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SWPS 2016-16 (September) SWPS 2016-16 (September) Understanding the Intensity of UK Policy Commitments to Nuclear Power Emily Cox, Phil Johnstone, Andy Stirling SPRU Working Paper Series (ISSN 2057-6668) The SPRU Working Paper Series aims to accelerate the public availability of the research undertaken by SPRU-associated people, and other research that is of considerable interest within SPRU providing access to early copies of SPRU research. Editors Contact Tommaso Ciarli [email protected] Daniele Rotolo [email protected] Associate Editors Area Florian Kern Energy [email protected] Paul Nightingale, Science, & Technology Policy [email protected] Ben Martin, & [email protected] Ohid Yaqub [email protected] Tommaso Ciarli Development [email protected] Joe Tidd & Technology Innovation [email protected] Carlos Sato Management [email protected] Maria Savona & Economics of Technological Change [email protected] Mariana Mazzucato [email protected] Andrew Stirling Transitions [email protected] Caitriona McLeish Civil Military Interface [email protected] Editorial Assistance Tomás Saieg [email protected] Guidelines for authors Papers should be submitted to [email protected] as a PDF or Word file. The first page should include: title, abstract, keywords, and authors’ names and affiliations. The paper will be considered for publication by an Associate Editor, who may ask two referees to provide a light review. We aim to send referee reports within three weeks from submission. Authors may be requested to submit a revised version of the paper with a reply to the referees’ comments to [email protected]. The Editors make the final decision on the inclusion of the paper in the series. When submitting, the authors should indicate if the paper has already undergone peer-reviewing (in other series, journals, or books), in which case the Editors may decide to skip the review process. Once the paper is included in the SWPS, the authors maintain the copyright. Websites UoS: www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/research/swps SSRN: http://www.ssrn.com/link/SPRU-RES.html IDEAS: ideas.repec.org/s/sru/ssewps.html Research Gate: www.researchgate.net/journal/2057-6668_SPRU_Working_Paper_Series UNDERSTANDING THE INTENSITY OF UK POLICY COMMITMENTS TO NUCLEAR POWER the role of perceived imperatives to maintain military nuclear submarine capabilities Emily Cox, Phil Johnstone and Andy Stirling Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) University of Sussex July 2016 Contents Abstract 1: Introduction and Summary 2: Why Undertake this Study? 2a: Grounds for Queries over the Intensity of UK Nuclear Commitments 2b: Curious Levels of Neglect in Questioning UK Nuclear Commitments 2c: Overview of this Paper 3: Theoretical Background – Contrasting Understandings of Incumbency 3a: Theoretical Approaches to Power 3b: Exploring the Dynamics of Incumbency 4: Methodological Approach Employed in this Study 4a: Overview of the Main Hypotheses Framing this Analysis 4b: Testing the ‘Deep Incumbency Hypothesis’ 5: How Intense are UK Policy Commitments to Civil and Military Nuclear Infrastructures? 5a: UK Policy Commitments to Civilian Nuclear Power 5b: UK Policy Commitments to Military Nuclear Capabilities 6: Are There Under-Visible Linkages Between UK Military and Civil Nuclear Policy Priorities? 6a: The International Comparative Background 6b: Linkages Between Civil and Military Nuclear Capabilities 6c: The Under-Visibility of Civil-Military Nuclear Linkages 7: Is UK Civil Nuclear Policy Partly Driven By Commitments to Nuclear Submarine Capabilities? 8: What Conditioned the Radical Reversal of UK Nuclear Policy in the Critical Juncture 2003-2006? 9: Comparing Alternative Hypotheses – Rationality? Regimes? Individuals and Networks? 10: Is There a ‘Deep Incumbency Complex’ Around UK Civil and Military Nuclear Power? 1 Abstract The UK Government has long been planning to build up to 16 GWe of new nuclear power – a proportional level of support unparalleled in other liberalised energy markets. Despite many challenging developments, these general nuclear attachments show no sign of easing. With many viable alternative strategies for efficient, secure, low-carbon energy services, it is difficult to explain these commitments solely in terms of officially-declared policy rationales. A variety of possible reasons are suggested for the persistent intensity of UK attachments to civil nuclear power. Each is taken here as a basis for systematic hypothesis testing. And one additional hypothesis is also interrogated that has hitherto been virtually entirely neglected – about maintaining national capabilities to build and operate nuclear- propelled submarines. To explore and test this idea, this paper analyses linkages between UK military and civilian nuclear sectors in terms of high-level policy processes around supply chains, skills and expertise. Especially interesting is the critical juncture between 2003-2006, when stated policy moved radically from nuclear power as ‘unattractive’ to calls for a ‘nuclear renaissance’. In this period, especially intense activity can be observed around UK nuclear submarine capabilities. Among many factors, we conclude it is difficult fully to comprehend the persistent intensity of official UK attachments to nuclear power, without also considering aims to maintain nuclear submarine capabilities. Yet this aspect is entirely undocumented anywhere in UK energy policy literatures. To acknowledge this, is not to entertain a conspiracy theory. It can be understood instead, in terms of more distributed and relational dynamics of power. Building on literatures in political science, we refer to this as a ‘deep incumbency complex’. Such an evidently under-visible phenomenon would hold important implications not only for UK nuclear strategies, but also the wider state of British democracy. Keywords Civil nuclear power; nuclear energy strategies; UK energy policy; nuclear weapons; nuclear-propelled submarines; incumbency; lock-in; renewable energy; technological discontinuation; sociotechnical transformation; theories of power; institutional theory; political science; science and technology studies. 2 Section 1: Introduction and Summary With current controversies around the Hinkley Point C project simply one further specific twist in the plot (Ruddick & Grierson 2016), the story of UK nuclear power is a fascinating one. Albeit in many changing ways, the UK Government has long professed to be planning to build up to 16 GWe of new nuclear electricity generation capacity - a proportional level of support for new nuclear power unparalleled in any other liberalised energy market (World Nuclear Association 2016e; Kee 2015). Despite many challenging developments, these general attachments show no sign of easing. With many alternative (arguably preferable) strategies available for delivering economically viable, politically and technically secure, low-carbon energy services (Liebreich 2016; National Audit Office 2016; Environmental Audit Committee 2006; IRENA 2016; Frankfurt School-UNEP 2016), it is difficult satisfactorily to explain the historic intensity of these commitments solely in terms of officially-declared policy rationales (Phil Johnstone & Stirling 2015a). A variety of reasons have been proposed in policy and academic discussions for the persistence of these distinctively strong UK policy attachments to civil nuclear power (BERR 2008; DECC 2011c; Thomas 2016; Ruz 2015). Each of these is taken in this study as a basis for systematic hypothesis testing. Among these possible explanations, however, this paper interrogates one hypothesis that has hitherto been almost entirely neglected. This is, that the unusual intensity of UK commitments to civil nuclear power are especially understandable in light of a parallel but distinct policy aim that also deeply pervades elite British political cultures. This is the goal of maintaining national capabilities to build and operate nuclear-propelled submarines (House of Commons Defense Committee 2007; HM Government 2006). It is these highly demanding feats of engineering that are widely seen to present the only militarily credible platform for strategic nuclear weapons – thus (in some strongly held views) supporting a place for the UK at the ‘top table’ of global affairs (HM Government 2015; Barckham & Norton-Taylor 2010). To explore and test this hypothesis, this paper carefully analyses linkages between UK military and civilian nuclear sectors, using an ‘innovation systems’ focus on supply chains, skills, expertise and associated high-level policy processes (Edquist, 1997). Augmented by key informant interviews, systematic document and web analysis methods are used to explore a large body of evidence from UK policy documents and Parliamentary inquiries. Despite acknowledged incentives to “mask” them (Ireland 2012), strong interconnections emerge between the UK civilian and military nuclear engineering interests . Yet these linkages are notable for their lack of visibility, equally in academic, policy and critical journalistic discussions of what are conventionally taken to be effectively separate UK civil and military nuclear commitments. In further investigating these dynamics, a particular focus is directed at the period 2003-2006 – widely recognised as a recent critical juncture for UK civil nuclear policy (Taylor 2016; Thomas 2016; Environmental Audit Committee 2006). It is shown how this episode constituted an unprecedented turnaround in official characterisations of civil nuclear power (reversing
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