DOCSLIB.ORG

Tchad Oriental) Johanne Favre

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Tchad Oriental) Johanne Favre Insécurités. Une interprétation environnementale de la violence au Ouaddaï (Tchad oriental) Johanne Favre To cite this version: Johanne Favre. Insécurités. Une interprétation environnementale de la violence au Ouaddaï (Tchad oriental). Géographie. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2008. Français. tel-00406684 HAL Id: tel-00406684 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00406684 Submitted on 23 Jul 2009 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. UNIVERSITE PARIS I – PANTHEON-SORBONNE Ecole doctorale de géographie de Paris DOCTORAT DE GEOGRAPHIE Johanne BEGIN FAVRE Insécurités Une interprétation environnementale de la violence au Ouaddaï (Tchad oriental) Thèse dirigée par M. Roland POURTIER Soutenue le 26 novembre 2008 Membres du jury : Mme Béatrice GIBLIN M. Géraud MAGRIN M. Denis RETAILLE M. Bernard TALLET Insécurités Une interprétation environnementale de la violence au Ouaddaï (Tchad oriental) Mots-clés : Tchad, Ouaddaï, conflit environnemental, ressources, violence, réfugiés, aide humanitaire. Résumé : Quelle est, dans l’est du Tchad, la validité des théories néo-malthusiennes sur les « conflits environnementaux » ? Les pénuries alimentaires y sont structurelles, mais ne s’expliquent qu’incomplètement par des facteurs démographiques et environnementaux. C’est le contexte sociopolitique qui détermine l’occurrence de la violence. A partir de 2003, la guerre du Darfour provoque un afflux de réfugiés dont la présence accroît la pression sur les ressources. L’aide internationale d’urgence nourrit des tensions, alors que les multiples projets de développement échouent à sortir la région d’une insécurité plutôt politique qu’alimentaire. Le rapport au pouvoir central est déterminant. Ancien centre, le Ouaddaï est devenu un Far est marginalisé dans l’Etat construit par la colonisation. La région pâtit de l’absence d’aménagement et d’administration. La frontière soudanaise est propice à la fuite et à l’insoumission. Berceau du régime, l’est tchadien est le territoire où se fomentent les rébellions qui le menacent. L’accaparement du pouvoir et des récentes ressources pétrolières par le groupe dirigeant suscite la réapparition d’une opposition armée victime d’un processus continu de scissions et de recompositions. Les affrontements intercommunautaires qui explosent en 2006 et le déploiement en 2008 d’une force de sécurisation ONU/UE sont à interpréter dans ce contexte. La violence s’enracine dans l’histoire de la région. L’empire précolonial du Ouaddaï – monarchie de droit divin – est le point de ralliement identitaire d’une population agressée par la colonisation. Après l’indépendance, la région est au cœur d’une guerre de Trente ans qui achève de corrompre les relations intercommunautaires. Le refuge est dans l’adhésion au monde arabo-musulman. Elle se manifeste par un refus des modèles de développement importés d’Occident et par un rejet de l’enseignement laïc. L’école publique tchadienne, en crise, ne permet pas de dépasser ce conflit culturel : elle est à la fois le réceptacle et le catalyseur des violences sociales. Au Tchad, la gestion des ressources et la gestion de la pénurie sont également facteurs de violence. L’établissement de la paix passe par une exigence de justice sociale, économique et politique. La nation se forge dans ce combat, et dans l’appropriation d’une histoire commune. Johanne FAVRE est rattachée à l’UMR 8586 PRODIG-CNRS, 2 rue Valette, 75005 PARIS. 2 Insecurities An environmental interpretation of the violence in Wadai (Eastern Chad) Keywords : Chad, Wadai, environmental conflict, resources, violence, refugees, humanitarian aid. Abstract : How far do neo-malthusian theories on environmental conflicts apply to the east of Chad ? Food shortages there are a regular occurrence but can’t be entirely explained by demographic and environmental factors. It’s the socio-political context which provokes the violence. From 2003, the war in Darfur has led to an important number of refugees whose presence has increased the pressure on resources. Emergency international aid feeds tensions while the many development projects fail to bring the region out of a state of insecurity which is related to politics rather than food. The relationship with the central power is a decisive factor. Formerly the centre, Wadai has become a marginalised Far East in the state that was created by colonisation. The region is suffering from the absence of both development and administration. The Sudanese border encourages escape and insubordination. Cradle of the regime, eastern Chad is the territory where the rebellions that threaten the latter, brew. The seizure of both power and the recently exploited oil resources by the rulers has again led to the appearance of an armed opposition that is victim of its constant schisms and recompositions. The conflicts that erupted between communities in 2006, and the deployment of a UN/EU protection force in 2008, must be interpreted in this context. Violence is deeply-rooted in the region. The pre-colonial empire of Wadai, with a monarchy by divine right, gave a unified identity to a population threatened by colonisation. After independance, the region was at the heart of a thirty years war which finally broke down relations between the communities. Refuge is found in belonging to the Arab-Muslim world. It can be seen in a refusal of development along lines imported from the West, and in a rejection of lay education. In a state of crisis, Chad’s state schools cannot solve the cultural conflict : they are both the battleground and catalyst of social violence. In Chad the management of resources and the management of penury also contribute to violence. To establish peace there must be social, economic and political justice. Nations are forged by such struggles and by adopting a common history. 3 REMERCIEMENTS Merci à tous les Tchadiens dont la parole libre et confiante a nourri ces pages. Merci aussi à ceux qui n’ont pas pu tout dire. Merci à mes hôtes : à Joël Rouméas et Henri Coudray, qui furent également des compagnons de route idéaux ; à Robert Mougabé Koslengar, Simon Salimini et Symbil Chérif, dont j’ai tant appris ; et à Ibrahim Abdel Bagui, mon guide en terre nomade. Merci aux ONG SECADEV, Intersos, COOPI, CARE, Oxfam, HELP, NCA, à la GTZ et aux agences des Nations Unies pour leur coopération transparente et leurs coups de main logistiques. Merci à Marie-José Tubiana, qui partage son savoir, ses relations, ses engagements. Merci à Marie-Françoise Courel qui a facilité cette entreprise, et au laboratoire de géographie CNRS-PRODIG au sein duquel j’ai bénéficié de deux années de détachement, et qui continue de m’accueillir. Merci à mon professeur, Monsieur Roland Pourtier, de m’avoir de nouveau accordé sa confiance et son aide bienveillante. Merci à mon époux pour son patient soutien, et à ma mère, de m’avoir relayée en mon absence. 4 ______________________________ à Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh ______________________________ 5 TABLE DES MATIERES Introduction 10 PREMIERE PARTIE : PENURIES. 34 Chapitre I : Vivre avec la faim. 36 1. Une pénurie structurelle. 36 A. De l’expérience de la faim aux alertes à la famine. 36 B. Ce qui dit l’histoire : la récurrence des pénuries. 41 2. La part des explications néo-malthusiennes. 45 A. Surpopulation ou sous-peuplement ? 45 B. La mesure de la dégradation environnementale. 49 C. Un système plus complexe. 54 3. Vers un déterminisme de la violence ? 58 A. Interpréter les corrélations chronologiques. 58 B. Une géographie de l’adaptation. 64 C. La variable clé est sociopolitique. 68 Chapitre II : La guerre du Darfour et l’aggravation des tensions. 72 1. « Les réfugiés sont nos frères ». 73 A. La parenté ethnique. 73 B. Au début, le partage. 78 C. Les limites de la solidarité. 82 2. Le désastre environnemental. 86 A. Des réfugiés environnementaux ? 86 B. Sédentariser dans le désert. 92 C. Mesures d’impact et tentatives de restauration. 98 3. Nourrir les gens, nourrir les haines. 102 A. Quand l’aide déstabilise la société. 102 B. 5 % pour les populations locales. 108 C. L’extension du conflit. 114 Chapitre III : Sortir de l’insécurité alimentaire. 122 1. L’humanitaire entre urgence et développement. 123 A. Des commencements dans l’urgence. 123 B. De l’irréalisme de certains « projets ». 125 6 C. Les conditions d’un impact positif. 129 2. L’utopie de la participation communautaire. 135 A. Les concepts d’intervention de la coopération allemande. 135 B. Une inégale participation. 140 C. La stratégie HIMO. 144 3. De la sécurité à la sécurité alimentaire. 149 A. De l’intérêt des pénuries, ou les dessous de l’économie céréalière. 149 B. Sécuriser l’économie. 152 C. La demande d’Etat. 155 Conclusion de la première partie 159 DEUXIEME PARTIE : ELOIGNEMENTS. 160 Chapitre IV : Le « Far Est » tchadien. 162 1. Marginalisation et recentrage. 162 A. Les enclavements concentriques. 162 B. Marges du territoire, marges du pouvoir. 167 C. Des liens centrifuges. 169 2. La frontière. 172 A. Darfour, Ouaddaï : une histoire partagée. 172 B. Insoumission aux confins. 176 C. Le prétexte de la « darfourisation ». 181 3. Hors-les-lois. 189 A. Exactions quotidiennes. 189 B. Gniguilim 1993 : les évènements et leur mémoire. 194 C. Les malversations de l’Etat zaghawa. 196 Chapitre V : Les carences de l’administration. 202 1. Le règne du vide. 203 A. Une sous-administration ancienne. 203 B. La décentralisation en dépit du bon sens. 206 C. Sédentariser l’Etat ? 211 2. La « kermesse du désordre » n’est pas terminée.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ngarlejy YORONGAR Député Fédéraliste
    Ngarlejy YORONGAR Député Fédéraliste TCHAD LE PROCÈS D’IDRISS DÉBY Témoignage à charge L'HARMATTAN L'HARMATTAN Inc. 5-7, rue de l'École-Polytechnique 55, rue Saint-Jacques 75005 – PARIS MONTREAL (QC) CANADA H2Y 1K9 © L'HARMATTAN 2001 ISBN: 2-7475-0800-5 2 Le témoin à charge Ngarlejy YORONGAR (photo Yorongar) «…Idriss Déby tue pour le plaisir, massacre, génocide, se livre à des carnages réguliers des populations civiles, émascule les hommes, fait éventrer les femmes enceintes comme Mannodji à Kaga (30 km de Moundou) pour en extraire des bébés qu’il fait égorger dans le dessein d’offrir à Allah (Dieu), qui n’en demande pas tant, enregistre les suppliques et les cris de ses victimes qu’il écoute une fois à table pour en rire, fait violer les vieillardes, les femmes et les gamines, livre le Tchad et les Tchadiens en pâture aux membres de sa famille et de son clan, de même, aux mercenaires venant des pays voisins avec mission d’asseoir, de consolider et de renforcer son pouvoir, pille et fait piller le Tchad et les Tchadiens, bazarder le pétrole tchadien… » 3 La lèvre inférieure de cette femme d’Abéché (Ouaddaï) est coupée à l’aide d’un couteau par un parent militaire à Idriss Déby parce qu’il la soupçonne d’être une concubine à un opposant. 4 DANS LA MÊME COLLECTION 1993 Sodinaly Kraton. Les chefferies chez les Ngama. Paul Créac’h. Se nourrir au Sahel. L’alimentation (1937-1939) Jean Malval. Ma pratique médicale au Tchad (1926-1928). 1994 Marie-José Tubiana.
    [Show full text]
  • The Executive Survey General Information and Guidelines
    The Executive Survey General Information and Guidelines Dear Country Expert, In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). • The Head of State (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country; his or her function could be purely ceremonial. • The Head of Government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government; the HOG may also be HOS, in which case the executive survey only pertains to the HOS. • The executive survey applies to the person who effectively holds these positions in practice. • The HOS/HOG pair will always include the effective ruler of the country, even if for a period this is the commander of foreign occupying forces. • The HOS and/or HOG must rule over a significant part of the country’s territory. • The HOS and/or HOG must be a resident of the country — governments in exile are not listed. • By implication, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony or an annexed territory, the HOS and/or HOG will be a person located in the territory in question, not in the capital of the colonizing/annexing country. • Only HOSs and/or HOGs who stay in power for 100 consecutive days or more will be included in the surveys. • A country may go without a HOG but there will be no period listed with only a HOG and no HOS. • If a HOG also becomes HOS (interim or full), s/he is moved to the HOS list and removed from the HOG list for the duration of their tenure.
    [Show full text]
  • Chad: a New Conflict Resolution Framework
    CHAD: A NEW CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK Africa Report N°144 – 24 September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................I I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. A CRISIS OF THE STATE ........................................................................................... 2 A. 1990-2000: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR RECONCILIATION......................................................2 B. OIL, CLIENTELISM AND CORRUPTION........................................................................................3 1. Clientelism and generalised corruption ..............................................................................3 2. The oil curse .......................................................................................................................4 C. MILITARISATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND POPULATION ..................................................5 D. NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVIDES .........................................................................................6 III. THE ACTORS IN THE CRISIS................................................................................... 8 A. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION .....................................................................................................8 1. Repression and co-option ...................................................................................................8 2. The political platform of
    [Show full text]
  • Chad Country Report BTI 2006
    Chad Status Index Management Index (Democracy: 3.53 / Market economy: 4.18) 3.86 3.25 HDI 0.341 Population 9.1 mn GDP per capita ($, PPP) 1.210 Population growth1 2.8 % Unemployment rate - Women in Parliament 6.5 % UN Education Index 0.30 Poverty2 64.0 % Gini Index - Source: UNDP: Human Development Report 2005. Figures for 2003 unless otherwise indicated. 1 Annual growth between 1975 and 2003. 2 People living below the national poverty line (1990- 2002). A. Executive summary In early 2004, Chad prepared for a referendum scheduled for June 6, 2005 on a constitutional amendment to allow President Idriss Déby a hitherto unconstitutional third term in office. Polls have been marred by irregularities since 1996; it comes as little surprise that the vote in favor of a third term was at 77%. Prior to the referendum, opposition parties had declared their intention to boycott the referendum, thus protesting the autocratic nature of the regime. Chad is not a market-based democracy. It’s political system continues to fall short of the minimum criteria for democracy—particularly in terms of stateness, political participation, rule of law, and political and social integration. The country’s economy suffers from major shortcomings, although growth rates (and inflation) have been strong since oil production began in 2003 in southern Chad. The oil windfall is perhaps the only credible economic progress observed. Neither the macroeconomic environment nor social conditions improved in the last two years. Change resulting from pressure from the IMF and World Bank has been sluggish; a special oil management regime has yet to become fully operational.
    [Show full text]
  • Tchad: Un Nouveau Cadre De Resolution Du Conflit
    TCHAD: UN NOUVEAU CADRE DE RESOLUTION DU CONFLIT Rapport Afrique N°144 – 24 septembre 2008 TABLE DES MATIERES SYNTHESE ET RECOMMANDATIONS.............................................................................I I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. UNE CRISE DE L’ETAT .............................................................................................. 2 A. 1990-2000: OCCASIONS MANQUEES DE RECONCILIATION ..........................................................2 B. PETROLE, CLIENTELISME ET CORRUPTION ..................................................................................3 1. Clientélisme et corruption généralisée ................................................................................3 2. Malédiction pétrolière..........................................................................................................4 C. MILITARISATION DE L’ADMINISTRATION ET DE LA POPULATION.................................................6 D. FRACTURES NATIONALES ET RELIGIEUSES..................................................................................7 III. LES ACTEURS DE LA CRISE .................................................................................... 9 A. L’OPPOSITION POLITIQUE ...........................................................................................................9 1. Entre répression et cooptation .............................................................................................9
    [Show full text]
  • Resolving the Chadian Political Epilepsy: an Assessment of Intervention Efforts
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date issued: 1 June 2009 Author: Chrysantus Ayangafac1 Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Resolving the Chadian Political Epilepsy: An Assessment of Intervention Efforts Chad’s political economy is littered with the wreckage of failed attempts at Introduction resolving the country’s intractable political crisis. Since independence, Chad has not witnessed any constitutional transfer of power. Its political history is a story of drawn-out conflicts with incidental cessation of hostilities, peace agreements and national elections.2 In reality, these events have merely provided an opportunity for alignment, realignment and, in the process, preparation for the next battle. The attack on N’Djamena in February 2008 might not be the last of these.3 As Chad’s belligerents flex their muscle for yet another round of a violent contest for the soul of the Chadian state, the stage seems set for renewed violence. Hopefully they are grandstanding for potential negotiation. Against this backdrop, it is imperative to interrogate whether the international community so far has been right about Chad, and, if not, why and what could be done to improve the situation? Considering the present international response to the crisis, is there any political incentive for President Déby’s regime to accommodate a robust political solution that will usher in peace; is the regime prepared to pay the political cost of peace – at least from a human security perspective? This situation report analyses and presents an update on the domestic and international responses to the Chadian crisis. It concludes that though the current policy approach is certainly not a panacea to the Chadian crisis, it is a good starting point.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 Country Review
    Chad 2016 Country Review http://www.countrywatch.com Table of Contents Chapter 1 1 Country Overview 1 Country Overview 2 Key Data 3 Chad 4 Africa 5 Chapter 2 7 Political Overview 7 History 8 Political Conditions 14 Political Risk Index 41 Political Stability 55 Freedom Rankings 71 Human Rights 82 Government Functions 86 Government Structure 88 Principal Government Officials 91 Leader Biography 93 Leader Biography 93 Foreign Relations 94 National Security 109 Defense Forces 116 Chapter 3 118 Economic Overview 118 Economic Overview 119 Nominal GDP and Components 121 Population and GDP Per Capita 123 Real GDP and Inflation 124 Government Spending and Taxation 125 Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 126 Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 127 Data in US Dollars 128 Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 129 Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 130 World Energy Price Summary 131 CO2 Emissions 132 Agriculture Consumption and Production 133 World Agriculture Pricing Summary 135 Metals Consumption and Production 136 World Metals Pricing Summary 138 Economic Performance Index 139 Chapter 4 151 Investment Overview 151 Foreign Investment Climate 152 Foreign Investment Index 154 Corruption Perceptions Index 167 Competitiveness Ranking 178 Taxation 187 Stock Market 188 Partner Links 188 Chapter 5 189 Social Overview 189 People 190 Human Development Index 192 Life Satisfaction Index 196 Happy Planet Index 207 Status of Women 216 Global Gender Gap Index 219 Culture and Arts 228 Etiquette 228 Travel Information 229 Diseases/Health
    [Show full text]
  • Provisional List of Delegations to the United Nations Conference on Sustanable Development Rio+20 I Member States
    PROVISIONAL LIST OF DELEGATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTANABLE DEVELOPMENT RIO+20 I MEMBER STATES AFGHANISTAN H.E. Mr. Zalmai Rassoul, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Representatives H.E. Mr. Wais Ahmad Barmak, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development H.E. Mr. Mohammad Asif Rahimi, Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Animal Husbandry H.E. Prince Mustapha Zahir, President of National Environment Protection Agency H.E. Mr. Jawed Ludin, Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Sham Lal Batijah, Senior Economic Adviser to the President H.E. Mr. Zahir Tanin, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Mr. Mohammad Erfani Ayoob, Director General, United Nations and International Conferences Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ershad Ahmadi, Director General of Fifth Political Department Mr. Janan Mosazai, Spokesperson, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Mr. Enayetullah Madani, Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN Mr. Aziz Ahmad Noorzad, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Ms. Kwaga Kakar, Adviser to the Foreign Minister Ms. Ghazaal Habibyar, Director General of Policies, Ministry of Mine Mr. Wahidullah Waissi, Adviser to the Deputy Foreign Minister 2 ALBANIA H.E. Mr. Fatmir Mediu, Minister for Environment, Forests and Water Administration of the Republic of Albania Representatives H.E. Mr. Ferit Hoxha, Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations H.E. Mrs. Tajiana Gjonaj, Ambassador to Brazil Mr. Oerd Bylykbashi, Chief of Cabinet of the Prime Minister Mr. Glori Husi, Adviser to the Prime Minister Mr. Abdon de Paula, Honorary Consul to Rio de Janeiro Mr. Thomas Amaral Neves, Honorary Consul to São Paulo Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • State and Statelessness in the Chad– Sudan–Libya Triangle
    43 Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad– Sudan–Libya Triangle By Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi A co-publication of the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan and the Security Assessment in North Africa with Conflict Armament Research HSBA Copyright Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2017 First published in June 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Series editor: Emile LeBrun ([email protected]) Copy-edited by Alex Potter ([email protected]) and Claire Mc Evoy ([email protected]) Proofread by Donald Strachan ([email protected]) Cartography by Jillian Luff (www.mapgrafix.com) Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Rick Jones ([email protected]) Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland ISBN 978-2-940548-37-8 2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 43 Contents List
    [Show full text]
  • Chad Country Report BTI 2010
    BTI 2010 | Chad Country Report Status Index 1-10 3.01 # 122 of 128 Democracy 1-10 2.83 # 122 of 128 Market Economy 1-10 3.18 # 120 of 128 Management Index 1-10 2.20 # 121 of 128 scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) score rank trend This report is part of the Transformation Index (BTI) 2010. The BTI is a global ranking of transition processes in which the state of democracy and market economic systems as well as the quality of political management in 128 transformation and developing countries are evaluated. The BTI is a joint project of the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Center for Applied Policy Research (C•A•P) at Munich University. More on the BTI at http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 — Chad Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009. © 2009 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh BTI 2010 | Chad 2 Key Indicators Population mn. 10.8 HDI 0.39 GDP p.c. $ 1470 Pop. growth % p.a. 2.8 HDI rank of 182 175 Gini Index 39.8 Life expectancy years 51 UN Education Index 0.33 Poverty2 % 83.3 Urban population % 26.2 Gender equality1 - Aid per capita $ 32.7 Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 2009 | The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2009. Footnotes: (1) Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). (2) Percentage of population living on less than $2 a day. Executive Summary This report on the state of political and economic transformation concludes that the Chadian government does not seek to establish a democracy under the rule of law or a market economy anchored in principles of social justice.
    [Show full text]