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The Murmansk Initiative - RF: COMPLETION Carl Czajkowski,1Robert S

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The Murmansk Initiative - RF: COMPLETION Carl Czajkowski,1Robert S WM’03 Conference, February 23-27, Tucson, AZ The Murmansk Initiative - RF: COMPLETION Carl Czajkowski,1Robert S. Dyer ,2 Anita A. Sörlie,3 Dennis W. Wester, 4 Bredo Moller, 3 1Brookhaven National Laboratory, Building 475B, Upton, NY 11973. 2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC 20034. 3Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, PO Box 55, N-1345 Østerås, Norway. 4 Battelle Memorial Institute, P. O. Box 999, Richland, WA 99352., ia ABSTRACT The Murmansk Initiative-RF (MI) was conceived to provide the Russian Federation (RF) with the capacity to manage low-level liquid radioactive waste (LLRW) and comply with the requirements of the London Convention that prohibit ocean dumping of these wastes. The Initiative, under a trilateral agreement begun in 1994/95, has upgraded an existing low-level liquid radioactive waste treatment facility, increased its capacity from 1,200 m3 /year to 5,000 m3 /year, and expanded the capability of the facility to treat liquids containing salt (up to 20 g/L). The three parties to the agreement, the Russian Federation, Norway, and the United States, have split the costs for the project. It was the first project of its kind to utilize exclusively Russian subcontractors in the upgrade and expansion of the LLRW treatment plant on the premises of FGUP Atomflot (now FGUP Atomflot) in Murmansk, Russia. The project advanced into the test-operation phase. These start-up activities have included processing of actual radioactive liquid waste from the Arctic icebreaker fleet, and incorporation of these wastes into a cementation process of Russian design. Initial runs have revealed that procedures for unloading spent ion-exchange sorbents need to be improved and that sludges formed during removal of alkaline-earth metals should be compacted in order for the facility to operate at its full potential. These issues needed a substantial amount of work but have now been resolved, and progress on the final critical phases of the project, including Russian licensing activities will be reported. Discussions will also report on any modifications to the proposed operational schedule or protocols for the now operating facility. “Lessons Learned” over the six years of construction through operation are evaluated and discussed. INTRODUCTION The Project known as the "Murmansk Initiative," has been an ongoing collaboration between Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America [1] and started in 1994 with preliminary discussions. Cooperative design and feasibility studies were conducted from April to December 1995, when an agreed-upon scheme for the financing and construction upgrade for the facility was approved. The objective of the tri-party collaboration was the expansion and upgrade of the low-level liquid radioactive (LLRW) waste facility located in Murmansk, Russia. The treatment plant is located at the facilities of the Russian company FGUP Atomflot (now FGUP Atomflot), which provides support services for the Murmansk Shipping Company's nuclear icebreaker fleet The capacity of the plant has been increased from 1 WM’03 Conference, February 23-27, Tucson, AZ 1,200 m3/year to 5,000 m3/year. Plant capability has been expanded to treat three different liquid waste streams: Low-salt solutions (#1); Decontamination and laundry waste, medium salt content solutions (#2); and High-salt solutions (#3). The low-salt solutions are currently treated at the facility. The upgrade project adds the capability to treat solutions #2 and #3, and will automate most of the processing with computer-controlled programmable logic controllers supplied by the U.S. to reduce occupational exposures. Except for the U.S.-supplied process control equipment, the new facility has been built completely with Russian technology. The protocol (signed in Oslo in December 1995) between the three member nations specified financing responsibilities and called for construction evaluations at the 20, 50, 80 and 100 % completion milestones in the project. There were a number of changes in the regulations of the Russian Federation, such as a reduction in exposure limits and discharge limits for radionuclides, e.g. tritium. These changes occurred in the interim period from 1995 until the first technical team inspection in 1996. These regulatory changes required extensive facility modification, andresulted in delays in the project completion dates. Completion of the construction phase of the project was accomplished in 2000. Under the conditions of the Oslo protocol, the construction phase included start-up testing. The start-up testing of the facility began in the summer of 2000. The start-up testing was conducted first using clean water and then using actual liquid wastes to be treated. Clean water was used forinitial water-tightness testing (hydrotesting), and for system maintenance activities including addition and removal of sorbents. A Russian company Energospetsmontazh (ESM), a subsidiary in the Minatom system, was contracted to carry out the start-up testing. The September 2000 inspection showed that hydro tests had been completed, and that the system components were watertight. The Honeywell control system installation had been completed, and the final phases of the control system tests were in progress. Clean water tests of the full system using the Honeywell controllers were planned in October 2000, after which a test operation run of 2,000 m3 of low-salt waste was to be initiated using solution #1 that was stored on-site. Delays, however, continued for the project, with the facility’s inability to unload spent sorbents from the columns and the excessive amount of “pulp” generated in thesoftening/precipitation process stream. These last two issues continued to plague the facility into 2002, when they were finally resolved. FACILITY DESCRIPTION The final facility design and early construction phases have been described in detail in previous publications [1-3]. Solution #1, the low-salt and lower radioactivity waste, has historically been processed at the facility with filtration, sorbent and ion-exchange technologies. Because of their similarities and higher salt content, Solutions #2 (Figure 2 WM’03 Conference, February 23-27, Tucson, AZ 1) and #3 (containing an average of 2 g/L salt, and 10 g/L salt, respectively) are treated in the same process units, although the liquids can be treated separately. Figure 1. Schematic of flow for treatment of Type 2 solutions - in Murmansk facility. The presence of decontamination reagents, especially complexants such as Trilon B (containing EDTA and oxalate) in solution #2, presents an additional challenge because the complexing agents must be destroyed to prevent the degradation of specialized sorbents and salt removal systems. Salt removal by electro-dialysis and electro-membrane concentrators (Unit 6) is required because discharges into the Kola Bay have regulatory maximum concentration limits for salinity (about that of freshwater, even though the Bay is salt water). CONSTRUCTION All piping, valves, column containers for sorbents, and specialized treatment units (electro-membranes, and electro-destructor unit) have been installed and hydro-tested manually. Physical installation of the Honeywell computer-control system, a major component of the instrumentation and control (I&C) system, was verified complete by the U.S.-Norwegian inspection team. The programmable logic controller (PLC) system (financed separately under the US Technology Innovations for Environmental Solution 3 WM’03 Conference, February 23-27, Tucson, AZ (TIES) program experienced delays in delivery and actual installation. Initially there were problems with getting the equipment through Russian customs without paying import fees. After delivery, slight Russian partner changes in process design, identified after the equipment had been ordered, required the purchase of additional equipment. Training of Murmansk technical personnel on the use and maintenance of the PLC systems is complete, as well. A period of 18 months was originally estimated for the duration of this construction phase. All three parties shared the cost for the project. The original budget was a total of 1.55M USD from the US and Norway to be sent to the RF. This did not include the cost for the participation of both US and Norwegian experts. In addition, the US committed up to $300K of additional funding under the US TIES program to promote the use of innovative U.S. technologies to solve environmental problems in other countries. The Technical Team identified three such technologies. These were pleated membrane filters, programmable logic controllers, and high integrity containers. The Russian contribution to this project has consisted of both “in-kind” and financial support, since Minatom joined the PMG in 1996. The project was included in the targeted federal program “Russian Management of Radwaste and Spent Radioactive Materials, Their Treatment and Disposal, 1996-2000”. It became one of the highest priority environmental projects implemented in the Russian Northwest. Being aware of the great importance of the problem to tackle, Minatom gradually increased the financing for some years. The initial 1996 Russian input was declared to be 3 M Russian rubles (RuR). That amount was doubled in 1997. As of December, 2000, the total contribution by Russia was 10.2 MRuR (over $1.4M taking into account the exchange rates). The original budget was based more on available funding than on a detailed cost estimate. As mentioned above, the project became larger in scope and more complicated than first anticipated. In 1997, it was evident that more money was needed. The project had started with a comparatively very small budget. However, the general crisis in the Russian economy in 1997 and the issuance of NRB-96 with stricter radiation protection levels (the walls in the facility had to be thicker) increased the cost. It was therefore decided, at the 50% completion-meeting in November 1997, that the US and Norway would equally finance the project with an additional total of 750,000 USD to the RF partner. The cost to the US and Norwegian sides for participation of their experts was, again, in addition to this.
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