Panel 2C+ 3C: Great Power Engagement in the North Atlantic, 1700s till the Present Day: International Systemic Drivers and Network Path-Dependencies, I-II Format: Paper panel in English Conveners: Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen & Mariia Kobzeva Panel 2C+ 3C abstract: The Kingdom of Denmark is divided between the Continental European Denmark, historically in a German , and the North Atlantic, historically in an Anglo-American sphere of influence. Great power conflict and engagement in the North Atlantic has historically and continue to put enormous strain on the cohesion of the Realm. It is therefore important for Denmark, the Faroe Islands and – as well as third parties – to understand historical and current great power dynamics and engagements in the North Atlantic. The panels introduce Danish, Faroese and Greenlandic strategic learning from history for policymaking. The North Atlantic has been the object of British and French strategic interests since at least the 1700s showing geostrategic continuity with lessons for today. The shaped the North Atlantic with a heavy American footprint, but also especially Soviet economic, cultural and political engagement of Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Cold War networks continue to influence Russian and Chinese relations with Iceland as the hub of the North Atlantic. remains economically engaged especially in North Atlantic marine economy. China is rapidly developing its political, scientific, economic and technological engagement. Great power engagement and competition in these very small or microstate polities is linked to individuals and individual projects.

Panel 2C Paper 10.1 Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen: Danish/Faroese/Greenlandic Strategic Learning from North Atlantic Great Power History Paper 10.2 Mariia Kobzeva: Chinese and Russian involvement in the West Nordic region: from Cold War legacy to future trends Paper 10.3 Sumarlidi Isleifsson: Networks, the small state of Iceland and relations with the and the People's Republic of China Paper 10.4 Andrey Krivorotov: U.S. AND CHINA ENGAGEMENT IN GREENLAND – SEEN FROM RUSSIA Paper 10.5 Agne Cepinskyte & Michael Paul: Security Environment in Flux: From ‘Zone of Peace’ to Security Dilemma

Panel 3C Paper 11.1 Rasmus Leander Nielsen: Arctic Exceptionalism vs. Looming Arctic Security Dilemma? The Case of the Kingdom of Denmark in the Midst of Fluctuating Power Politics Dynamics in the High North Paper 11.2 Alexander Sergunin: NATO-Russian renewed naval confrontation in the GIUK Gap: the role of Greenland and Denmark Paper 11.3 Chuanxing Wang: More of Great Power Continual Post-Cold War Coordination or Reversal to Disruptive Strategic Competition in the Arctic Connecting the Northern Atlantic to the Northern Pacific Nowadays? Paper 11.4 Anna Agnarsdóttir: (tba) Paper 11.5 Marc Lanteigne og Mingming Shi: (tba)

Paper 10.1 abstract Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen: Danish/Faroese/Greenlandic Strategic Learning from North Atlantic Great Power History

The Kingdom of Denmark is stretched between Denmark as a small Continental European state at the entrance of the Baltic containing 98% of the population and economic activity and vast North Atlantic autonomies, the Faroe Islands and Greenland (and historically Iceland) covering 98% of the Kingdom’s territory. Denmark historically and currently falls into a German (-French) sphere of influence, while the North Atlantic falls into an Anglo-American sphere of influence. During the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and II, Denmark and the North Atlantic were separated driving internal relations of the Kingdom. Constitutional stability in the Realm depend on great power stability. History suggests great risk to the Realm from current widening transatlantic divide between German/French-dominated Continental (EU) and UK (Brexit) and USA (Trump). This risk is compounded by power transition from West to East and emerging Sino-American bipolarity. What are historical strategic lessons for current and future Danish/Faroese/Greenlandic policy?

Paper 10.2 abstract Mariia Kobzeva: Chinese and Russian involvement in the West Nordic region: from Cold War legacy to future trends

Since the Cold War, the West Nordic region remains a sphere of special concern for both China and Russia. Today, the independent political line of the region and its position on the new shipping routes break new ground for cooperation with the two states. In this regard, it is worth understanding whether the current cooperation holds historical trends and ties. Is it of a cooperative or competitive nature? Do Russia and China coordinate their approach vis-à-vis with the West Nordic region, or do they neglect each other’s involvement? Finally, does the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and mutual interest in Arctic development have any impact on their cooperation with the West Nordic states? In the presentation, we elucidate the scope of Russian and Chinese involvement in the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Iceland and share the results of a comparative analysis aimed to determine the place of these territories in modern Russia's and China's policies.

Paper 10.3 abstract Sumarlidi Isleifsson: Networks, the small state of Iceland and relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China

Formal relations between the Soviet Union and the Icelandic government were insignificant until after the Second World War. Concerning the People´s Republic of China the relations were minor until the last few decades but have grown rapidly since around the turn of the 2000´s. In addition to formal relations, a network was created between individuals, associations, and political parties, with institutions of both of these . The network with the Soviet Union was largely based on the co-operation of the Communist Party of Iceland (founded 1930) and later the Socialist Party (1938) with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In addition, there were friendship associations and Icelandic students went to Eastern Europe for studying and the East-bloc sent artists to Iceland. After the Second World War, the Icelandic trade union movement worked closely with the trade unions in Eastern Europe. Relations with the People's Republic of China were similarly structured. The Chinese Communist Party began cooperating with Marxist-Leninist parties throughout Western Europe, including Iceland in the 1960´s and the 1970´s. The ties were cultivated in a variety of ways, through invitations to embassies, visits to China, and the Friendship Association of Iceland and China was active. The cultural relations between Iceland and China were also significant. It is clear, that in both cases the Soviet government and the Chinese government emphasized to establish good relations with young people in Iceland. In the paper I will discuss the success of these two superpowers in their efforts to increase goodwill in Iceland and how it was done. Furthermore, I will discuss the impact on Icelandic political discourse and attitudes to these two superpowers.

Paper 10.4 abstract Andrey Krivorotov: U.S. AND CHINA ENGAGEMENT IN GREENLAND – SEEN FROM RUSSIA

Since 2019, the U.S. Administration has included the Arctic, in particular Iceland and Greenland, into its overall policy of confronting China and Russia. While Russia is almost entirely viewed as a re-emerging power (which has revitalized NATO’s interest to the GIUK gap), China seems to be a broader concern. In Greenland, the makes a special focus on enhancing its military presence, preventing large Chinese investments, which would involve the island into the Polar Silk Road initiative, and a potential extraction of strategically important rare earth elements (REEs). To achieve this, Trump Administration prefers a direct outreach to Nuuk bypassing Copenhagen and creating a complicated set of quadripartite relations. We may foresee three medium-term scenarios, with Greenland remaining in a gradually looser union with Denmark, moving into the U.S. domain, or acquiring a full statehood with a subsequent competition of great powers. The next few years may be crucial. Russia does not have material economic interests in Greenland, and this may explain its rather limited media coverage of the island developments (except for Donald Trump’s offer to purchase it from Denmark). However, it is naturally affected as the biggest Arctic nation, which has among other submitted continental shelf claims overlapping with Greenland’s, and a potential REE exporter. Since 2019, Russia has been reshaping its Arctic policy with a stronger emphasis on national security, peaceful international cooperation, and enhancing the northern population’s life quality. It is not in the Russian interests to be involved in a U.S.-China rivalry in the Arctic, and charting a right course towards Greenland may represent a distinct foreign policy challenge for Moscow, as well.

Paper 10.5 abstract Agne Cepinskyte & Michael Paul: Arctic Security Environment in Flux: From ‘Zone of Peace’ to Security Dilemma

Over three decades ago, launched a set of policies, commonly known as the Initiative, aiming to transform the Arctic from a military theatre to an international ‘zone of peace’. The Murmansk Initiative marked a radical shift in Soviet Arctic policy and spurred eventual de-securitisation of interstate relations in the region. Up until recently, such a view had largely been shaping the Arctic policy of the circumpolar states. At present, however, Arctic exceptionalism – an approach to the region as immune to geopolitical tensions and confrontations – is being replaced by strategic competition between great powers. The increasingly easier access to the circumpolar North, caused by rapidly melting ice, has prompted not only the Arctic great power states, notably Russia and the US, but also new actors, such as China, to revise their Arctic policies. In its latest policy, China, positioning itself as a ‘near Arctic state’, has demonstrated a greater focus on building capacity to defend state interests in the Arctic through military means. Russia continues to advocate cooperation but has significantly expanded its military activities in the North. Russia and China’s growing military-security interest in the Arctic has triggered a security dilemma for the US and NATO allies: should they respond in kind by increasing military engagement in the circumpolar North or signal reassurance by maintaining the status quo in the region? The solution to this security dilemma is contingent upon the assessment of whether the observed military-security developments in the Russian Arctic are defensive or offensive. However, such a differentiation is problematical, particularly given the lack of trust in US-Russian relations. The security dilemma is further exacerbated by the absence of an agreement on acceptable military practices. This paper explores the shifting Arctic security environment and argues for the need to resume a military-security dialogue, which could foster transparency between the states concerned and potentially decelerate the militarisation of the Arctic.

Paper 11.1 abstract Rasmus Leander Nielsen: Arctic Exceptionalism vs. Looming Arctic Security Dilemma? The Case of the Kingdom of Denmark in the Midst of Fluctuating Power Politics Dynamics in the High North

Is the Arctic still ‘exceptional’ in terms of being a low-conflict region? The intended decoupling of security issues from the DNA of the from its introduction in the 1990s, the desecurization obtained by the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, and low spill-over effects from other regions, say Russia’s annexation of Ukraine, suggest so. Iterative signals from numerous political actors, civil servants, and pundits stipulate the region is, indeed, at least rhetorically, detached from the power rivalries elsewhere. On the other hand, this is getting harder to sustain with e.g. Russia’s increasing military posturing, US-British or Norwegian joint exercises, and Mike Pompeo bashing of China and Russia suggest arms races could lead to a spiral-effect of renewed conflict. Theoretically, classic disputes between realists and liberalists about the nature of IR thus come to fore in contrasting Arctic Exceptionalism vs. the Security Dilemma; the Rosetta stone of the Realist tradition dating back to Thucydides. This paper discusses the merits of these two concepts and schools of thought, but also dig deeper into the causal mechanisms by process tracing the concepts as both independent and dependent variables to scrutinize current Arctic relations. The analysis unfolds in two steps: First, the conceptual discussion is elaborated in a general Arctic empirical setting. Second, the analysis zooms in on the Kingdom of Denmark and especially the Greenlandic case.

Paper 11.2 abstract Alexander Sergunin: NATO-Russian renewed naval confrontation in the GIUK Gap: the role of Greenland and Denmark The GIUK Gap (Greenland, Iceland, UK) is an area in the between these three landmasses that forms a naval choke point. For the Russian warships (especially for ) to get from icy northern waters to the North Atlantic, they must pass through the GIUK Gap. If American warships are sent with large numbers of troops and materiel to reinforce Europe, they must cross Atlantic waters infested with Russian submarines, surface vessels, or aircraft that transited south through the gap. The GIUK Gap is once again garnering increased attention among NATO allies, especially as Russian submarines have become more capable, while Allied anti- warfare (ASW) capabilities have atrophied over time. Defense experts now caution that the Gap is a potential flashpoint between NATO and Russia, whose fleets must transit the Gap to reach either the Atlantic or Arctic Ocean. Both the NATO countries and Russia invested greatly to the navy modernization programs to upgrade and expand their undersea warfare capabilities, surface ASW and maritime patrol aircraft fleets, as well as the naval infrastructure in the region. Along with the Greenland’s growing significance in the NORAD system, the NATO and Russian renewed interest in the GIUK Gap necessitates the need to reevaluate the role and place of the ‘icy’ island not only in the great powers’ ‘grand strategies’ but also in the Danish Arctic policies. Should Denmark play a bigger role in NATO strategies in the High North or should it rely more on the U.S.-Danish bilateral military cooperation? Or should Copenhagen distance itself from the great powers’ geostrategic games and focus more on its relations with Greenland (especially in the economic sphere)? This paper also aims to examine how the GIUK, Greenlandic and Danish factors are reflected in the NATO, U.S., UK and Russian naval doctrines and strategic planning.

Paper 11.3 abstract Chuanxing Wang: More of Great Power Continual Post-Cold War Coordination or Reversal to Disruptive Strategic Competition in the Arctic Connecting the Northern Atlantic to the Northern Pacific Nowadays?

Undoubtedly, international system is witnessing another fundamental transformation today, with the features of “the rise of the rest (China) vs the West (America)”. Many analysts observe and hold that such shock waves make water stirred up global seas and oceans; hence no exception the Arctic Ocean which connects the Northern Atlantic to the Northern Pacific. “The panels introduce Danish, Faroese and Greenlandic strategic learning from history for policymaking”, which seemingly implies that the rehearsal and presentation of today’s tragicomedies regarding Great Power interaction is coming. But the key here is whether this is simply the past history repetition in the world in general, and in the North Atlantic in particular; even so, a question in point is whether there are striking features and/or patterns with such repeated tragicomedies. And if it is so, origins which help define such features/patterns are worth digging out. Specifically, the involvement of East Asian nations, especially China, in the Arctic in the past two decades is partly confined to the “law” of traditional Western inter-state politics, which focuses on the struggle between losers and winners. But on the other hand, what decides the behaviors of states is on the way evolving from international politics to global politics, which redefines the patterns of state interaction because of, first of all, natural environment under huge change in the Arctic and around the world, accompanied with the social environmental changes, and vice versa. In this regard, by assuming the practical China’s idea to jointly build a community of common destiny for all mankind in the Arctic affairs, this paper tries to establish a de/link between the past and the present/future regarding Great Power interaction in the Northern Atlantic via comparisons and .

Paper 11.4 abstract Anna Agnarsdóttir: (tba)

This paper will focus on the British and French in the North Atlantic during the long 18th century with the emphasis on Iceland, though certainly in many instances Greenland (and the Faroes) shared a similar fate and comparisons with the other Danish dependencies will be made throughout. During the Middle Ages both English and German seamen had been frequent visitors to Icelandic waters and Danish kings had been keen to pawn the island to e.g. Henry VIII of England, who failed to be tempted. During the Early Modern Age this interest waned but after the Seven Years’ War in the 18th century big power interest was revived. Both Britain and France proved interested in acquiring Iceland. In the 1760s there was French interest in exchanging Iceland for Louisiana, the idea being to establish a French naval station in Iceland from whence ships could be sent to regain (lost in the Seven Years’ War). In Scotland in the 1780s there were plans afoot for a British takeover of Iceland in exchange for an island in the West Indies or the Duchy of Saxe-Lauenburg, on the border of Schleswig-Holstein. Both were territories that the Danes had been interested in acquiring. Negotiations with Denmark never reached an official level. In 1801, when relations between Denmark and Britain were becoming increasingly strained, proposals were made to the British government to make use of the hostile situation and send a force to annex Iceland. The Pitt administration took these proposals seriously enough to seek the advice of Sir Joseph Banks, virtually the only influential Englishman (president of the Royal Society and friend of ministers) who had first-hand knowledge of the island. (Banks, a naturalist, had sailed on Captain Cook’s voyage to the South Seas on the Endeavour in 1768–71. In the following year 1772, he led the first British expedition to explore Iceland.) In detailed memoranda on the feasibility of annexing Iceland, Banks professed himself in favour of the conquest of Iceland, which would subject Denmark to ‘a considerable political humiliation in the eyes of Europe’. He believed the possession of Iceland would benefit British trade, revenues and nautical strength. Apparently both Pitt, the Prime Minister and Dundas, the Secretary of War, had been ‘fully impressed with the importance of possessing Iceland’ but before further discussions could take place peace was restored.During the Napoleonic Wars (1807-1814) when Britain and Denmark were on opposing sides this idea of annexing Iceland (and the Faroes) to the British Empire was revived. As to Greenland the “displanting and dispeopling” of the people of the Danish colonies was mooted. Though the Icelandic Revolution of 1809, placing Iceland, declared independent, under the protection of Britain, was short- lived, the fate of the three Danish dependencies was very similar. Britannia ruled the North Atlantic and the trade of the Danish islands was effectively run by the British Board of Trade. All the Danish dependencies shared the same fate at the Peace of Kiel in 1814 where the British negotiator played a crucial role. Though was lost they stayed within the realm – in Britain’s interests. There is no doubt that in the early 19th century Iceland and the other Danish dependencies were within the British sphere of influence, brought home in the First World War (when Anglo-Icelandic relations bore many similarities to British treatment in the Napoleonic Wars) not to mention the Second World War when the British invaded in 1940, eventually bringing the Americans into the world war.

Paper 11.5 abstract (tba) Marc Lanteigne og Mingming Shi: (tba)