A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace

BY DAVID KILCULLEN & GREG MILLS

uch progress has been made in Colombia that it is hard to remember that only 20 years ago, the country was renowned not for its practical people or its wonderful cities and rain- Sforests, but for its cocaine-fuelled murder rate. At the height of the drug war in the 1990s, Colombians suffered ten kidnappings a day, 75 political assassinations a week, and 36,000 mur- ders a year (fifteen times the rate in the ).1 The military and police competed with an array of guerrillas, gangs, narcos and paramilitaries. Guerrillas had so isolated the largest cities that urban-dwellers traveling as little as five miles out of town risked kidnapping, or worse. Twenty-seven thousand two hundred thirteen people died in 1997-2001 alone.2 Colombia entered the 21st century at risk of becoming a failed state. Since then, national leaders have turned the situation around, applying a well-designed strategy with growing public and international support. Kidnappings, murders and cocaine cultivation are down, government control has expanded, and the economy is recovering. Talks in Havana, , offer the hope of peace, even as fighting continues on the ground in key areas. But the situation is shakier than it seems—indeed the very success of Colombia’s current campaign carries the risk of future conflict. In this paper, which draws on fieldwork in Colombia between March 2009 and August 2014, we examine Colombia’s turnaround, explore current issues, and offer insights for the future and for others facing similar challenges. We consider the conflict’s political economy, by which we mean the dynamic social-political-economic system that frames people’s choices within incentive structures created by two generations of war. Our key finding is that, with some significant excep- tions, key commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known widely by their Spanish acronym, FARC) and others have become what we call “conflict entrepreneurs,” seeking to perpetuate war for personal gain rather than to win (and thereby end) the conflict. Therefore, remarkable as it is, today’s military progress won’t be enough to end the war in a way that guar- antees Colombia’s peaceful future. We argue that a comprehensive conflict transformation is

Dr. Greg Mills is Executive Director of the Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg. South Africa. Dr. David Kilcullen is the Founder and Chairman of Caerus Associates.

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needed—one that moves Colombia from a cities, the violence fell most heavily on rural political economy of violent exploitation, to and small-town communities, where partisan one of inclusive, sustainable peace. violence among local groups was often spon- sored by outside (principally urban, elite) Background actors. This pattern of violent clientelism From Spain’s conquest in the 1500s, through ended only in 1953 when both parties, recog- resistance to colonialism in the 18th century, to nizing they were powerless to stop the violence the liberation wars of Simón Bolívar in 1812- they had unleashed, asked the military to step 19, the area that is now Colombia has seen in to end the conflict. The period of martial near-continuous conflict. Colombia is the old- law that followed was the Army’s sole 20th cen- est democracy in , but has been tury intervention in politics—and it resulted in at war for 150 of its 195 years of indepen- a 1957 political settlement, brokered by the dence: there were nine civil wars and more military, in which Liberals and Conservatives than fifty insurrections in the nineteenth cen- agreed to share power, alternating at the head tury alone. Colombians have learned to live of bipartisan National Front governments for with “democratic insecurity.” the next 16 years. Historically, conflict arose between This cosy reconciliation among elites— Liberals and Conservatives, political blocs that which, by definition, excluded the poor, rural, mirrored a stratified, segmented society of and indigenous workers and peasants who had European oligarchs controlling factories and been most heavily affected by the violence— huge estates, excluded rural and urban poor, ended but created the conditions and marginalized Indian and Afro-Colombian for future conflict. In particular, the deal minorities. Colombia’s temperate, urbanized, excluded Communist armed movements, as populated, developed center contrasted with well as more moderate Marxist groups, that its tropical, rural, sparsely inhabited, neglected had emerged outside the traditional Liberal- periphery. Structural inequality and lack of Conservative dichotomy as a result of the vio- opportunity created fertile ground for revolu- lence. The Communist Party refused to join tionaries seeking to overthrow the system, and the National Front reconciliation process; sev- those living outside the law. eral Communist militias refused to disarm, Ironically, today’s conflict arose from the instead establishing autonomous zones pacification process after Colombia’s bloodiest (which the central government called “inde- episode of social conflict, La Violencia, which pendent republics”) in defiance of Bogota.3 left 300,000 dead between 1948-53. The mur- Because these “republics”—and the armed der of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a Liberal leader, groups controlling them—rejected the unleashed savage violence among Liberal and National Front arrangement, successive Conservative militias, in a nationwide blood- Colombian national unity governments (both letting Colombians still remember with hor- Liberal- and Conservative-led) saw them as a ror. The conflict rapidly expanded beyond its threat, and a potential trigger for collapse of original causes, and tore the social fabric apart. the entire 1957 peace deal and the return of Although it derived, at least initially, from con- massive violence. flicts among Colombia’s political elites in the

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Conflict indeed began to intensify after turned to criminal activity to fund its struggle. 1959, part of a region-wide rise in unrest after As the distinguished Colombia analyst David the Cuban Revolution—rural violence, for Spencer points out, “FARC never received the example, rose 30 percent in 1960-62.4 From external support it wanted. Fidel Castro hated 1959, with help from U.S. special warfare Communist Party organizations and the teams and civil agencies, Colombia improved Soviets only provided political and moral sup- its counterinsurgency capabilities, developed port. FARC was always self-supporting and dis- Plan LAZO (a comprehensive Internal Defence covered drugs in the early 1980s. [FARC lead- strategy), and sought to suppress the indepen- ers] always intended it to be a temporary dent republics.5 Evidence in late 1963 that means of financing to fill the gap until external Colombian guerrillas had received weapons support could be found, but the amount of and training from Cuba underlined the money eventually seduced them so that by the regional dynamic, and prompted government early 1990s they were totally in.” action against the “independent republics.” With the collapse of Communism in the In May 1964, the Armed Forces attacked early 1990s, the prospect of external support the “” led by Manuel receded even further, and narcotics became a Marulanda Velez. The assault pushed key source of finance, along with kidnapping Marulanda’s guerrillas into the neighbouring and extortion. Drugs brought in an estimated “Republic of Rio Chiquito” where in July 1964 $3.5 billion annually by 2005, or 45 percent a confederation of guerrilla groups formed the of FARC’s funding. The paramilitaries, likewise, Southern Bloc. “Declaring themselves ‘victims received three-quarters of their income from of the policy of fire and sword proclaimed and drug cartels, to which they hired out their ser- carried out by the oligarchic usurpers of power,’ vices. the new coalition called for ‘armed revolution- This created a huge overlap between guer- ary struggle to win power’”6 and renamed rillas and gangsters in Colombia. FARC has itself the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias indeed evolved into a criminal-insurgent de Colombia) two years later. Also opposing the hybrid: the system it spreads to areas under its government were the rural ELN (Ejercito de control creates its own exploitative and violent Liberación Nacional) the Maoist Chinese- political economy, where Marxism provides a oriented EPL (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion) veneer for racketeering built on drugs, illegal and a decade later, the urban M-19 (Movimiento mining, extortion, robbery and kidnapping. 19 de Abril). The Army, in turn, received sup- Colombia’s insurgency has merged with crim- port—sometimes helpful, often unwanted or inality while FARC leaders (among others) embarrassing—from right-wing paramilitaries have emerged as conflict entrepreneurs—they that had formed to defend communities (and have discovered the value of crime as an wealthy landowners) threatened by the guer- enabler for their pursuit of raw political power. rillas. Ideologically-motivated insurgents fight M-19 demobilized in 1990 and trans- for objectives extrinsic to conflict; they stop formed itself into a parliamentary political fighting when those objectives are achieved. party, but FARC and ELN opted to continue States operate the same way: as Colombia’s the struggle, alongside EPL. FARC quickly Defence Minister, Juan Carlos Pinzon points

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out, “governments don’t fight wars just to Likewise, the Haqqani network in Pakistan, fight—they fight to build a better reality for Mexico’s Zetas, and several Libyan militia their people.”7 By contrast, conflict entrepre- groups can be considered conflict entrepre- neurs fight to perpetuate a conflict, since its neurs. existence creates wealth, power and status for Defeat into Victory? them: their goals are intrinsic to conflict. When their stated political objectives cease to help By 1996 Colombia was losing the battle maintain a profitable conflict, conflict entre- against this criminal-insurgent complex. Drug preneurs simply change the objectives and cartels—Pablo Escobar in Medellín, and the continue the conflict. FARC, like the milita- rival Cali cartel—had subverted Colombia’s rized criminal groups (bandas criminales, democracy and brought violence to its cities. BACRIM) that emerged from the paramilitar- In the countryside, paramilitaries had united ies, is a classic example of this war-as-racke- into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia teering phenomenon, but it is not the only (AUC) and branched out into drugs, extortion one. Many African conflicts, in particular— and extrajudicial killing. FARC had escalated including clan warfare in Somalia, conflicts in from a guerrilla war to a War of Movement Sudan and the Congo, and the Lord’s phase in its modified People’s War strategy, Resistance Army in Uganda and the Central achieving a string of major victories between African Republic—show a similar pattern. April 1996 and December 1999. Main force

Thierry Ehrmann Thierry FARC columns, operating openly in large for- mations, proved capable of defeating battal- ion-sized Army units and seizing and holding territory.8 By the end of the 20th century, on the Army’s admission, the guerrillas controlled ter- ritory stretching “from Ecuador to Venezuela, had built themselves considerable infrastruc- ture in the southeast around Caquetá and Meta, and not only had Bogotá surrounded, but had deployed guerrillas into its outskirts. Road transport between the major cities was very difficult, if not impossible.”9 FARC’s vic- tories—and its expansion, which for the first time directly threatened Colombia’s major cit- ies—were a wake-up call for Colombians. Many had previously seen the guerrillas (to the extent they thought about them at all) as a nuisance, a problem for campesinos but no threat to business-as-usual in Colombia’s sophisticated centre. Suddenly the threat Graffiti portrait of Pablo Escobar.

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seemed real, prompting a national mobiliza- Uribe took the fight to both guerrillas and tion. paramilitaries, personally driving the effort, Elected in 1998, President Andrés Pastrana turning the guerrillas’ strategy—the “combina- initially pursued peace talks, creating a demil- tion of all forms of struggle” that treated itarised zone centred on San Vicente del armed action, agitation and propaganda, eco- Caguan, including a “peace camp” at Las nomic action and political negotiation simply Pozos. But he broke off talks in February 2002 as facets of a unified struggle—against them after the guerrillas showed no willingness to through his concept of “.” abandon the armed struggle, continued the Under Uribe, and a series of talented and capa- fight outside the demilitarised zone, exploited ble Defence Ministers, Colombia went from the peace talks to gain breathing space, and widespread insecurity to expanding normality. used their Caguan enclave (demilitarized only Military recruiting surged—the Armed Forces by Colombian forces—FARC maintained a grew from just under 205,000 in 2002 to strong armed presence) to massively expand 288,000 by 2013, and the National Police cocaine production and attack Colombia’s cit- from 110,000 to 178,000 in 2013. More impor- ies. tantly, the number of professionals (as Colombian military leaders realized that opposed to two-year conscripts) almost qua- something had to change, and began develop- drupled from 22,000 in 2002 to 87,000 by ing plans to break the deadlock. These eventu- 2010. The defence budget rose from three per- ally resulted in a major FARC defeat at Mitu, cent of GDP to over four percent during the which signalled the government’s new resolve 2000s, partly financed through a 1.3 percent and marked the beginning of Colombia’s “Wealth Tax” on businesses and well-off remarkable turnaround. Pastrana had earlier Colombians. formulated , a $10.6 billion Colombia’s military rose in quality as well effort formally known as the “Colombia as quantity. New equipment—Blackhawk heli- Strategic Development Initiative,” which “was copters, Super Tucano counterinsurgency air- a determining factor in the return of govern- craft, unmanned aerial vehicles, precision ment control to wide areas of the country.”10 guided weapons, and the latest communica- Partly U.S. funded, and launched in 2000, tion and surveillance technology—paralleled Plan Colombia was initially focused primarily the creation of a special operations command on the drug war, but gained impetus after the and increased investment in training. While 2001 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, which freed the military and police bore the initial burden, Washington to expand cooperation beyond follow-up efforts were led by the Centro de counter-narcotics into anti-terrorism. Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI), a recon- Encouraged by this boost, though largely rely- struction and stabilization organization cre- ing on their own capability (Plan Colombia ated by, and reporting directly to, the accounted for no more than five percent of the Presidency. As in earlier periods, low-profile effort, which was driven by Colombians them- U.S. assistance helped—but the talent, energy selves) the military turned the tide, a process and leadership that drove success were all that hastened after the election of President Colombian. Alvaro Uribe in August 2002.

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Uribe tackled the nexus between the insur- members could pose questions, and raise con- gency, paramilitaries and drugs through efforts cerns, directly with the President and his min- to demobilize AUC, which succeeded in 2006, isters. It also began to include in the national prompting a dramatic drop in criminal vio- dialogue the marginalized communities that lence. As David Spencer argues, much of this had been co-opted or intimidated by guerril- violence “was also being perpetrated by FARC. las. Uribe visited most of Colombia’s thou- The initial success of Democratic Security was sand-plus municipalities and 32 departments in generating a huge drop in crime from all in his eight years—many more than once—cre- sources, merely by the government occupying ating not just positive public relations, but a and patrolling all of the municipalities.” By feedback loop that helped his administration protecting communities that had previously fine-tune its policy through an active action- seen little or no state presence, Uribe removed learning cycle. the main rationale for the paramilitaries. He Uribe’s “democratic security” programme also promoted demobilization and reintegra- was extended by his successor, President Juan tion of guerrillas, infrastructure improvement Manuel Santos—one of Uribe’s last defence and popular dialogue throughout the country- ministers—whose Sword of Honour campaign side. aimed to degrade FARC while consolidating The effect was dramatic. Homicides halved control in 140 contested municipalities. Sword from 28,837 (70 per 100,000) in 2002 to of Honour, developed in late 2011 using 16,127 (35 per 100,000) in 2011; kidnappings Operational Design principles by a hand- plummeted by 90 percent from 2,882 to 305; picked team that included some of the most and car theft more than halved from 17,303 to gifted and battle-experienced officers in 10,269.11 The drop in kidnappings, in particu- Colombia, called for increased pressure on lar, brought a sense of relief and progress to FARC, quick impact projects in contested dis- Colombians. Security improvements helped tricts (from water reticulation, sewers, bridges the economy develop, creating a virtuous cycle and roads, to community sports centers) and of governance, growth and stability. Foreign the creation of nine Joint Task Forces to take direct investment rose to $19 billion by 2012, the fight to FARC bases. The current iteration enabling further spending on security. of the plan (Sword of Honour III) includes 12 Economic growth averaged five percent during Joint Task Forces intended to penetrate FARC the ten years from 2002, enabling fresh invest- strongholds, while territorial brigades and ment in infrastructure, and funding the police secure contested areas, and civil agen- expanding and professionalizing military and cies bring governance and development to nor- police. malizing districts. Uribe led a hands-on approach to popular As discussed below—and as inevitably dialogue, holding televised consejos comuni- happens in war—things have not worked out tarios (Community Councils) each weekend quite as planned. Still, there has been a steady across the country, where he and his entire increase in reintegration, with 1,350 guerrillas cabinet travelled to small towns and city dis- demobilised in 2013, and 24,856 since 2002. tricts. This created a public forum that was A further 6,000 FARC have been killed in Army both local and national, in which community raids, Joint Task Force deep-penetration

11 2 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 3 COLOMBIA operations, or precision strikes by the Air kidnapping by 97 percent, represent strategic Force. But the insurgents, under tremendous blows against FARC’s funding. Regarding mate- pressure, have not stood still. General Juan riel, the Armed Forces have seized 248.1 tons Pablo Rodriguez, by 2014 Chief of the Armed of explosives and 18,583 explosive devices, Forces, admits that, “FARC is not stupid. They and destroyed 69,411 improvised explosive adapt and change, and every day is more dif- devices (IEDs) since 2010. ficult for us.” This can be seen in the most That said, as it loses territorial control, recent FARC numbers of approximately 8500 FARC has been forced to drop back a stage in full-time personnel and 10,000 part-time its strategy, abandoning the War of Movement, members as of September 2013, suggesting returning to guerrilla operations in the coun- that despite all the pressure it was under, the tryside and urban terrorism. Instead of frontal organization had still managed to recruit, attacks on cities and military bases, FARC replace losses, and continue to operate. hides among the population, using People’s Since 2010, the Colombian government Militia—urban underground cells—to snipe at has effectively used its operations Sword of soldiers, intimidate communities and extort Honour and Green Heart to steadily affect ter- businesses, employing IEDs to deny access to rorist and criminal groups, their violent meth- base areas. ods and financial means. In terms of fighting President Santos restarted peace talks, structures, by 2014, the FARC had about 6,900 announcing in his August 2010 inaugural fighters (a 25% reduction), the ELN 1,495 and address that the “door to peace is not closed.” BACRIM 3,400, showing the smallest size in at This led to exploratory talks with the rebels in least 15 years. Fifty-five FARC leaders, 17 from February 2012, which produced a six-point the ELN and 42 from the BACRIM have also agenda for formal negotiations that began in been killed or captured through targeted oper- Havana in November 2012 and continue ations. today. Santos made it clear that unlike previ- Colombian government data showed that ous talks, this time military operations will 90 percent of municipalities did not register continue until a deal is reached. The govern- any terrorist attacks in 2014; 95 percent expe- ment is also addressing the social basis of the rienced no subversive actions; 82 percent of conflict, through the 2011 Land Restitution the population did not report presence of and Victims’ Law—to redress human rights active terrorist structures or criminal gangs; violations by all sides—and social programs and 94 percent of the country had no recorded including Acción Social and a new Department cases of kidnapping. As of 2014, only 6 percent of Social Prosperity. of the Colombian population was directly or Current Issues indirectly affected by terrorist actions. With respect to FARC’s financial and mate- From this brief historical sketch it should be rial means, the Armed Forces have also clear that despite a turnaround so dramatic achieved notable success. The reduction of that some call it “The Colombian Miracle,” coca crops to 48,000 hectares and the seizure Colombia still faces a robust insurgency.13 of 1.6 out of every three kilograms of cocaine Current issues include sustainability, the potentially produced, as well as the fall of

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civil-military gap, village governance and secu- The civil-military gap rity, and the FARC-criminal nexus. Simultaneously, civilians need to step more The dilemma of sustainability actively into the space created by the military, Colombia needs a sustained effort—lasting lest soldiers be left holding an empty bag— 15-20 years—to consolidate its gains, but these or, worse, become tempted to usurp civil could be undone overnight if talks fail, or if authority in order to get the job done. peace allows FARC (supported by less than five As designed Sword of Honour envisaged percent of Colombians) to bounce back. More civilian agencies assuming administrative func- fundamentally, Colombia’s government seeks tions, and Police taking over cleared areas, to end the conflict on favorable terms— freeing troops to maneuver against FARC whereas FARC, as conflict entrepreneurs, seek bases. Under Green Heart, the Police compan- to preserve the conflict. They regard peace talks ion plan to Sword of Honour, police were to as just one more phase in an ongoing struggle assume responsibility for cleared (“green”) that serves their business interests as much as areas, freeing the military for maneuver in con- their political goals. tested (“amber”) and FARC base (“red”) zones. For the military, after hard-won battlefield In practice, populations rejected the Police, success, huge expansion, and a massive growth while civilians proved unable to fulfil their in public support and prestige, there is a dif- role in a timely and effective manner. The ferent dilemma. Military commanders under- military was forced to step into the gap, leav- stand they must sustain a local security pres- ing troops pinned down in administrative, ence, and remain involved in governance and security and integral action roles, rather than economics, for the foreseeable future, so that doing what only soldiers can do—keeping the civilian agencies can work with the population enemy under pressure to set conditions for to extend governance, improve services, and successful peace talks. As one analyst puts it, reduce the structural inequality and exclusion “we’re not killing FARC fast enough to put that provoked the insurgency. This will take enough pressure on them to achieve a peace enormous political commitment over a long settlement, because we’re soaking up the Army time—historical benchmarks suggest that post- doing things that are really the job of civil- conflict stabilization may last twice as long as ians.”15 the conflict that preceded it.14 Thus, while military progress is impres- Such a commitment, however—on top of sive, civilian performance is lagging, creating a the massive growth in budget, manpower, and gap guerrillas can exploit. Unless the govern- prestige of the past decade—brings personal ment creates a permanent presence at village and institutional incentives that carry the risk level to replace the FARC system that has dom- that the military, too, may become stakehold- inated communities for so long, destroying ers in a political economy of war, with institu- today’s guerrillas will only create a vacuum to tional interests in preserving a state of conflict. be filled by successive generations of insur- This risk may be worth taking—without pres- gents and criminals. This is a fundamental ence in contested areas, it is hard to see how challenge: military progress without civil gov- the conflict can end—but it is still a risk. ernance either leaves the military pinned

11 4 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 3 COLOMBIA down, protecting every bridge, schoolhouse leave, the guerrillas return. Villagers who inter- and office; or it makes the population vulner- act with soldiers know that as soon as the sun able to guerrillas once the military leaves. goes down, or at most in a few days, the guer- rillas will hold them to account for whatever Village governance and security they do or say. As one commander of a territorial brigade Civil government has no permanent pres- pointed out, the Army doesn’t in fact maintain ence at village level either: the mayor of each a permanent presence at village level—troops municipio (which may include 200 villages) establish bases at municipio (equivalent of a represents the lowest level of formal adminis- U.S. county) level, or in departmental capitals, tration. Most mayors remain in their offices in then send out patrols that visit villages only district capitals, rarely visiting villages. Instead, periodically, and stay only briefly. They never they liaise with village-level Community sleep in villages (to avoid violating civilian Action Committees, (Juntas de Acción Comunal, property rights by sleeping in schools or pri- JACs), informal bodies with no status under vate houses, a practice the Army banned sev- the constitution. Most governance at village eral years ago) but retire to patrol bases at level is done by JACs, and where FARC has a night. permanent presence, the guerrillas influence When soldiers arrive, guerrillas retreat to membership in the JAC so that, in the words the hills or nearby jungle. They leave a network of one soldier, “the neighborhood is the guer- of informers—underground cells the Army rilla front.”16 calls RATs (“terrorist support networks”, redes This dynamic—fragmented or absent civil de apoyo al terrorismo)—to watch the village governance and episodic military presence, while they’re gone. As soon as the soldiers combined with permanent local presence of Thomas Dahlberg

Kogi children in a rural village in Colombia.

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 11 5 KILCULLEN AND MILLS the guerrillas—creates a “double brain drain.” viable justice system must include courts, cor- Government supporters are systematically rections and effective formal and informal culled as the military’s episodic visits expose legal institutions. But delays in the court sys- them, but then leave them unprotected. tem, and overcrowding of jails, mean that Meanwhile, villagers see FARC as the legitimate some detainees end up serving their sentences system, and those with talent and ambition in holding cells in police stations. Judges shy disappear into the movement. Money, brains away from custodial sentences for all but the and jobs—in that order—flee contested areas, most extreme crimes, realizing there is no and once gone are extremely difficult to get room in the correctional system—hence many back. violent offenders, even notorious BACRIM and guerrilla members, are quickly released. FARC-Criminal Nexus This frustrates police and military officers, FARC-BACRIM collaboration exemplifies the who see known criminals and insurgents walk- strange bedfellows that emerge in a political ing free, able to retaliate against witnesses. economy of war, when conflict entrepreneurs Over the long term, such impunity—for peo- see opportunities to perpetuate the violence ple whom the community and law enforce- from which they benefit. Most paramilitaries ment are convinced are guilty—can prompt demobilized under the 2006 agreement but by people to take the law into their own hands then, some had become little more than ban- and (in extreme cases) result in extra-judicial dits, and these evolved into BACRIM (bandas killings, as has happened in the past in criminals). Having given up their political Colombia, as in many countries. But change is agenda—it was now all just business— hard to imagine without a structural shift in BACRIM were willing to collaborate with any- the incentives that make people conflict entre- one (including FARC) who could advance their preneurs—in other words, without transforma- goals of plunder and profit. For its part, FARC tion from a political economy of crime and saw an opportunity to spread government conflict, to one of sustainable and inclusive efforts more thinly by establishing temporary prosperity and peace. This is a daunting chal- alliances of convenience with criminal groups, lenge, but it is the fundamental task of peace and to use proxies to protect its cocaine econ- building: after generations of conflict, it omy, and to hide within criminal networks. should be no surprise that making peace This makes sense: as a conflict entrepreneur, if should be difficult or require a wholesale your interests are commercial rather than transformation. political, why pose as an insurgent and risk Insights being killed by a Special Forces raid or a 500- pound laser-guided bomb? You can make Colombia is at a complex inflection point. The more money, and have a more comfortable life insurgency is far from spent: many guerrillas as a criminal, protected by civil rights and remain in the field, and even many demobi- criminal law, merely risking arrest in a country lized fighters remain committed to revolution- with no death penalty. ary ideologies, and might vote for FARC or Dealing with this kind of ingrained vio- hard-left candidates if FARC were to create a lent criminality demands more than police: a political party. Peace offers FARC, within its

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“combination of all forms of struggle,” the society for excluded and marginalized popula- opportunity to trade a tenuous military posi- tions that are FARC’s principal constituency. tion for a stronger political one through nego- This in turn requires recognition that FARC tiation. It may seek to manipulate grievances, and BACRIM are conflict entrepreneurs seeking mobilize populations and capture the state to perpetuate violence for personal gain, so through the ballot box, a “revolutionary judo” that extension of government presence and move like Bolivarian revolutionaries else- rule of law to the very local level of society is where. Moreover, peace offers FARC racketeers critical. the option to drop their political agenda and Related to this, given the failure of civilian (like AUC) become BACRIM. agencies to deliver the governance and recon- This is not the place for detailed policy struction effects envisioned in Sword of Honour, prescriptions, which are, in any case, a matter political leaders need to recognize that the for Colombians. Nevertheless, this analysis critical counterinsurgency element today is not suggests several insights for the future, and for the military effort, but rather the ability of others experiencing similar challenges. We can these civilian agencies to backfill that effort. divide these into political, military and eco- Local civil governance—and the willingness of nomic insights. civil agencies to support a comprehensive national plan—demands political leadership. Political Insights Since civil agencies don’t work for the Defense Politically the irony is that the military’s very Minister, such leadership can only come from success may undermine support for its ongo- the Presidency. This suggests that a balance is ing efforts to maintain a stabilizing security needed between pursuing peace talks them- presence in contested areas. As we have seen, selves, versus extending civilian governance so national mobilization happened because the as to free the military to generate enough pres- guerrillas began to threaten Colombia’s cities. sure on FARC to ensure a favorable outcome As the military rolled FARC back, the threat for those talks. perception in Colombia’s urban core (where A third political insight is the recognition the vast majority of Colombian voters live) that—as in La Violencia—the peace settlement dropped—but so in turn did the public sense from one conflict can create the seeds of of urgency. People want the war to be over, and another. In that previous case, exclusion of now that FARC seems less threatening, other some Colombians from the National Front led concerns predominate. This combination of to “independent republics,” and suppressing war fatigue and shifting concerns on the part these republics created today’s insurgency. A of urban Colombians helps the guerrillas. future peace settlement that lets conflict entre- Government’s key challenge is to sustain preneurs unfairly control territory or govern- political support without (on the one hand) ment institutions could lead to a “soft take- letting voters slip back into apathy, or (on the over” by groups that have been defeated other) putting Colombia on a perpetual war militarily and whom very few Colombians footing. What is needed is a genuine social support. But equally, excluding such actors transformation—one that transforms the terms from politics could set the conditions for of the conflict by creating a more inclusive another insurgency, and denying them

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 11 7 KILCULLEN AND MILLS economic opportunity could increase crimi- properly those of civilians, toward a single- nality, as insurgents rebrand themselves in the minded focus on population security at the manner of BACRIM. Finally, a settlement that local level. penalizes military or police for actions during This effort (primarily the role of Territorial the conflict, while giving blanket amnesty to Brigades) needs to be complemented by an guerrillas, may create a constituency against effort to fully unleash the Joint Task Forces, political integration—as soldiers worry accompanied by Special Forces and supported whether some future government may punish by air and maritime power, to radically them or their families for acts that were legal increase pressure on remaining FARC strong- and seen as necessary at the time. holds and on BACRIM. The goal is not to kill or capture every last guerrilla, but to convince Military Insights FARC negotiators that they are in a closing A key military insight is the need to redouble window of opportunity to achieve peace efforts to secure the at-risk rural population— before their forces in the field are destroyed. In people willing to work with the government, the crudest terms, the military needs to seize but living in FARC-dominated areas. These control of the guerrillas’ loss rate—driving that people are the seed-corn of future rural stabil- rate upward, until a sufficiently high rate of ity, and must be protected at all costs. Periodic kills, captures and surrenders is achieved that raiding or patrol visits expose them to retalia- FARC leaders understand their best option is a tion as soon as soldiers move on. This in turn negotiated peace. At the same time, intensive systematically culls community leaders in con- targeting of BACRIM can help convince insur- tested areas. The only solution is permanent gents that criminality offers no sanctuary. presence—troops must live, permanently, It may seem premature to consider demo- among the people at village level, creating a bilization and restructuring—what we might safe enough environment that local communi- call a “peace dividend”—while peace is still in ties feel confident to identify RATs and insur- doubt. But structures like a national guard that gent networks, and reversing the brain drain lets demobilized veterans serve part-time in by helping JACs, community leaders, and tal- their home villages, a rural constabulary ented local people regain control of their own (under regular police commanders and villages. responsive to local civil authority), or a recon- By lifting the pall of fear off rural com- struction corps that provides employment and munities, the loss of money, brains and jobs training to ex-soldiers and enables infrastruc- can begin to be reversed. Village outposts, sup- ture development, are worth considering now. ported by district quick-reaction forces and These create a pathway to peace that soldiers embedded police and administrative officials, can understand, and prevent demobilized per- can create a framework for radical improve- sonnel from the Colombian Armed Forces ment. Until civil agencies and police backfill being drawn into criminality or destabilizing the military, there will be insufficient troops to political activity. secure all contested districts—until then, there Economic Insights will be a need to prioritize key districts and redirect effort away from tasks that are Economically, one insight is the danger of

11 8 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 3 COLOMBIA the military becoming enmeshed in the local have accompanied the economic growth. economy and crowding out the private sector. Together with improvements in security, this There’s no doubt that security improvements established a positive cycle. have helped the economy develop. Pro- But change is not only about financial fig- market policies helped Colombia reduce ures and riches. According to public figures, poverty by 38.4 percent (from 49.7 percent public health care coverage expanded from less in 2002 to 30.6 percent in 2013) and cut than 25 million people in 2002 to 45 million unemployment by 46 percent (from 15.6 at the end of 2013, and “basic and medium” percent in 2002 to under little over eight education coverage from 7.8 million to 8.7 percent in 2013). Reducing public debt to million students in 2013. This has required below three percent of GDP, and an export- improving the aspect of counterinsurgency led growth strategy, facilitated economic that most campaigns struggle with—connect- recovery, with Colombia’s economy ing improvements in security with sustainable achieving sustained growth (6.4 percent in employment creation, especially in rural areas. the first trimester of 2014). Direct Investment The government has a role in wealth creation, has been growing over the last years (30.4 by assisting with necessary physical infrastruc- percent of GDP in the first months of 2014) ture to help create markets, and with farming and there are higher tax revenues that inputs. But governments must walk a fine line Luis Perez

Slum housing in Colombia

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 11 9 KILCULLEN AND MILLS between rewarding success while preventing struggle, a political war in which fresh chal- outright failure. Job creation is key, because it lenges will emerge. Should a peace settlement will help dissipate much of the sense of griev- be achieved, there’s every likelihood FARC will ance that has historically fuelled conflict. continue its efforts under another guise. Another insight is that more thought is Military force will diminish in importance, needed on how the military can include the effectiveness and relevance: you cannot apply private sector, to expedite small, local develop- lethal force against unarmed protestors or cad- ment projects that directly benefit local econo- res operating in civilian clothes in the cities. mies, facilitate private business and encourage Colombia will need new approaches that private investment. A number of ideas might respect human rights, but can prevent a take- be explored: embedding civilians, from NGOs over as in Venezuela or Bolivia, by conflict or the private sector, with military units in a entrepreneurs who simply adapt to new condi- sort of Colombian Pioneer Corps, or exploring tions. Ultimately, a more inclusive society, an mechanisms for public-private partnership economy that helps marginalized and beyond simply engaging with chambers of excluded populations share in economic commerce or extant investors. It is precisely opportunity, the extension of rule of law and the investors who are not already present that civil governance to every level of society, and one wants to attract; first by knowing what economic policies that bring money, jobs and opportunities they are interested in, and sec- talent back to the areas that have suffered most ond by understanding and facilitating their heavily, are critical steps in conflict transforma- requirements. Efforts to promote and protect tion. This will be extremely difficult—perhaps investments in employment-generating busi- even harder than the military struggle—yet it nesses are key to reversing the money/brains/ will be utterly essential if Colombians are to jobs drain from local communities, and here achieve peace with victory. PRISM Colombia might lead a change in global think- ing, and offer a new model to be emulated.

Conclusion Fifty years ago in Vietnam, John Paul Vann said that “security may be ten percent of the NOTES problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it is the first ten percent or the 1 See Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and first ninety percent…Without security, nothing Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. New York: Routledge, else we do will last.”17 Colombia has achieved 2006, p.2. 2 an amazing turnaround in security that offers Information supplied by the Police Intelligence Division, Bogota, 10 December 2010. lessons for others facing similar challenges, 3 These “Independent Republics” included and has put the country within striking dis- Agriari, Viota, Tequendama, Sumapaz, El Pato, tance of peace for the first time since Vann Guayabero, Suroeste del Tolima, Rio Chiquito, 26 de Septiembre, and Marquetalia. deployed to Vietnam way back in 1963. 4 See Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, But if this paper shows anything, it is that and Independent Republics: US Counter-insurgency Colombia today is entering a new phase of

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Efforts in Colombia 1959-1965” in Small Wars and Photos Insurgencies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1995), pp. 304-327. 5 ibid. 6 ibid. Page 110 photo by Thierry Ehrmann. 2013. Pablo 7 In conversation with a delegation of African Emilio Escobar Gaviria, painted portrait. From https:// leaders visiting Bogota, 19th June, 2014. commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pablo_Escobar_graffitti.jpg 8 At Puerres in the department of Norino on 5 licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution April 1996 resulting in 31 government troops killed; 2.0 Generic license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Las Delicias in Putumayo on 30 August 1996 with 31 by/2.0/deed.en. Photo reproduced unaltered. killed and 60 wounded; La Carpa in Guaviare on 6 Page 115 photo by Thomas Dahlberg. 2004. September 1996 with 23 dead; Patascoy in Guaviare Fotografiert von Thomas Dahlberg, Oktober 2004. From on 21 December 1997 with 22 killed and 18 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kogi.jpg licensed wounded; El Billar in Caqueá on 5 May 1998 with 63 under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share dead and 43 wounded; Miroflores in Guaviare on 3 Alike 3.0 Unported license. https://creativecommons.org/ August 1998 with 9 dead and 22 wounded; Mitú in licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en. Photo reproduced unaltered. Vaupes on 1 November 1998 with 37 dead and 61 Page 119 photo by Luis Pérez. 2007. Buildings in wounded; and Jurado in the department of Chocó on Colombia. From https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ 12 December 1999 with 24 government troops killed. File:Poverty_in_Colombia_by_Luis_Perez.jpg licensed under 9 Discussion, Bogota, 9 December 2010. the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic 10 Oscar Naranjo, ‘Colombia Shows the Value of license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en. Cooperation’, New York Times, 17 April 2013. Photo reproduced unaltered. 11 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional Colombia. 12 See Milburn Line, ‘Trying to End Colombia’s Battle With FARC’, Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2012. 13 See for example Peter J. Moons, The Colombian Miracle: How the Beat Back an Insurgency and Saved the Nation, 2013. 14 Insurgencies can last 15-30 years, while reconstruction often takes far longer. For example, the Malayan Emergency began in June 1948 and the insurgents were effectively neutralized by 1959. However, it took another 30 years—until 1989—for Communist Party leaders to surrender. During that time the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces (with assistance from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) maintained an internal security role, while the government undertook a national development plan to address the grievances that had driven the insurgency. Likewise, a U.S. Defense Science Board summer study in 2003 found that stabilization and reconstruction operations under- taken by the United States since the end of the Cold War lasted, on average, ten years. 15 Discussion with a Colombian strategic analyst, Tolemaida, August 2014. 16 Interview at forward operating base with troops of JTF Nudo de Paramillo, 12th June 2014. 17 Quoted in Neil Sheehan (2009), A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, Locations 1206-1207.

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