 and deficiencies from a Psychoanalytic Psychological adults with weak self identities are practitioner’s point of view. Theories drawn to groups that adhere to absolutist or apocalyptic beliefs. Identity Theory: Participating in Theories from Psychology These groups allow their members political violence is an attractive to project violence against the “out In 2005 psychiatrist Jeff Victoroff option for young individuals who group,” which the groups typically published an extensive review of lack self-esteem and are seeking to believe are trying to destroy them. theories from psychology and “consolidate their identities” and These groups are generally sociology that have been used to find self worth. This theory draws characterized by a messianic figure explain why individuals employ from extensive psychological that the group reveres and/or a terrorism. In his study, Victoroff literature on identity formation.4 strongly held belief by group identifies eight theories from the Although some interviews of members that out-groups are bent field of psychology and five from terrorists appear to support this on annihilating the in-group. the field of sociology, as well as theory,5 Victoroff notes that no Victoroff’s primary criticism is that theories of group process which empirical study on this subject had this theory is not falsifiable. draw from social psychology. been published as of 2005.

Although Victoroff reviews these theories in the context of Narcissism Theory: From the self- Non-psychoanalytic explaining terrorism, many apply to psychology theory put forth by Psychological Theories individuals that employ political Kohut (1972), individuals who are Cognitive Theories: Violent behavior violence in general, not terrorism denied maternal empathy when is determined by cognitive capacity solely. The following section they are young fail to develop and/or cognitive style. Victoroff provides an overview of the identity and morality as adults. defines cognitive capacity as theories that Victoroff highlights, as These individuals develop a desire “mental functions such as memory, well as his primary critiques of to destroy the source of this failing, 1 attention, concentration, language, each. which materializes into a narcissistic and the so-called ‘executive’ rage that is sometimes projected in Psychopathological Theory: functions, including the capacity to the form of terrorism (Crayton Terrorists exhibit behavioral learn and follow rules, to anticipate 1983; Akhtar 1999). Like identity disorders that modern Western outcomes, to make sensible theory, a narcissism theory of psychiatry classifies as either Axis I, inferences, and to perform accurate terrorism is based largely on which refers to major clinical risk-benefit calculations” and impressions of terrorists rather illnesses such as schizophrenia or cognitive style as “biases, than on a methodical empirical major depression, or Axis II, which prejudices, or tendencies to over- study. refers to personality disorders such or underemphasize factors in as antisocial personality disorder. decision making.”7 Individuals who Paranoia Theory: Individuals who Victoroff finds in regards to Axis I possess certain cognitive capacities suffer psychological damage when classifications that “very little and styles, for example believing they are young grow up with research has been done involving that certain individuals or groups “intolerable internal feelings,” which comprehensive psychiatric have evil intentions, may be more they project outwardly onto examination, and no properly prone to use violence than others. external actors.6 These individuals controlled research is found in the 2 cognitively develop a good self and open literature.” In regards to Axis Novelty-Seeking Theory: Some bad self and attempt to destroy II classifications, Victoroff similarly individuals genetically posses needs their bad self through violent acts. finds that there is no evidence from for “high-level stimulation, risk, and This theory, developed in Post empirical study to support the catharsis,” and seek out political (1997), is closely related to Kohut’s claim that terrorists are violence to fulfill those needs.8 3 self psychology theory. Victoroff sociopaths. Proponents of this theory point to notes that this theory is intriguing interviews with current and former yet requires further research. terrorists during which they

highlighted the thrill that Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory: As accompanied their terrorist proposed by Lifton (2000), young activities. In his comprehensive 1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to works from other authors in this section are provided in Victoroff (2005). 4 See Erikson (1959) for example. 2 Ibid, 12. 5 See Bollinger (1981) and Crenshaw (1986). 7 Ibid, 26. 3 See also Merari (2006). 6 Victoroff, 24. 8 Ibid, 28.

2 study of al-Qaeda-affiliated foreign Lebanon—become terrorists as Victoroff notes, “particularly in the fighters, Venhaus (2010) finds the adults.10 This theory is commonly case of nationalist-separatist or desire to seek out excitement and criticized as being too broad in its ethnic-sectarian terrorism (e.g., thrills to be a driver of scope; many individuals grow up ETA, PIRA, Hamas), actors often participation. Victoroff suggests that exposed to terrorists, but relatively cite the injustice of their treatment it is plausible that individuals who few actually become terrorists. by governments that rob them of are novelty-seeking are identity, dignity, security, and disproportionately represented in Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: freedom as the motive for their terrorist groups, however he notes Political violence, like all violence, joining a terrorist group.”14 This that there is no empirical evidence directly results from frustration.11 theory suffers from the fact that to support this. Like Social Learning Theory, this oppression is an ill-defined term, theory is criticized on the grounds particularly in psychology literature, Humiliation-Revenge Theory: that many people face frustration in and no method has been created to Terrorism is an act of revenge in life, but not all of them undertake measure it. Empirically, not all response to being humiliated. The political violence. Hence, there oppressed people rebel; many use sources of humiliation can vary must be more causal factors than non-violent methods to express widely, from parents in early frustration. A further criticism their frustrations, so it remains childhood to the state later in life. noted by Victoroff is that terrorism unclear why certain oppressed In many cases, revenge is viewed as often is not the last resort adopted groups choose violence while a pro-social, if not altruistic, by frustrated individuals and groups others do not. response. Proponents of this that have exhausted all other theory highlight the “cycle of options. A related theory to the National Cultural Theory: Weinberg oppression and humiliation, frustration-aggression hypothesis is and Eubank (1994) argue that followed by violent action in the the strain theory, which comes individuals from “collectivist” name of liberation” that is common from the literature on and cultures are more likely to in the Middle East, a region which unemployment.12 This theory states undertake terrorism against “out has produced many violent non- that crime (or anti-social behavior) groups,” such as foreigners, state groups.9 Victoroff again notes results from emotional frustrations whereas individuals from that while this theory is plausible, due to discrepancies between “individualistic” cultures are more no empirical measures exist of aspirations and expectations. likely to employ terrorism against humiliation, desire for revenge, or members of their own . satisfaction from carrying out Relative Deprivation Theory: When Victoroff explains that “according violent actions. groups or individuals suffer relative to this theory, in collectivist to others or are deprived of cultures, a person’s identity is Theories from Sociology something to which they believe primarily derived from…dividing Social Learning Theory: According to they are entitled, they may the world strictly according to in- Bandura (1973, 1998), individuals participate in violence or extremist groups and out-groups and linking that directly witness aggressive or movements in order to improve their personal well-being to the violent behavior or live in societies their situation.13 This theory has well-being of their group, while in that glorify violence will imitate this provided the foundation for analysis individualist cultures, identity is behavior. Individuals, particularly that attempts to link economic derived from personal goals.”15 The when they are in their formative deprivation to terrorism, which will primary shortcoming of this theory years, that are exposed to terrorist be discussed in a later section. is that it explains who terrorists are messages and propaganda are more likely to target but not why prone to engage in terrorist Oppression Theory: Oppression individuals become terrorists in the activities than those not similarly causes individuals and groups to first place. respond with political violence. As exposed. This theory explains why To summarize, many psychological individuals raised in areas in which and sociological theories of political acts of terrorism and terrorism 10 See Crenshaw (1992); Taylor and Quayle violence are compelling but are propaganda are commonplace— (1994); Kelly and Rieber (1995). based on very anecdotal evidence. 11 such as Palestinian refugee camps, See Davies (1973). Victoroff struggled to find examples Northern Ireland, or Shia 12 For more information, see the following: neighborhoods in southern Merton (1938), Cantor and Land (1985), Aseltine et al. (2000), Baron (2008), Jacobs 14 Victoroff, 20. For further explanation see and Carmichael (2002), and Hannon and Crenshaw (1986); Taylor and Quayle (1994); DeFronzo (1996). Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003). 9 Ibid, 29. 13 See Gurr (1970) for further explanation. 15 Victoroff, 21.

3 of empirical testing of these outlined above certainly shape non-violent individual into someone theories in the case of terrorism. individuals’ perceptions of the capable of employing violence or At the risk of generalizing, most of world, these individuals are not whether the individual’s these theories share a common mentally prepared to employ psychological characteristics must empirical challenge: while aberrant political violence until after they are also be factored in.24 Sageman, psychological and sociological radicalized. Post, Ruby, and Shaw among others, contends that behaviors are common in many (2002) note that “groups and terrorism is “a group societies and settings, rebellion is organizations that reach terrorism phenomenon,” and suggests that relatively rare, and terrorism is generally do so at the end of a terrorism cannot be thought of especially rare. Thus, these theories process of radicalization during without factoring in group do not provide sufficient which the balance progressively processes (i.e. radicalization).25 On explanations. shifts from psychological the other hand, scholars have constraints against violence to emphasized that groups specifically Theories of Group Process, incentives for violence, to viewing target individuals who already Radicalization and violence/terrorism as the only posses specific psychological Deradicalization course.”19 In his study of Islamic characteristics or who have Theories of group process are diasporas in Europe, Sageman undergone particular experiences (2008) finds that although young that may predispose them to drawn primarily from social 26 psychology and emphasize the men in these diasporas may harbor commit violence. feelings of frustration, humiliation, effect of joining a group on an Deradicalization is the process of and oppression, they must be individual’s behavior. Theories of turning a radical group away from radicalized by others to “cross the group process assert that groups using violent methods to achieve line from venting their anger to provide the context for individual political goals. While this is an becoming terrorists.”20 development and allow individuals important process in restoring to define new identities within the Much has been written about what order in areas of the world where group structure. These theories occurs during the process of conflict does exist, deradicalization assert that individuals participate in radicalization into violence- is not a well understood (or well groups because of the solidarity and producing groups.21 In general, studied) process. Most of the commitment this process these studies suggest that during literature concerning generates. As one set of authors the process of radicalization, group deradicalization involves note, by joining a group “an forces—including “ideological understanding and changing the overarching sense of the collective indoctrination, repetitive training, psyche of the radical or group by 16 consumes the individual.” and peer pressures”—alter group creating incentives for leading a members’ perceptions of and ability normal life. Whether this can be In much of the literature on 22 political violence, particularly to partake in violence. However, successful is largely debatable, and terrorism, theories of group there is an ongoing debate in the the literature is seriously lacking in process are presented in the literature regarding which aspects empirical studies. The role aid can context of radicalization.17 of the process are the most critical. play in this process is not well Some scholars contend that defined. Aid can provide incentives McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) 27 define radicalization as a “change in ideological indoctrination is the key to enter legitimate society. beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in component of the radicalization However, an increase in incentives directions that increasingly justify process, whereas others contend to enter legitimate society would intergroup violence and demand that socialization among group likely draw the least devoted members is the critical aspect of members first, resulting in a sacrifice in defense of the in- 23 group.”18 Some authors contend radicalization. There is also a remaining group of more radical that while the sociological theories debate as to whether group individuals who might want to processes are sufficient to turn a perpetuate more violence.28 Thus, in the short-run, aid can both 16 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003), 176. reduce the number of terrorists 17 Some authors use the term radicalization 19 Post, Ruby, and Shaw (2002), 94. to include any psychological, sociological, or 20 Sageman (2008), 84. 24 Victoroff (2005). ideological characteristic/factor that 21 For examples of radicalization by terrorist 25 Victoroff, 30. contributes to an individual’s use of political groups, see Sageman (2008), Hegghammer 26 See Victoroff (2005) for a summary of this violence. See Helmus (2009) for example. In (2006) and Venhaus (2010). 22 ongoing debate. this paper, radicalization is viewed more Victoroff, 30. 27 narrowly, in the context of a group process. 23 For more on this debate, see Helmus Ashour (2010) 18 McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), 416. (2009). 28 Bueno De Mesquita (2008) 4 and create a more radical terrorist terrorist organizations in the name and were therefore more . A priori, there is no of religion, despite the fact that susceptible to radicalization than way to know which of these effects religion was not at the source of their richer and more educated will outweigh the other. these claims.” neighbors. Recent studies that have examined biographical data of A related theory suggests that terrorists have not supported this individuals undertake political theory. Krueger and Maleckova and Religion as violence to obtain religious (2003), in their study of Palestinians Drivers of Political Violence rewards. This theory has been and Lebanese citizens, find that advanced to explain the actions of Many groups that employ political education, income, and class played suicide terrorists, particularly those violence adhere to an ideology. This no relevant role on radicalization. who are Muslim. The theory ideology can represent “a These authors analyzed biographical purports that these individuals are systematic body of concepts data of 129 members of Hezbollah’s motivated by the belief that they especially about human life or military wing who died in action will receive rewards, such as a culture” or “the integrated between 1986 and 1994, and found passage to heaven or 72 virgins that assertions, theories and aims that that Hezbollah fighters had on await them once there, in the constitute a sociopolitical average low levels of poverty 29 afterlife. While this theory has program.” However, the (though this figure was not grown in popularity since hypothesis that an ideology, in and statistically significant), and that September 11, 2001, it is based of itself, causes groups to be violent Hezbollah fighters were significantly largely on anecdotal evidence from is largely erroneous. As will be better educated than the average interviews with some Islamic discussed in research cluster two, Lebanese young man. In his study of militants rather than on empirical groups that employ political 335 Palestinian terrorists, Berrebi study.30 It is possible that this violence do so in order to achieve (2007) found that “both higher theory explains the actions of a political objectives. Examples of education and standard of living small number of individuals who political objectives include the appear to be positively associated undertake political violence, its desire to change forms of with membership in explanatory power as an government, claim or reclaim organizations, such as Hamas or PIJ, individualistic driver of political territory, or alter the laws under and with becoming a suicide violence is severely limited. Aside which a state is governed. These bomber.”31 However, these studies from that fact that not all groups apparently make rational and others similar in design have individuals that employ political choices to utilize violence to focused solely on members of violence are religious, even among achieve their objectives. terrorist organizations. Terrorist those who are religious, most do organizations are just one of many Another theory suggests that not actively seek out death with the types of groups that employ groups undertake political violence hope of obtaining heavenly rewards. political violence, and there is because of their religious beliefs. Psychologist Ariel Merari’s evidence indicating that low While numerous religiously inspired interviews with failed suicide opportunity costs may be a driver individuals and groups employ terrorists provide compelling for participation in other groups political violence, the explanatory evidence on this point (Berman that employ political violence. This power of this theory is limited. As 2009). Berrebi (2009) highlights in his topic will be explored below. thorough review of this theory: Poverty and Low Education Another way to think about “Dealing with as Drivers for Political poverty and low levels of education can be confusing, since it is difficult Violence as a precursor to violence is that to know whether terrorist high levels of education (and, to a organizations, which on the face of For many years it was thought that individuals with low levels of certain extent, conditions related it are considered religious, are to upper class living situations) using religion to attract an audience income and education were relatively more likely to undertake should correlate with certain value while primarily motivated by structures in which human life is secular goals. Further confusing to political violence. This theory rested on the notion that these most treasured. Additionally, the outside observer is when education should allow individuals political goals are claimed by disadvantaged individuals faced lower opportunity costs of violence

31 For an thorough review of the anecdotal 29 Definitions from Webster’s online 30 For examples see Hegghammer (2007) and and empirical evidence that debunks this dictionary. Soibelman (2004). theory, see Berrebi (2009).

5 access to the political system and analysis of why Afghans join the information violence may be to non-violent methods of political Taliban and Hizb-i Islami in the best preemptive move; engagement, thereby decreasing any Afghanistan, Ladbury (2009) finds b) Credible commitments from given individuals support or that Afghans who were other individuals or groups that participation in violent activities. unemployed or underemployed, they will not engage in violence and therefore had low opportunity The evidence linking education to or not renege from an costs for joining the insurgency, radicalization as a process or to agreement are impossible; joined the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami support for radical groups is to obtain cash. c) Issues are indivisible, meaning limited. The assumption that that whatever groups disagree madrasas are the source of A related theory suggests that the about cannot be split in a radicalization is very difficult to presence of lootable resources meaningful way (locations, such verify. According to Winthrop and makes political violence more likely as the Temple Mount, Graff’s (2010) analysis of survey at the organizational level. This exemplify something that is data, census reports, and expert theory rests on the notion that the only meaningful to groups in its opinion, madrasas are not clearly prospect of accessing and entirety). linked to terrorism. Parents often controlling lootable resources send their children to madrasas provides an incentive for individuals Victoroff (2005) notes that this because they value religious to join violence-producing groups. theory of violence as a bargaining education and radicalization is in no Although lootable resources usually failure, as it is used to explain way an obvious outcome. refer to natural resources and terrorism, is commonly criticized Furthermore, links between the commodities, they can also take the because it fails to explain why level of education more generally form of development aid. De Soysa relatively few individuals, among and terrorism are difficult to (2000) finds that countries with an many who are in the same position, empirically validate..32 Similarly, abundance of mineral wealth are become terrorists. The Rational researchers have trouble validating likely to suffer greed-motivated Choice Theory will be explored in links between poverty and support rebellion. In their studies of civil more detail in cluster two. for extremists. In their study on wars, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) support for militant organizations in find that primary commodities Self-control theory Pakistan, Shapiro and Fair (2009) do provide extortion opportunities The self-control theory suggests not find poverty to be a root cause and thereby increase the risk of that countries with a large of support for militancy. political violence.33 These proportion of young males are arguments are more fully developed more prone to crime and violence in Cluster 2. because of the age specific Material Incentives as Alternative Theories tendency toward violence of this Drivers of Political subpopulation. This is the Violence Rational Choice Theory demographic structure of Afghanistan and so this theory is An alternative approach to Rational Choice Theory suggests that relevant. It combines ideas about examining characteristics of individuals and groups participate in the biological basis of self-control violence-producing individuals and violence because they lack one of with demographic theories of groups is examining the role of the necessary elements for an 35 34 crime. material incentives as a driver of efficient (Coasian) bargain: Criminal Opportunity participation in political violence. a) Information on everybody Theory One influential theory suggests that else’s intentions is incomplete - individuals participate in violence- others may have both the This theory asserts that as producing groups for material capability and willingness to macroeconomic conditions benefit. In their study of the factors attack and without sufficient improve, increasing economic that caused individuals to join the activity and decreasing Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 33 unemployment, more opportunities in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and This study also found that ethnic and religious heterogeneity and income for criminal behavior emerge and, Weinstein (2008) find that material inequality did not explain the outbreak of thus, the crime rate increases. In offers made participation in the civil war. the context of a terrorist group or RUF more likely. Similarly, in her 34 For more information, see the following: Lake and Rothchild (1998), Fearon (1995), Walter (2002), Ikle (1991), Gurr (1990), Ray 35 See Cretacci (2008) and Flowers (1989) 32 Noted in Shafiq and Sinno (2010). (2008, 2009); and Powell (2006). for more information.

6 insurgent group, opportunity cost intervention based on reducing suggests that their motivations theory may apply in a slightly grievances, income inequality, are highly political. different way. As a group grows unemployment, or the like. Drying Evidence of rationality on the part and consolidates, the opportunities up the pool of potential recruits of insurgents and terrorists might to join as a member or as an until it is so small that there is no be discouraging from this point of operative also increase.36 insurgency would require absolutely view, as it suggests that the pool of massive programs, especially in potential violent actors is quite conflict areas such as Afghanistan, large. This is, in fact, what Hamas where unemployment is extremely Globalization Theory claims about their pool of potential high, grievances run rampant and suicide attackers. A reassuring fact The Globalization Theory suggests mental health care is generally is that even with a large pool of that there is a link between nonexistent. So while psychological recruits, the number of sustainable globalization and terrorism such profiles of terrorists and insurgents terrorist or insurgent organizations that globalization, and the relative would be valuable to a security is quite small, as noted by Berman disjoint it has created between the guard engaged in screening, for (2009), suggesting that the “haves” and the “have-nots,” incites example, they do not aggregate up operative constraint on the amount some to participate in terrorist to an argument for a development of political violence a country activities. strategy aimed at reducing violence experiences is not the size of the by reducing the proclivity of recruiting pool. A discussion of predictive characteristics in the those constraints requires a theory Implications for population. Development Policy of violent organizations, which is In fact, as Berrebi (2009) notes, the the subject of cluster two. evidence for sane, rational, The evidence for pathological Interventions that improve terrorists (and insurgents) cannot individual psychology as a cause of governance and foster development recruitment to political violence is be dismissed: may still be effective through means weak. Yet even if it were strong, a) Targets are chosen other than reducing recruitment. A the policy implications for instrumentally, as shown by "hearts and minds" theory predicts development practitioners would Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007), that these programs can shift the lead to a contradiction. Insurgent and by Heger (2010). support of noncombatants away organizations are small, numbering b) Tactics are chosen optimally.37 from rebels and toward in the tens of thousands, even in a c) More talented assailants are government. A club model predicts large insurgency like that taking sent to attack higher value that these measures can weaken place presently in Afghanistan. targets.38 the hold of violent clubs on Terrorist organizations are even d) Terrorism might be achieving members and reduce their ability to smaller. A public health political and territorial recruit defection-resistant intervention aimed at identifying objectives. This point is operatives. These theories are and reducing the number of controversial as the stated developed in cluster two on individuals with individual objectives of terrorist groups organizations and in cluster three pathologies in a population of are often ridiculously on interventions. millions would be prohibitively impractical (e.g., a global expensive. Moreover, since mental Caliphate), probably revealing illness is notoriously difficult to strong incentives to cure, a capture or kill strategy, Conclusion exaggerate. Yet there is however ethically abhorrent, would evidence of terrorism altering This paper has reviewed likely be more cost effective. This political attitudes, and it has explanations for participation of view of a limited pool of potential certainly influenced U.S. individuals in political violence, insurgents may be what convinces policies.39 spanning psychology, sociology, the military that a capture or kill e) The morphing of many political science and economics. strategy is attractive. terrorist and insurgent groups Although the arguments are The same problem of into political organizations compelling at an anecdotal level, orders of magnitude applies to any the evidence is weak, as the literature leans heavily on retrospective cases, without 36 For more information on the description 37 Berman and Laitin (2008). of crime and opportunity cost theory, see 38 Berrebi and Benmelech (2007). examining the characteristics of Cantor and Land (1985) 39 See Berrebi and Klor (2008) for example. counterfactual individuals who do

7 not engage in political violence. the accompanying readings on Where counterfactual comparisons organizations and on interventions. are made, the conventional wisdom is often overturned. For instance: terrorists are not disproportionately poor or poorly educated (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003); suicide terrorists are not psychotic or motivated primarily by religious beliefs (Merari, 2004); grievances and rebellion are uncorrelated across countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Moreover, explanations based on individual or group pathology face the same empirical problem, namely that these pathologies are quite common in societies that do not experience widespread political violence, and sometimes have not for centuries. More research is necessary to understand these phenomena. From a development policy perspective, it should be reassuring that political violence is not rooted in psychosis or other aberrant individual behavior, as those problems are notoriously difficult to treat and prevalence is quite high, even in peaceful societies. On the other hand, development policies aimed at drying up the pool of potential recruits with any given predisposition to political violence face a logical contradiction. The characteristics of recruits are not homogeneous or easily identified, the interventions available to shrink the pool (e.g., reducing unemployment, income inequality, or societal grievances) can result in only fractional reductions in large pools, while the number of recruits required to sustain an insurgency is relatively small. Fortunately, the number of organizations that can sustain political violence is also relatively small, as they require special characteristics. Evidence and analysis suggest that development policies can reduce political violence by undermining violent organizations, a topic addressed in

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Drivers of Popular Support for Asal et. al.: Militancy: Studies from Pakistan . A family’s economic standing influenced their Winthrop, Rebecca and Croinne Graff. (2010). beliefs about their son’s joining a militant. “Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links organization; richer households are less likely to consent to their son joining a militant organization. BetweenEducation and Militancy in Pakistan.” . Pakistani sons who were unemployed faced fewer Brookings: Center for Universal Education rebuttals when they attempted to join a militant Working Paper. organization than those who were employed. Asal, Victor, C. Christine Fair, and Stephen . There was a positive correlation between the Shellman. (2008). “Consenting to a Child's son’s madrasa attendance and his family’s consent. Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict and . Deobandi families were less likely to consent to Terrorism. Volume 31, Issue 11, pages 973 – 994. their sons joining a militant organization than non- Deobandis. Major Findings Methodology: Winthrop and Graff’s primarily Winthrop and Graff (extracted verbatim): quantitative paper is based largely off of existing studies . Demand for education within Pakistan far exceeds Asal et al rely on data from surveys of 141 Pakistani the government’s ability to provide it. families, primarily concentrated in Punjab and NWFP, . Contrary to popular belief, madrasas have not who had at least one son who had been slain while he risen to fill the gap in public education supply and was a member of a militant organization. have not been one of the primary causes of the Summary: In their own words, Winthrop and Graff’s recent rise in militancy. report “systematically explores [their nine] key . Beyond madrasas, the education supply gap in and findings, provides an objective synthesis of the available of itself likely increases the risk of conflict in low- evidence on education and militancy, and highlights the income countries, including in Pakistan, highlighting mechanisms through which education appears to the importance of expanding educational access. contribute to various forms of militancy in Pakistan. It also represents a call to action, underscoring the . A nuanced analysis of the mechanisms whereby power of education reform as a means of supporting education may exacerbate conflict risk suggests security and stability in Pakistan. It identifies priority that in addition to access, education quality and areas that can serve as a guide to policy interventions content may be just as important for promoting in the education sector, and seeks to promote dialogue stability. within Pakistan about how to best harness the power of education for stability and peace.” . Poor education-sector governance creates huge discrepancies in the public education system, Through their survey data, Asal et. al. test the inflaming citizens’ grievances against the following seven hypotheses: government. . Families who are weaker economically are more . Poor learning outcomes hinder the development likely to give consent. of the core skills, including those related to good . Families who have more sons are more likely to citizenship, that are needed to help mitigate give consent. . . Sons who are educated and unemployed are more likely to be given consent. . The curriculum and teaching in government . Families that are more religious are more likely to schools help create intolerant worldviews among give consent. students. . Sons who are educated in a madrasa are more likely to be given consent. Schools do little to prepare students for the labor . . Families that are connected to militant-inclined market, frustrating young achievers and increasing traditions should be more likely to give consent. the pool of possible militant recruits. . Older heads of household are more likely to give . Education provision is highly inequitable, consent. exacerbating grievances by those left out of the Conclusion: Winthrop and Graff provide 13 policy system. recommendations based on their findings. Most of

9 their recommendations involve supporting Pakistan’s 1. Leadership: the religious/spiritual leaders, as education system, which they believe is key to opposed to the radical organization leaders, play a providing stability in Pakistan and possibly reducing crucial role in bestowing legitimacy on de- militancy. They also encourage a more thorough radicalization. Without a charismatic leadership analysis of the linkages between deficiencies in that controls or strongly influences its followers, education and militancy. the initiation as well as the success of a de- radicalization process is less likely. And, in the Asal et. al. conclude that although their sample size cases not led by a charismatic leadership, the was small, their findings suggest the importance of unsuccessful attempts were followed by programs in Pakistan that reduce poverty and foster fractionalization, splintering, and internal violence. employment opportunities. The authors also conclude 2. State Repression: On one hand, this is a primary that their study largely debunks the notion that cause of radicalization. However, intense and madrasas are breeding grounds for militants; however sustained repression was one factor that led the they acknowledge that families that support militancy leadership of armed organizations to rethink the may prefer madrasas for their children. Like Winthrop costs of violent confrontations. and Graff, Asal et. al. also emphasize the need for 3. External social interaction: If allowable and additional, empirical study on the link between successful, it may affect the worldviews of the education and militancy in Pakistan. leadership of armed organizations, which can lead to de-radicalization. 4. Inducements: By using “carrots” to attract the On Deradicalization attention of the members of the armed Ashour, Omar. The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: organization, it can bolster the position of those Transforming Armed Islamist Movements. who support de-radicalization and oppress those who are not. London: Routledge, 2010. “Terrorist Factions” discusses how sociopolitical Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan. "Terrorist Factions." and economic factors can contribute to radicalization Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3.4 (2008): of a terrorist group, or how it can encourage 399-418. formation of a splinter group (or both). The model Major Findings: Ashour discusses a number of discusses populations as having a range of preferences, successful and unsuccessful de-radicalization processes which terrorist organizations can accommodate. In in Egypt and Algeria, and highlights four primary factors many cases, when governments provide benefits (e.g., contributing to successful de-radicalization. Namely: jobs or training programs) to individuals in terrorist successful leadership, effective state repression, groups which induce them to exit, those who remain positive external social interactions, and inducements. in the group do so because they are more devoted to Bueno de Mesquita uses a game theory model to the cause and in many cases are more willing to use highlight the difficulties of creating an effective violence. From his model Bueno de Mesquita deradicalization strategy, including how aid can serve as concludes: a radicalizing force. 1. An improvement in the economy increases the Methodology: Ashour examines armed Islamist extremism of the original faction, decreases the movements in Egypt and Algeria since the 1950s probability of a splinter faction forming and, seeking common factors contributing to de- conditional on a splinter forming, increases the radicalization. Bueno de Mesquita uses a two-period extremism of the splinter faction. game theory model to explain recruitment: in the first 2. When nonviolent political systems are more period, members of the population can join a terrorist viable, the extremism of the original faction group, and in the second period, members can splinter increases, and the probability of the splinter group into a new faction. forming decreases, and conditional on a splinter group forming, the extremism of the splinter Summary: faction increases.

“The De-Radicalization of Jihadists” identifies the 3. When factional leaders are better able to provide following four independent variables, which explain non-ideological benefits, a more moderate splinter the initiation and success of the deradicalization group is more likely to form. process: 4. When the structural environment makes terrorist mobilization more difficult, it can lead to increased extremism within the terrorist group.

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interviewed 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists representing Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Hizballah, and While Bueno de Mesquita’s model is only applicable to Fatah (a secular group). Ladbury conducted a study of the short run and even then contains some flaws 192 individuals who lived in areas of Afghanistan which (which the author addresses), the conclusions it draws had high insurgency activity, including civilians, Taliban are noteworthy. Combatants, and Hizb-i Islami commanders.

Summary: Conclusion: De-radicalization is not a well “Terrorists in Their Own Words” highlights a understood process. These two papers present starkly wide range of factors that lead to radicalization in both different views on the potential for aid. Ashour argues secular and religious organizations. We highlight four: that through both “carrots” and “sticks,” individuals can have their incentives realigned and change the 1. The social environment of youth plays a large role. organization for the better. Bueno de Mesquita argues Namely, when one’s peers join terrorist the factors which draw individuals away from a organizations, that individual is at higher risk of terrorist organization only succeed in having those radicalization. least devoted to the cause depart; in doing so, the 2. The prison experience further consolidates the makeup of the organization becomes more radical, terrorist’s identity as a member of their which can lead to a newer more aggressive position. organization. Most incarcerated members felt the prison experience brought them closer to the

group and they became more committed to the Lessons From Interviews cause. 3. The process of recruitment is largely a personal Ibrahim, Saad E. "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant one, with over half the subjects knowing their Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and recruiter prior to the recruitment. Preliminary Findings." International Journal of Middle 4. Most interviewees reported not only enhanced East Studies 12.4 (1980): 423-53. social status for the families of fallen or incarcerated members, but financial and material Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny. support from the organization and community as "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews well. with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists;” ”Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups” Terrorism and Political Violence 15.1 (2003): 171-84. had similar findings, but also expanded on the militants’ Ladbury, Sarah, and Cooperation for Peace and backgrounds and philosophies. Ibrahim observed most Unity, Kabul. Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation militants also came from rural areas or small towns on Afghanistan: Why Do Men Join the Taliban and and joined the groups upon shortly after moving to a Hizb-i Islami? How much do local communities large city, often to attend university. He found the militants generally did well in school, were highly support them? Rep. Vol. 14. Department of motivated, came from middle or lower-middle class International Development, 2009. families, and joined the militancy during times of crisis or sociopolitical upheavals. Ibrahim indicates in the absence of a credible, secular national vision, which Major Findings: Ibrahim and Post et al discuss enhances the present and future socioeconomic commonalities between Islamist and secular terrorists. prospects of the middle and lower class, individuals will Taken together, they detail the socioeconomic factors continue to turn to militancy. contributing to radicalization and how joining radical groups can lead to elevated status and family support. “Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation in Ladbury highlights the role society plays in promoting Afghanistan” highlights a number of findings radicalization in Afghanistan though a series of civilian concerning the culture of insurgency in Afghanistan. and insurgent interviews. We highlight the most significant ones below: Methodology: Ibrahim conducted a series of 1. Religious motivation is one of several reasons for interviews in 1977 of 33 imprisoned Islamic militants joining or supporting the Taliban or Hizb-i Islami. who were members of the Technical Military Academy The religious message of the militants does group (the MA) or the Repentance and Holy Fight resonate with the majority, but only because it is group (RHF). Those interviewed occupied a range of couched in terms of two keen grievances: the positions within the organization’s hierarchy. Post et al

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corruption of government and the presence of Methodology: Berrebi first encodes and runs foreign troops. hypothesis tests on the biographies of 335 Palestinian 2. There is almost no government support in the terrorists from 1987-2002, the sources of which were regions studied (less than 6% attributed something the websites and on-line Journals of Hamas and positive to the government). Palestinian Islamic Jihad, analyzing data on education 3. The majority of respondents supported the and poverty levels. He compares this sample with a Taliban. random sample of 306 Palestinian civilians of a similar 4. Young men join: age range to construct a model for predicting terrorist . For cash due to unemployment. participation. He also constructs a dataset containing . For status reasons- to receive a gun and a daily information for every fatal terrorist attack against cause. noncombatants that occurred on Israeli soil from 1949 . For religious beliefs. to January31, 2003, and runs a regression testing the . For self-protection. predictive capabilities of economic factors. Krueger . To leverage armed support for an ongoing and Maleckova utilize interviews and public opinion dispute, usually over land or water with polls from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza another family or lineage member. Strip and biographies of Hezbollah militants in Lebanon 5. Radicalization generally occurs after joining the (data was obtained from the Palestinian Center for Taliban group. Policy and Survey Research and the Lebanese 6. Responses from those interviewed confirmed the government, respectively), and run chi-squared tests Taliban is a broad movement of groups with on socioeconomic factors to examine how they lead to different agendas and varying degrees of alliance to radicalization. a central command. Summary: “Education, Poverty and Conclusion: These studies indicate a range of factors Terrorism” shows highly educated Palestinian contribute to radicalization. This finding suggests that individuals are no less supportive of violent attacks while aid may be used as a tool to deter young men against Israeli targets than those who are illiterate and against radicalization, it will not halt all radicalization. poorly educated. They also show that students, in However, all studies indicate that improving particular, find the use of violence against Israel to be socioeconomic prospects for youths results in fewer acceptable. They also analyze biographical data of 129 incentive to join a militant group. members of Hezbollah’s military wing who died in action between 1986 and 1994, and found that these

members to have on average lower levels of poverty Education and Economic Factors on than the normal population before their death (though Radicalization this figure was not statistically significant), and that these members were significantly better educated than Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. "Education, the average Lebanese young man. Overall, they found Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Casual no direct connection between poverty or low- Connection?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 17.4 education and participation in terrorism. (Fall 2003): 119-44. “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Claude Berrebi, "Evidence About the Link Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians” reveals an individual’s economic condition and Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism education are statistically insignificant, but have a Among Palestinians", Peace Science and Public positive correlation with likelihood of becoming a Policy, 13(1), 2007. terrorist. To explain this, Berrebi highlights segments Major Findings: Despite frequent claims connecting taken from textbooks, noting the anti-Israeli poverty and poor education with radicalization, these sentiments as a possible explanation for the findings two studies show otherwise. Krueger and Maleckova, relating to education, as he argues the education over several national studies and one cross-national system is venue for radical propaganda. study, indicate education, income, and class play no Conclusion: Both papers explore the role economic relevant role on radicalization. Berrebi shows if there factors and education play in radicalization. The impact is a link between income level, education, and of economic factors on political violence is further participation in terrorism, it is either very weak, or in explored in the Cluster 3 analyses, with the primary the opposite direction of what one might intuitively conclusion from the sections “Labor Market expect. Conditions and Insurgent Violence” and “Lessons from Cross-National Studies on

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Macroeconomic Trends and Violence” being there is no simple link between employment or GDP per capita and political violence. However, many papers in these sections still indicate aid can be used to counter violence, especially if it is administered at a local level to better the lives of the populations and reduce income inequality.

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