Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota: the Evolution of Colombia’S National Strategy
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Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota: The Evolution of Colombia’s National Strategy by Robert W. Jones Jr. In more than fifty years of battling with anti-govern- lante-style law and order. ment insurgent movements, Colombia has used a num- The first large scale attempt to defeat the insurgents ber of strategies in an attempt to achieve victory. Plan was Plan Lazo in 1962. Rebel groups had established Colombia and Plan Patriota are the latest plans designed enclaves in the mountains. The enclaves became known to defeat the insurgency. The difference between Plan as “independent republics,” operating beyond govern- Colombia and previous campaigns is threefold. First, the ment control. Initial attempts by the police, and then the scope is larger. Plan Colombia covers the entire country army, proved fruitless. The bandits and quasi-guerrillas and is not limited to isolated enclaves. Second, it is a com- fought back and maintained control of their areas. The bined political, military, and economic effort as opposed conflict lead to an integrated operations plan named to seeking a strictly military solution. Finally, there is the “Lazo.” (In Spanish a “lazo” is a rope, noose, or snare.) The unprecedented level of support from the United States. plan called for operations to isolate the independent This article will explain Plan Colombia and the follow-on republics and then use military force to defeat the insur- Oranjestad Plan Patriota in the context of U.S.-Colombian relations. gent groups. While a military operation, Plan LazoCaribbean also Sea Willemstad The historical roots of Plan Colombia date to the 1960s. had a civil component, one of national- and community- Riohacha Golfo de Venezuela From 1948 to 1966, Colombia endured a harrowing level rural development, civic action, and civil defense.Santa Marta Barranquilla period of internal strife known as La Violencia. More The final phase of Plan Lazo became “Operación MAR- Caracas Cartagena than 250,000 people were killed as warring political QUETALIA,” the military operation to remove the so- Valledupar Lago de factions in the country vied for supremacy. Ultimately, called “Marquetalia Republic.” The military force was Maracaibo a power-sharing arrangement known as the National to destroy the social andPanama military infrastructure estab- Panama Sincelejo Front alternated power between the Liberal and Conser- lished by Jacobo Arenas. This Colombian Communist Monteria Venezuela vative parties. In 1962, U.S. Army Brigadier General Wil- tried to create a socialist communeGolfo or society, based on De liam P. Yarborough visited Colombia and helped draft a the examples of the Paris CommunePanama in 1871 and the 1949 Cucuta plan to quell the insurgency. Known as Plan Lazo, the Chinese Revolution. The Marquetalia Republic was an fundamental elements were national to community-lev- 800–square kilometer area Bucaramanga Arauca el civic action done in conjunction with aggressive coun- in the Andes Mountains terinsurgency operations by the military and police. Plan located at 6000 feet above sea Medellin Puerto Carreno Quibdo Tunja Lazo helped the first two National Front administrations level and was well suited for Manizales Pacific Yopal (1958–1966) end La Violencia. With the drawdown of most defense.1 The Army focused Bogotá Ocean Pereira Armenia political violence, Bogotá policy makers reclassified the a major offensive against the Ibaque rural guerrilla movement as a criminal problem. This town of Marquetalia itself. Villavicencio Puerto Inirida made the insurgency a law-and-order issue and gave Following the military Cali Marquetalia the primary responsibility to the national police. The offensive, the surviving reb- Neiva government increased the scope of the police mission els and bandits managed Popayan San Jose del Guaviare without increasing its budget or force size. The focus of to escape and scatter. The Colombia Colombia’s armed forces reverted to traditional national destruction of the indepen- Pasto Mocoa Florencia Mitu defense. Over the next decade, these conditions led to dent republics led to the the re-emergence of insurgent groups. In the absence of coalescing of several scatteredEcuador an effective government presence to counter the guerril- groups and the formation ofQuito Map of Colombia indicating las, self-defense forces were formed that provided vigi- the FARC and ELN. In the the Marquetalia Republic. Brazil 60 Veritas Independent Republics of Colombia N during the 1950s and early 1960s P e r u 0 200 Miles 0 200 KM Leticia 1970s, Colombia witnessed a rejuvenation of insurgency Special Forces.3 including the rise and fall of the M-19 as an urban group. A unique feature was that Colombian diplomats and Adding to the violence and discontent was the increase military leaders came to Washington DC to garner sup- in narcotrafficking by the Cali and Medellín cartels. The port for the plan even before it was fully explained to chronically weak Colombian government was unable the Colombian government. The Colombian leadership to control either the illegal drug trade or the growing briefed Plan Colombia to Congress to gain not only the insurgency. financial, but also the political support of the U.S. gov- Unfortunately, the U.S. attitude toward Latin America ernment. President Pastrana’s Chief of Staff, Jaime Ruíz, drifted into “benign neglect” until the 1980s. The United wrote the first draft in English, causing rumors that States was fully engaged in Vietnam and the Cold War the plan originated in the United States. The Colombi- in Europe. In the United States, the political and social ans received Congressional support. Responsibility for upheaval of the 1960s and early 1970s only quieted down Plan Colombia was assigned to the Department of State at the end of the Vietnam War. Latin America received (DOS). Implementation would take place through the little attention until the overthrow of the Anastasio U.S. Embassy in Bogotá.4 Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua by Communist Part of President Pastrana’s plan was to hold peace Sandinistas in 1979. In the case of Colombia, it was only talks with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom- when the Medellín and Cali drug cartels became the bia (FARC). To demonstrate world’s leading cocaine suppliers in the mid-1980s that sincerity, Pastrana formed a the United States focused on that country in a meaning- demilitarized zone called the ful way. In the 1990s, a change of regime in Colombia “despeje” (des-pah-hey), mean- brought a new strategy. ing “clear” or “open.” Here In 1998, after decades of violence and guerrilla war- the FARC and the govern- fare, President Andrés Pastrana Arango was elected— ment of Colombia could have Colombia largely because he promised to seek peace with the “breathing space.” Cessation Bogotá insurgent groups. Pastrana’s advisors developed a plan of hostilities in the despeje entitled “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and would ostensibly allow all Strengthening the State.” President Pastrana presented sides to come to the negotiat- DMZ “Plan Colombia” as “a set of alternative development proj- ing table to discuss peace and ects which will channel the shared efforts of multilateral ultimately bring an end to Larandia organizations and [foreign] governments toward Colom- conflict in Colombia.5 bian society.”2 At $7.5 billion, the projected cost of the Pastrana’s concept, while six-year Plan Colombia seemed enormous. The country well intentioned, did not sought outside assistance. Colombia pledged to provide work. The government of $4 billion and asked the international community for the Colombia moved police and Map of despeje area. remaining $3.5 billion. The United States provided a $1.3 military units out of the des- billion package of support, which included helicopters, ignated despeje, but the FARC did not honor the agree- equipment, and training, primarily from the U.S. Army ment. Instead, the FARC used the cease-fire as a time to rest, refit, and build strength without the Colombian armed forces or police disrupting its activities. The “Switzerland-sized” despeje became a de facto country within Colombia. The FARC provided public services for the people, albeit at the price of absolute loyalty. For the next three years, the Pastrana administration pursued a series of negotiations with the FARC. The failure of these negotiations led to an increase in U.S.-supported coun- ter-drug operations.6 In Bogotá, the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the DOS became the staff agency responsible for the coun- ter-drug mission and its subsequent support. Staffed with a mix of DOS, military, and contracted personnel, NAS handled the counter-drug (CD) logistics and all coordination with the Colombian government, from the national government down to equipping and advising police and military units. The largest monetary part of the American contribution came as equipment support, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango (left) meets primarily helicopters. UH-60 Black Hawks and refur- with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (right) at bished UH-1 “Huey” helicopters gave the Colombian the Pentagon on 26 February 2001, to discuss a range of regional issues. Pastrana was accompanied by the Colom- National Police and newly designated and trained Army bian Minister of National Defense Luis Ramírez (center). Vol. 2 No. 4 61 Secretary of Defense William Cohen (third from left) and Minister of Defense José Florencio Guzman (second from right) conduct a bilateral meeting on 2 December 1998. A Colombian Black Hawk lands in a jungle clearing. The The defense ministers are in Cartagena, Colombia, attend- helicopters provide a rapid deployment capability. ing the Third Defense Ministerial of the Americas. Cohen CD battalions the mobility to attack the narcotrafficking is accompanied by General Charles Wilhelm (on his right), 7 U.S. Marine Corps, commander, U.S. Southern Command; labs and the cocaine transit sites. and Peter Romero (on his left), Assistant Secretary of The level of U.S.