Work, Care and Belonging: A Feminist Critique of the 'Duties Discourse5 in Israel
By
Revital Goldhar
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science
Graduate Department of Law
University of Toronto
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Doctor of Juridical Science, 2008
Revital Goldhar
Graduate Department of Law, University of Toronto
Abstract
Like many other countries, Israel has recently reformed its welfare system and introduced its citizens to the requirement to enter the labour market. I refer to this requirement as 'the duty to work'. Israeli citizens are required to become economically independent rather than a burden on society, and only those who fulfill this requirement and find a paid job, are entitled to welfare benefits. This development signalled an important change in the interplay between rights and obligations of citizenship. If in the past, social citizenship was built upon holding social rights, today, social citizenship is conditioned upon fulfilling a social obligation, the duty to work. In practice, however, not everyone can easily enter the labour market and find a paid job that meets all their needs. Women, especially single mothers, usually face significant difficulties in balancing family responsibilities and labour market participation. In light of these difficulties, many of them might not be able to fulfill the duty to work, and therefore might not reach full membership in the Israeli society.
ii How do we understand the duty to work? How do women, and in particular single mothers, cope with the new requirement? What are the sanctions they face if they do not work? How does the duty affect the practice of motherhood and care? My thesis is aimed to answer these questions. The central argument that runs through the thesis is that the 'duty to work' is structured according to gendered norms that do not allow all women, especially single mothers, to fiilfill the new duty thus limiting their ability to contribute to society and establish their belonging to the national collective. This new duty adds to women's problematic position in society as their previous main citizenship duty was that of motherhood - a practice that paved their route into the collective but was structured in a way that provided them with merely second-class citizenship. A possible solution to this gendered structure of citizenship duties is recognizing care as an active citizenship responsibility and allowing women to stay outside the labour market without marginalizing their standing in society.
iii Acknowledgments
I arrived in Canada five years ago to participate in the graduate program at the University of Toronto. The journey toward completing the doctoral thesis was indeed challenging and demanding. I would have not able to fulfill my goals without the support and care of many people, in Canada both and Israel, who stood by me during these years.
I would like to express my genuine gratitude to my supervisor Patrick Macklem for his calm and patient guidance throughout the project. I thank him for pushing me to enhance my arguments, reassuring about the quality of my work and believing in my ability to complete the program. I am especially thankful for his encouragement and generous support that convinced me to present my work in different forums and conferences which improved my thesis in an enormous way.
I thank committee member Brenda Cossman for supporting me during the ups and downs of writing the thesis. I am grateful for her tremendous shaping force on my thesis, her helpful assistance with my feminist research and giving me the opportunity to talk about my thesis even when I was not convinced that I should write it. Without her motivation and feedback I would not have completed the program.
I thank committee member Lome Sossin for invaluable guidance on my theoretical research in the areas of welfare and citizenship. I am grateful for his insights about the Israeli case-study, his kindness and supportive approach throughout the project. His comments lead to important improvements in this thesis.
I would also like to express my appreciation to Jennifer Nedelsky for her thoughtful and constructive comments during my oral examination. I am also grateful to Daphna Barak- Erez, my external reader, who carefully read my thesis, engaged with my arguments and contributed with helpful comments.
IV Special gratitude to Denise Reaume, whose guidance, understanding and patience added considerably to my graduate experience. I am grateful for long conversations about academic life as well as personal events, and for a great sense of humour. Her door was always open and she welcomed me to share my thoughts and worries. Her support and attention eased the difficulties of living and studying abroad.
I also thank Kerry Rittich, who was my supervisor for the master thesis, for her comments on the doctoral proposal. I am also thankful for her support and guidance during my participation in the master program mat paved my way into the doctoral program.
I am grateful for the generous financial support of the Graduate Program at the Faculty of Law. David Dyzenhaus, Kaye Joachim, Julia Hall and Rose Ann MacGillivray made enormous efforts to accommodate my needs during the years. Special thanks to David for extending the financial support during my maternity and sick leaves. Special thanks also to Julia for unique sense of humour and special care.
I was privileged to meet great friends in Canada with whom I shared the academic project as well as personal experiences. I thank Ummni Khan, Jarmila Lajcakova, Jillian Boyd, Yaara Lemberger-Kenar and Zoran Oklopcic for being good friends who listened to my thoughts and shared the joy and challenges of this journey. Without them, our space in the library would not be the same.
I would also like to thank my good friends Carla Troper, Emily Hammond, Rayner Thwaites, Boaz Ben-David and Adi Folkman for their love, friendship and support. They made my stay in Canada an extraordinary experience.
I had the fortunate opportunity to meet Meital Pinto and Boaz Miller who became close friends and my family in Canada. I am indebted for their rare and enduring friendship. I thank Meital for her love and support, and for her faith in me and my work, which often exceeded my own. I am grateful for her willingness to listen and comfort, cook and shop, and for sharing with me both happy and hard times in Canada. I am also thankful for her intellectual insight about my work. I thank Boaz for reading and improving earlier drafts of
v my thesis, for intellectual advice, and for his fun and sarcastic sense of humour. I am thankful for his support and encouragement, and for preparing wonderful dinners.
It is not easy to keep a friendship alive when living abroad. Special thanks to my friend in Israel, Limor Levi, for long conversations that helped me to cope with my life in Canada. I am grateful for her love, encouragement and patience.
I would also like to thank my mother-in-law Cynthia Turner for carefully editing my thesis. I value her patience and comments that improved not only the language but also the content.
None of this would have been possible without the love and support of my beloved family. I am grateful for the overwhelming support of my parents, Zipi and Chaim, and my sister Galit, who sent their endless love across the ocean and believed in my ability to participate in the graduate program and build my live in Canada It was extremely hard to stay so far away and not being able to share with them the small moments in life, but I always felt that they are part of me and that they contribute to me in this journey.
Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Josh Turner, for his endless love. I appreciate his incredible understanding, encouragement and patience. I am grateful for long hours of editing earlier drafts of the thesis! am especially grateful for wiping away the tears and sharing the smiles, for his positive attitude and believing in me. Together we built a home in Canada that gave me strength and support.
vi Table of Context
Abstract ii
Acknowledgments iv
Table of Context vii
Introduction 1
Chapter I The Duty to Work: Between the 'Rights Discourse' and the 'Duties Discourse' 25 Part I: The Rise of the Duty to Work 27 A. The Liberal Discourse of Citizenship 27 B. Understanding Social Citizenship and the Welfare State within a 'Right 31 Discourse' 1. The Liberal Model: A Narrow Welfare State 34 2. The Social-Democratic Model 3 7 C From the 'Rights Discourse' to the 'Duties Discourse' 42 1. The Pressures on the Welfare State 42 2. Introducing the Duty to Work 45 3. Understanding the Duty to Work: Being Independent from 52 Society Part II: Providing a Broader Perspective on the Duty to Work: Contribution and 60 Belonging A The Civic-Republican Model of Citizenship 61 B, Belonging and the Politics of Belonging 69 1. Belonging and the Politics of Belonging 69 2. Belonging, the Politics of Belonging and Duties of Citizenship 75 C. Understanding the Duty to Work 78 Conclusions 84
Chapter II The Duty to Work in Israel: Past and Present 86 Part I: The Early Duty to Work 89 A The 'Duties Discourse' and the Zionist Project: Establishing the Duty to 89 Work B. The Welfare State and the 'Duties Discourse' 95 C. The Scope of the Duty to Work 98 Part II: The Decline of the 'Duties Discourse' and the Rise of Liberal Citizenship 102 A The First Phase: State's Responsibility instead of Citizens' Duties 102 B. The Second Phase: The Rise of the Liberal Discourse of Citizenship 104 Part HI: The Return of the Duty to Work 109 A. Is there still a 'Duties Discourse' in Israel? 110 B. Welfare Reform and the Renewed Duty to Work 116 1. The Background to the Welfare Reform 116 2. Welfare Reform 119
vn 3. The Effects and the Responses to the Reform 122 4. The Renewed Duty to Work 128 Conclusions 135
Chapter HI The Early 'Duties Discourse' in Israel: Women and the 'Duty of 137 Motherhood' Part I: Motherhood and the 'Duties Discourse': From Exclusion to Inclusion 142 A Recognizing the Principle of 'Difference' 145 B. Restructuring Citizenship according to Difference: Can Motherhood be 149 Recognized as a Form of Participation? Part II: The Duty of Motherhood in Israel 163 A. Motherhood as a National Mission and as a Basis for Inclusion in 165 Citizenship 1. The Origins of the 'Duty of Motherhood' 165 2. Constituting the 'Duty of Motherhood' through Legal and Public 167 Discourses 3. The Meaning and Importance of the 'Duty of Motherhood' 170 B. Still Not Fully Equal: The Limitations of Constituting Motherhood 178 as a Route to Citizenship 1. Lack of Privacy and Autonomy - No 'Free Choice' 179 2. Ignoring Diversity among Women 182 3. Trapping Women in the Private Sphere 189 I. Limiting Women's Participation in other Duties of 190 Citizenship II. Undervaluing Women's Experience as Mothers 195 Conclusions 199
Chapter TV 201 Exempting Women from the Duty to Work during the Early Years Part I: Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work 204 A. The Early Years of Pre-Statehood: The Foundations of Women's 204 Exemption from the Duty to Work B. During Statehood: Reflection of Women's Exemption from the 209 Duty to Work Part II: The Implications of Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work 215 A. Lack of Membership and Belonging 216 B. Lower Status in the Labour Market and Lack of Economic Power 220 within the Family C. The Interaction between the two Duties: Motherhood and Work 224 Conclusions 229
Chapter V 230 Women, Single Mothers and the Return of the Duty to Work Part I: Single Mothers in Israel 234 A. The Phenomenon of Single Motherhood 23 5 B. The Difficulties of Being a Single Mother 23 8 C. Single Mothers and the Welfare System 242
viii D. Structuring Single Mothers' Citizenship through the 'Rights Discourse' and 247 their Role as Caregivers Part II: Back to the 'Duties Discourse': Establishing Women's Duty to Work under 251 Recent Welfare Reform Initiatives Part III: An Analysis of the Current Duty to Work 254 A. The Gender-Neutral Model of Citizenship Duties 258 B. Applying the Gender-Neutral Model to the Duty to Work 263 1. Changing the National Priority: From Motherhood to Work 263 2. The Limitations of the Labour Market 270 3. Ignoring Care Work 276 Part IV: The Implications of the Duty to Work 283 A. Poverty and Economic Dependence 284 B. Promoting the Institution of Marriage 288 C. The Undeserving 'Others' 293 D. 'Not Belonging': Women, Belonging and the Duty to Work in Israel 298 Conclusions 304
Chapter VI 306 Expanding the 'Duties Discourse': Care as a Citizenship Responsibility Part I: Beyond the Gender-Neutral and the Gender-Differentiated Models of 310 Citizenship A. The Principle of 'Differentiated Universalism' 310 B. Care and the Principle of 'Differentiated Universalism' 313 Part II: Care as an Independent Practice of Citizenship 316 A. Can Care be Understood as a Practice of Citizenship? 319 B. Does this Process Endanger Women's Status? The Concerns and 328 Responses 1. Diminishing the Value of Paid Work for Women and their 330 Position in the Labour Market 2. Perpetuating the Gendered Division of Labour 333 3. Increasing Women's Dependency 337 C. Stay-at-Home Mothers under the Principle of 'Differentiated 342 Universalism' Part HI: Care within the 'Duties Discourse': A Duty or a Contribution? 344 Part IV: The Importance of Establish^ Ca^ 349 Conclusions 354
Conclusions 355
Bibliography 362
ix Introduction
"Building a state is - returning to work... we do not see work as a curse and as a bitter necessity or only as a means of living... but as a social duty, a human duty, discovering the creative power of human beings and their domination of nature" (David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister, Israel, 1949).1
"Those who can work - must work" (Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Minister of Finance, 2005)2
"No one will escape work anymore... this [welfare4o-work] program will benefit the unemployed, the economy, and society..." (Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Minister of Finance, 2005).3
"We are not parasites, but there is no work and no money... today I asked my daughter's kindergarten teacher if she can bring my daughter a sandwich tomorrow because I don't have enough to give her" (A single mother, 2003) 4
A. Background
On July 10,2003, Vikcy Knafo left her home in Mitzpe-Ramon (an impoverished town in south
Israel) and marched to Jerusalem. Knafo, an unemployed single mother, walked 250 kilometres, carrying on her shoulder the flag of Israel. This was her act of protest against the Ministry of
Finance's plans to reform the welfare system, move the unemployed from welfare to work and reduce their benefits and entitlements. This act signalled the beginning of single mothers'
1 As cited in Itzhak Harpaz, The Meaning of Work in Israel: Its Nature and Consequences (New York: Praeger, 1990) at 13. 2 As cited in Moti Basok, "The Minister of Finance of the Top Echelon", Haaretz (12 August 2005) (Hebrew). 3 As cited in Yediot Aharonot, "Netanyahu: No One will Escape Work Anymore" (1 August 2005) (Hebrew). 4 As Cited in Ruth Sinai, "Vikcy Knafo: I will Go on a Hunger Strike if Netanyahu does not Renew the Negotiations with Me", Haaretz (1 September 2003) (Hebrew).
1 struggle against the threat of economic impoverishment that these plans would entail. This struggle lasted four months and included demonstrations, protest encampments outside the
Ministry of Finance and the Parliament, as well as a sustained attack on the Government through the written and broadcasting media The struggle sharply divided Israeli society. At one end of the spectrum, there was sympathy for the economic difficulties faced by single mothers in their everyday lives and acknowledgement of the need to provide them with financial
support. At the other end of the spectrum, single mothers were blamed for being 'parasites', unproductive and responsible for their lower economic status. The struggle forced Israeli
society and policy-makers to seriously address the phenomenon of single motherhood and the difficulties of balancing paid work and family responsibilities. By carrying the Israeli flag,
Knafo signaled that she still belonged to the Israeli collective, even though some parts of the population possibly saw her as an 'outsider', someone who did not contribute to society and was therefore considered to be a second-class citizen. Her struggle, in my view, brings to light
important questions about citizenship, duties and belonging.
Like many other countries around the world, Israel has recently reformed its welfare system and
introduced the requirement for Israeli citizens to enter the labour market. I refer to this requirement as 'the duty to work'. Israeli citizens are required to become economically
independent rather than a burden on society, and only those who fulfill this requirement, or at
least show willingness to find paid work, are entitled to welfare benefits. This development
signalled an important change in the interplay between the rights and obligations of citizenship.
If in the past, social citizenship was built upon holding social rights, today social citizenship is
conditioned upon fulfilling a social obligation: the duty to work. In practice, however, not
everyone can easily enter the labour market and find a paid job that meets all their needs.
2 Women, especially single mothers, usually face significant difficulties in balancing family responsibilities and labour market participation. In light of these difficulties, many of them may not be able to fulfill the duty to work, and therefore may not attain full membership in Israeli society.5
How do we understand the duty to work? How do women, and in particular single mothers, cope with the new requirement? What are the sanctions they face if they do not work? How does the duty affect the practice of motherhood and care? My thesis aims to answer these questions. The central argument that runs through the thesis is that the 'duty to work' is structured according to gendered norms that do not allow all Israeli women, especially single mothers, to fulfill the new duty, thus limiting their ability to contribute to society and establish their belonging to the national collective. The new duty to work adds to women's problematic position in society, which had previously been primarily based on their ability to produce offspring for the new state. Their main citizenship duty was that of motherhood - a practice that paved their route into the collective but was structured in a way that provided them with merely second-class citizenship. A possible solution to this gendered structure of women's citizenship duties is recognizing caregiving as an active citizenship responsibility and allowing women to stay outside the labour market without marginalizing their standing in society.
- My thesis focuses on Jewish women in Israel and does not refer to Palestinian women's citizenship in Israel. This is not to suggest, of course, that only Jewish women face the duty to work or the consequences of welfare reforms. However, the early 'duties discourse' in Israel excluded the Arab minority from most duties of citizenship, and the relation of this minority to the current duty to work is very complex. Moreover, Palestinian women face unique difficulties that are beyond the scope of this thesis. For general discussions about Palestinian women's citizenship in Israel see Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh, Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Hannah Herzog, "Both an Arab and a woman': gendered, racialised experiences of female Palestinian citizens of Israel" (2004) 10 Social Identities 53; Barbara Swirski, "The Citizenship of Jewish and Palestinian Arab Women in Israel", in Suad Joseph, ed., Gender and citizenship in the Middle East (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000) 314.
3 B. Thesis Objectives, Core Arguments and Potential Contribution
The object of this thesis is twofold. First, it is aimed to develop a new understanding of the duty to work within the discourse of citizenship. 'Citizenship' is a highly contested notion. From a narrow legal perspective, citizenship is about formal membership in a particular nation state, symbolized by a passport, legal rights and certain duties that differentiate between citizens and aliens. Yet, broadly defined, citizenship is also about full membership in a political community, constituted of different dimensions of rights and responsibilities, participation and culture. As
Ruth Lister notes, "an understanding of citizenship in terms of membership and identity underlines that what is involved is not simply a set of legal rules governing the relationship between individuals and the state but also a set of social relationships between individuals and the state and between individual citizens".6 Citizenship here is about belonging; to be a citizen means to be included in a certain community where the individual can participate in different practices, establish social ties and enjoy support in case of need.7 What are the requirements for
achieving full membership and inclusion in the political community? One possible answer is that full membership in a community is conditioned upon participation in society. The
individual is obligated to participate in certain activities, passive or active, that are aimed to
6 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) at 15, 7 According to Bryan Turner, citizenship is about the "nature of social membership within modern political collectives". He defines citizenship as a "set of practices (judicial, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups". See Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", inBryan Turner, ed., Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1993) at 2-3. See also J.M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) at 2; Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History" (1995) 40 International Review of Social History 1 at 8-9. Historically, nation states were the locations that constituted the political community, where individuals exercised their rights and responsibilities and gained full membership. Today, there is much writing about international and sub-national locations for gaining citizenship. See, for instance, David Held, "Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?" (1992) 40 Political Studies 10; Richard Falk, "The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization" (2000) 4 Citizenship Studies 5. My thesis does not touch upon this literature as it focuses on membership in a specifically defined political community - the Israeli society. The discussions in the following chapters will demonstrate that national polities are still relevant to the discourse on citizenship.
4 protect the community and support its efficient functioning. These activities are the 'duties of citizenship', meaning activities that are required by society, as opposed to ones that are permitted by or good for society or the individual.
One of the dominant debates in the literature regards the balance or interaction between the rights and duties of citizenship. Civic-republicanism supports the position presented above.
Citizenship is tested by the degree to which the individual actively participates in the community. Fulfilling duties aimed at accomplishing the common good is what constitutes citizenship. This approach reflects a 'duties discourse' in which duties and participation represent the essence of citizenship and the conditions for achieving full membership. Within a
'duties discourse', citizenship is understood as a practice rather than merely a status and it emphasizes obligations over rights.8 Traditional liberal thinking, on the contrary, focuses on rights granted to the individual. In return for possessing rights, the individual is required to fulfill only minimal obligations. Rights, under liberal citizenship, serve as the basis for establishing membership in the community. Throughout my thesis, I refer to this as the 'rights discourse' of citizenship, meaning that rights are the pivotal element of citizenship and are necessary to protect individuals' freedom and establish their membership in society. In other words, the 'rights discourse' reflects the notion of a rights-based citizenship.
The term 'discourse' is very dominant throughout the thesis. When I refer to a 'citizenship discourse', 'rights discourse' or 'duties discourse', I use the term 'discourse' to refer not only to rules or legal arrangements but also to the political and moral understandings and assumptions around a certain concept. Thus, for example, when referring to the 'duties discourse', I mean not only the specific legal duties that citizens are required to fulfill but also the understanding that citizenship is conditioned upon carrying out these duties, which serve as a basis for full membership and belonging.
5 For many years in the Western world, citizenship was understood within the 'rights discourse', i.e., in terms of possessing rights.9 This was well reflected in the notion of social citizenship and the development of the welfare state.10 Largely inspired by the work of T.H. Marshall, the main focus was on promoting different social rights aimed to ensure citizens' well-being and their integration into social institutions. Social citizenship, thus, was structured and spoken about within a rights-based discourse of citizenship. In recent years, the legitimacy of the welfare state has been questioned. The rhetoric of social citizenship has been shifting away from a 'rights discourse' to a 'duties discourse'. Welfare systems have become more restrictive and citizens are required today to join the workforce as a precondition to social rights. In that sense, the practice of work became a dominant form of citizenship participation.11 If in the past, social citizenship was built upon holding social rights, today, it is conditioned upon fulfilling a social obligation: the duty to enter the labour market and find a paid job. This signals a revival of the notion of the active citizen and an understanding of social citizenship not merely as a status but
9 Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory" (1994) 104 Ethics 352 at 354; Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self' (1984) 2 Political Theory 81 at 82; Morris Janowitz, "Observations on the Sociology of Citizenship: Obligations and Rights" (1980) 59 Social Forces 1 at 1-2. 1 ° Generally speaking, the term'social citizenship' refers to arenas, such as education and health, and to a variety of social rights, such as the right to welfare that allows the citizens to fully participate in society. According to Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, 'social citizenship' conveys "the idea that, in a welfare state, citizenship carries entitlements to social provision. It would bring social provision within the aura of dignity surrounding 'citizenship' and 'rights'". Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? On the ideology of Contract-Versus-Charity", in Bart Van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994) 90. 1' It should be noted that I do not aim to address the question whether duties of citizenship are justified or not and whether citizenship should be conditioned upon fulfilling duties. My starting point is that duties are an integral part of citizenship structures. The following discussions in this chapter will provide different perspectives about the scope of duties and their justification, but I will not take a stand on the righteousness of these arguments. Similarly, I do not question whether labour market participation should be a duty of citizenship. My departure point is that such a duty currently exists in many societies. My aim is to understand the nature and structure of citizenship duties, including the duty to work, and to set a framework to analyze whether certain duties of citizenship disadvantage certain groups in society. For a general discussion about whether work should be a duty of citizenship, see Ralf Dahrendorf, The Modem Social Conflict: An Essay on the Politics of Liberty (New York: Weidenfled & Nicolson, 1988) at 33-34.
6 also as a practice. Citizens are required to be active; they have to enter the labour market or at least prove their willingness to find a paid job.u
Usually, the duty to work is understood in individualistic terms: the citizen is required to be economically independent, and if he does not meet this requirement, he is entitled to fewer rights. This perspective remains true to the 'rights discourse' and to basic notions of liberalism: individuals are autonomous, independent human beings who exercise their freedoms and rights separately from other. Looking at the duty to work from within the liberal individualistic discourse does not, in my opinion, provide a sufficient basis for understanding the duty to work and its implications. Drawing on the civic-republican model of citizenship, I argue that the duty to work should be understood not merely in terms of achieving economic independence, but also in terms of contributing to society. According to civic-republicanism, individuals are members of a certain society where they enjoy a 'sense of belonging' and special attachment to fellow citizens. From this belonging and attachment arises the duty of individuals to contribute to and fulfill the general interests of society. To further develop the notion of belonging within the context of the 'duties discourse', I draw on the work of Nira Yuval-Davis who presents an analytical framework for understanding the concepts of 'belonging' and the 'politics of
12 Under this agenda, the notion of 'work' refers exclusively to paid work performed in the labour market, thus excluding any domestic activities taking place in the private sphere, usually by women. This argument will be explored in much detail in the following chapters. A certain distinction is required here between work as a form of citizenship participation and work as a duty of citizenship. In its broad meaning, citizenship, as noted above, is about the participation and involvement of individuals in the community to which they belong. Work is one form of such participation. It is a "central social institution and an essential part of most people's lives". See Keith Grint, The Sociology of Work: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) at 46. Through work, individuals position themselves in the public sphere, establish social networks, engage in collective purposes, constitute their identity and socioeconomic status, and acquire a social existence. In other words, work is a practice through which individuals constitute themselves as members of society. Under recent welfare debates, work has shifted from merely a possible form of citizenship participation to a citizenship obligation. Individuals are required to engage in the labour market as a condition of welfare. Work, thus, is no longer just a practice in which individuals can choose whether to be involved or not. It is a duty towards their community. See Peter Leisink & Harry Coenen, "Work and Citizenship in the New Europe", in Harry Coenen & Peter Leisink, eds., Work and Citizenship in the New Europe (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 6-11, 13-18.
7 belonging'. She argues that certain projects and practices in society serve as tools for establishing boundaries between different groups in society, which limit people's belonging to their nations or communities. By applying her insights, I argue that the duty to work is an example of these political projects, and, as such, it has the potential to limit citizens belonging to their society if they cannot fulfill this duty. In practice, it has been indeed argued that reducing the state's welfare expenses leads to a stronger economy, which benefits every citizen and society as a whole.14 Work here is not merely a personal interest but also part of building society. The duty to work is therefore not merely about making a living and being self- sufficient, and it is not merely a precondition to social rights and an escape from poverty. It is also a form of contribution to society and a path to attachment and a sense of belonging. It is a political project of belonging because, if it is structured in a way that does not allow everyone to fulfill it, as this thesis will demonstrate, boundaries may be created between those who belong and those who do not.
Israel is a good case study here because full citizenship in Israel, for the Jewish population, has always been understood in terms of fulfilling duties. During the early years of statehood, the duty to work was part of a civic-republican model of citizenship. It emerged as an obligation toward the Zionist project of establishing a Jewish home in the land of Israel. The expectation of being economically independent was also part of the labour culture, but more emphasis was given to nation-building in terms of hard, manual work. Later, the duty to work lost its momentum, while a liberal discourse became very dominant. In recent years, however, the duty
13 Nira Yuval-Davis. "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging" (2006) 40 Patterns of Prejudice 197. 14 My thesis does not aim to examine or question this assumption. 1 assume, for the purpose of my arguments, that today a more limited welfare state is needed for the recovery of the economy and therefore not relying on welfare benefits is indeed a contribution to society's general interest
8 to work emerged again as part of the welfare reform aimed at the recovery of the Israeli economy. The current duty to work is indeed presented in individualistic terms by policy makers who see it as an obligation to earn a sufficient living and to be economically independent rather than a burden on society. However, looking closely at the reforms, I argue that a further collectivist agenda can be found. Being self-reliant is presented as a contribution to the common good since it helps reduce welfare expenses and, in return, strengthens the market and helps in the recovery of the economy. Furthermore, beyond contributing to the economy, the duty to work is aimed at achieving other national goals, such as security and peace. The duty is attached therefore to the future existence of Israel as a whole. Reflecting both the requirement to be self-sufficient and the requirement to contribute to society, it provides individuals with social rights as well as with a route to create social ties and a 'sense of belonging' to the Israeli collective.
The second aim of the thesis is to present a feminist critique of the way Israeli women have been integrated into the 'duties discourse' in Israel. Much has been written in the feminist literature regarding women's participation in the labour market, in general, and the harsh effects of welfare reforms on women's social and economic citizenship, in particular. The mainstream literature, however, focuses on the challenges women face when trying to fulfill the duty to work, i.e. entering the labour market and earning a decent wage that will allow them to be independent from welfare support. This literature, for the most part, focuses on the denial of welfare entitlements that results in poverty and reliance on either men or the state. In other words, similar to the common understanding of the duty to work itself, the common feminist critique locates its objections to the welfare reform within the 'rights discourse'. This sort of critique is indeed valuable and valid, but it misses a broader perspective of the 'duties discourse'
9 that examines the relationship between women, citizenship duties and the potential results of not carrying out these duties. These results are reflected not only in fewer welfare rights but also in less attachment and belonging to society. In fact, current feminist literature lacks a complete and wide-ranging analysis of how women are integrated into the 'duties discourse'. In this thesis, I seek to begin such a discussion and use insights of current feminist analysis of citizenship to point to certain problematic aspects of the 'duties discourse'. While the duty to work stands at the heart of the thesis, other duties of citizenship in Israel - motherhood, care and military service - are explored in order to facilitate a better understanding of the complexity of the duty to work and to provide a comprehensive framework for the 'duties discourse' in Israel.
While the writing of many scholars in the areas of feminism and citizenship has influenced my arguments, the thesis has been especially inspired by the work of Ruth Lister. She explores different ways to reformulate the concept of citizenship, which are aimed to include women through the full recognition of their different and unique experiences. In her well-known book
Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives,15 and in many other important articles,16 Lister presents three possible models for women's inclusion in citizenship: (1) the gender-neutral model that brings women into citizenship based on the principle of their equality with men, (2) the gender- differentiated model that recognizes women's differences and includes their different practices and needs in regard to citizenship, and (3) the gender-inclusive model, based on the principle of
'differentiated universalism', that is aimed at blurring or dissolving the equality/difference
15 Lister, supra note 5. 16 See, among others, Ruth Lister, "The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics: Balancing Paid Work, Care and Citizenship" (2002) 31 Economy and Society 520; Ruth Lister, "She has Other Duties - Women, Citizenship and Social Security", in Sally Baldwin & Jane Falkmgham, eds., Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model (New York: Harvester, 1994) 31; Ruth Lister, "Towards a Citizens' Welfare State: The 3+2 'R's of Welfare Reform" (2001) Theory, Culture & Society 91
10 binary and recognizes women's differences in a way that ensures their equal citizenship standing. My feminist critique in the thesis revolves around these three models. Historically, the model that was most relevant to women's citizenship in Israel is the gender-differentiated one.
Women were included in the 'duties discourse' through the practice of motherhood. Scholars are divided around the question whether practices from the private sphere, like motherhood, can be recognized as practices of citizenship. I argue that childbearing and childrearing should be acknowledged as 'active participation' in citizenship given their contribution to the common good of society. The Israeli case demonstrates how the practice of motherhood was in fact integrated into the 'duties discourse'. Women were called to increase the birthrate to create a demographic advantage in the new state. This was their 'duty of motherhood'. It was their route into mainstream society and the path to citizenship. In practice, however, this gender- differentiated structure of citizenship did not provide Israeli women with full citizenship. It exposed them to public interference and judgment. It assumed that motherhood was every woman's ambition in life and stigmatized women who could not or chose not to become a mother. In addition, it did not fully recognize the practice of care and its contribution to society.
It also limited women's access to other duties of citizenship, which were usually considered to be of greater societal value.
One of these duties was the duty to work. I argue that while women had their 'own' citizenship duty - motherhood, they were exempted from the early duty to work. They were not considered to be equal partners in fulfilling this duty and were usually not expected to provide for their own living expenses. Indeed, many women worked and significantly contributed to the process of nation-building, but society did not view the duty to work as applying to them. Only men were assigned this duty. Between motherhood and work, it was assumed that women would and
11 should be able to put motherhood first. The result of this exemption from the duty to work, I argue, was that women had one less route to full citizenship and to establishing a sense of belonging. They were not equal members of the Zionist project. Once the duty to work was allocated to men and not to women, the 'duties discourse' assumed masculine norms of work and women suffered traditional inferior status to men both in the labour market and the family.
Women were considered a reserve of labour, their work was seen as secondary in the national effort, and they were attached even more to the private sphere and to the practice of caregivers.
While the early 'duties discourse' in Israel was structured according to the gender-differentiated model, the renewed duty to work is built upon the gender-neutral model of citizenship. Recent welfare reforms in Israel apply this duty to all citizens, men and women alike. While in the past, women were allowed to stay outside the labour market and were entitled to welfare benefits, today they are required to earn a living and are expected to be economically independent. Given its gender-neutral nature, I argue that this duty to work disadvantages women on three fronts.
First, the scope of the renewed duty indicates a change in national priorities. It undervalues the practices of motherhood and care, and places them outside the 'duties discourse'. Second, the duty to work requires women to enter a labour market that does not always provide them with appropriate working conditions. And third, closely related to the previous points, the duty to work ignores women's double burden at home and their care work in the domestic sphere. Of all women, single mothers are the most likely to face the implications of the current duty to work. I pay special attention to the impact of the current 'duties discourse' on single mothers in
Israel, as they are a distinctive group of women out of the total female population. The result of the current structure of the 'duties discourse' is that not all women, and in particular, single mothers, can fulfill the duty to work. The feminist literature critiques this scenario and argues
12 that it results in increasing women's poverty, pushing them into the traditional model of the two-parent family and constituting them as the 'undeserving others'. I apply this critique to the
Israeli case, and in addition argue that not being able to fulfill the duty to work means that women do not take part in the new civic virtue. They are not seen as contributing to the recovery of the Israeli economy. The duty to work, as a 'political project of belonging', creates a boundary between these women and the collective. As a result, these women may experience a lack of belonging and attachment. Not being able to demonstrate their commitment and contribution to national goals, these women may face alienation and isolation, and their ability to create social ties is in jeopardy.
One possible solution to this problematic structure of citizenship is to incorporate care into the
'duties discourse' in a manner that truly values the contribution of this practice to society.
Rather than restoucturing the labour market to accommodate childcare responsibilities, I argue that care should be recognized as a form of 'active participation' and as independent grounds for inclusion in citizenship, thus serving as an alternative to the duty to work. The 'duties discourse' should be expanded to include care and allow parents to stay at home with their children, for a certain period of time, without them facing lower social standing. In other words, care should be a site for contributing and belonging that challenges and weakens the boundaries set today by the duty to work.
C. Methodology
In this thesis, I draw on several fields of study, including political science, feminist legal and political analysis, labour relations, sociology and psychology. These perspectives contributed to my understanding of the 'duties discourse' and the different ways it aims to include women's
13 practices and interests. From political science, I borrowed discussions on the balance between rights and duties of citizenship. The field of women's studies provided many useful insights about the gender-neutral and gender-differentiated models of citizenship, which show possible routes for including women in society. From this field, I borrowed important discussions on care and work. From sociology and psychology I learned about notions of belonging and attachment, which helped understand the implications of not fulfilling citizenship duties.
Theories alone, however, cannot fully explain or illustrate the complexity of integrating women into the 'duties discourse'. My thesis therefore combines theory with practice, by looking at the
Israeli society. As already mentioned above, Israel presents a unique example of society that conditions citizenship upon fulfilling certain duties. The Israeli case provides an opportunity to learn how theories are translated into practical policies and legal documents. It provides a historical and concrete attempt to integrate women into a 'duties discourse' through both gender-neutral and gender-differentiated models of citizenship. The Israeli case links practice and theory and shows how the legal system serves as a mechanism to both produce and express social structures that disadvantage women and constitute them as second-class citizens. To learn and develop the discussion of the Israeli case, I turn to various academic studies about Israel, in general, and Israeli women, in particular. I draw on sources from anthropology, sociology, history and politics. All of these studies together provide a complete picture about the struggle of women to fulfill duties of citizenship and become equal citizens in Israel.
A few words should be said about the role the law plays in the thesis. The law here is a site through which I explore and demonstrate how citizenship duties are constructed and allocated in society. Laws established women's 'duty of motherhood'. Other laws perpetuated women's
14 exemption from the early duty to work, while recent welfare laws introduced them with the renewed duty to work. Legislation, regulations and legal debates in Israel express and perpetuate gendered practices and barriers that prevent women from gaining full inclusion. In other words, the law is a mechanism that both reflects and reproduces social structures that constitute women as second-class citizens.
D. Outline of the Thesis
The thesis begins by exploring the meaning of the duty to work. Chapter I of the thesis examines two possible ways of understanding the duty to work. The first part of the chapter looks at key notions of liberal thinking according to which rights of the individual are the core element of citizenship. Holding rights, under the liberal tradition, is the test for citizenship.
Within this 'rights discourse', I then examine the concept of social citizenship and the rise of the welfare state. Until recently, I argue, welfare systems focused on providing citizens with social rights and safety nets. Not much attention was given to the duties of the citizens and rights were not conditioned upon participating in certain practices. In recent years, many countries advocate a return to a more limited welfare state that requires citizens to find a paid job as a precondition for welfare benefits. In the thesis, I review the writing of two leading scholars who support this
'duty to work'. The first one is Lawrence Mead. He sees the unemployed as having problems functioning in society, as displayed by joblessness and a poor work ethic. Unemployment, for him, is often seen as voluntary non-work, and he believes that the law should enforce participation in the labour market. A citizen, according to Mead, has an obligation to be independent rather than a burden on society. The second scholar I review is Anthony Giddens.
He presents a gentler view, which sees the welfare state as being responsible for the poor being
15 excluded from the market. Giddens does not blame the unemployed themselves, but also believes that 'there are no rights without responsibilities' and that welfare benefits should be conditioned upon seeking a paid job. These points of view establish the 'duties discourse' and understand the duty to work in individualistic terms, as the obligation to be self-sufficient; they reflect basic notions of liberalism, that is, that individuals are autonomous, independent human beings who have no special attachment to society. The second part of the chapter presents a different and broader understanding of the duty to work. Drawing on the writing of Adrian
Oldfield, I outline principle concepts of civic-republicanism, such as active participation in and contribution to society. Under the civic-republican model of citizenship, citizens have the duty to contribute to society; this contribution serves as a basis for creating social ties and identities.
In other words, fulfilling duties evokes and activates a sense of belonging. Drawing on the work of Nira Yuval-Davis, I argue that duties of citizenship are a route for achieving belonging and attachment. They are 'political projects of belonging' because they provide those who fulfill them with a sense of belonging with society, and at the same time they can build boundaries between those who fulfil them and those who do not. The way society chooses to structure and allocate duties can create, therefore, boundaries within society between those who belong and those who do not. In one line with this argument, I suggest that the duty to work is a 'political project of belonging'. It is not just about being independent but is also about belonging to a certain society. Not fulfilling the duty, thus, can sanction the citizen not only with less social rights but also with less attachment to and affiliation with mainstream society.
Chapter II presents the Israeli case-study and reviews the historical development of the welfare state and the duty to work in Israel. I begin by describing the early 'duties discourse' in Israel, which subjected citizens to certain practices aimed at fulfilling the Zionist project - establishing
16 a home for the Jewish people One of these duties was labour. Under this civic-republican structure of citizenship, as the quotation at the beginning of the Introduction shows, the newcomers were expected to participate in hard, manual work. Labour, was constructed as a national duty and as part of nation-building. However, this duty, I argue, was not applied to all groups in society. Arabs and the ultra-orthodox were exempted from the duty. Sephardic Jews, although participating in labour activities, were considered as providing merely 'quantity' to the work effort, while the Ashkenazi Jews were the 'pioneers' whose work answered the civic virtue. Sephardic Jews, thus, were only partially included in the 'duties discourse' and could achieve only partial citizenship. In the second part of the chapter, I proceed to examine the decline of the 'duties discourse' and the rise of the liberal discourse of citizenship. I describe the process of economic liberalization, which took place during the 1970s and signalled the beginning of a new era, one that was characterized with an emergence of a new scale of values, such as individualism and self-fulfillment. Work was understood more as a source of personal inspiration rather than a duty toward the collective. In the third part of the chapter, I question whether there is still a 'duties discourse' in Israel. Based on legal documents and current debates within the Israeli society about the duty to serve in the army, I show that a 'duties discourse' still plays a role in structuring citizenship in Israel, side by side with the liberal model. I then move to present welfare reform. I review the changes in welfare entitlements and the program 'from-welfare-to-work', which all together established the renewed duty to work in
Israel. Drawing on the discussion in Chapter I of the thesis, I conclude Chapter II by demonstrating that this renewed duty is structured in both individualist and collectivist terms. It reflects both the requirement to become self-sufficient and the requirement to contribute to society.
17 Chapter HI turns to the feminist analysis of the 'duties discourse' in Israel. I open the chapter by discussing how the 'duties discourse' can be restructured according to the gender-differentiated model of citizenship. This model, as noted above, aims to acknowledge women's unique experiences and rebuild gendered structures in society that limit women's full inclusion in citizenship. Bringing the principle of 'difference' into the 'duties discourse', I argue, requires us to recognize motherhood as a form of active participation in citizenship. To demonstrate this point, I present the 'duty of motherhood' as it was established through different legal documents, and public discussions, such as the 1949 Defence Service Act,17 the 1951 Women's
Equal Rights Actls and the 1950 Marriage Age Act19 In one line with the gender-differentiated model, I show how Israeli women were called to increase the birth rate and to establish a Jewish majority in the new state. This was their unique route to contribute to and achieve belonging in mainstream Israeli society. This route, nonetheless, did not provide women with full inclusion and constituted them as second-class citizens. In the last part of the chapter, I present four major limitations of the gender-differentiated structure of women's citizenship. These limitations, I show, mainly resulted from emphasizing the principle of 'difference' rather than challenging practices and structures that that perpetuate women's inferior status in society. The first limitation is the lack of privacy and autonomy concerning women's decisions about motherhood. Once women's private choice regarding motherhood gained a public meaning, motherhood was no longer entirely a women's affair. I demonstrate this argument by looking at fertility treatments in Israel. The use of reproductive technologies was always very widespread and many women are being pushed into trying again and again to become mothers. I argue that
17 S.H. 25.1949. 18 S.H. 248, 1951. 19 S.H. 57, 1950.
18 in light of the national interest in motherhood, the discourse of fertility placed much pressure on women to give birth and did not leave much room for personal considerations. The second limitation of the 'duty of motherhood' concerns ignoring diversity among women, known in the feminist literature as the problem of essentialism. By constituting the practice of motherhood as a duty of citizenship, I show how the 'duties discourse' portrayed Israeli women as a homogenous group and assumed that they all aspire to become mothers. This structure of citizenship disadvantaged women who could not or did not want to become mothers.
Childlessness, therefore, was devastating to women. It placed them at the margins of society.
Childless women had one less route to full citizenship. However, even if women became mothers and fulfilled their national duty, they still gained only partial citizenship. The third limitation of the 'duty of motherhood' was that it trapped women in the private sphere and perpetuated an attachment to their traditional roles as wives and mothers. This limited women's ability to fully participate in other duties of citizenship, such as military service. The Israeli society understood the duty of military service to be secondary in women's lives, as they had their 'own' duty: motherhood. I argue that since military service was placed higher than motherhood in the hierarchy of duties, women were again structured as second-class citizens.
Furthermore, despite the fact that it was constituted as a citizenship duty, the practice of motherhood was not fully acknowledged and valued. Women's reproductive role did not entitle them to substantial economic support. This further perpetuated women's dependency on men and limited their path into the public sphere. By ignoring the true value of caregiving, the early
'duties discourse' in Israel failed to challenge gendered structures within the family and the public sphere.
19 I continue the discussion of the early 'duties discourse' in Chapter IV, where I examine more closely the duty to work and its relation to women during the early years of statehood. Drawing on historian accounts of women and labour, I demonstrate in the first part of the chapter that women were exempted from the early duty to work. The fact that women had to struggle for inclusion in labour activities and that society resisted allowing mem to participate in manual work shows, in my view, that only men were seen as the ones to carry out the duty to work, while women were expected to maintain their traditional roles in the household. To support my argument I point to certain policies that aimed to encourage men, and not women, to take part in the national missions of labour and settlement. The legal system also served as a mechanism for maintaining women's exemption from the duty to work. It was more concerned with protecting and encouraging motherhood than with women's ability to participate in the labour market.
This was well reflected in the 1980 Income Support Act20 and the 1954 Women's Employment
Act21 both acts included many measures to allow women to become mothers and to focus on caregiving rather than employment. In the second part of the chapter, I analyze the implications of women's exemption from the duty to work. First, women had one less route to full citizenship. The practice of work could not provide them with a route for gaining full recognition and belonging in mainstream society. Only men's belonging depended on fulfilling the duty to work. For women who did not work outside the home, the structure of the 'duties discourse' was to some extent advantageous, because they were not condemned for not fulfilling a national duty. However, for women who did work and contribute to nation-building, their work could not provide them with full inclusion and a sense of belonging. Being exempted from the early duty to work, they were once again constituted as second-class citizens. Second,
20 S.H. 30, 1981. 21 S.H. 154. 1954.
20 in practical terms, this exemption also perpetuated gendered practices in the labour market and the family. Being structured around masculine norms, the duty to work helped build barriers for women who tried to participate in the labour market. It also helped direct them into 'feminine' occupations and perpetuated the gender wage gap and women's attachment to the practice of caregiving. The early duty to work, therefore, narrowed women's citizenship in Israel.
Following a discussion of the gender-differentiated model and its limitations, as reflected in the early 'duties discourse' in Israel, I turn in Chapter V, to examine the gender-neutral model of citizenship. The renewed duty to work in Israel no longer distinguishes between men and women. If women want to gain full citizenship, they have to enter the public sphere on similar terms to those of men. In the first part of the chapter, I give a general overview of the phenomenon of single motherhood in Israel. I present formal data about single mothers, describe the difficulties they face in their daily lives, and show how the welfare system responded to these difficulties in the past. I also show that the 1992 Single-Parent Families
Act22 constituted single mothers' citizenship, through a 'rights discourse', as caregivers who were entitled to a variety of rights aimed at helping them cope with economic pressures. The second part of the chapter details the changes in the welfare system that had special implications for women and that established their duty to work. The third part of the chapter then analyzes the duty to work. I begin the analysis with a general discussion of the gender-neutral model of citizenship and its limitations within the context of the 'duties discourse'. Under a gender- neutral structure of duties, the common good is often built around masculine norms and does not leave much room for women's experiences and interests. Women are expected to unite with men around certain common ends that do not necessarily reflect their own concerns. Moreover,
22 S.H. 147, 1992.
21 the duties that women are expected to fulfill also reflect masculine practices mat do not respond to or accommodate women's particular needs or experiences. Using this critique, I examine the
duty to work in Israel. I argue that under the current 'duties discourse' in Israel, being 'just' a
mother is not seen as a complete civic virtue. Women are expected to fulfill the common good -
recovering the Israeli economy — by combining family responsibilities and paid work. The duty
to work, therefore, reflects a new national priority: the good female citizen is the working-
mother-citizen. Women are expected to minimize or adjust parenting to the demands of the
labour market. This is a classic example, I argue, of how the general interests of a certain
society reflect priorities that come from a 'men's world'. The practice of care, under this
structure of citizenship, is undermined even more. Moreover, the duty to work forces women to
enter an unfriendly labour market that usually does not provide them with sufficient economic
resources and ignores their unpaid work in the domestic sphere. In light of these limitations, I
argue, many women find themselves unable to fulfill the renewed duty to work. The last part of
Chapter V explores the implications of not being able to carry out the renewed duty. First, I
show how the welfare reform increases women's poverty and forces them to rely on others for
economic support. Second, I argue that by pushing them into poverty, the duty to work also
drives women into marriage and the two-parent family, where they can find someone to provide
for their needs. This has the potential to perpetuate women's subordination to men and trap
them in abusive relationships. Third, I show how the duty to work helps categorize unemployed
single mothers as the 'undeserving others'. They are portrayed as lazy, unproductive parasites.
They are also exposed to a never-ending surveillance of their homes and earegiving activities.
Finally, I argue that as a 'political project of belonging', the duty to work distinguishes and
builds boundaries between single mothers and the Israeli collective. Single mothers who cannot
22 fulfill the duty to work may experience a lack of belonging and attachment to society. Single mothers, who are already seen as deviating from 'normal' behaviour, may now lose an importance route into mainstream society. The 'duties discourse', therefore, puis their ability to affirm their loyalty to the collective and establish social ties at risk.
Both the gender-neutral and the gender-differentiated models of citizenship are therefore problematic. Structuring the 'duties discourse' on either of them did not provide Israeli women with full and equal citizenship. In Chapter VI of the thesis, I argue that care should be integrated into the 'duties discourse' as an independent practice of citizenship, thus allowing parents, for a certain period of time, to stay home with their children without being categorized as second- class citizens. In the first part of the chapter, I present Ruth Lister's gender-inclusive model of citizenship that rests on the notion of 'differentiated universalism'. She argues that women's particularities should be integrated and acknowledged in the discourse of citizenship, but in such a way that ensures their equal standing in society. Integrating women's differences should lead to equality in results. In other words, gendered institutions need to be reformed in order to value and accommodate women's experiences and concerns in a manner that will provide them with full equal citizenship. To fulfill the principle of 'differentiated universalism', Lister prefers to reform the labour market (as do many other feminist scholars) to ensure that care work does not prevent women from finding a good paid job. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that the practice of care should not be merely accommodated but should be recognized as an expression of active citizenship that allows stay-at-home parents to achieve full citizenship. I review recent scholarship that is willing to recognize care as a form of active participation and contribution to society. In line with this writing, I argue that given the essential contribution of caregiving to society, the practice of care should be incorporated into the 'duties discourse' to
23 save as an alternative to the duty to work, thus establishing another route of belonging. I further argue that this approach needs to be accompanied by proper policies that provide parents with adequate benefits, eliminate the gender wage gap, encourage fathers to take upon themselves more caregiving responsibilities and uproot the stigma of 'welfare dependency'. Implementing these policies will ensure that the inclusive 'duties discourse' will not run the risk of perpetuating the gendered division of labour and women's inferior position within the labour market and their families. In the third part of the chapter, I argue that when one incorporates care into the 'duties discourse', care should be formulated not as a 'duty' but as a
'responsibility' or 'contribution'. Care should not be constituted as a new duty of citizenship, but rather be given its true recognition as a social responsibility that many citizens already carry out. This strategy also aims to avoid over-supervising women's choices and practices in their private life. Framing care as a 'duty' of citizenship for which women are compensated could conceivably justify, in the eyes of the public, further investigations by the welfare authorities regarding the way women choose to fulfill care activities. Finally, the last part of the chapter highlights the importance of incorporating care into the 'duties discourse' as a form of contribution to society. I maintain that this approach fully recognizes the meaning and value of caregiving, and makes it easier to justify allocating funds to give parents the opportunity to stay at home without falling into poverty. Moreover, this strategy constitutes the practice of care as a site of belonging, thus providing many women with another route through which they can gain full inclusion in society.
24 Chapter I
The Duty to Work: Between the 'Rights Discourse9 and the 'Duties Discourse9
Part I: The Rise of the Duty to Work A The Liberal Discourse of Citizenship B. Understanding Social Citizenship and the Welfare State within a 'Rights Discourse' 1. The Liberal Model of the Welfere State 2. The Social-Democratic Model C. From the 'Rights Discourse' to the 'Duties Discourse' 1. The Pressures on the Welfare State 2. Introducing the Duty to Work 3. Understanding the Duty to Work: Being Independent from Society Part II: Providing a Broader Perspective on the Duty to Work: Contribution and Belonging A The Civic-Republican Discourse of Citizenship B. Belonging and me Politics of Belonging 1. Belonging and the Politics of Belonging 2. Belonging, the Politics of Belonging and Duties of Citizenship C. Understanding the Duty to Work
As mentioned in the introduction, the mainstream discourse of citizenship usually understands the duty to work in individualistic terms: it is a personal responsibility of citizens to be economically independent. Citizens are expected and encouraged to be self- reliant. Those who do not fulfill the duty to work are denied social rights and benefits. They are considered to be second-class citizens in terms of having limited social rights, opportunities and access to resources. I argue in this chapter that there is another way to
25 understand this duty and the consequences of not carrying it out. Citizens are required to work as a way to contribute to society. Under civic-republicanism, individuals enjoy a
'sense of belonging' to a certain society and special attachment to their fellow citizens. From this belonging and attachment rises the duty of individuals to play a part in fulfilling the interests of society. The duty to work, therefore, can be understood not merely as the obligation to be economically independent but also as the requirement to contribute to society. The practice of work, I will argue, is not just a means to achieve independence but also a route to belonging and attachment. A second-class citizen here is therefore not just someone who has fewer rights but also someone who has weaker ties to the collective and cannot establish a sense of belonging. In that sense, the duty to work serves as a 'political project of belonging'; it has the potential to limit individuals' ability to establish a sense of belonging, thus providing them with only partial citizenship.
The chapter is structured as follows; The first part addresses the rise of the duty to work. I begin with the key notions of the liberal discourse of citizenship. Then, with the 'rights discourse' in mind, I address the notion of social citizenship and the development of the welfare state. I end the discussion in this part by looking at the different agendas that shifted towards the 'duties discourse' and introduced the duty to work. The second part of the chapter turns to discuss the alternative understanding of the duty to work. I begin the
discussion with the key elements of civic-republicanism, mainly those of contribution and belonging. Then, I turn to elaborate on the notions of 'belonging' and the 'politics of belonging' that helps characterize duties as projects of belonging. Based on these insights, I
end the discussion in this chapter by using them in relation to the new duty to work in order to provide abroad explanation of its nature and sanctions.
26 Part I: The Rise of the Duty to Work
A. The Liberal Discourse of Citizenship
The liberal model of citizenship is closely linked to the idea of liberal individualism. One of the basic notions of liberalism is that every human being is a separate, autonomous entity
who has the freedom to pursue his life unhindered. * The individual is a sovereign being who
should be allowed to fulfill his autonomy separately from other individuals. He should have
control of his life and be protected from forces that might limit his ability to fulfill his personal goals. To protect his autonomy, the individual should be given rights that are
independent of others and of belonging to a certain community. These rights are to be
allocated equally among all individuals. As Rawls states, "each person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others".2
According to these principles of the liberal tradition, citizenship is a status derived from
rights given to and possessed by the individual. It is primarily a system of rights aimed to
protect the interests of the individual from any harm caused by other individuals or by
society itself. The individual is a citizen for the reason that he is a rights bearer; holding the
rights provides him with full membership in a particular society.3
Under this liberal conception of citizenship, the citizen, as an autonomous human being, has
the right to choose his conception of the good and the way to fulfill it. Each citizen should
be free to choose and promote his own good, as long as he does not interfere with others'
1 For the purposes of convenience, I will refer to 'he' rather than 'he or she'. 2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 60. Rawls presents a list of the basic rights: "political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; freedom of person, along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, as defined by the concept of the rule of law". Ibid, at 61. 3 Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory" (1994) 104 Ethics 352 at 354. See also Herman van Gunstere, "Four Conceptions of Citizenship", in Bart Van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition o/Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994) 36 at 38-39.
27 right to so the same.4 As Michael Sandel explains, for liberalism, the right takes precedence
to the common good. Society should not give priority to the good of certain individuals or
groups over others' good, and should not limit individual rights in the name of the common
good. Society must allow each citizen to believe in his own conception of the good, even if
it does not derive from or promote a common good. Sandel puts it as follows:
A just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must govern by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. What justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they maximize the general welfare, or cultivate virtue, or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good, and independent of it.5
If citizens are separated fromeac h other and promote their own good according to their own
choice, then society, under the liberal tradition, is merely a group of individuals gathered
together for the purpose of advancing and fulfilling their own private interests. Society does
not have a value of its own. It is merely a means for the realization of the citizens'
autonomy. It is where individuals express their liberal autonomy.6 As Maurice Roche notes,
in this society, citizens are strangers to each other.7
4 Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self (1984} 2 Political Theory 81 at 82. See also William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1991) at 4-5. 5 Sandel, supra note 4 at 82. See also Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism", in Stuart Hampshire, ed.. Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) at 127, where he explains that the liberal state "must be neutral on... the question of the good life {and} political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life". 6 Ronald Beiner, What's the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) at 29. Beiner explains that under liberalism, individuals may have an attachment to a particular community, but this is an attachment that they choose for themselves as an expression of liberal autonomy. Ibid, at 30. 7 Maurice Roche, "Citizenship, Social Theory and Social Change" (1987) 16 Theory and Society 363 at 376- 377.
28 Since rights are the central expression of citizenship and based on principles of liberty and
autonomy, in return for possessing citizenship rights, the individual is required to fulfill only
minimal obligations: voting, obeying the law, paying taxes and serving in the military.
Traditional liberal theory is unwilling to impose further obligations upon citizens because it
inevitably involves giving priority to a certain goal, good or form of participation.
Citizenship, thus, is considered to be 'passive' because in return to holding rightsther e is no
substantive obligation to participate in public life or contribute to the common good.8 Rawls
explains as follows:
It should be kept in mind that the principle of participation applies to institutions. It does not define an ideal of citizenship; nor does it lay down a duty requiring all to take an active part in political affairs... what is essential is that the constitution should establish equal rights to engage in public affairs and that measures betaken to maintain the fair value of these liberties (emphasis added).9
In other words, citizenship is not conditioned upon participation in a community or society,
but is defined principally in terms of rights. The citizen can choose when and where to participate, and if he chooses not to be active, his citizenship status is not to be revoked.10
This does not mean that liberalism ignores the importance of public participation. While
they mainly focus on rights and the institutions that provide and secure them, some liberal
thinkers maintain that a certain level of civic-mindedness is needed for liberal society to
function successfully. This participation, however, is aimed first and foremost to fulfill self-
8 Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 3 at 354-355. 9 Rawls, supra note 2 at 227-228. 10 Thus, it can be argued that the passive nature of citizenship under liberalism does not mean that citizens are generally passive but that their rights do not require them to be active. In fact, rights are given to citizens to have them active and make use of capacities and opportunities; it is just that they are not required to do so. More about the use of rights see J.M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) at 16.
29 selected activities that empower the citizen. Even if some liberal thinkers encourage participation and cooperation, it is usually done in a very modest and gentle way that focuses on narrow forms of participation in the public discourse, such as listening seriously to a range of political views or questioning the conduct of political officials.11 William
Galston, for example, looks into different liberal virtues that he thinks are essential in liberal communities. The more traditional and obvious virtues that he points to are the willingness to fight to protect the state, obeying the law and loyalty to society. Beyond these, Galston points out other virtues, such as strong families that are needed to ensure citizens' independence from society, tolerance to others' differences and a strong work ethic.
However, when referring to virtues of citizenship, he summarizes the core liberal notion about active participation as follows:
In a liberal society, there is not duty to participate actively in politics, no requirement to place the public above the private and to systematically subordinate personal interest to the common good, no commitment to accept collective determination of personal choices. But neither is liberal citizenship simply the pursuit of self-interest, individually or in fractional collusion with other or like mind. Liberal citizenship has its own distinctive restraints - virtues that circumscribe and check, without wholly nullifying, the promptings of self-aggtandizement.12
Since liberal citizenship does not impose a concept of the good life, it is argued that it tolerates different interests derived from cultural, ethnic or religious connections. It is
11 Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 3 at 365-366, 368. Beiner explains that in liberal society, citizens' participation in the political dialogue is very limited and narrow since the debated issues and arguments do not vary much and do not deal with the complexities of community life: "Citizens within this polity do not debate the substance of civic ties that give life or richness to the community of which they are members. They do not debate whether there are social or collective resources that they might wish to devote to beautifying or ennobling their shared living space ... there is no conversation about the kinds of individual or social purposes that might be worthy of pursuit, since questions of this sort would violate the whole liberal agenda". See Beiner, supra note 6 at 100-101. 12 Galston, supra note 4 at 225. For more about narrow virtues in liberalism, see Ludvig Beckman, The Liberal State & the Politics of Virtue (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001) at 19-39.
30 marked by pluralism and universalism. As Ronald Beiner explains, "the dialectic of liberal existence encompasses both diversity and sameness, pluralism and uniformity, privatization and planetarization. The official ideology of liberal society... is of course diversity - the rich multiplicity of different conceptions of the good or of the ends of life".n Citizenship, under tiie liberal mode, is therefore marked by the principle of inclusiveness, as all individuals, at least in theory, are entitled to citizenship rights regardless of cultural, ethnic or religious connections.14
B. Understanding Social Citizenship and the Welfare State within a 'Rights Discourse'
Post-war political writings followed the liberal tradition and defined citizenship in terms of the possession of rights, that is, within a 'rights discourse'. In his most influential work on citizenship and social class in Britain, T.H. Marshall defines three types of citizenship rights:15
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty
of the person, freedomo f speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to
conclude valid contracts, and the right tojustice . ... By the political element I mean
the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body
invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body ...
By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the fill in the social heritage
Beiner, supra note 6 at 23. 14 These ideas have served as a basis for the claim that the liberal state is neutral with respect to the diverse life- choices of its citi2ens. Much criticism has been directed toward this concept as it is argued that liberalism is in practice more about sameness than difference. In this regard, the feminist critique is discussed in the following chapters. For a general critique of the superficial pluralism and universalism of the liberal notion, see Beiner, supra note 6 at 23-24; Barbalet, supra note 10 at 19. 15 It should be noted that Marshall was not a liberal but a social-democrat. His work indeed placed much attention on the rights of the citizen, but he departed from liberalism in many important aspects. I will elaborate on the differences between liberal citizenship and Marshall's ideology in the sections below.
31 and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the • . 16 society.
The third group of social rights, referred to above, constituted the idea of social citizenship and is Milled mainly through education systems and social services. These systems and services are commonly associated with what is known as the 'welfare state'.
What is the welfare state? When does a state become a welfare state? Esping-Andersen provides a basic definition, according to which a welfare state "involves state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens".17 Christopher Hereon, in his book about the political economy of welfare, refers to the welfare state as a "state which intervenes within the processes of economic production and exchange to re-distribute life chances between individuals and classes".18 And according to Paul Pierson,
"The welfare state' is generally taken to cover those aspects of government policy
designed to protect against particular risks shared by broad segments of society.
Standard features... would include: protection against loss of earnings due to
unemployment, sickness, disability, or old age; guaranteed access to health care;
support for households with many children or an absent parent, and a variety of
T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950) 10-11. Marshall assigns the development of each of the three elements of citizenship to a different century: civil rights to the eighteenth century; political rights to the nineteenth century; and social rights to the twentieth century. Ibid, at 14. Marshall admits, however, that this historical division is not completely accurate and that there were some overlaps between the three periods. Ibid, at 21. Many scholars have been critical of Marshall's theoretical analysis of rights and citizenship. I leave these critiques aside as they are less relevant here. The feminist critique will be presented when discussing women's citizenship in subsequent chapters. For different critiques of Marshall's work see Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship" (1990) 24 Sociology 189 at 192- 201 [Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship'!; Barbalet, supra note 10 at 108-111. 17 Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 18-19 [Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds]. 18 Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2006) at 24 [Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State}. In another place, he elaborates that "the welfare state is the product of a struggle between the political powers of social democracy and the economic powers of capital". Ibid, at 30.
32 social services - child care, elder care, eta - meant to assist households in balancing multiple activities which may overtax their own resources.19
Common to these definitions is the principle that society has a responsibility to provide a safety net for those who cannot independently ensure their welfare. These definitions also show that the welfare state was indeed understood in terms of providing social rights - that is within a 'rights discourse'. In fact, the writing of these scholars and others mainly focused on welfare systems in different countries and their willingness to provide and achievement in providing social rights. Little attention was given to the duties of citizens, probably because policies did not obligate the citizens to follow certain practices.
Esping-Andersen conducted comprehensive research of different models of the welfare state and identified three types of welfare state: liberal, social-democrat and conservative.20 He presents several criteria for distinguishing between the different models, including the scope of social rights granted to individuals, aiming to achieve de-commodifi cation of their status through the market;21 the level of social stratification;22 and the role of the market and family in providing welfare.23 The following discussion provides a brief sketch of the liberal
Paul Pierson, "Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies", in Paul Pierson, e&, The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 410 at 420 [Pierson, "Coping with Permanent Austerity"]. 20 Although certain types of welfare state can be identified, in reality no state adopted a pure type of welfare regime, but adopted rather a mixed ideology that balanced various elements from different welfare state ideologies. This is evident in the Israeli case, where the welfare state shifted back and forth between liberal and socio-democratic principles, and where the reasons for adopting any of these models rested on both national and economic ideologies. This is demonstrated in Chapter H. 21 The principle of de-comrnodifieation refers to the ability to liberate citizens from market dependency. In the model structure of the market, individuals' labour power becomes a commodity and their well-being depends on the cash nexus. This means that individuals cannot ensure that they will have an acceptable standard of living independent of market participation and those who cannot enter the market are at risk of poverty. In addition, being a 'commodity', the worker's power within the market is marginalized. As Esping-Andersen explains, "when workers are completely market-dependent, they are difficult to mobilize for actions of solidarity. Since their resources mirror market inequalities, divisions emerge between the 'ins' and the 'outs', making labor-movement formation difficult. De-commodification strengthens the workers and weakens the absolute authority of the employer". Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, supra note 17 at 22. 22 Esping-Andersen explains that the welfare state is a system of stratification: "it is an active force in the ordering of social relations". Ibid, at 23. 23Ibid. sill.
33 and social-democratic models. Both these models demonstrate the different implementation of the 'rights discourse' with respect to the welfare state and are most relevant to the latter discussion of the duty to work.24
1. The Liberal Model: A Narrow Welfare State
Traditional liberalism confines citizenship mainly to civil and political rights. It prioritizes negative freedoms and allocates to the state the minimal role of protecting individuals' rights from interfering forces.25 Under the liberal model of the welfare state, promoting social objectives through public policies may obligate individuals to donate part of their resources for the benefit of other individuals. This is considered to be an unnecessary interference in individuals' rights. The answer to social goals should be found in the market. The market is the best sphere for citizens' self-reliance, where they can be employed and ensure their well- being.26 This, as Esping-Andersen explains, fits within a classical liberal political model of the economy that rejects promoting social protections outside the market and assumes that
"the road to equality and prosperity should be paved with a maximum of free markets and a minimum of state intervention".27 Under the liberal model, citizens themselves are responsible for ensuring their welfare and providing for their needs, either through the market, their families or voluntarily organizations in the community. The state indeed provides welfare benefits, but these are aimed to be the last resort for needy citizens who cannot find any other solution in the market or in the private sphere. Welfare benefits,
24 The purpose of the following discussion is to present only the core elements of the two models. In each country, we can find different versions of these models creating a unique structure of a welfare state according to local, specific political and economic circumstances. For a detailed overview of the origins and development of the welfare state in different countries, see Piersoa, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 99-13 5. 25 Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", supra note 16 at 191. 26 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, supra note 17 at 42. 2/ Ibid, at 10. Aiming to maintain the equilibrium of supply and demand, liberals argue that social protection would not eliminate social inequalities and poverty but rather perpetuate them. The market is the principle answer to these phenomena. Ibid, at 35-36, 42.
34 therefore, are very modest and are usually based on a means-tested assistance system. They are not considered to be 'rights', but merely assistance based on public discretion. By providing only limited social rights, the state aims to motivate citizens to turn to the market, thus making sure that they do not favour welfare over the market.28 Esping-Andersen summarizes the limited safety net under the liberal welfare state as follows:
In this model, the prog-ess of social has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic norms: it is one where the limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. Entitlement rules are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest. In turn, the state encourages the market, either passively - by guaranteeing only a rmnimum - or actively - by subsidizing private welfare schemes.29
The liberal welfare state does not, therefore, adopt the principle of de-commodification. On the contrary, citizens in the liberal welfare state, as noted, depend on the market as a source of welfare. Even when providing minimal social entitlements, these are conditioned upon individuals' contributions to the welfare system through their wages.30 With respect to social stratification, the liberal model aims "to grant the cash nexus a hegemonic role in the organization of social and economic life... the state (has] no proper reason for altering the stratification outcomes produced in the marketplace".31 The answer to social stratification, in the eyes of die liberal model, is found in individual insurance in the market. Other solutions are education and the creation of equal opportunities.32
Ibid, at 42-43. Ibid, at 26-27. Ibid, at 43. Ibid, at 62. Ibid, at 62-65.
35 The liberal model of the welfare state began spreading among Western states at the end of the nineteenth century,33 together with the corporatist model mentioned above.34 Scholars point to the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and the UK as countries where the liberal model was, and still is, very dominant in the structure of their welfare systems. These countries adopted narrow welfare programs that covered only specific groups (mainly elderly and the unemployed) and involved a modest fiscal contribution on behalf of the state.33 It should be noted that the classical liberal model of the welfare state, although believing in the ability of the market to provide welfare, does not advocate a duty to work and does not enforce work through the welfare system. Countries that adopted the liberal model focused on providing minimal welfare support to encourage citizens to enter the labour market while leaving many people, who could not ensure their welfare independently, to cope with poverty. In other words, the liberal model, although providing only limited welfare benefits, still understands social citizenship within a 'rights discourse'. Its implementation was focused on providing rights to citizens without imposing concrete obligations on them. In contrast,
Generally speaking, the origins of the welfare state were in the late nineteenth century and the liberal model, representing a narrow approach towards welfare services and entitlements, was very dominant in the early years. It is commonly argued that the birth of 'the welfare state' was in Germany, where industrial accident insurance was adopted in 1871. Germany was also a pioneer in adopting other social programs such as health insurance and a pension program. Germany, however, was not a typical liberal welfare state but rather characterized more with elements from the corporatist regime. See Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 104-108. 34 As noted above, another type of welfare state that Esping-Anderse n indicates in his research is the corporatist regime, which characterized the welfare systems in Italy, France, Germany and Austria (again, these countries do not represent only the corporatist model, and elements of the other two models can be found there as well). It is similar to the liberal model in its passive approach to market regulation and intervention. Social rights under the corporatist model are narrow as well but, instead of glorifying the marketplace as the dominant arena, this regime focuses also on the family as the institution to which to provide welfare. Thus, under the corporatist model, the state intervenes "only to help the family take care of its members", as Handler explains. "Women are discouraged from working. Social insurance typically excludes non-working wives; family benefits encourage motherhood". See Joel F. Handler, Social Citizenship and Workfare in the United States and Western Europe: The Paradox of Inclusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 93 [Handler, Social Citizenship]. See also Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, supra note 17 at 83-84; Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Welfare States without Work: The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 66 [Esping-Andersen, Welfare States in Transition], 35 For an overview of the dominance of the liberal model in these countries, see John Myles, "When Markets Fail: Social Welfare in Canada and the United State", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage Publications, 19%) 116; Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 20-86.
36 current welfare reforms move to understand social citizenship within a 'duties discourse' and thus not only strongly advocate active participation in the labour market but also enforce this participation by reducing welfare support even more. This ideology will be addressed below in more detail.
2. The Social-Democrat Model
Marshall's ideology is considered to be a milestone in the development of the welfare state and is most identified with the social-democratic model. Similar to the liberal tradition,
Marshall believed that citizenship rights were needed to ensure that all individuals could gain equal and full membership in society. His ideology was developed, as mentioned above, within a 'rights discourse' of citizenship that focused on the rights of the citizen rather than on his duties. Marshall departed, however, from traditional liberal thought in which social rights derive from property rights and are exercised through the market. He claimed that social rights should not necessarily be seen as a product of other rights, but as an integral component of citizenship itself36 He saw social citizenship as a means to resolving social and economic inequalities which are rooted, in his opinion, in the capitalist market and the existence of private property. Marshall saw citizenship and capitalism as contradictory institutions. He argued that capitalism, through market forces, produces inequalities among citizens while citizenship is a status that provides citizens with equal rights and forms of participation.37 Inequality among social classes is a result of the rise of capitalism because not all citizens are able to find work and ensure their social and economic needs through labour. These citizens, although formally being full members in society, are unable to participate in social institutions and exercise their civil and political
36 Marshall, supra note 16 at 111. 37 Ibid, at 84 ("citizenship and [the] capitalist class system [are] at war").
37 rights. Without social and economic rights, Marshall argued, people who lack the necessary resources and qualifications are unable to benefit from formal opportunities and participate in society and the political process.38
Social rights, thus, are aimed to reduce social inequalities that result from market operations.
As Bryan Turner writes regarding Marshall's work, "the importance of [his] contribution is the claim that citizenship modifies the negative impact of the capitalist market by a redistribution of resources on the basis on rights".39 Believing that a just society should be built on principles of solidarity and equality, Marshall argued that the welfare state should make it possible for impoverished groups to enter the mainstream of society by according them social rights. The state should enable them to exercise their civil and political rights, and to participate in their communities.40
While his attention is directed at rightsa s abasis forcitizenship , Marshall did not ignore the idea of social obligations. He mentioned that citizens "should be inspired by a lively sense of responsibility towards the welfare of the community".41 He distinguished between duties that are obvious, clear and immediate, such as the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions, education and military service, and duties that are vague and "included in the
Limited social rights, Marshall argued, leads to inequalities in the civil and political spheres. For example, a lack of education limits one's ability to exercise the right to freedomo f speech. Poverty means unequal status; it undermines citizens' ability to successfully participate in the marketplace or to access property. In other words, without social rights, citizenship becomes practically worthless. Ibid, at 88-91. See also Barbalet, supra note 10 at 2. 39 Bryan S. Turner, "The Erosion of Citizenship" (2001) 52 British Journal of Sociology 189 at 190. See also Barbalet, supra note 10 at 9. 40 Marshall, supra note 16 at 29. See also Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 3 4 at 89 ("Social rights would give individuals a sense of security, which, in turn, would foster a sense of belonging and commitment to the political community"). Marshall emphasizes, however, that the purpose of the welfare state is not to guarantee equality of income but to ensure equal status of citizens. Instead of equal outcomes, Marshall advocated for substantive equality of opportunities as an instrument of combating illegitimate inequalities. He did not aim, therefore, to diminish social inequality per se but to ensure that citizens were not deprived of opportunities and rights because of their lower socio-economic standing. Marshall, supra note 16 at 110-116. 41 Marshall, supra note 16 at 70.
38 general obligation to live the life of a good citizen", such as the duty to work. Marshall, it seems, did not classify the obligation to work as a strong citizenship duty. He assumed conditions of full employment where it is relatively easy to find work; and for him the duty to work was essentially about "[putting] one's heart into one's job and work[ing] hard".43
He also noted that in society, unlike local communities, the contribution one makes in one's work seems remote and unreal, and since it makes a small contribution, it is hard to develop a sense of loyalty around this form of participation.44 Therefore, it seems that the duty to work was considered by Marshall to be more of a personal matter rather than an obligation toward society. Furthermore, although recognizing duties as part of citizenship, Marshall, like other liberal thinkers, did not link citizens' access to rights with fulfilling these duties.45
Here Marshall's theory of social citizenship shares with traditional liberal thought one dominant principle: citizenship is first and foremost about holding rights, without substantive obligations to participate in public life. In other aspects, as mentioned above,
Marshall departed from traditional liberalism. The liberal model of citizenship traditionally focuses on civil rights and freedoms, and places much weight on the market as the source of welfare, thus advocating only minimal intervention on behalf of the state. In contrast, according to Marshall, social rights are inherently part of citizenship, derived from the status
42 Ibid, at 78. 43 Ibid, at 80. 44 Ibid, at 78-80. It can be argued, of course, that even a small contribution makes a different in society and that, if we add each person's contribution to the collective effort, we can all contribute a significant change in society. Marshall does not deal with this argument but rather addressed work as a personal matter. 45 It is true that Marshall does not directly address the theoretical debate regarding the balance between the rights and obligations of citizenship, and he also does not explicitly reject the possibility of making social rights conditional upon a particular form of social participation. Stuart White points to this vacuum in Marshall's theory as part of his argument that the idea of social citizenship can be accommodated according to a contractualist conception of social rights that are conditioned upon labour market activities: "I can see no warrant, textual or contextual, for attributing to Marshall a conception of social rights that is intrinsically exclusive of work-testing or other forms of welfare contractualism". Stuart White, "Review Article: Social Rights and the Social Contract - Political Theory and the New Welfare Politics" (2000) 30 British Journal of Political Science 507 at 512. White may be right to argue that Marshall does not directly argue against a social obligation to work. However, looking at bis work in general, it is clear that Marshall's main focus and concern was to provide citizens with social rights that are not linked with or depend on market forces. The discussion of citizenship obligations is a minor part of his overall theory.
39 of citizenship and independent from employment contracts and the market. It is the state that is placed under the obligation to provide certain goods and services to its citizens to guarantee the enjoyment and fulfillment of their social rights.4*
After World War IE, the social-democratic model of the welfare state gradually replaced the liberal model in many countries. This model puts forward an increased involvement of the state in many social areas such as social security, health, education, housing and employment. During the 1960s and 1970s, when countries experienced economic growth, the idea of an extended welfare state was widespread in Western Europe, mainly in
Scandinavia but also in other countries. There, welfare state entitlements were granted the status of rights rather than merely assistance or charity.47 Although the degree of social rights and social spending varied in different countries, as a whole, the dominant agenda focused on providing more welfare benefits and promoting social goals.48 The expansion of the social-democratic regime was possible because countries enjoyed not only economic growth but also full employment. This was a necessity for maximizing tax revenues, on the one hand, and to minimizing the number of people drawing state benefits, on the other hand.49
The social-democratic model has emerged, on the whole, in response to the destructive impacts of capitalism and the liberal model of the welfare state, which left many citizens deprived.i0 It rejects the idea of the free market as the source of citizens' welfare and also the idea of narrowing welfare benefits to meet only minimal needs. Rather, the social-
46 Marshall, supra note 16 at 54. See also Barbalet, supra note 10 at 18-19. 47 Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 90-91; Joel Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Blame Welfare, Ignore Poverty and Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 166-167. 48 For a further discussion of fee development of the welfare state during these years, see Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 121-135. 49 Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 94; Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, supra note 17 at 28. 50 Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 23.
40 democratic model pursues a welfare state that "crowds out the market" and can guarantee
"equality of the highest standards".51 Following Marshall's ideology and within a strong
'rights discourse' of social citizenship, the social-democratic model views the state as having an extensive responsibility to guaranteeing citizens' social rights by redistributing the proper resources and developing welfare services. The social-democratic model is aimed, therefore, at achieving de-commodifiying programs by separating the right to social income from wage labour and the market. It sees the welfare state as a mean for restraining the market and lessening the negative impact of capitalism. For that purpose, the social- democratic model widens social rights to cover more than the absolute needs of the citizen to meet the average living standards in society.32 This does not mean, however, a complete release of the citizen from market dependency. Rather, the goal of the welfare state is to prevent poverty and allow citizens to stay outside the market, for certain periods of time when needed, without falling on hardship. This is achieved, Esping-Andersen notes, in two ways:
First, the extension of rights beyond the narrow terrain of absolute need; and second, the upgrading of benefits to match normal earnings and average living standards in the nation. In reference to the former, what mattered especially was the introduction of a variety of schemes mat permit employees to be paid which pursuing activities other than working, be they child-bearing, family responsibilities, re-education, organizational activities, or even leisure. Such programs are, in spirit, truly de-commodifying. With respect to me latter, the crucial
51 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, supra note 17 at 27-28. 52 Ibid, at 44-47. The social-democratic model is also aimed to release the family from the responsibility for ensuring welfare. Rather than assuming that the family takes care of children and the elderly, under the social- democratic model, the welfare state provides social services that allows individuals to be independent not only from the market but also fromth e family. As Esping-Andersen explains, "the result is a welfare state that grants transfers directly to children, and takes direct responsibility of caring for children, the aged, and the helpless. It is, accordingly, committed to a heavy social-service burden, not only to service family needs but also to allow women to choose work rather than the household". Ibid, at 28.
41 issue was that the status of welfare client should impose no decline in living
standards, even ova- an extended time.
Beyond the principle of de-commodification, which is one of the economic aspects under the social-democratic model, the welfare state also has a moral goal: classless justice and solidarity among citizens. Building class solidarity is done through the principle of universalism, that is to say, social entitlements are not conditioned upon belonging to a certain class or union but rather are given to all citizens based on their different needs; these entitlements are also structured according to middle-class standards. This, as Esping-
Andersen notes, was very dominant in the Swedish welfare state: "The formula was to combine universal entitlements with high earnings-graduated benefits, this matching welfare-state benefits and services to middle-class expectations"/4
C. From a 'Rights Discourse' to a 'Duties Discourse'
1. The Pressures on the Welfare State
The post-World War II period was generally characterized by a positive approach toward the welfare state. This period, known as the 'Golden Age of the welfare state,' took place between 1945 and the mid-1970s. These were years of rapid expansion in welfare state provisions and increasing social security expenditures. Even countries that rested mainly on a liberal model of the welfare state gradually extended, to some degree, their welfare programs.35 The general understanding and implementation of the welfare state, as noted above, reflected a 'rights discourse' that viewed social citizenship in terms of citizens' entitlements to social benefits and state responsibility to provide some kind of a safety net.
53 Ibid, at 46. 54 Ibid, at 69. See also Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 91 ("In theory, benefits are universal and solidaristic; they are not based on previous earnings or work performance"). 55 Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 94-95.
42 Since the early and mid-1970s, a narrower vision of the welfare state again took centre stage when states could not continue to afford welfare expenses.56 What caused this shift? Why has the welfare state's ability to answer citizens' welfare needs declined? Scholars present different explanations for these changes. Paul Rerson argues that the pressures on welfare states mainly resulted from domestic social changes. He points to four main transitions in western welfare states. First, the growth of productivity slowed down as a result of the shift in employment from increasingly efficient manufacturing activities towards less dynamic and more stagnant service industries. In service provision, the opportunities forproductivit y improvements were relatively limited and the outcome was a slowdown in overall productivity and economic growth. This process led to a decline in wages and to higher unemployment, thus reducing tax revenues while simultaneously increasing welfare expenditures. Second, welfare states faced budgetary pressures because of commitments made during the post-war years, when they took upon themselves the mission to extend welfare programs and benefits, especially in the areas of health care and old-age pensions. In time, when economic growth slowed, these previous commitments slowly increased fiscal stress. Third, population aging created new pressures for welfare states. As birth rates declined and life expectancy increased, states had to cope with the higher demand for welfare support by the elderly, meaning an additional increase in pensions and health care spending. And fourth,th e interaction between family and work changed when the structure of the household shifted from the traditional breadwinner model to the dual-earners or the single-parent households. The massive entry of women into the labour market required states to provide families with different welfare services, such as daycare services, where previously women themselves within their households provided childcare. Simultaneously,
56 It should be noted that an objection to the expanded welfare state were voiced during the post-war 'Golden Age' by scholars and policy-making on both left and right. These voices became more dominant, however, when the welfare state began facing social and economic circumstances that made it harder to cope with welfare needs and expenditures. See Christopher Rerson, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 136-137.
43 maternity and parental leave entitlements expanded to ensure women's right to participate in the labour force. States also faced the need to fill the income gap for single-parent households, usually headed by women, whose earning capacity was limited. All of these factors further increased the burden on providing public social benefits.57
While Pierson focuseso n domestic occurrences, others focus more on the effect the global economy has on local markets. Until the early 1970s, most economic activities took place within the boundaries of nation states and were regulated under domestic legal systems.
Since the mid-to-late 1970s, the introduction of new or improved information and communications technologies led to more dynamic and widely dispersed markets. Business capital and migrant labour began moving across borders, corporations became transnational, private international investment and trade increased, and economic competitiveness grew.
The global economy forced governments to keep their domestic markets flexible, efficient, innovative and competitive. Doing so meant allowing and encouraging local corporations and businesses to produce globally market high-value, low-cost products while still offering foreign capital an attractive investment environment. States could not isolate their own welfare affairs from global pressures. They faced tough competition frommarket s that were less regulated and restricted in terms of welfare and employment regulations.58
For a summary of these factors and a further discussion, see Paul Pierson, "Post-Industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare State", in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 80 at 83-99 [Pierson, "Post-Industrial Pressures"]. See also Gosta Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 1 at 6-9 [Esping- Andersen, "After the Golden Age?"]; Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 95-99; Anton Hemerijck, "The Self-Transformation of the European Social Model(s)", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Why We Need a New Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 173 at 179-183 [Hemerijck, "The Self- Transformation"] . 58 These developments and pressures are discussed in Hemerijck, "The Self-Transformation", supra note 57 at 183.
44 2. Introducing the duty to work
These circumstances provoked an increasing concern among scholars and policymakers regarding the functioning of the welfare state. Advocating a return to the principles of liberal capitalism, they argue that
[T]he welfare state is an ill conceived and unprincipled intrusion upon the welfare- maximizing and kberty-maximizing imperatives of a liberal market society. It is inconsistent with the preservation of freedom, justice and real long-term welfare.59
The solution, commonly promoted, was to re-adopt the liberal narrow vision of the welfare state and free the market from state intervention. According to Esping-Anderson, "the gist of the policy was to manage economic decline and domestic unemployment with greater labour market and wage flexibility.Thi s has involved social policies, primarily in terms of reducing the social wage and legislated or de facto minimum wages"60 In practice, governments have gradually taken measures to narrow their welfare systems, which include cutting welfare expenditures, introducing selective criteria in welfare programs, encouraging policies of privatization and decentralization of welfare services, and turning down social legislation.61 In addition, and most significant to our discussion, several governments
Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 46. See also Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 3 at 355-356; Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, supra note 17 at 9. Very often, academic scholars and policymakers mistakenly assign this position to the 'New Right'. In practice, there are several political visions or agendas that indeed share a concern about the welfare state but differ in their theoretical position and point of focus. Brenda Cossman divides them into fiscal, libertarian and social conservatives. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address the elements of each political vision or the differences between them. For a detailed account see Brenda Cossman, "Contesting Conservatisms, family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency" (2005) 13 American Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 415 at 431-439, 460-465. 60 Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age?", supra note 57 at 15. 61 Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State, supra note 18 at 153-154. This was very dominant in the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Other countries responded to economic and social changes in different ways, although they were not necessarily more successful. The Scandinavian states adopted a strategy of employment expansion, social service expansion and gender equalization, while the continental European states preferred to reduce labour supply through the mechanism of early retirement. In time, though, even those countries also adopted a certain depee of welfare state erosion For an overview of the different strategies and their success see Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age?", supra note 57 at 10-15, 18-20; Gosta Esping- Andersen, "Towards the Good Society, Once Again?," in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Why We Need a New
45 introduced the 'duty to work' in their welfare legislation and policies, requiring citizens to find a paid job as a precondition for welfare benefits.62 Among the many policymakers and scholars who advanced the 'duty to work', two leading scholars who were influential in their agendas are Lawrence Mead from the US (identified with neoliberalism) and Anthony
Giddens from the UK (identified with the Third Way). In essence, their agenda advocates moving people from welfare into the labour market to reduce welfare expenditure and to free the economy from external barriers. The following sections describe the key principles of their agendas.63
Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1 at 11-17 [Esping-Andersen, "Towards the Good Society"]; Pierson, "Coping with Permanent Austerity", supra note 19 at 431-456; Hemerijck, "The Self- Transformation", supra note 57 at 184-187. 62 In the US, the requirement to work was implemented in the 1988 Family Support Act. for more about the American legislation, see Desmond S. King, "Citizenship as Obligation in the United States: Title II of the Family Support Act of 1988", in Ursula Vogel & Michael Moran, eds., The Frontiers of Citizenship (Houndmils: Macmillan, 1991) I. See also Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 47 at 179-183. The UK also implemented a duty to work in its welfare policies and programs such as the New Deal for Young People, New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed People, and New Deal for Lone Parents. See Robert Walker & Michael Wiseman, "Making welfare work: UK activation policies under New Labour" (2003) 56 International Social Security Review 3; Desmond King & Mark Wickham-Jones, "From Clinton to Blair: The Democratic (Party) Origins of Welfare to Work" (1999) 70 The Political Quarterly 62. For a Canadian example, see Dorothy E. Chunn & Shelly A.M. Gavigan, "Welfare Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the 'Never Deserving* Poor" (2004) 13 Social & Legal Studies 219. For the Australian experience see John Burgess et at, "The Developing Workfare Policy in Australia: A Critical Assessment" (2000) 29 Journal of Socio-Economics 173. It should be noted that the attack on the welfare state was accompanied by an increased concern about the erosion of the traditional family and a desire to strengthen marriage and the two-parent family. The discussion in this chapter does not deal with this concern and I will return to it in Chapter V when I address the implications of the duty to work in Israel. 63 My aim here is not to criticize these approaches or to determine whether their justifications are persuasive or not. The purpose of the following discussion is merely to present the core elements of the new ideologies regarding the welfare state and the social obligation to work. This discussion is aimed to provide the basis for characterizing the nature and justification of the duty to work, as well as the sanctions for not fulfilling it. For general critiques of Neoliberalism and the Third Way see Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age?", supra note 57 at 16-17; Joel Handler, "Myth and Ceremony in Workfare: Rights, Contracts, and Client Satisfaction" (2005) 34 Journal of Socio-Economics 101; Martha T. McCluskey, "Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State" (2003) 78 Indiana Law Journal 783; Sarah Hale et al, eds.,The Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures, Alternatives (UK: Manchester Unviersity Press, 2004); Chris Pierson, "Lost Property: What the Third Way Lacks" (2005) 10 Journal of Political Ideologies 145.
46 1. Lawrence Mead
Lawrence Mead suggests coping with the increased rate of unemployment, poverty and welfare expenses by narrowing the welfare state and obligating the poor to search for work in the labour market. Committed to free markets and economic growth, Mead blames the welfare state for creating hostility toward the market. The welfare state, according to him, encourages the poor to remain passive and dependent on welfare benefits without taking responsibility for improving their living standard. The welfare state thus is the source of the problem; it perpetuates idleness and dependency by reducing citizens' motivation to be self- reliant. The core weakness of the welfare state is not necessarily the wide-ranging social rights and generous benefits but the fact that these are given to citizens without requiring them to work in return. Social policies erred, Mead argues, in not treating the behavioral problem of non-work: "m the face of problems of personal conduct, [social programs] offered essentially only benefits".64 This statement indicates a dominant element in Mead's ideology - the dysfunction of the poor. For Mead, the underclasses are lower-income people with "functioning problems such as difficulties in getting through school, obeying the law, working and keeping their families together. These characteristics, in turn, are traceable to an unstable family life, marked by absent fathers, erratic parenting, and low self-esteem and aspiration".65 Mead distinguishes between the 'deserving poor', who work and function well, and the 'undeserving poor', who do not work and generally have serious behavioral difficulties, like joblessness. Unemployment, according to Mead, "has more to do with
64 Lawrence M. Mead. Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Macmillan, 1986) at 47 [Mead, Beyond Entitlement}. 65 Ibid, at 22. Michael Novak also sees the crisis of poverty and dependency as being rooted in the personal behaviours of the poor who "are not demonstrating the behaviors expected of free and responsible citizens". Michael Novak, The New Consensus on Family and Welfare {Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987) at 4. He focuses his attention on two groups - Blacks and single mothers - as the ones having the most serious behaviour difficulties. They are 'behaviorally dependents' since, according to Novak, it is their own behaviour which leads them to depend on the state or other citizens.
47 functioning problems of the jobless themselves than with economic conditions".
Unemployment is often understood by Mead as voluntary non-work, which means that
"jobseekers often choose to remain jobless rather then take the jobs most accessible to them".67 Put differently, the poor are the source of the problem, since they are 'picky job- shoppers' who do not accept work if it does not meet their expectations. Mead admits that unemployment and social inequalities may result from market barriers, but he claims that these impediments are too difficult to remove and, in any case, the main problem is not with the market but with the unemployed themselves who do not keep their jobs. Again, this is a
'functioning' problem. It has to be solved, Mead believes, under authoritative social policy that is aimed to teach the needy how to function better.68
Since the problem derives from the poor who lack the ability or the willingness to cope with market participation, providing them with opportunities and benefits is not the answer.
Social policies, thus, have to set the standards according to which poor people must function.69 These standards have to be formulated as social obligations and be enforced under the law.70 One of these obligations is the duty to work - the responsibility to earn a
Mead, Beyond Entitlement, supra note 64 at 24. For a similar opinion see Novak, supra note 65 at 11 -12. 61 Mead, Beyond Entitlement, supra note 64 at 70. 68 Ibid, at 41-45. Mead acknowledges that his approach seems to carry with it a 'blaming-the-victim' agenda. Mead rejects this criticism, however, and argues that his approach is not aimed at blaming or coercing the needy but rather to "persuade them to blame themselves" (in original). Ibid, at 10. In his opinion, the poor cannot produce, by themselves, fee sense of responsibility that is expected fromeac h citizen - the responsibility to be economically independent. Thus, society has to structure its social policy to enforce such compliance. 69 Mead uses the term 'paternalism' to describe the social policies that take supervisory steps in order to make sure that the poor meet certain behavioural requirements. He compares traditional welfare policy with paternalist welfare policy and argues that while the main limitation of traditional policy was that it left the poor free to choose their own way of dealing with poverty, paternalist policies are more demanding in nature and they involve close supervision on the choices made by the poor. See Lawrence Mead, "The Rise of Paternalism", in Lawrence Mead, ed., The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997) 1 at 2-3. See also Novak, supra note 65 at 12. 70 Mead explains the need for enforcement mechanisms by arguing that poor people will not work unless they are required to do so. Out of several explanations regarding the phenomenon of voluntary non-work, Mead focuses on the non-economic ones. He argues that the jobless remain unemployed as a way of protesting against the expectation that they will accept "dirty" jobs: "For an individual that protest usually means nothing more demonstrative than claiming government benefits when menial work in fact available". Mead, Beyond Entitlement, supra note 64 at 78. Another explanation why people do not work is cultural - the jobless hold the
48 living and be economically independent. Work, according to Mead, is no longer just an expression of self-interest but is an obligation citizens owe to their society. A citizen has an obligation to be independent rather than a burden on society.72 In other words, work shifts from being a formo f citizenship participation to a duty of citizenship. Seeing the market as the arena for producing welfare, Mead argues that citizens are responsible to insure themselves against social risks through the labour market. For this purpose, the poor have to develop the necessary capacities and skills needed to adapt to the dynamic and flexible nature of the current capitalist economies. Thus, responsibility shifts from the state to the citizens themselves who are expected to be self-reliant and self-governing.7j To move citizens from welfare to work and motivate them to fulfill their social obligation of joining the market, Mead calls for condition welfare privileges to be dependent upon active participation in the labour market. Namely, welfare benefits should be complemented by the duty to work. According to Mead, therefore, welfare is no longer an entitlement; it is a reward given only to those who join the workforce.74 Fulfilling the duty to work is thus a precondition for full and equal citizenship, Mead argues, given that "equality is not so much an entitlement status, as an activity. To be equal, an American must do things, not just claim them".75
'wrong' values. They do not share with the rest of the population the 'right' work ethic. This is reflected, for example, in welfare mothers' behaviour: "Rather than accept a work obligation, they feel society should support them in their role as mothers". Ibid, at 81. See also Novak, supra note 65 at 4. 71 Novak, supra note 65 at 84. 72 Mead, Beyond Entitlement, supra note 64 at 70. 73 Novak, supra note 65 at 4. For him, shifting the responsibility fromsociet y to individuals is the best means to encourage the poor to try toovercom e the obstacles in the market. See also Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1984) at 228-229. He advocates shifting responsibility not only to the market, but to family and friends as well. 74 Mead, Beyond Entitlement, supra note 64 at 145; Novak, supra note 65 at 75, 111. For a detailed explanation of how mandatory programs produce their effects, see Lawrence Mead, "Welfare Employment", in Lawrence Mead, ed., ITte New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997) 39 at 57-70. 75 Mead, Beyond Entitlement, supra note 64 at 239. Also according to Novak, a 'full citizen' is one who fulfills social obligations. See Novak, supra note 65 at 13,73.
49 2. Anthony Giddens and the Third Way
The Third Way is an agenda aimed to reconstruct the familiar ideas of old-style social democracy and adapt them to the changing global order. A particular leading scholar who provides the basic ideology of the Third Way is Anthony Giddens. His theory "is an attempt to transcend both old-style social democracy and Neoliberalism".76 Giddens aims to moderate Neoliberalism by using what he considers to be the noble ideas of social democracy: solidarity and egalitarianism.77 He shares Mead's concern about the passive citizen and advocates for more active living: "We need more actively to accept responsibilities for the consequences of what we do and the lifestyle habits we adopt".78
Unlike Mead, however, Giddens does not focus on the function of the poor and does not blame them for their dependency or for being inept. He believes the source of the problem is a function of the state itself. While recognizing the possible moral hazard of providing high welfare benefits to the unemployed, Giddens holds the welfare system itself responsible for this danger rather than the recipients. It is the system that offers the unemployed the opportunity to remain outside the labour market, and so the unemployed, as rational actors,
Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal ofSocial Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) at 26. The main limitation of Neoliberalism, according to Giddens, is the tension between two of its core elements. On the one hand, as seen above, Neoliberalism is devoted to the ideas of the free market and limited state intervention. Markets will deliver welfare if they are left to operate freely. On the other hand, Neoliberalism sees the traditional family and nation as necessary for social order. This, according to Giddens, is self- contradictory: "Individualism and choice are supposed to stop abruptly at the boundaries of the family and national identity, where tradition must stand intact But nothing is more destructive to tradition than the 'permanent revolution' of market forces. The dynamism of market societies undermines traditional structures of authority and fractures local communities; Neoliberalism creates new risks and uncertainties". Ibid, at 15. At the same time, Giddens criticizes old-style social democracy for underestimating the benefits of capitalism and dominant markets. He also argues that this model is built upon certain characteristics and elements of family life and market functioning which are not necessarily relevant to our time - such as a traditional family model (which is composed of a husband, who is the breadwinner, and a wife who is a caregiver); mass production; full employment; and citizens who are willing to take any job to support their families. This model, Giddens argues, does not fit the current nature of the market. Ibid, at 16. 77 Giddens asks to distinguish his agenda from Mead's agenda, which might lead, he argues, to extreme levels of inequalities. Ibid, at 25. 19 Ibid, at 37.
50 take advantage of this possibility. Giddens does not leave the citizen alone in the battlefield. He is interested not only in an active citizen who is responsible for his choices but also in an active state that invests in its citizens and helps them to fulfill their duties. The state may change its shape to adjust to the new circumstances of the global economy,
Giddens notes, but it still has the responsibility to provide citizens with welfare and security.
The market, in his opinion, cannot replace the state in these areas.80 The role of the welfare state, thus, is not abolished.
Giddens accepts, nevertheless, that the welfare state cannot retain its former structure where unemployment benefits actually serve as a shelter from market forces, thus "[creating] perverse consequences that undermine what [welfare benefits] were designed to achieve".81
The welfare state must be reformed, Giddens argues, to incorporate and encourage its citizens to participate in active lifestyles of its citizens. Similar to Mead's agenda, he claims that the new politics of the welfare state should be based on the idea of wo rights without responsibilities: 'Unemployment benefits... should carry the obligation to look actively for work, and it is up to governments to ensure that welfare systems do not discourage active search".82 Benefits need to be reformed to encourage an "active risk-taking attitude", which should be cultivated "wherever possible through incentives but where necessary by legal obligations"83 Giddens refers to this model as 'positive welfare', under which citizens
Ibid, at 115. Thus, when introducing his vision of the welfare state, and citizens' obligation, Giddens explains that a policy aimed to present a duty to work should be designed to cover all citizens and not just the poor or the needy in order to avoid the Mead's agenda of blaming-the-victim. Giddens argues that "we can't blame the erosion of civility on the welfare state" and suggests solving this crisis by strengthening local community life, including welfare responsibilitiesan d family relationships. Ibid, at 79-80. For more about these elements in the Third Way agenda, see Peter Dwyer, "Conditional Citizens? Welfare Rights and Responsibilities in the late 1990s" (1998) 57 Critical Social Policy 493 at 496. 80 Giddens, supra note 16 at 48-53. 8I/6M at 113. 82 Ibid, at 65. 83 Ibid, at 122. On the surface, arguably, Giddens uses a softer tone than the one used by Mead, but in practice both obligate the unemployed citizen to look for work and condition welfare rights upon the willingness to participate in the labour market.
51 create and contribute to the overall welfare of society. Under this model, idleness is replaced with initiative and citizens are expected to recognize their personal responsibilities, both to themselves and society.84 Giddens does not explicitly condition citizenship upon fulfilling the duty to work. For him, however, citizenship means inclusion in the public sphere and one form of this inclusion is participation in the labour market (another form is education.)
Reintegration into the labour market, therefore, is a route to reestablishing social citizenship.85 While citizens are obligated to actively look for ajob, the role of the state is to enable them to be part of the labour market by investing in their human capital through education and training. Instead of redistribution of benefits, Giddens argues, the welfare state has to focus on the redistribution of opportunities in the education system and the labour market.86
3. Understanding the Duty to Work: Being Independent from Society
Both Mead and Giddens integrate the duty to work into the welfare system and they both believe that the citizen should be economically independent. Their agendas, despite being different in certain points, are similar in the clear departure they take from the traditional understanding of social citizenship articulated by Marshall and reflected in the social- democratic welfare state. During the earlier manifestation of the welfare state, citizenship was understood to be a status independent of labour participation and work was considered iAIbid. at 117. 85 Ibid, at 102-103. In practice, when the Third Way was implemented in the UK, the duty discourse central to the ideology behind the reform of fee welfare state. The dominant approach conditioned rights upon the fulfillment of duties. As Tony Blair declared in 1997, "a decent society is not based on rights. It is based on duty. Our duty to each other to all should be given opportunity, from all responsibility demanded" (quoted in Ruth Lister, "From Equality to Social Inclusion: New Labour and the Welfare State" (1998) 55 Critical Social Policy 215 at 222). For more about the implementation of the Third Way in the UK, see Dwyer, supra note 79 at 499-513. For further discussions about the expression of the Third Way in other European countries, see Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 133-139. 86 This is what Giddens calls 'the social investment state', which uses the weapons of education and paid work to fight the social exclusion of those who are at the bottom. Giddens, supra note 76 at 109-110, 117. Job opportunities should be developed in accordance not only with the needs of the market but also in response to the needs of the family, and attention should be placed on family-friendly workplace policies. Ibid, at 123-125.
52 to be a form of participation that needed to be supported, or enabled, by providing social rights. Today social citizenship rests upon the duty to work. What is the purpose of this new structure of social citizenship? Why are citizens required to work?87 The main concern of recent welfare reforms, as discussed above, is to free the market from state intervention and external barriers, such as welfare expenditure and labour regulation. Long-term welfare dependents are the core problem; they are a burden on society because they do not earn a living and turn to the state for welfare services. In response, the reforms require the unemployed to enter the labour market and earn a living, thus releasing society from the need to support them. Underlying this agenda, as noted, is the belief that citizens should be economically independent and that self-reliance of citizens is essential to ensure the free, flexible and efficient functioning of the market88 As Desmond King notes, underlying the new duty to work is "a central role attributed to working as the basis for self-sufficiency and competence amongst citizens", and as a requirement forth e "transition of welfare recipients from dependency to employment and toward self-sufficiency".89
As noted earlier. I do not take a stand about whether the duty to work should or should not be a requirement for social citizenship. In addition, despite certain problematic aspects in their agendas, I do not aim to assess whether Mead and Giddens currently applied their approach to the welfare state. My departure point is that a duty to work has become an integral part of our current welfare systems, as both Mead and Giddens advocate, even though they differ in their perspectives and justifications. 88 Of course, people can achieve economic independence in different ways. While some reach this position by marrying a wealthy partner or receiving an inheritance, most people have to be engaged in some sort of paid work to reach economic independence. Working people, and especially the ones that failed to achieve the goal of economic independence, are at the centre of the current welfare reforms. In other words, since the idea behind the new agendas is to avoid being a burden on society, full citizenship is achieved by becoming self- reliant, whether through the labour market or not. The attention today, however, is directed toward those who cannot become self-reliant without the support of the state, and for them paid work becomes the route to full citizenship. 89 Desmond S. King, "Citizenship as Obligation in the United States: Title H of the Family Support Act of 1988", in Ursula Vogel & Michael Moran, eds., The Frontiers of Citizenship (Houndmils: Macmillan, 1991) 1 at 10. It should be noted that the notion of individualism is more dominant in Mead's writing than in the ideology of the Third Way. As the discussion above has shown, Giddens tries to soften Mead's approach and still aims to promote notions of solidarity and state responsibility toward the citizens. See the discussion above near footnote 79-80.
53 Indeed, many scholars agree that recent welfare reforms and the requirement to enter the labour market reflect the ideals of independence and individualism.90 Expecting citizens to be economically independent remains true to basic notions of liberalism: individuals are autonomous, independent human beings who have no special attachment to society and who exercise their freedoms and rights separately from others. In that sense, the duty to work is aimed at achieving two principles of classic liberalism. The first is the idea that the individual is, or should be, independent from society. Participation in the labour market is assumed to ensure citizens' social needs and interests, thus allowing them to be self- sufficient rather than a burden on society. In other words, being economically independent allows citizens to live their life in an autonomous way without the need to rely on others for welfare support. The second principle is that the rights of the individual should not be limited or threatened by other individuals' activities and choices. Citizens, who are already participating in the labour market, whether as employers or employees, are required to contribute a smaller portion of their resources and can better utilize their freedoms and liberties in the market, once the long-term unemployed enter the market and welfare expenditure declines, tax burdens decline. By requiring individuals to enter the labour market, the duty to work pushes individuals to fulfill the liberal ideal of autonomy and independence. Its justification is also strongly attached to the 'rights discourse' that, as previously explained, understands citizenship in terms of possessing rights. The unemployed are encouraged to enter the market where they can utilize their rights. At the same time, they release their fellow citizens from the burden to support them through the welfare system, thus allowing these citizens to make better use of their own rights. In other
90 See, for example, Esping-Andersen, "Towards the Good Society", supra note 61 at 4-5; Ruth Lister, "Towards a Citizens' Welfare State: The 3 + 2 'R' s of Welfare Reform" (2001) Theory, Culture & Society 91 at 100; Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 140; Cossman, supra note 59 at 470; Martha A. Fineman, "Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse", in Martha A. Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds., Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation ofMotherhood (New York: Columbia University Press 1995) 205 at 208.
54 words, through the welfare system, the duty to work promotes the key ideas of liberal citizenship.91
While indeed corresponding to the elements of independence and individualism, the duty to work does not fit two other core features of liberal citizenship. The first feature is the balance between rights and duties. Welfare reforms, as discussed, advocate the idea of the
'active citizen' and condition welfare rights upon labour market participation. Under liberal citizenship, however, rights are not conditioned upon participation and full citizenship is not conditioned upon fulfilling duties. The second feature is the notion of the contributing to the
'common good'. Giddens, for instance, places the duty to work within a broad agenda of increasing civic involvement and the bond between citizens and society.92 For him, the duty to work is part of a renewed civic culture. He advocates for 'an active civil society' where individuals carry a responsibility, not only to themselves, but also to their fellow citizens, thus strengthening society as a whole.93 As Novak also explains regarding the duty of the citizens to enter the labour market, "on the personal ledger, a sense of responsibility is essential to self-respect and to a fulfilling life. On society's side, it is essential to the good of the whole... The nation values self-reliance; both the good of individuals and the common good depend on it".94 Mead himself indicates that the duty to work is "the obligation to be
It is not surprising that the duty to work was structured within the 'discourse of rights', especially in the U. S., given the strong emphasis on civil rights and individual liberties. For more about the attachment of the new duty to the 'rights discourse' in the U.S. see Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract-Versus-Charity", in Bart Van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994) 90. 92 Giddens, supra note 76 at 78-86. 93 Ibid, at 78. 94 Novak, supra note 65 at 13. Referring to the American culture, Novak indicates that the national ethos of self-reliance, which used to be flie dominant one in the U.S. for two centuries, has been eroded when poverty and dependency became widespread. This national ethos of "self-control, self-mastery, self-determination and self-reliance", Novak argues, needs to be rebuilt for fee poor to achieve independence and for the benefit of the common good. Ibid, at 13-16. Novak does not explain what the common good is. Given the principles of liberalism, it seems, however, that the common good is manifested here in a society where citizens are 'free' and the economy is 'free' as well in terms of state intervention.
55 independent from society as a way of showing a responsibility to the common good". Yet, as discussed above, classical liberal theory refuses to promote or even to encourage the citizen to contribute to a certain 'common good' because it might limit individuals' own interests and interfere with what is considered to be their private preferences. How does the new duty to work, as an integral part of social citizenship, fit the liberal ideal? Can the liberal discourse of citizenship fully explain or justify the duty to work?
Mead and Giddens do not provide an answer.96 Lawrence Becker argues that in light of the unreflective bias of liberalism against citizenship duties, the answer should not be provided within the discourse of citizenship. Analyzing the duty to do socially useful work, he notes that
Liberalism teaches that there is something natural, fundamental, and inescapable about people's right to liberty... an obligation to work for the benefit of others is seen as artificial rather than natural and as something which - if it can ever be justified at alL must be subordinate to the demands of liberty.97
Therefore, Becker continues, the duty to work is "artificial rather than natural" to the discourse of liberal citizenship and "its moral basis lies in the ongoing human artifacts known as social institutions rather than in an imaginary state of nature".98 He then turns to the principle of reciprocity to justify the duty to work. He explains that "citizenship
95 Mead, Beyond Entitlement;, supra note 64 at 70. 96 Mead is using a paternalist justification for the duty to work. According to his agenda, the non-working poor do not act according to their awn test interest; they do not actively participate in the labour market and thus do not achieve self-sufficiency. In Mead's view, it is the responsibility of society, then, to force citizens to act according to their best interests, that is, to force them toreestablis h self-discipline and enter the market to make their living. See the discussion above near footnotes 64-75. For more about Mead's paternalist agenda, see White, supra note 45 at 523-528. 97 Lawrence Becker, "The Obligation to Work" (1980) 91 Ethics 35 at 39.
56 obligations may be thought of as the institutionalized demands of our benefactors for reciprocity" and that citizens have an obligation "to make a proportional return of good for a good received".99 Since each citizen lives off, in one way or another, the work done by others, each citizen has in return the obligation to work and produce a good which others can enjoy.100 As part of his theory of welfare constractualism, Stuart White also justifies the duty to work by turning to the principle of reciprocity, however, within a framework of social citizenship. He argues mat there should be a contract between the citizen and society according to which society provides social rights to the citizen only if the citizen behaves in a satisfactory manner and actively searches for a job. Once the citizen displays 'proper behavior', he or she is eligible for the unconditioned right of reasonable access to welfare.101
This social contract reflects, according to White, the principle of fair reciprocity as a requirement of distributive justice. According to White, "it is intrinsically important that citizens who share in the social product make a reasonable effort to ensure mat others also benefits from their membership in the productive scheme and, on the flip-sideo f this, that they do not burden their fellow citizens".102 White is aware that his arguments regarding welfare contractualism violate the traditional concept of the unconditional quality of rights.
To answer this concern, he turns to the writings of early social democrats, such as Marshall, and shows that welfare benefits are typically conditional on some sort of productive
'"Ibid, at41. 100 Ibid, at 39-43. Becker then moves to discuss whether the duty to work should be enforced by law, a question that I do not deal with in this thesis. See Ms discussion, ibid, at 43-47, 101 White distinguishes between two understandings of social rights. The first one is the ultimate right to unconditional welfere resources, and the second one is the unconditional right of reasonable access to welfare resources. The later interpretation is the appropriate one, in his opinion, and it is compatible with his theory of welfare contractualism. White, supra note 45 at 510. 102 Ibid, at 513. He further argues that the principle of fair reciprocity is an expression of the ethic of solidarity, where a citizen makes a reasonable effort to provide Ms fellows citizens with the goods and services that he produces through work in return for the goods and services provided to him by his fellow citizens. Ibid. For more about restructuring social citizenship as a social contract, see Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 132-141.
57 contribution. He sees the duty to work as implicitly included in the duty to pay taxes that
Marshall embraces as part of his concept of citizenship.103
White is indeed correct in turning to Marshall's theory of citizenship since, as discussed above, Marshall certainly includes duties as an integral part of citizenship and he does not rej ect the notion of conditioning rights upon fulfilling duties. However, neither Marshall nor
White deal with the traditional liberal concept that rights are not preconditioned upon obligations. Aiming to provide an answer to this dilemma, Joseph Carens takes up the challenge by examining whether the duty to contribute to society (which he also refers to as the duty to make good use of one's talents and skills) is compatible with core liberal principles.104 He admits that the duty to contribute limits individual preferences and freedoms, and thus, on the surface, is undesirable from a liberal perspective. Yet, he further argues mat this duty is "a necessary condition if all individuals are to enjoy equal freedom".105 Turning to Rawlsian principles of liberalism, Carens sees the duty to contribute as a component of the duty to support just institutions, a duty that Rawls includes as part of the natural duties that liberalism acknowledges. He argues that, while this duty might restrict one's liberty, it also enhances others' liberties, and as long as it is not too demanding or too costly to oneself, it actually supports required institutions in a just society.106 As also noted in the beginning of this chapter, in contrast to classical liberalism, contemporary liberals do
White, supra note 45 at 511. As part of his proposed theory, White also explains that certain conditions of fair reciprocity must be in place, i.e., a guarantee of a decent share of the social product for those meeting the minimum standard of productive participation; decent opportunities for productive participation; equitable treatment of different forms of productive participation; and universal enforcement of the minimum standards of productive participation. Ibid, at 515-521. 104 Referring to the expression "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs", Carens assumes that "individuals have an obligation to contribute as much as they are capable of contributing to the productive output of society". He seeks to determine whether liberalism leaves some room for a positive obligation (contrary to negative obligations, such as the obligation not to violate the law or other individuals' rights). Joseph H. Carens, "Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society" (1986) 14 Political Theory 31 at 32-33. 105 Ibid, at 36. 106 Ibid, at 36-45.
58 not completely reject the notion of citizenship duties. They accept a limited scope of obligations that are aimed to empower citizens and help them better exercise their rights.107
The duty to work indeed aims at achieving this goal. Pushing individuals into the labour market aims, as discussed above, to encourage them to pursue their own self-interest, that is, to achieve economic independence.
The question of how to balance the liberal commitment to freedom with the duty to work and contribute to society is indeed a difficult one. I do not aim here to resolve this dilemma but to present a certain understanding, based on liberal principles, of the new structure of social citizenship and the nature of the duty to work. To summarize the discussion so far, today, social citizenship is conditioned upon labour market participation. This new duty is one facet of a general agenda aimed at minimizing state intervention and freeing the market from labour regulation and the burden of welfare expenses. The duty to work returns to a narrow liberal model of the welfare state and requires citizens to work for their benefits, thus freeing the state from the need to intervene in the functioning of the market to support them.
The understanding of the new duty mainly focuses on the ideal of individualism and independence: citizens are required to work because it is their responsibility to earn a living and become economically self-reliant. The sanction for not fulfilling the duty to work, within this discourse, is structured within the rhetoric of rights. Those who remain outside the labour market are excluded from welfare benefits and social protections. They do not have access to the same social rights and resources as their fellow citizens.108
See the discussion above, near footnotes 10-11. One can argue that the duty to work is a relatively narrow citizenship obligation in the sense that it is applied to a small group of people out of the whole population. Indeed, the long-term unemployed are a small percentage of society and, in practice, the duty to work is limited in terms of its application to the population as a whole. This explanation, however, is weak because it is built upon specific circumstances and does not resolve the contradiction between the principle of 'the right is prior to the common good' and the emergence of the new duty to work. 108 See Handler, Social Citizenship, supra note 34 at 46-55.
59 Part II: Providing a Broader Perspective of the Duty to Work: Contribution and Belonging
Current welfare reforms, as we saw above, introduce a new citizenship obligation: the duty to work. This is indeed a departure fromth e traditional liberal structure of citizenship under which rights are not conditioned upon active participation. Still, as discussed above, the new approach does not completely remove itself from liberal principles. It structures the duty to work and the sanctions for not fulfilling this duty in individualistic terms: the citizen is required to be independent and, if he does not meet his duty and finds himself excluded from the labour market, he is entitled to fewer social rights. The citizen remains detached from society, whether he fulfills his duty or not. The primary element in this agenda, as argued above, is the requirement to become independent rather than a burden on society, while the secondary element is the expectation that one will make a contribution to society as part of an overall need to increase civic involvement. This agenda, however, does not comfortably fit into the traditional liberal understanding of citizenship, as it imposes the notion of the 'active citizen' and conditions full citizenship and the entitlement of rights upon fulfilling a duty to work and making a contribution to the general will.
There is another line of reasoning to follow when analyzing the new duty to work. The tradition of civic-republicanism may offer a few insights that can provide a better analytical framework to explain the duty to work and social citizenship. Drawing on the civic- republican model of citizenship, my purpose here is to broaden the understanding of the duty to work and its justification by further emphasizing contribution to the common good as a core aspect of this duty. Based on the notion that citizenship duties express the commitment of citizens and the connection between them, I will argue that the duty to work
60 signifies a practice that contributes to society and in return establishes a sense of belonging among citizens.
The discussion begins with the core aspects of civic-republicanism. Similar to liberalism, civic-republicanism is a rich and comprehensive theory that relates to different elements of life. I will therefore present here only the central ideas of this theory that present the notions of participation, contribution and belonging as intrinsic aspects of citizenship, which both derive from and establish social ties between individuals.110 Then, I further develop the notion of belonging through the discussion of 'the politics of belonging', aimed to show that duties of citizenship are political projects of belonging. The chapter ends by applying these concepts to the duty to work thus setting a new understanding of this duty.
A. The Civic-Republican Model of Citizenship
Civic-republicanism is a traditional school of thought rooted in the writings of Aristotle,
Machiavelli, Rousseau and Tocqueville. In recent years, civic-republicanism has been
It should be clear that I do not intend to critique liberalism itself or replace the current individualist understanding of the duty to work, and I do not intend to discuss whether liberalism and civic-republicanism necessarily contradict each other in their analysis of the new duty. By using elements of civic-republicanism, I aim to build a framework that provides the best and most comprehensive understanding of the duty. In practice, as I will later explain, the duty to work at the present time reflects elements of both liberal individualism and civic-republicanism. For a general discussion of interaction between liberalism and civic-republicanism, see Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Egalitarianisin and Civic Republicanism: Friends or Enemies?", in Anita Allen & Milton Regan, eds., Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 131. In fact, several scholars believe that liberalism and civic-republicanism can work together and that they are not necessarily contradictory. See, for instance, Richard Daggar, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism (oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 110 Indeed, recently there is a revival of interest in civic-republicanism and many scholars address different aspects of the traditional theory. As noted above, I will focus only on the elements of citizenship duties that are most relevant for understanding the new duty to work. I do not aim to apply all elements of civic-republicanism to this duty or to discuss the possible implementation of these elements on the Israeli society as a whole. Jerold Waltman provides a discussion of the modifications needed to implement civic-republicanism in the UK. See Jerold Waltman, "Citizenship and Civic-Republicanism in Contemporary Britain" (1998) 40 The Midwest Quarterly 93. For a general discussion of civic-republicanism and more specific discussions of its approach to the notions of freedom, non-domination and self-government, see Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Philip Petit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Philip Petit, "Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner" (2002) 30 Political Theory 339; Iseult Honohan & Jeremy Jennings, eds., Republicanism in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006); Richard Dagger, "Neo-republicanism and the Civic Economy" (2006) 5 Politics, Philosophy and Economic 151.
61 revisited and modernized by Adrian Oldfield who conceptualizes the idea of citizenship in terms of citizens' duties towards society. Oldfield critiques the notion of liberal individualism, under which the individual is atomistic and independent of society and other individuals. He argues that autonomous individuals are social beings who derive their identity from the social roles they hold within a certain community. This community, according to Oldfield, provides individuals with their social identity, which is an expression of their collective life. This shared identity binds one individual to another and to the community as a whole. In such a community, therefore, individuals are not strangers but friends who depend on and are responsible for each other. These ties are the basic components of individual identity. Thus, according to Oldfield's vision, the individual isnot an abstract subject but has certain particularities that tie him to the community. The bonds and social identities that tie individuals together are what integrate them into a community.
In other words, belonging to a community provides individuals with their social identity, which is "bom in part from self-determination, and in part from a common history, or language, or continued occupancy of the same territory".111 Oldfield further explains that, while under the liberal-individualist conception, individuals create social ties and take upon themselves obligations to the wider society based on reciprocity of self-interests, in civic- republicanism,
[t]he social bonds between die citizens are not contractual but are based upon sharing and determining a way of life. It is shared commitment toth e practice which makes individuals
111 Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modem World (London: Routledge, 1990) at 7 {Oldfield, Citizenship and Community]. See also his discussion at 20-27. Michael Sandel similarly argues that by viewing the citizen as an abstract and universal subject, liberalism actually stripped the individual of any particularity resulting fromethnic , gender or religious affiliations. He describes this citizen as an "unencumbered self, who lacks a particular identity and personal characteristics. Such citizens, who are stripped of all particularity, cannot form a community that is bound by moral ties. See Sandel, supra note 4 at 85-87. Van Gunstere also maintains that the problem with individualistic citizenship is the lack of civic- mindedness that is required for a community to exist. See van Gunstere, supra note 3 at 39-40. See also Allen Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitatian Critique of Liberalism" (1989) 99 Ethics 852.
62 citizens, and in the process creates and maintains that social solidarity and cohesion of the
community upon which the practice rests.
The community itself rests on the bond between individuals themselves. For a community to succeed and survive, individuals must be committed not only to their fellow friends but also to the community itself. They must perform certain duties aimed at building and strengthening their community. The element of contributing to society is therefore very dominant in the civic-republican community. Individuals are required to take part in protecting and advancing the common good to ensure the survival of their community.113
Unlike the liberal vision, where individuals' interests are prior to the general will, under civic-republicanism, the common good, which has to be carried out by the members of society, is prior to rights.114 Belonging to community, then, carries explicit duties with it.
These duties are attached to individuals' social identity:
Individuals do not only conceive themselves as bearing rights, nor is their posture to
forms of collective life solely instrumental. In particular, individuals recognize that
they have duties, duties which extend further than the minimally civic and respect
to others, and which are associated with the fact that they identify themselves
socially - as parents and children; as members of a class, a religion, or a race; as
112 Adrian Oldfield, "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?" (1990) 61 Political Quarterly 177 at 178. 113 Oldfield, Citizenship andCommunity, supra note 111 at 25-27. Amitai Etzioni provides a useful explanation of the 'common good': "The common good... connotes those goods that serve all of us and the institutions we share and cherish - for instance, national defense or a healthy environment. The common good is much more than an aggregation of all private or personal goods. It includes things that serve no one in particular... and it serves members of generations not yet bom... Contributions to the common good often offer no immediate benefits, and frequently it is impossible to predict on whom such benefits will fall in the long run. Still, we invest in it not because it will necessarily or even likely benefit us, or even our children, but because we consider it a good to be nourished". Amitai Etzioni, The Common Good (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) at 1. Etzioni provides a similar link between obligations, the individual and the community. He explains that communities are an essential element that constitutes individuals as human beings and they provide the environment where individuals can fully develop and flourish, and therefore individuals have the responsibility to protect the community and nurture its identity. Ibid, at 19-22. 114 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 153.
63 neighbours and friends; as carrying a trade or profession; as acknowledging a
common nationally (emphasis added).115
The devotion or willingness to attend to the ends of the community is known as civic virtue.
Under the civic-republican model of citizenship, individuals become citizens by identifying with and fulfilling this civic virtue. The test for citizenship is therefore the performance of duties. Citizenship is a practice rather than simply a status. The citizen has to be active, by participating in the community and fulfilling the civic virtue, to gain his citizenship. Full membership is gained when one fulfills duties and obligations. A failure to exercise the duties and practices of citizenship implies a limited or lack of citizenship. In Oldfield's own words,
The test of full membership ..., by which the individual becomes a citizen, is performance of the duties of the practice of citizenship. Within civic-republicanism, citizenship is an activity or a practice, and not simply a status, so that not to engage in the practice is, in important senses, not to be a citizen.116
The rights of the citizen under civic-republicanism, then, are derived the membership in a certain community and the fulfillment of the tasks needed for its existence.117 The performance of citizenship duties establishes a full membership, which is also then expressed in the rights given to the citizen. In other words, rights are attached to the status of citizenship, which is gained through the practice of obligations. The citizen is first and
Ibid. at 4. For a similar argument, see also Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 18-19. 116 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 5. See also his discussion ibid, at 27, 147. 117 As Janoski indicates, "citizens are expected to fulfill obligations and without expecting immediate return. Rights were to be fulfilled in the long run after citizens have fulfilled a large number of their obligations". Janoski, supra note 115 at 19-20.
64 foremost a 'bearer of duties' rather than a 'bearer of rights'.118 In return for carrying out these duties, the citizen establishes attachment to the community, social identity and a sense ofbelonging.
For Oldfield, citizens' commitment to the common good primarily means playing apart in the political process. Citizens are expected to be politically active, as this type of participation helps shape and ensure the future of the community. The emphasis on political participation within the civic-republican discourse of citizenship derives from the ancient
Athenian ideals of civic participation. In the Greek city-states, citizens met and thoroughly discussed major public matters. These activities were considered to be prior to any personal interests. Ann Philips describes the traditional understanding of political participation:
The emphasis was on active participation and on each being ruled and ruler in turn. Citizens weie expected to devote themselves to matters of general concern. Politics was no petty matter of protecting individual interest or concerns. The good citizen was he who transcended personal preoccupation to address die needs of the republic as a whole.119
Following the traditional model of citizenship activities, Oldfield places much weight on political participation as the main duty of citizenship and as an expression of devotion to society. Citizenship is a function that takes place, by and large, in the public domain. It is limited to the public sphere where individuals exercise their duties of citizenship, while the private sphere is left outside the boundaries of citizenship as the arena where the individual deals with merely private matters of family and friendship. This model, therefore, ignores a
1* 8 Oldfield. Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 159 ("... individuals become citizens by taking their civic duties seriously. Individuals are eligible for the status of citizen by virtue of being born and living within some territory, but they only achieve the status by acting accordingly"). 119 Ann Phillips, Engendering Democracy (Pennsylvania: Hie Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991) at 24.
65 substantive part of many citizens' lives, particularly the lives of women who devote much of their time to domestic responsibilities.120 Another constraint of the civic-republican understanding of community life is that it is exclusive in its nature. Civic-republicanism does not entail much respect for diversity and culture particularities that do not conform to the common good. As Oldfield himself puts it:
Citizenship is exclusive: it is not a person's humanity that one is responding to,i t is the fact
that he or she is a fellow citizen, or a stranger. In choosing an identity for ourselves we
recognize both who our fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of our
community, and thus are potential enemies. Citizenship cuts across both religious and
secular universalism and involves recognizing mat one gives priority, when and where
required, to one's political community. This does not entail an aggressive posture towards
strangers. It simply means mat to remain a citizen one cannot always treat everyone as a
121 human being.
Furthermore, the civic-republican vision of citizenship is difficult to implement in everyday life. As Oldfield maintains, "there is no warmth in life in such a community. Citizens are called to stern and important tasks which have to do with the very sustaining of their identity... it is not the kind of peace that permits a relaxed and private leisure".m In light of
Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 159. Oldfield is aware of the gendered implications of his theory but argues that women can fulfill civic virtues, even if they are characterized in masculine terms: "The practice of citizenship in a political community is an egalitarian practice, and one aspect of that egalitarianism is that the practice is not gender-specific". Ibid, This assumption, as well as the focus on the public sphere, was widely criticized in the feminist literature. These discussions are elaborated in the following chapters. 121 Ibid, at 8. Oldfield is aware of this constraint and advocates for the recognition and accommodation of multiple loyalties. He, however, does not elaborate how this should be done and merely points to possible conflicts. Ibid, at 157-158. For more about the limitation of civic-republicanism to adopt the principle of multiculturalism and group rights,se e Iseult Honohan & Jeremy Jennings, "Introduction", in Iseult Honohan & Jeremy Jennings, eds., Republicanism in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006) 1 at 12. 122 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 5. It is also argued that the civic-republican approach to citizenship does not fit people life in the modem world. Kymlicka and Norman explain that today people do not understand citizenship as being fulfilled in the public sphere but as a means to achieve goals in the private sphere. The idea of the good life is understood in terms of family life, work, religion and leisure rather than in terms of political activities. See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 3 at 362. More about the sphere
66 this difficulty, how can a community generate the commitment to be active? As Oldfield explains, society has to motivate and push its citizens to fulfill their duties. Empowering citizens and providing them with opportunities and resources are not sufficient, since these strategies do not necessarily create commitments and they leave room for citizens to eventually avoid participation. Given that the practice of citizenship is not natural and easy for individuals, they "have to be moulded and shaped for their role as citizens".123 This can be achieved through education and training: "Citizens are learners all their lives, and education in the sense of the building of the appropriate character for willing engagement in the practice of citizenship never ceases".124 People need to be taught, according to civic- republicanism, that the interests of the community are also their own and that contributing to these interests secures their ability to live the good life within the community.125
The notion of'independence', it should be noted, is not alien to civic-republicanism. In fact, as his Young explains, individuals are expected to be independent in order to efficiently participate in political activities: "if every citizen meets the needs of himself and his dependents through his own property, men citizens are immune to threats or particularist influence by others on whom they depend for their livelihood. With independence in this sense they may deliberate on equal terms and consider the merits of issues in terms of the
of 'private life' with relation to civic-republicanism see Lawrence Quill, Liberty after Liberalism: Civic Republicanism in a Global Age (Houndmills: Palgrave MacmiUan, 2006) at 4. 123 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note Hi at 8. Etzioai also indicates that "societies cannot rely on people to automatically do, of their own freewill , all that must be done without their being encouraged by their fellow men and women". Etzioni, supra note 113 at 2. For more about the 'creation' of the 'educated citizen' in the traditional civic-republicanism, see Quill, supra note 122 at 7. Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 28. 125 Ibid, at 164. Oldfield believes that motivating the citizen to fulfill citizenship duties does not undermine his autonomy. On the contrary, "those institutional supports that motivate individuals to engage in the practice of citizenship enable them to reach a degree of moral and political autonomy which a rights-based account cannot vouchsafe. Citizens govern themselves". Ibid, at 6.
67 general good". Indeed, being independent, self-governing citizens is an important civic virtue under civic-republicanism. At the same time, however, citizens in the civic-republican community have a responsibility and commitment to support their fellow citizens. As
Oldfield notes, "it is important that [individuals'] actions be informed by a sense of responsibility towards their fellow citizens. They must recognize their mutual dependence".127 In other words, citizens should aspire forindependence , but if they cannot achieve it on their own then the community has the obligation to support them so that they can fulfill their duties as citizens.128
To summarize the civic-republican approach, duties are an intrinsic component of citizenship and an expression of the solidarity and connection between citizens. The success of a community is fostered by the commitment of the citizens to contribute to and support the common good. In such a community, citizens are tied to each other and are responsible to participate in the core institutions and place general interests above their own. In such a community, citizens experience intimacy and a sense of belonging from which their duties derive, and in return, the fulfillment of these duties further fosters this belonging. The two
Iris Marion Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values" (1995) 105 Ethics 535 at 546. Richard Dagger also emphasizes the notion of independence, as non-domination, in the civic-republican tradition: "f WJhatever else people may want, they will want to be tree from domination because they will then have the ability to make plans, to speak with independent voices, and to be self- governing persons". Dagger, supra note 110 at 155. 127 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 27. 128 Oldfield only briefly refers to social rights when discussing the implications of civic-republicanism for practical policies. He accepts that social rights are a necessary element of full citizenship: Without health, education and a reasonable living income, for instance, individuals do not have the capacity to be effective agents in the world, and the possibilities of a practice of citizenship are thus foreclosed in advance. Such rights and resources have to be secured for citizens, for citizenship is an egalitarian practice. Ibid. 27-28. However, while Marshall encourages social entitlements as required for the enjoyment and fulfillment of civil and political rights and participation in all practices of citizenship, Oldfield focuses on the link between social entitlements and the fulfillment of duties without which Ml citizenship cannot be achieved. He also argues, as noted above, that merely providing rights and resources is not sufficient for ensuring that citizens indeed carry out their obligations, and that more persuasive measures should be taken. For more about the need to limit socio-economic inequalities in order to ensure political participation, see Dagger, supra note 110 at 154-155.
68 concepts of contribution and belonging are therefore closely attached together and they both serve as the founding elements in society.
B. Belonging and the Politics of Belonging
As noted, one of the main elements in the civic-republican model of citizenship duties is the bond among citizens and their social ties and identities, fromwhic h their sense of belonging arises as well as the duties themselves. As Oldfield notes,
Hie idea of community has less to do with formal organization than with a sense of belonging and commitment. The commitment is to others who share interests, or positions, or purposes, and it is also to those who, for whatever reason, are unable to look after their own interests or pursue their own purposes... it is this mat creates the sense of community; and it is this that creates citizens.129
Although being an important element ofhi s theory, Oldfield does not elaborate much on the meaning of belonging and its relation to the duties of citizenship. To better understand the notion of belonging within the context of the 'duties discourse', I now turn to the recent work of Nira Yuval-Davis who presents an analytical framework for understanding the concepts of'belonging' and the 'politics of belonging'.
1. Belonging and the Politics of Belonging
The notion of belonging, according to Yuval-Davis, has three different dimensions. The first dimension is that of social and economic locations, such as race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, profession, age-group or religion. This dimension answers the question 'to what or where do people belong' in terms of their affiliation to a certain group of people all
Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 173.
69 characterized with one or several main elements. Social and economic locations, Yuval-
Davis explains, have particular implications for the people who 'belong' into mem because of certain power relations in society, at certain historical moments and within certain contexts. Belonging, in that sense, reflects an individual's social position. Thus being a woman means not merely belonging to a certain gender and being part of the category
'women', but also living through particular experiences derived fromthi s belonging, such as inferior status and subordination.131
The second dimension, according to Yuval-Davis, relates to individuals' identification and emotional attachment to certain groupings. She explains that identities are narratives that relate, among other things, to what it means for a person to belong to a particular collective:
"[S]uch stories often relate, directly or indirectly, to self and/or others' perceptions of what being a member in such a grouping or collectivity (ethnic, racial, national. Cultural, religious) might mean".B2 Put simply, belonging becomes part of our identity. Being part of
The social location that is most relevant to my discussion is the national one. as I address women's belonging to the Israeli national collective. Many scholars in recent years refer to a post-national dimension of belonging and to the effects of globalization on the traditional concept of national belonging. This aspect of belonging is beyond the scope of my thesis and is less relevant to the discussion here, which focuses on belonging in Israel. For such a discussion, see, for example, Jacqueline Bhabha, "Belonging in Europe: Citizenship and Post-National Rights" (1999) 51 International Social Science Journal 11. 131 Nira Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging" (2006) 40 Patterns of Prejudice 197 at 199- 201 [Yuval-Davis, "Belonging"]. See also Elaine Thomas, "Who Belongs? Competing Conceptions of Political Membership" (2002) 5 European Journal of Social Theory 323 at 328-331. Certain social and economic locations can be flexible and changeable, and people's belonging is usually constructed of multiple social or economic locations. Belonging can, therefore, be understood as intersectional. See Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", ibid, at 199-200. 132 Ibid, at 202. Floya Anthias refers to the interaction between identity and belonging. She argues that "a sense of collective identity and a feeling of belonging to the country you reside in are neither necessarily coterminous nor mutually exclusive. You may identify but not fed that you 'belong' in the sense of being accepted or being a full member. Alternatively, you may feel that you are accepted and 'belong' but may not fully identify, or your allegiances may be split". See Floya Anthias, "Belonging in a Globalizing and Unequal World", in Nira Yuval-Davis et at, eds., The Situated Politics of Belonging (London: Sage Studies in International Sociology, 2006) 17 at 18-19. Anthias's explanation implies that belonging is not just about an emotional attachment to a collective but can carry two other meanings for some people. It can mean identifying with the collective and it can also mean being fully accepted as an equal member of the collective. These two meanings are of course not a necessary component in every person's sense of belonging. In fact, one might feel 'safe' and a 'real' attachment to her community, even though she is not, or does not feel like an equal member. The complexity of the meaning of belonging here results from the fact that this notion has many sociological and psychological aspects.
70 a cognitive story, the notion of belonging refers to emotional investments and a desire for attachments. It also refers to patterns of trust and confidence. Belonging here means the
'longing to belong' and it reflects social ties to individual experiences within acollective, be it a community, a nation or a state. Belonging, therefore, is not only an isolated private matter. It is "about emotional attachment, about feeling 'at home' and... about feeling
'safe'."133 Being an essential component in the social relations with other fellow citizens, this sense of belonging is a significant element in people's quality of life.134 Floya Anthias puts these notions in clear words:
Belonging is not... merely about forms of identification with groups, or with other
people. It is about the social places constructed by such identifications and
memberships, and the ways in which social place has resonances with stability of
the self, or with feelings of being part of a larger whole and with the emotional and
social bonds that are related to such places.13S
Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 197. Ulf Hedetoft and Mette Hjort also describe the interaction between the concept of 'home' and the concept of 'belonging' and their emotional, psycho- sociological aspects: Our home is where we belong, territorially, existentially, and culturally, where our own community is, where our family and loved ones reside, where we can identify our roots, and where we long to return to when we are elsewhere in the world. In this sense, belonging is a notion replete with organicist meanings and romantic images... the indicative, seemingly neutral. And very simple statement "home is where we belong" really means "home is where we feel we belong". See Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, "Mroduscion", in IM Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) vii. See also Nira Yuval-Davis et al, "Secure Borders and Safe Haven and the Gendered Politics of Belonging: Beyond Social Cohesion" (2005) 28 Ethnic and Racial Studies 513 at 528 ("Belonging therefore involves an important affective dimension relating to important social bonds and ties") [Yuval-Davis et al, "Secure Borders"]; Nira Yuval-Davis et al, "Introduction", in Nira Yuval-Davis et al, eds., The Situated Politics of Belonging (London: Sage, 2006) 1 at 4 [Yuval-Davis et al, eds., The Situated Politics of Belonging}. 134 Anthias, supra note 132 at 20; John Crowley, "The Politics of Belonging: Some Theoretical Considerations", in Andrew Geddes & Adrian Favell, eds., The Politics of Belonging: Migrants andMinorities in Contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 15 at 18;ElspethProbyn, Outside Belonging (New York: Routledge, 1996) at 13. Establishing a sense of belonging is important of course not just for the individuals themselves. It is also in the interest of society that its members feel as if they belong, otherwise it is likely that they will not feel obligated to contribute to and participate in society. 135 Anthias, supra note 132 at 21. See also Floya Anthias, "Beyond Feminism and Multieulturalism: Locating Difference and the Politics of Locating" (2002) 25 Women's Studies International Forum 275 at 277. See also Mike Savage et al, Globalization ami Belonging (London: Sage Publications, 2005) at 29; Ulf Hedetoft,
71 This aspect of belonging strongly relates also to commitment, loyalty and common purpose that individuals feel or identify with once they can establish a firmemotiona l connection to their collective. This second understanding of belonging is what I refer to in the thesis as 'a sense of belonging'. It means being part of a particular collective or a group not only in actual membership but also on an emotional level of a person's feeling that he belongs, that he is an inherent part of agroup and that he shares goals or experiences with that group. This dimension of belonging is also the one that the civic-republican model rests on.
The third dimension is that of ethical and political values. As Yuval-Davis explains,
"belonging is not only about social locations and constructions of individual and collective identities and attachments but it is also about the ways these are valued and judged".136 It is about the way society views social locations and the belongings that derive from them. It is about the standpoints and ideologies one might have regarding what constitutes belonging.
This third dimension, Yuval-Davis argues, relates to the notion of'the politics of belonging' that
... comprises specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular ways to particular collectives that are, at the same time, themselves being constructed by these projects in very particular ways.137
To better explain her argument, Yuval-Davis turns to Benedict Anderson's theory of the
'imagined community'. In his famous work on the nature of nations, Anderson argues that the nation is an 'imagined' political community in the sense that, even though the members of such a nation will never meet or know their fellow-members, "in the mind of each lives
"Discourses ami Images of Belonging: Migrants between New Racism, Liberal Nationalism and Globalization", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 23 at 24-25. 136 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 203. 137 Ibid, at 197.
72 the image of their communion". The members of such anation imagine certain social ties to their fellow-members that build deep solidarity and friendship among them. This nation,
Anderson adds, is always built around boundaries "beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind". °9 Drawing on these ideas, Yuval-Davis explains that
the politics of belonging is all about potentially meeting other people and deciding whether they stand inside or outside the imaginary boundary line of nation and/or other conununities of belonging, whether they are *us' or 'them'.140
The politics of belonging, thus, is aimed at maintaining the borders and boundaries of a certain society by separating its members into two categories: 'us' (those who belong) and
'them' (those who do not belong).141 Belonging here is not only a particular affiliation to a collective or an emotional attachment to a collective. It is also a product of constructing practices and institutions in a way mat sets boundaries around the political community and separates the population along the lines of 'us' and 'them'. By distinguishing those who belong from those who do not belong, these boundaries take part in establishing the meaning and sense of belonging for those who stand on each side of the boundaries. The
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1993) at 6. 139 Ibid, at 7. 140 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 204. See also Anthias, supra note 132 at 22. 141 The terms 'borders' and 'boundaries' are very central in the analytical framework of belonging and the politics of belonging. In a piece by Nira Yuval-Davis and Marcel Stoetzler, they differentiated between these two terms in the following way: 'borders' refer to the legal and territorial edges of a certain collective, while 'boundaries' refer to divisions and limit-lines within the collective. See Nira Yuval-Davis &. Marcel Stoetzler, "Imagined Boundaries and Borders" (2002) 9 The European Journal of Women's Studies 329 at 330 [Yuval- Davis & Stoetzler, "ImaginedBoundaries"].
73 ability to gain belonging therefore depends on how certain practices, values or projects
(torn which belonging is derived) are constructed.142
Political projects of belonging refer therefore to certain practices, mechanisms or institutions in society that entail or establish a sense of belonging and that may be structured in a way that does not allow all individuals to gain this belonging, thus building boundaries around the political community and differentiating between certain groups in society, based on their ability to establish this belonging. To illustrate how her analytical framework operates,
Yuval-Davis outlines different political projects of belonging in Britain. One is that of the
'cricket test', introduced by a Conservative minister in Thatcher's government during the
1990s. He claimed that if British citizens cheer for a team from a country from which they or their relatives originated, these citizens do not truly belong to the British collectivity. This
'cricket test' is a project of belonging, Yuval-Davis explains, as it aims to create solidarity and it establishes boundaries among citizens in terms of identification and emotional attachment.143 The New Labour's policies of assimilation are another example of a British project of belonging that was introduced in response to the multicultural policies of the
Labour party. As Yuval-Davis describes, in recent years several different measures were taken to integrate ethnic minority communities into British society, such as requiring the learning English to attain formal citizenship or encouraging people with ethnic background to find partners from families living in Britain rather than from their countries of origin.
Those who manage to assimilate into the British society are considered to be those who truly 'belong', while the others remain on the margins of their communities.144 Another
142 Nira Yuval-Davis, "Borders, Boundaries and the politics of Belonging", in Stephen May et al, eds., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 214 at 216 [Yuval-Davis, "Borders"]. 143 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 210. 144 Ibid, at 211. Using language as a project of belonging is common also in Canada, where certain regulations limit the use of French and force the use of English, thus creating a sense of alienation and exclusion among
74 ©cample is that of migration policies. In recent years, certain steps were taken to limit low- skilled foreign workers from migrating to Britain, while high-skilled workers were encouraged to settle and become formal citizens. The assumption behind these migration policies is that high-skilled workers are better able to assimilate and to belong to the British society. These policies were aimed, according to Yuval-Davis, to preserve a national collectivity by policing those who are allowed to enter, belong and become a future citizen, and by encouraging those who migrate to adopt British manners, thus establishing and proving their belonging to the British collective.145 What is common to all these policies and practices is that they all aim, implicitly or explicitly, to stimulate and inculcate a sense of belonging that is believed to be essential formaintainin g the boundaries of a certain political community. Furthermore, these policies and practices have the potential to single out those groups or individuals who do not meet to the requirements and prove their belonging to the collective, thus pushing them to the margins of society.
2. Belonging, the Politics of Belonging and Duties of Citizenship
Once setting out the general notions of belonging and the politics ofbelonging , Yuval-Davis turns to examine more closely how citizens gain belonging and become full members of a certain community. When setting the borders and boundaries between those who belong and those who do not, political projects of belonging often involve an evaluation of the criteria for achieving belonging. As Yuval-Davis puts it,
francophone communities. A good example here is the past restrictions on the use of French in (Marian schools. Such restrictions are in fact a mechanism for delineating a certain behavioral norm that affects the ability of citizens to create a sense of belonging to their society. See Marc Cousineau, "Belonging: An Essential Element of Citizenship - A Franco-Ontaiiam Perspective", in William Kaplan, ed., Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993) 137. 145 Yuval-Davis et al, "Secure Borders", supra note 133 at 517-520.
75 Much contemporary debates on the politics of belonging surround the question ...
what are the minimum common grounds - in terms of origin, culture and normative
behavior - that are required to signify belonging.146
Criteria of belonging can be passive or active. Some forms of belonging are passive in their nature, meaning that a person can achieve belonging by 'doing nothing'. These criteria of belonging include those that are defined in terms of origin, sex or religion. A person is bom
Jewish, or Israeli, or a woman. She meets all of these criteria without taking any positive action on her own behalf. Holding citizenship rights can also be passive grounds for belonging, as some people develop a sense of belonging to a certain collective by the mere feet that they are entitled to certain rights within this collective. Most grounds for belonging, however, rest on active normative behaviour, meaning that a person has to take a certain action to belong and to develop a sense of attachment. A good example here concerns belonging to a certain profession. A person cannot be bom into a profession, even if he is bom into a family that traditionally practices a particular profession. To belong to a particular profession, one must obtain the knowledge and skills required. Of course, several grounds for belonging can be considered passive for some people and active for others.
Being a Jew is a passive ground for someone who is bom Jewish, but it is active grounds for someone who wishes to convert to Judaism. However, even for someone who is bom
Jewish, belonging that is expressed in terms of identification and emotional attachment may still be conditioned upon taking active steps, such as practicing Jewish customs and traditions. It may also depend on how a certain community values and structures the practice
Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 207.
76 of Judaism, or, in other words, how Judaism is constructed in a certain community (thus actually becoming a project of belonging).147
These active grounds reflect what Yuval-Davis refers to as the 'performative' dimension of belonging in the sense that belonging is often aproduct or outcome of a certain behaviour or performance of an activity. For an individual to belong to a certain collective, he or she might need to follow repetitive or ongoing practices that serve as the precondition for achieving social attachments. Belonging, thus, is cultivated by adopting a certain behaviour or deed.148 In that sense, as Yuval-Davis rightfully explains, the notion of belonging is closely related to the participatory dimension of citizenship. Duties of citizenship, she notes, indicate "what is required from a specific person for him/her to be entitled to belong, to be considered as belonging, to the collective".149 Fulfilling duties of citizenship is therefore a ground for belonging; it evokes and activates a sense of belonging. In other words, duties are a possible route for achieving belonging and the mechanism through which people can position themselves within the group of those who fulfill them and contribute to society. 15°
This brings us back to Oldfield's argument about duties of citizenship: through duties, people can establish their sense of belonging and attachment to the collective to which they contribute. The concept of belonging in fact adds another dimension to the discourse of citizenship: citizenship is not merely about rights and duties, or the relations between
This demonstrates what is argued above, that is, that belonging in terms of social location does not always entail a sense of belonging. One can formally belong to a certain community but still not develop a strong sense of belonging. People who are bom into a certain religion but are raised secularly, for instance, may not have a strong emotional attachment to Judaism and their identity may not be structured around Jewish traditions. 148 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 203; Vikki Bell, "Performativiity and Belonging: An Introduction" (1999) 16 Theory, Culture & Society 1 at 3. 149 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging", supra note 131 at 209; Yuval-Davis etal," Secure Borders", supra note 13 3 at 526-527. 150 For more about the connection between participation and belonging, see James Tully, "Reimagining Belonging in Circumstances of Cultural Diversity; A Citizen Approach", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnatianal Self: Belongingami Identity(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 152 at 158, 165.
77 individuals and their state or community; citizenship is also about the emotions that are generated by such rights, duties and relations.
Given that the act of fulfilling citizenship duties may serve as a basis for belonging, the duties themselves should be understood as possible projects of belonging. As is shown in the examples provided above from the British experience, citizenship duties are arrangements from which belonging is derived. Their structure may affect individuals' ability to gain belonging, thus creating boundaries between individuals based on their performance. Those who fulfill the duty 'prove' that they identify with the community and are willing to contribute to the common good, thus earning the possibility of belonging to it.
Those who do not fulfill the duty stand on the other side of the border and may not be able to achieve a sense of belonging to the collective. The challenge then is to look at how duties are structured and whether they allow only certain groups of citizens to fulfill particular duties, thus creating a boundary between those who meet the requirements ofth e duties and those who do not and are excluded from establishing a sense of belonging and attachment to the collective.
C. Understanding the Duty to Work
Building on the civic-republican model of citizenship as well as the concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging, we should return now to the duty to work. Looking again at the current ideology of the welfare state, as discussed earlier, the new structure of social citizenship combines a liberal-individualist perspective of the citizen, as being a self-reliant working person, with a civic-republican model of citizenship, in which citizens must be encouraged to be active and in which citizenship is conditioned upon fulfilling duties. In fact, there is much in common between the current liberal-individualist perspective of the duty to work and the civic-republican tradition: both condition full citizenship upon active
78 participation; both integrate the element of duties into the structure of citizenship; and both believe in taking active measures to encourage citizens to fulfill their responsibilities. At the same time, there are also differences between the two perspectives and their implications on the duty to work. According to the liberal-individualist approach, the duty to work reflects the assumption that citizens should be economically independent and provide for their own needs thus releasing the market from the burden of supporting them. In contrast, under the civic-republican model of citizenship, the duty to work derives not from the expectation that the individual will be independent of society and responsible for his own needs, but rather from the connection and bond between individuals and their shared social identity and purposes. Individuals are required to work to fulfill the common good and the general interest of the community. They are required to participate in the labour market to help reduce welfare expenditures and contribute to the recovery of the economy. This is their contribution to the collective. While under the liberal-individualist approach, civic virtue is attached to the notion of the free market, under the civic-republicanism approach, civic virtue is rooted in the notion of serving and contributing to the community.151
The way we justify the duty to work is not the only difference between the liberal- individualist and the civic-republican approach. Two additional distinctions can be made here with respect to the 'gain' from fulfilling the duty to work and 'loss' from not fulfilling it. First, under the liberal-individualist perspective, as discussed above, obligations are
151 It should be noted, however, that not all kinds of paid work would be accepted under the liberal-individualist and the civic-republican models as serving the wide interest of society. Some occupations or jobs may be considered to have damaging effects on society, even if the people who perform them are economically independent. Activities that damage and pollute the environment, for instance, are socially detrimental and they would probably not be seen as Mfilling the duty to work, even though those who perform them are being paid and are not a burden on welfare expenditures. The same might be said about prostitutes, who may indeed provide for themselves but are usually seen as having negative implications on society as a whole. Activities that are harmful, even if they provide those who perform them with economic independence, cannot answer the requirement of contributing to the common good, and therefore would not likely to serve as a basis for establishing solidarity and belonging. As Becker defines, the duty to work refers to the obligation to do socially useful work. Such work can be one "whose beneficiaries are all the members of the group which imposes the obligation" or that "produces (or contributes to) a public good". See Becker, supra note 97 at 35.
79 attached to rights; the duty to work is attached to welfare entitlements. Those who fulfill their duty avoid the risk of poverty and gain welfare support and economic independence.
They stand alone among their fellow citizens without the need to ask for support. Civic- republicanism adds another element to this picture. Under civic-republicanism, obligations are first and foremost attached to membership in society. As projects of belonging, duties of citizenship provide the individual not only with formalmembershi p in but also with a 'sense of belonging' to the collective. This sense of belonging establishes an attachment and a link to a citizen's community, and a connection between individuals, all from which individuals define their social identities.152 In this sense, participating in the labour market not only provides individuals with economic independence but also with a deep connection to the society in which they live. Indeed, being independent, as noted above, is an important value under civic-republicanism as well. However, this notion of independence does not mean that individuals are detached from each other and that they should learn to stand alone in their struggle for welfare. The principle of independence is the tool, or the mechanism, for making a contribution to the common good. Each individual's independence is needed for the benefit of the whole. Independence is a relevant principle even under the civic- republican understanding of the duty to work, but is not the main principle: it is a route for achieving full membership. This framework of belonging and attachment to society provides abroad and supportive basis for imposing the duty to work. It provides a 'thicker' notion of community and support.153 It establishes an environment where it is easier to motivate citizens to fulfill their obligations. They are not left alone to cope with the
132 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 172-173. 153 Quill, supra note 122 at 8. Indeed, scholars emphasize the importance of the notion of 'community' under civic-republicanism. As discussed above, a central civic-republican critique of liberalism is its lack of 'community sense', where individuals are assumed to be detached from their socio-historical situation. Civic- republicanism brings the community to &e centre and advocates for a strong bond between individuals, and between them and their community. This bond can create a supportive environment for the individuals to fulfill their citizenship duties. For more about the 'thicker notion of community' under civic-republicanism, see Beiner, supra note 6 at 37.
80 difficulties of meeting these obligations, but rather enjoy the support of their fellow citizens or the institutions in the community. They draw their strength frombot h the community and their sense of belonging.
Second, the liberal-individualist and civic-republicanist approaches differ in how they treat the consequences of not fulfilling the duty to work. Under the liberal-individualist approach, the sanction for not fulfilling this duty is a denial of social rights, which then results in poverty and economic dependency. Under civic-republicanism, the sanction is understood in terms of belonging. An individual who does not take up the duty to work is simply not a citizen, not in a formal sense of residency and citizenship, but in a substantive sense of being part of the mainstream collective and enjoying an attachment to society. A second-class citizen here is someone whose attachment to society is weak. The denial of rights is merely a second stage. It results from the individual not being a full and equal member of the collective. In that sense, beyond being an expression and expectation of self-reliance, the duty to work is a political project of contribution and belonging. Indeed, this duty is not aimed at creating boundaries in society and at differentiating between people. It reflects a new political goal to encourage the unemployed to enter the labour market and to become self-sufficient in order to reduce state expenditures. The duty to work, however, has the potential impact on the way in which the boundaries are constructed within society. The duty to work is the renewed civic virtue that serves as a central element in the structure of citizenship. It is the route for becoming a first-classcitize n in terms of gaining a sense of belonging. Those who participate in the labour market are considered to be contributing to the common good. The duty to work distinguishes between those who become self- sufficient and those who, through their inability to find paid employment, do not meet the new duty to work. It reflects a political goal that affects the way citizens build the boundaries around their collective and understand who is included and who is not.
81 The question is, however, whether the theory of civic-republicanism can easily apply to labour market participation, given that its main focus is on political participation. Even
Oldfield himself understands the duties of citizenship to include first and foremost "the exercise of judgment on common affairs".154 Indeed, in the classical civic-republican theory, politics was indeed meant to be dominant in all aspects of social life. As Lawrence Quill notes, "the classical model of political life, although depended on a slave class, rejected the relevance of manual labor which was regarded as a curse from theoretical discussions of civic life".155 This traditional conception of civic-republicanism should be restructured, however, to correspond to the modem world, where citizens find interest not only in politics but in a variety of practices and where it is impossible for all citizens to take part in the political process, whether because there is no room for everyone in such a process or because citizens are required to devote their time to fulfill other goals.I56 Furthermore, politics is not the only practice that contributes to or ensures the existence of society. Labour is needed to guarantee the continuity of society as well. Citizens' labour is required for the process of society-building and even once society is well established, labour is needed to provide services and lead society forward in response to social, economic or cultural changes.157 In fact, Oldfield himself implies that politics is not the only practice and duty of citizenship. In the end of his discussion, he notes that "because modem societies are plural and heterogeneous, citizens who are properly motivated will find that there is much else that they can do. To a large extent, they will choose where to be active and, when and where
154 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 147. 155 Quill, supra note 122 at 36. 156 Ibid, at 18. 15' Quill analyzes the integration of labour into tivic-republicanism. He indicates that there were a few republicans who viewed labour as a practice of citizenship. He refers, among others, to the writing of Rousseau who saw labour as a significant social and political activity, "a form of public service forming part of a national work ethic that would energize the nation". For Rousseau, experiencing the hardships of work could be beneficial "for developing a sense of civic obligation to others and a sense of belonging to the community at large". Ibid, at 37.
82 they are active, they will create a sense of community". This approach opens the door to a variety of practices, such as labour, that contribute to society and can establish a sense of belonging.
Yet even if we understand 'active citizenship' to include contributing to society through the labour market, it is still not clear whether labour market participation meets the civic- republican definition of citizenship as "acknowledging the community's goals as one's own, choosing them, and committing oneself to them".159 Today, work is mainly understood and acknowledged as a private self-interest. People join the labour market first and foremost to provide for themselves and achieve personal goals, such as social status and professional satisfaction. Most people, whether they work as a personal choice or because welfare laws force them to work, do not join the workforce because they are committed to their society's interest in having a strong economy. Can we still see them as the 'active citizens' under the civic-republican model of citizenship? I think the answer should be apositive one. Indeed, it is hard to disconnect the individualist aspect of the duty to work from the current structure of social citizenship. Most societies today are built upon a liberal tradition where the values of individualism and independence are deeply rooted in the concepts of citizenship, work and welfare. Furthermore, most of the activities that citizens perform in the public domain have some aspect of self-interest. When citizens choose to participate in political organizations or run for a political position, even though this form of activity indeed implements the civic- republican ideal of 'living one's life publicly', for the most part the choice of political life reflects personal and private self-interests. Beyond serving society and achieving political goals, political positions are not mat different than any other labour market positions in
158 Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, supra note 111 at 174. Earlier in his discussion, when he refers to the principle of self-government, Oldfiled also notes that this principle should not be understood in a narrow political sense, "where 'political' is meant 'that which is open to has an effect on everyone within a community, and which is open to change by collective action on the part of members'". Ibid, at 28. 159 Ibid, at 8.
83 terms of achieving economic independence, social status and personal ambitions.
Nevertheless, whether dealing with political activities or labour market participation, and in light of the current structures of societies and the values they hold, the focus should be placed on the outcome of public activities rather on the question whether these activities reflect aspects of private life and self-interest.160 Furthermore, there are societies, like Israel, where the notions of duty and the common good are a central component of citizenship, and where belonging to the collective is defined in terms of active participation. In these societies, the civic-republican interpretation of the duty to work is still very relevant. Yet, even in societies where the notion of duty is peculiar to their structure of citizenship, civic- republicanism and the notion of duties as political projects of belonging can still facilitate a broader basis for justifying the duty to work and motivating for individuals to fulfill it.
Conclusions
Citizenship is a link between individuals and society. A central debate among scholars and policy makers is whether to conceptualize citizenship in terms of rights or obligations, or both. To address this dilemma, this chapter has presented two schools of thought. The first i s the liberal tradition that sees rights as the core element of citizenship. It prioritizes the rights of the individual and understands citizenship as being composed of strong unconditioned rights and weak restrictive obligations. The second is civic-republicanism that places much weight on civic virtues and the interests of the wider society. It requires the individual to actively participate in public institutions to gain his or her membership. The fulfillment of duties is the integrative force that provides the individual with a sense of belonging and community membership. This debate is of central importance when one looks at the recent
160 Indeed, even Oldfield himself admits that citizens' private life cannot be ignored. Ibid, at 8. It seems that he is willing to place the focus on •whether there is some aspect of public life in citizens' activities, an aspect that, in my opinion, should be measured by looking at the outcome of the activities rather than merely the intensions and commitment of the citizens.
84 changes in the welfare state and the way social citizenship has been redefined by policymakers around the world. Social citizenship used to be understood within a 'rights discourse', meaning in terms of providing social rights and entitlements that aim to protect citizens against the risks of the market and reduce poverty. Today, the understanding of social citizenship is structured within a 'duties discourse' that requires citizens to enter the labour market and seek economic independence. Citizens no longer enjoy unconditioned welfare entitlements, guaranteed by the state This 'duty to work' means that the individual has the responsibility toward himself and society to ensure his welfare without relying, i.e., being a burden on society. The mainstream understanding of the duty to work today presents a liberal-individualistic approach according to which individuals should aim to be self- sufficient and responsible for their own welfare. By fulfilling the duty to work, they gain autonomy and independence. The discussion above has presented another way of looking at this new citizenship obligation. Based on a civic-republican understanding of citizenship and the politics of belonging, the duty to work is a form of contributing to society and participating for the benefit of the common good. It is part of state-building. The individual is required to work as a way of expressing his or her belonging to society. The duty to work derives from societal attachment rather than from the need to be independent and separate from society. Those who carry out the duty to work can establish a path into the collective that enables individuals to share, institute or renew their shared identities.
The Israeli welfare system provides an interesting example of the broader understanding of the duty to work that was discussed in this chapter. It reflects both the expectation of individuals to become economically independent and the requirement for them to make a contribution to the national common good. The next chapter will review the structure of
Israeli citizenship and the development of the duty to work in the Israeli welfare system.
85 Chapter II The Duty to Work in Israel: Past and Present
Part I: The Early Duty to Work A. The 'Duties Discourse' and the Zionist Project: Establishing the Duty to Work B. The Welfare State and the 'Duties Discourse' C. The Scope of the Duty to Work Part II: The Decline of the 'Duties Discourse' and the Rise of Liberal Citizenship A. The First Phase: State's Responsibility Instead of Citizens' Duties B. The Second Phase: The Rise of the Liberal Discourse of Citizenship Part IH: The Return of the Duty to Work A. Is There Still a 'Duties Discourse' in Israel? B. The Welfare Reform and the Renewed Duty to Work 1. The Background to the Welfare Reform 2. The Changes in the Welfare System 3. The Responses to the Reform 4. Understanding the Duty to Work
In most countries, as discussed in the previous chapter, the practice of work has only recently been established as a duty of citizenship. It is a product of many welfare reforms aimed to recover local markets and reduce governments' expenditures. This new citizenship duty mainly reflects a liberal-individualist agenda aimed to help citizens stand on their own and be independent of society. In Israel, however, the case is quite different. First, the duty to work is not anew component of Israeli citizenship. Historically, it was part of citizens' greater obligation toward the Zionist project: establishing a Jewish home in the land of
Israel. Full membership during the early years was preconditioned upon fulfilling duties toward the collective, and social rights were given to create solidarity and strengthen nation- building. Second, as part of this structure of citizenship, the duty to work has always
86 reflected more than the individualist understanding; it rests on the idea that citizens are expected and required to contribute to their society, and from this contribution their belonging and attachment to the collective emerges.
Discussions of citizenship in Israeli literature do not devote much attention to the duty to work or its place in the structure of Israeli citizenship. Most writing focuses on either defining the conceptual framework of citizenship, or analyzing the citizenship status of certain groups in Israeli society, such as Palestinians or ultra-orthodox Jews.1 When addressing the 'duties discourse', the duty of military service is the one the mentioned most frequently.2 Yoav Peled and Gershon Shaflr are two leading scholars in the area of Israeli citizenship. I draw upon their work to understand the place ofth e duty to work in the general structure of citizenship in Israel. At the same time, there is much writing about the welfare state and social rights in Israel. I rely on the work of Abraham Doron and John Gal, who are leading scholars in the area of welfare in Israel. My intention in this chapter is to combine these two areas of research - citizenship and the welfare state - to make several observations regarding the development and nature of the duty to work in Israel.
Peled describes the political culture in Israel as composed of three citizenship discourses: liberalism, civic republicanism and ethno-nationalism.3 As discussed above, liberal citizenship focuses on the rights of the individual, which serve as the basis for establishing membership in the community. Citizenship, therefore, is derived from rights possessed by
1 See, for instance, Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli]; Yoav Peled & Gershon Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel, 1948-93" (1996) 28 Int. J. Middle East Stud. 391 [Peled & Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking"); Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype" (1997) 2 Israeli Studies 198; Baruch Kimmerling, "Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel" (1999) 6 Constellations 339. 2 See, for instance, Sara Helman, "From Soldiering and Motherhood to Citizenship: A Study of Four Israeli Peace Protest Movements" (1999) 6 Social Politics 292. 3 Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State" (1992) 86 American Political Science Review 432 [Peled, "Ethnic Democracy"].
87 the individual. Civic republicanism, by contrast, understands citizenship in terms of fulfilling duties aimed to accomplish the common good. Belonging to a community, according to civic-republicanism, carries explicit duties with it, and the individual is required and expected to take part in protecting and advancing the common good. The third citizenship discourse, which plays an important role in the Israeli political culture, is ethno- nationalism. Like civic-republicanism, the ethno-narionalist notion of citizenship also rejects the individualistic nature of liberal citizenship, but unlike civic-republicanism, which focuses on the common good of a community as a whole, ethno-nationalism is concerned with a certain kind of a community: the nation or ethnic group. Citizenship, under this approach, is understood as membership in a particular homogenous ethnic group and is conditioned upon a certain ethnic belonging.4
All these three citizenship discourses are relevant when looking at how the duty to work was constructed and allocated in Israel. Its development can be divided into three stages. At first, the duty to work was conceived as part of a civic-republican model of citizenship, which included ethno-national elements. Labour was constructed as a national duty required as part of nation-building. Later, when the civic-republican discourse of citizenship was replaced by a liberal one, the emphasis shifted fromcitizens ' obligations to individual rights and the duty to work receded. In recent years, with the introduction of welfare reform, the duty to work returned to prominence, but this time, it rests on both individualist and collectivist agendas.
The discussion in this chapter tracks these three phases and is also built in three parts. The first part addresses the establishment of the 'duties discourse' in Israel and the early duty to work. The second part addresses the decline of the 'duties discourse' and the rise of the liberal discourse of citizenship. The discussion in these two parts rests, as mentioned above,
4 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
88 on existing scholarship. It does not make new historical arguments, but is aimed to review certain developments and policies from which we can learn about the 'duties discourse' in general and the duty to work in particular. The third part of the chapter addresses the return of the duty to work and brings my own contribution to understanding the 'duties discourse' and the duty to work in Israel. Based on the discussion in the previous chapter, the third part shows how the renewed duty to work reflects both the requirement to become economically independent and the requirement to make a contribution to the national common good. The duty to work, it is argued here, can provide the citizen with a path to welfare rights and economic independence, on one hand, and with a path to belonging and attachment to the
Israeli collective, on the other.
Part I: The Early Duty to Work
A. The 'Duties Discourse' and the Zionist Project: Establishing the Duty to Work
Our discussion begins with the prologue to the Zionist project during the Yishuv period (the
Jewish community in pre-1948 Palestine). Its core purpose was to establish a Jewish home in the land of Israel.3 For the success of the Zionist project, Shafir and Peled explain, the
Yishuv was founded as "an ethno-republican community, committed to common moral purpose - the fulfillment of Zionism".6 The civic virtue associated with the Yishuv was pioneering {chalutziyut) and to be virtuous meant to be a pioneer who devotes oneself to the
5 There is much writing about the Zionist project and movement. For a general discussion see, for instance. Ben Halpem & Jehuda Reinharz, Zionism and the Creation of a New Society (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 2000); Dan Horowitz & Moshe Lisak, Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine under the Mandate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Claude Klein, "Zionism Revisited", in Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ed., Israel Democracy at the Crossroads (London: Routledge, 2005) 238. 6 Peled & Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking", supra note 1 at 398. For a further discussion of the ethno- national nature of the Zionist project and the state of Israel, see Bernard Susser & Eliezer Don Yehiya, "Israeli and the Decline of the Nation-State in the West" (1994) 14 Modem Judaism 187; Oren Yiftachel, "Ethnocracy: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine" (1999) 6 Constellations 364.
89 project of nation-building. The newcomer was required, under the ethos of pioneering, to sacrifice his or her social and personal needs for the sake of fulfilling the common tasks needed for transforming Palestine into a Jewish homeland.7 One of the most dominant features that ibstered this civic virtue was the Labour Settlement Movement (LSM), which organized all Jewish workers in Palestine. Its ideology was that pioneers' interests were inferior to the demands of nation-building, and it structured its goals and institutions in support of national challenges, such as working the land and building the nation. Its actions, according to Peled and Shafir, were aimed to discipline and educate the newcomers in the service of national goals.8
Labour became a central element in the Zionist project for two main reasons. First, employment opportunities were needed to guarantee income for newcomers. Most of the labour during these years was done by Arabs, even for Jewish settlers who already lived in
Palestine. The pioneers therefore organized for the "conquest of labour" - shifting labour to
Jewish hands to ensure employment opportunities and sources of income, as well as a
Jewish hegemony in the area9 The LSM's interest in and commitment to full employment, as Zeev Rozenhak indicates, did notpurely stem fromsocia l and economic considerations; it
7 Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 17,42-43; Mordeehai Nisan, Toward a New Israel: the Jewish State and rite Arab Question (New York: AMS Press, 1992) at 48-49. A more specific classification of pioneers can be presented here. They were secular Ashkenaa Jews. Thus, as Shafir and Peled argue, constituting the virtuous according to these elements - the pioneer as an Ashkenazi secular Jew - has contributed much to differentiating between Jews and Arabs, and between different groups in the Jewish society. See the discussion below near footnotes 33-42. 8 See Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 53; Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, "introduction: The Socioeconomic Liberalization of Israel", in Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, eds., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000) 1 at 2. For a further discussion of the origins of the collectivistic agenda of the pioneers, see Uri Ben-Eliezer, "The Meaning of Political Participation in a Nonliberal Democracy: The Israeli Experience" (1993) 25 Comparative Politics 397 at 399-400. 9 'Arab work' was cheaper because Arab workers were known as faster workers with fewer demands. They were also considered more obedient than the new pioneers. Dafha Izraeli, "The Female Workers' Movement in Palestine from its Beginning till 1927" (1984) 32 Cathedra 109 at 112 (Hebrew). For more about the use of political mechanisms of control over the labour market and the system of labour exchange, see Zeev Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms and the Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Israeli Welfare State and the Zionist Colonial Project" (1998) 18 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 157 at 167-170 [Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms"].
90 "evolved as intimately linked to the processes of nation- and state-building in the context of a colonial project".10 Second, once lands were purchased by Zionist organizations, the nation had to be built in terms of establishing towns, settlements, infrastructures, agriculture and industries. The ideal model of the pioneer was therefore one who is involved in labour, mainly hard manual labour.11 Pioneering meant devoting oneself to labour and hard work, to the service of the nation and the homeland. The duty to participate in agriculture work was especially emphasized as an extremely important element to the growth and development of the pioneering-movement.12 Deborah Bernstein expressed these notions in clear and strong words:
Heavy emphasis was placed on wok, physical work work that involved creation,
liberation, and the formation of a new Jew, work mat was thought to constitute
realization for the working person and which would open the way to the
emancipation and redemption of the entire people. And beyond the importance
attached to physical labor in general, a special significance was attributed to
agriculture labor, to working the land This occupation was thought to epitomize the
Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms", supra note 9 at 168. For more about the "conquest of labour" see Gershon Shafir, Land Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) at 45-90. 11 Izraeli, supra note 9 at 112. One of the known concepts during these years was the 'religion of labour', reflecting the agenda of one of the dominant figures these days, Aaron David Gordon. He believed in devoting oneself to physical labour and simple life style. He also proposed as an alternative secular-religion for the young immigrants who came fromreligio n families in Europe. He believed that working the land would lead the individual to a more spiritual life. For more about his philosophy see Aaron David Gordon, Selected Assays (New York: Amo Press, 1973). 12 Henri Nir, "Pioneers and Pioneering in Israel: Semantic and Historic Aspects, 1948-1956" (1992) 2 Studies in Zionism 116 at 123 (Hebrew). The importance of labour found its place in the education system of these years as well. In the first assembly of the teachers' association, it was mentioned that the purpose of the education system is to structure the new generation as one that ioves work. See Margaliy Shilo, "The New Hebrew Woman - Many Faces She has: The Female Guard as a Case Study" (2000) 34 Critique & Interpretation 7 at 8 (Hebrew) {Shilo, "The New Hebrew Woman"]; Zeev Sternhell, Nation-Building or a New Society? The Zionist Ijibor Movement (1904-1940) and the Origins of Israel (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd., 1995) at 155-159 (Hebrew).
91 connection between the renewal of the laborer and the creation of a society of laborers, paving the way for a nation of laborers rooted in their own land.13
The practice of labour, therefore, constituted a sense of belonging and attachment among
Zionists in Palestine. It became a political project of belonging, differentiating between those who fulfilled the civic virtue of labour and those who did not. Those who worked the land and contributed to the economy could share the feeling of responsibility to the future of the nation.14 Workers' interests, under the civic-republican structure of the Zionist project, were secondary to the demands of nation-building, and work was first and foremost an activity that benefited the collective.15
The LSM aimed to create an economy employing only Jews by closing off the labour market to Palestinians. The WZO (World Zionist Organization) bought the lands and transferred them to the LSM, which established new economic sectors and infrastructure, based on an interventionist ideology.16 By dominating the mobilization of capital and the purchase of land, the LSM removed land and labour from the market to create a closed collectivist economy. Its economic activities were managed by two administrative institutions: the Histadrut (the General Federation of Hebrew Workers in Palestine) and its
Deborah Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality: Urban Women in Prostate Israeli Society (New York: Praeger, 1987) at 18. Samuel Alrnog examines the changes in values between traditional Jewish society in the Diaspora and the pioneering society in Palestine. The traditional scale of values included, first and foremost, education. Other fundamental values were the family, charity and respect for others. The dramatic change in Jewish pioneering society pushed aside the value of education, which was replaced with the value of labour. The main pioneering values were then work, courage and simplicity. See Samuel Almog, "Pioneering as an Alternative Culture" (1993) 58 Zion, A Quarterly for Research in Jewish History 329 at 336-345 (Hebrew). 14 See Dov Khenin, "From 'Eretz Yisrael Haovedet' to 'Yisrael Hashniah': The Social Discourse and Social Policy of Mapai in the 1950s", in Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, eds., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000) 71 at 78-79. See also Dan Avnon, "Introduction: Why the Israeli Democracy does not have a Developed Civic Tongue", in Dan Avnon, ed., Civic Tongue in Israel (Tel Aviv: Magnes, 2006) at 4 (Hebrew). 15 Khenin, supra note 14 at 79. 16 Michael Shalev, "Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy", in Garshon Shafir & Yoav Peled, eds., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization (Boulder CO: Westview) 129 at 130-131.
92 holding company, Chevrat Haovdim (the Workers' Society). Their goal was to ensure that all economic enterprises served the national project. As Shafir and Peled explain:
Central ownership, then, was meant to obviate the danger that befell successful economic
cooperatives elsewhere, namely, a return to hired labor. Like the kibbutz, Chevrat Haovdim
cooperatives were protected from outside competition and enjoyed the advantage of shared
resources and an internal market. Thus, in developing rural settlements and urban
employment opportunities, and in setting up its own economic enterprises, required for the
absorption of immigrants, the Histadrut in effect created a new and separate national society
and acted as its state-in-flie-making. Each member of the Histadrut now became a citizen of
that state-in-the-making.17
The ethos of pioneering did not vanish after the establishment of the state. On the contrary, it was implemented by the sovereign state's organizations and institutions aimed to ensure citizens' commitment to the virtues of pioneering. David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister, expressed this idea in clear words:
Even if in their private lives they act as chalutzim [pioneers], bom the individual, and the
organizations of individuals, will fail if they do not put their chcduzic [pioneering] activity in
the service of the state, and if the state's financial, organizational and legislative power is
not committed to the chahmc tasks that are thrust upon us.
The practice of labour, in the post-1948 period, was still a national goal and obligation. It was the means for the absorption of the many Jewish immigrants that arrived after the War of Independence. It was a crucial element in the 'melting pot' and served as the route for
17 Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 48. 18 Cited in Peter Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 136. Shark and Peled explain that the ethos of pioneering - chahitziyut - was in fact transferred into a new ethos oimamktchtiyut and can be best translated as national statehood - which "emphasized the shift from sectoral interests to the general interest, from semi-voluntarism to binding obligation". Peled & Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking", supra note 1 at 398. See also Uri Ram, "The State of the Nation: Contemporary Challenges to Zionism in Israel" (1999) 6 Constellations 325 at 331; See also Ben-Eliezer, supra note 8 at 404.
93 integration and assimilation. Through labour, the new immigrants could establish and prove their loyalty to the new Israeli collective19 As Ben-Gurion said in 1949,
Building a state is - returning to work... we do not see work as a curse and as a bitter necessity or only asameamofliving... but as a social duty, a human duty, discovering the creative power of human beings and their domination of nature,20
The new state, thus, continued to treat its citizens according to their contributions to the
common good of the newborn society.21 The civic-republican model was also maintained on
the institutional level, as many of the previous institutions of the LSM continued to function
in the post-1948 period and were transformed into a strong and powerful public sector. To
ensure the continuality of the Zionist project and its supremacy as an institution and a
symbol, the state nationalized the military, the police, certain institutions in the labour
market, the construction industry and natural resources. In addition, it established a state-
financed capitalist economy by subsidizing private enterprises.22
This is not to say that the duty to work was not understood in individualistic terms as well,
indeed, the leaders expected the pioneers and newcomers to work and provide their own
welfare rather than being a burden on the new society.23 However the idea of work as a
means for economic independence was closely attached to the notion of work as a social
More about the national practice of labour during early statehood see Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms", supra note 9 at 177. 20 As cited in Itzhak Harpaz, The Meaning of Work in Israel: Its Nature and Consequences (New York: Praeger, 1990)atl3. ' Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy" (1998) 21 Ethnic and Racial Studies 408 at 417 [Shafir & YoavPeled, "Citizenship and Stratification"]. 22 Kimmerling, "Religion", supra note 1 at 355. Shalev mentions four parameters that characterized the economic policy during the early years of statehood: "(1) High levels of government expenditure and employment (biased by commitments to defence and immigrant absorption), relative to the economy's level of development; (2) Extensive state control of savings, investment and foreign currency; (3) Modest public ownership alongside a high degree of public subsidy of private and Histadrat-owned business; (4) Corporatist delegation of state functions to the Histadrut, with the state trading subsidies for policy cooperation and legitimation". Shalev, supra note 16 at 131. 23 Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 61.
94 obligation toward society. Labour was considered to be a form of contribution on two fronts: first, the pioneers and newcomers were expected to work in terms of building the nation, and second, they were expected to work and become independent so as to avoid
asking for public support, which might have slowed down the national project.
B. The Welfare State and the Duty to Work
The welfare system during the early years was established and developed with a strong
relation to nation-building and the national obligation to work. To ensure the loyalty to the
nation and willingness to participate in national projects, the LSM developed social services
aimed to guarantee its members a respectable standard of living. It provided them with public housing, medical coverage and unemployment benefits, which were "necessary for
an immigrant to sink roots in a low-wage country".24 Not only did social rights support the
settlement mission, but they also reflected the importance and centrality of work. Social
rights were closely tied to labour. Those who worked were entitled to different services,
such as maternity leave, work accident insurance, and old-age retirement pensions.25 As
Shafir and Peled explains, in accordance with the civic-republican model of citizenship,
welfare rights were a reward for carrying out civic virtues and they were closely associated
with fulfilling the duty to work. The 'citizens' of the Histadrut, the workers, enjoyed
universal social rights. In other words, social rights were attached to membership in the
republican community.26 At the same time, while the members of the LSM m&Histadrut
enjoyed social rights as a reward for building the nation, the general population was not
provided with any substantive welfare support. Placing much weight on the practice of
24 Ibid, at 62. See also Ben-Eliezer, supra note 8 at 400. 25 Many of the services and benefits were provided by the Histudrut to its members, who were all workers and were entitled to health services, old-age and survivors pensions, unemployment relief and housing. See Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms", supra note 9 at 161. 16 Ibid, at 63-65; Peled & Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking", supra note 1 at 398.
95 labour, the LSM did not view welfare for the general population favourably. It was considered charity. The leaders were concerned that providing welfare would prevent people from working hard to build the nation's infrastructure. Therefore, even though the
LSM recognized the need to provide welfare, it did not hold itself responsible to provide these services, which were transferred to volunteers.27
Similar patterns and ideology characterized the welfare system after the establishment of
Israel. Many social actions taken in these years were aimed to achieve national goals. The education system, for instance, was aimed to promote immigrants' social integration, while housing services were aimed to populate rural areas and to integrate the newcomers into the
Israeli collective.28 Welfare concerns, however, were not a top priority for the first governments. They aimed to provide only the minimal welfare services needed to ensure the achievement of national goals; the interests of the workers were considered only if they matched national needs.29 John Gal, one of the leading sociologists in Israel, explains that welfare expenses were limited not just because of economic constraints, but because of ambivalence about providing welfare for the poor. As part of the pioneering approach, the first governments saw welfare programs as an encouragement of idleness, and firmly rejected any proposal to regulate unemployment or income support benefits. They preferred taking measures to ensure that citizens were fulfilling their duty to work rather than providing them with welfare that was assumed to discourage them from carrying out
27 For a review of the voluntary organizations that provided welfare during the Mandate, see John Gal. Social Security in Israel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2004) at 25 (Hebrew) [Gal, Social Security]; Abraham Doron & Ralph M. Kramer, The Welfare State in Israel: The Evolution ofSocial Security Policy and Practice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) at 12-15 [Doron & Kramer, The Welfare State in Israel]. See also Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms", supra note 9 at 162,181-186. 28 For more about the development of the welfare state according to national objectives, see Zeev Rosenhek & Michael Shalev, "The Contradictions of Palestinians Citizenship in Israel: Inclusion and Exclusion in the Israeli Welfare state", in Nils. A. Butenschon etal, eds., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East (NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000) 288; John Gal, "Values, Categorical Benefits and Categorical Legacies in Israel", in Asher Ben-Arieh & John Gal, eds., Into the Promised Land: Issues in the Welfare State (Westport: Praeger, 2000) 115 at 130-131. 29 Khenin, supra note 14 at 80-81.
96 national goals. Leaders tied the problem of unemployment to the poor themselves, most of whom were immigrants from Arab countries (Sephardic Jews), who were valued in
accordance with the pioneering virtue of hard, manual and physical work. Assuming that the
Sephardic Jews did not understand the value of labour in the same way the pioneers did,
governments preferred to develop a program of "busy works" - unrequited jobs invented to provide work for the unemployed, especially among the new immigrants.30
The connection between the republican model and the welfare system was maintained,
Shafir and Peled argue, in the 1953 National Insurance Act (NIA).31 This act reflected the idea that social insurance is one of the rights of the working man, who was a member of the
Histadrut - the marker of the republican community. The MA preserved the power and position of the Histadrut that continued to provide social services to its members - the
workers. The state was left with only three welfare programs: old-age retirement pensions,
maternity benefits and work accident insurance. Other welfare services, such as long-term health services and services for the disabled, which were especially required during the big
waves of immigration, were transferred to an outside organization - until the newcomers
found their place in the working community. Being part of the working community was the
main expectation of the newcomers, and welfare was aimed and structured to bring them
into the labour market.32
Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 27, 85, 118. Until the late 1960s thousands of unemployed were incorporated in "busy works", especially in infrastructure and forestation. 31 SH231. 32 Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 65. See also Abraham Doron, "Fifty Years for the Social Security Program in Israel - The Kenev Committee Report" (2001) 8 Labour, Society and Law 43 at 51-53 (Hebrew) [Doron, "Fifty Years"]. For more about the ideology behind the narrow welfare state in the early years of statehood, see Abraham Doron & Ralph Kremer, "Ideology, Programs and Organizational Factors in the Welfare System: The Case of Israel" (1975) 9/10 Social Security 20 (Hebrew).
97 G The Scope of the Duty to Work
Not all groups in society shared the duty to work equally. Women, as will be argued in
Chapter IV, were not expected to fulfill the duty even though in practice they worked and contributed to the development of the nation. Arabs were excluded fromth e duty to work, as they were excluded from the whole 'duties discourse'. Not being part of the dominant ethno-national group, the Jewish majority was not interested in sharing its national project with the Arab population. Since Arabs could not take part in nation-building, they could not establish any significant sense of belonging to the Israeli collective33 The project of
'conquest of labour', as mentioned above, was aimed to exclude Arabs from labour market opportunities, and it continued after the foundation of Israel as well. During early statehood,
Peled argues, citizenship was formed as multilayered: the liberal layer of citizenship ensured all citizens universal citizen's rights, while the ethno-republican layer of citizenship was exclusive to Jews who were eligible and who were required to contribute to the common good. Only those who were included in the two layers of citizenship could enjoy full membership in the Israeli collective. The result of this structure was that the Arab minority was excluded from the duties of citizenship and from any significant contribution to the
Israeli collective, whose membership was based only on liberal rights. Under this structure of citizenship, Arabs could not achieve full membership and a real sense of belonging to the
Israeli collective.34 Being excluded from the 'duties discourse', the duty to work was not
33 It should be noted that the Arab population itself is divided around the question whether Israeli Arabs should fulfill duties of citizenship. The debate usually arises around the duty of military service. While a few argue that Arabs should be integrated into some kind of national service (similar to community service), many argue that in light of the unequal treatment of the Arab population in terms of rights and access to opportunities and resources, Arabs should not be obligated to participate in national institutions until their standing improves. They also argue that duties of citizenship, such as the military service, should not apply to them since these duties are aimed to protect mainly the Jewish majority. For more about this debate, see Hassan Gabareen, "Towards a Critical Palestinian Minority Approach: Citizenship, Nationalism and Feminism in Israeli Law" (2000) 9 Pliliin, The Multi-Disciplinary Journal of Public Law, Society and Culture 53 (Hebrew). 34 Peled, "Ethnic Democracy", supra note 3 at 434-436. Peled & Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking", supra note 1 at 402-404.
98 applied to Arabs and their work was merely for their own personal economic independence.
They could not use the practice of labour as a route into the Israeli collective. They also
enjoyed less welfare rights because many benefits were attached, as discussed above, to the
duty to work; thus, those who made a contribution to the national effort and were members of the Zionist organizations enjoyed more assistance. Arabs, for many years, were not
included among those beneficiaries.35'
The Sephardic Jews also had a complex relation to the duty to work. As Shafir and Peled
indicate, they were never seen as part of the 'pioneering heroism' and for the most part they
were treated by the Zionist organizations as second-class citizens. This attitude was invoked by certain stigmas regarding the cultural qualities of the Sephardic Jews who originated in
Arab countries and were assumed to adopt the negative aspects of uncivilized Muslim
cultures and values.36 The duty to work itself was applied on Sephardic Jews and they were
required to take part in the burden of building the nation, but their labour was not considered
to be the civic virtue of the Ashkenazi mainstream. Even though they worked, they were
excluded from the Zionist discourse of republican civic virtue. This exclusion rested on a
For more about the marginal position of the Arabs within the Israeli welfare state, see Rosenhek & Shalev, supra note 28 at 295-307. For further general discussions about the status of Arabs and their citizenship in Israel see Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype" (1997) 2 Israeli Studies 198; Nadim Rouhana, "Israel and its Arab Citizens: Predicaments in the Relationship between Ethnic States and Ethnonational Minorities" (1998) 19 Third World Quarterly 277; Zeev Rosenhek, "New Developments in the Sociology of Palestinian Citizens of Israel: An Analytical review" (1998) 21 Ethnic and Racial Studies 558; Yoav Peled, "The Or Commission and Palestinian Citizenship in Israel" (2005) 9 Citizenship Studies 89; Muhammad Amara & Izhak Schnell, "Identity Repertoires among Arabs in Israel" (2004) 30 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 175. 36 Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 75. The integration of Sephardic Jews into Israeli society and the treatment they received, and still receive today, are very complex and sensitive issues in Israel. It is beyond of the scope of the thesis to address these issues in great details. The aim of the discussion here is merely to demonstrate the problematic structure of the duty to work through its application on Sephardic Jews. For further discussions of Sephardic Jews in Israel, see Yinon Cohen, "Socioeconomic Gaps between Mizrachim and Ashkenazim, 1975-1995" (1998) 1 Israeli Sociology 115 (Hebrew); Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Exclusionism in the Periphery: The Case of Oriental Jews in Israel's Development Towns" (1990) 13 Ethnic and Racial Studies 345; Yoav Peled, "Towards a Redefinition of Jewish Nationalism in Israel? The Enigma of Shas" (1998) 21 Ethnic and Racial Studies 703; Don Handelman, "Contradictions between Citizenship and Nationality: Their Consequences for Ethnicity and Inequality in Israel" (1994) 7 International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 441 at 451-453; Uri Ram, "National, Ethnic or Civic? Contesting Paradigms of Memory, Identity and Culture in Israel" (2000) 19 Studies in Philosophy and Education 405 at 411-412.
99 distinction between the 'idealistic' and 'civilized' workers, who were the Ashkenazim, on the one hand, and the 'natural' workers, who were the Sephardim, on the other. As Shafir and Peled further explain,
'Idealistic workers' were those who acted virtuously by fostering the comforts of European
urban life and the opportunity to immigrating to America and joining the project of Zionist
redemption instead 'Natural workers', on the other hand, were neither idealistic nor
civilized. They were 'natural' in a dual sense: their participation in the Zionist project
stemmed naturally from their ethno-national identity as Jews, rather than from ideological
conviction; and, bring non-modem, they were naturally suited for hard work, harsh
discipline, and scanty material rewards... 'Idealistic workers', the bearers of republican
virtue, were the stuff pioneers were made of, blazing the trail and setting moral standards for
the nation. 'Natural workers', on the other hand, were to be foot-soldiers in the Zionist
campaign, adding 'quantity' to the pioneers' 'qualitative' efforts.5
Providing merely 'quantity' to the work effort and to the process of nation-building,
Sephardic Jews were not members of the virtuous republican community. Their belonging and attachment to the collective were the result of ethno-national ties only. For along period of time (and this is still true today for some Sephardim), Sephardic Jews did not enjoy the same social ties and attachment as the Ashkenazim enjoyed, and they did not fully belong to the core Israeli mainstream. Although receiving all citizenship rights, they were not fully included into society and they "were discouraged from expressing their collective voice in the formulation of the common good of society".38
Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 76. Ibid, at 78.
100 The treatment of ultra-orthodox Jews provides another example to the multifaceted scope of the duty to work. Although officially part of the Jewish community in Israel, for the most part, ultra-orthodox Jews were not incorporated into the 'duties discourse' and citizenship duties were not applied to them. As part of their profound opposition to the Zionist project, ultra-orthodox Jews turned their back on any pioneering activity aimed to build the nation, including military service, settlement and labour.39 At the same time, however, they were entitled to all universal rights and were even given special rights and autonomy in certain areas, even though they carried out almost no duties. The explanation for this balance of rights and duties of citizenship is rooted in a tactical move made in 1947 by the Zionist leaders in what is known as the 'status-quo letter'. In mis letter, Ben-Gurion aimed to guarantee the support of the ultra-orthodox Jews in forming the state in Israel, and for that purpose he promised to implement Jewish law in certain areas of life and to provide ultra- orthodox Jews with special rights. Later on, to ensure the status-quo, ultra-orthodox Jews were also exempted from citizenship duties of labour and military service.40 The duty to work, then, was never applied to them, hi practice, since then, most ultra-orthodox Jews have remained outside the labour market for many years, as they spend their time in religious institutions and continue to receive state budgets through the religious parties.41
According to their belief, the study of the Torah is the core activity that protects the Jewish people and that can promote their goals. See Nurit Stadler & Eyal Ben-Ari, "Other Worldly Soldiers? Ultra-Orthodox Views of Military Service in Contemporary Israel" (2003) 9 Israel Affairs 17 at 24-25. 40 For more about the background for the special status of ultra-orthodox Jews in Israeli society, see Baruch Kimmerling, "Religion", supra note 1. Shafir and Peled argue that ultra-orthodox Jews received special treatment because they were part of the ethno-national community and thek presence reflected the Jewish claim over the land of Palestine, two elements that were crucial for the legitimization and success of the Zionist project. See Shafir & Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification", supra note 21 at 416. 41 Shlomo Swirski et al, "Government Allocations to the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Sector in Israel" (1998) Adva Centre; Orna Blumen, "Criss-crossing Boundaries: Ultraorthodox Jewish Women Go to Work" (2002) 9 Gender, Place and Culture 133; Eli Berman, "Subsidized Sacrifice: State Support of Religious in Israel" (1998) paper presented at the International Conference on the Economics of Judaism and Jewish Observance, Israel. More generally about the relation of ultra-orthodox Jews to the Israeli society, see Noah Efiron, Real Jews: Secular versus Ultra-Orthodox and the Struggle for Jewish Identity in Israel (New York: Basic Books, 2003); David Lehmann, Remaking Israeli Judaism: The Challenge ofShas (London: Hurst Co., 2006).
101 These examples of Sephardic Jews, ultra-orthodox Jews and Arabs indicate how the way a certain citizenship duty is structured and allocated may differentiate between citizens and have major implications on the rights and sense of belonging of certain groups in society.
Indeed, part of the population may not have been harmed by these implications, as revealed by the example of ultra-orthodox Jews. They did not fulfill the duty to work and did not have a significant sense of belonging to the Israeli collective, but in fact they were not very interested in such an attachment and they enjoyed enough political power to protect and guarantee many of their economic needs. The harm resulting fromno t fulfilling the duty to work, with respect to this group, was relatively minimal.42 As for other groups, such as
Arabs or Sephardic Jews, the duty to work was structured and applied in such a way mat disadvantaged them. A similar critique will be developed in the following chapters with respect to the problematic inclusion of women into the 'duties discourse' in Israel.
Part Jt The Decline of the 'Duties Discourse' and the Rise of liberal Citizenship
A. The First Phase: From Citizens' Duties to State's Responsibility
The 'duties discourse' began losing its strength and centrality in Israeli society in the early
1960s. This change began with a growing awareness of state's responsibility to support its citizens. As discussed above, during the first decades of statehood, the leaders adopted a collectivist agenda that encouraged citizens to fulfill their duties and participate in nation- building. During the 1960s, in light of Israel's victory in the Six Day War and the subsequent intense economic development, many felt that there was no immediate threat to the existence of Israel. The new generation of leaders in the Labour party was much more
42 The absence of the need to belong was dominant among the old generation of ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel. The objection to military service, as well as to carrying out other duties of citizenship under the republican model, was stronger in the past. Today, however, there are some new voices that indicate a change and a willingness to be more incorporated into society. For more about ultra-orthodox Jews' sense of belonging in society, see Stadler & Ben-Ari, supra note 39 at 32-37.
102 influenced by European social-democrat policies that focused on notions of solidarity and mutual aid than by the pioneering approach that focused more on the notion of participating in the collective. The early discourse, then, focused on citizens' duties toward society, accompanied by the notion of society's responsibility toward its citizens.43
This was well reflected in the welfare system. From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the budget for welfare services was slowly increased and many welfare programs were established or broadened in scope, hi 1965, for example, the Government increased the benefits for the elderly who did not have income from any other source and broadened the eligibility for children's allowances.44 As Doron and Kramer further describe, "the most significant reforms introduced during [the 1970s] in the social security system were the establishment of the Unemployment Insurance program, which came into effect in 1973; the General
Disability Insurance program, which began in 1974; the amalgamation of the existing children's allowances, in 1975, into one program that covered all children in the country, and a substantial increase in the level of these allowances; as well as the gradual relaxation of the insurance principle in most national insurance schemes".45 In addition, during these years, the foundations for income support system were laid, the alimony payments program was established, and the budget for housing and education was increased.46
Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 29-30. 44 Ibid, at 28. 45 Doron & Kramer, The Welfare State in Israel, supra note 27 at 21. 40 Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 30-31. See also Abraham Doron, In the Name of Universality: The Challenges of the Social Policy in Israel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2002) at 124 [Doron, In the Name of Universality] (Hebrew).
103 B. The Second Phase: The Rise of the Liberal Discourse of Citizenship
The rhetoric of citizens' duties and the civic-republican discourse of citizenship further lost their centrality by the late 1970s as part of the economic liberalization of the Israeli market.
As noted above, the early years, when the civic-republican discourse was dominant, were characterized with a central market controlled by the state. During the late 1960s and increasingly since the mid-1970s, the private sector grew and became a central player in the
Israeli market. Peled and Shafir explain that the elite groups in Israel "have gradually come to realize that the colonial citizenship discourse and its corresponding social institutions, which were crucial to Israel's state and nation-building, and which provided the Labour movement with much of its identity, glory, and privileges, were no longer necessary and may have even become a hindrance to their economic interests".48 In 1977, a dramatic political changeover occurred when the Likud, a right-wing party, won elections for the first time after 29 years of Labour party governance. To integrate the Israeli market into the global economy, the Likud applied liberal economic principles, such as deregulation and non-intervention in the market, as a means to improve its competitiveness and efficiency. It took several measures to reduce the barriers that were placed on the market by the Labour party. For example, it opened the market to direct foreign investment, thus allowing international market forces to play a greater part in the Israeli economy. It also reduced military expenditures, as the military industries had gradually lost their centralist place in the
Israeli economy. The Likud also destabilized the privileged position of the Histudrut in the capital market by cutting its financial resources, thus diminishing the advantages it could
From the late 1970s until the late 1990s, many changes and developments occurred in Israel. As it is impossible to describe all of them within this chapter, and the following discussion briefly address only the most prominent ones that best reflect the shift from the 'duties discourse' to the 'rights discourse'. 48 Peled & Shafir. "The Roots of Peacemaking", supra note 1 at 405-406.
104 previously offer its members. The result of these steps and others was that that the public sector has gradually diminished in relation to a growing private sector, as the centralist economy was abundantly in favour of privatizing and freeing the market50 In light of these economic, political and ideological changes, as Abraham Doron notes, "more spheres of life
[were] being rapidly subjected to the control of market forces".51
The process of economic liberalization also opened the door to a liberal discourse of citizenship. As Peled and Shafir explain, "no area of social life seem[s] to be immune now from sweeping changes that question the legacy of the formative colonial era and its tradition of republican values and citizenship practice".52 And they also add,
[t]he liberal economic values of the Israeli business community are naturally more
consonant with a liberal conception of citizenship than with the ethno-republican
conception of pioneering civic virtue. Thus, these business leaders have been
promoting liberal reforms not only in the economy, but also in civil rights, the
electoral system, health care, education, mass communications, and other areas of
social life.53
For an overview of the different elements of liberating the Israeli economy, see Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 232-245. 50 For a detailed overview of the process of economic liberalization in Israel see Shalev, supra note 16 at 134- 144. See also Doron & Kramer, The Welfare State in Israel, supra note 27 at 22; Shafir & Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification", supra note 21 at 418-419; Joseph Zeira, "From Socialism to Capitalism? The Involvement of the Government in the Israeli Market", in MosheNaor, ed., State and Community (Tel Aviv. Magnes, 2004) 55. Dan Gutwein, an Israeli historian, argues that this liberalization of the Israeli economy did not result only from economic considerations and interests, but also from political-ideological ones. He argues that the Likud aimed to change the structure of power in Israel and todestro y the institutions of the Labour party, and for that purpose, the Likud directly and indirectly nationalized or took over parts of the public sector and social services. See Dan Gutwein, "Trends in the Economic Policy of the Israeli Right 1977-2003" (2003) 10 Society, Labour and Law 221 at 224-230 (Hebrew). 51 Abraham Doron, "Fifty Years of Social Security in the Making: A Participant's Journey", in Asher Ben- Arieh & John Gal, eds., Into the Promised Land,: Issues Facing the Welfare State (London: Praeger, 2000) 87 at 96. 52 Shafir & Peled, "Citizenship and Stratificati0n"5 supra note 21 at 419. 53 Peled & Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking", supra note 1 at 408. Peled and Shafir further explain that the new generation of leaders was drawn to the private sector. Together with the members of the new economic elite in Israel, they viewed the institutions set by the previous generations in the Labour movement as serious obstacles to the Israeli economy. Ibid, at 407.
105 The rise of liberal citizenship was characterized with an emergence of a new scale of values.
Instead of prioritizing collective values of solidarity and mutual aid, Israeli society adopted values of competition, ambition, individualism and self-fulfillment.54 In the area of labour market participation, the duty to work lost its grasp and was replaced with a different perspective, one mat saw work as a source of personal fulfillment and inspiration.55 Yael
Yishai describes the ideological shift:
Israeli society no longer resembles that pioneer society in the heyday of statehood. In its formative period, Israel was dominated by strong collectivist values. Sacrificing one's own interests for the sake of the nation was a widely accepted practice. Today Israel is characterized less by a collectivist orientation and more by ideas and institutions stemming from Western societies. Self-fulfillment and conspicuous consumption have become top priority in the order of priorities.56
This is not to say that the collectivist ideology has completely disappeared. It still played a role in structuring the nature of Israeli society, alongside the liberal discourse, but to a lesser degree. As Yishai adds, "to this day, collectivism remains an overriding and overarching norm".57
As a liberal discourse of citizenship emerged and the notion of citizens' obligations toward the common good lost its impetus, the 'rights discourse' became a dominant element in public and legal discussions. One major element that promoted the 'rights discourse', Peled
54 Doron, In the Name of Universality, supra note 46 at 34. For more about the growth in individualism see Kimmerling, "Religion", supra note 1 at 355. 55 Harpaz, supra note 20 at 14-24,162-163. 56 Yael Yishai, "Democracy for the People? Welfare Policy Making in Israel", in Asher Ben-Arieh, ed., Into the Promised Land {London: Praeger, 2001) 153 at 160 [Yishai, "Democracy for the People?"]. Ben-Eliezer also points at several institutions that served to reproduce collectivism in Israel and that disappeared or weakened during the years, such as the youth movement, the role of the Kibbutz in Israeli society and the power of the Histadrut. See Ben-Eliezer, supra note 8 at 405. 57 Yishai, "Democracy for the People?", supra note 56 at 163. Yishai points at several areas and institutions that still reflect a collectivist ideology, such as the military and reserve service, the education system, and the land policies.
106 and Shafir note, was the legislation of two constitutional acts in 1992 dealing with different civil freedomsan d rights (such as freedom of occupation, freedomo f movement, property, privacy and dignity). The Supreme Court, they add, has become a central institution in
Israeli society, similar to other liberal institutions such as the Bank of Israel and the Ministry of Finance.58 The 'rights discourse' was reflected not only in the demands of economic institutions for further freedoms in the sphere of the marketplace, but also in the growing claims for individual rights, and thus the legal discourse began reflecting a rhetoric of rights.59 On the one hand, a number of groups used a language of liberal citizenship and demanded equal rights and freedoms,bu t on the other hand, structured their demands based on cultural differences as part of an ethno-nationalist discourse of citizenship.60
While civil and political rights received much attention and were broadened under the liberal discourse of citizenship, social rights were gradually narrowed and society's commitment to social solidarity has slowly diminished.61 As part of the process of economic liberalization, Governments reduced the welfare budget and limited the eligibility to several
Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 20; Shafir & Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification", supra note 21 at 420. 59 One example of the rise of individual rights is found in the discourse on health services. During the early years, as part of the centralized structure of the economy and the public sector, the Histadrut monopolized the provision of health care. Health services were attached to membership in the Histadrut In 1994, the National Health Insurance Act was legislated, transferring the control of the health services firomth e Histadrut to the state. This meant that citizens received the right tochoos e which health fund would provide their health care. In 1996 the Patient Rights Act was also legislated, establishing citizens' right to receive medial treatment and informed consent. For more about these two laws and the ideology they reflect, see Yishai, "Democracy for the People?", supra note 56 at 155-158. See also Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 296-302. For more about the rise of the 'rights discourse' in the legal arena see Ruth Zafran, "The Relational Discourse as a Theoretical Basis for Resolving Family Disputes - Some Thoughts about Care and Justice" (2005) Law Society & Culture 49. 60 This could be seen in the emergence of claims on behalf of religious institutions, as well as Arab Israelis or Mizrachi Jews. The interaction between the liberal and ethno-national discourses of citizenship is less relevant for the purpose of this chapter. For more about the rise of ethno-nationalism and its tension with the liberal discourse of citizenship, see Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 20-21; Shafir & Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification", supra note 21 at 422-425. 61 It should be noted that social, economic and cultural rights are not included in the two Basic Laws that constitute the Israeli Bill of Rights. For a general discussion of this omission see Yoram Rabin & Yoval Shani, "The Israeli Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?" (2004) 37 Israel Law Review 299.
107 benefits. Children allowances became more selective, unemployment insurance was narrowed and elderly benefits were cut.62 Furthermore, Gal adds, unlike the trends during the early 1970s, when many social programs were established, almost no new welfare laws were enacted since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, and no significant welfare programs were developed.63 This trend changed slightly during the early 1990s.64 During the first half of the 1990s, after the Labour parry was re-elected to Parliament, the welfare budget was increased to the level at the early 1980s, and a few steps were taken to strengthen the social security system. For instance, selective elements in the children allowances were cancelled, financial benefits for new immigrants were increased, and certain groups, such as single-parent families, new immigrants and children with special needs, got extra benefits or forms of protection.65 Despite these encouraging developments and as a response to the renewed economic recession that occurred during the second half of the 1990s, the welfare system continued to shrink as governments gradually narrowed the unemployment and income support programs by lowering the rates of benefits and tightening the conditions for eligibility. In addition, the trend toward privatizing welfare
Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 33. See also Abraham Doron, "Tendencies in the Development of the Israeli Welfare Policy", in Mosbe Naor, ed., State and Community (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004) 37 (Hebrew). ~ Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 3 2-33. Another element of the welfare policy during the 1980's was the increased willingness of the government to privatize several social services. Ibid, at 34. Shafir and Peled describe the process of shrinking education, health and housing rights in much detail. See Shafir & Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 1 at 293-307. 64 These trends were influenced by the economic and demographic development which occurred during the 1990s. About a million new immigrants arrived in Israel during this decade, among them many old people and single-parent families. This massive immigration required allocating resources to deal with the social needs of the new comers. In the first half of the 1990s, economic conditions improved and the economy significantly grew. However, during the second half of this decade, Israel faced another economic recession and increased rates of unemployment. Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 35. 65 Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 36-37. Other social laws that were legislated during these years are the 1997 Extended School Day and Educational Enrichment Act, the 1994 State Health Insurance Act, the 1998 Equal Rights for People with Disabilities Act, the 1998 Public Housing (Purchase Rights) Act and the 1998 Rights of Tenants in Public Housing Act. For an overview of these laws, see Daphne Barak-Erez, "The Israeli Welfare State: Growing Expectations and Diminishing Returns", in Eyal Benvenisti el al, eds., The Welfare State, Globalization and International Law (Berlin: Springer, 2004) 103 at 108.
108 services continued during the 1990s, as the state and local municipalities transferred part of their welfare responsibilities to private institutions and NGOs.66
Part HI: The Return of the Duty to Work
In recent years, as with other countries, the duty to work reemerged as part of welfare reforms aimed to restructure the concept of social citizenship. The discussion above showed that since the late 1970s, the welfare system in Israel had already narrowed down, as part of the process of economic liberalization, based on an economic ideology aimed at limiting the role of the state in providing welfare to citizens. Since 2002, further steps were taken to reform the welfare state. As the following discussion elaborates, this reform presented radical changes to the welfare system and introduced Israeli citizens not only with limited welfare rights but also with a renewed social obligation - the duty to work. While, in the past, most debates regarding the welfare state in Israel focused on the obligations of the state towards its citizens and the scope of welfare rights, the new reform changed the focus and rhetoric of public discourse and welfare policies. It also changed the structure of citizenship and the conditions for full membership.
As we saw previously, during recent years, the 'duties discourse' in Israel has lost its momentum and was gradually replaced with a general 'rights discourse' that placed much attention on citizens' rights and freedoms. Welfare reform, and mainly the renewed duty to work, raises the question of the place of the 'duties discourse' in the current structure of citizenship in Israel. Does the duty to work re-emerge within a complete liberal discourse of
6 Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 37. See also Yosef Katan, The Welfare State on the Eve of a New Century (Jerusalem: Henrietta Said Institute, 2000) at 27-29 (Hebrew); Doron, In the Name of Universality, supra note 46 at 128-129, 150-153; Abraham Doron, "Welfare Policy in Israel - Developments during the 1980s and 1990s", in David Nahmias & Gila Menachem, eds., Public Policy in Israel (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1999) 437; Zeev Rozenhek, "The Crisis of the Israeli Welfare State and the Process of Globalization", in Mosfae Naor, ed., State and Community (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004) 46 at 50-52 (Hebrew).
109 citizenship? Or does a 'duties discourse' still play a role in Israeli society? The answers to these questions, I believe, are important to the understanding of the duty to work itself The following discussion begins, therefore, by addressing different signs that point to the existence of a 'duties discourse' in Israel. Then the discussion provides the background for current welfare reform, the changes in the welfare system and the new structure of social citizenship in Israel.
A. Is there still a 'Duties Discourse' in Israel?
In the late 1990s, Shafir and Peled predicted that the tension and conflict between the liberal and ethno-nationalist discourses of citizenship would result in a new regime of multiple citizenships that would reshape Israeli society. They also assumed that
.. .as the forces that shape Israeli society are becoming more global, the prospects of the liberals to win are improving, for the more minimal demands of liberal citizenship cohere better with mternational trends than either the republican or the ethno-national discourse.67
In a recent article, Peled repeats this position and argues that the consequence of the economic liberalization, "as far as the interplay between the different discourses of citizenship is concerned, [is that] the republican discourse was discarded almost completely, with competition between the liberal and ethno-nationalist discourses assuming the form of a head-on confrontation",68
Shafir & Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification", supra note 21 at 425. 68 Yoav Peled, "Towards a Post-Citizenship Society? A Report fromth e Front" (2007) 11 Citizenship Studies 95 at 98 [Peled, "Towards a Post-Citizenship Society?"].
110 Indeed, full membership in the Israeli collective is not understood today only in terms of fulfilling duties and contributing to the common good. As discussed earlier, a strong 'rights discourse' developed during the last few decades and the liberal discourse, as Shafir and
Peled argue, has become a dominant element in the structure of citizenship in Israel, along with the ethno-nauGnal discourse. Membership in the Israeli collective is gained, for the most part, by holding civil, political and social citizenship rights. The republican structure of citizenship and the 'duties discourse' itself are certainly not dominant features in the structure and understanding of citizenship in Israel. But has the 'duties discourse' vanished completely? Or has the republican discourse merely become a secondary yet still relevant approach alongside the dominant liberal discourse?
In my opinion, a 'duties discourse' still exists in Israel, as the state is still characterized by national elements or values originating from the Zionist project.69 Indeed, on the institutional level, the civic-republican model has almost entirely disappeared and not many institutions are built today around national interests or a centralist ideology. In fact, the most prominent changes that occurred over the years with respect to the republican model relate to the liberalization of the economy and the disappearance of centralized institutions. This process, as discussed earlier, led to the rise of a liberal discourse of citizenship. However, certain values and features rooted in the republican model of citizenship are still in place, even if they are balanced today by opposing morals and beliefs.70 One of these features is
69 Even though many elements of Zionism have faded away during the last few decades,. Israel is still an active immigrant society that struggles with security threats and unclear geographic borders, which endanger its existence. In light of these conflicts and despite great objection to the Zionist project from the Jewish population itself, there is still a strong collective national identity that comes into play when facing national struggles. See Kimmerling, "Religion", supra note 1 at 341; Yishai, "Democracy for the People?", supra note 56 at 161-163. 70 In her research about the concept of 'Israeliness', Rakefet Sela-Sheffy indicates that aside from adopting a liberal-individualist values and worldviews, many Israelis still define themselves or their culture in terms of national solidarity, pride, collectivism and commitment to the state. See Rakefet Sela-Sheffy, "What Makes One an Israeli? Negotiating Identities in Everyday Representations of 'Israeliness'" (2004) 10 Nations and nationalism 479 at 488-490. Other research also points out that despite a weakening of collectivist values in Israel, many Israelis still identify with collectivist identities and the values they entail. See Dahlia Moore &
111 the 'duties discourse', as reflected in several documents, discourses and practices. One indication of the existence of a 'duties discourse' is found in a document prepared by the
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Parliament in early 2006. This document, named "Constitution by Broad Consensus", aims to complete the work of writing a constitution for Israel. In section 2, titled "basic obligations", it declares that the residents of
Israel will participate in the development, protection and strengthening of Israel to the benefit of all its residents.71 In the explanatory part of the document, the Committee indicates that mis section is aimed at establishing and emphasizing the mutual responsibility of the state and its residents and the duties of the citizens so that they will participate in the burdens related to the existence and success of Israel. The Committee links the concept of citizenship with active participation in state life, and also links the notion of participation with that of belonging. It indicates that there may be different forms of participation, and emphasizes that these acts of participation are aimed at benefiting the public as a whole.
Evidence of a continued 'duties discourse' in Israel can also be found in the organization and practice of military service. Indeed, it is less prestigious today to serve in the army and the motivation to serve has weakened as well. This decline can be related to two main factors: the rise of an individualistic approach among the younger generation who look at devoting themselves to personal accomplishments rather than national goals, and an ongoing political debate about the legitimacy of military activities in the occupied territories.72 Nonetheless, military service is still considered a leading duty in Israeli society,
Baruch Kimmerling, "Individual Strategies of Adopting Collective Identities: The Israeli Case" (1995) 10 International Sociology 387 at 396-398. 71 For the English version of the proposed constitution see http://experts.cfisrael.org:81/-admin/pi"oposals.pdf (last checked June 15,2008). 72 For more about recent approaches toward military service in Israel see Daphne Barak-Erez, "The Military Service of Yeshiva Students: Between the Citizenship and Justiciability Dilemma" (2006) 22 Bar-Ilan Law Review 227 at 252-253 (Hebrew) [Barak-Erez, "The Military Service of Yeshiva Students"]; Ruth Linn, "Conscientious Objection in Israel During the War in Lebanon" (1986) 12 Armed Forces & Society 489; Gabriel Ben-Dor & Ami Pedahzur, "Civil-Military Relations in Israel at the Outset of the Twenty-First
112 not merely on the legal level, but on the societal level as well. Serving in the military is seen as establishing a connection and attachment to the Israeli collective. It reflects a form of contribution that is highly valued by many parts of the population. In her research about conscientious objection and duties of citizenship in Israel, Sara Helman examines the attitude of young soldiers to the duty of military service as part of their membership and citi2enship in Israel.73 Helman shows that through the recent phenomenon of conscientious objection, an alternative conception of citizenship has arisen, one that challenges the monopoly of the state over the definition of what is considered to be participation in national security and military service.74 What these interviews also indicate, however, is that the concept of citizenship obligations is still rooted in the minds of the younger generation in
Israel. Although soldiers may question the definition of the common good, the form of military service or its missions, many are also committed to the notion of citizenship obligations and they support a structure of citizenship built upon fulfilling practices aimed to serve the common good. For them, military service is still a landmark of contribution and of belonging to the Israeli collective that should be a condition for receiving rights and entitlements.75 As Helman indicates, for these soldiers, "the fulfillment of obligations is the prime criterion for civic value and an essential prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the
Century", in Uzi Rebfoun & Chaim Isaac Waxman, eds., Jews in Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 2004) 331; Michael Keren, "Justifications of Conscientious Objection: An Israeli Case Study" (1998) 26 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 121. 73 Sara Helman, "Rights and Duties, Citizens and Soldiers: Conscientious Objection and the Redefinition of Citizenship in Israel", in Nils Butenschn et al, eds., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000) 316. 74 In their interviews with Helman, soldiers pointed out the political nature of the army, mainly during the war in Lebanon during the years 1982-1985. They found themselves objecting to commands and instructions in a way that challenged the definition of the scope and content of their obligations to the state. They presented a critical view of the function of the military and its purposes, aiming to open the public discourse on military service to more personal criteria regarding the circumstances and conditions of fulfilling the duty to serve. Ibid. at 331-336. 75 Ibid, at 323-327.
113 political community" and they "equate civic value with the fulfillment of obligations" as they emphasize an ideology of contribution and belonging.
These findings are reinforced by research concerning ultra-orthodox views of military service in Israel. Generally speaking, ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel, as discussed earlier, are exempted from the duty of military service. In their research, Nurit Standler and Eyal Ben-
Ari show that while the older rabbinical authorities disapprove of military service, young ultra-orthodox members present a more complex approach that does not completely object the idea of military service. What stands behind this view, and among other views as well, is the acknowledgment that certain responsibilities and obligations must be fulfilled for the sake of society and that everyone should carry this burden in one way or other. Some of the younger ultra-orthodox community recognize the importance of serving in the army and actually acknowledge this practice as aroute for achieving full citizenship and incorporation into the Israeli collective. According to Standler and Ben-Ari, "younger members of the community are engaged [in the] republican approach" of citizenship and are willing to fulfill the duty of military service.77 The younger generation, they explain, "seems to accept the idea of incorporation through contribution which has been at the core of the Zionist republican conception of citizenship - they were bom in Israel and wish to take part in what they see as the central arena for participation: the military".78
Ibid, at 324. In her study about women's recent struggles for inclusion in the army, Daphne Barak-Erez also indicates that these struggles reflect the desire to contribute to society and the understanding that full citizenship is connected to a certain commitment to the common good. See Daphne Barak-Erez, "The Feminist Battle for Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and Conscientious Objection" (2007) 13 Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 531 at 555-556. 77 Stadler & Ben-Ari, supra note 39 at 39. 78 Ibid, at 40-41. For more about this approach of ultra-orthodox Jews to notions of active participation and contribution see Nurit Stadler etai, "Fundamentalism's Encounters with Citizenship: The Haredim in Israel" (2008) 12 Citizenship Studies 215 at 222-223.
114 The struggle of secular groups for mandatory drafting of ultra-orthodox Jews into the army also reflects the understanding that duties are an integral part in the structure of citizenship in
Israel, and that all groups in society should contribute to the common good.79 This struggle arrived at the courts via several petitions calling to abolish the exemption of ultra-orthodox
Jews from the army, an exemption that until recently was regulated under a command of the
Ministry of Defence. Early petitions during the 1970s and early 1980s were not successful.
Initially, the courts ruled that the petitioners did not have standing in the matter and that the matter was not justiciable.80 Later, in furtherpetitions during the 1980s, the courts ruled that although the matter was justiciable, the exemption was still reasonable.81 More recent petitions during the 1990s were, however, more successful and the Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, ruled that the exemption could not be regulated merely under a military command but must be regulated by parliamentary law.82 In response, the Parliament enacted a law in 2002 that gave the Ministry of Defence the authority to postpone, under certain conditions, the service of someone who studies in a rabbinical institution.83 Another petition was filed against this law in 2002, arguing that it was unconstitutional because, among other things, by exempting part of the population fromth e duty to serve in the army, the law violated the right to equality of those who must serve in the army. The petition was eventually denied based on the principle of proportionality, but the court, nonetheless, made a number of important statements regarding citizenship duties. The court wrote that military service is a citizenship duty derived from the need to ensure the existence of Israel, and that
79 For a general discussion of this struggle see Gidon Sapir, "Drafting Yeshiva Students in Israel: A proposed Framework of the Relevant Normative Considerations" (2000) 9 Plilim, The Multi-Disciplinary Journal of Public Law, Society and Culture 217 (Hebrew). 80 HCJ 40/70 Beker v. The Minister of Defence, PD 24(1) 238 (Hebrew); HCJ 448/81 Resler v. The Minister of Defence, PD 36(1) 81 (Hebrew); HCJ 179/82 Resler v. The Minister of Defence, PD 36(4) 421 (Hebrew). 81 HCJ 910/86 Resler v. The Minister of Defence, PD 42(2) 441 (Hebrew). 82 HCJ 3267/97 Robinshtein v. The Minister of Defense, PD 52(5) 481 (Hebrew). 83 The 2002 Postponing Military Service for Yeshiva Students Act, SH 2002, 521 (Known also as the 'Tal Act').
115 all citizens should cany out this duty in an equal way, based on the notion that citizens should equally cany out the burden of social obligations as a basis to equal civil rights.84
This statement of the court, delivered in 2006, provides additional evidence that a 'duties discourse' still exist in Israel and that fulfilling citizenship duties is still a central element and value in Israeli society.
All these documents and debates point out that the 'duties discourse' has not vanished completely from public discourse in Israel. Again, I do not aim to suggest here that citizenship in Israel is built only on a civic-republican structure or that citizenship duties are dominant today to the same degree as they were in the past. The previous discussion points out that even though the liberal discourse of citizenship has become the leading one, fulfilling citizenship duties is nonetheless a prominent feature that serves as a basis for establishing a sense of belonging to the Israeli collective. Notions of contribution, belonging and civic virtue are, therefore, still present and relevant to the structure of citizenship in
Israel.
B. Welfare Reform and the Renewed Duty to Work
1. The Background to the Reform
Since 2000, Israel has laced an ongoing recession and a significant slowdown in its economic activities, which overshadow any economic difficulties that the Israeli market experienced in the past. This crisis occurred after a short but promising period of economic growth characterized by a significant increase of employment in the business sector, an expansion of the service and commerce sectors, a decline in the budget deficit, a slowdown
84 HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel et at v. The Knesset et al (not published yet) para. 28 (Hebrew). For an overview of the petitions regard drafting ultra-orthodox students to the army see Barak-Erez, supra note 72 at 236-246.
116 in the rise of prices, and an increase in the GDP. This period of growth ended in the year
2000.
Several factors have contributed to the recent economic crisis in the Israeli economy. First, the failure of the 2000 peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the second
Intifada, which broke out in October 2000, reignited the armed struggle in the area The security deterioration damaged several sectors, mainly tourism and construction.86 Trade relations between Israel and the Palestinians had also almost entirely stopped.87 Along with the increased tension about security in the area, the Israeli economy was greatly affected by external economic developments: the worldwide recession, (particularly as it affected the
U.S., Israel's chief ally), which began in early 2001 and deepened after September 1 Ith, and the sharp fall in the Nasdaq, as well as other capital markets around the world. These factors decreased the demand for Israeli products, especially technology-intensive products that were an important feature of the Israeli economy during the 1990s and the beginning of the year 2000.88 The deterioration of safety, together with the global economic slowdown, have inevitably decreased the rate of foreign investment in Israeli industries, consequently
Ministry of Finance, National Budget for the Years 2001-2003 (Jerusalem, 200QXHebrew). For a comparison between the current economic recession and the previous recessionary period, see the Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2002 (Jerusalem, 2003) at 6-7. 86 Reuben Gronau, ed., Macroecommic Policy 2002-2003 — The Tenth Annual Conference, July 2002, Position Paper No. 34 (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy InstitHte, 2002) at 7 (Hebrew). See also Bank of Israel, 95 Recent Economic Development, April-September 2001 (Jerusalem, 2001) at 1 [Bank of Israel, Recent Development, April-September 2001], 87 Ibid. Israeli exports to the Palestinian Authority significantly slowed down due to sharply declining Palestinian income rates and transportation difficulties arising from military confrontation. 88 Gronau, supra note 86 at 7-8. In its report on economic developments from April to September 2001, the Bank of Israel described how the global high-tech crisis contributed to the economic slowdown in the Israeli economy: "The bursting of the high-tech share-prices bubble adversely affected the ability of Israeli firms - and particularly of start-ups - to raise capital. M the second quarter of 2001, this category of investment was down by 30 percent from the first quarter of 2001, after having contributed 3 percentage points to GDP growth in 2000. The damage to the ability of start-ups to raise capital caused many of them to fold, setting off a negative economic chain reaction. The drop in demand for technology-intensive products harmed manufacturing exports classified as high-tech (about 50 percent of manufacturing exports), which were down by 18 percent from the previous six-month period. In addition, the export of start-up companies, which had reached a quarterly average of $450 million in 2000, came to a complete stop". See Bank of Israel, Recent Development, April- September 2001, supra note 86 at 1.
117 narrowing the productive potential of local businesses. And finally, political instability resulting from frequent government changes reduced confidence in the Israeli market and economic policies and thus increased the vulnerability of the Israeli economy.90
All these developments have led to deep ongoing recession in the Israeli economy, which was reflected in a considerable economic slowdown of the principal industries
(manufacturing, commerce, hotels, construction, transport and communications, and business services), an increase in prices and inflation, and a sharp decrease in state revenue from taxes.91 While the private sector has slowed down its economic activities, the governmental involvement in the market has increased.92 At the same time, the worsening of the security situation and the restoration of the Palestinian Intifada have increased the financial needs of the Israeli military and other defence institutions, therefore requiring the
Government to raise security budgets.93 The combination of a rapid increase of public expenses, a slowing down in state incomes and an urgent need for increased defence budgets - led to a substantial increase in the budget deficits.94
The economic crisis led to societal instability and increased economic inequalities among the Israeli population. The rise in the real wages slowed down,95 and those who were employed in lower positions and earned lower salaries suffered a decrease in the actual value of their wages, which in rum led to an increase in the economic inequalities between
89 According to the Bank of Israel, by the end of 2001, "foreign direct investment plummeted by 70 percent... and foreign portfolio investment was down by 75 percent from the equivalent period in 2000". Ibid, at 2. 90 Gronau, supra note 86 at 8. 91 Ministry of Finance, Economic Policies for the Years 2002-2003 (Jerusalem, 2002), at 4 (Hebrew) [The Ministry of Finance, 2002-2003 Economic Policies]; Bank of Israel, Recent Development, April-September 2001, supra note 86 at 3-4. 92 Ministry of Finance, National Budget for the Years 2002-2004 (Jerusalem, 2001 XHebrew). 93 Ministry of Finance, 2002-2003 Economic Policies, supra note 91 at 3. 94 Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2001 (Jerusalem, 2002) at 16 [Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2001]. 95 Ibid, at 17.
118 different groups of employees. In addition, the unemployment rate increased from 8.8 percent in 2000 to 10.7 percent in 2003 m The impact of the economic crisis was also reflected in the increased rate of poverty among Israeli families: the proportion of impoverished families (those whose disposable income is below the poverty threshold) increased from 17.6 percent of all families in Israel in 2000 to 19.3 percent in 2003,98 The increased number of unemployed people and income support beneficiaries has inevitably increased welfare spending by the Israeli government, thus contributing to increased deficits as well."
2. Welfare Reform
In response to the economic crisis and its outcomes, the Ministry of Finance adopted a series of economic plans aimed at recovering the Israeli economy. Most initiatives were outlined under the fiscal budgets for the years 2002 to 2005 and were adopted under different economic laws. The main objective of the economic plans was to create a stable economic environment that would allow the business sector to recover and widen its activities. A reduction of the national deficit was needed for the government to financeit s investment in this sector and expenditure in the public sector was reduced.
Gronau, supra note 86 at 9-10. 91 Nil, Rates of Poverty and Inequality in the Division of Incomes in the Market, 2001: Main Findings (Jerusalem, 2002) at 2 (Hebrew) [Nil, 2001 Poverty Report); Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2003 (Jerusalem, 2004) at 2 [Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2003]. For further discussions regarding unemployment trends and participation in the labour market during the economic crisis see Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2001, supra note 94 at 17-19,107-138. 98 Another indicator of increased poverty in the Israeli society is the number of income support beneficiaries: approximately 128,500 in 2000, 142,000 in 2001, 151,000 in 2002, and 155,500 in 2003. In addition, the average deviation of income fromth e poverty line (excluding residents of East Jerusalem) widened during the years of the economic recession: 26 percent in 2000,29 percent in 2002 and 30.5 percent in 2003. See Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2003, supra note 97 at 12; NH, Rates of Poverty and Inequality in the division of Incomes in the Market, 2000: Main Findings (Jerusalem, 2001) at 2, 9 (Hebrew)[NII: 2000 Poverty Report]; NU, 2001 Poverty Report, supra note 97 at 2,9; Nil, Rates of Poverty and Inequality in the division of Incomes in the Market, 2003: Main Findings (Jerusalem, 2004) at 3 (Hebrew)[NIJ, 2003 Poverty Report]. 99 Bank of Israel, Annual Report- 2001, supra note 86 at 2.
119 One of the main targets of the economic plans was the welfare system. The vision of the
Ministry of Finance was, and still is, to create a streamlined welfare system. For this purpose, two steps were taken. The first one was cutting the rates of many welfare entitlements, such as child allowances, maternity grants, alimony payments and unemployment benefits, as well as expanding the requirements for receiving them.101 The second step in restructuring the welfare system was moving the unemployed from welfare into the labour market. A program named "From Welfare to Work" was adopted under the
2003 Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2004 (legislative Amendments) Act.102 It was mainly directed at the long-term unemployed who rely on income support benefits.103 The
Act establishes employment centers, which offer the unemployed job opportunities in the labour market.104 If such jobs cannot be found or if only part-time jobs are available, the centres prepare a personal program in which the participant is referred to community work or vocational training. Participating in these activities, under the law, is a precondition for
Changes were also introduced in other public areas. For example, the defence budget was reduced, salaries in the public sector were fixed at their current levels, municipalities were combined to reduce manpower and many employees in the public sector were dismissed. For an overview of the different steps taken, see the Ministry of Finance, 2002-2003 Economic Policies, supra note 91 at 5-7, 11,19 and 21; Ministry of Finance, The Economic Policy for the Year 2004: Structural Changes and Budget Arrangement (Jerusalem, 2003) at 7- 10 (Hebrew) [Ministry of Finance, The Economic Policy far the Year 2004]; Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Policy for the Year 2005 (Jerusalem, 2004) at 24 (Hebrew). 101 For an overview of welfare cuts, see National Insurance Institute, Summary of Developments and Trends in Social Security 2002 (Jerusalem: National Insurance Institute, 2003) at 15; Nil, Summary of Developments and Trends in Social Security 2003 (Jerusalem: National Insurance Institute, 2004) at 17 [National Insurance Institute, 2003 Developments and Trends]; Rachel Vartzberg, "The Damage to Women following the Income Benefits Cuts under the 2003 Proposed Budget and the Program 'From Welfare to Work"', a background paper submitted to the Committee of the Advancement of Women's Status (August 2003) at 7 (Hebrew). 102 SH 2004, 99. In March 2000, the Minister of Labour and Welfare appointed a committee to consider the needed policy reform regarding long-term unemployed persons. The committee was asked to examine different ways to integrate unemployed persons who live on welfare into the labour market and to propose a model for establishing employment centres, which would teat these unemployed persons. See Israel, The Recommendations of the Committee to Reform the Treatment Policy regarding Unemployed Persons whoLive on Long-term Income Support Benefits, Intermediate Report submitted to the Minister of Labour and Welfare (August 2001). Most of the committee's recommendations were eventually adopted by the Government. 103 For a review of the income support branch before the implementation of the welfare reform see John Gal & Abraham Doron, "Dealing with the Elusive Welfare-to-Work Issue: the Case of Poverty Traps in Israel" (2000) 34 Social Policy & Administration 253; Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 118; Brenda Morgenstein & Miriam Schmeltzer, "The Changes in the Characteristics of Income Support Beneficiaries in the Last Decade: The Potential for Employment" (2000) 58 Social Security 28 (Hebrew); Doron & Kramer, The Welfare State in Israel, supra note 27 at 28-30, 32-34. See also Doron, In the Name of Universality, supra note 46 at 122-124. 104 These centres began working in 2005 in four cities: Jerusalem, Ashkelon, Nazareth and Hadera.
120 receiving income support benefits and an absence from such activities, without a reasonable justification, results in denied benefits.105
To ensure the successful implementation of the program and to motivate the unemployed to
enter the labour market, several changes were adopted with respect to the income support
benefits themselves. First, the benefit rates were reduced by 8 to 23 percent, based on family
composition and the age of the beneficiaries.106 Second, the income test was changed: the
amount of income fromwor k or pension not taken into account for purposes of calculating
the eligibility for benefits and their level was reduced from 13 to 5 percent of the average
wage for a single person, and from 17 to 5 percent for other family structures.107 In addition,
for any income higher than the minimum untaxable income, benefits were reduced by 60 to
70 percent, in accordance with the family composition.108 Third, the employment test was
changed as well. Until 2003, beneficiaries were required to be at employment centres and
show their willingness and capacity to work (the employment test). Many beneficiaries, as
explained above, were exempted from this requirement, not because they were not
employable, but because different circumstances made it very difficult for them to
participate. These people were required to attend the employment centres less frequently for
evaluation of their personal circumstances. Those who were found to be permanendy
unemployable were not required to attend the centres at all. As of January 2003, the
exemption from the employment test for mothers with a child under the age of seven was
changed and today only mothers of a child under the age of two are exempted from the
105 Sections 42-45. For an overview of the Welfare-to-Work program, see John Gal, "From Welfare without Work to Work with More Welfare" (2005) 69 Social Security 5 (Hebrew). 106 The 2003 Economy Arrangements (Legislative Amendments for Achieving the Budgetary Objectives and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2003) Act, SH 150, section 17(3) [The 2003 Economy Arrangements Act}. 107 This means that a bigger portion of these incomes is now taken into consideration when calculating the income test. This determines if a person's income is too low and if he or she should be financiallysupported . See ibid, section 17(7). 108 Nil, Annual Review 2002/2003 (Jerusalem, 2004) at 154 [ND, Annual Review 2002/2003}.
121 employment test. As a result of these changes and reductions, the total yearly sum of income support payments was reduced by about 800 million MS (approximately 200 million Canadian dollars) and fewer individuals or families were entitled to these benefits.
For example, out of nearly 152,000 families who received these benefits in mid-2002, about
97,000 received a reduced rate and for 9,000 families, the benefits were revoked.110 From
January until December 2003, the number of income support beneficiaries decreased by approximately 1 l,000.ni This decrease in the number of income support beneficiaries also continued from 2004 to 2006, as a result of the narrow eligibility provisions.112
3. The Effects of and the Responses to the Reform
The summer of 2003 was one of the most intense ones in terms of public debates, rallies and protests. Groups of children, single mothers, elderly and disabled people organized big demonstrations around the country and even hunger strikes.113 A few petitions were also filed before the Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, against the reduction of the welfare benefits.114 These protests and petitions, however, had little effect on the
See the 2003 Economy Arrangements Act, section 17(5). Single parents entitled to alimony continue to be exempt from the employment test. Furthermore, the option of classifying persons as permanently unemployable was abolished with respect to new beneficiaries. These people are all required to attend the centres for the purposes of employment placement. 110 Nil, Annual Review 2002/2003, supra note 108 at 159. 111 Ibid, at 170. 112 Nil, 2005 Annual Report (Jerusalem, 2006) at 146 |MI, 2005 Annual Repent]. 113 For an overview of the demonstrations against the welfare reform see Ruth Sinai, "2000 Demonstrated against the Economic Plan", Haaretz (1 May 2003); Ruth Sinai, "Knafo's Achievement: Fighting for Job Opportunities and not for Benefits", Haaretz (24 September 2003); Hanna Kim, "July War", Haaretz (18 July 2003); Moti Basok, "8 Mothers and Fathers Began Marching to Jerusalem; 8 More Begin Today", Haaretz (14 July 2003); Ruth Sinai, "Knafo and 7 Others are on a Hunger Strike", Haaretz (8 September 2003); Mazal Mualem, "We are Out of Patience, Said the Protesters", Haaretz (31 July 2003). 114 In the beginning of 2003, two petitions were filed before the Supreme Court as a High Court of Justice against the economic plans: HCJ 888/03 The Association far Civil Rights in Israel, et al, v. The Israeli Government, et al (not yet published) (Hebrew); HCJ 366/03 The Association for Commitment for Peace and Social Justice, et al, v. The Israeli Government, et al (not yet published) (can be found at www.court.gov.il) (Hebrew). These petitions targeted the reduction of the rate of benefits and entitlement conditions, both of which were claimed to violate the constitutional right to minimal living conditions and the state's duty to provide a social safety net for its citizens. The court ruled that the state had a duty to provide a safety net to protect the constitutional right of each citizen to a minimum standard of living that allows him or her to survive
122 execution of the welfare reform. As of 2003, most of the welfare cuts were implemented and the Welfare-to-Work program began operation in the summer of 2005.
Following the implementation of the economic plans, mainly the 2003 Recovery Plan, the
Israeli economy began showing signs of improvement. Modest indications of recovery were seen in 2003 and more rapid improvement was achieved during 2004. In 2003, according to the Bank of Israel, "GDP rose by 1.3 percent and business-sector productivity by 1.8 percent, after a 3 percent decline in each of the two preceding years".m Exports and private consumption also increased during the second half of 2003, and the productivity of the high- technology industry and the commerce and service sector expanded as well.nl In 2004, the expansion of economic activities continued: the GDP kept increasing, private consumption rose, business-sector productivity increased (leading to an increase in Israel's exports), goods and services imports rose, and the fiscal deficit declined.118 Furthermore, the rate of unemployment declined in 2004 to 10.4 percent (compared to 10.7 percent in 2003).U9 In addition, according to Central Bureau of Statistics, the average wage in the labour market increased in 2004 by 2.5 percent when compared to the average wage in 2003. This increase in the society in which they live. This right to a minimum standard of living is part of the constitutional right to dignity. In the specific petitions, however, the Court ruled that the petitioners did not prove that the lower level of benefits failed to provide them with this minimum standard of living or that cutting the benefits violates their right to dignity. For an overview of the petitions and their importance in constituting social rights in Israel see Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, "Social Citizenship: The Neglected Aspect of Israeli Constitutional Law", in Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, eds., Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford: Hart Publications, 2007) 243 at 250-252. 115 One exemption is the elderly benefits that were increased in 2005. See the NIL 2005 Annual Report, supra note 112 at 3. 116 Ibid, at 1. For an overview of the positive outcomes that resulted from the implementation of the economic plans, see the Ministry of Finance, The Reforms in the Israeli Economy 2003-2005 and the Outcomes of the Economic Policy (Jerusalem, 2005) (Hebrew). 117 Ibid, at 5-6. 118 Bank of Israel, Recent Development, April-September 2004 (Jerusalem, 2005) at 1-3. Furthermore, according to the Bank of Israel: "Against the background of fiscal policy that reduced government expenditure and led to greater government credibility and to the stabilization of the long-term interest rates at a relatively low level, the slow rate of price increases and the stabilization of inflation expectations within the target range, the Bank of Israel kept the interest rate relatively low and thus supported increased demand". Ibid, at 2. For more about gross domestic investments and economic activities of specific sectors, see ibid, at 3-8. 119 Central Bureau of Statistics, "Manpower Survey for the Year 2004", Press Release, February 28,2005,
123 came after a decline in the 2003 average wage of about three percent compared to the
average wage in 2002. Nevertheless, the 2004 average wage was still one percent lower than
the average wage in 2002.120 Similar positive developments also took place in subsequent years. For example, in its Annual Report for the iscal year 2006, the Bank of Israel
indicated that "development in the economy was particularly positive this year, and was
reflected in several areas; GDP grew by 5.1 percent, led by an increase in high-tech exports;
rapid growth has continued now for more than three years; unemployment fell to its lowest
this decade and reached 7.7 percent this year; the debt to GDP ratio fell significantly; the
surplus in the current account was very high, and foreign investment in Israel reached record
levels".121 This positive progress continued also in 2007.*
Despite mis development and the shift toward economic growth, much criticism was
directed at the economic plans as they resulted in negative impacts on Israeli society in
general and on more vulnerable groups in particular. According to the National Insurance
Institute's 2003 Poverty Report, poor families became poorer, mainly families that were
headed by unemployed persons. The percentage of families whose income is lower than the
poverty line increased from 18.1 percent in 2002 to 19.3 percent in 2003, and transfer
payments (after taxes were deducted) pulled only 43 percent of poor people out of poverty
in 2003, compared to about 47 percent in 2002.m These trends also continued in subsequent
years. In its 2005 annual report, the Bank of Israel indicated that the incidence of poverty
had gradually increased since the implementation of the welfare reform, mainly due to the
budget cuts in social benefits. It also indicated that the incidence of poverty in Israel was
120 Central Bureau of Statistics, "Average Wages per Employee Post in 2004", Press Release, March 9,2005. 121 Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2006 (Jerusalem, 2007), summaries, at 1. * Nil, Levels of Poverty and Gaps in Incomes 2006/2007: Main Findings (Jerusalem, 2008) at 1 -3 (Hebrew). 122 NU, 2003 Poverty Report, supra note 98 at 3. The percentage of poor people as compared with the entire population increased from 21.1 percent in 2002 to 22.4 percent in 2003. The percentage of poor children as compared with all children in Israel increased from29. 6 percent to 30.8 percent. Ibid, at 8.
124 high relative to other countries around the world. The MPs 2005 annual report presents similar findings: the scope of poverty continued to expand and the percentage of families whose net income fell below the poverty line increased from 19.3 percent in 2003 to 20.6 percent in 2005. Since 2001, the report points out, the poverty rate increased by almost 3 percent.124 Furthermore, the report indicates, "quantitative estimates of the social implications of die budgetary policy show an unfair distribution in the cost of the economic recovery, that is, the accumulative influence of the changes in transfer payments, in expenditures on education and health services, and in direct taxes, considerably lowered the net income of the four lowest deciles, while raising that of the other deciles, particularly the two highest ones".125 In 2005 and 2006, the poverty rates remained stable, but still high in comparison to the poverty rates before the implementation of welfare reforms and in comparison to other western countries around the world.126
These socioeconomic inequalities and increasing poverty rates happened, it can be argued, because certain sectors of the Israeli society prospered at the expense of others when the
Government designed the plan for economic growth. The economic plans concentrated on the business sector and those employed within it and on the population that lives in the central part of Israel (while most poor persons live on the periphery). Therefore, the financial policies benefited those who already enjoyed some economic stability or well-
Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 200S (Jerusalem, 2006) at 303. MI, 2005 Annual Report, supra note 112 at 76. The Report further indicates that "The poverty rate rose most notably among families wife children and among families headed mainly by an elderly person. This rate rose from 23% in 2003 to 25.1% in 2004/5 and from 22.3% in 2003 to 24.5% in 2004/5, respectively. The increase in the poverty rate did not skip over working families. For example, the rate of single-earner families with a net income below the poverty line grew from 18.6% in 2003 to 20.8% in 2004 and to 22.0% in 2004/5." Ibid. 125 Ibid, preface. 126 NH, 2005 Poverty Report (Jerusalem, 2006); NE 2005-2006 Poverty Report (Jerusalem, 2007).
125 being.127 Other objections to the economic plans were that the Welfare-to-Work program did not allocate sufficient resources to address labour market failures that prevented poor people with family responsibilities from entering the labour market. It was also claimed that not enough resources were allocated to substantially improve the human capital of those who were forced to find a job.128 The Bank of Israel itself indicated that this program
"should have been accompanied by an increase in direct incentives for participation of households in the labour market [but] no such steps [had] been taken".129 Another objection referred the inability of the labour market to absorb long-term unemployed persons who were pushed out of the welfare system due to the already high rate of unemployment and the competition with other unemployed people who were better educated and more skilled. 13° It was also argued that initiatives aimed at reducing the size of the public sector and dismissing employees should be implemented only after the market moved from recession into
127 SMomo Swirski & Etty Konor-Atias, Social Situation Report - 2004 (Tel Aviv: Adva Centre, 2005) at 4 (Hebrew). According to this report, more resources were directed at the high-tech industries and at the financial and service sectors, while fewer resources were transferred to traditional industries (such as food and textile) and agriculture. Therefore, more job opportunities became available to those who could integrate into the financial and service sectors, where the wages were higher. These opportunities benefited those who were better educated and skilled and who were already better economically positioned in society. Ibid, at 6-13.
128 Avishy Benish, "Chronicle of Social Damage: From Damaging the Unemployed to Damaging the Public Sector's Employees", in Marathon of Responses, supra note — at 55. Similarly, it is argued that the labour market cannot offer employment opportunities to those who must work longer to obtain retirement benefits, that is, until they are 67 years old. See Abraham-Vis, Sharon. "Damaging the Democratic Process and Employees' Rights in General and Women's and Elderly in Particular", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) 25 (Hebrew).
129 Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2003, supra note 97 at 14. See also Erik Ben-Shahar, "Comments regarding Unemployment", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) at 34-37. 130 Abraham Doron, "From Welfare to Work: A Threat to the Safety Net of the Israeli Social Security System" (2000) 57 Social Security 37 at 40-41 {Doron, "From Welfare to Work"]; Gal, Social Security, supra note 27 at 127.
126 economic growth to avoid an increase in the rate of poverty and in economic inequalities among the population.131
Many of these concerns regarding the operation of the Welfare-to-Work program were found to be valid. During 2006 and in early 2007, the NH published a few reports dealing with the implementation and function of the employment centres that were established under the Welfare-to-Work plan. According to the 2007 reports, only 15 percent of those who were referred to the centres found ajo b or increased their number of working hours.m
The number of benefits recipients significantly decreased since the program came into operation, but only 30 to 40 percent of those former recipients could be attributed to employment assignments.133 The reports also indicated that the employment centres, operated by private companies, did not function well. They focused more on referring participants to jobs rather than improving the participants' human capital and abilities to keep a job. The centres, according to the reports, provided mainly short-term activities that focused primarily on soft skills.134 There are also indications that those who entered the labour market since the implementation of the welfare reform earned low salaries or were
Menachem Yahaii, "Comments on the Ministry of Finance's Plan for the Recovery of the Israeli Economy", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon ofResponses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) at 14-15. 132 Nil, Estimation Research of the Welfare-to-Work Program, Second Report (Jerusalem, February 2007) [Nil, Second Estimation Research] at 82 (Hebrew); NJJ, Estimation Research of the Welfare-to-Work Program, Forth Report (Jerusalem, July 2007) [MI, Forth Estimation Research] at 4 (Hebrew). 133 NIL The implementation of the Law for Integrating Income Support Recipients into Work, Second Report (Jerusalem, 2007) at 15 (Hebrew). 134 NH, Second Estimation Research, supra note 132 at 113-138; Nil, Forth Estimation Research, supra note 132 at 88-91. Much criticism was directed at the employment centres by other organizations and by the participants themselves. It was argued, for example, that since private companies seeking profits operate these employment centres, they focus more on referring participants to possible jobs, since for each employment assignment they receive a payment from the government. The State Comptroller, in his 2007 report regarding certain aspects of the Welfare-to-Work program, pointed out the danger that financial considerations might lead these private companies to put more effort into findingemploymen t for groups who had a better chance to enter the labour market, while neglecting the less able members of the population. See State Comptroller, Several Aspects of the Welfare-to-Work Program (Jerusalem, 2007) at 10 (Hebrew). This report also indicated that the program did not properly respond to those with health limitations and that the centres did not always fulfill the requirements under the law and do not prepare personal plans for the participants that take into consideration their qualifications and employment experience. Ibid, at 9-12.
127 employed in low-skilled jobs that did not allow them to rise above the poverty line. In response to these findings,th e Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment announced its intention to abandon the current Welfare-to-Work program and adopt a new one that would better accommodate certain groups, such as single mothers, elderly and new immigrants.
According to the new plan, recipients older man 45 years old, among others, will be exempted from the program and the sanction of denial of benefits will be abolished.136 This alternative plan was not approved yet and is still discussed in different committees of the
Parliament. At the moment, the original Welfare-to-Work program is still in place, and the common approach among policymakers and the general view of the public is that work ethic must be promoted and the unemployed must try to join the workforce as a precondition to welfare support.
4. The Renewed Duty to Work
Welfare reform, as discussed earlier, requires every citizen to enter the labour market as a precondition of welfare rights. One might argue that the practice of work does not reflect a duty of citizenship, like paying tax or serving in the military, but merely a qualification for being eligible for welfare support from the state. In that sense, the argument goes, the welfare reform merely tightened the employment test under the Income Support Act to encourage the unemployed to find a paid job. One might further argue that the requirement to enter the labour market is not a citizenship duty, as it refers only to a small part of the population, that is, those individuals who have the choice of meeting this requirement or not.
This line of argument, in my opinion, is artificial as it looks at the welfare reform from a
133 Roth Sinai, "90 Percent of the New Employees Earn Less than 5000 Shekels a Month", Haaretz (31 October 2004) (Hebrew). 136 For more about the proposed plan, see the Industry, Trade and Employment Ministry, press announcement, 25.2.2007. See also Ruth Eglash, "Putting Down Roots in Wisconsin", Jerusalem Post (8 January 2007); Ruth Eglash, "Olmert to Establish Special Panel to Amend Wisconsin Plan", Jerusalem Post (6 February 2007).
128 very narrow point of view. Indeed, unlike paying tax or serving in the military, the reform did not establish a legal duty to work. It is also true that, in practice, the reform tightens the conditions for receiving welfare benefits and is applied only on a relatively small portion of the population, those who are considered to be long-term unemployed. Most citizens in
Israel indeed work and are not at all influenced by the new qualifications for receiving income support benefits.137
However, on a normative and ideological level, and within the discourse of citizenship, the welfare reform did establish a citizenship duty to work. Within a broad understanding of citizenship, as indicated in the previous chapter, citizenship is about the relation between individuals, the state and their fellow citizens. It is about belonging to a certain society or community, a belonging that is built on or derived from the rights, duties and cultures of its individuals. Beyond being an activity regulated under the law or a precondition to citizenship rights, a 'duty of citizenship' is a practice that reflects a certain societal normative judgment about the proper behaviour in society and about what kind of actions are understood to be necessary for the success of society. Welfare reform in Israel, in my opinion, certainly reflects a clear societal normative judgment regarding the proper work ethic of its citizens, and it establishes a duty to work as a basis for welfare rights and full citizenship. "Those who can work - must work", declared Benjamin Netanyahu, the former
Minister of Finance, who implemented most of the economic plans and the welfare reform.138 This renewed duty is grounded in two perspectives discussed in the previous chapter, liberal and civic-republican, and it reflects both individualist and collectivist elements.
137 Although every citizen might potentially arrive at a situation where he or she faces hardship and needs to ask for welfare support. It might be argued, then, that the welfare reform has the potential to affect each citizen in Israel and therefore its scope is theoretically broader than what it seems in practice. 138 Moti Basok, "The Minister of Finance of the Top Echelon", Haaretz (12 August 2005) (Hebrew).
129 First and foremost, as many scholars argue, a strong and dominant neo-liberal agenda stands behind the Israeli welfare reform. The Ministry of Finance, and especially Netanyahu, declared many times that the inspiration for the changes was the American welfare reform.
In fact, the Israeli Welfare-to-Work program was inspired to a large extent by the Wisconsin plan that applied clear neo-liberal notions of citizens' social obligations as a precondition to social rights.139 The Israeli Ministry of Finance published a document explaining its inclination to learn from the American experience.140 Similar to Mead's ideology discussed in the previous chapter, the Israeli Ministry of Finance has frequently emphasized its expectation mat all citizens in Israel be required to enter the labour market and to earn a living before turning to welfare support. The recent welfare reform is thus a direct continuance of the liberalization process described above. The focus of this reform is on a strong market, free of state intervention, and on a citizen's personal responsibility for his or her own well-being. Dan Gutwein, an Israeli historian, argues that this reform carries a clear ideological message. It presents socialism as evil and neo-liberalism as redemptive. The reform's objectives are not merely economical but ethical as well, and the reform introduces a social perspective that covers almost all areas of life. The reform, Gutwein explains, aims to satisfy the interests of the private sector and the financial elite. For that purpose, the
Ministry of Finance renounces its responsibility to the less able and more vulnerable groups in society, whose contribution to the economy is small. To promote tax benefits to the middle and upper levels, it aims to reduce the public expenditure on the 'useless' groups.
Wisconsin was one of the first states in the US to implement welfare reform that conditioned welfare support upon working in the labour market. For more about the welfare reform in Wisconsin, see Lawrence M. Mead, Government Matters: Welfare Reform in Wisconsin (Princerton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 140 See Ministry of Finance, From Ensuring Income to Ensuring Employment (Jerusalem, 1999)(Hebrew).
130 Based on typical neo-liberal assumptions, Gutwein further maintains, the reform emphasizes the contribution of private capital to the market and gives incentives to the middle class.141
As part of the process of instituting the duty to work, anew rhetoric of'blaming the victim'
appeared in public discourse. Indeed, on the surface, the Ministry of Finance was careful not to point a finger at the unemployed as the cause of the welfare crisis. Instead, the welfare
system itself and those who designed it were responsible, according to the government, for
creating a 'poverty trap'. The welfare state, it is argued, encourages the poor to remain passive and dependent on welfare benefits without taking the responsibility for improving their standard of living. The welfare state is thus seen as the source of the problem; it perpetuates dependency by reducing citizens' motivation to be self-reliant. Its core
weakness is not necessarily the high level of social rights and benefits but the fact that these
are given to citizens without requiring them to work in return.142 At the same time, if we
read between the lines of the reform and the public discourse, the unemployed and the poor
are also being blamed for being unmotivated and unwilling to work hard for a living. They
are presented as those who will work only for good salaries that will provide them with a
standard of living similar to that provided by the welfare system. In other words, the poor
are portrayed as lazy and as having no work ethic. Welfare recipients are therefore
stigmatized as those who failed to function properly and to provide forthemselves , and they
face direct or implied hostility from members of Israeli society. As Abraham Doron argues,
instead of focusing on the limitations of the market to provide employment opportunities,
Israeli society holds the unemployed responsible for their situation and for exploiting the
141 Dan Gutwin, "Changes in the Fiscal Policy of the Right, 1977-2003" (2004) 10 Labour, Society & Law at 222,232-233. More about the domimancy of the liberal discourse in the economic policies see Peled, "Towards a Post-Citizenship Society?", supra note 68 at 100-101. 142 Ministry of finance. Fiscal Policy for the Year 2003 (Jerusalem, 2002) at 30 (Hebrew); Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Policy for the Year 2004 (Jerusalem, 2003) at 4 (Hebrew).
131 system, while the welfare system itself is accused of encouraging a 'culture of laziness and idleness'.143
The duty to work, therefore, becomes once again a central element in the structure of
citizenship in Israel. Structured in individualistic terms, this renewed duty, as noted, reflects the notion that the citizens are required to be economically independent and responsible for their living, thus reducing the burden on society to support them. To fosterth e Welfare-to-
Work plan, similar to the proposals of Mead, the Israeli reform undertakes certain measures to force the unemployed into the labour market. They are forced to arrive regularly at
employment centres and to participate in employment or training activities, or else they are
sanctioned and denied welfare support. In this way, the poor are being disciplined to adopt the proper work ethic and become self-reliant.
Looking closely at the statements of the Ministry of Finance, it can be argued that the duty to work is also built upon the civic-republican structure of citizenship and its understanding of a citizenship duty. First, carrying out the duty to work becomes a precondition for welfare
rights and therefore to full citizenship. This clearly brings back the traditional civic-
republican structure of citizenship where, as discussed previously, full citizenship is
conditioned upon being an 'active citizen' - one who takes part in certain activities and
practices before becoming a full member of society. Full citizenship, therefore, is once again
achieved through fulfilling a duty of citizenship. Furthermore, the current duty to work also
reflects the idea of contributing to the common good, which is a dominant element in the
civic-republican understanding of citizenship duties. Indeed, as noted earlier, the
government emphasizes again and again the responsibility of individuals to take care of
themselves and the value of being independent of state support. However, the duty to work
143 Doron, In the Name of Universality, supra note 46 at 116-117; Doron, "From Welfare to Work", supra note 130 at 38, 53.
132 is also attached to national goals. Netanyahu declared many times that the goal of the reforms was not only achieving a strong economy but also guaranteeing "all the elements in
[Israeli] national life".144 Using the rhetoric of'saving the nation', Netanyahu explained in his personal blog that a strong economy was required to ensure the security of Israel, as well as peace in the future. The welfare reform, he further maintained, allowed allocating more money for security projects, such as building the fence between Israel and the Occupied
Territories, which helped fight terror and fostered further economic growth.145 In another interview, given on the first day of implementing the Welfare-to-Work program, Netanyahu
declared that "we will prevent people from not working" and that the reform program was
aimed to help not only unemployed individuals but also "the economy, society and
everyone".146 In other words, the duty to work is attached here to the future existence of
Israel as a whole. Israeli citizens are required to work to help achieve the common good:
security and peace.147 Being economically independent is therefore not merely an individualist concept but also a way of contributing to the common good; it helps reduce
welfare expenses and, in return, strengthens the market and helps the economy recover, which then contributes to achieving other national goals. Being structured around notions of contribution and the common good, the renewed duty to work once again provides a route to belonging; it is a renewed 'political project of belonging' that can potentially differentiate between those who fulfill the new duty and those who do not, leaving the latter with a limited ability to establish a sense of belonging.
Ministry of Finance, the Reforms in the Israeli Economy 2003-2005 and the Outcomes of the Economic Policy (Jerusalem, 2005) at 7 (Hebrew). 145 See Netanyahu's blog at http://netanYalni.org.il/inside/nii.asp (page titled "Benjamin Netanyahu: The Best Minister of Finance Since the Establishment of the State"). 146 Yediot Aharonot, "Netanyahu: No One will Escape Work Anymore" (1 August 2005) (Hebrew). 147 See also Benjamin Netanyahu, "The Benefits Perpetuated Poverty", Yediot Aharonot (10 September 2004) (Hebrew).
133 The difference between the duty to work during the early years of statehood and the current renewed duty to work is mainly in their focal point and the ideological balance they reflect.
The early duty to work was part of a strong civic-republican structure of citizenship. It was derived from a Zionist pioneering ethos built on the values of collectivism and self- sacrifice. The Zionist movement, as discussed above, structured membership around fulfilling duties and it required everyone to work, and work hard, to build the nation and ensure the existence of the new state. The duty to work, thus, reflected firstan d foremost the value of contribution and a civic-republican understanding of membership. At the same time, the duty to work during these years also reflected the notion of personal responsibility, as individuals were expected to be economically independent rather than relying on a young society struggling to survive. But the notion of economic independence did not stand on its own; it was strongly attached to the notion of contributing to society by not being needy and thus to the national project as a whole. In other words, what justified the requirement to be economically independent were the collectivist agenda of the Zionist movement and the strong principle of contribution to the nation. Today, the duty to work is strongly attached to liberal notions of individualism and independence, and those who do not fulfill it are sanctioned with a denial of rights.Nevertheless , even today, as I argued above, the renewed duty reflects the notion and obligation of contributing to the common good. Indeed, unlike the early duty to work, the current duty is not attached to a project of nation-building since, for the most part, the basic institutions, economy and infrastructure are in place. At the same time, in light of the ongoing struggle of the state to survive and put down roots in the land of
Israel, the current duty to work is still attached, in an indirect and implied way, to the national objective of ensuring the existence of Israel. For that purpose, which mirrors the common good of the majority in Israel, citizens are required to contribute by becoming economically independent and strengthening the Israeli economy. Understood from this
134 perspective, the duty to work therefore still serves as a route to belong to the Israeli collective and those who do not carry out the duty may face the risk of not being able to create social attachments and be part of the mainstream. One indication of such a structure of the duty to work, in my opinion, has to do with the notion of'the salt of the earth'. This expression refers not only to mainstream Israeli society but also to the elite, those who reflect the most excellent values and practices, such as contributing to their society and working hard. Today, the formerly employed who manage to rejoin the workforce and become independent of welfare support are indeed considered to be 'the salt of the earth', even if they remain poor, because they prove to society that they meet the expectation to work and they do their best to work - and work hard - to not be a burden on society.148
Conclusions
Many states around the world have introduced their citizens to the duty to work. This duty reflects anew 'duties discourse' of citizenship, as well as an ideological shift with respect to the structure of the welfare state and the responsibilities of citizens. A similar process, as described in this chapter, took place in Israel, as Israeli citizens are expected to rely less on the welfare system and more on their own earnings and resources. The changes in the Israeli welfare state, however, provide a unique case of a 'duties discourse' that reflects not only the principle of independence but also the principle of contributing to society as a basis for achieving belonging. Historically, the structure of citizenship in Israel was framed around a civic-republican model that emphasized the duties of citizens and required them to contribute to the process of nation-building as a precondition for rights and social attachments. One of these duties was work; citizens were expected to work hard and build the new home for the Jewish people. This was the original duty to work. Later on, as a
148 Sheri Rivkin. "The Second-Class Poor", Haaretz (25 November 2004) (Hebrew).
135 liberal structure of citizenship became more central in Israeli society, work became more an individualist practice, rather than a duty toward the collective. Today, as part of a welfare reform that is aimed to move people from welfare to the labour market, Israeli citizens face a renewed duty to work. This time, the duty reflects firstan d foremost aliberal-individualist notion that a 'good citizen' is an independent one. Citizens are required to enter the labour market and find a paid job as a precondition to welfare rights. At the same time, as argued in this chapter, the renewed duty to work is also built upon the notions of contribution and belonging. Moving from welfare to work, Israeli citizens are taking part in the recovery of the economy and the maintaining of security. Being independent of welfare support, they are contributing to the common good and national goals, thus establishing a path toward mainstream society. In other words, the renewed duty to work in Israel creates a 'political project of belonging'. It provides Israeli citizens with a route to belonging and attachment, two principles that are still very central to Israeli society and that are essential to full citizenship.
Not all citizens in Israel, as mentioned earlier, are capable of fulfilling the duty to work.
Women (mainly single mothers) are one of these groups. Not being able to carry out the renewed obligation, their membership and belonging are in danger. The next chapters move to explore the relation of Israeli women to the 'duties discourse'. To fully understand and analyze the implications of the renewed duty to work on women and single mothers, I begin the discussion by looking at the early 'duties discourse' in Israel, which introduced women with a 'duty of motherhood' and exempted them from the early duty to work. Once this background is in place, the discussion will return to present time and look at the current duty to work and its effect on women's citizenship in Israel.
136 Chapter in The Early 'Duties Discourse' in Israel: Women and the 'Duty of Motherhood'
Part I: Motherhood and the 'Duties Discourse': From Exclusion to Inclusion A Recognizing Women's Differences B. Restructuring Citizenship according to Difference: Can Motherhood be Recognized as a Form of Participation? Part II: The Duty of Motherhood in Israel A. Motherhood as a National Mission and as a Basis for Inclusion in Citizenship 1. The Origins of the 'Duty of Motherhood' 2. Constituting the 'Duty of Motherhood' through Legal and Public Discourses 3. The Meaning and Importance of the 'Duty of Motherhood' B. Still Not Fulry Equal: The Limitations of Constituting Motherhood as a Route to Citizenship 1. Lack of Privacy and Autonomy - No 'Free Choice' 2. Ignoring Diversity among Women 3. Trapping Women in the Private Sphere I. Limiting Women's Participation in other Duties of Citizenship II. Undervaluing Women's Experience as Mothers
In most societies in the developed world, the process of recognizing women as full citizens was slow and progressive, and for centuries they were denied access to citizenship rights and practices. Compared to these societies, women's inclusion into Israeli society was relatively fast. The explanation for this is quite simple. As a new state bom in the mid- twentieth century, its members were highly influenced by western values and concepts.
Furthermore, learning from their own experience as a disadvantaged minority in the Jewish
137 Diaspora, Israel's founders sought to create a fair and just society. Zionist ideology incorporated the principle of equality between the sexes and Israel aimed to provide its female citizens with equal rights, entitlements and opportunities.1 This is not to say, however, that Israeli women have always enjoyed full and equal citizenship. In fact, for many years, women were not provided with equal rights in almost all areas of life: the labour market, education, health care, politics, military service and family life. Even today, despite their struggle for equality and the major victories and progress made, Israeli women still enjoy only partial and limited citizenship.2
The literature and public debates in Israel have brought much attention to promoting women's citizenship in terms of rights. My focus, however, is not on the allocation of rights to women, but on their integration into the 'duties discourse'. As the previous chapter showed, duties are an important element in the Israeli structure of citizenship, hi 1949, the first Israeli Parliament approved the primary guidelines for governmental legislative process. Chapter two of this plan declared that women would enjoy full and complete
About the aspiration to establish a society based on liberty and equality, see Frances Raday, "Women in the Israeli Law", in Dafha Izraeli et al, eds., The Double Bind, Women in Israel (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House Ltd., 1982) 172 at 172-173 [Raday, "Women in the Israeli Law"] (Hebrew); Sylvie Fogiel- Bijaoui, "On the Way to Equality? The Struggle for Women's Suffrage in the Jewish Yishuv, 1917-1926", in Deborah Bernstein, ed., Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in PreState Israel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 261 at 272-273 [Fogiel-Bijaoui, "On the Way to Equality?"]. 2 There is an extensive literature about women's status in Israel. See, in general, Marsha Freeman, "Women, Law, Religion and Politics in Israel: A Human Rights Perspective", in Kalpana Misra & Melanie S. Rich, eds., Jewish Feminism in Israel: Some Contemporary Perspectives (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002) 57; Frances Raday, "Women's Human Rights: Dichotomy between Religion and Secularism in Israel", in Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ed., Israeli Democracy At The Crossroads (New York : Routledge, 2005) 78; Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safe, "Living in a Jewish State: National, Ethnic and Religious Implications", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 8; Pnina Lahav, "The Status of Women in Israel" (1974) 22 Am. J. Comp. L. 107; Frances Raday, "The Concept of Gender equality in a Jewish State", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 18; Frances Raday, "Feminist Legal Theory, Legislation and Litigation in Israel: A Retrospection", in Daphne Barak-Erez et al, eds., Studies in Law, Gender and Feminism (Jerusalem: Nevo, 2007) 19 [Raday, "Feminist Legal Theory"]; Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, "Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel" (2000-2001) 5 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 339. For general discussions regarding the struggle of Israeli women for equality see Marcia Freedman, "Theorizing Israeli Feminism, 1970-2000", in Kalpana Misra & Melanie S. Rich, eds., Jewish Feminism in Israel: Some Contemporary Perspectives (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002) 1; Barbara Swirski, "Israeli Feminism New and Old", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 285; Hanna Herzog, "Re/visiting the Women's Movement in Israel" (2008) 12 Citizenship Studies 265.
138 equality of rights and duties in all areas of life.3 Was that actually true? Did women actually get the opportunity to fulfill duties? And when they fulfilled duties, did they gain full membership in society? The declaration also presents conceptual dilemmas with respect to women's integration into the 'duties discourse'. What does full equality of duties mean?
Does it mean that to achieve full membership, women must fulfill duties that are equal (read similar) to the duties of men, or duties that are equally important and contributing as much to society? Are women's duties equal in their content or are they equal in their worth? These questions reflect a core debate among feminists about whether women should be incorporated into citizenship based on their similarities to men or their differences from men. They also bring to the surface gendered structures in society that might affect women's ability to carry out duties, whether equal to or different from men's, and thus their ability to gain full membership. These dilemmas stand at the heart of this chapter as well as the following ones.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the first stage of the 'duties discourse' in Israel took place during pre-statehood and the early years of the state, when citizens' duties toward the collective were dominant under a civic-republican structure of citizenship.4 During these early years, two different citizenship routes were established: the male-citizen was produced through military service, settlements and labour; the female-citizen was produced through the practice of motherhood. Indeed, Israel has always been a family-oriented and strongly pronatahst society. The biblical command of Pru u-Rvu - "be fruitful and multiply", has become a central imperative in the eyes of the Israeli population, placing a strong expectation on women to bear children. The traditional structure of the family has therefore
3 Shulamith Aloni, Women as Persons (Jerusalem: Mabat, 1976) at 17 (Hebrew). 4 The second period refers to recent years of welfare reform when citizens, including women, were required to enter the renewed 'duties discourse' through labour. Chapter V will focus on this phase and analyze the integration of women into the 'duties discourse' as workers through the public sphere, based on a gender- neutral model of citizenship.
139 become a dominant facet of the Israeli society, under which women are expected to prioritize motherhood over any other activity and carry most domestic responsibilities. This traditional role of women as mothers was integrated into the 'duties discourse'. The societal expectation of women to become mothers and devote their time to domestic activities was
' upgraded' or 'translated' into a duty of citizenship, thus establishing a path into the national collective. Women were included in the 'duties discourse' through the private sphere, as mothers, while other duties applied to them only partially. This was their gendered- differentiated route into citizenship and their unique political project of belonging; it aimed to integrate their unique practices from the private sphere into the discourse of citizenship. In practice, however, as the discussion in this chapter will reveal, this gender-differentiated route disadvantaged women and allowed mem to gain only partial citizenship.
An important comment is necessary here about the meaning and scope of 'motherhood'.
The notion of 'motherhood' can refer to a variety of activities. Slaughter, for instance, explains that 'motherhood' refers to two functions: the first is to be a mother, meaning to give birth, and the second is to mother, meaning to care and nurse a child. While the first function of childbearing refers to a biological/physical activity that differs women from men, the second function of childrearing is produced by gendered structures, practices and social positions that place care responsibilities on women rather than on men.5 These two functions usually collapse together and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether a certain policy or statement refers to childbearing, childrearing or both. This was the case with the discussion of the 'duty of motherhood' in Israel. In the context of the 'duties discourse', as the discussion in this chapter will reveal, the 'duty of motherhood' sometimes referred only to childbirth, since the main purpose of this duty was to achieve a Jewish
5 M. M. Slaughter, "The Legal Construction of 'Mother'", in Martha A. Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds., Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 73 at 73.
140 majority in Israel. In a few documents, however, the duty indeed referred to other practices of mothering but they were only partially acknowledged within the 'duties discourse' thus perpetuating women's inferiority in the Israeli society.
The chapter is structured in two parte. The first part presents a feminist reading of the' duties discourse'. Drawing on a feminist analysis of citizenship, I address women's historic
exclusion from duties of citizenship and the gender-differentiated route that brings women into citizenship based on their distinctive characteristics and experience of gendered practices and structures in society. One of the debates among feminists is whether practices from the private sphere, like motherhood, can be considered practices of citizenship. I apply this debate to the 'duties discourse' and argue that the practice of motherhood can be integrated into the 'duties discourse' given its contribution to the common good of society.
The second part addresses the Israeli experience. The Israeli 'duties discourse' demonstrates how the practice of motherhood was integrated into the public sphere and structured as a
duty of citizenship. I begin the discussion of the Israeli case by exploring how the 'duty of motherhood' was framed and incorporated into the legal system and social policies. Then I
argue that integrating women into citizenship based on this duty was problematic for four reasons: it intervened with women's private choice, ignored differences among women, did not fully recognized women's care activities, and trapped women into the private sphere.
The Israeli case therefore demonstrates the potential limitations of the gender-differentiated
model of citizenship and suggests that, in light of current gendered structures in society, it
can provide women with merely partial and limited citizenship.6
6 A note regarding the duties of citizenship is required here. The following discussions introduce three different duties of citizenship in the Israeli society: military service, labour and motherhood. Although all three serve as a basis for inclusion in citizenship, one major difference between these practices is the formal mechanism of their regulation and enforcement. The duty to serve in the army is regulated under the law and violating this obligation is a criminal offence; a citizen who is obligated under the law to serve in the military service and does not carry it out is subject to a military trial. In contrast, labour and motherhood are not enforceable under
141 Part I: Motherhood and Citizenship: From Exclusion to Inclusion
Within the 'duties discourse', as discussed in the first chapter of the thesis, citizenship is conditional upon an active participation in practices that benefit the community. The citizen, therefore, is an active participant in the practices of citizenship. This participation provides the citizen with rights as well as a sense of belonging in his society or community. In his discussion of civic-republicanism, Oldfield claims that overall "...there is nothing aggressively male in the civic-republican conception of the citizen."7 Indeed, citizenship was traditionally understood to be a universal concept that refers to all individuals.
Feminists, however, have lifted the 'veil of universalism' to show the different ways in which the theory and practice of civic-republicanism have excluded women from duties and practices of citizenship, thus constituting civic-republicanism around the male-citizen.8 As
Ruth Lister writes, "in the republican tradition, the active participation of male citizens was predicated on the exclusion of women who sustained that participation by their labour in tile
'private' sphere."9 The reason for constituting women as non-citizens, Lister explains, derives fromcategorizin g mem as unqualified and incapable of participation in citizenship.
the law in the sense that society cannot put a citizen on trial forrefusin g to work or for bringing a child into the world. The legal system may include means of moral encouragement and regulation, as will be shown below, but the main sanction involved in these practices is the threat of poverty (with respect to the duty to work) and stigmatization (with respect to motherhood and work). 7 Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1990) at 159. 8 A similar critique was directed at the liberal tradition under which women were denied the formal standing and rights of citizenship. There is an extensive feminist scholarship regarding the false gender-neutral nature of liberal citizenship. In fact, given that the liberal model of citizenship is the most dominant and widespread one, most feminist writings focus cm the relations between women and citizenship rights. The feminist critiques of the liberal and republican traditions have much in common. For example, they note that both traditions include the false universalism of citizenship, the definition of citizenship as a gender-neutral concept, and explanations for the historical exclusion of women from citizenship. The preceding discussion, therefore, draws upon a feminist analysis of the liberal tradition as well, where applicable. For feminist work regarding the liberal tradition, see Kathleen B. Jones, "Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity" (1990) 15 Signs 781; Susan Moller Okin, "Gender, the Public, and the Private", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 116. 9 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macnrillan, 2003) at 70 [Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives]
142 Men were considered to be abstract and disembodied individuals: rational, impartial, independent and active. In contrast, women were envisioned as particular and embodied beings: emotional, irrational, partial, preoccupied with domestic matters, dependent and passive. Since the "qualities of impartiality, rationality, independence and political agency, which the citizen is expected to demonstrate, turn out to be male qualities," only men were entitled to citizenship status.10 This categorization, Lister argues, served as abasis to relegate women to the private sphere of the family and the household. Citizenship was considered to take place only in the public sphere - mainly the arena of politics - where men participated and exercised their rights as rational, independent and active citizens. Women, who did not hold the 'right' capacities, could not take part in debating common interests and fulfilling the general will. Therefore, they were exiled from the masculine public sphere into the private sphere of the family and household, which was not seen as a site for citizenship but where women, as non-citizens, took care of domestic concerns.11 Iris Young frames this dichotomy as between "the universal, public realm of sovereignty and the state, on the one hand, and the particular, private realm of needs and desires, on the other hand... the public realm attains its generality only by the exclusion of particularity, desire, feeling, and those aspects of life associated with the body".12 Domestic activities were not considered, therefore, as duties of citizenship.
10 Ibid, at 71. See also Ms M Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 109-110 [Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference}. 11 Ann Phillips, Democracy and Difference (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993) at 76 [Phillips, Democracy and Difference]. Historically, the public sphere was understood as the arena of politics, while the private sphere included both the family and the economy. During the years this dichotomy was restructured and the 'public' became to include not only politics but civil society as well, still leaving the family in the private sphere as irrelevant to citizenship. For an overview of this development see Ann Phillips, Engendering Democracy (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991) at 29-30 [Phillips, Engendering Democracy]. 12 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, supra note 10 at 107 See also Pnina Webner & Nira Yuval-Davis, "Introduction: Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship", in Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werber,eds., Women, Citizenship and Difference (London: Zed Books, 1999) 1 at 6; Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 71-72. Kathleen Jones argues that women's exclusion from the public sphere resulted also from viewing the female body and women's sexuality as "dangerous" to the political and
143 Mothers, nonetheless, received a special status under the civic-republican tradition. Women were constituted as the 'republican mothers'. They had a contribution to make and a duty to perform. As Carole Patemai explains,
The political theory of civic republicanismemphasize d active political participation
by citizens imbued with crac-virtue, who were also capable of bearing arms.
Republican citizens were thus men and soldiers - but what of women? They were to
be subordinate companions of citizens, but with their own political task; they were
to be republican mothers. In America, a republican mother was excluded fiom
citizenship, but she had a crucial political part to play in bearing and rearing sons
who embodied republican virtues, she remained as auxiliary to the commonwealth
but an auxiliary who made a mndamental political contribution.13
'Republican mothers', nevertheless, were still excluded from citizenship as it was believed that they lacked the capacities needed to be citizens. Motherhood was therefore a function that took place outside the borders of citizenship and it did not provide women with full membership. As non-citizens, Jones explains, "[women's] contribution to the ends of the state were limited to the production of the mere necessities of existence and to reproduction, literally, of those who might become citizens".14
During the years, women have struggled and proved that they have the capacities and qualities to hold rights, carry out duties and participate in practices of citizenship. They became citizens, formally, but were still excluded from many rights and practices. As part of
social order. The anxiety about the female body restricted women to their homes and reproductive functions. See Jones, supra note 8 at 800-801. 13 Carole Pateman, "Equality, Difference, Subordinatksi: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship", in Gisela Bock & Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference (London: Routledge, 1992) 17 at 19-20. For more about the notion of the 'republican mothers' in the traditional political thought, as well as in American history see Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Virginia: University of North Carolina Press, 1980)7-12, 283-285. 14 Jones, supra note 8 at 790.
144 their effort to fully incorporate women into citizenship, feminists put the institution of motherhood on their agenda and aimed to integrate it into the discourse of citizenship. This was quite a challenge given that the traditional understanding of citizenship is not women- friendly. As noted, it is limited to the public sphere, with participation in political life structured around masculine norms and experiences.15 The practice of motherhood, on the other hand, takes place in the private sphere and is the most distinctive mark of women's difference since they are the only ones with the capacity to give birth. Childbearing, as
Carole Pateman notes, is "the mark of'difference' par excellence".16 Feminists, therefore, faced a dual challenge: bringing both the principle of'difference' and the private sphere into the discourse of duties and citizenship.
A. Recognizing the Principle of'Difference'
Men and women are different from each other in many ways. Women are biologically different because they are the only ones with the capacity to give birth and breast-feed infants. Some women are physically weaker than men. It is also argued that some women are psychologically different because they think in terms of 'care' rather than 'rights'.17
Women are also differently situated in society. Traditional gendered structures of the family and the market place certain roles and responsibilities on women, thus setting barriers which
Anne Phillips, "Feminism and Republicanism: Is This a Plausible Alliance?" (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 279. 16 Pateman, supra note 13 at 18. 17 The most dominant work on this argument is that of Carol Gilligan, who conducted a series of behavioural experiments to examine men and women's different behaviour while dealing with dilemmas and making decisions. Gilligan found that women define themselves through their relationships with others, that they have higher sensitivity and care for others and thus see moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities (an 'ethic of care'), while men see moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting rights ('ethic of justice). See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1982). While trying to explain women's differences, Gilligan referred to other studies, including Nancy Chodorow's research about maternity, which espouses that women's differences and identities result from their role as the primary caretakers of young children: Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) at 199-210. Biological and psychiatric analysis led Gilligan to determine that due to their different social roles, women and men typically display different emotional and cognitive patterns, and different social skills or characteristics, stemming frominnat e physiological traits or from different life experiences.
145 prevent many of them from entering the public sphere and differentiating between the activities of men and women in society.18 Furthermore, in light of the power hierarchy between the sexes, many women experience life in a different way when they are treated as sexual objects and exposed to domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment and prostitution, occurrences which not only limit their access to the public sphere but impair their dignity and autonomy.19 In light of these differences between the sexes and their unique experiences in society, women share certain concerns, practices, needs and responsibilities that are different than those of men.
Early feminism put these unique experiences aside. Given that the traditional structure of citizenship is defined as general rather than particular and that the individual is supposed to trade his particular identity for an abstract self, early feminist scholarship of citizenship argued that women should put their particularities aside and should adopt or adjust to the rights, duties and practices of citizenship that already existed in society. This, according to
Lister, is the gender-neutral route to citizenship, where gender is "irrelevant to the allocation and exercise of citizenship rights and obligations."20 The key notion here is sameness; women are expected to become citizens on the same terms as men by claiming equal rights and opportunities to those granted to men and by carrying out the obligations, rituals and practices that men fulfill.21 Much criticism was directed toward this gender-blind
18 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 130-135. 19 Catharine A M&dtinaon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 22-23. She explains that "women and men appear biologically more alike and socially more different than is generally supposed. Our social treatment certainly is different - the difference between power and powerlessness" and men's greater power is achieved mainly through sexuality and sexual abuse of women. Ibid, at 25. While explaining women's powerlessness, Mackinnon focuses on the way men see women as sexual objects. Mackinnon deals with violence against women as an explanation for their subordination, especially rape, abuse, sexual harassment, pornography and prostitution. See Catharine A. Mackinnon, "Not a Moral issue" (1984) 2 Yale L. & Poly Rev. 321 at 325-329. 20 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 94. 21 For more about the early feminist discourse, see Karen Offen, "Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach" (1988) 14 Signs 119 at 122-123. This approach dominates the way the current duty to work is structured in Israel. I will return to the gender-neutral model in Chapter V.
146 approach. It has been argued that this gender-neutral model measures women according to men's norms and experiences, thus ascribing women's interests and needs as of inferior worth. Under this model, women have to conform to men's identities and practices if they wish to gain citizenship. They have to prove that they are similar to men and have the same capacities and abilities to gain full inclusion in citizenship. This model, therefore, does not leave much room for women's unique experiences and needs. It fails to recognize gendered practices and structures that disadvantage women, prevent them from participating in different practices and perpetuate their inferiority in society.23
In light of these limitations, many feminists began advocating a more inclusive and particularistic vision of citizenship that does not force women to adopt the masculine norm and abandon their distinctiveness. Lister refers to this notion as the gender-differentiated model of citizenship, which is aimed at recognizing "women's particular concerns and contribution, and value their responsibilities in the private sphere."24 Being a 'gender- differentiated' model, its goal is not merely to recognize women's differences but also to reconstruct the gendered mechanisms of citizenship that structure women as 'different' and oppress them because of their different location in society. In other words, as Jones writes, this model is aimed "to construct a political community responsive to women's complex social locations".25 She also adds that under this women-friendly polity, "citizenship is defined as a practice of embodied subjects whose sex-gendered identity affects
221 only briefly address this critique and will elaborate more in Chapter V when discussing the duty to work. See Jones, supra note 8 at 792; Phillips, Democracy and Difference, supra note — at 43; Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women is Social and Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) at 229 [Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman]. 24 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 11 at 94. See also Jones, supra note 8 at 784-789 (referring to this as 'gender-defined practices' of citizenship); Offen, supmnote 21 at 135-136. In practice, this model has been implemented in different areas of women's live and with respect to different rights, duties and practices of citizenship. These include, among others, reproductive health and rights, violence and harassment, unequal pay and the sexual division of labour within the family. See, in general, Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 125-138; Jones, supra note 8 at 795-796. 25 Jones, supra note 8 at 790.
147 fundamentally their membership and participation in public life". The gender- differentiated model thus provides an alternative discourse of citizenship that aims to provide women with the possibility to establish their loyalty to the state through their distinct experiences and practices. Under this model, women's distinctive practices are recognized as a possible basis for inclusion in citizenship. A few words are needed here about the principle of' difference' and the way it was treated and understood. The discussion of women's differences among feminists began by looking at the ways women are different from men, mainly due to their sexuality and reproductive capacities. Focusing on these distinctive attributes, feminists advocated matemalist policies to improve and accommodate women's different needs and interests, such as paid maternity leave and other gender- specific protections of women's caring responsibilities, that would also enable women to better integrate into the public sphere. Later on, attention was shifted from women's differences per se to a broader analysis that looked at how social institutions and practices place women in vulnerable social positions. This perspective is aimed at analyzing gender as a social construction. Beyond recognizing that women and men are different from each other and have different functions in society, this approach is aimed at also recognizing that certain practices and institutions portray women as 'different' and inferior to men and that, until these practices and institutions are transformed, women will continue to be second- class citizens.28 Lister summarizes these two forms of difference feminism in relation also to matemalist discourses:
26 Ibid, at 786. 27 Ibid, at 794. 28 For an overview of these different strategies see Deborah L. Rhode, "Hie Politics of Paradigms: Gender Difference and Gender Disadvantage", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 344; Okin, supra note 6 at 127-130; Susan H. Williams, "Feminist Legal Epistemology" (1993) 8 Berkeley Women's L.J. 63 at 80-82. Martha Minow provides a useful critique of focusing on women's differences rather on the social constructions that disadvantage women. See Martha Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 19-23, 52-55, 227-228.
148 [Ajt one end of the continuum would be those whose theoretical and political reference point is a belief in the essential difference between women and men; at the other, can be placed those who focus more on the theoretical and political implications of the caring (not just maternal) responsibilities shouldered by women. While agreeing that the qualities and values typically labelled female should be recognized and valued alongside their dominant male counterparts, the latter do not accept that either set are to be attributed respectively and exclusively to women and men.29
In practice, the main focuso f the gender-differentiated model and its implementation was on women's differences as such. In that also lies the main limitation of the model. In placing much emphasis on the principle of 'difference', the model runs the risk of ignoring differences among women and trapping them in the private sphere and in their traditional roles as wives and mothers. Later in mis chapter, I will return to these limitations of the gender-differentiated model, and in the last chapters of the thesis, I will present an analysis aimed at reconstructing the sameness/difference dichotomy and that focuses more on gendered structure in society than on women's differences as such. In the following sections, I turn to examine more closely the interaction between the gender-differentiated model and the 'duties discourse', as illustrated by the practice and duty of motherhood.
B. Restructuring Citizenship to Include 'Differences': Can Motherhood be Recognized as a Form of Participation?
If the scope of citizenship is indeed broadened to include women's differences and respond to gendered structures in society, then the duties and practices of citizenship need to be restructured around women particularities and their complex social locations to allow them to achieve full membership. As Jones indicates,
29 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 97.
149 If the scope of politics is broadened by the aphorism "the personal is political," then the arenas for political action (the architecture of public space), the depth of personal commitment and connection to political activity, and the forms of political participation are transformed. Correspondingly, new duties and responsibilities are added to the obligations of members of the political community.30
Jones, in feet, suggests two different ways to integrate women's particularities into the
'duties discourse'.31 The first looks at the practices that are already established as part of citizenship in a certain society, and seeks to restructure them according to women's different interests and experiences. Since duties of citizenship traditionally took place in the public sphere, much work has been done with respect to how the civic public should respond to gendered structures and allow women to integrate into public life. In fact, given that civic- republicanism is strongly attached to political participation, most attention was given to modifying the civic public according to the principle of 'difference'. Iris Young is a dominant scholar in this area She analyzes the modern ideal of the public sphere under civic-republicanism and argues that it requires citizens to adopt a universal and impartial point of view necessary for acknowledging the common good. As part of her 'politics of difference', Young claims that the civic public has to be transformed into a heterogeneous sphere in which "actual people, with their geographical, ethnic, gender, and occupational differences, assert their perspectives on social issues within institutions that encourage the representation of their distinct voices"/2 This means removing the barriers to women's full
30 Jones, supra note 8 at 787. 31 Aside of reforming the duties of citizenship themselves, feminists also argue that implementing women's particularities into civic-republicanism should mean structuring the common good and the general interests, around women's unique interests as well. This will be discussed in Chapters V and VI. 32 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, supra note 10 at 116. Young's main focus is indeed on the political realm and she aims to structure this practice in a way that allows people to "stand forth with their differences acknowledged and respected". This structure would allow a representation of the different voices and perspectives of those traditionally excluded from the public sphere. See her discussions ibid, at 96-121, 183-191. In her analysis of the public/private dichotomy, Phillips also advocates restructuring the interaction between these two spheres to allow women to combine their responsibilities and activities in the private sphere
150 inclusion in public life and allowing them to participate in citizenship without the need to abandon their distinctiveness and adopt masculine norms or practices.
The strategy Young presents is indeed an important challenge to the public/private dichotomy. It shows how practices in the public sphere are being shaped by experiences from the private sphere, and how the former should be restructured according to the latter to allow excluded groups to fulfill civic activities.33 A second possible strategy for integrating particularities into citizenship, as Jones indicates above, is to recognize new practices as duties of citizenship that reflect women's unique interests and experiences. Can motherhood be one of these new practices mat serve as a basis for women's inclusion in citizenship?
Feminists are divided on this question. The difficulty arises from the ideal of 'active participation' under civic-republicanism. As discussed in the first chapter of the thesis, active participation was traditionally considered as the involvement of the citizen in governance of the cornmunity. The modem understanding of civic-republicanism also focuses on an ongoing engagement in the formal political process. In other words, 'active participation' under civic-republicanism is strongly attached to the public sphere and the
'political'.34 Can motherhood be recognized as political participation? Can 'the political' be broadened to cover the private sphere and include motherhood?
with practices of the public, thus enabling themselves to participate equally in the political process. See Phillips, Engendering Democracy, supra note 11 at 7. Both Young and Phillips, like many other feminist scholars, pay much attention to the mission of integrating women into politics, while recognizing their distinct practices in the private sphere. I will return to their critique of the public sphere under civic-republicanism when addressing the renewed duty to work in Chapter V. 33 For similar feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy, pointing at the way the private sphere affects the public, see Okin, supra note 6 at 122-125. 34 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 26; Phillips, Democracy and Difference, supra note 11 at 76. For this reason, many feminist scholars focus on incorporating women into the formal political process and structuring politics according to women's particularities. They argue that other arenas of decision making in the public sphere, such as the workplace, Should be recognized as part of 'polities', thus recognizing workplace activities as part of citizenship. Others argue tiiatth e sphere of "polities' should include not only the general government but also local activism and social movements. For a general discussion of political participation in a 'feminine voice' see Pnina Werbner, "Political Motherhood and the Feminisation of Citizenship: Women's Activism and the Transformation of the Public Sphere", in Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina
151 In her discussion about the politics of motherhood, Carole Pateman introduces two ways of incorporating motherhood into the discourse of citizenship. The first one understands motherhood as apolitical status and recognizes the contribution of women, as mothers, to the continuance and success of society. It replicates the notion of'republican motherhood', but this time as an integral part of citizenship. Women bring children into the world and by doing so, guarantee the continuation of society: "women are the principle 'vehicle' for ensuring the continuality of the political order (aside from immigration, which is seen as a problematic mechanism in many societies)."35 Furthermore, in their domestic activities at home, women also produce and provide the welfare upon which society depends, although this formo f contribution is rarely acknowledged.36 In other words, Pateman argues, women fulfill their duty and service to the state through motherhood. Based on a gender- differentiated understanding of citizenship, motherhood, which is usually considered to be a traditional female private activity, changes into apublicly relevant experience. Motherhood becomes a route for women's inclusion in citizenship and, as Pateman writes, a political status that reflects "a major vehicle of women's incorporation into the political order [which shapes] women's duty to the state and women's citizenship".37
Pateman compares the contribution of mothers to that of workers. Looking at the British welfare ideology and system, she shows how women's activities as caregivers at home are seen, in theory, as a contribution to the overall welfare of society. This contribution, however, is not understood as an equal and integral part of citizenship and in practice is not
Werber, eds., Women, Citizenship and Difference (London: Zed Books, 1999) 221. Motherhood, however, poses a different question regarding whether the private sphere can be recognized as part of politics. 35 Pateman, supra note 13 at 29. 26 Ibid, at 22. 3' Ibid, at 22. Pateman admits that today motherhood is not women's ultimate political duty anymore and that women have gained access to other forms of contribution such as soldiering and labour. However, she argues that, since women are the principle 'vehicle' for ensuring the continuality of the political order (aside of immigration, which is seen as a problematic mechanism in many societies), the institution of motherhood is still closely attached to citizenship. Ibid, at 29. See also Jones, supra note 8 at 789.
152 equally valued as men's work in the market. In other words, mothers make a significant contribution 'without which the national could not continue', a contribution that should provide them with the political status of full citizens. However, their domestic work is still undervalued and is not recognized as a real contribution to the common good.38 Pateman then goes on to compare women's service as mothers to men's service as soldiers. She explains that "the ultimate test for the allegiance of the citizen and the ultimate duty of citizenship are to die for the state".39 While men fulfill this duty by dying in the public sphere of the battlefield, women meet their duty by dying in the private realm during childbirth: "[W]omen's ultimate political duty is motherhood, to give birth for the state, and, if nature so decrees, to give their lives in creating new life, new citizens".40 Pateman, however, considers the difficulty of arguing mat motherhood carries the same risk as soldering. Death in childbirth is a natural phenomenon, while death in the battlefield is seen as heroic. Society views childbirth as a natural reproductive activity aimed at fulfilling the personal needs of women, thus death during labour is not understood as a sacrifice similar to that of a soldier. In light of this difficulty, Pateman seems to return, at the end of her discussion, to justify the political standing of motherhood based on anotion of motherhood as the mechanism for maintaining the political order.41
The second strategy Pateman presents is grounded in the 'maternal thinking' approach.42
Here, motherhood enters the discourse of citizenship through the symbol of the mother-child relationship and by bringing into the concept of citizenship the values of parenting and familial relations. In her discussion of how women experience motherhood, Sara Ruddick
38 Ibid, at 22-23. 39 Ibid, at 23. 40 Ibid, at 24. 41 Ibid, at 27-29. 42 Ibid, at 21.
153 argues that this practice involves a certain 'maternal thinking' that grows out of child-caring and the attentive love of a mother for her child.43 As she explains,
For whatever reasons, mothers typically find it not only natural but compelling to
protect and foster the growth of their children. Relatedly, mothers, especially those
who have chosen or come to welcome parenthood, experience a social-biological
prise in the function of their reproductive processes, a sense of me activation of
maternal power. In addition to a sense of reproductive power, many mothers early
develop a sense of maternal competence, a sense mat they are able to protect and
foster the growth of their children.44
Women's thoughts, Ruddick notes, reflect certain interests, which arise from and govern the practice of motherhood: the maintenance of the life of the child, fostering the physical, emotional and intellectual growth of the child, and his or her acceptability in society.
Women's thoughts regarding these interests are translated into intellectual capacities, judgements, metaphysical attitudes and values - all of which are derived from the virtue of
'attentive love' and which are very different from the dominant public ones.43 This
'maternal thinking', Ruddick argues, should be brought into the public realm. She calls for
"a theory of justice shaped by and incorporating maternal thinking".46
Like Pateman, Ruddick also argues that women's power results from their capacity to bear and nurse infants. However, instead of focusing on women's reproduction, she turns to address their way of thinking as mothers. '' Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" (1980) 6 Feminist Studies 342 at 344. Ruddick explains that 'maternal thinking' does not necessarily arise from biological parenting but is rather a social category: both women and men can experience this respect of thinking, although in different ways. Ibid, at 346. More about the different modes of experiencing paternal thoughts and feelings see Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 45 Ibid, at 348-349, 359. Ruddick is aware of the danger of referring to all women as unity. She admits that not all women share this 'maternal thinking' and she is also aware that discussing this mode of thought might perpetuate women in their role of motherhood, which is socially constructed as subordinated to other 'masculine' practices. Ibid, at 346. 46 Ibid. &X 361.
154 Jean Elshtain farther develops another implementation for 'maternal thinking' when she advocates recognizing motherhood as apolitical practice.47 In her analysis of the interaction between the public and the private, Elshtain views the private sphere as "a locus of human activity, moral reflection, social and historical relations, the creation of meaning, and the construction of identity having its own integrity".48 The family is the ideal of this private world; it is a necessary element in the structure of society: "Familial ties and modes of child- rearing are essential to establish the minimal foundation of human, social existence. What we call human capacities could not exist outside a familial mode; for human beings to flourish a particular ideal of the family is necessary".49 Elshtain names her theory 'social feminism'. It is aimed at fostering women's identity as mothers, an identity which is not subordinated to masculine norms and characteristics, and to reverse the hierarchy between the public and the private realms. For her, the private sphere of the family enjoys a moral primacy.50
According to Elshtain, the values imbedded in mother-child relationships (what Ruddick calls 'maternal thinking'), should be integrated into the discourse of politics. While the close interaction between the public and the private spheres is widely understood among
Elshtairfs starting point is a critique of liberal feminism (or the principle of sameness) that aims to incorporate women into the public arena on the same terms as men. Similar to 'difference feminism', as discussed above, Elshtain argues that this strategy requires a Ml assimilation of the female identity into the masculine one, but ignores the conflict between women's experience in the arena of the family with the practices of the public sphere. Instead, she aims to define a female identity that is rooted in women's unique experiences in the sphere of the family. Rather than assuming that women are forced to stay in the sphere of the family and incorporating them into the public sphere, Elshtaim's basic argument is that women should be allowed to stay in the family sphere and, from this space and based on the traditions and values their experience there, to restructure political life, hi her words, "the family is our entry point into the wider social world". Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Antigone's Daughters", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 363 at 372 [Elshtain, "Antigone's Daughters"]. More about her critique, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists", in Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed., The Family in Political Thought (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts, 1982) 51. 48 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women is Social and Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) at 322 [Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman]. 49 Ibid, at 326-327. Like Ruddick, Elshtain also stresses the importance of the family institution as the institution to provide children with their essential needs for long-terms ties and a protective environment. Ibid. at 331.
155 feminists, and while many accept the argument mat women's values and concerns in the private sphere should be incorporated into the public sphere of polities, Elshtain moves one step further and claims that women must be seen as an active political actor even when not entering the public sphere. Instead of drawing women into the public sphere so that they can take part in politics, Elshtain claims that the private sphere should be politicized - in the sense that values, concerns and practices from the private sphere will be understood as political values and virtues:
In order for it to flourish the public world itself must nurture and sustain a set of ethical imperatives, including a commitment to preserve, protect, and defend human beings in their capacities as private persons ... Rather than an ideal of citizenship and civic virtue that features a citizenry grimly going about their collective duty, or an elite band of citizens in their "public space" cut off from a world that includes most of the rest of us, within the ethical polity the active citizen would be one who had affirmed as part of what it meant to be fully human a devotion to public, moral responsibilities and ends.
Other feminist scholars, however, reject the idea that motherhood should be recognized as a form of citizenship participation. Mary Dietz, a leading opponent of 'maternal thinking', argues that the values promoted by 'maternal thinking' (intimacy, love and attentiveness) and the goal of motherhood {protecting the child) cannot serve as a basis for political participation.52 Politics, for Dietz, reflects the values of self-government, egalitarianism and freedom; it is a "collective and participatory engagement of citizens in the determination of
51 Ibid, at 351. 52 Mary G. Dietz, "Citizenship within a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking" (1985) 13 Political Theory 19 at 30 [Dietz, "Citizenship within a Feminist Face"}. In addition to showing why motherhood cannot be understood as a political participation, Dietz presents several disadvantages inherent in this strategy for women. I will turn to these difficulties in the discussion below when addressing the limitations of the duty of motherhood in Israel.
156 the affairs of their community".33 Maternal virtues, she argues, cannot be 'political' because the mother-child bond and practice cannot apply to the ideals and values of political life;
The special and distinctive aspects of mothering emerge out of a decidedly unequal
relationship, even if benign or loving, in which one person is responsible for a given
period of time for the care and preservation of another. This is an intimate,
exclusive, and particular activity... Democratic citizenship, on the other hand, is
collective, inclusive, and generalized. Because it is a condition in which individuals
aim at being equal, the mother-child relationship is a particularly inappropriate
model ... Furthermore, the bond among citizens is not like the love between a
mother and a child, for citizens are not intimately, but politically involved with each
other.54
The family therefore, Dietz claims, is the wrong place for structuring a model for political participation. The institution of motherhood does not take part in the process of interacting with other citizens for the purpose of discussing and pursuing personal and common
interests, thus it cannot be seen as a practice of politics. Being a mother, therefore, according to Dietz, does not truly fulfill the ideal of active citizenry.55
Ann Phillips also prefers to leave motherhood outside the political arena hi her account of the relation between public spaces and private lives, Phillips acknowledges that family ties
and the unequal division of labour in the household, as well as power hierarchies and the
experience of domestic violence, shape the public sphere and affect the ability of women to
53 Mary G. Dietz, "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 378 at 390 [Dietz, "Context is All"]. M Dietz, "Citizenship within a Feminist Face", supra note 52 at 31. 55 Dietz, "Citizenship within a Feminist Face", supra note 52 at 32-33. Dietz, therefore, advocates encouraging women to enter the public realm, take part in public debates and share the responsibility for self-government. See Dietz, "Context is AH", supra note 53 at 390-394. It should be noted that Dietz's critique focuses on the 'maternal thinking' approach and she does not articulate the possibility of incorporating motherhood into citizenship, due to the contribution of childbearing and cMldrearing to society. However, based on her strong emphasis on participating in political processes as the primary practice of citizenship, it can be assumed that she would also reject even this approach.
157 actively participate in different public/political practices. The way the private sphere is structured, Phillips explains, constrains women's access to the practices of the public sphere.
After recognizing that 'the personal affects the political', she adopts a broader understanding of 'the personal is political', but not in the sense that the personal (the private sphere) is
'political' like other practices in the public sphere, but rather that the personal (the private sphere) should be structured according to principles of democracy and equality.56 She rejects eliminating the distinctions between public and private or identifying the two spheres. She supports the argument mat motherhood is apolitical and claims that "being a good citizen is not the same as being a good mother; nor is it the same as being a good feminist; nor is it the same as being a good neighbour. There is a kind of jump from the way we relate to people in our more private, and even group, relations to what goes on in political interaction...
Politics is a particular kind of activity, and not to be dissolved into everything else".57 For
Phillips the question is not only whether the elements of political participation apply to motherhood but also whether motherhood should be part of politics. Her answer is no. In her opinion, some aspects of life should be left outside the public arena: "if we treat the personal as thoroughly identical to the political, we run the twin risks of believing our lives can be made perfect... and of handing over to others the responsibility for making them so".58 In other words, Phillips is worried that placing personal matters within the public sphere will create a false sense of security and diminish a sense of responsibility. Beyond that, she is also concerned that without maintaining a certain separation between private and public,
Phillips, Engendering Democracy, supra note 11 at 96-101. See also her discussion in Phillips, Democracy and Difference, supra note 11 at 80. 51 Ibid, at 86. 58 Ibid, at 106.
158 women might lose their autonomy to choose, especially with respect to matters of reproductive and sexual relations.59
Neither Phillips nor Dietz directly considers the first strategy that Pateman presents: defining motherhood as participation that contributes to society and therefore serves as a basis for inclusion. However, their position that motherhood, as a practice and activity, should be left outside the public sphere does not leave much room for fully incorporating motherhood into citizenship. From mis perspective, it can be assumed mat they prefer other practices, rather than motherhood, to be structured as possible sites of citizenship participation or obligation, most likely within the public sphere. It is reasonable to assume, then, that they would probably reject the first strategy of childbirth as a ground for inclusion in citizenship.
Lister, when presenting a feminist reading of civic-republicanism, also argues that 'political participation' is located in the public sphere. Personal and intimate activities that take place in the private sphere might indeed affect one's capacity to act as a citizen but they are not part of citizenship in its active political sense:
[Ijt is thereby accepted that the terrain of political citizenship in the public sphere while underlining how it cannot be divorced from what happens in the private, which shapes its contours and which can be the proper objects of citizenship struggles.60
59 Ibid, at 106-108. 60 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 30. Her position regarding the private sphere and political participation is quite problematic because in a later part other theory, she argues that care work should be part of citizenship and serve as a basis for citizenship rights. However, when analyzing civic-republicanism and the possible activities that can be considered 'participation', the private sphere is excluded (as a sphere for civic virtues), but when taming to address what activities should be rewarded with rights, the private sphere becomes an integral arena for such process. It seems that this contradiction results from distinguishing between political citizenship and social citizenship. The duties of citizenship under civic-republicanism are associated with the 'political' element in citizenship, while women's care work is associated with the 'social' element of citizenship. Lister assumes, apparently, that civic-republicanism is about 'political' participation alone, thus excluding activities from the private sphere. As I argue below, this assumption or understanding is not necessarily accurate.
159 The private sphere, thus, is relevant when broadening and structuring the political obligations, in the public sphere, according to women'spractices in the private sphere.61 But these practices as such are not part of active political citizenship. Later on in her discussion,
Lister refers more specifically to the integration of motherhood into citizenship. When addressing the notion of 'republican mothers', she does not object to the idea that women contribute to the political order by bearing and rearing children, but she criticizes the use of this agenda She argues that it might be implemented in a racial manner aimed at promoting
'quality' ratherthan 'quantity', meaning childbirth among the dominant group.62 Lister then turns to address the notion of 'maternal thinking' and Elshtain's agenda regarding
'politicized motherhood'. Unlike Dietz, Lister does not explicitly claim that activities in the private sphere cannot be considered 'political' under the theory of citizenship, and, like
Phillips, she seems to oppose this approach because of the danger it poses for women. For example, she argues that
An approach that ... promotes motherhood per se as a vehicle for political citizenship runs the danger of consolidating women's political marginalisation... Lip service might be paid to the importance of mothering but political power (including the power to shape the conditions under which mothering takes place) would remain in the hands of true political citizens.63
Jones also thinks that what is considered a political action should be redefined in relation to interactions between individuals in the private sphere. She explains that "women's experiences in the private sphere are political in both the sense of constructing an identifiable set of interests, virtues, and values that can be expressed in public, or politically relevant, terms and in the sense of creating, at least potentially, a group that shares those interests, virtues, and values". Jones, supra note 8 at 799-780. Jones, however, is skeptical about whether citizenship can be both intimate and political, thus questioning whether motherhood can be a practice of citizenship. She does not answer this dilemma but merely raises the question and points at the need to restructure traditional concepts of citizenship and virtue to reflect women's interests and values. Ibid, at 810- 811. 62 Similar to the way it was previously applied to differentiate between White and Black women, when it was White women's rather than Black women's motherhood that was promoted. Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 148. 63 Ibid, at 148-149.
160 Focusing on maternalism is also problematic because not all women, Lister notes, share or experience 'maternal thinking'. The notion of'maternal thinking' it promotes heterosexist assumptions about the group 'women'.64 Returning to her initial stand, Lister prefers to focus on how the political sphere should be accommodated and structured according to women's values and practices from the private sphere, while leaving motherhood outside the definition of'political participation' itself65
Dietz, Lister and Philips leave the practice of motherhood outside the borders of 'active citizenship participation'. For them, the practice of motherhood is not, nor should be,
'political'. This position leaves motherhood outside the 'duties discourse' either because motherhood does not meet the criteria for'politica l participation' or because incorporating motherhood into the 'duties discourse' presents women with different limitations. I think, however, that neither ofthes e arguments justifies excluding the practice of motherhood from the 'duties discourse'. The claim that motherhood cannot be incorporated into citizenship as active participation because it is not 'political' is incorrect, in my opinion, not necessarily because motherhood should be understood as part of'the political', but because the 'duties discourse' is not just about the political arena nor should it be understood as limited to political participation alone.66
Ibid, at 149-151.1 will return to these limitations and develop them further when addressing the duty of motherhood in Israel. 65 Young also is not interested in abolishing completely the separation between the public and the private. She believes that such a division is acceptable and that the individual should be allowed to keep certain aspects of personal life 'private' - as long as no 'private' concern is excluded from a public discussion. In other words, a division between the public and the private should be maintained in terms of allowing the individual to decide by herself which matters remain personal and not associated with the public. 66 It can be argued that the notion of 'politics' should be expanded to include the practice of motherhood. Indeed, if we understand 'politics' in its broader sense, it refers to all interactions between individuals and to any activity or practice that involves power relations. In this broader sense, the practice of motherhood can be indeed included in 'polities'. From this perspective, motherhood is a practice of citizenship, if we understand citizenship, also in its broader sense, as referring to all aspects of life. Being part of politics and citizenship, motherhood then should be a ground for certain rights and protections, as well as an integral part of the public debate. However, expanding the concept of'politics' to include the institution of motherhood is not sufficient or necessarily helpful, in my opinion, for making motherhood part of the 'duties discourse'. Not every practice
161 Indeed, the traditional model of civic-republicanism focused on the arena of politics and
advocated participating in the political dialogue. However, as discussed in the firstchapte r
with respect to the duty to work, civic-republicanism can apply to many practices in society.
Oldfield himself acknowledges diversity among citizens and his theory opens the door to
other practices rather than merely to politics.67 In fact, if we look again at the core elements
of the 'duties discourse', they can be divided into two groups: substantive and instrumental.
The 'duties discourse' rests on the idea that individuals live within a certain community, and that they ought to be active and participate in difFerent practices that ensure the existence of
this community. Citizenship, as discussed earlier, is firstan d foremost about contributing to
the common good and being active. This is the substantive aspect of civic-republicanism:
individuals facing the obligation of being active, and of participating in and contributing to
society. Political participation is one possible instrument through which individuals fulfill
the common good. Indeed, it is an important instrument given that democracy is built upon
the involvement of individuals in the political process. It is by no means, however, the only
form of contributing to society, especially given that, in practice, not each individual can
take part in politics and that other values and interests became dominant in modem societies.
Active citizenship should not be limited, therefore, to the public sphere of politics. Women
can contribute to the common good in different ways and through different routes, such as
bearing and rearing future citizens. Women's activities and responsibilities in the private
sphere should thus be recognized as fulfilling a civic virtue, a contribution to society, and
therefore serving as a basis for inclusion in citizenship. This requires expanding the
understanding of citizenship and civic-republicanism to include virtues from the private
that falls under the hroad definition of 'politics' is necessarily a form of 'active participation' in citizenship that constitutes a duty of citizenship. For a certain practice to become part of the 'duties discourse', in my opinion, it must be considered to be a 'contribution'. The key element for establishing the institution of motherhood as part of the 'duties discourse' lies in the notion of'contribution' rather than the notion of 'polities'. 67 Oldfield, supra note 7 at 174.
162 sphere that reflect women's unique practices in the domestic domain. This is not to say, of course, that incorporating the practice of motherhood into citizenship has no constraints.
Lister and Phillips' fears are very real and relevant given that society is built upon power inequalities between the sexes and traditional structures of family and the market. These fears, however, should not preclude motherhood from being recognized as a practice of citizenship; they require restructuring certain structures in society, as well as concepts of citizenship, to fully meet and acknowledge women's unique experiences. The last chapter of my thesis will return to address possible measures needed to achieve this goal. As the preceding discussion shows, in the Israeli society, the practice of motherhood was indeed recognized as a form of participation and contribution to the collective. The following discussion addresses the process of establishing motherhood as a route into citizenship in
Israel and the constraints of this process on women's citizenship.
Part II: The 'Duty of Motherhood* in Israel
Israel, as noted above, is a strong family-oriented society. Since the early days of settlement in the land of Israel, women have faced strong social pressures to become wives and mothers. Motherhood became their primary role in society and was placed very high on the hierarchy of values. As Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui indicates, 'familism' is aleading characteristic of Israeli society where "the woman is constructed as a mother and wife, whose primary
One might argue that motherhood cannot be recognized as a practice of citizenship because women do not place the interests of the collective above their personal interests when choosing to become mothers. Indeed the traditional theory of civic-republicanism expects citizens to subordinate their personal concerns and familial loyalties to the interests of the collective - the common good. Women rarely choose motherhood for the sake of the collective. It is their personal aspirations and desires, or personal circumstances and beliefs, which stand at the heart of such a decision. Nevertheless, as Jones indicates, many women on entering motherhood, make the other personal dimensions of their life secondary to the new bond and relationship with their children. As Phillips indicates, "the relationship of mothers to children, for example, often involves putting the needs of others above one's own, and a concern for the empowerment of one's children who will then grow away from one into independence". Phillips, 'Teminism and Republicanism", supra note 15 at 284. See also Jones, supra note 8 at 811. This bond serves the collective as well This idea is further developed by feminists as part of their 'ethic of care' which many, such as lister herself, consider to be an integral part of citizenship.
163 obligations are to bear children and take care of her home and family" In practice, Israeli women indeed carried out this expectation. Statistics indicate that the fertility rate has been consistently higher in the Israeli population than in most developed countries. Researches also show that most women in Israel would like to have a large family and many find the greatest satisfaction in being wives and mothers.™
Motherhood, however, did not merely become the traditional role of women in Israel. It was also a national mission and a responsibility toward the collective, thus serving as a basis for inclusion in citizenship. It is important therefore to distinguish here between motherhood as a societal expectation and obligation that drive women into the traditional role of bearing and rearing children, and motherhood as a duty of citizenship that serves the collective and has the potential to establish a connection between women and their society. As the following discussion will show, through the discourse of citizenship, motherhood was shifted and 'upgraded' from a traditional role and a private-personal matter into a national duty that has a public-political meaning. Constructed as a duty of citizenship, motherhood
SyMe Fogiel-Bijaoui, "Familism, Postmodemity and the State: The Case of Israel", in Hannah Naveh, ed., Israeli Family and Community: Women's Time (London: Valientine Mitchell, 2003) 38 at 3 8. Indeed, in recent years, Israel faces a process of individualism, whereby the family becomes a more private concern, marriage rate drops and different family forms arise. Still, the institution of the family remains a dominant element in society, especially in comparison to other western countries. Ibid, at 39-42. The centrality of the family in the Israeli society is usually attributed to Judaism and the fact that religious laws regulate the processes of marriage and divorce in Israel. For more about the institution of the family in Israel and its relation to religion, see ibid. at 43-48; Marilyn P. Safir, "Religion, Tradition and Public Policy give Family First Priority", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 57; Dahlia Moore, "No Longer Complacent? Why Israeli Women did not Rebel" (1998) 28 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 169 at 178-181. For general discussions about the centrality of the family in Israeli society see Yohanan Peres & Ruth Katz, "The Family in Israel: Change and Continuity," in Lea Shamgar-Handelman & Rivka Bar-Yosef (eds.), Families in Israel (Jerusalem: Academon, 1991) 9 [Hebrew]; Elliot J. Markus & Naomi Doron, Young Families in Israel (Tel-Aviv. Cherikover Inc., 1988) [Hebrew]. 70 See Selma Koss Brandow, "Ideology, Myth and Reality: Sex Equality in Israel" (1980) 6 Sex Roles 403 at 415. In one survey regarding fertility patterns in Israel, on average, women indicated that they desire about three children. When asked about the 'ideal' number of children, the average answer is four. These women are not necessarily religious or from traditional families, which counters the argument that the desire for large families is linked to religious beliefs. See Ariela Keysar et al, 'Tertility Patterns in the Jewish Population of Israel", in Eric Peritz & Mario Baras, eds., Studies in the Fertility of Israel (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1992) at 23,29-33. See also Ruth Kate & Yochaman Peres, "The Sociology of the Family in Israel: An Outline of its Development fromth e 1950s to the 1980s" (1986) 2 European Sociological Review 148; Anya Glikman et al, "A New Israeli Family? Sex Roles and Labour Division in the Family in the beginning of the 21 Century", Public Opinions, The B.I. and Lucille Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research, Israel (2003).
164 therefore became a 'national asset' to be used to integrate women into the 'duties discourse' based on their traditional role as mothers. The term 'duty of motherhood' was coined in the
Israeli literature by Nitza B erko vitch, a leading Israeli sociologist who studies the integration of Jewish-Israeli women into citizenship through the institution of motherhood. She uses this notion to signify that women were incorporated into citizenship through their roles as wives and mothers, and that their national mission constructed them as a 'different type' of citizen who, eventually, did not gain full membership in the collective. The following discussion of the 'duty of motherhood' in Israel refers to the early years of statehood, a period of time that was critical in its implications for the ways in which women were constructed as citizens and members of the Israeli collective.71
A. Motherhood as a National Mission and as a Basis for Inclusion in Citizenship
1. The Origins of the 'Duty of Motherhood'
In their writing about women, nations and citizenship, Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis describe and analyze women's participation in national processes as biological reproducers for national and ethnic collectives. They explain that due to "the fear of being 'swamped' by different racial or ethnic groups," states have used national discourses to establish and perpetuate women's duty to give birth to more children as part of an "active encouragement of population growth of the 'right kind', i.e., of the ethnic group dominant in the state apparatus".72 This ideology is well exemplified in the Israeli case. The notion of
'motherhood as a national duty' was rooted in Zionist ideology and the circumstances
71 The following discussion shows how women's citizenship duties reflected a certain ideology that prioritized commons goods and collective needs over individual rights and freedoms. Frances Raday argues that the same was true with respect to women's rights. Feminist litigation during the early years, she shows, rested on socialist-coUectivist ideology that emphasized motherhood and the institution of the family. See Raday, 'Terninist Legal Theory", supra note 2 at 40-42. 72 Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis, "Introduction", in Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, Women-Nation- State (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989) 1 at 8.
165 relating to the establishment of Israel. In light of the higher Arab population in Palestine, much attention was given to increasing Jewish domination in the area Even when a Jewish majority was achieved (due to the mass Jewish immigration before and mainly after the establishment of the state, and the exit of many Palestinians during the 1948 war), demographics continued to be a political issue. As equal Israeli citizens (at least formally),
Palestinians had great potential for political power, since the birth rate among Palestinians was higher than among the Jewish population, their life expectancy increased (so that by
1967 they composed 15 percent on the overall population), Jewish immigration to Israel during this period slowed down, and the takeover of the occupied territories in 1967 increased the Palestinian population.73 To win the demographic race, Jewish women were called to participate in the nation-building by having more children.74 Aside fromcreatin g a
Jewish majority in the area, more Jews were needed for "military and technological superiority over the Arabs".75 In other words, being 'the mothers of the nation' was required for three reasons: to create a demographic advantage for the Jewish population in Israel; to increase the potential labour force; and to provide future soldiers.76
Nira Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction and the Demographic Race' in Israel", in Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, Wamen-NationState (Houndmiils: Macmillan, 1989) 92 at 94-95 [Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction"]. 74 For more about the official concern for birthrate in Israel see Jacqueline Portugese, Fertility Policy in Israel: The Politics of Religion, Gender and Nation {Westport: Praeger, 1998) 72-82. 75 Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 94. She also indicates another goal of the demographic policies in Israel, which in fact relates not to the Jewish nation itself but to the global Jewish population after the Holocaust; '...the second [goal],... has been to reproduce and enlarge the Jewish people' all over the world and for Israeli Jewish mothers to have enough children to 'compensate' for the children lost in the Nazi Holocaust and to what is called in Israel the Demographic Holocaust' and assimilation". Ibid. See also Gary S. Schiff, "The Politics of Fertility Policy in Israel", in Paul Ritterband, ed., Modern Jewish Fertility (Leiden: Brill, 1981) 253 at 258-259. 76 It should be noted that certain policies were proposed to control the increase of the Arab population in Israel, such as "encouraging Arab emigration from the country by limiting Arab prospects of employment and studies" and by "cutting Arab child national insurance benefits". However, these proposals were not implemented, and the focus shifted to encouraging birth among Jews. Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 95-96.
166 2. Constituting the 'Duty ofMotherhood'through LegalandPublicDiscourses
Citizenship in Israel, as discussed in the previous chapter, was structured during the early years according to a civic-republican model, under which Israeli women (and men) were required to contribute to the collective and the common good to earn their citizenship. Seen as crucial to the survival of Israel, the ideology of 'motherhood as a national mission' was incorporated into the civic-republican discourse through the legal system. In her study of the duty of motherhood, NitzaBerkovitch examines parliamentary debates regarding two early laws to show how the duty of motherhood, as part of the general 'duties discourse', was constructed and implemented in public policies and Israeli law.77 The first of these two laws is the J 949 Defence Service Act, which governs all issues related to service in the Israeli military.78 It obliges both sexes to serve in the military, but men and women are treated differently with respect to the conditions and length of service, and the roles they fulfill.79
Among its many provisions, the^c* deals with those exempted from service; among them are married women and mothers.80 When the Act was discussed in Parliament, as
Berkovitch explains, mere was broad consensus that married women should not serve in the army. This exemption was justified based on both the personal and national importance of
The duty of motherhood was not explicitly included in any formal legal document and the main sources for learning about this duty are parliamentary and public discussions about different laws dealing with women's and familial issues. 78 S.H. 25, 1949. 9 There is extensive literature discussing the military service of Israeli women and its implications on their political, social and economic status in Israel. It is impossible to relate in this chapter to all the dilemmas regarding Israeli women's military service. The discussion here, therefore, focuses only on those elements in the military service that related to women's citizenship as mothers. For further discussions regarding female soldiering in Israel see Orna Sasson-Levy, "Constructing Identities at the Margins: Masculinities and Citizenship in the Israeli Army" (2002) 43 The Sociological Quarterly 357; Quia Sasson-Levy, "Contradictory Consequences of Mandatory Conscription: The Case of Women Secretaries in the Israeli Military" (2007) 21 Gender & Society 481; Orly Lubin, "'Gone to Soldiers': Feminism and the Military in Israel" (2002) 21 Journal of Israeli History 164; Noya Rirnalt, "When a Feminist Struggle Becomes a Symbol of the Agendas as a Whole: The Example of Women in the Military" (2003) 6 Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies and Gender Issues 148. See also the discussion below near footnotes 154-163. 80 Other groups exempted from the service under this^4cf are individuals who do not intend to remain in Israel and women who declare that because of conscience or religious conviction they cannot serve in the military. Aside from them, Arab citizens are also excluded from military service and Ultra-orthodox Jews get special delay in their service under certain conditions.
167 motherhood. David Ben-Gurion, the then defence minister, explained that women should be given the opportunity to stay home with their husband and enjoy married life.81 Another
Parliament member, whose statements reflect the Zionist ideology that advocates the need for a high birth rate among Jewish women, said that "he who worries about Jewish demography should worry about the family. We cannot afford to draft married women because it will decrease the birth rate."82 This statement that attached women to the national duty of giving birth received almost no opposition. As Berkovitch points out, "it was obvious to most members of Parliament that wives cannot and indeed should not be soldiers, since military service would prevent them from fulfilling their most important duty, motherhood. This, in turn, would lead to a decrease in the birthrate and, as such, would eventually pose a threat to 'Jewish demography'".83 Berkovitch adds, rightfully, that the exemption of married women from defence service was never challenged or debated in public, that no women's group had initiated a campaign against this exclusion and that there was no indication that any married woman asked to be drafted - indeed, that they took upon themselves the national mission.84
The second law that reflects the idea of 'the mothers of the nation' is the 1951 Women's
Equal Rights Act*5 This piece of legislation deals exclusively with women's basic rightsi n different areas of life, and aims to improve and guarantee their equal status. When justifying women's right to equality, women again were portrayed as contributing to the nation
81 D.H. 2, at 1568. 82 D.H. 2, at 1627. 83 Nitza Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission: The Construction of Womanhood in the Legal Discourse in Israel" (1997) 20 Women's Studies International Forum 605 at 610 [Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission"]. See also Daphne Barak-Erez, "The Feminist Battle for Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and Conscientious Objection" (2007) 13 Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 531 at 536-537. 84 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 611. 85S.H. 248,1951.
168 through the institution of motherhood. The Minister of Justice emphasized that the most important way an Israeli women contributes to the new society is
... in fulfilling her duty and privilege as a Hebrew mother cherishing the young generation and educating them... [I]n all that, the Hebrew woman and mother continues the great tradition of the Israeli heroine.86
The Hebrew woman was prized for taking upon herself the duties of Zionism. Participating in nation-building through the institution of motherhood was, as Berkovitch indicates, the rationalization for receiving equal rights.87
The notion of 'motherhood as a national duty' was reflected in other public and legal discussions. The demographic concern played an important role in the abortion debate in
Israel. The 1977 Criminal Code in Israel defines four categories that enable legal abortions to be carried out: the age of the women (under 18 and above 40); the pregnancy is a result of
'forbidden relations'; the health of the fetus; and the health of the woman.88 Until the late
1970s, a fifth category, "social hardship", was included in the law. This category was abolished in 1977, as part of the coalition agreement with the religious parties in the
Parliament. This legislative action was not merely carried out for religious reasons, but was accompanied with "the emotive call to Jewish mothers to do their national duty and replace the Jewish children killed by the Nazis".89 Another example of legislation that reflects the demographic concern is the 1950 Marriage Age Act that regulates the minimum age of
86 D.H. 9 at 2004. 87 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra Bote 83 at 612. Much criticism was directed at the Women's Equal Rights Act, mainly because it upheld marriage and divorce as matters falling under the jurisdiction of Israel's religious bodies, thus subjecting women to laws that do not see them as equal partners within the family unit. The Act, for the most part, focused on married women and mothers, thus perpetuating their traditional role in society. For more about the limitations of the Act see Pnina Lahav, "When the 'Palliative' only Spoils Things: The Parliamentary Debate on the Women's Equal Rights Act" (1993) 46/47 Zmanim 149 (Hebrew). 88 S.H. 226,1977. 89 Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 99.
169 marriage in Israel. The parliamentary debates regarding this Act reflect again the link between the demographic concern and the institution of motherhood.91 Those who supported a lower age of marriage emphasized the national destination of women - motherhood - and their fundamental contribution to the existence of Israel.92 The need to increase birthrate was also reflected in the welfare system. In the early 1950s, the then Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion initiated a prize for women with 10 children or more as part of the strategy, 'few against many.'93 In the late 1960s, the Housing Ministry set up the 'Fund of Encouraging Birth' which provided financial support to families with more then three children, and in the early 1980s, the Law on Families Blessed with Children was enacted, which also provided a variety of benefits to families with more than three children.94
3. The Meaning and Importance of the 'Duty of Motherhood'
All these legal documents, public debates and discourses framed motherhood as a path to citizenship. Women fulfilled the common good by helping to achieve and maintain a Jewish majority in the land of Israel. Motherhood was portrayed as the most important contribution of Israeli women to the collective; it was their primary civic virtue and basis tor inclusion and belonging. As Delila Amir and Orly Benjamin explain,
Motherhood... has always been the necessary condition for social legitimation for Israeli women. Women in Israel grow up in an environment which constitutes affiliation and
90 S.H. 57, 1950, 91 These parliamentary discussions articulated the demographic concern not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality. The debate whether to increase or lower the age of marriage involved questions of culture and ethnicity, and divided Israeli women into two camps: Ashkenazi women and Sephardic women. 92 Sho'am Melamed, "Motherhood, Fertility and the Construction of the 'Demographic Threat' in the Marriage Age Act" (2004) 25 Theory and Critique 69 at 76-78. 93 Hanna Herzog, "Homefront and Battlefront: The Status of Jewish and Palestinian Women in Israel", in Esther Fuchs, ed., Israeli Women's Studies: A Reader {New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005) 208 at 219 [Herzog, "Homefront and Battlefront"]. 94 Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 96-99. For more about promoting the institutions of motherhood and the family through the welfare system and reproductive policies, see Schiff, supra note 75 at 267-275.
170 connection as dependent on motherhood. It not only builds a sense of belonging, but is also an experience that creates a path for connecting with the collective.95
The fact that women's inclusion in citizenship was structured through the institution of motherhood, in a society built upon a civic-republican model, was indeed an advantage to
Israeli women. Women's practices and responsibilities in the private sphere, as mothers, were recognized as part of citizenship and as a basis for establishing social ties and a 'sense of belonging' to their collective. Women were included through an alternative path to citizenship that defined them as citizens and partners in the nation. Motherhood allowed them to construct their identification with and membership in the national community. It allowed them to show their commitment and loyalty to the collective without putting aside their 'differences'. This route took into account the distinctive characteristics of women and their roles in society and defined them as a contribution to the nation and, therefore, as a justification for citizenship. While this path to citizenship differed from that taken by men, it led women into the heart of Zionism in Israel: they took part in maintaining the Jewish nature of the state.96 In that sense, the institution of motherhood served as a 'political project of belonging'; it constructed women's belonging in a very particular way, through the practice of motherhood, and to a very particular community, the Israeli collective. As mothers, Israeli women stood within the borders of the collective.97 The duty of motherhood was placed at the top of citizenship duties for women, especially above soldiering.98 As the
95 Delila Amir & Orly Benjamin, "Defining Encounters: Who are the Women Entitled to Join the Israeli Collective?" (1997) 20 Women's Studies International Forum 639 at 641. 96 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 241. This, Berkovitch adds, allows Israel to maintain its ethnc-republic nature that is not threatened by the fact that the Palestinian citizens hold formal rights. 97 Being a 'project of belonging', constituting motherhood as a duty of citizenship that maintains those who belong to the collective also disadvantaged all those women who did not carry out the duty. This point will be further discussed below. For more about political projects of belonging and duties of citizenship, see the discussion in Chapter I near footnotes 145-150. 98 Barbara Swirski, "The Citizenship of Jewish and Palestinian Arab Women in Israel", in Saud Joseph, ed., Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000) 314 at 318.
171 former MP Geula Cohen explained, motherhood became equivalent to military service as a duty:
The Israeli woman is an organic part of the femily of the Jewish people and the female constitutes a practical symbol of that. But she is a wife and a mother in Israel, and therefore it is of her nature tob e a soldier, a wife of a soldier, a sister of a soldier, a grandmother of a soldier. This is her reserve service. She is continually in military service."
Incorporating motherhood into the 'duties discourse', Berkovitch explains, was a reflection of two models of citizenship: the civic-republican and the liberal ones. Israel was founded as a Jewish state and home for Jews from all around the world. As such, only Jews were (and still are) full members of the collective, and only they could structure and contribute to national projects. As the discussion in the previous chapter showed, their citizenship was based on the civic-republican model, which required them to contribute to the collective to earn their citizenship, as well as on the liberal model that ensured (at least in theory) equal rights. Palestinian citizens were given only liberal citizenship providing them with citizenship rights as part of the democratic principle. The fact that Palestinian citizens had the right to participate in the political process in Israel directed much attention to their relative size in Israeli society and perpetuated the desire to guarantee a Jewish majority that would minimize the Palestinians' political power. For their part, Berkovitch explains,
Jewish women are to fulfill the civic virtue of increasing population through the institution of motherhood. In other words, the fact that Israel prioritized the Jewish collective identity and that a large part of the Israeli population did not belong to the dominant ethnic group but nevertheless held rights - all these elements affect the structure of women's citizenship.
They were subjected to the civic-republican 'duties discourse' and expected to participate in
99 As quoted in Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 101.
172 nation building, a participation that, as noted above, was the basis for achieving in return citizenship rights.100
What was the scope and meaning of 'motherhood' as a duty of citizenship? As explained in the beginning of this chapter, the notion of 'motherhood' can be understood to include different activities, from giving birth to children, to nurturing and educating them. What functions and roles were included in the 'duties discourse' when motherhood was made into a national mission? The discussion above clearly indicates that the duty of motherhood first and foremost referred to childbearing, which was "celebrated as having a major national significance"101 in light of the demographic concern and the ongoing efforts to increase the birthrate among Jewish women. Much attention was given to the extent to which motherhood could meet the need for increased population, that is, the quantity of new births.
Indeed, as shown above, many statements and policies encouraged women to become mothers and fulfill their demographic duty as the bearers of the Jewish-Israeli collective.
The same cannot be easily said about the nurturing role of women. Was the practice of care understood as an activity that could provide women with apath into citizenship and as a site for achieving a 'sense of belonging'? Or was it left outside the 'duties discourse', thus narrowing women's route to citizenship? It should be noted again that a duty of citizenship is different from a social practice or expectation. While care is certainly a dominant practice and activity in many people's lives, it is not necessarily a duty of citizenship, and a certain public policy or statement is required to transform it from a practice into a duty.102 Looking back at the discourse of the duty of motherhood, not many statements explicitly linked care
100 Nitza Berkovitch- "Citizenship and Motherhood: The Status of Women in Israel", in Yoav Peled & Adi Ofir, eds., Israel: From a Drafted Society to a Civil Society (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institution, 2001) 206 at 208- 218 (Hebrew) [Berkovitch, "Citizenship and Motherhood"]. 101 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 616, 1021 do not intend to suggest that 'motherhood' should be narrowly understood to include only one function or another. I merely wish to better define the scope of the duty itself to empathize which activities formed the connection between women and their collective.
173 to the 'duties discourse'. There was, nevertheless, an implicit assumption behind the 'duties discourse' that the practice of motherhood would also include nurturing and educating.
Women were constantly referred to as 'wives and mothers'. When the Parliament discussed the exemption of married women and mothers from military service, it was assumed that once she had a child, a woman would devote her time to raising it, and thus would not be able to join or rejoin the army.103 There is no doubt that women were seen as the ones to carry on the traditional role of caregivers.104 Furthermore, the discussions of'motherhood' under the legislating process of the Women's Equal Rights Act did not separate or distinguish between childbearing and childrearing, and the two functions were strongly linked as the main duty of the Jewish woman toward her collective.105 It seems, therefore, that the practice of care was also understood to be a certain vehicle for contributing to the common good and a route to membership in the Israeli collective. Childbearing and childrearing were seen as part of the collective activities needed for the success of the
Zionist project, thus a woman who prioritized her familial responsibilities was considered to be taking part in creating one of the important facet of the collective - the family.106 Yet, caregiving still stood in the shadow of the 'real' effort of childbirth and it was not an explicit part of the 'duties discourse'. While the practice of giving birth was directly and explicitly discussed and framed as a national duty, there was no substantive profound public
103 When asked why married women could not serve in the army, Ben-Gurion answered that "he who worries about Jewish demography must worry about the family and the family unit" (quoted in Nitza Berkovitch, "Women and Citizenship in Israel" (1999) 2 Israeli Sociology 277 at 305 (Hebrew) [Berkovitch, "Women and Citizenship in Israel"]). Even within the demographic discourse, Ben-Gurion did not restrict his notion of motherhood to childbearing alone but referred to the broader familial roles. The discussion around the Marriage Age Act, which emphasized the demographic concern and the need tor a higher birthrate, also placed much attention on the role of women in nurturing and educating their children. Motherhood was not restricted to childbearing alone but included caregiving as well. See Melamed, supra note 92 at 83-86. 104 See Sylvie Fogiel-Bijoui, "Women in the Kibbutz: The "Mixed Blessing" of Neo-Liberalism" (2007) 13 Nashim, A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies &. Gender Issues 102 at 110 [Fogiel-Bijoui, "Women in the Kibbutz"]. 105 Berkovitch, "Women and Citizenship in Israel", supra note 103 at 295-296. Even when discussing the Military Service Act, where much emphasis was given to birthrate and women as the bearers of the collective, Israel's leaders attached the responsibilities of women as housewives toth e notion of motherhood. Ibid, at 303. 106 Berkovitch, "Citizenship and Motherhood", supra note 100 at 230.
174 discussion that specifically related to the practice of care and framed it as a basic duty of citizenship. In any case, whether being an integral part of the 'duties discourse' or not, the proceeding discussion will showthat caregiving was still not fully acknowledged within the
Israeli society, thus not providing women with a strong path for belonging and citizenship.
What is the relevance of the duty of motherhood today?Ove r the years, as discussed earlier, the 'duties discourse' slowly faded away when the civic-republican model was replaced with the liberal approach to citizenship. As the 'rights discourse' became more and more dominant, motherhood (and parenthood) became understood not so much as a duty toward society, but as a righto f women (and men) themselves.107 However, since the demographic concern is still part of politics and ideology in Israeli society, birthrate remains a national concern. This is reflected in the activities of the Demographic Council. This institution was established in 1967, as part of the Prime Minister's office, with an aim "to act systematically to realize a demographic policy directed at creating an atmosphere and conditions for encouraging a higher birth rate, which is so vital to the future of the Jewish people".108 The
Demographic Council did not function continuously, but only after the 'demographic problem' reappeared in the media and public debates. In 1986, after 35 years of non- operation, the Council renewed its work following research indicating Israeli women would like to have more children but do not live under the proper conditions to do so. The Council then met to make recommendations mat were aimed to change conditions so that Jewish mothers would have more children. These recommendations, however, were not implemented. Eleven years passed and the Council was reformed again in 1997 to present
107 Berkovitch, "Citizenship and Motherhood", sttpra note 100 at 242-243. Addressing parenthood within a 'rights discourse' is in the forefront with respect to the issue of reproductive rights and technologies and divorce law. For a general discussion, see Pinchas Shifman, "Hie Right to Parenthood and the Best Interests of the Child: A Perspective on Surrogate Motherhood in Jewish and Israeli Law" (1987) NY Law School Hum Rights Annu. 555; Dapfana Hacker, "Motherhood, Fatherhood and Law: Child Custody and Visitation in Israel" (2005) 14 Social & Legal Studies 409. 108 As quoted in Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 92.
175 new recommendations about the need to establish a public campaign against abortions, to emphasize the national aspects of the demographic problem, and to promote the positive image of families with many children. These proposals were also not implemented and soon after presenting its findings,th e council stopped working again. In 2002, the Demographic
Council assembled again. This time, in addition to the usual concerns about the increased number of abortions and the increase in the birthrate among the Palestinians, anewnational fear appeared-the increase in the number of the foreign workers in Israel. One of the main objectives of the renewed council was, as expected, to identify ways to encourage higher birth rates among secular Jewish mothers.109 It is evident, then, that the need or desire to increase the birthrate has never disappeared from the daily political agenda110
Throughout the public debates, despite having different patterns of participation, Israeli women were not defined or described as non-citizens or even as second-class citizens. At least in theory, as Berkovitch writes, "by being constructed as mothers women [were] neither altogether excluded, nor merely marginalized".111 Women were constructed as
'others' but their otherness was not aimed at excluding them from citizenship, but to direct them to a different partem of participation.112 Constituting women as 'the mothers of the nation' and motherhood as a route to citizenship has somewhat blurred the dichotomy between the public and the private spheres. The institution of motherhood was placed side
109 Merav Sarig, "We Love You Giving Birth", Haaretz (1 November 2002). 110 For more about the demographic concern in recent years, see Portugese, supra note 74 at 83-86. It should be noted that the idea of 'increasing birthrate as a war weapon' is implemented among the Jewish settlers in the West Bank to create a Jewish majority and win control over the territories. This strategy, however, is not part of our discussion here since it does not represent a duty of women toward the whole Israeli collective (even through the female settlers might think otherwise) and since it does not serve as a basis for inclusion in society. 111 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 616. The dilemma of choosing between equality and difference as a basis for equal rights or equal citizenship is less relevant for the discussion here, which is aimed at establishing the idea of motherhood as an obligation/expectation. For more about the misleading assumption about women's equal rights and the dichotomy equality/difference in the Israeli context, see ibid, at 612-613; Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, "Women in Israel: The Social Construction of Citizenship as a Non-Issue" (1997) 12 Israeli Society Science Research 1. 112 Berkovitch, "Women and Citizenship in Israel", supra note 103 at 309.
176 by side with men's duty of military service. Berkovitch describes these last points in clear words:
It is precisely through their familial roles that women are brought into the public sphere. While married women are exempt from the draft, and thus excluded from a major citizensmp-reilifying institution, they are returned to the Jewish-Israeli collective through their roles as "mothers". This particular celebration of motherhood is made possible by blurring the boundaries between the "public" and fee "private" and by subordinating the latter to the needs of the former.113
In fact, at least theoretically, fulfilling different duties was supposed to provide Israeli women with equal standing. The discussion regarding the duty of motherhood in
Parliament, Berkovitch notes, was part of a general debate regarding women's equality. The principle of sex equality was acknowledged side by side with legitimizing women's differences. For instance, the discussion of the Defense Service Act involved statements about "equality in duties" and "women being pioneers making the same sacrifice as men", while at the same time the Act acknowledged women's unique function as mothers.114
Another clear example is found in the debate regarding the Women '$ Equal Rights Act where it was believed that Israeli women deserve equal rightsbecaus e they contribute to the national proj ect through their difference—by fulfilling their duty as mothers.115 In theory, this was supposed to be a winning ideology: recognition of women's difference entitles them to equality with men. In practice, as the following discussion shows, women did not gain full
Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 616. Ibid, at 609-610. Berkovitch, "Women and Citizenship in Israel", supra note 103 at 298.
177 membership in Israel, despite fulfilling the duty of motherhood, and achieved merely second-class citizenship.116
B. Still not Fully Equal: The Limitations of Constituting Motherhood as a Route to
Citizenship
The gender-differentiated model of citizenship, as mentioned above, presents women with many difficulties, which mainly result from placing emphasis on the principle of
'difference' rather than on the practices and institutions that position and perpetuate women in their social locations. The downside of the gender-differentiated model and its emphasis of women's differences is well illustrated by the Israeli case of constituting motherhood as women's duty of citizenship.117 First, this discourse involved women's most intimate and personal decisions regarding their bodies and relationships. The interaction between these decisions and a 'duties discourse' exposed women to public interference and judgment. In addition, this route ignored differences among women and assumed that motherhood was every woman's ambition in life. Even for women who choose motherhood, this route was still very problematic. The practice of motherhood was rarely fully appreciated and it limited women's access to other duties of citizenship, which were usually considered to be of greater societal value.118
Again, it should be noted that women's second-class citizenship resulted not only from a partial integration into the duties discourse but also from not receiving all citizenship rights and having less access to different practices of citizenship. The discussion here, however, focuses only on the dimension of the duties discourse. 117 This is not to suggest, however, that motherhood should not be recognized as a possible activity of citizenship or that the practice of motherhood should not be incorporated into the discourse of duties. The sole purpose of the following discussion is to point to the limitations of the duty of motherhood, while the last chapter of the thesis will discuss a better way of constituting motherhood (together with labour) as a practice of citizenship. 118 Promoting the institution of motherhood as a "national duty" was criticized not only from the women's point of view and because of the negative effects of such policy on women's status. Other objections focused on the racist nature of the reproduction policies since they were aimed only at Jewish women, while excluding the Arab-Palestinian population, thus blocking its access to welfare benefits. Still other criticism focused on the problem of children's poverty. The state was interested in increasing the birthrate but did not pay enough attention to the issue of poverty among families with many children. Only during the 1970s were measures
178 1. Lack of Privacy and Autonomy-No 'Free Choice'
The gender-differentiated model is aimed, as discussed above, at incorporating women's practices from the private sphere into the discourse of citizenship, as abasis for membership
and inclusion. These practices, however, often relate to intimate aspects of women's lives.
This is clearly the case with respect to motherhood. This practice involves intimate,
emotional and personal decisions regarding issues of health, sexual activity, bodily
experience or family relationship. Incorporating childbirth into citizenship under the duties
discourse opens the way forth e involvement and intervention of society into women's most
private decisions and activities. Being the 'guardians of the nation', therefore, might provide
women with political standing and membership in society, but the price is the possible
interference, by society, in their intimate behaviours. As Pnina Werbner and Nira Yuval-
Davis explain,
Women's ambivalent positioning is expressed in the fact mat, on the one hand, they are considered fully fledged members of the political community - often, together with their children, its most precious possessions, the promise of a collective future ... On the other hand, they are subjected to special rules and regulations aimed at controlling their behaviour in order to ensure that they conform to this imposed 'burden of representation'.119
This is the disadvantage of blurring the borders between the public and the private spheres:
stretching the veil of citizenship over women's practices in the private sphere as mothers
exposes them to a social examination of how they fulfill their obligation toward society.
Motherhood becomes a public issue and a source of social pressure on women. Certainly,
taken to provide these families with welfare benefits. For more about these critics see Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 96-98. 119 Werbner & Yunal-Davis, supra note 72 at 13.
179 this limitation is not unique to the experience of integrating motherhood into the 'duties discourse'. It appears also in the allocation of rights that relate to women's practices in the private sphere. Almost every discussion about women's reproductive rights or maternity leave entitlements leads to public debates regarding the proper behaviour of women in these areas. But placing motherhood within the 'duties discourse' is even more problematic because motherhood becomes an instrument aimed to serve the public good or to fulfill public interests. This legitimates all the more the involvement of the public in women's choices regarding the practice of motherhood. As it stands, women do not enjoy absolute
'free choice'. To turn motherhood into more of a matter of the public interest would mean that women would lose even more privacy and autonomy around questions of how, when, with whom and if they should become a mother. As Ann Phillips indicates, once women's
'private' choice regarding motherhood has 'public' effects - in this case, the fate of the
Jewish nation - then motherhood is no longer entirely her affair. 12°
A good example is the treatment of fertility in Israel. Reproductive technologies are more available and publicly welcomed in Israel man in the rest of the world. There are more public In-Vitro Fertilization (TVF) clinics per capita in Israel than any other country in the world.121 Alison Solomon, who researched the issue of reproductive technology in Israel, found a link between viewing reproduction as a national issue, on the one hand, and investing in new reproductive technologies, and encouraging women to undergo complicated and dangerous medical treatments. As an expression of this policy and its link
120 Phillips is especially worried about women's right to abortion. Once certain aspects of reproductive and sexual relations become part of politics rather than pure personal affairs, women may face public pressures and their choice in these issues will be limited. Therefore, while providing women with rights is a positive thing, "the sphere of sexual and family relations cannot be treated in exactly the same way as the sphere of work or the sphere of conventional politics. Phillips, Engendering Democracy, supra note 11 at 108-109. 121 Carmel Shalev & Sigal Gooldin, "The Uses and Misuses of In-Vitro Fertilization in Israel: Some Sociological and Ethical Considerations" (2006) 12 Nashim, A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues 151 at 154-157; Portugese, supra note 74 at 153-155.
180 to the birthrate concern, Solomon mentions a statement by Motta Gur, a former member of
Parliament, "who stated that although IVF was expensive, it was still cheaper than the cost of bringing in new immigrants".122 This statement, from the late 1980s, shows how demographic concerns had not disappeared and that women are the access to solving these concerns. Similar to the exemption of married women from military service, there is almost no public debate in Israel questioning the intensive development and use of reproductive technologies. On the contrary, Solomon illustrates how this progress is usually viewed as positive and needed. The societal stress of being childless, according to Solomon, drives many women in Israel to participate in long and expensive fertility treatments and blinds them to the dangers and risks of such medical procedures. Moreover, the strong belief in the importance and success of reproductive technologies, among doctors and women themselves, creates an assumption that the technology is safe and when it fails - it is the women's body that is at fault. The message, Solomon argues, is that a woman who cannot conceive or produce a child is worthless,123 Being constituted as a public matter with a national significant, the discourse of fertility places much pressure on women to become mothers without leaving enough room for personal and private considerations. As Daphna
Birenbaum-Carmeli rightfully indicates,
[the] pronalalist climate that glorifies motherhood restricts women's autonomy by delegitimizing alternative life courses [in] which motherhood is not as prominent... Israel's reproductive policy undermines women's autonomy at the deeper level of
122 Alison Solomon, "Anything for a Baby: Reproductive Technology in Israel", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 102 at 103. More about the demographic consideration and the pronatalist agenda embedded in the IVF discourse see Shalev & Gooldin, supra note 121 at 166-167; Portugese, supra note 74 at 56-69. 123 Solomon, supra note 122 at 104-106. Solomon refers to this phenomenon as the "industrialization of female reproduction" and she claims that the medical community in Israel does not provide women with all information about infertility treatments but rather encourage women not to stop trying having babies. See also Larissa Remennick, "Childless in the Land of Imperative Motherhood: Stigma and Coping among Infertile Israeli Women" (2000) 43 Sex Roles 821; Shalev & Gooldin, supra note 121 at 169.
181 promoting [an] ideology that positions motherhood as the heart of women's lives...
in a context wherein childbcaring is constituted as a political act, the family
becomes a legitimate site for state intervention.124
2. Ignoring Diversity among Women and Disadvantaging Childless Women
A much-related critique of the gender-differentiated model is mat it risks ignoring diversity among women. One of the main objectives of this model, as explained above, is to acknowledge that women have characteristics and interests that are different from those of men. This model is aimed at challenging the masculine element in the structure of citizenship and at recognizing that women's unique experiences under gendered structures and institutions serve as the barriers to their full inclusion. However, because this model focuses on women's differences from men and their unique experiences (which may indeed be a real barrier to citizenship), it has been criticized for placing all women under one category ('women') and overlooking differences among them. This difficulty is known in the feminist literature as the problem of essentialism. As Ruth Lister explains, gender- differentiated citizenship "runs the risko f sinking into the sands of an essentialism which, in lauding women's (read mothers') essential nature and values, ignores the differences between women".125 This model, as Anne Phillips also notes, can "generate essentialist
See Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Reproductive Policy in Context: Implications on Women's Rights in Israel, 1945-2000" (2003) 24 Policy Studies 101 at 110-111 [Birenbaum-CarmelL "Reproductive Policy in Context"]. See also Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Cheaper than a Newcomer: On the Social Production of IVF Policy in Israel" (2004) 26 Sociology of Health & Illness 897 at 916-918 [Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Cheaper than a Newcomer"]. The regulation of hospital births is another example of society participating in private interests regarding childbirth. Giving birth in a hospital is being prioritized by the state as the best option for women, in comparison to home birth, which is being largely discouraged to ensure the health of the women giving birth and their newborns. It is argued that this policy is part of the general notion about women's national service, parallel to military service, that has to take a certain form to satisfy society and ensure women fulfill the general will. See Omi Morgenstem-Leissner, "Hospital Birth, Military Service, and the Ties that Bind Them: The Case of Israel" (2006) 12 Nasbim, A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues 203. 125 Ruth Lister, "Dialectics of Citizenship" (1997) 12 Hypatia 6 at 15. For further discussion about the critique of essentialism, see Jane Roland Martin, "Methodological essentialism, False Difference and Other Dangerous Traps" (1994) 19 Signs 630; Linda Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist theory" (1988) 13 Signs 405; Dianna Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (New York: Routledge, 1989) at 1-6; his Marion Young, "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a
182 notions of a unified voice that [has] neither theoretical nor empirical validity". Indeed, as many writers have demonstrated, not all women are different from men in the same way and not all women necessarily are interested or willing to experience or exercise their differences from men. In other words, women may differ in their differences from men. The gender- differentiated model can be seen as portraying women as a homogenous group in which all women share similar interests, experiences or practices. The concerns of some individuals
(even if they formth e majority in the group) may falsely represent or structure the interests of the whole group.127
One area where differences among women are being ignored is that of motherhood. Under the gender-differentiated model, as shown above, Israeli women gain citizenship by fulfilling a duty taken from their private sphere of experience as mothers. Their civic activity is motherhood. Their political standing "is grounded in the virtues of woman's private sphere, primarily in mothering".128 This concept of women's citizenship, Dietz argues, is troubling because it turns women into universalized entities. It structures motherhood as a
Social Collective" (1994) 19 Signs 713 {Young, "Gender as Seriality"]; Joanne Conaghan, "Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law" (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 351 at 366-368. 126 Anne Phillips, "From Inequality to Difference: A severe Case of Displacement?" (1997) 1/224 New Left Review 143 at 151. 127 Nira Yuval-Davis, "Women, Citizenship and Difference" (1997) 57 Feminist Review 4 at 18; Deborah L. Rhode, "The Politics of Paradigms: Gender Difference and Gender Disadvantage", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 344 at 346-348; Marilyn Frye, "The Necessity of Differences: Constructing a Positive Category of Women" (1996) 21 Signs 991 at 999-1000. Another stream of criticism objects to the strategy of 'gendered citizenship' for ignoring or overlooking other sites of women's oppression. It has been widely argued that many women are being denied full citizenship, not only because of their gender but also because of their race, age, ethnicity, religion, class, sexual orientation or disability. Traditional feminist scholarship, as Phillips for example argues, has treated women as a homogenized group with similar interests and difficulties, thus ignoring the special needs and experiences of women who belong to particular oppressed groups, such as blacks or homosexuals. Their straggles face not only gendered structures but also other forms of oppression that were ignored for a long time in feminist discussions and strategies of difference. See Ann Phillips, "Introduction", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 1 at 12-13; Young, "Gender as Seriality" supra note 125 at 714-715. This critique, which focuses on women's diverse backgrounds and the interrelationships between the different sources of oppression, is however less relevant to our discussion. Although there are indeed major differences among Israeli women in terms of their backgrounds and characteristics, mainly in the areas of religion and ethnicity, the focus of the thesis is on Jewish women as a whole. For a general discussion of the 'false unitary woman' in Israel, see Tamar Rapoport & Tamar El-Or, "Cultures of Womanhood in Israel: Social Agencies and Gender Production" (1997) 20 Women's Studies International Forum 573. 128 Dietz, "Context is All", supra note 53 at 386.
183 universal activity; it creates the 'universal female citizen' who is assumed to have a matemalistic need, thus leaving women with "a one-sided view of politics and therefore of citizenship".129 Put differently, gender-differentiated citizenship celebrates women's values and experiences, as mothers, while assuming that motherhood is an intrinsic part of all women's lives. It homogenizes women as mothers and perpetuates a general attitude in society, which views motherhood as women's natural practice and choice; "reproduction has been so taken for granted that only women who are not parents are regarded as having made a choice - a choice that is constructed as non-traditional, non-conventional, and for some, non-natural".130
Women, however, differ in how they choose to participate as citizens. Some may not see motherhood as a preferable way to achieve full membership in society. In recent years, much research regarding the phenomenon of 'childless by choice' indicates that a growing number of women prefer or choose not to be mothers.131 The gender-differentiated discourse does not leave much room for these women to be full members of society without fulfilling their 'natural' destiny as mothers. It encompasses socially structured notions and assumptions of motherhood into the structure of citizenship. The result is that women who are unable to give birth are pitied and women who choose not to be mothers suffer intense stigmatization. Ignoring differences among women, while assuming that they all long for a
Ibid, at 388-389. For more about homogeneity and women's citizenship see Phillips, "Feminism and Republicanism", supra note 15 at 287; 130 Katherine M. Franke, "Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire" (2001) 101 Colum. L. Rev. 181 at 185. Franke focuses her research on legal feminism and not on political feminism and questions of citizenship, however her arguments are still very relevant as the legal arena clearly reflects societal structures and the image of women as mothers. For further discussions about the assumed role of women as mothers, see Martha A. Fineman, Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (New York: Routledge, 1995) at 44-45, 51; Slaughter, supra note 5. 131 See, for example, Jane Bartlett, Will you be mother? Women who Choose to Say No (London: Virago Press, 1994); Rosemary Gillespie, "Childfree and Feminism" (2003) 17 Gender & Society 122; Susan Stobert & Anna Kemeny, Childfree by Choice, Statistics Canada - Canadian Social Trends (2003); Michelle Goldberg, "Will I Regret Not Having a Baby", The Guardian (11 August 2003); Caitlin higrassia, "child-free - and Lovin' It", Times Herald-Record (22 June 2003),
184 mother role, is especially problematic where the institution of motherhood is attached to national processes, understood as the primary duty toward the collective and has served as a basis for inclusion in citizenship. Such a situation runs the risk of creating serious tensions between women's interests and the nation, and of sanctioning women who do not choose motherhood, which results in undermining their membership in the collective and structuring them as second-class citizens.132
This was the case with the duty of motherhood in Israel. Looking closely at the 'motherhood as a duty' discourse, it appears that the leaders were not concerned about women failing to have children at all; they were concerned about the number of children per family and how to further increase the rate of childbirth. It was assumed that motherhood was an inherent part of a woman's life. The question was not 'procreation or not' but how to increase procreation.133 When discussing the exemption of married women from military service in
Parliament, Ben-Gurion explained that women should not be prevented from becoming mothers since "motherhood is the unique destiny of women and there is no destiny that is more important man motherhood".134 Women's identity thus collapsed into motherhood.135
When constituting motherhood as women's primary form of contribution to the collective, the Israeli society ignored the possibility mat not all women could or wanted to become mothers. It was assumed that motherhood was women's most essential duty of citizenship
132 Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation (London: Sage, 1997) at 35. 133 As Hanna Herzog argues, "the dominant cultural assumption is that [women's] firstpreferenc e is for family roles and that if forced to choose between the private and the public sphere, they would opt for the former". See Herzog, "Homefront and Battlefront", supra note 93 at 210. 134 D.H. 2, at 1568. Even in 1993, when celebrating the International Women's Day in the Parliament, the then Prime Minister chose to identify womanhood with motherhood: "And I will finish in a praise (hellel) song, a praise song to the Jewish mother, to the Israeli women, that worries day and night, the woman who takes care of her home, of our children, the women that is an integral part of our personal and national life, that we could not do without her". As quoted in Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 613.
135 Fogiel-Bijoui, "Women in the Kibbutz", supra note 104 at 110. This perspective was not unique, of course, to the duties discourse. It matched a deep-rooted perspective of 'women as mothers' that was integrated into the legal and public 'rights discourse'. See Leora Bilsky, "Cultural Import: The Case of Feminism in Israel" (2001) 25 Tel Aviv Law Review 523 at 540-544, 549 (Hebrew),
185 and, as such, would have a central place in all Israeli women's lives. Lesley Hazleton refers to this as the biological myth of Israeli women:
The basic assumption of the biological myth is that women are defined, both physically and
psychologically, by their biology ... it offers an alternative basis for self-esteem by positing
that women's child-bearing capacity is of over-riding importance, the major factor in any
woman's life and therefore a prime determinant of her personality, abilities and desires. It
presents reproduction as women's incomparable and unique contribution as citizens of then-
state, and as their prime channel for fulfillment as human beings. All else, in comparison, is
unimportant [emphasis added].136
Childlessness, as previously mentioned, was generalized as a devastating occurrence for women.137 It was also seen as a destructive occurrence for the nation, and public debates often "associated childlessness with a diminished personal contribution to the national collectivity".138 In Ben-Gurion own words,
Increasing the Jewish birthrate is a vital need for the existence of Israel, and a Jewish
woman who does not bring at least four children into the world... is defrauding the Jewish
• • 139 mission.
Placing motherhood first in the hierarchy of duties for women, childlessness and full membership clearly did not easily go hand in hand. As Amir and Benjamin put it,
136 Lesley Hazleton, Israeli Women: The Reality behind the Myths (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977) at 27. 137 Ibid, at 65. See also the discussion above near footnotes 121-124. 138 Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Cheaper than a Newcomer", supra note 124 at 910. 139 David Ben-Gurion, "How can the Birthrate be Increased?", Haaretz (8 December 1967) {quoted in Hazlenton, supra note 136 at 63).
186 [since] motherhood is perceived in Israeli culture as a major link to the mainstream of
society... childlessness ... is loaded as a major characteristic of women in the margins of
society.140
In a society where a 'good female citizen' meant to be a mother and where motherhood brought women into the mainstream of society, childless women did not fulfill their duty toward the collective thus their route into full citizenship was obstructed and they often found themselves at the margins of the collective.141
The 'duties discourse' clearly caused a conflict between the collective national goals and women's individual interests. This conflict, as discussed above, usually impairs the personal and private aspects of motherhood, and serves as a ground for state intervention in family life. Yael Yishai, an Israeli sociologist, articulates this scenario as being trapped 'between the flag and the banner'.142 She defines Israel as a 'visionary democracy' where the government has a national vision or objective and it aims to create a deep individual commitment and loyalty to the nation and to mobilize citizens in the way that best serves the vision. Those who identify with the national vision gain a strong national identity and sense of belonging. In a visionary democracy, Yishai explains, "there is a constant tension between the collective imperatives of society and particularistic needs of subgroups within it, including women" whose own needs might be obstructed by the comprehensive force of
Amir & Benjamin, supra note 95 at 645. 141 Ibid, at 645. See also Daphna Haker, "Singlehood as an Important Opportunity for Women and its Treatment by the Israel Law" (2005) 28 Eyuney Mishpat 903 at 927-929 (Hebrew). Connecting childlessness with non-contribution to the national collective is found in the public discussions of IVF treatment in Israel. See Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Cheaper than a Newcomer", supra note 124 at 910; Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Reproductive Policy in Context", supra note 124 at 108. See also Hilla Haelyon, "Longing for a Child'. Perceptions of Motherhood among Israeli-Jewish Women Undergoing In-Vitro Fertilization Treatments" (2006) 12 Nashim, A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues 177. 142 Yael Yishai, "Between the Flag and the Banner: Dilemmas in the Political Life of Israeli Women", in Esther Fuchs, ed., Israeli Women's Studies: A Reader (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005) 190. We will see that this difficulty appears also when the duties discourse is structured around the gender-neutral model, even to a larger extent.
187 national goals. Indeed, Israel can be considered a visionary state that mobilized its female citizens into motherhood due to demographic and security concerns, and as part of the
Zionist project. This created a tension for women who had to choose between the national vision, which mobilized them to childbirth, and their own aspirations to advance their professional career instead of, or before, giving birth to children. The later choice goes against the national project. Prioritizing personal interests might be seen as "[breaching] a fundamental norm: doing one's best for the country's survival".144 These women faced the risk of losing their sense of belonging and being punished by a negative societal reaction.
Women who could not give birth or chose not to become mothers had one less route into citizenship and one less site for participating in the national process. Whether they were childless by choice or not, these women failed the test of citizenship. By constituting the
'unitary woman' who is expected to give birth and raise a child, it becomes apparent that the function of the duty of motherhood as a 'political project of belonging' was not merely in creating a site of gaining a sense of belonging and attachment, but also as a means of valuing and differentiating between women along the lines of motherhood. Not fulfilling the duty of motherhood, women could findthemselve s outside the boundaries of the collective, the 'community of belonging'. The duty thus separated mothers, who belonged, from childless women, who did not fully belong to the Israeli collective. As argued earlier, the ability to gain a sense of belonging depends on the way a certain practice is constructed.
Here, since the practice of motherhood was constituted as a duty of citizenship, it took part in establishing the boundaries of the Israeli collective that differentiated between women who fulfilled the duty and those who did not.
Ibid, at 194. Ibid, at 197.
188 3. Trapping Women in the Private Sphere
Even when women chose to become mothers and fulfill the national duty of motherhood, they still enjoyed only second-class citizenship because of their attachment to the private sphere and the traditional roles of wives and mothers. As noted earlier, focusing more on women's 'differences' than on gendered structures in society, the gender-differentiated model runs the risk of perpetuating women's attachment to the private sphere, thus maintaining their lower position within the family and excluding them from the public sphere. This was the case in the Israeli 'duties discourse'. Women were incorporated into citizenship through the institution of motherhood, as 'women', as 'different' and as the
'others'.145 Indeed, they were included in citizenship as the 'reproducers of the nation' and not merely as mothers or housewives; however, this discourse was marked by their most typical 'difference' and it left them in the private sphere of the family - one of the most gendered institutions in society and the symbol of their past exclusion from citizenship.
Structuring motherhood as women's primary duty toward society helped maintain women's segregation in the private sphere.146 Hanna Herzog, a leading Israeli sociologist, writes regarding the public/private dichotomy and the duty of motherhood:
Women are being captured as the representativeso f the collective: the mothers of the nation. They are captured as responsible for the continuity of the nation in their primary role as child-bearers and as the educators of the new generatioa They represent the honour of the nation and symbolize its borders. Within such cultural
For general discussions about incorporating the principle of women's difference into legal and public discourses in Israel see Carmel Shalev, "On Equality, Difference and Sex Discrimination", in Aaron Barak, ed., Landoi Book (Tel Aviv: Burci, 1995) 893; Raday, "Women in the Israeli Law", supra note 1 atl74-177. 146 Pateman presents this limitation when introducing motherhood as a route to citizenship: "women were included as subordinated, as the 'different' sex, as 'women'. They were incorporated as men's subordinates into their own private sphere, and so were excluded from'civi l society' in the sense of the public sphere of the economy and citizenship of the state". Pateman, supra note 13 at 19. See also Werbner & Yuval-Davis, supra note 72 at 14.
189 perception women's location within the private sphere is not only being determined
but also intensified (my translation- R.G.).'47
Ann Phillips also expresses this critique in a similar way:
If men 'earnf their citizenship as soldiers and workers, while women 'earnf their citizenship as mothers and educators of their children, then the political settlement has already legitimated the sexual division of labour.148
While recognizing that women are different from men and may have a different way to contribute to society, the 'duties discourse' did not resolve the limitations women faced in light of their attachment to the private sphere. Being trapped in the private sphere, the duty of motherhood disadvantaged women on two main fronts. First, the traditional role of motherhood limited their way into other sites of citizenship and their ability to fulfill other duties of citizenship. Second, the role of caregivers was undervalued in its contribution to society, thus increasing women's dependency on their husbands and perpetuating their inferiority in society. The following sections address these two limitations.
/. Limiting Women's Participation in other Duties of Citizenship
In her research of Israeli women and the public sphere in cultural discourses, Hanita Brand argues that attaching women to domestic activities limited their ability to demonstrate their loyalty to and establish belonging to the national collective:
Haana Herzog, Realistic Women: Women in Local Politics (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institution for the Research of Israel, 1994) at 330 (Hebrew). For more about the attachment of women to the private sphere see Dafha Izraeli, "Women, Work, Family and Public Policy", in Arye Globerson et al, eds., Human Resources & Industrial Relations in Israel: New Horizons (Tel Aviv: Industrial Relations Research Association of Israel, 1990) 327 at 328 (Hebrew); Deborah Bernstein, "Economic Growth and Female Labour: The Case of Israel", in Yael Azmon & Dafha N. Izraeli, eds., Women in Israel: Studies of Israeli Society, Volume VI (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993) 67 at 68-69. 148 Ann Phillips, "Must Feminist Give Up on Liberal Democracy?" (1992) 40 Political Studies 68 at 72.
190 Since women are incorporated in the private sphere, which is separated from the 'civil' sphere' their appearance cm the national arena is a novel phenomenon. If they are perceived as newly arrived on the public scene, as not really or naturally belonging there, mis gives rise to suspicion and doubt about their loyalty to the national cause.149
In other words, women could only truly prove their loyalty through the private sphere, by fulfilling their traditional roles in the family. They were seen, Brand adds, as "betraying the public cause if they [did] not fulfil their roles as wives and mothers".150 Being trapped within the private sphere, it was harder for women to fulfill other duties of citizenship.
These duties took place in the public sphere and were usually ranked higher on the 'scale of duties' in terms of making a contribution to society. This scenario is evident in the experience of Israeli women in relation to the duty of serving in the military.151 Military service is considered to be the most important citizenship institution in Israel: "the ultimate token of political obligation as well as the highest contribution to the enhancement of collective goals".152 Military service is the citizenship-certifying institution in Israel. It grants the 'entry ticket' to full Israeli citizenship and provides the strongest tie of citizenship between those who serve in the army and the Israeli collective.153 No other site of participation - education, politics (both in terms of voting and holding a representative position), the labour market, parenting or voluntary work - is equivalent to joining the defence force. Yet women, whose participation path is strongly attached to the feminine and
149 Hanita Brand, "Loyalty, Belonging and their Discontents: Women in the Public Sphere in Jewish and Palestinian Cultural Discourse" (2003) 9 Nasbim, A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues 84 at 94. 150 Ibid, at 95. 151 There is intensive writing about women in the Israeli army, which relates to the history of women's military participation, before and after Israel was founded, the dynamic of women within different units in the army, and negative phenomena that women faced in the military, such as sexual assaults and harassments. The discussion here, however, focuses only on the interaction between motherhood and military service in order to provide a better understanding of the different aspects of motherhood obligation in Israeli society. 152 Sara Helman, "From Soldiering and Motherhood to Citizenship: A Study of Four Israeli Peace Protest Movements" (1999) 6 Social Politics 292 at 298. 153 Berkovitch, "Women and Citizenship in Israel", supra note 103 at 306.
191 familial role, have limited access to military service. They do not participate in this institution as equals, They are either excluded or only partly included. On the one hand, women have the right as well as the duty to serve in the army. On the other hand, in light of their 'duty of motherhood' and traditional role as caregivers, soldering is considered to be secondary in women's lives and they are only partly included in military service. As discussed above, married women are not drafted since they are 'mothers in potential'.
Women who serve in the army are usually exempted from the reserves once they are married, pregnant or reach the age of twenty-four, to avoid interfering with family planning and childbirth. For the same reason, women are drafted for a shorter period of service, about two years compared to the three-year obligatory service for men.154 This, according to
Yuval-Davis, "reflects the basic nature of women's participation in the military, which, unlike men's, is only a temporary phase in their life, before marriage and motherhood".155 In other words, being assigned to adifferent mission in theproject of nation-building, women's access to the "ultimate expression of civic virtue" was limited.156 As Berkovitch writes,
"women's incorporation into the military is done is such a way that their role in the military does not significantly influence the roles they assume in society and are overshadowed by their roles as mothers".157
Even if women do take part in military service, their inclusion is marked by the images of femininity and their traditional roles in the private sphere. Women are usually excluded from the battlefield as combatants and from operational activities (although recently they
154 Women who serve in professional positions as officers do continue to serve after the obligatory period, but they constitute a very small portion of the standing army. See Nira Yuval-Davis, "Front and Rear: The Sexual Division of Labor in the Israeli Army" (1985) 11 Feminist Studies 649 at 661 [Yuval-Davis, "Front and Rear"], 155 Ibid, at 671. 156 Helman, supra note 152 at 298-299. 157 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 607. See also Moore, supra note 69 at 181-182.
192 were allowed to participate in limited combat-related tasks). The fighter's role is identified with the male, while women are segregated into supportive positions in the rear, where they serve in clerical positions, welfare duties and teaching.159 Most women fulfill secondary and passive jobs; they are helpmates who contribute to the national efforts through their traditional female characteristics.I60 Since their national mission - motherhood
- prevents them from taking an equal part in the military arena, women are marginalized to peripheral military occupations as well as to the margins of society. Their military service does not fully carry out the ultimate civic virtue in the Israeli society.161 Being segregated into secondary feminine military occupations, women are not given the real opportunity to gain full citizenship.162 Moreover, having less military experience may also affect women's integration in the labour market. Employers appreciate military background and many soldiers develop qualifications that are highly valued in the labour market. In that respect,
See the petition in HO 4541/94 Milterv. The Minister ofDefence,¥D 49(4) 94. For more about integrating women into combat positions see Da&a N. Izraeli, "Paradoxes of Women's Service in the Israeli Defense Forces", in Daniel Maman et al, eds., Military, State ami Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001) 203 at 209 [Izraeli, "Paradoxes"]; Barak-Erez, "The Feminist Battle for Citizenship", supra note 83 at 543. 159 Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction", supra note 73 at 102. Until recently, all women formally belonged to a separate corps named "Chen" which is the initials in Hebrew for women's corps but the word itself means charm. In practice, women were assigned to units outside this corps. For a details discussion about women's different jobs in the Israeli army, see Yuval-Davis, "Front and Rear", supra note 154 at 661-666; Yishai, supra note 142 at 196; Herzog, "Homefront and Battlefront", supra note 93 at 213. 160 When women demanded to be included within combat positions, the army's objection mainly rested on logistical reasoning. The army argued that once female pilots get married or become mothers, they will not complete their service. Thus, it was argued, it is not worth training them as pilots, given the cost and the length of this training. The army also argued that the uncertainty about the length of women's service, who might choose to become mothers during that time, may harm the operational ability of the army. These arguments show that placing women in short-term and non-combat roles reflected not only the assumption about their biological limitation, but also the assumption that sooner or later they would prioritize motherhood over a military career. For mere about the reasoning of the army see Shulamit Almog, "On Women, Army and Equality" (1996) 3 Mishpat Umimshal (Haifa Law & Government Journal) 631 (Hebrew); Izraeli. "Paradoxes", supra note 158 at 211-212; Barak-Erez, "The Feminist Battle for Citizenship", supra note 83 at 542. 161 Daphna Izraeli, "Gendering Military Service in the Israeli Defence Force" (1997) 12 Social Science Research 129 at 140; Francis Raday, "The Army - Feminism and Citizenship" (2000) 9 Plilim 185 at 196 (Hebrew) [Raday, "The Army - Feminism and Citizenship"]. 162 Berkovitch, "Motherhood as a National Mission", supra note 83 at 611; Oma Sasson-Levy, "Feminism and Military Gender Practices: Israeli Women Soldiers in 'Masculine' Roles" (2003) 73 Sociological Inquiry 440 at 459-460.
193 the military "is a source of recruitment for managers in business and industry, and a channel of political mobility-but primarily for men".163
Not only does women's attachment to the private sphere limit their access to other duties of citizenship, but it also undermines the value of the duty they fulfill in the private sphere.
Their contribution to the common good is negatively influenced by its attachment to the domestic practices that are undervalued in society. The duty of motherhood is therefore subordinate and inferior to other duties of citizenship. SaraHelman, in her research of peace protest movements, shows how a hierarchical structure of citizenship duties has been created in Israel, according to which motherhood is subordinated to soldering. This hierarchy was structured by differently incorporating women and men into different task-based groups that both reflect and perpetuate the unequal division of responsibilities in the private sphere.164 In other words, by allocating men and women to different duties of citizenship - duties that are differently valued in society - the Israeli society structured women as second-class citizens.
They did not enjoy full membership as their contribution was seen as secondary and of lower value to society, thus their contribution could not provide them with a substantive sense of belonging. Their differential model of contribution and belonging could not allow them to be included as equal citizens. Both the duty of motherhood and the duty of military service are therefore a conflicting project of belonging: they both are aimed to include women in citizenship but, in practice, exclude them from full membership in the collective.
Hanna Herzog, "Homefront and Battlefront", supra note 93 at 208 at 215; Raday, "The Army - Feminism and Citizenship", supra note 161 at 199-200. 164 Hehnan, supra note 152 at 294, 298.
194 II. Undervaluing Women *s Experience as Mothers
The strategy of recasting citizenship according to women's unique experiences is aimed, in theory, to acknowledge and incorporate their distinctive activities and concerns. The 'duties discourse' in Israel, as noted, indeed recognized that women have different ways to contribute to society. In practice, however, despite recognizing that women are 'different' and that this difference should be part of citizenship, the gender-differentiated structure of the 'duties discourse' did not fully respond to the ways women were affected by gendered structures that constituted them as 'different' and as mothers. Here lies one of the major limitations of the gender-differentiated model and its implementation in the area of motherhood: despite focusing on the special status of mothers and their contribution to society, not enough attention is given to gendered practices or structures that disadvantage women as mothers. In practice, women's unique practices as mothers and caregivers are rarely fully recognized and valued within the discourse of citizenship. As Lister notes, "it has proved very difficult to win recognition of the value of caring work in the construction of social citizenship rights".165 Indeed, the feminist literature intensively deals with the issue of care work. For many years, feminist scholars have argued that women's care work is not acknowledged in economic terms and does not serve as a basis for citizenship rights, thus perpetuating women's lower position within the family and limiting their ability to enter the public sphere.166 In her discussion of motherhood and citizenship, Carole Pateman shows how motherhood, although being a responsibility toward the state, is not understood as carrying with it an economic value and a basis for citizenship rights. She examines welfare policies in the UK which, in principle, recognized women's care work as a one "without
Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 95. See the discussion in Chapter VI near footnotes 10-15.
195 which the nation could not continue", but in practice recognized only paid employment or military service as making a 'real' contribution to society, thus providing mostly men with independent welfare benefits.168
Turning back to the Israeli context, the structure of citizenship in Israel, as discussed above, indeed incorporated women's practice of motherhood as abasis for inclusion. However, this process did not fully value the practice of motherhood and its contribution to society.
Women's reproductive role did not entitle them with any substantive economic subsidies or welfare benefits. Caregiving was understood to be women's 'natural' traditional role, which did not carry with it an economic value. It was not part of the economy and was not considered as 'work' for the purpose of social entitlements.169 As Ruth Halperin-Kaddari indicates, "Israel is no exception in its failure to consider housewives, stay-at-home mothers, and all the unpaid housework, child care, and other forms of care work for the computation of the gross national product".170 Not recognizing the economic value of caregiving perpetuated women's dependence on men and limited their route into the public sphere. It perpetuated the notion and practice of the 'family salary', earned by men, who had to provide for their wives and children, thus becoming the 'head' of the family.m Rather than challenging the underlying assumptions about women's care work and changing the disadvantaging norm, the 'duties discourse' helped maintain the deep-rooted gendered social constructions in the Israeli society. By ignoring and not recognizing the true value of
167 Pateman, supra note 13 at 22 (referring to the Beveridge Report), 168 Ibid, at 23. For a further discussion of not recognizing care work as a basis for citizenship rights, see Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 9 at 130-138,176-178. 169 Daphna Izraeli, "The Gendered World of Work", in Daphna Izraeli et ail, eds., Sex, Gender and Politics: Women in Israel (Tel Aviv. Hotsa'at ha--Kibuts ha-me'u-had, 1999) 167 at 181 [Israeli, "The Gendered World of Work"] (Hebrew); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel: A State of their Own (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) at 101-102, 124. 170 Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 169 at 113. 171 Moore, "No Longer Complacent?", supra note 69 at 176; Aloni, supra note 3 at 10.
196 care work, it failed to erode the gendered structures of family and work that took a central part in creating women's inferiority. It did not challenge the source of women's difference and the practices that structured women as 'different', as mothers and caregivers. The
'difference' itself remained, therefore, an inherent characteristic of women themselves, rather man being understood to be an outcome of gendered social constructions in society.
The Israeli case demonstrates another aspect and outcome of not recognizing the true value of women's care work. As discussed above, the practice of care was not a dominant element of the 'duties discourse'. It was not an explicit civic virtue. Childbearing was indeed celebrated and emphasized, both within the demographic threat discourse and the fertility discourse, as women's national duty. The process of nation-building took advantage of women's capacity to bear children but did not recognize the full meaning of being a mother.
It was mainly the biological element of motherhood - the capacity to bear children - that stood at the centre of constituting women's citizenship. In light of the demographic concern, women were asked to increase the birthrate, but childrearing was not understood to be a necessary part of women's route into citizenship or women's contribution to the collective.
Women were constituted, therefore, mostly in the role of a 'womb in the service of the nation'. Care work was assumed to be women's traditional role that would accompany their national mission, as an inherent element of their lives. There was no strong declaration that women indeed fulfilled their duty of citizenship through childrearing and other domestic activities, and even though care work was indirectly included in the 'duties discourse', there was no sincere public recognition of the contribution of care work as a duty of citizenship.
Care work was a very minor element of the 'duties discourse', if at all, although it was a very dominant element in many women's lives. In other words, care work was more a traditional role of women than a civic activity that constitutes a duty of citizenship. As
Daphna Izraeli explains, unlike military service, care work was considered to be an
197 obligation that women took upon themselves with their freewil l While military service was seen as a national duty that provided men with prestige, care work was taken for granted, despite its declared importance, and thus did not receive special recognition.172 This was a major disadvantage in the way women's citizenship was structured since in the early years of statehood, many women took upon themselves the role of caregivers, sometimes as a full- time occupation, as a result of their own 'maternal thinking' or the social structures of the
Israeli society. Nonetheless, this practice did not provide them with a stronger attachment to the Israeli collective. Not acknowledging care work as fulfilling a civic virtue left a big portion of women's lives outside the discourse of citizenship, thus blocking or limiting an important route for women to inclusion. Not being recognized as a strong civic virtue, care work could not offset other practices that were seen as citizenship duties, such as paid employment and military service. This structure helped constitute women as merely second- class citizens.
In sum, the process of constituting motherhood as a route to citizenship was not designed to benefit Israeli women. Constituting motherhood as a national duty was not made by women or for women, and it was not an outcome of any struggle to structure citizenship according to a gender-differentiated understanding. It was aimed to serve the nation. The nation needed women to win the demographic race and so motherhood became a tool for fulfilling a national goal. It was not recognized as a value of itself but mainly as a function aimed to benefit the common good. In other words, there was no recognition of motherhood as a value or practice separate from the national project. The gender-differentiated route to citizenship was not established in the Israeli case to recognize women's particularities but rather as a route that uses women's capacity to give birth as a means to achieve a Jewish majority. Constituting women's citizenship around national needs rather than a real
172 Izraeli, "The Gendered World of Work", supra note 169 at 170.
198 recognition of their different practices provides women with a weak attachment to society.
National projects are often temporary in nature and influenced by other national concerns; demographic concerns may vanish either because a significant Jewish majority is achieved or because other national needs take priority. In light ofth e possible temporary nature of the national project, women's belonging to society rests upon an unstable and unpredictable link. Once the demographic race is won, and without a real recognition of caregiving as part of citizenship, the institution of motherhood will lose its heroic national nature and will again be understood as merely women's traditional role in the private sphere.
Conclusions
This chapter demonstrated that the way citizenship duties were allocated and structured has negatively affected women's status within Israeli society. Because of the need to achieve a
Jewish majority in Palestine and later in Israel, Jewish women were called to participate in nation-building by increasing the birth rate and having more children. Motherhood was therefore women's civic duty and was a basis for inclusion in citizenship. It did not, however, provide women with full membership and was quite problematic. The institution of motherhood was not given a value of its own; it was attached to a national goal which might be temporary in nature. Women who could not or chose not to be mothers did not earn the title 'good citizen'. They found themselves at the margins of the collective. Women who did become mothers, however, enjoyed only partial citizenship because the institution of motherhood was considered to be inferior to other social institutions, like military service.
The role of motherhood also perpetuated women's lower position in the private sphere, and their responsibilities as mothers were undervalued.
Exploring the relation between motherhood and military service in Israel revealed how the barrier to women's full citizenship lies in the inter-relationship between the public and the
199 private spheres. Certainly, the duty of motherhood, under the gendered-differentiated model of citizenship, brought theprivate sphere into citizenship. In that sense, it had the potential to blur the boundaries between the public and private spheres, as both stood side by side under the citizenship umbrella However, in light of patriarchal structures in Israeli society, the duty of motherhood led in the opposite direction as it perpetuated the public/private dichotomy. This dichotomy created a hierarchy of duties, where the duty of motherhood was subordinated to other duties in society, such as soldering. In addition, the institution of motherhood was only partly valued and the attachment of women to the private sphere limited their access to other duties that were ranked higher in the 'hierarchy of duties'. In light of these limitations, women were incorporated into citizenship as second-class citizens rather than full members of the collective. Again, it is important to stress that the disadvantages of the duty of motherhood did not result entirely from the duty itself. Given that citizenship was built upon fulfilling duties, it was not so much about the existence of the duties but more about the way they were structured, allocated and implemented. Many of the limitations of the duty of motherhood, therefore, resulted not necessarily from the fact that women had to face this obligation, but from the way patriarchal structures in society affected and shaped the duty itself Despite all limitations imposed on it, the institution of motherhood still provided women with inclusion and was an important route to membership. It was one of the main paths that women were expected to take as members of the Israeli collective. The question, then, is how to reform the way motherhood is incorporated into citizenship to avoid the many limitations presented under the current model. I will come back to this question in the last chapter of the thesis when discussing how to incorporate the practice of care into citizenship. The following chapters turn from the institution of motherhood to address the duty to work and its implications for women in
Israel.
200 Chapter IV
Exempting Women from the Duty to Work during the Early Years
Part I: Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work A The Early Years of Pre-Statehood: The Foundations of Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work B. During Statehood: Reflection of Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work Part II: The Implications of Women's Exemption fromth e Duty to Work A. Lack of Membership and Belonging B. Lower Status in the Labour Market and Lack of Economic Power within the Family C. The Interaction between the Two Duties: Motherhood and Work
The discussion in the previous chapter showed how women's citizenship during the early years of statehood was constructed through the institution of motherhood. As part of a gender-differentiated model of civic-republican citizenship, women's main duty toward
Israeli society was to become mothers. Today, welfare reforms introduce women to another duty of citizenship - participation in the labour market. As discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, the duty to work is understood in two ways: the duty to be engaged in paid work and to be independent from society, and the duty to enhance national strength through a strong economy and effective security. Is this duty to work new to women? Did women have to cany this duty to ensure their membership and belonging? The Israeli literature dealing with women's labour participation, similar to the literature worldwide, does not address these questions within a 'duties discourse'. This literature focuses almost entirely on
201 the obstacles limiting women's entry into the labour market and the rights women should be given to guarantee their equal and fair involvement in it. Most examinations of women's struggle for workforce participation are delivered through the 'rights discourse' perspective.
My aim here, however, is different. I aim to examine women's work as part of the early
'duties discourse' in Israel. Looking at the interaction of women and the duty to work within
a 'duties discourse' is important to understand the implications of the gender-differentiated
structure of women's duties and citizenship in Israel. It also fits the current welfare discourse
and policies that emphasize the responsibility of the citizen to enter the labour market. In
addition, it allows us to better understand the relationship between motherhood and work as
duties. As the following discussion aims to demonstrate, Israeli women were not considered to be equal partners in the national duty to work and they were not expected, for the most part, to support themselves independently. This is not to suggest that women did not work or that their work did not contribute to the national project. Many of them worked and
significantly contributed to nation-building.1 The duty to work itself, however, was not fully
applied to women.
It is not a simple matter to reach this conclusion. Public policies regarding women and the
duty to work have always been ambivalent. On the one hand, the norm in Israel is for
women to be engaged in paid work and society's view of working women is largely a positive one. It is generally considered legitimate for a mother to choose joining the
workforce rather than being a full-time mother.2 We can also find public statements that
called on women to participate in nation-building and to share the burden of work. In her
1 For a documentation of women's increasing participation in the labour market, see Dafiia Izraeli, "Women in the World of Work", in Dafiia Izraeli et at, eds., The Double Bind, Women in Israel (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House Ltd., 1982) 113 at 119-123 [Izraeli, "Women in the World of Work"]; Vered Rraus, Secondary Breadwinners: Israeli Women in the Labor Force (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002); Yoram Ben-Porath & Reuben Gronau, "Jewish Mother Goes to Work: Trends in the Labor Force Participation of Women in Israel, 1955-1980" (1985) 3 Journal of Labor Economics S310. 2 Izraeli, "Women in the World of Work", supra note 1 at 116.
202 research about women in Israeli politics, Yael Yishai indicates that public figures
encouraged women "to contribute their due share to the country's economic development"
and that governmental committees emphasized the importance of women's work to the nation.3 On the other hand, as the discussion in mis chapter will suggest, these statements
were not translated into any real action and the common assumption was mat only men needed to carry out the national and personal duty (rather than practice) to work.
This chapter will elaborate on the history of work and women in the early years of statehood to provide some insight into the structure of women's citizenship and the implications of
their exemption from the duty to work. While the discussion in chapter II provided a
detailed account of the general historical development of the duty to work, the discussion here highlights the relation of women to this obligation of citizenship. It is impossible within
the scope of the thesis to conduct a deep and thorough inquiry into the experience of women
and the duty to work during the early years of statehood. The discussion in this chapter,
therefore, is by no means a comprehensive historical account that stands on its own. It rests
on existing historical research and literature and aims to draw a few conclusions that will
highlight the complexity of women's integration, or lack of integration, into the 'duties
discourse' in Israel. This overview and analysis serves as a background for the discussion in
chapter V that analyzes the impact of the current duty to work on women.
Yael Yishai, Between the Flag and the Banner: Women in Israeli Politics (New York: State University of NewYorkPress, 1999) at 152 {Yishai, Between the Flag and the Banner]. This ambivalence was well reflected in the agenda of the Women's Worker Movement during the early years of statehood. On one hand, this movement encouraged women's work as a means to strengthen the national economy and meet defence needs, but on the other hand, it made women's work secondary to their motherhood duty and argued that mothers of young children should not be compelled to work. See ibid, at 167-168.
203 Part I: Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work
Unlike the public treatments of motherhood and soldering, there is no specific legislation that refers to women's social obligation to work or that exempts mem from fulfilling this obligation. Therefore, we can only learn about women's exemption from the duty to work in an indirect way, that is, by observing that the state and society did not make much effort to pave the way for women to enter the labour market and that, in practice, many women stayed outside the labour market without suffering any significant social stigma I divide the following discussion into two parts. I will begin by addressing women's patterns of work during the period of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine).4 These were the years that set and structured the foundations of Israeli society. These were also the years when women's exemption from the duty to work was established. I will then move to discuss women's pattern of work during the early years of statehood, when women's exemption from the duty to work was maintained through legislation and public policies governing labour and unemployment, and women's actual patterns of participation in the labour market.
A. The Early Years of Pre-Statehood: The Foundations of Women's Exemption from me
Duty to Work
The foundations of women's exemption from the duty to work were established during the pre-statehood period. As we saw earlier, these were the years when labour was constituted as a national duty and a route to citizenship. Being a worker was a basis for belonging.
Women pioneers felt obligated to take part in the physical effort required to build the nation.
They came to Palestine willing to fully participate in its social life. They expected to be
4 This period began at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Zionist immigration to Palestine got underway, and lasted until the foundation of Israeli in 1948. See the discussion in Chapter II near footnotes 5-8.
204 workers outside the boundaries of the household and the family, just as men were.5 The assumption, however, among the population mat already lived in Palestine and the male pioneers themselves was that women were not supposed to, and by no means were not obliged to, work outside their homes and cany out manual labour. Jewish farmers justified their refusal to hire women by pointing to the danger Jewish women faced working alongside Arabs workers. These farmers also held negative attitudes towards these women who "behaved like men", associated with men, and looked for a job far away from the established settlements.6 In addition, many male pioneers adhered to the traditional division of labour between the sexes. They did not seriously consider women's attempts to change their perspective on this matter and did not judge women to be essential players in creating a new society in Israel. Thus, women's personal life was attached to the traditional structures of the family. They were first and foremost homemakers. The average age of marriage was relatively low, and many women pioneers were either already married by the time they
5 Before coming to Israel, most of these women belonged to the Zionist-socialist movement. Izraeli explains that among the Zionist organizations in Russia, the principle of equality between the sexes was taken for granted, and women were involved in various activities and given responsibilities in the preparation for the immigration to Palestine. As a result of this experience, female immigrants assumed and expected that they would receive equal standing in the new homeland and featthe y would share all national duties with men, one of which being the duty to work. See Dafha Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement in Palestine from its Beginning till 1927" (1984) 32 Cathedra 109 at 110-112 (Hebrew) [Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement"]. See also Deborah Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers in the Second Aliya: Hopes and Disappointments", in Mordecai Naor, ed., The Second Aliya, 1903-1914 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi, 1985) 145 at 146-147 (Hebrew) [Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers"}. The women pioneers who came from Iraq during the 1940s also had a similar experience. While in Iraq, they learned about the egalitarian life in the kibbutz, which fulfills the principle of equality between the sexes. These ideas were very new to these women who came from very patriarchal and traditional families. Thus, they came to Palestine ready to fully participate in any required work. See Esther Meir-Glizenstein, "Ethnic and Gender Identity of Iraqi Women Immigrants in the Kibbutz in the 1940s", in Margalit Shilo el al, eds., Jewish Women in the Yishuv and Zionism: A Gender Perspective (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press, 2001) 109 at 111-15. 6 Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 112-113; Deborah Bernstein, A Woman in the Land of Israel: The Aspiration for Equality during the Yishuv (Tel Aviv: Hotsaa'tHakibutsHame'uhad, 1987) at 22 (Hebrew) [Bernstein, A Woman in the Land of Israel].
205 arrived in Palestine or got married soon after immigration. It was assumed that married women would focus their efforts on household work and child-rearing activities.7
Women pioneers had to fight to participate in the traditional structures of labour, while usually facing an attitude of disregard and indifference toward their ambitions.8 Their demands were partly answered by the establishment of a new form of settlement called the kvutza, a group or a team that was a collective farmstead and a precursor to the kibbutz commune.9 After much struggle and pleading, women in these new settlements were given only kitchen and laundry duties, which were seen, at that time, as the main expression of women's labour participation.10 In her study of women pioneers, Izraeli explains the hierarchy between men and women in the new settlements. The pioneering ideology assigned secondary roles to women - cooking and laundry - and their contribution to nation- building was considered to be minor and indirect. Women did not receive full membership in the Kvutza. The assumption was that only men were the members, while the women were merely salaried employees for household chores. They were seen as 'friends' and 'sisters' who supported and provided for men, and not as equal participants or workers who fulfilled
7 Deborah Bernstein, The Struggle far Equality: Urban Women in Prestate Israeli Society (New York: Praeger. 1987) at 19 [Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality]. For more about the traditional division of labour in the family during the Yishuv time, see Deborah Bernstein, "Human Being or Housewife: The Status of Women in the Jewish Working Class Family in Palestine of fee 1920s and 1930s", in Deborah Bernstein, ed., Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State IsraelX Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 235 at 243-255 [Bernstein, "Human Being or Housewife"]. 8 Ada Fishman, The Female Workers Movement in the Land of Israel, 1904-1929 {Tel Aviv; Ha'Poel Ha'Tzair, 1929) at 6-9 (Hebrew). 9 Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 113. 10 Fishman, supra note 8 at 18. Izraeli explains that the ideology and social frameworks that were developed during the second Aliya, as well as the difficulties encountered in Palestine, contributed to the perpetuation of the segregation of women to the kitchen and laundry work. The assumption among many male pioneers was that women immigrated with them to the new homeland to provide them with household services. Others argued that agriculture work did not suit, and can even harm, women. Women were also excluded from training that was provided to the new pioneers by professional agronomists. Because women were assumed to be less productive in agriculture then men, they were not allowed to participate to avoid an economic deficit. See Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 114-115. See also Dafna Izraeli & Dvora Bernstein, "The Female Workers in the Second Aliya", in Israel Bartel et al, eds., The Second Aliya (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1997) 294 at 298 (Hebrew).
206 national goals" In time , women fought forth e establishment of learning farms, where they could become skilled at manual work. This opened the door to the negotiation of women's involvement in agricultural work.12 Women sought to prove that they had the same potential as men to do manual work so that they could be accepted as full members in working society.13 At the same time, their strategy was to develop new areas of agriculture that would better 'fit' women, such as dairy farming and vegetable gardening. Many women also saw child-rearing as their main responsibility.14
The same pattern occurred in cities and towns. Margalit Shilo researched women's work in the cities during the second^4%a {wave of immigration). She points to women's willingness to work not merely as a means to support their families but also as apart of nation-building.
Lzraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 115; Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers", supra note 5 at 150. Women were not included as members for the purpose of signing the yearly contracts with the Zionist organizations abroad. The settlements attached a list of members to these contracts, which served as the basis for calculating the yearly budget, but women's names were not included, as if they did not take part in developing the land. Ibid. See also Bernstein, A Woman in the Land of Israel, supra note 6 at 22; Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers", supra note 5 at 151. Another example regarding women's lack of membership can be found in the organization called Ha 'Shcmer (the Guard). This group moved around the country to provide protection for the new settlements. It included both men and women, however most of the women were denied the opportunity to work as a guard and they did not have equal membership in the group. In other words, they were excluded from fulfilling the main goal of the organization. One of the male guards explained that "the lives of our young women in the collective were hard... for generations we got used to viewing them as merely housewives and mothers... it was not easy for the female members to gain respect in our lives... theoretically, we were all equal in one collective, but the males were the members of "Ha'Shcmer" and they ... were left outside the association and were not considered to be official members" (my translation), lzraeli & Bernstein, supra note 10 at 302. Margalit Shilo also studied the image and identity of women in the guarding organization. She found that although a few women did take part as guards, they did so as an optional activity and not as a duty. Women's guard activities were not an integral part in the guard mission. The exclusion from the duty of being a guard led to them being excluded from knowing organizational secrets and attending organizational meetings. In fact, the women in this organization were the guards' wives. They accompanied their husbands and built their lives around their husbands' guard activities. Their role was to be mothers and housewives. This organization structure, in fact, helped to perpetrate the traditional model of women, rather than opening the way for structures leading to a more progressive and equal status. See Margalit Shilo, "The New Hebrew Woman" (2000) 34 Critique and Interpretation 7 at 8-10,12-3 (Hebrew) [Shilo, "The New Hebrew Woman"].
12 Fishman, supra note 8 at 18-28. See also Lilach Rosenberg, "The Religious Female-Workers' Farms in Palestine during the years 1925-1939" (1999) 90 Cathedra 87 (Hebrew); lzraeli & Bernstein, supra note 10 at 296-301; Bernstein, A Woman in the Land of Israel, supra note 6 at 24-25. 13 lzraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 119. Along with establishing these learning farms, working women were also organized themselves into separate associations to promote their ambition to share the duty of work. For more about this movement, its activities and accomplishments, see Bernstein, A Woman in the Land of Israel, supra note 6 at 24. 14 lzraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 120,122.
207 Women believed in being partners of the national revival project. They saw their work as a path for belonging and attachment to the national collective. For them, working outside their households was not only a means of attaining economic independence but also as making an important contribution to the process of nation-building. They saw labour as a precondition for putting down roots in the new society and for gaining a sense of belonging and partnership.15 Not surprisingly, however, these women faced limited employment opportunities and had to struggle for a place among the labour force.u Even during times of economic growth, when various job positions became available in cities, many women remained unemployed and faced employers who were unwilling to offer them a job.17 One area where this occurred was construction. After World War I, during the British Mandate and the third and fourth Aliya, much of the labour sector was involved in construction (in towns, as well as in the building of road and railroad infrastructure). Construction became the distinctive expression of pioneering. As in agriculture, women were not welcomed in this sector. Here too, they had to fight for their place in nation-building.18 Women asked to share in the manual work of building the land but faced a strong objection from employers and male workers. Eventually, after a long struggle, only a limited number of women were
In many of their writings, women expressed their vision of participating in the building of the new homeland and "merging into the national burden". Female teachers were especially the ones to view themselves as the educators of the future generations and the work of teaching (mainly teaching Hebrew) as the means to creating the new Jewish society. Margalit Shilo, "The Image of the Women in the Second Aliya: The Citizen" (2004) 6 Israel 83 at 89, 96-97 (Hebrew) [Shilo, "The Image of the Women'!. 16 Ibid, at 89. Women's efforts were indeed fruitful. Some of them, as Shilo describes, established new routes for women into the labour market. Many worked as kindergartens and schools teachers, doctors and social workers. Ibid, at 89-95. 17 Thus, as Bernstein indicates, "for women unemployment was not so much the result of economic factors, but derived rather fromprevailin g prejudices". Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 46. 18 Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 126-127.
208 integrated into the construction sector after proving their abilities to carry out physical work.19 A similar situation occurred in other sectors, such as light manufacturing.20
In many instances, women worked, contributed to the process of nation-building and provided, at least partly, for their economic needs during the years of pre-statehood. They did not, however, fully or equally share the duty to work. In the eyes of society, they had other primary roles as mothers and housewives, and when they worked, it was simply to satisfy their own needs and ambitions. Within iheKvutza, the symbol of the Zionist national project, women were not allowed to share the same duties with men. They were not defined as full-fledged members and were not allowed to take part in the internal process of decision-making. Their work, therefore, could not provide them with full membership.21
B. During Statehood: The Reflection of Women's Exemption from die Duty to Work
In the early years of statehood, many women took upon themselves the roles of mother and housewife, and those who worked outside the home usually had part-time jobs. They prioritized child-rearing and household activities.22 When women gradually joined the workforce in large numbers, it usually happened for two reasons: to raise the standard of
Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 32-34. One exception to this state of affairs is the life of women in Gdud Ha' Avodah (the "Labour Corps"), which were communes spread across the country. Bernstein explains that these groups provided more labour opportunities for women. Both men and women worked in the kitchen, as well as in the fields and roads; however, not in equal measure. The Gdud, according to Bernstein, "was the frameworktha t afforded women the fullest partnership. At the same time, most of the responsibility for the kitchen and other services still fell to them". Ibid, at 35-36. 20/6i^. at79-81. 21 Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, "From Revolution to Motherhood: The Case of Women in the Kibbutz, 1910- 1948", in Deborah S. Bernstein, ed., Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State Israel (Albany; State University of New York, 1992) 211 at 214 [Fogiel-Bijaoui, "From Revolution to Motherhood"]; Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers", supra note 5 at 150-151. 21 Oz Almog, "Pioneer, Sabra, Housewife, Yuppie: Changes in the Image of the Israeli Women and her Social Status" (2000) 34 Critique & Interpretation 20 at 24 (Hebrew); Yoram Ben-Porath & Reuben Gronau, "Jewish Mother Goes to Work: Trends in the Labor Force Participation of Women in Israel, 1955-1980" (1985) 3 Journal of Labor Economics 310.
209 living by taking a second salary, or to respond to the influence of feminist agendas which increased women's awareness of their equal right to enter the labour market24
Public policies in the 1950s, as Dafha Izraeli explains, were aimed at fulfilling national interests of settlement. To encourage new immigrants to settle down in rural parts of the country, governments put much effort into creating job opportunities in these areas. These jobs, however, were created first and foremost for men, who were considered the breadwinners. These were the men, therefore, who took part in fulfilling the national mission of settlement, through the labour market, while their wives accompanied them as housewives or secondary earners who worked for the benefit of the family unit rather than as part of a national mission.25 Other public policies indicate that even when women were encouraged to enter the labour market, and even when their work was seen as part of a national duty to build the economy, this work was still considered secondary to men's work and to other obligations at home. For example, during the 1960s, when the economy rapidly expanded and there was a lack of workers, the Government took active measures to encourage women to join the workforce. More daycare facilities were built and were subsidized for working mothers (where previously these benefits were directed almost exclusively to children in very poor and broken families). When unemployment increased again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these subsidies were cut, since, as Izraeli explains,
Frances Raday, "Women in the Israeli Law", in Dafha Izraeli et al, eds., The Double Bind, Women in Israel (Tel Aviv: HakibbuJz Hameucfaad Publishing House Ltd., 1982) 172 at 174 (Hebrew); Lesley Hazleton, Israel Women: The Reality behind the Myths (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977) at 30; Debora Bernstein, "Economic Growth and Female Labour: The Case of Israel", in Yael Azmon & Dafha N. Izraeli, eds., Women in Israel: Studies of Israeli Society, Volume VI (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993) 67 at 87. 24 Dafha Izraeli, "Women, Work, Family and Public Policy", in Arye Globerson et al, eds., Human Resources & Industrial Relations in Israel: New Horizons (Tel Aviv: Industrial Relations Research Association of Israel, 1990) 327 at 336-337 (Hebrew) [Izraeli, "Women, Work"]; Leora Bilsky, "Cultural Import: The Case of Feminism in Israel" (2001) 25 Tel Aviv Law Review 523 at 545-551 (Hebrew). 25 Izraeli, "Women, Work", ibid, at 335.
210 "there was no incentive to encourage the entrance of more women into the labour market".
In practice, as Izraeli notes, public policies reflected the national concern for the well-being of the family, which perpetuated the traditional model of the family and the assumption that women's main duty was to take care of the household.27
This is well reflected in the legal system, which was more concerned with protecting the institution of motherhood than with women's ability to participate in the labour market.
Shulamith Aloni, a former MP, explains that the Legislature paid attention to everything that related to fertility, motherhood and childcare, so that the 'daughters of Israel' would continue to have babies in large numbers, even if they chose a professional career. Less was done in the area of services that would encourage the housewife to enter the labour market.
Increased daycare facilities, longer school hours and meals at school, she argues, were introduced not out of a concern for women's work, but to support the poor population.28 In fact, the Legislature was much more concerned with providing women with the conditions to become mothers rather than the ability to participate in the labour market. If the goal was to encourage women to share the duty to work with men, one would expect extensive legislation aimed at promoting women's status within the labour market. However, a close look into labour and employment legal discourses in the early years of statehood reveals that the state was more concerned with protecting the institution of motherhood than guaranteeing women with access to the labour market. Legislation dealing with mothers' working conditions was much broader and extensive than the legislation providing women with equal rights or status in the labour market.
26 Ibid, at 335. Another example of this attitude presented itself during the Six-Day war when the economy was almost paralysed as men left their jobs and went to war. Women who asked to fill the jobs vacated by men but were told that their work was merely temporarily, until men returned from the front.Se e Bilsky, supra note 24 at 543. 27 Izraeli, "Women, Work", supra note 24 at 335-336. 28 Shulamith Aloni, Women as Persons (Jerusalem: Mabat, 1976) at 25. See also Hazelton, supra note 23 at 29; Dafha Izraeli, "Women in the World of Work", supra note 1 at 116.
211 In the early years, the Legislature enacted the 1954 Women's Employment Act. Despite the broad title of the Act, which implies that it relates to all women's issues in the workplace, the
Act focuses only on working mothers. The Act does not deal with problems of discrimination, unequal pay or sexual harassment. It provides a list of prohibitions and entitlements for the mother-to-be, the pregnant worker and the working mother. The first section of theylcr allows the Minister of Labour to prohibit or limit a woman's employment in certain jobs that might harm her health. Specific regulations were introduced, which apply to women in their fertile years (up to the age of 45). These regulations limit women's work in medical or educational institutions where they might be exposed to rubella. They also prohibit women from working in places were certain substances are produced (such as benzene, arsenic or chloride) or near very hot areas. It is important to note that the Act did not give women a choice; it assumed that women would prioritize their fertility over
employment considerations.30 The Act also addresses night work. It prohibits employers from refusing to hire women who are not willing to work at night (with certain exceptions) - if the refusal is based on familial considerations. Women can also refuse to work night shifts in a workplace that previously did not operate during the night.31 The Act allows women to miss work if they undergo fertility treatments and the absence from work is necessary for the treatments.32
29 SH 154,1954. 30 The first regulations on this matter were introduced in the 1979 Women's Employment (Prohibited Work and Limited Work) Regulations, KT 163. These were replaced later on with the 2001 Women's Employment (Prohibited Work, Limited Work and Dangerous Work) Regulations, KT 634. There are also regulations that limit women's employment in places where there is ionizing radiatioa See the 1979 Women's Employment (Work in Ionizing Radiation) Regulations, KT 690. 31 Sections 2 and 4 of the Act. Section 2 also allows the Minister ofLabour tointroduce regulations that set the conditions for women's night work, which are relevant for their health and which require employers to give notice to the Government of women that they employ on night shifts. 32 Section 7(cX2).
212 Employers are also prohibited from asking female employees who are five-monthspregnan t
or more to work overtime, night shifts and during rest days.33 After the birth of a child, the
Act also prohibits women's employment during their maternity leave, which lasts 12
weeks.34 In addition, it allows women to shorten their work day to easily manage breast
feeding,35 as well as allowing them to take time off without pay after the delivery.36
Furthermore, the Act prohibits employers from decreasing the working hours of a pregnant
employee. Finally, it prohibits employers from dismissing an employee receiving fertility
treatments, a pregnant employee or an employee on maternity leave - unless special
permission is given after the employer proves that the dismissal is not related to the
pregnancy or to the employee being a mother.37
The wide scope of the Women '$ Employment Act, which contains dozens of sections and
subsections, indicates that the focus of the Legislature at that time was on women's fertility.
This is particularly apparent if we compare this extensive Act with another employment law
that was enacted during these years - the 1964 Equal Pay Act,38 It was the first legislation to
deal with unequal treatment of women in the workplace. It included only 6 sections - one
substantive and the others procedural - and its scope was quite limited. It referred only to
men and women who performed the same jobs and did not include a definition of 'wage'
33 Section 10. 34 Section 6. 35 Section 7(cX3). 36 Section 7(4). 37 Section 9. It should be also noted that under the 1963 Compensation/or Dismissal Act, women were allowed to resign from their work within nine months of delivering a child in order to take care of the baby, and the resignation would not be seen as a dismissal for the purpose of receiving compensation. See section 7(1). This right was also given later to male employees under certain conditions. 38SH231.
213 that covered differences in benefits. Other employment laws that aimed to promote
women's employment status were not enacted until the late 1980s. The Equal Retirement
Age Act was enacted in 1987,40 followed by the 1988 Equal Opportunities in the Workplace
Act41 The Equal Pay Act was re-enacted in 1996 to widen its scope;42 and in 1998 the
Legislature introduced the Act for the Prevention of Sexual Harassment4* None of these
laws, however, is as wide and extensive as the Women's Employment Act.
In regard to welfare legislation, the 1980 Income Support Act44 provided mothers of young
children with income support benefits without the need to meet the employment test, thus
allowing them to choose full-time parenting. Mothers with a child up to fiveyear s of age or
with a few children with the youngest under the age of 10 were entitled to income support
benefits without the need to meet the employment test and to prove that they could not enter
the labour market.43 There was a clear assumption in this law that between motherhood and
employment, women should be provided with the opportunity to give priority to
motherhood, at least when their children were young. The welfare system also recognized
the status of "housewives" for women who did not work but received welfare benefits if
their spouses were insured (i.e., participating in the labour market). None of these
For more about the limited scope of the Equal Pay Act, see Frances Raday, "Women, Work and the Law", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 178 at 180; Ruth Ben-Israel, "Equal Pay: Illusion or Reality?1', in Anat Ma'or, ed.. Women in Israel (Israel: Sifriyat Po'alim, 1997) 14 (Hebrew). 40 SH 48,1987. 4iSH38, 1988. 42 SH 230,1996. 43 SH 1666,1998. 44 SH 30,1981. 45 Section 2(5). Later, this entitlement was also given to single-parent fathers.
214 employment and welfare laws encouraged women to take a foilan d equal part in the labour market. On the contrary, they were aimed at protecting women's role as mothers.46
All of these public policies and legal proceedings indicate that women were not obligated to work. They also clearly indicate that women did not share the duty to work. If they were viewed as carrying out the duty to work, we could expect to see public policies that truly provided women with the rights and conditions needed to participate in the labour market.
The fact is, however, that such policies were rare, narrow, and lacking in financial means for implementation.
Part II: The Implications of Women's Exemption from the Duty to Work
The discussion thus far has demonstrated that labour was not the element that attached women to the collective. Women fought for 'equality in duties', but in practice they did not achieve this goal. Despite the fact that Zionist ideology was based on the principle of equality between the sexes and despite pubic statements that called for both men and women to take part in the process of nation-building, women were not considered to be the ones to whom the duty to work related. On the contrary, women usually had to organize and struggle for the recognition of their right to fulfill national labour duties. When they worked, it was not because society expected them to carry out the national labour obligation, but rather work was seen as an outcome of their personal pioneering vision or economic need.
In other words, as Oz Almog notes, the Zionist woman was structured not as a worker but as
"a mother, a sister, a teacher or a lover who waits for her man to come back from the battlefield".47 Women were not obligated to share the national duty to build the nation, nor were they required to independently support themselves. Men's duty to work was aimed to
46 Hazleton, supra note 23 at 29. See also Bilsky, supra note 24 at 541-543. 47 Almog, supra note 22 at 23.
215 both build the land and support their women. Despite women's ambition and desire to
'conquest labour' together with men, the dream of establishing a society where men and women equally shared national burdens was not accomplished.48 What were the implications of this exemption for women's citizenship and status in Israeli society? The following sections address this question.
A. Lack of Membership and Belonging
Being exempted from the duty to work, Israeli women had one less route to full citizenship.
The practice of work, although providing economic independence and personal satisfaction, could not truly pave their way into mainstream society. Only men's belonging rested on carrying out the obligation to work. Again, this is not to say that women's path to full citizenship was blocked and that women were not allowed to work and take part in this form of contribution, but that this route to citizenship was not theirs in terms of them gaining full membership and recognition. No matter how hard they worked or how much they struggled for equality in fulfilling duties, women were not seen as full and equal members of the
Zionist project.
For women who did not work outside the home, as a matter of personal preference or due to social pressure to focus on their domestic responsibilities, the exemption from the duty to work was somewhat beneficial. Unlike women who did not fulfill the duty of motherhood, these women did not face stigmatization for not fulfilling a national duty and their societal
48 One can argue that the reason women did not face the "duty to work" was that they themselves paved their way into the labour market. Indeed, it is quite possible that if women had not struggled to participate in labour, at some point and in light of the growing need for working hands in the process of nation-building, women would have faced an obligation to work. In other words, one can argue that if women had not fought for sharing the national project, they would have eventually been required to do so. However, as reasonable and rational as this assumption is, the reality is that women's belonging to Israeli society, as structured by fulfilling national duties, did not depend on the requirement to work. Although women in practice worked, and surely contributed to the nation by taking part in the labour market, as a matter of social policy, women did not have to work.
216 belonging was not in danger, as long as they fulfilled their other duty and role: motherhood.
However, women's incorporation into citizenship through the institution of motherhood was not equal to the citizenship men gained through the labour market. As already discussed in the previous chapter, Israeli society did not highly value the tasks and responsibilities that women fulfilled in their households. Women's unpaid work as caregivers and homemakers
was less valued than men's paid work in the labour market. This is demonstrated by the lack of economic value given to women's work at home as well as the general attitude in society that undervalued care work, and perceived it as secondary to labour market participation.
Similar to the case of military service, considered earlier in the thesis, the responsibilities of
motherhood were ranked lower in the hierarchy of work than paid labour. Moreover,
fulfilling the duty to work through paid labour was given far higher status than motherhood
when one considers all the other household and caretaking activities that were not even fully
included or recognized under the practice of motherhood. Because labour market participation stood higher than motherhood and caregiving on the scale of citizenship duties,
women could gain less social attachment and 'sense of belonging' than men when fulfilling their personal duty of motherhood or other domestic activities. The duty of motherhood, therefore, could not offset the disadvantages of being exempted from the duty to work.
Motherhood itself, despite its national importance and status as a civic virtue, was not
considered to have a value equal to that of fulfilling the duty to work. Its contribution to the
national project was understood as a quantitative effort (increasing the Jewish majority)
rather than a qualitative one (building the nation).49
What about women who did work outside the home? How did the exemption from the duty
to work affect the status of women who participated in the labour market, or at least those
49 Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 108-109.
217 who tried to enter the labour market? As indicated previously, many women took part in the workforce. Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled argue that even if Israeli women worked and contributed to the national project, their contribution "did not impart to them, but only to men, the aura of republican virtue".50 In other words, even when women participated in nation-building, not because of a formal duty but as a matter of choice, this participation did not provide them with the same status as men. Why is that? The feminist literature dealing with women in the labour market does not provide a clear answer to this question. Feminist scholars in this area focus, for the most part, on the barriers women faced when trying to enter the labour market. Their underlining assumption is that once women enter the market
(whether on equal terms with men or as part of different arrangements particular to their needs), they improved their status and membership within society. This perspective focuses on providing women with equal or special rights as a key to obtaining economic independence, and obtaining social citizenship rights. However, in a society built upon the requirement to fulfill duties as a basis for citizenship, this literature is not very useful. It analyzes women's status within the 'rights discourse' and looks at what rights or opportunities women lack, and should be granted, to ensure full and equal citizenship. This literature does not understand work as a duty of citizenship and does not look at the outcomes of not fulfilling a duty that serves as a precondition to full membership. Even the feminist critique of civic-republicanism is not very useful here since its focus is, for the most part, on the duties women want or are supposed to fulfill, as well as how these duties need to be restructured in relation to women's unique particularities.51 It does not address the unique
Ibid, at 96. Fogiel-Bijaoui also points out that working women did not enjoy the same prestige as men and were not considered to conform to the true pioneering ideal. See Fogiel-Bijaoui, "From Revolution to Motherhood", supra note 21 at 215. 51 See, for example, Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) at 24-34. "This critique will be further discussed in the next chapter where I discuss the current duty to work in Israel, which, unlike the early duty to work, does apply to women.
218 circumstances, which the Israeli case presents, where a certain duty is differently allocated to groups in society and where women fulfill a duty that is not assigned to them.
What Israeli history reveals is that the process of allocating a certain duty of citizenship to
different groups in society creates a hierarchy - between those who are obligated and those
who are not - and carries with it assumptions about the abilities and qualities of one group in
comparison to the other. This process has the potential to perpetuate myths and biases
regarding the two groups in question and it may place one group above the other. When the
duty to work was allocated to men rather than women, it brought women's traditional
inferiority to men in the sphere of the labour market and into the 'duties discourse'. A
hierarchy was thus created between men who fulfilled a duty to work and women who chose
to participate in the labour market. Although many women worked and made a contribution
to the national effort, they were considered a reserve of labour and their work has always
been secondary in the market and to the national effort. They were seen as less productive
and efficient, thus their work did not receive as high a value on the scale ranking
contributions to the national project.52 Social alienation was therefore attached to the type of
work that women performed. Productive work could provide them with better social
attachment, but most women were eventually directed to service jobs that were considered
less productive and less prestigious.53 The work women carried out, therefore, did not pave
their way to citizenship, or, at best, it provided them with a social status mat was not as high
as that attained by men. In other words, even if they worked, women could not establish a
strong connection to society through the practice of labour. This was especially true during
52 Fogiel-Bijaoui, "From Revolution to Motherhood", supra note 21 at 215. 53 Abigail Paz-Yesha'yaho, "People and Especially Women in the Labour Corp" (2004) 5 Israel 151 at 159 (Hebrew). Even when women took part in manual and physical work, they were measured by the same parameters as men, based on the amount of work they performed. In light of their physical disadvantage, most women could process smaller quantities and they were seen as less productive and therefore enjoyed a lower standing within their groups. Ibid, at 160.
219 the pre-statehood years with respect to women pioneers in rural settlements who experienced a great deal of dissatisfaction and frustration, given their formal status as second-class members of society and the limitations placed on their participation in national duties.54
B. Lower Status in the Labour Market and Lack of Economic Power within the Family
On a more practical level, the exemption from the duty to work created or perpetuated other disadvantages for women both in the labour market and in the family. First, since the assumption was that women were not required to work and since men were supposed to be the ones to fulfill the duty to work, it was structured according to male standards. As noted previously, manual, physical work required certain capabilities and experience, which women usually lacked. In light of its gendered nature, women who wished to fulfill the duty to work and participate in the process of nation-building faced many obstacles. They had to organize and struggle for the opportunity to work outside the home, a fight that was only partially successful, as the majority of the population assumed that women could not or
should not work in construction or agriculture, or even outside the home.55 For mis reason, many female pioneers emphasized their similarity to men and tried to put aside their family responsibilities in order to gain access to the labour market and to share in nation-building.
Many felt the need to abandon their feminine characteristics to show that they were equal to men and thus entitled to equal rights and opportunities. This strategy was not very useful
since overall women were captured as being 'different' from men due to their traditional
54 Dafiia Izraeli, "The Women Workers' Movement: First Wave Feminism in Pre-State Israel", in Deborah S. Bernstein, e&, Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State Israel (Albany: State University of New York, 1992) 183 at 185 [Izraeli, "The Women Workers' Movement"]; Izraeli & Bernstein, supra note 10 at 302. Like Fogiel-Bijaoui above, Izraeli also explains that despite taking part in physical work, women did not enjoy the same status as male pioneers because their work was not considered to be as productive as men's work, especially given that most of their tasks fell under 'domestic service work' that was deemed to be less valuable to society. Ibid. 55 Shafir &. Peled, Being Israeli, supra note 49 at 96.
220 role as wives and mothers. This pattern of behaviour took place after the establishment of
Israel. As already mentioned, women's work was not a priority for the Government and its policymakers, and, as Izreali notes, "Government employment policy was directed at creating jobs primarily for men, not women".37 As a result, the exemption fromth e duty to work played an important role in building barriers that made it harder for women to enter the labour market, carry out the duty of work and gain equal citizenship with men.58
In addition, the exemption of women from the duty to work and its perceived masculine nature helped channel women into 'feminine' jobs in the labour market and perpetuated the gendered division of labour within the family. For the most part, women's participation in the workplace was concentrated in 'female' activities and most of them were excluded from manual productive labour, which was considered the most liberating type of work, which created the 'new Jew' in Israel. Most women found themselves, as noted above, in limited
'feminine' occupations such as teachers, nurses and welfare workers.59 Although many men supported the idea of 'the working woman', the traditional division of labour between the
Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 119. Women's efforts to blur their femininity were expressed in adopting male-style clothes, haircuts and behaviour. See also Billy Melman, "From the Margins to the History of the Yishuv. Gender and the Land of Israel (1890-1920)" (1997) 52 Zion 243 at 255-274 (Hebrew); Shilo, "The New Hebrew Woman", supra note 11 at 11. 57 Dafha Izraeli, "Women and Work: From Collective to Career", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 165 at 165-166 [Izraeli. "Women and Work"]. See also Dahlia Moore, "No Longer Complacent? Why Israeli Women did not Rebel" (1998) 28 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 169 at 176 ("... finding jobs for me was presented as of paramount importance... encouraging women to work was seen as much less importance, if not improper competition with men for limited resources..."). 58 For more about the masculine nature of the workplace in Israel, see Izraeli, "Women in the World of Work", supra note 1 at 118. Unemployment policies during pre-statehood also reflect the assumption that women would not necessarily be a past of the labour market. When employment opportunities were limited, it was argued that only one spouse in the household should work, to allow a more equal division of employment opportunities among families. The underlining assumption, as Bernstein explains, was that women would be the ones to give up paid work and would stay at home. See Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 137. 59 For women's segregation in female occupations during pre-statehood, see Shilo, "The Image of the Women", supra note 15 at 86-93; Izraeli & Bernstein, supra note 10 at 302. For similar patterns during the early years of statehood see Almog, supra note 22 at 24; Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 165; Dorit Padan-Eisenstark, "Are Israeli Women Really Equal? Trends and patterns of Israeli Women's Labor Force Participation: A Comparative Analysis" (1973) 35 Journal of Marriage and the Family 538 at 542-544; Frances Raday, "Feminist Legal Theory, Legislation and Litigation in Israel: A Retrospection", in Daphne Barak-Erez et at, eds., Studies in Law, Gender and Feminism (Jerusalem: Nevo, 2007) 19 at 21.
221 sexes was eventually accepted by the majority of the population, a division under which women did not have to work outside their households.60 As Bernstein writes, "it was with mixed feelings that [men] accepted working women in general, and in particular they opposed any breakthrough into the existing domain of men's work".61 The majority of the population accepted the traditional division of labour between the sexes under which women were not required to work outside the home to be part of the collective.62 Most women, it should be noted, did not reject the traditional division of labour within the domestic sphere but sought to broaden the range of duties and practices they could fulfill to allow them a more equal sharing of the national efforts.63 This, as explained earlier, was not achieved. For men, work was a central duty, alongside military service, and a precondition for full membership. For women this duty was secondary to their other domestic responsibilities.
In fact, it is interesting to see how women used the notions of 'sameness' and 'differences' to pave their route to citizenship during pre-statehood. One dominant line of argument, as noted above, was that women were similar to men in that they were capable of participating in masculine work and should be given the same duties and roles. They tried to prove that they were similar to men and sometimes adopted a 'manly appearance' by such activities as cutting their hair short and wearing pants instead of skirts. This strategy corresponds to the
60 See Fogiel-Bijaoui, "On the Way to Equality?", in Deborah S. Bernstein, ed., Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State Israel (Albany: State University of New York, 1992) 261 at 278 [Fogiel-Bijaoui, "On the Way to Equality?"]. 61 Bernstein, "Human Being or Housewife", supra note 7 at 249. 62 See Fogiel-Bijaoui, "On the Way to Equality?", supra note 60 at 278; Prima Lahav, "The Status of Women in Israel - Myth and Reality" (1974) 22 American Journal of Comparative Law 107 at 113. 63 Izraeli & Bernstein, supra note 10 at 294; Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 20. While struggling for participation in practices that were designated to men, women did not expect or demand that men would take part in domestic activities. Most of then accepted the fact that they were the main caregivers and those responsible for household activities. At the same time, they tried to minimize the place of these activities in their lives to show that they could take part in other duties and practices outside the homes. Their solution was to establish common/collective daycare facilities where all women share the burden of nurturing the children, thus providing more spare time to work outside the homes. See Izraeli, "The Zionist Women's Movement", supra note 5 at 122.
222 gender-neutral model of citizenship under which women enter citizenship on the same terms of men. At the same time, many women tried to structure the duty to work according to their unique needs and practices, reflecting the gender-differentiated understanding of citizenship.
Most female pioneers thought that there was a basic difference between men and women in terms of their nurturing nature and traditional role as wives and mothers. They did not argue, therefore, that they were completely similar to men or that men should participate in more
'feminine' activities. They claimed to be able to participate in the same duties as men, while maintaining the traditional division of labour within the family, thus taking upon themselves a double burden. Women did aspire to be identical to men, but rather emphasized full partnership.64 In practice, although women tried to fulfill the same duties and tried to structure them according to their own different needs and life experiences, the barriers in
Israeli society prevented them from carrying our the duty to work and gaining full and equal access to citizenship.
Since women were seen mainly as caregivers, they were usually employed in part-time and temporary jobs and their incomes were, by and large, low and insufficient for their needs. A significant gender wage gap was a prominent phenomenon both during pre-statehood and during the early years of statehood.65 This has naturally led women to have lower status within the family where they had to rely on the earning power of their husbands for economic security.66 At the same time, women who focused on being housewives and
64 Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers", supra note 5 at 150-151. 65 Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 3; Bernstein, A Woman in the Land of Israel, supra note 6 at 11; Bat-Sheva Margalit Shtern, "Drafting Female Workers to the Histadrut and their Forms of Organization" (2001) 14 Judaism at our Time 185 at 188-189; Lahav, supra note 62 at 112; Selma Koss Brandow, "Ideology, Myth and Reality: Sex Equality in Israel" (1980) 6 Sex Roles 403 at 405. 66 Brandow, supra note 65 at 405. Ursula Vogel analyzes the institutions of marriage and the family to show that these traditional structures set "barriers that {held] back women's claim to equal citizenship" because women's lower position within the family affects their participation in the public sphere as well as prevented them frombein g economically independent. See Ursula Vogel, "Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship", in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sega, 1994) 76 at 85-86. When speaking about women's economic dependence, it usually refers to dependence on men or on the state. In our discussion
223 homemakers were still part of society through their husbands who fulfilled the duty to work and earned a 'family salary' in the labour market. In feet, during pre-statehood, being workers' wives provided women with acknowledgment and actual membership in the
collective. Those women whose husbands were members of the Histadrut were given the
status of 'worker's wives' or 'comrades' wives'.67 Gaining this mediated membership through their husbands was still very problematic for women in light of the dependence
implied by it. Workers' wives did not have independent status or recognition for their own
accomplishments, and being a housewife or a secondary earner was ranked lower on the
scale of occupations or activities than those of men. Given that their domestic work was not
economically valued, women depended on their husbands for providing for their needs, and
that naturally increased the hierarchy within the family. The status of 'worker's wife',
therefore, perpetuated the traditional division of labour within the family and women's
inferiority within society.68
C. The Interaction between the Two Duties: Motherhood and Work
Much has been written, both in the Israeli literature and elsewhere, about the interaction
between the practices ofmotherhood and work. Women's participation in the labour market,
as discussed above, has always been partial and limited because of societal expectations and
here, since the analysis mainly refers to the period of time when the civic-republican discourse was dominant, that is, the first decades of statehood, the most common family model was that of two-parent household. Therefore, if women did not work or did not gain economic independence through the labour market, their source of economic support was the family - their husbands. The state became a source of support only later and mostly for unmarried women or women whose husbands were unemployed. 67 Bernstein, "Human Being or Housewife", supra note 7 at 244. 68 In response to their mediated membership through their working husbands, women formed the 'Associations of Mothers Working in their Homes', known also as the 'Associations of Working Mothers'. This organization aimed to help housewives to obtain an independent and direct membership in the Histadrut, thus providing mothers working in their homes with some contact with labour organizations. Despite acknowledging that mothers work hard in their households, the organization did not fight for such recognition and, as Bernstein notes, "did not attempt to deal with the roots of the problem of the woman at home... the only attempt to deal with the dependent status of the mothers was the prolonged campaign to obtain a separate membership card for her". Bernstein, The Struggle for Equality, supra note 7 at 143.
224 assumptions regarding their domestic responsibilities. As the previous discussions in this chapter showed, women' s traditional roles as wives and mothers negatively affected the jobs they were offered as well as their salaries and other employment benefits. Beyond this link between motherhood and work, it is interesting to look at how motherhood and work interact within the 'duties discourse', i.e., as duties of citizenship rather than merely as
socially constructed practices, and also to look at the relation between the practice of work
and the gender-differentiated model of citizenship.
Exempting women from the duty to work, rather than restructuring the duty to recognize
and accommodate women's unique experiences and locations, was a failure of the gender-
differentiated route of women into citizenship. For the gender-differentiated model to be
fully applied to Israeli society, the duty to work should have been applied to women and they should have been given the opportunity to participate in carrying out this duty, as they
indeed struggled to do, in a way that fitted their capabilities and domestic responsibilities.
Instead, the gender-differentiated model was applied only with respect to the practice of
motherhood, which was translated into a duty of citizenship and served, as discussed in the previous chapter, as a possible route to membership and belonging. A similar structure of a
'duties discourse' was not applied to the practice of work. Of course, the practices of work
and motherhood are not alike when one speaks of a gender-differentiated model of
citizenship duties. Applied to motherhood, this model incorporated a practice that is unique
to women (as they are the ones who bear children or the ones Israeli society structured as
caregivers) and structured it as a duty of citizenship. In other words, under the gender-
differentiated model, a new duty was created, which was particular to women. In other
words, a feminine practice was integrated into the 'duties discourse' that reflected women's
unique experience as mothers. In relation to the practice of work, applying the gendered-
differentiated model would have required one to take a duty that already existed in Israeli
225 society and to modify it according to women's abilities and needs. This would have allowed women to truly participate in the duty to work, thus providing them with a stronger attachment and sense of belonging to the Israeli collective. In practice, as the discussion has shown, this was not done, and the gender-diflferentiated model was only partially applied to the 'duties discourse' in Israel.69
It should be noted that die duly of motherhood and the exemption from the duty to work were not tied together. There was no 'exchange of duties'. The duty of motherhood was not understood to replace the duty to work. Historically, the exemption from the duty to work began during the 1920s and 1930s, along the early waves of immigration to Palestine and the gradual implementation of the Zionist project. The duty of motherhood, on the other hand, was introduced mainly during the early 1950s, the early years of statehood. Thus, chronologically, this was not a case of introducing women with a certain duty of citizenship while exempting them from another one. Furthermore, there were no public policies or discussions that linked the two duties together. The interaction between work and motherhood, as duties, was different than the interaction between military service and motherhood. As discussed in the previous chapter, the duty of motherhood was presented, among others, when the 1952 Military Service Act was introduced in the Parliament.
Women's exemption from equal and full military service was explained with reference to their other duty of citizenship: bearing and rearing the next generation. The relation between motherhood, as a duty of citizenship, and the exemption frommilitar y service was clear and
This is not to say, of course, that if the duly to work had been applied to women, they would have gained full citizenship like men. As we saw with women's experience of military service, a duty that was partially applied to them, serving in the army did not provide women with Ml citizenship, as their service was distinguished by their feminine 'differences' and limited by their responsibilities as caregivers. In a similar way, I speculate that even if the duty to work had been applied to women, they would have segregated in certain occupations that were undervalued in society and their contribution to the national effort would have been considered to be minor and less significant than their contribution as mothers.
226 sound. This was not the case with respect to the exemption from the duty to work. Public
policies or statements did not justify the exemption from the duty to work by pointing to
women's duty of motherhood. In other words, there was no direct interaction between the
two duties. It can be argued, however, that the exemption from the duty to work was an
indirect outcome of structuring motherhood as a duty of citizenship. As discussed earlier,
constituting motherhood as a national duty perpetuated traditional family structures and the
unequal division of labour between the sexes. The duty of motherhood contributed to
maintaining women's assumed roles of wives and mothers. These factors in turn served as justifications for exempting women from the duty to work and seeing their contribution as
secondary. In other words, while the duty of motherhood itself did not serve as the
justification for the exemption fromth e duty to work, it was the traditional role of women as
mothers and caregivers that excused women from carrying out this duty. For many women,
therefore, the exemption from the duty to work was a damaging by-product of the gender-
differentiated structure of citizenship itself.
In theory, placing the two duties side by side could have brought caregiving into the 'duties
discourse' in a much clearer way and highlighted the importance of the practice of
caregiving in comparison to paid work in the market. In other words, if these two duties
could truly be traded off- motherhood in exchange for work - this might have opened the
way for recognizing the true value of women's unpaid work in the home. However, in light
of traditional social structures and assumptions about women's roles in society, I speculate
that even a direct connection between the two duties of work and motherhood would not
have upgraded the practice of motherhood and caregiving. Looking back at the example of
military service, mothers and married women were exempted from the national duty to
70 See the discussions in Chapter HI near footnotes 151-164.
227 serve in the army because of their other duty - to become mothers. As the discussion in the previous chapter has shown, the exemption from the duty of military service was closely tied with the duty of motherhood; the exemption was justified by pointing to the risk of lowering the birthrate and the need to maintain a Jewish majority. In fact, the duty of motherhood itself was established and introduced in relation to discussions concerning the exemption of married women and mothers from the duty to serve in the military. There was a strong connection therefore between the two duties. And yet, in practice, placing motherhood and military service side by side did not provide women with strong citizenship status. As shown, the duty of motherhood was placed lower on the scale of duties than military service. The practice of caregiving and the assumptions about women's traditional roles as wives and mothers also served as a major barrier for women who did serve in the army. While serving in the army was a strong route to full membership, the duty of motherhood and the practice of childcare provided women with only limited and partial citizenship. It can be assumed mat a similar outcome would have resulted fromexchangin g the duty to work with the duty of motherhood, hi other words, even if the exemption from the duty to work was directly justified by fulfilling the duty of motherhood, and even if there was a real trade-off between these two duties, in light of the general lack of appreciation and recognition of caregiving in the Israeli society, it is highly likely that in the hierarchy of duties, the duty of motherhood would still be ranked lower than the duty to work in the hierarchy of work and women would not have reached full citizenship and belonging merely through the practice of caregiving.
228 Conclusions
Israeli women were not considered equal partners in the national duty to work and they were not expected, for the most part, to support themselves independently. There was a clear assumption among the population that women were not required to share in the duty to work and that between motherhood and work, women should be provided with the opportunity to give priority to motherhood. Being exempted from the duty to work, women had one less route to citizenship. Even if they worked, their work did not provide them with the same citizenship tie as men. Being exempted from the duty to work, Israeli women were left with the duty of motherhood as their main path to citizenship. The duty of motherhood was prioritized over the duty to work, which means that for women, being a 'good citizen' was not only being a mother but also being a 'good mother', a mother who valued her family responsibilities over career interests. The duty of motherhood, however, could not offset the disadvantages of being exempted fromth e duty to work. Motherhood, as explained, was not valued in economic terms, thus women had to rely on their husbands who fulfilled the duty to work. This differentiated allocation of duties, therefore, provided women with a limited or partial citizenship. It perpetuated gendered structures that narrowed women's citizenship in
Israel.
229 Chapter V
Women, Single Mothers and the Return of the Duty to Work
Part I: Single Mothers in Israel A. The Phenomenon of Single Motherhood B. The Difficulties of Being a Single Mother C. Single Mothers and the Welfare System D. Constituting Single Mothers' Citizenship through the 'Rights Discourse' and Their Role as Caregivers Part II: Back to the 'Duties Discourse': Establishing Women's Duty to Work Part HI: An Analysis of the Current Duty to Work A. The Gender-Neutral Model of Citizenship Duties B. Applying me Gender-Neutral Model to the Duty to Work 1. Changing Priorities 2. The Limitations of the Labour Market 3. Ignoring Care Part IV: The Implications of the Duty to Work on Women in Israel A. Poverty and Economic Dependence B. Promoting the Institution of Marriage C. The Undeserving'Others' D. 'Not Belonging': Women, Belonging and the Duty to Work in Israel
During the early years of statehood, as discussed in Charters III and TV, the 'duties discourse' in Israel reflected a gender-differentiated model of citizenship. Women's main route to membership and belonging was through the 'duty of motherhood'. This route allowed women to establish their national attachment without putting aside their unique experience as mothers. However, although acknowledging their contribution to the collective as mothers, the gender-differentiated route did not provide women with full citizenship. It did not fully
230 recognize the contribution of caregiving and limited women's ability to fulfill other dunes of citizenship, thus maintaining their inferior status in society. In addition, as discussed in
Chapter IV, the gender-differentiated route served as a justification for exempting women from the early duty to work. This exemption, on the one hand, allowed women to give priority to motherhood over work without necessarily losing their place in the collective, but, on the other hand, further perpetuated their lower status in Israeli society.
Over the years, as discussed in Chapter II, the 'duties discourse' in Israel has slowly faded away and has been replaced with a 'rights discourse' of citizenship. Israeli citizens' membership was understood more in terms of rights rather than in terms of duties. This process was applied to women as well as men. Motherhood, as noted in Chapter WL, was understood as a right rather than as a duty toward the collective. The relation of women to the practice of work, as discussed in Chapter IV, was also established through a 'rights discourse', as many laws and policies were adopted to provide and ensure women's rights and opportunities in the labour market. In recent years, as the discussion in Chapter II showed, citizenship in Israel once again is understood within a 'duties discourse'. The welfare state in Israel has been restructured to introduce all citizens with the duty to enter the labour market as a precondition to obtaining social rights. As women were previously exempted from the duty to work, this development is indeed a change for many women as it introduces not only new economic challenges but also a new route into the Israeli mainstream. Now women's relation to the practice of work is structured through a 'duties discourse'. Furthermore, this new structure of the 'duties discourse' departs fromth e past, as it is built upon a gender-neutral model of citizenship that applies one duty to all citizens in
Israel. Both men and women are now expected to enter the labour market and to earn a living.
231 Feminist literature, in Israel and around the world, has extensively discussed welfare reforms that have introduced the requirement for women to enter the labour market. For the most part, these discussions critique the new duty of citizenship within a 'rights discourse', i.e., they seek to understand the damage done to women in terms of their lack of rights. They emphasize women's inability to enter the labour market or to find a suitable job and also point to the denial of welfare rights and economic resources to women, which often results in poverty and economic dependency. I agree with this line of critique. The duty to work has indeed limited women's rights, autonomy and independence, and I therefore believe that a critique from within a 'rights discourse' is certainly a valid and fair one. The dominance of this approach among feminist scholars can also be easily explained: being part of liberal societies and a liberal discourse of citizenship, one can understand why scholars tend to articulate the limits of the duty to work in terms of rights, autonomy and independence. My own critique, however, is aimed at exploring the destructive implications of the duty to work within a 'duties discourse' of citizenship. As I argued in the first chapter of the thesis, the duty to work is not merely a requirement that citizens become economically independent and that they work as a precondition for welfare rights. It is a requirement mat citizens contribute to society and that they work in the labour market as a precondition for gaining a sense of belonging and attachment to society. The duty to work, as I argued, is a 'political project of belonging'. Those who do not fulfill the duty to work are sanctioned not only in terms of fewer welfare rights and being dependent on public funding (the 'rights discourse') but also in terms of not being part of the mainstream and having less social ties to their nation or society (the 'duties discourse').1
1 For more about the distinction between the 'rights discourse' and the 'duties discourse', see the discussion in the Introduction, near footnote 8.
232 This chapter exploreshowthe duty to work, understood both within the 'rights discourse' and the 'duties discourse', affects women's citizenship in Israel. My argument in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that although the duty to work has the potential to improve women's citizenship, in practice, it is structured in a way that limits women's ability to carry it out.
Built upon a gender-neutral model of citizenship, the new 'duties discourse' does not acknowledge care as a form of work and does not acknowledge women's difficulties in entering the labour market and finding a paid job that provides for all of their economic needs. Second, I argue that the new 'duties discourse' results not only in economic dependency and poverty, but also in a limited ability to contribute to the common good, and to establish a strong sense of belonging. Out of all women, single mothers are the most likely to face these unique difficulties and consequences. Being a distinctive group out of the total population of women, this chapter pays special attention to the impacts of the new citizenship model on single mothers.2
The discussion in this chapter is structured in four parte. The firstpar t generally reviews the phenomenon of single motherhood in Israel to provide a background for the discussion that follows in the chapter. I address general information about single mothers, the difficulties they face in their everyday lives, and how the welfare system supported them in the past and constituted their citizenship as caregivers. The second part reviews the changes in the Israeli welfare system mat established women's duty to work. The third part turns to explore how the duty towork , under a gender-neutral model of citizenship, is structured around masculine ideals, norms and practices that limit the ability of women to carry this duty out. I begin this
2 Of course, single mothers are not the only group in society to suffer from recent welfare reform. Both in Israel and in other countries around the world, other disadvantaged groups, such as people from certain ethnic background, the elderly and children are likely to face increased difficulties . For a further discussion on how these groups cope with recent welfare reforms, see Moria Avnimelech, "Security and Welfare", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) at 45 (Hebrew); Aziz Hider, "The Effects of the Economic Plan on the Arab Sector", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon a/Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) at 57 (Hebrew).
233 part by generally addressing the weaknesses of the gender-neutral model of citizenship duties.
I then apply this analysis to the duty to work in Israel in order to point at three possible limitations: the new structure of the 'duties discourse' undermines the importance and contribution of motherhood and care as practices of citizenship; it forceswome n to enter the unfriendly sphere of the labour market that does not necessarily provide them with sufficient economic resources; and it ignores women's unpaid work in the domestic sphere that makes it difficult for them to join the workforce. In the fourth part, I examine how women's potential inability to fulfill the duty to work may impact their citizenship. The fourthpar t also focuses on four possible consequences. Three of them have been commonly discussed in the literature: perpetuating poverty and economic dependency, promoting the institutions of marriage and the two-parent family, and stigmatizing women as the 'undeserving poor'. The fourth consequence concerns the way the duty to work affects women's belonging in Israel.
Here I develop my critique from within the 'duties discourse' and argue that, when women do not fulfill a citizenship duty (in this case the duty to work), they do not take part in the new civic virtue (recovering the Israeli economy), which then may result in losing their attachment and belonging to the Israeli collective.
Part I: Single Mothers in Israel
Single motherhood in Israel became a public concern and the center of public discourse twice in the last few decades. The first time was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the number of single mothers dramatically grew and their economic difficulties became evident to the public. In response, the Parliament enacted the 1992 Single-Parent Families Act
(SPFA)3 to provide these families with social benefits aimed at helping them cope with financial difficulties. The second time single mothers received public attention was when
3 The 1992 Single-Parent Families Act, S.H. 147.
234 the recent welfare reform was introduced. The cuts in the welfare system had an enormous effect on single mothers who protested against the reform, making their welfare needs known in public debates around the country.4 The following discussion begins with general data about single mothers in Israel. Then it briefly addresses the difficulties single mothers face in their everyday lives and the response of the welfare system to these difficulties.
A. The Phenomenon of Single Motherhood in Israel
A single-parent family, according to the Israeli law, is a family in which a single parent runs an independent household for himself or herself and his or her children (up to the age of 18 years) without having a permanent partner.5 The law refers to certain circumstances of single parenthood: (1) men and women who live separately from their partners for a period of at least two years and have applied for a divorce during that time frame; (2) women who are considered 'Agunof (women whose husbands are missing for at least two years, including women whose their husbands live abroad without the consent of their wives and who do not financially support their wives in that period of time); (3) women who live separately from their husbands and who have stayed in a shelter for abused
4 It should be noted that there is almost no legal academic literature dealing with single mothers in Israel. Most writing is either sociological academic literature or position papers produced by NGOs and research institutions. The media is another source of data on this topic, as well as the MPs reports. Information can also be found on the websites of governmental offices or social organizations. Even these resources are very much limited in the information they provide, and many issues and questions relating to single mothers have not been given proper attention. This lack of data (especially updated data) makes it difficult to answer all questions on single mothers or to support many assumptions or claims regarding their lives. However, despite this limitation, the available information is sufficient to provide the necessary background for the following discussion. 5 In the original version of the SPFA, as was adopted in 1992, the term 'single parent' was defined as an unmarried Israeli resident who has no permanent partner and is a parent of a child aged below 18 years who is living with him or her. Based on this definition, three groups of people could be classed as a single parent: never married persons, divorcees and widows. This provision excluded women who had separated fromthei r husbands but had not yet been formally divorced. Since divorce proceedings are long and complex, these women were subject to economic instability since often no division of property is conducted until the divorce is final. See Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel: A State of their Own {Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) at 104-105.
235 women and applied for a divorce. In addition, the SPFA recognizes immigrants who are single parents who have lived in Israel more than a year but less than two years and where their spouse did not immigrate with them to Israel and they do not have another partner.7
As in many countries around the world, most single parents in Israel are women. The number of single-parent families in Israel, especially single mothers, has been on the rise over the past 30 years. In 1985, families headed by single mothers were about five percent of the total number of families in Israel, and by 2005 they were about 12 percent of all families.9 The increase in the number of single mothers in Israel can be attributed to several factors. The first one is the overall improved economic standing of women in Israeli society. Women's participation in the labour market has dramatically increased over the years. The gendered earning gap has narrowed and women have been able to enter male- dominated occupations that are generally characterized by high salaries and good working conditions.10 As many women no longer need the institution of marriage as a source of economic support, more women are choosing to get divorced and more choose not to
6 SPFA, supra note 3, section 1 (2). Halperin-Kaddari explains that even this definition, although broader than the original definition, still excludes many women. For example, women whose husbands or spouses are in jail cannot financiallysuppor t their families, as well as women whose spouses have deserted them. Furthermore, the definition of Agunot is narrower under the SPFA than the Jewish definition that refers to women whose husbands refuse to give them a divorce. In such a situation, they cannot marry another man and are left without financial resources. The definition of Agunot under the SPFA therefore leaves many women without the protection given to other single mothers. See Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 105. 7 SPFA, section 1(3). 8 In 2006, 91 percent of single parents were women See Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2007, table 5.12; Central Bureau of Statistics, Toward "Family Day": Data regarding Families and Households in Israel, Press Release (February 8, 2005) (Hebrew) [Central Bureau of Statistics, Toward "Family Day"] Online at: http:/Avww.Central Bureau ofStatistics.pov.il/hodaot2005/01 05 26.htm (Last visited: June 15,2008). According to the New Family Organization, 85 percent of single parents in Israel are Jewish. See New Family Organization, The 2007 Family Report, online at: http://newfamilv.org.il/pagel69.htmr7amp (Last visited: June 15, 2008) (Hebrew) [New Family Organization, The 2007Family Report}. 9 Central Bureau of Statistics, Family Day - Families and Households in Israel, 2005 (February 13, 2007) (Hebrew) [Central Bureau of Statistics, Family Day 2005]. 10 Shlomo Swriski et at, "Single Mothers in Israel" (2002) 12 Information on Equality Journal at 1-2; Rachel Pasternak, The One Parent Family in Israel: Its Influence on Children's Education (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim Publishing House Ltd., 1989) at 13 and 24-25 (Hebrew).
236 remany.11 Indeed, while thirty years ago, most single mothers in Israel were widows, today, most of them are divorcees.12 Women's ability to financially support themselves has also enabled them to become mothers without turning to marriage at all.13 Another factor that explains the rise in the number of single mothers is the immigration of single-parent families from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union.14 Statistics show that during the
1990s, when more than one million people moved to Israel from these countries, the approximate number of single-parent families multiplied from 5 percent to 10 percent of all families in Israel.15 A research published in 1991 regarding Ethiopian immigration into
Israel indicates that about a third of the Ethiopian households were run by single mothers, roughly four time higher than the rate of all single-parent families among the non immigrant society in Israel.16 Regarding single-parent families from the former Soviet
Union, nearly 13 percent of the immigrants were single parents. This demographic difference was a result of higher rates of divorce and a more rapid decline in the rate of
11 The approximate number of divorces in Israel increased from 2,150 in 1955 to 11.030 in 2005. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2007, table 3.1. For more about the patterns of divorce in Israel, see Ruth Katz & Johanan Perez, "Trends of Divorce in Israel and their Implications on Family Therapy" (1996) 17 Society and Welfare 483. 12 In 2005, about 60 percent of single parents were divorced, 15 percent separated, 13 percent never-married and 12 percent widowed. See Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release, International Women's Day, March 7, 2007 (Hebrew) [Central Bureau of Statistics, International Women's Day]; New Family Organization, The 2007 Family Report, supra note 8. 13 The statistics in Israel show a clear increase in the number of never-married Jewish women who gave birth; these range from an annual average of 1609 live births during the years 1990-1999, to 3,349 live births to never- married Jewish women in 2006. Pasternak, supra note 12 at 31. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2007, table 3.16. See also Central Bureau of Statistics, Family Day 2005, supra note 9 New Family Organization, The 2007 Family Report, supra note 8. John Gal, Social Security in Israel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2004) at 107-108 (Hebrew). 15 Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 2. In total, the new immigrants raised the number of single-parent families in Israel by approximately 14 percent. IWN, "Single Mothers", in Women in Israel - Information, Data and Commentary (Jerusalem: IWN, 1995) at 1 (Hebrew) pwN, "Single Mothers"]. 16 Shalva Weil, One-Parent Families among Ethiopian Jews in Israel (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1991) at 23 (Hebrew); Central Bureau of Statistics, Family Day 2005, supra note 9 This high rate of single parenthood is the result of higher incidences of divorce, widowhood and abandonment of women by their partners in the Jewish communities in Ethiopia. Additionally, many Ethiopian women were separated from their husbands and many were widowed due to the risky journey from Ethiopia to Israel. Ibid, at 7; Katz & Perez, supra note 11 at 497.
237 marriage. It should be noted, however, that despite the increased number of single mothers in Israel, their percentage in the Israeli population is still lower than in families in other western countries. This is because the traditional model of the family institution is still very central in the Israeli society and is considered to be the conventional pattern of family relations. Furthermore, since Israeli society is relatively young, any social phenomenon usually emerges and develops later then it does in other western societies.18
B. The Difficulties of Being a Single Mother
As in many societies, single mothers in Israel face unique difficulties.19 Two Israeli researchers published a study in 1986 that examines social and personal elements in single mothers' lives.20 They found that single mothers' well-being was lower than that of women in dual-parent families. According to this research, single mothers suffered more exhaustion and frustration, poorer health, loneliness and anxiety. These symptoms resulted from a lack of intimate and sexual relations, in addition to the stress of being solely responsible for their children and households. While in dual-parent families, the duties of caring and financially supporting family members are shared, to some extent, by both parents, single mothers carry a heavy burden in fulfilling all family duties. Many work long
Guedalia Naveh, The Absorption of Single-Parent Immigrant Families from the Former Soviet Union (Jerusalem: JDC - Brookdale Institute, 1994) at 1-3 (Hebrew). 18 For a comparison between Israel and other countries with respect to the incidence of single motherhood, see the data in Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 2; DaMa Gordon & Tamar Aliav, Single-Parent Families (Jerusalem: NIL 1992), at 2 (Hebrew) {Gordon & Aliav, Single-Parent Families]-, Mimi Eizenshtat & John Gal, Gender in the Israeli Welfare State (Jerusalem: The Center for the Research of Social Policy in Israel, 2001) at 18-19 (Hebrew). For a general discussion of the phenomenon of single motherhood around the world, see Martina Klett-Davies, Going it Alone? Lone Motherhood in Late Modernity (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) 11-30; Rosanna Hertz, Single by Chance, Mothers by Choice: How Women are Choosing Parenthood Without Marriage and Creating the New American Family (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 3-157. 19 The discussion here only briefly addresses these difficulties, and the discussion below will provide more details when addressing the current duty to work. 20 Ruth Katz & Niza Bender, Single-Parent Mothers: Support Systems and Personal Welfare (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institution to Israeli Study, 1986) (Hebrew).
238 hours and thus do not have sufficient time for their own needs, as well as having less time to devote to their children.21
Many single mothers also race the societal stigma of being considered 'deviants' and abnormal. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter HI of the thesis, the institution of motherhood is of central importance in Israel. Israeli society actively pushes women to become mothers and childlessness is disapproved of, even for women who are not married. Unmarried women can achieve a certain degree of societal legitimization by becoming mothers.22 At the same time, single-parent families are still considered, to some extent, 'broken families'.
Single mothers often face the antagonism of society toward their marital or family status - having a child but no spouse - especially when they are unemployed and supported by the state. They are condemned due to their choice of having or raising a child without a father figure. In addition, single mothers do not enjoy full privacy in their daily lives and experience more state intervention than married mothers.23 Although data shows that only a small percentage of single mothers define themselves as 'single by choice',24 most people usually ignore these nuances and instead resort to stereotypes and biases. Indeed, as moral values slowly changed over time, the Israeli society has become more accepting of the phenomenon of single motherhood during the 1980s and people acknowledged the
Ibid, at 4-5,19-21,46-47. For more about the low self-esteem of single mothers in Israel, see Shulamit Albek & Eti Bar, "Non-Married Mothers out of Choice" (1993) 14 Society and Welfere 67 at 72-77 (Hebrew). For a general discussion of the stress and emotional difficulties single mothers face, see John Caimey et al, "Stress, Social Support and Depression in Single and Married Mothers" (2003) 38 Social Psychiatry and Psychiatry Epidemiology 442; Ruth Sidel, Unstmg Heroines: Single Mothers and the American Dream (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) at 60-79. 22 See the discussion in Chapter HI near footnotes 69-70. 23 In her research about the way Israeli law creates and maintains certain boundaries around the institution of the family, Ayelet Blacher-Prigat demonstrates the underlining assumption in Israeli case-laws that the break-down of the traditional structure of the family weakens the rights of single parents to privacy and autonomy. She argues that the boundaries around the single-parent family are weaker than those around the two-parent family, thus single parents are subjected to external intervention that affects their decisions about private matters. See Ayelet Blacher-Prigat, "Rights, Boundaries and Family" (2003) 27 Tel Aviv Law Review 539 at 563-565 (Hebrew). 24 The Israel Women's Network, We Keep Rwming, But are We Getting Somewhere Else? Israeli Women in 2005, A report submitted to the Beijing +10 conference (March 2005) at 8 [IWN, We Keep Running].
239 difficulties that single mothers' face on a daily basis. However, during the second half of
1990s, this sympathy began to vanish as unemployment increased and economic growth slowed. Unemployed single mothers found themselves again under public attack and were frequently viewed as being unproductive, undeserving, and a burden on society.25
Single mothers also usually face economic difficulties. These difficulties largely stem from three related factors: they are women, mothers and single. Taken together, these factors increase the chances that families headed by single mothers, even if the mothers are employed, will have lower income and fewer resources than families headed by single fathers, and especially lower income and fewer resources than families that have two working parents.26 For many single mothers in Israel, it was not easy to join the workforce.
Unemployment rates have always been higher among single mothers than among society as a whole.27 Most single mothers in Israel, however, participate in the labour market,28 but many still find it very difficult to earn sufficient income. In light of women's overall inferior status in the labour market, which is reflected in low salaries and poor working conditions, single-parent families headed by women can expect to have lower incomes than
This attitude has become more intense in recent years, as will be discussed below. For a discussion of the shift from positive to negative attitudes toward single mothers over the past two decades, see Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 12-13. Regarding society's negative attitude toward never-married mothers, see Albek & Bar, supra note 21 at 69-70. 26 Economic difficulties are even more frequent among single mothers who are new immigrants. According to Naveh, only 25 percent of these mothers were employed in 1992. For those over 40 years old, the employment rate was 15 percent. The main reasons for these low rates of employment are a lack of skills and working experience in Israel, and language difficulties. See Naveh, supra note 17 at 5-7. 27 Data shows that the unemployment rate among single mothers is higher in comparison to the total employable population of Israel. In 2003, 15 percent of all single mothers were unemployed, while the overall unemployment rate in that year was about 10.8 percent. See Efrat Kaol-Granot, "Single-Parent Families", Background Paper submitted to the Committee for the Advancement of Woman's Status (May 2004) at 8 (Hebrew). Furthermore, the unemployment rate is higher among single mothers than married mothers. See Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 25. 28 In 2000, for example, among non-immigrant Jewish single mothers, 77.4 percent of unmarried mothers participated in the labour force, as did 79.8 percent of widows and 80.4 percent of divorcees. Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 21. According to the New Family Organization, the employment rate among single mothers is, in fact, almost the same as among married women. See New Family Organization, The 2007Family Report, supra note 8 The Central Bureau of Statistics presents similar data: in 2005,88.1 percent of single mothers were employed, compared to 93.1 percent of married mothers. See Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release, International Women's Day, supra note 12.
240 dual-parent families or single-parent families headed by men. In fact, data regarding the level of income in the year 2005 shows that although single mothers and married mothers worked almost the same amount of weekly hours, the monthly income of single mothers was about 20 percent lower.29 Having to fulfill all household and child-rearing responsibilities by themselves and without the help or support of a partner, many single mothers cannot find full-time jobs or a career that includes substantive economic benefits.30
Due to the difficulty of carrying all the responsibility for caregiving and other household activities, many single mothers turn to part-time jobs or jobs that offer flexible hours, jobs that cannot provide a sufficient income and guarantee a reasonable standard of living.31 The cost of childcare has always been relatively high and thus frequently takes up a large portion of the income earned by single mothers in the labour market, especially if they work part-time. Thus daycare expenses reduce the financialreturn s from having a paid job and absorb resources needed for financing other household activities.32 In addition, many single mothers lack the needed skills and experience to join the labour market, especially in jobs that can provide them with the income support they need. Some single mothers do not have the basic educational background or the background needed for specific jobs, since they became mothers at a very young age and did not have the chance to expand their knowledge. Other single mothers can develop their human capital but, after a long absence
29 Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release, International Women's Day, supra note 12. See also Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 4 ("There is every likelihood that a family that has only one parent, working or not, will have a lower income than a family that has two working parents. This is particularly true for solo parent families headed by women, because, on average, womerfs salaries are lower than men's"). 30 Eizenshtat & Gal, supra note 18 at 19. 31 In 2003, for example, 46 percent of all single mothers worked in part-time jobs. Central Bureau of Statistics, Toward Family Day 2005, supra note 8. 32 Gordon & Aliav, Single-Parent Families, supra note 18 at 3. Moreover, there are not enough daycare centres to offer services to all interested mothers and only 30 to 40 percent of all working mothers can place their children in these centres (single mothers are indeed given preference over other mothers but the reality is that in many cities and towns, the childcare system is not adequate and cannot offer services all single mothers). Furthermore, the operating hours of the centres are limited and made it difficult for many women to keep full- time jobs and work in sectors that require longer working hours. For single mothers, whose main challenge is the balance of childrearing with paid work, these limitations pose a major obstacle to joining the labour market. See Gal, supra note 14 at 112.
241 from the workforce staying at home with their children, they find it extremely hard to re enter the labour market.33 When it comes to divorced, separated or widowed mothers, many have found themselves, after long years of marriage, without the necessary skills to participate in the labour market.34
C. Single Mothers and the Israeli Welfare System
Given the difficulties in providing their families with sufficient economic resources, many single mothers have no choice but to turn to the welfare system for financial relief hi the past, a few welfare benefits were given to single mothers who were widowed but not to divorced, separated or never-married single mothers. Widows were entitled to an increased rate of income support benefits and the possibility of participating in vocational rehabilitation programs provided by the MI.33 Over the years, as the rate single mothers increased, the Israeli legislature and ministries have adopted several tools to help single
Moria Avnimelech & Yosi Tamir, The Economy and Politics of the Welfare in Israel (Tel Aviv: Kibutz- Poalim, 2002) at 68 (Hebrew). Regarding the level of education among single mothers, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2006,17 percent of all single parents did not finished high school, while 42 percent had a high-school diploma and 25 percent had an academic degree. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2007, table 5.12 34 Haya Shtair & Aliza Levin, Poor Women in Israel (Jerusalem: FWN, 2000) at 6-7, 10 (Hebrew). The institution of the family plays a role at putting single mothers at an economic disadvantage not only with respect to their employability but also when it comes to their financial resources. Women's low economic status within the family institution results from the unequal division of the financial resources between the couple during the marriage, but to a larger extent after separation, when many women receive a smaller share of the family's property. This phenomenon affects single mothers' economic struggle, as most of them are divorcees and many of them are separated from their husbands: the fact that they are economically disadvantaged under the divorce law and its procedures means that when they become single mothers, they have fewer resources than they would have had if family law had guaranteed their equal rights when the family's assets are divided. For more about the economic results of marriage in Israel, see Halperin-Kadari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 234, 252-254; Ariel Rosen-Zvi, "Rabbinical Courts, the Halacha and the Public: A Very Narrow Bridge" Ariel Porat, ed., Religion, Liberalism, Family and Society: A collection of Articles by Ariel Rosen-Zvi (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 2001) 143 at 166-167 (Hebrew); Menashe Shava, "The Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733-1973, in light of Religious Divorce in Israel", in Menashe Shava, ed., Selected Topics in Family and Private International Law (Tel Aviv: The Israel Bar-Publishing House, 2000) 213 at 226; Pinfaas Shifman, Civil Marriage in Israel: the Case for Reform (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1995) at 77-84 (Hebrew).
Dalia Gordon & Tamar Aliav, Vocational Training of Single Mothers Who Receive Income Support Benefits (Jerusalem: NIL 1994) at 2-3 (Hebrew).
242 mothers cope with their economic struggle.36 The most important legislation was the 1992
Single-Parent Families Act*1 The idea behind the SPFA was that a single-parent family could find it hard to achieve a reasonable standard of living even if the parent works, and that a single parent - usually a single mother - would find it more difficult to participate in the labour market and thus would have an increased chance of facing economic hardship.38
To improve their skills and increase their chances of joining the labour market, single parents were given priority in attending vocational training programs.39 The SPFA also gave priority to single parents when it allocated places for children in the childcare system; it also reduced the amount paid for such childcare services.4* hi addition, the SPFA gave single parents the right to have an increased mortgage from the state for housing,41 as well as the right to an annual education grant for children between the ages six and fourteen.42
The SFPA also amended the Income Support Act to give single parents the right to an exceptional rate of benefits that, until 1992, had only been given to widows.43
36 The following discussion regarding the benefits under the Single-Parent Families Act refers to the level of protection given to single parents before the recent welfare reform. Changes that were mandated through this reform are discussed later. 37 The need for such legislation was already identified in 1978 when a governmental committee was established to examine women's status in Israel. This committee recommended adopting a formal definition of the 'single- parent family' and enacting a law that would provide welfare assistance to single parents in several areas, such as minimum wage, housing, tax relief and extended child benefits. The committee further emphasized the importance of providing single mothers with employment training. These recommendations were not adopted at that time and only in 1989 was a formal bill regarding single-parent families brought before the Israeli Parliament. This bill was eventually formulated into the current Single-Parent Families Act. For more about the history of the SPFA see Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 7. 38 Gal, Social Security in Israel, supra note 14 at 107. 39 SPFA, section 2. 40 Ibid, section 3. The payment to childcare facilities, which are subsidized by the state, is based on the correlation between parents' incomes and the number of household members. See also the 1998 Single-Parent Families (Consideration of Single Parent's Income far Calculating the Cost of Childcare) Regulations, K.T. 362. 41 SPFA, section 4. 42 Ibid, section 8 (amending section 74 of the National Insurance Act). The grant was 18 percent of the average monthly income for every child six to eleven years of age, and 10 percent for every child eleven to fourteen years of age. 43 In the past, there were three levels of income support benefits: a basic rate - 30 percent of the average monthly income - was paid per couple and was aimed at those who needed the benefits for a short period of time, lasting no more than two years; an increased rate - 37.5 percent of the average monthly income - was paid per couple and was
243 Under the SPFA, single parents were exempted from the employment test established by the Income Support Act as a precondition to receiving income support benefits. Before the
SPFA was enacted, the Income Support Act exempted mothers with a child under fiveyear s of age (or with more than one child when the youngest is under ten years of age) from the employment test. The SPFA expanded the exemption to include single parents with children up to seven years of age.44 Setting the exemption until seven years of age was designed to give further flexibility to single mothers and to acknowledge the difficulty they encountered in combining paid work with family responsibilities.45 They were not required to prove their availability and willingness to participate in the labour market and thus could choose to stay at home with their children while receiving income support benefits.46
In addition to the welfare support described above, single parents were entitled to income support benefits, alimony and nursing benefits, and were also entitled to a municipal property tax reduction of up to 70 percent.47 Furthermore, single mothers were given income tax credit points in addition to the half-point that all women receive and the full point that mothers receive for each child under 17 years of age (except for children in their
aimed at those who needed the benefits for longer periods; and an exceptional rate - 42.5 percent of the average monthly income - was paid to female widows. This last rate was given, under the SFPA, to single parents as well. According to the Nil's data, after the SPFA was implemented, approximately 80 percent of all single-parent families that previously received income support benefits were now entitled to the exceptional rate of benefits, and the average income support benefits for a single-parent family increased by approximately 26 percent in comparison to the previous year. Ibid, 44 Ibid, section 7 (amending sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Income Security Act). 45 In the explanatory part of the 1991 Single-Parent Families Bill, it was argued that because even mothers whose young children attended school might find it very difficult to return to the workforce, the exemption should cover mothers with children up to six or seven years of age (however if there are more than one child, the exemption should not be extended until the youngest is ten years age but be limited to children seven years of age as well). The Israeli legislation adopted this proposal and single parents with a child seven years of age or younger were exempted from the employment test See the 1991 Single-Parent Families Bill, H.H. 86. 46 Following this provision, the number of single mothers who received income support benefits in 1992 and 1993 increased by about 15 percent, and by 5 percent on average in each of the following years until 2000. Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 8. A1 Ibid, al 11.
244 first year and those who turned 18 that year, for whom half point was given).48 A few benefits were also given to single mothers by governmental ministries. For instance, the
Ministry of Construction and Housing assisted with rental payments of single-parent families for a period of three years (for the purpose of this assistance, a single-parent family can include children up to 21 years of age).49 The safety net for single parents was further strengthened following the enactment of two laws that were aimed to reduce the poverty rate in Israel and to ensure that the social security benefits would not fall below the poverty line (50 percent of the average monthly income). The 1994 Act to Reduce the Scope of
Poverty and Income Gaps increased the increment given under the Income Support Act for families with one or two children from 5-7.5 percent to 10 percent of the average monthly income.50 The 1995 Act to Reduce the Scope of Poverty (Amendments of Legislation)
(Complimentary Measures) equalized the level of benefits given to single parents who were not included under the SPFA with those who were formally considered single parents under the law.51 As a result of the enactment of these two laws, the poverty rate among single- parent families in Israel was significantly reduced by about a third.52
48 ibid. 49 See the Ministry of Construction and Housing, online at: http://www.moch.gQv.il(/NRi,rdotitvfes/83B5849A- 9278-45B4-9974-A3242227.1FD8/0/2 2 2.pdf (HebrewXLast visited: June 15,2008). In addition to die benefits under the SFPA and the Income Support Act, single parents enjoyed several weltare protection under other general welfare laws. Like all women, single mothers were entitled to maternity insurance and child allowances under the NIA which also provided many of them with unemployment benefits. Another piece of legislation that is largely relevant to many divorced and separated single mothers is the above-mentioned Alimony (Guarantee of Payment) Act under which women, who are entitled to alimony fromthei r husbands, can receivethi s sum from the Nil if the husbands do not obey to the court's order on this matter. See Halperin-Kadari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 104; Gal, Social Security in Israel, supra note 14 at 85, 50 The 1994 Act to Reduce the Scope of Poverty and Income Gaps, S.H. 256, section 2. 31 The 1995 Act to Reduce the Scope of Poverty (Amendments of Legislation) (Complimentary Measures), S.H. 50, section 1. 52 Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 5 at 104; NI, Annual Report 1995/1996 (Jerusalem: NIL 1997) at 185 (Hebrew); Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 12. For a further overview of the welfare benefits that were given to single mothers see Karnit Plog et al, The Single-Parent Families A ct, Employment Supply and Poverty, Research Paper, Bank of Israel (My 2005) at 6-10 (Hebrew).
245 All these programs and initiatives indeed helped to reduce the risk of poverty among single mothers and provided mem with a certain level of assistance.53 Despite these measures, however, poverty was still a dominant element in many single mothers' lives. In 2000, the incidence of poverty among these women stood at 25.1 percent.54 There were 23,500 single-parent families who lived below the poverty line and they constituted 7.7 percent of all poor families in Israel.55 According to research and governmental documents, even single mothers who were not considered to be 'officially' poor found it extremely difficult to meet their financialneed s and the needs of their children without the financialsuppor t of a second family member who frequently acted as the primary breadwinner.56 In 2000, for example, about 57 percent of all single mothers in Israel could not provide themselves with minimal incomes by participating in the labour market or from other sources (not including welfare benefits).57 These figures indicate not only the low economic status of single mothers but also how limited the contribution of the welfare system was to their struggle against poverty.
According to Swriski et al, during the 1990s, "transfer payments succeeded in lowering the poverty rate among solo mothers by about 50 percent". See Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 11. "4 NIL, Rates of Poverty and Inequality in the division of Incomes in the Market, 2001: Main Findings (Jerusalem, 2002), at 10, 17 (Hebrew) [NIL 2001 Poverty Report]. See also Swriski etal, supra note 10 at 12; Avnimelech & Tamir, supra note 33 at 66-67; Gal, supra note 14 at 137. 55 Nil, 2001 Poverty Report, ibid, at 17. 56 Kutz & Bendor, supra note 20 at 1. The authors also indicate that, compared to children who are raised in two- parents families, many children in single-parents families sacrifice their continued education to work, sometimes in full-time jobs, to support their family's needs. Ibid. 37 Eizenshtat & Gal, supra note 18 at 20. Furthermore, single parents constituted 35.5 percent of all income support beneficiaries in 2000. See Swriski et al, supra note 10 at 12. 58 Beyond its failure to fully meet single parents' economic needs, the SPFA was also criticized for perpetuating negative attitudes toward single parents within Israeli society. Daphna Hacker, in a paper dealing with bachelorhood in Israel, argues that the mere existence of the SPFA emphasizes the assistance given to single parents and conceals the support married parents receive from the state, thus contributing to the process of categorizing single parents as poor parents in need. She claims that the benefits given to single parents should not be isolated in separate legislation, but rather should be integrated in the general welfare laws that provide welfare support to all citizens of Israel. See Daphna Hacker, "Beyond Old Maid' and 'Sex and the City': Singlehoed as an Important Option for Women and Israeli Law's Attitude towards This Option" (2005) 28 Tel Aviv Law Review 903 at 947 (Hebrew) [Hacker, "Beyond "Old Maid' and "Sex and the City"'].
246 D. Structuring Single Mothers' Citizenship through the 'Rights Discourse' and their
Role as Caregivers
The SPFA, together with the other welfare initiatives, aimed at helping single mothers cope with economic pressures, as well as to integrating them into mainstream Israeli society.
Given that many single mothers were new immigrants, the Act served also as a tool for the absorption of immigrants. The SPFA therefore paved the way for single mothers to gain a sense of belonging and served to constitute their citizenship in Israel. In the previous chapters, we saw that during the early years of statehood, women's citizenship in Israel was constituted through a 'duties discourse'. Under a gender-differentiated model of citizenship duties, women were attached to the duty of motherhood, exempted from the duty to work, and the duty of military service was only partially applied to them They were structured as mothers-citizens and earned their membership through the institution of motherhood. Was single mothers' citizenship also structured within such a 'duties discourse'? The answer, in my opinion, is no.
Looking at single mothers' exemption from the employment test under the Income Support
Act, it seems, on the surface, that it is in line with the earlier exemption of women from the duty to work. It appears as another sign of society's assumption, as discussed in the previous chapter, that women were not the ones to fulfill the duty to work given their family responsibilities in their household. I do not think, however, that the exemption from the employment test should be understood as part of a 'duties discourse' of citizenship. The phenomenon of single motherhood became widespread in Israel during the years when, as discussed in Chapter II of the thesis, citizenship was understood more in terms of having rights man in terms of carrying out duties. When the SPFA was legislated in the early
1990s, the practice of work was not really captured as a duty towards society or as part of
247 nation-building, but as a personal choice and necessity. Work was understood as a right and as a personal matter of citizens,59 Feminist and other public discourses during this period emphasized women's right, rather than duty, to enter the labour market and receive equal or special opportunities, pay and other working special conditions.60 Releasing single mothers from the employment test was therefore not part of the 'duties discourse'. Rather, it was a component of a very strong 'rights discourse' that aimed at bringing single mothers into mainstream society by providing them with social rights and support. Instead of pointing to the obligations of single mothers toward society, or even towards their own children, the emphasis was placed on the obligation of society to support single-parent families in their struggle to survive by providing them with adequate resources.
Under the SPFA, single mothers were attached to the traditional role of caregivers. In her paper about the public discourses of the SPFA, Sara Helman shows how the law constituted single mothers first and foremost as caregivers when they subordinated paid work activities to family responsibilities. She argues, rightfully, that although the Government provided single mothers with training opportunities and gave them priority in daycare facilities, the basic assumption of the SPFA was that the state should fulfill the role of the breadwinner in order to allow single mothers to devote their time to caregiving.61 Throughout the
See the discussion in Chapter 1 near footnotes 54-66.
60 For a discussion about the efforts and straggles to provide women with employment rights, see Halperin- Kadari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 115-122; Frances Raday, "Women, Work and the Law", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 178; Frances Raday, "Women in the Israeli Law", in Dafiia Izraeli e* al, eds., The Double Bind, Womenin Israel (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House Ltd., 1982) 172 (Hebrew); Frances Raday, "Feminist Legal Theory, Legislation and Litigation in Israel: A Retospection", in Daphne Barak-Erez et al, eds., Studies in Law, Gender and Feminism (Jerusalem: Nevo, 2007) 19 at 32-33; Daflia Izraeli, "Women, Work, Family and Public Policy", in Arye Globerson et al, eds., Human Resources & Industrial Relations in Israel: New Horizons (Tel Aviv: Industrial Relations Research Association of Israel, 1990) 327 (Hebrew); Dafha Izraeli, "The Act for Adequate Representation of Women in Directorates", in Anat Maor, ed., Affirmative Action and Equal Representation in Israel (Tel Aviv: Ramot 2004) 235.
61 The government training programs were limited in their scope and mainly provided single mothers with access to traditional female occupations with low pay and poor working conditions. The daycare system was also limited in 1he number of children it could accommodate and its schedule was not adjusted to meet the
248 discussion of the SPFA, caregiving was understood as a role that could not be easily combined with paid work and single mothers were seen as being forced to enter the labour market because mere were no 'fathers in the picture'. Single mothers were presented as brave 'superwomen' who suddenly had to struggle to fulfill their primary role as caregivers because they needed to join the workforce and earn their living. In other words, they had to fulfill the role of breadwinner that should 'normally' be carried out by the fathers.62
It should be noted that when the SPFA was legislated, structuring single mothers as mothers-citizens and emphasizing their caregiving responsibilities was no longer part of enforcing a 'duty of motherhood'. Indeed, when discussing the SPFA in the Knesset, many speakers pointed to the contribution single mothers make to society by giving birth and caring for their children. However, while in the past this contribution was transformed into a duty of citizenship, here it was not translated into a national duty but used to justify and foster societal responsibility to support single mothers and provide them with social rights.
Motherhood and family were understood within a 'rights discourse' that emphasized women's freedomo f choice to become single mothers and their entitlement to support from society in return for their contribution in raising the next generation. Member of the
Knesset (MK) OraNamir, who presented the SPFA in the Knesset, pointed out that
... there are certain groups in society that are willing to acknowledge and support single- parent families' difficulties because they hold a perspective about preserving the institution of marriage...; another value in society, that is no less important, is freedom of choice and
the opportunity to raise and educate children to be good, happy and healthy citizens. It is requirements of the labour market. In light of these limitations, the only real option left for single mothers was to stay at home and fulfill their caregiving role. See Sara Helman, "Let us Help them to Raise their Children into Good Citizens: Single Parents' Families Act and the Wages of Care-giving in Israel", Paper Presented at the Meeting of the International Sociological Association Committee on Poverty and Welfare (Chicago, 2005) at 33- 35. 62 Ibid, at 23-27. Helman also explains that the law aimed to provide equal conditions for single mothers with married mothers, thus fostering and reaffirming the traditional heterosexual model of the family. Ibid, at 24.
249 because of this value that society cannot ignore these families and must provide their social and economic welfare.63
Another MK also emphasized this point. "It is our duty as a society to do our best to ease the difficulties of single-parent families that raise a new young generation for the Israeli society".64 Welfare support was given, not in return for fulfilling a certain duty of citizenship, but as recognition of women's right to form a family outside marriage and of the challenge of coping with caregiving activities on one's own. Being a mother was not a precondition for full citizenship, but a basis for receiving rights.65
In sum, the SPFA incorporated single mothers into citizenship as mothers within a gender- differentiated model of citizenship. It provided single mothers with two routes to membership: they could choose full-time motherhood or combine motherhood with paid work. Each of these choices could establish their sense of belonging, while also providing them with some financial support. Overall, the citizenship of single mothers was framed and structured within a 'rights discourse'. Public attention regarding single mothers, as reflected in 1he legislative initiatives described above, focused almost entirely on providing single mothers with special rights. In other words, the ability of single mothers to integrate into the Israeli society and achieve economic stability was understood and measured in terms of social rights and support. Once the number of single mothers increased and their difficulties to maintain a reasonable standard of living became evident, these concerns were translated into welfare programs and entitlements aimed to provide single mothers with the resources and opportunities needed for them to better support their families and integrate
63 Knesset Minutes, Vol. 10 at 1204, December 10, 1991 (my translation) Many Knesset members, as Helman points out, ignored women who became single mothers 'by choice' and referred to single mothers as either deserted women or as widows. See Helman, supra note 61 at 21-22. 64 MK Raanan Cohen (Labour), Knesset Minutes, Vol. 10 at 1204, December 10, 1991 (my translation). 65 Helman, supra note 61 at 23.
250 themselves into society. As in the past, women gained the status of citizenship through the institution of motherhood, but this time, not as part of a 'duties discourse', but as part of a
'rights discourse'. They were not required to become mothers but were recognized as worthy of receiving public support for coping with caregrving on their own. The outcome, nevertheless, was very similar, that is, single mothers did not achieve full membership and recognition, and their experience as sole parents perpetuated their traditional role of caregiving and their inferior place in society. As noted above, despite its intention to acknowledge the value of care work, the welfare system did not provide single mothers with financial support that truly recognized the full worth and importance of such activities, and many women remained poor and at the margins of the Israeli society.
Part II: Back to the 'Duties Discourse': Establishing Women's Duty to
Work under Recent Welfare Reform Initiatives
In recent years, as discussed in Chapter II, the welfare system in Israel has gone through major changes aimed to transfer people from welfare to work. To fulfill this goal, the
Government reduced welfare benefits and conditioned them upon labour market participation.66 Some of the changes in the welfare system had a special effect on women, particularly single mothers. First, children allowances and maternity grants were reduced, thus decreasing the income of all mothers in Israel.67 Second, the reduction of the alimony ss For a general discussion of these changes in the Israeli welfare system, see Chapter IL near footnotes 100-112. 6 Two changes were made with respect to child allowances. First, a uniform rate of allowance was adopted. Prior to this change, child allowances were paid based on how many children were in a family with the same rate of payment being made for the first and the second child and a higher rate of allowance for each additional child. This scheme is being graduaEy altered, so that by 2009 a uniform child allowance will be paid for every child regardless of his or her place in the fenuly. Second, the rates at which the allowance was provided were reduced by about 30 percent between March 2002 and March 2005. See the 2002 Economy Arrangements Act, section 38; the 2002 Economy Emergency Plan Act, section 7(4); The 2003 Recovery Plan Act, section 58(6). See also Nil, Summary of Developments and Trends in Social Security 2002 (Jerusalem, 2003) 15 [NH, 2002 Developments and Trends]; ND, Summary of Developments and Trends in Social Security 2003 (Jerusalem, 2004) at 17 [NIL, 2003 Developments and Trends], Similar amendments were legislated regarding maternity insurance. First, the increment to the maternity grant paid for each child bom in a large family was abolished.
251 rates, as well as tightening of eligibility conditions, had a disproportionately harmful effect on single mothers' total incomes, as single mothers constituted a high portion of the women who receive alimony under the Alimony Payment Actm Third, single mothers were one of the groups most harmed by the changes in the income support system, as they constituted nearly
35 percent of income support beneficiaries. The 2003 Arrangements Act reduced the rate of the benefits received by single mothers with one child by 21.8 percent. The benefits received by single mothers with more than one child were reduced by 27.2 percent.69 According to the
Nil estimate for the year 2003, following the reduction of the benefits rate, a total of approximately 46,000 single-parent families received reduced benefits.70 In addition, as
Swirski notes, single mothers' economic well-being deteriorated because of reduced housing assistance grants given that "single-parent families headed by solo mothers [were] prominent among those whose grants [had] been drastically reduced".71 Furthermore, according to the
Adva Centre, "the 2004 Budget Law also increases the rent paid by households living in public housing units to a level that left them with insufficient disposable income to pay for
Second, a differential maternity grant was adopted: in the past, a maternity grant, calculated at a rate of 20 percent of the average wage, was paid for the first four children in the family and at a rate of 40 percent of the average wage for the fifth and any subsequent children. In 2003, the rates of the maternity grant were reduced to a rate of 20 percent of the average wage for the first child in the family and 6 percent of the average wage for all other children. See the 2003 Recovery Plan Act, section 58(4). See also Nil, 2003 Developments and Trends, ibid at 18. Furthermore, under the 2002 Emergency Economy Program Act, the rate of the maternity grant was reduced by four percent, as of My 2002. See Nl, 2002 Developments and Trends, ibid at 17, 68 Nil, Annual Review 2002/2003 (Jerusalem, 2004) at 179 [Nl, Annual Review 2002/2003}. Two changes were also introduced with respect to the alimony payments. First, a new condition for eligibility was added. As of January 2003, a woman is entitled to alimony payment from the Nil only if she does not live with the person who is obliged to pay alimony by a court order (previously, the only conditions for alimony entitlement were a court order, a means test of the woman and Israeli residence of the person obligated to pay alimony). The 2003 Economy Arrangements Act, section 19. See also NJJ, 2003 Developments and Trends, supra note 67 at 15. Second, alimony rates were reduced by approximately 20 percent for mothers of one child and by 28 percent for mothers of two children or more. The 2002 Economy Arrangements Act, section 21; Rachel Vartzberg, "The Damage to Women following the Income Benefits Cuts under the 2003 Proposed Budget and the Program from Welfare to Work1", a background paper submitted to the Committee of the Advancement of Women's Status (August 2003) at 7 (Hebrew). 69 Barbara Swirski, "Income Support Benefits" (Tel Aviv: Adva Centre, 2003) at 4, 70 hi addition, the income support benefits received by single mothers who work and earn less than half of the minimum wage were reduced by 41 percent; and single mothers who earn the minimum wage receive benefits that were reduced by 57 percent. Vartzberg, supra note 68 at 7. 71 Shlomo Swirski et al, "Two Years of Destructive Policies: A Gendered Perspective of the 2004 Budjet" (Adva Centre, 2003) at 5 [Swirski etal, "Two Years"].
252 food and other basic necessities. While single-parent families constituted about 10 percent of
Israeli families with children in 2003, they were about 18 percent of families living in public housing".72 Moreover, many supplemental benefits and subsidies that were received by most single mothers (as they were attached to income support benefits) were abolished, including the discount on municipal property tax discount, on health fees, on public transportation and the exemption from television license fee. These reductions further lowered the total income of single mothers.73
Finally, and most important to our discussion, women, along with all citizens, were introduced to the renewed duty to work.74 In the past, as mentioned above, mothers of children up to the age of five were exempted from the employment test under the Income
Support Act. Single mothers were exempted from the employment test if they were mothers of children up to the age of seven. In 2002, for example, 47 percent of single mothers were exempted from the employment test because their children were young.75 Today, following the welfare reform, only mothers whose children are under the age of two are exempted from the employment test. In other words, single mothers whose children are between two and seven years of age, and married mothers whose children are between two and five years of age, must participate in the labour market or vocational training programs. Although the scope of the 'welfare to work' program is narrow and not many suitable jobs are offered to the unemployed, in practice, welfare benefits have been already reduced and single mothers whose children are older than two years are required to arrive at employment centres and take
Vartzberg, supra note 68 at 7; NH, Annual Review 2002/2003, supra note 68 at 160. For a general discussion of the duty to work, see the discussion in Chapter II near footnotes 109-112. Swriski etal, supra note 10 at 4.
253 almost any job that is offered to them as a condition of continuing to receive benefits.
Narrowing the exemption from the employment test under the Income Support Act thus prevents many women fromreceivin g income support benefits. The result of these changes is that women's citizenship became conditional on being economically independent and for many women today, their inclusion in the Israeli society is constituted through the labour market.
Part III: An Analysis of the Duty to Work
Most literature usually focuses on the damaging implications of the duty to work on women.
A few words, however, should be said first regarding the potential positive aspects of restructuring women's citizenship in relation to the duty to work. The assumption behind the duty to work is that both men and women are working citizens. Unlike the gendered assumptions mat stood behind the duty to work during the early years of statehood, the current duty to work does not assume that only men are the head of families and the breadwinners. While in the past, the welfare state was strongly based on gendered principles concerning the division of labour between the sexes, today women are also expected to provide for their families, regardless of the femily composition. In that sense, at least in theory, the duty itself is not built on an underlying male norm.77 Moreover, being a central
Ruth Sinai, "Single Mothers Do Not Make Use of Job Offers", Haaretz (September 3,2003XHebrew); MI, Annual Review 2002/2003, supra note 68 at 174. The changes in the labour market, mainly in the public sector, also affect single mothers' lives. A high portion of single mothers in Israel are employed in public services; in the year 2000,49.3 percent of nonimmigrant Jewish single mothers worked in the public sector, as did 37.8 percent of immigrant single mothers, and 51.8 percent of Muslim single mothers. See Swriski etal, supra note 10 at 23. Although there is no specific data related to the effects of restructuring the labour market on single mothers, it can be reasonably assumed that the general trends of dismissing public-sector employees and the worsening of the working conditions of those who are still employed in the public service would have an adverse effect on single mothers. 77 See Ann Orloff, "Ending the Entitlements of Poor Single Mothers: Changing Social Policies, Women's Employment, and Caregiving in the Contemporary United States", in Nancy Hirschman & Ulrike Liebett, eds., Women and Welfare: Theory and Practice in the United States and Europe (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001) 133 {Orloff, "Ending the Entitlements"]; Jane Lewis, "The Decline of the Male Breadwinner Model: Implications for Work and Care" (2001) 4 Social Politics 160.
254 factor of citizenship, enforcing the duty to work can be valuable for women who do not currently work but can manage joining the workforce. It can provide them with economic autonomy and thus with a stronger route to citizenship. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, economic independence is a vital component of women's journey to full membership in terms of achieving rights and resources. Many women, especially single mothers, who have received welfare benefits for years, have lost their motivation to enter the labour market.
They became accustomed to depending on their husbands or the state, and have learned to live with limited support and even poverty. The welfare reform, which pushes and forces them to enter the labour market, has therefore a potentially emancipatory effect on unemployed women and single mothers.78
Portraying the value of the duty to work in terms of emancipation and economic independence is only part of the story. This aspect is associated, for the most part, with understanding citizenship as a route to social rights, opportunities and resources. I am also interested in the benefits of the duty to work in connecting women to the collective.
Citizenship in Israel, as we saw above, is built upon the bond between individuals and the nation, rather than merely upon autonomy and independence. Therefore, it is important to understand the value of the duty to work in terms of belonging to society and not merely as an emancipatory mechanism that benefits women in their private lives. The duty to work, in
Of course, the duty to work still leads to gendered results, as will be discussed further in the chapter, but when looking at the welfare policy itself and the assumption behind it, there is a shift towards seeing women not only as mothers but also as workers. It should be mentioned here that structuring the duty to work based on the assumption of the 'working woman' was not a product of any feminist struggle. Similar to structuring women's early route toward citizenship through the institution of motherhood, the Israeli welfare reform was designed with the intention to rebuild the Israeli economy rather than reconstruct to women's citizenship in Israel in a more equal way. 78 Paul Kershaw, Carefair: Rethinking the Responsibilities and Rights of Citizenship (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) at 75-78. For a discussion regarding the support feminists give to welfare reform and moving women into the labour market, see Gwendolyn Mink, "Feminists, Welfare Reform and Welfare Justice" (1998) 25 Social Justice 146 at 149-151 [Mink, "Feminists, Welfare Reform and Welfare Justice"}; Gwendolyn Mink, "The Lady and the Tramp (II): Feminist Welfare politics, Poor Single Mothers and the Challenge of Welfare Justice" (1998) 24 Feminist Studies 55 at 57-60.
255 my opinion, opens a new citizenship route for working women or for women who can adjust to this new requirement and join the workforce. In the past, as discussed in Chapter HL, work did not pave a path for women into the national collective. Participating in the labour market and earning a living contributed to the common good but did not necessarily strengthen women's attachment to society. Women were exempted from the duty to work and their citizenship was built mainly upon the duty of motherhood. In practice, however, many women in Israel participated in the labour market and many earned their living without relying on welfare benefits. Today, in light of the new structure of citizenship, their work can intensify their sense of belonging to the Israeli collective. In other words, being assigned the duty to work (and carrying it out) is the element that can 'upgrade' working women's citizenship.79 Fulfilling the duty to work alone, though, cannot guarantee women the same citizenship connection to society as men gain from participating in the labour market. Even if women could achieve more highly regarded membership in Israeli society, this connection would probably not resemble the citizenship men gain from fulfilling the duty to work - not until the duty to work is structured in a way that takes into consideration women's unique interests and characteristics.
Not all women, however, can fulfill the duty to work. This is especially true for single mothers. As discussed above, many single mothers find it difficult to balance paid work and parenting and thus cannot easily enter the labour market, hi fact, these single mothers, rather than those who already work, are the targets of the welfare reform. They are considered to be a burden on society and are seen to deviate from 'normal' behaviour of the working population. While previously, women, and especially single mothers, gained citizenship
79 Of course, for childless women, the change in the structure of citizenship is even more beneficial. If in the past they were condemned for not contributing to the national project, today they have an alternative route for showing their loyalty to the collective - through their career. This is not to say that childless working women will be free from any stigmatization. The institution of motherhood still holds a central place on the Israeli agenda. Their membership will still be partial because they are not mothers.
256 through a gender-differential model of citizenship, the current basis forcitizenshi p rests on a gender-neutral one. This model is aimed at bringing women into citizenship - through the public sphere of the labour market - according to the principle of'sameness'. In the past, as noted, society recognized women's difficulties in combining paid work with caregiving and exempted them from the requirement to work. They were given the choice of full-time motherhood. Today, the idea behind welfare reform is that 'everyone has to work', including mothers of young children. Welfare law, which incorporates the duty to work, is aimed, therefore, at applying the same rule to all citizens. Women are required to adopt anew route to citizenship and, just like any other citizen in Israel, to find a paid job. As Martha Minow writes about welfare reform in the US, which is very similar to the one in Israel,
... the basic assumption [is] that these mothers of young children should be treated like any other able-bodied poor person and be moved as soon as possible away from dependence on public benefits into the labor market (emphasis added).80
In that respect, the reform presents a gender-neutral approach to citizenship: all citizens, regardless of gender, face the duty to work. Yet, due to its limitations in accommodating women's different characteristics, the gender-neutral approach leaves many women, especially single mothers, outside the labour market and results in narrowing their citizenship.
The following sections begin with a general discussion of the gender-neutral model and its weaknesses within the 'duties discourse', and then turn to examine it with regard to the duty to work in Israel.
80 Martha Minow, "The Welfare of Single Mothers and their Children" (1993-1994) 26 Com. L. Rev. 817 at 823. See also Ann Qrloff, "Explaining US Welfare Reform: Power, Gender, Race and the US Policy Legacy" (2002) 22 Critical Social Policy 96 at 100 [Qrloff, "Explaining US Welfare Reform"].
257 A. Hie Gender-Neutral Model of Citizenship Duties
The gender-neutral model of citizenship, as discussed in Chapter ID, is aimed to include women in citizenship "on the same terms as men, as equal, supposedly, 'gender-neutral' citizens".81 This was women's earlier attempt to resolve their exclusion from citizenship.
Under this model, Ruth Lister explains, "gender would be irrelevant to the allocation and exercise of citizenship rights and obligations. It would thus accord women equal citizenship rights with men and enable mem to participate as equals in the public sphere".82 The rationale for advancing the gender-neutral model, or the principle of'equal rights and opportunities', is that women are morally and intellectually equal to men and thus should be given the same opportunity to enter all practices of citizenship, on the same terms. Based on this gender- neutral model, women should therefore be included in the 'duties discourse' on the same terms as men; that is, the same duties men fulfill should be applied to women, and these duties should be performed under the same conditions for both sexes.
Much critique was directed at the gender-neutral approach. In her analysis of the civic public and group differences, Iris Young rejects the idea that citizenship should be defined or applied based on the notion of equal treatment, which she refers to as 'the ideal of assimilation'. She presents three limitations of this model. First, given that citizenship is structured according to the standards of the dominant groups in society, other groups are measured according to the characteristics of already privileged groups. This creates a hierarchy between the norms and practices of the dominant groups and those of the oppressed groups, a hierarchy that places the latter at a disadvantage and attaches to them an inferior worth. It perpetuates the oppression of those who are already excluded from citizenship.
81 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).at 93 [Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives}. 82 Ibid, at 94.
258 Second, the ideal of assimiliationist citizenship presents the experience of the dominant groups as allegedly 'neutral' and 'universal', thus "only the oppressed groups come to be marked with particularity; they, and not the privileged groups, are marked, objectified as the
Others".83 Third, marked as 'the Others' and as subordinated to the dominant groups, the oppressed groups are under pressure to conform to the mainstream by adopting conventional points of view and behaviours that and fit the general norms. This, in return, "helps to produce the self-loathing and double consciousness characteristics of oppression... to participate means to accept and adopt an identity one is not, and to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of the identity one is".84
As many scholars who criticize the gender-neutral model, Young locates her analysis mainly within a 'rights discourse', which focuses on the principle of equal citizenship rights.
However, she also presents her critique within the context of the 'duties discourse' when analyzing civic-republican citizenship. She argues that the demand under civic-republicanism to fulfill the common good assumes homogeneity among citizens and ignores particularities:
The ideal of the public realm of citizenship as expressing a general will, a point of view and interest that citizens have in common which transcends their difference, has operated in fact as a demand for homogeneity among citizens... Citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life; it is a realm of rationality and freedom as opposed to the heteronomous realm of particular need, interest, and desire.85
Ms M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 165 [Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference]. uIbid. at 165. 85 Ms M. Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship" (1989) 99 Ethics 250 at 252-253 [Young, "Polity and Group Difference"].
259 Civic-republicanism, Young argues, is built upon a universal perspective of the common good and does not leave much room for particular points of view. All citizens are expected to adopt the same general interest - the common good.86 Since citizens are expected to unite around certain common ends, they are required to put aside their own specific interests and concerns and to prioritize the goals and activities that the collective dictates. In other words, when citizenship is built upon certain ends, citizens are supposed to give preference to the duties that better match the general will at a certain moment of time.87 The process of prioritizing certain goals over others is structured according to interests of the stronger groups in society and, therefore, subordinates the interests of oppressed groups, such as women.
Thus, when society sets its goals and ends, it is most likely that these will be rooted in the experiences of men and divorced from those of women. While men's practices will be considered as strongly contributing to the general interests, women's practices are likely to be seen as minor and insignificant in their contribution.88
If the general interest - the common good - is structured according to 'universal' masculine priorities, men citizenship duties are likely to be structured according to 'universal' masculine norms. Full citizenship, Young argues, is achieved in the public realm "in which all particularities are left behind" and is "measured according to norms derived froman d defined by privileged groups".89 The privileged group is composed of men who founded citizenship and built it upon their masculine values, norms and experiences. For women, Young explains, this model of citizenship is problematic, since it ignores feminine needs and values.
S6Ibid, at 257. 87 See also Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 31 ("Citizens are supposed to come together to achieve common ends with those different froin themselves and in so doing to transcend their specific interests and concerns and identity with the wider collectivity rather than with any particular group"). 88 One of Ruth Lister's objections to traditional civic-republicanism is that the need to identify with the common good overlooks different aspects of women's activism, such as in local politics. See Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 31-32. 89 Young, "Polity and Group Difference", supra note 85 at 257.
260 Women are indeed integrated into citizenship, but they are measured according to masculine standards. Therefore, under a gender-neutral structure of citizenship, not all women can achieve full citizenship status, given that not everyone is necessarily capable of carrying out what is considered to be the civic virtue. Only those who can leave theirparticularities behind and adjust to the masculine norms according to which the duty is structured, can do so.90 As
Ruth Lister asserts, when duties are built upon masculine experiences, it is likely that not all women will be able to meet the stringent tests of citizenship:
The more demanding the conception of citizenship, the more likely it is that those willing and able to meet its stringent tests will represent a minority. Given the sexual division of labour and of time, this minority is likely tob e predominantly male, as was the ideal citizen of classical republicanism who was largely freed from the necessity to labour and to meet his bodily requirements, facilitated by the ranks of non-citizens - women and slaves.91
Both Young and Lister show that the 'duties discourse' is, in feet, not gender-neutral but masculine in its nature. Since men were the first to enter citizenship and firstt o gain the status of citizens, these concepts, as explained above, were structured around masculine norms and experiences. The gender-neutral approach, therefore, is not really 'neutral' but rather demands women, if they are to meet citizenship obligations, to abandon their particularities and to have the capabilities and qualifications that will allow them to be like men and to fulfill the same obligations men fulfill. Equality, therefore, under the gender-neutral model, becomes understood as sameness. Women need to show that they are similar to men if they want to achieve the full citizenship that men already have by virtue of being male. Under this model, Jones notes, women are "incapable of expressing the broadened scope of citizenship
90 Ibid, at 253-257. 91 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 33-34.
261 that would include full-bodied participation.' Rather than providing a means of breaking barriers, the gender-neutral model perpetuates women's inferiority by requiring that they be like men to fulfill duties and obtain citizenship. Where women are not like men, they simply cannot achieve full membership in society. Overlooking the different ways women encounter citizenship may eventually foster and perpetuate inequalities between the sexes. If, for instance, the unequal division of labour between the sexes is ignored, women will not be able to achieve equal citizenship, as their access to political or employment opportunities are limited. If women's different political participation in local politics or social movements does not count as citizenship activity, then they may not gain full membership, thus making them into second-class citizens. In other words, unless the structure of citizenship responds to women's unique values and practices and to the fact that social institutions and locations are gendered in their nature and structures, then women will not be full citizens.9j
Furthermore, a gender-neutral notion of citizenship replicates one of the most fundamental limitations of the traditional concept of citizenship - the dichotomy between the public and private spheres. In her historical research of feminism, Keran Offen explains that gender- neutral arguments require women to enter the public sphere, which is male defined, and excludes their family-based experiences, thus not leaving room for women's distinctive contributions.94 This is especially true when looking at this dichotomy fromwithi n the 'duties discourse'. Citizenship obligations usually take place in the public sphere, such as military service or political participation. If gender is irrelevant to citizenship and if women enter citizenship on the same terms as men, then the domestic sphere, where many women's unique practices take place, is left outside citizenship. Put differently, entering citizenship on
91 Kathleen B. Jones, "Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity" (1990) 15 Signs 781 at 792. 93 Ann Phillips, Democracy and Difference (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993) at 43. 94 Karen Offen, "Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach" (1988) 14 Signs 119 at 136-137. For a similar critique, see Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 95.
262 the same terms as men means that women are supposed to join in certain rituals that were previously structured as the 'practices of citizenship', all take place in the public sphere. The gender-neutral model of citizenship, therefore, leaves many issues untouched, such as women's unequal status within the family, and perpetuates the "split between the public- political world of power and action, and a private-apolitical realm of sentiment and feeling".95
B. Applying the Gender-Neutral Model to the Duty to Work
The duty to work, as argued above, has been reconstructed according to the gender-neutral model. It is equally applied to all citizens in Israel, regardless of their gender; it demands both men and women to find paid work as a precondition to full citizenship; and it provides both men and women with the same route into citizenship - through the labour market. In this sense, it seems, at the outset, that the duty to work is gender-blind. However, being built on the gender-neutral model of citizenship, the duty to work carries with it the limitations of this model discussed above. These difficulties result from three causes: first, the duty to work indicates a change in national priorities. It undervalues motherhood and places it outside the
'duties discourse'. Second, the duty to work requires women to enter a labour market that does not always provide them with appropriate working conditions. And third, closely related to the previous points, the duty to work ignores women's double burden at home and their care work in the domestic sphere. The following sections discuss these limitations.
1. Changing the National Priority: From Motherhood to Work
Since the early years of pre-statehood, as discussed in Chapter II, the Israeli society was built on and united around certain elements that were considered to contribute to the 'common good'. As a notion, the 'common good' is expected to mirror the general will or interest. It is
95 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women is Social and Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) at 229 [Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman].
263 supposed to reflect the priority given to certain goals that serve the society as a whole. In the past, the common interest in Israel was to ensure the existence of the nation by reaching a demographic majority, building social and economic institutions, and protecting the borders and the safety of citizens. All three civic virtues served one common interest: building anew state. Structuring the common good upon these three civic virtues allowed some room for heterogeneity in the activities that were seen as serving the common good. Women, as discussed in Chapter ID, could contribute to the welfare of all through their ability to give birth and through the practice of care. The institution of motherhood, therefore, was seen as part of the struggle for national independence. This allowed women to integrate their own private matters as mothers into the national common good. In other words, the private sphere was integrated into the national struggle. Women's traditional roles, thus, were not completely a barrier; women were not required or expected to suppress their unique experiences as mothers to fulfill the common good. They could be full-time caregivers and still be seen as serving the common good.m
The common good itself has not dramatically change since the early days of statehood. The current general interest, following the recent welfare reform, is primarily considered to be achieving a strong economy that serves, as discussed in Chapter II, another general interest, namely ongoing security. Fertility is no longer a central merit needed for the pursuit of the common good and giving birth is no longer seen as a strong civic virtue. Today, focusing on being 'just' a mother is not seen as serving the nation, but rather it is considered to be a private concern of women that reflects their own desire to bear and raise children. Under the
96 See the discussion in Chapter I near footnote 113. 9' Of course, as discussed above, with regard to other duties - military service and work—gendered practices and institutions posed a major obstacle for women who sought full participation and a complete fulfillment of these duties. The 'duty of motherhood' itself, as also discussed above, could not provide women with full citizenship, but at least it opened a certain route into citizenship for women that allowed them to fulfill their unique private interests.
264 welfare reform, women are asked to reconsider their priorities and redirect their action towards the pursuit of a different matter affecting the common good. They need to adopt a new civic virtue and fulfill, like men, the duty to work in order to achieve, together with men, a strong economy. The current common good imposes homogeneity among the citizens of
Israel and requires women to put aside their experiences as mothers and caregivers, or at least combine them with other national goals. Women have to identify with a wider collective objective - the need to ensure economic growth - rather than focusing on their private interests and concerns in the area of parenthood. By demanding women, especially single mothers, to find a paid job, regardless of their caregiving responsibilities, society sends women a clear message about the changing national priorities. Women, particularly unmarried women, are actually told that if they cannot provide for their own economic needs, they should think twice before becoming mothers and a burden on the Israeli economy.
While women cannot always give priority to motherhood over work, they must minimize the time needed for the practice of parenting in order to match the requirements of the duty to work98
This is a classic example of how the general interests of a certain society, in this case, Israeli society, reflect practices or priorities mat come from 'men's world'. One of the more common masculine norms in society is that 'work' does not refer to care activities and that paid work in the public sphere subordinates caregiving in the domestic sphere. Most men indeed combine, quite successfully, work in the labour market and parenting responsibilities, mainly because most women still carry greater burden of domestic responsibilities thus
98 Michal Krumer-Nevo, Women in Poverty: Life Stories (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuehad Publishing House, 2006) at 92 (Hebrew) [Krumer-Nevo, Women in Poverty]. It should be stressed again here that my aim is not to create homogeneity among women. Surely, many women do not give priority to motherhood over labour market participation. However, on a more abstract level, the incorporation of the duty to work into the welfare system overshadows women's potential interests in the area of parenting and signals, to many women, that they are obligated to change their personal priorities according to national interests.
265 allowing men to give priority to their work in the labour market. For men, whether it is a personal choice or the submission to gendered social structures, work comes first and the institution of parenthood is narrowed according to the demands of the labour market. Ideal citizens, with respect to the duty to work, are those who abstract themselves from the private interests of the family and move into the public sphere, where national interests are achieved.
Defining the common good in terms of economic growth and placing great emphasis on the duty to work as a precondition for full citizenship, are both obvious reflections of how civic virtues and common ends are constructed according to masculine norms that subordinate women's interests and practices to those of the more powerful group in society. This, in return, perpetuates gendered hierarchies and inequalities in society. It signals that men's practices and norms are superior to those of women." This is not to say that women do not have an interest in making the national economy stronger. Obviously, they will directly or indirectly benefit from having a stable and progressive labour market. However, as the following discussion will show, the duty to work does not adequately balance the general interest of a strong economy with women's particular experience of caregiving. The common good is coloured by masculine norms and a woman who does not meet them and chooses her own balance between family and work, one that does not necessarily allow her to be economically independent from state support, is considered to be a selfish person who goes against the common will.
This is not to say that the institution of motherhood has completely lost its importance as a societal norm or its place in the 'duties discourse'. Indeed, the language of'duties' is rarely used when speaking about motherhood, mainly due to women's struggle for equality and their objection to be portrayed as a 'womb in the service of the nation'. Today, as mentioned
99 For a farther feminist critique of the idea of the 'common good' and its lacking acknowledgment of women's interests, see Birte Siim, Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 28-29.
266 in Chapter M, the practice of motherhood is understood more as a right than a duty.
However, as discussed earlier, the demographic concern has not entirely faded away and it is still on the political agenda Israel still takes certain steps to maintain a high birth rate and, as the parliamentary discussions about the 1992 Single Parent Families Act demonstrate, bearing children is still considered a contribution to society. The institution of motherhood has surely maintained a central place in Israeli society. However, today a woman is not seen as contributing to the collective if she is merely a mother. By applying the renewed duty to work on all citizens in Israel, welfare reform portraits anew image of the female citizen: the good female citizen is not merely a mother-citizen any more; she is the working-mother- citizen. She has to combine motherhood with paid work to fulfill the common good and achieve full inclusion into the Israeli society.
This new image of the female citizen, however, does not equally apply to all women in Israel.
Married mothers, whose husbands earn a sufficient salary or meet the needs of the family in other ways, can still choose full-time motherhood without turning for help of the welfare system. The same is true for single mothers who have another source of income to ensure their financialneeds . As long as these women do not turn to the state in asking for welfare support, they will not be seen as weakening the economy or having a negative impact on the common good. Their citizenship is mediated through their husbands. This means that the good female citizen is either a non-working-mother who does not need welfare support or a working-mother who can independently meet the financial needs of her family. In practice, even before the welfare reform was adopted, most married women in Israel participated in the labour market or enjoyed a certain level of financialsecurit y from their husbands. The duty to work, as well as the new image of the good female citizen, is therefore most relevant to single mothers. Among women, they were often the ones to be exempted fromth e employment test under the Income Support Act, and they are now the ones who must join the workforce to
267 ensure their citizenship. These single mothers were constituted as mother-citizens under the
Single Parent Families Act and they are now the ones that have to conform to the new model of the working-mother-citizen. For them, full-time motherhood becomes an expression of egotistic self-fulfillment rather than participation in a national struggle.100
How does the new structure of the 'duties discourse' reflect on the practice of caregiving?
Does reconstructing the common good and introducing the duty to work really make a difference to the standing of care within the 'duties discourse'? On the one hand, one might argue that there is no real change to the status of care, since it was never, as explained in
Chapter ID, a dominant part of the former 'duties discourse' in Israel. It was recognized, to a certain degree, as a form of contribution and as affecting women's ability to perform other duties, but it was not given independent standing, nor was it understood to be an active citizenship practice. It stood in the shadow of giving birth. In that sense, recent welfare reform does not greatly change the place of care in the discourse of citizenship duties. On the other hand, I think mat the preoccupation with paid work within the 'duties discourse' marginalizes the role of caregiving in the institution of motherhood. In the past, while the
'duty of motherhood' itself was measured or understood mostly in terms of bearing children to increase the Jewish majority, it was accompanied with an understanding that motherhood
It should be noted, however, that in certain circumstances, married mothers might be also seen as of the working-mother-citizen that no longer have of the option of choosing full-time motherhood. Currently, there is not much data about married mothers who enjoy the exemption from the employment test, thus it is difficult to draw conclusions about their share in carrying out the renewed duty to work. However, in theory, we might find married mothers with young children whose husbands cannot meet the financial needs of the family, for instance if they themselves are unemployed. In the past, these women could receive welfare support to maintain a sufficient standard of living without joining the labour market. Today, like many single mothers, they have to work. This shows that women in two-parent families may also be subjected to the new structure of citizenship and may be asked to fulfill the requirements of the female citizen, la fact, data shows that welfare benefits given to two-parent families were also reduced under the welfare reform. This means that these families also faced reduced resources, which could lead women in these families to enter the labour market or to move frompart - time jobs to full-time jobs. However, the number of these women is likely to be small, and the model of the working-mother-citizen will be mostly imposed on mothers in single-parent families. For data about the impact of the welfare reform on two-parent families, see NH, Poverty Report 2004 (August 2005) at 4-5 (Hebrew); NH, Poverty Report 2005 (August 2006) at 7 (Hebrew). For more about differentiating between single and married women under welfare reforms, see Mink, "Feminists, Welfare Reform and Welfare Justice", supra note 78 at 148.
268 included not only childbirth but also childcare. Indeed, childcare was not fully considered a practice of citizenship, especially in comparison to other practices of citizenship. There was, however, a clear acknowledgment of the importance of childcare, both for the nation and as a personal choice, and an acknowledgement of the difficulty in balancing paid work with caregiving. This was reflected in the Single Parents Families Act. Today, since the duty to work does not include care work done in the household, and since mothers are expected to enter the labour market even when their children are very young, the notion of motherhood and the scope of its responsibilities have been narrowed down. It is being reduced primarily to childbirth, as women are expected to enter the market even when their children are still young. In that sense, the view of care has indeed changed underthe current 'duties discourse'.
Women, as mentioned, cannot give preference to care activities if they conflict with fulfilling the duty to work. By giving priority to 'citizen-the-worker' over 'citizen-the-mother', the current understanding of the common good and the civic virtues deepens the separation between work done in the labour market and the work women perform in the home. It further perpetuates the general view that care is not considered work. Care work is hence undervalued even more. In that sense, the current 'duties discourse' deepens the dichotomy between the public and the private spheres, namely that paid work is one's prime goal and it is performed in the public sphere while excluding domestic activities and responsibilities that take place in the private sphere. Once again the private sphere is excluded from the 'duties discourse'. The duty to work sends a clear statement about which activities constitute duties of citizenship and which activities are merely 'private interests' of the individual and thus outside the realm of citizenship. Care is not recognized as an expression of active citizenship responsibility and is pushed aside to make room for more 'important' practices in the public
269 sphere. The discussion below will further show that care is also not taken into account in the construction of the duty to work itself.
2. The Limitations of the Labour Market
Beyond reflecting a problematic choice of priorities, the duty to work does not respond to the many practical challenges that women face when trying to enter the labour market. There are some limitations that all citizens in Israel face today, significant among them is the lack of good jobs. Welfare reform pushed many welfare recipients into the labour market, but the market does not have the ability to absorb all new job seekers, due to the already high rate of unemployment and the competition from the unemployed who are better educated, trained and skilled.102 Many of those who object to the welfare reform in Israel point out that it does not allocate sufficient resources to fix labour market failures that prevent the poor or those with family responsibilities from entering it It is also argued that not enough resources are allocated to substantively improve the human capital of those who are forced to find a job.103
The Bank of Israel indicated in 2003 that the reform "should have been accompanied by an increase in direct incentives for households' participation in the labour market [but that] no such steps ha[ve] been taken".104 The limited number of positions in the market especially affects women, and in particular single mothers, who stay outside the labour market for a long time. They are most likely to lack the skills and training needed for finding a job, and
101 See also Ruth Lister, "She has Other Duties: Women, Citizenship and Social Security", in Sally Baldwin, ed., Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994) 31 at 39-43. 102 Abraham Doron, "From Welfare to Work: A Threat to the Safety Net of the Israeli Social Security System" (2000) 57 Social Security 37 at 40-41 (Hebrew); Gal, supra note 14 at 127. For a similar critique of welfare reforms in the US and Europe, see Joel F. Handler, "Social Citizenship and Workfare in the US and Western Europe: From Status to Contract" (2003) 13 Journal of European Social Policy 229. 103 Avishy Benish, "Chronicle of Social Damage: From Damaging the Unemployed to Damaging the Public Sector's Employees", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) at 55. 104 Bank of Israel, Annual Report - 2003 (Jerusalem, 2004) at 14. See also Erik Ben-Shahar, "Comments regarding Unemployment", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) at 34-37.
270 many have only limited education. Indeed, the Israeli government takes some steps to advance women's human capital and their ability to join the workforce, but it is argued that these measures are not sufficient and, for practical reasons, only a small number of women can take part in training programs.106 In other words, while all women are being pushed into the labour market, only a small portion of them get real help to cope with this demand.107
In addition to the limitations derived from the structure of the labour market and women's human capital, the duty to work is problematic because it requires them to enter a gendered institution that is built around masculine norms. Indeed, the current duty to work is not masculine in the same way it used to be in the past. In the early years of statehood, the
'manly' nature of the duty to work was related to masculine work that required the physical strength that men possess, mainly in agriculture and construction. Today, the duty to work refers to the requirement to enter the labour market regardless of what kind of paid work one holds. Yet women have to exercise the duty in a sphere that still discriminates against them and provides them with low pay and poor working conditions. They are required to enter a woman-unfiiendly labour market, which is, as Ursula Vogel notes, a "ready-made, gender-
A recent study of the ability of single mothers to integrate into the labour market found that single mothers who did not work in the five years that immediately preceded the 'welfare to work' program was adopted had more difficulties in joining the labour market in light of their lack of skills and training. See Neta Achdut, "The Program for the Integration of Single Parents into the Labour Market: Resources and Obstructions for Employment Integration" (2007) 73 Social Security 69 at 97-98 (Hebrew). See also Minow, supra note 80 at 828. 106 Ittai Rom, "In all Reforms We Do Not See a Creation of Jobs", Globes (3 February 2007) (Hebrew). 107 Single mothers also face an absurd situation if they want to apply for higher education. Today, the Income Support Act denies entitlements to single parents who ask to continue, whether part-time or full-time, with higher education at university. Single parents who participate in higher education do receive some funding to cover the cost of universities fees, but, ironically, are not entitled to income support benefits that are supposed to help provide for their families' needs during the time when the parents are at school instead of in the workforce. A petition was filed in the High Court of Justice against this arrangement, but a decision has not yet been delivered. A bill is currently being discussed in Parliament to amend this vicious circle. See Yuval Yoaz & Ruth Sinai, "A Parliament Committee Approved: A Single Mother that Studies Will Not Lose her Income Support Benefits", Haaretz (28 January 2008) (Hebrew). In the meantime, however, the Industry, Trade and Employment Ministry presents a limited program to support single parents who have lost income support benefits as a result of participating in higher education. This program provides fellowships to single parents who undertake their first degree. The program is short-term, experimental and does not have many resources allocated to it. For more about this initiative see the Industry, Trade and Employment Ministry, "Professional Training: Academic Studies for Single Parents", at www.moital.ppv.il (Hebrew).
271 neutral [space] of traditional conceptions of citizenship" that is structured according to male norms and characteristics.108
Women's inferior position in the Israeli labour market takes many forms. Even today, after years of struggling for equality, many women face biases and discriminatory practices that prevent them from joining the workforce or achieving good working conditions. Finding a job, therefore, does not necessarily guarantee economic independence and many women in the labour market earn a very low salary, sometimes even less than the minimum wage.109
Many women are often offered only low-paid jobs in certain occupations and sectors of the labour market that have been feminized over time.110 The Government perpetuates this situation when it offers women training programs for occupations that are feminized in nature. Thus, for example, one training program provided under the Israeli welfare reform offers women a course in industrial sewing, an occupation that is not only no longer in high demand in Israel but is also known as 'women's work' and unlikely to provide a good salary in the labour market111 Jobs such as these often involve also non-standards forms of employment, such as part-time work, homework, temporary work, casual work and self- employment. 112 In Israel, as in most countries around the world, non-standard work is largely
Ursula Vogei, "Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship", in B. van Steenbergen, ed., The Conditions of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994) at 86. 109 For similar research with respect to the US, see Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, "Work, Welfare, and Single Mothers' Economic Survival Strategies" (1997) 62 American Sociological Review 253. 110 VeredKraus, Secondary Breadwinners: Israeli Women in the Lobar Force (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002). at 111-142. For more about occupational segregation in recent years see Noya Rimalt, "Between Segregation and Integration: A Call for a New Feminist Agenda of Gender Equality in the Workplace" (2008) 24 Bar-Han Law Studies 1 at 2-3. 111 Yedid, "A Critique of Wisconsin Decision to Open an Industrial Sewing Course", 01/02/2007 (Hebrew). 112 For a general discussion, of non-standards forms of employment, see Harry Arthurs, "Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy" (2001) Berkeley J.Emp.& Lab. L. 271; Harry Arthurs, "Labour Law without the State" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 1 at 4-6; Joanne Conaghan, "Labour Law and the New Economy* Discourse" (2003) 16 AJLL1 at 10-11, 21-22.
272 a gendered phenomenon, since more women than men are employed in this way.113
Interestingly, during the same years that the duty to work was introduced and implemented in the welfare system, the number of non-standard forms of employment has increased and the number of women employed in these jobs has multiplied. In 2003, for instance, women constituted about 72 percent of part-time workers in Israel.114 The increased likelihood that women will work part-time is the result of several, often inter-related, factors, namely: lower levels of education or training and responsibility for young children at home (rather than in daycare).115 Researchers in Israel have shown that non-standard work is often associated with inferior pay or employment conditions and the lack of social benefits. This has the effect of marginalizing women in the labour market and not providing them with sufficient resources to achieve genuine economic independence.116
Women in the Israeli labour market also face a gender wage gap as their average wage continues to lag behind those of men. Indeed, the earning gap in Israel has decreased over the years in most economic sectors, and many women have entered male-dominated occupations
The phenomenon of feminized non-standard work has been widely discussed in the literature. See Judy Fudge, "New Wine into Old Bottles?: Updating Legal Forms to Reflect Changing Employment Norms" (1999) 33 UBC L. Rev. 129; Judy Fudge & Leah F. Vosko, "Gender, Segmentation and the Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law, Legislation and Policy" (2001) 22 Economic & Industrial Democracy 271; Leah F. Vosko, Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Ann Bookman, "Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers" (1995) 52 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 799; Marilyn Carr et al, "Globalization and Home-based Workers" (2000) 6 Feminist Economics 123; Elisabeth Pragl, The Global Construction of Gender: Home-Based Work in the Political Economy of the 20th Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Guy Standing, "Global Feminization through Flexible Labor; A Theme Revisited" (1999) 27 World Development 583. 114 Central Bureau of Statistics, supra note 8 table 12.21. Similar figures are found when it comes to temporary work., It is estimated that women make up over 80 percent of all temporary workers in Israel. Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 114. 115 Kraus, Secondary Breadwinners, supra note 110 at 107; Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 131. 116 According to Vered Kraus, part-time workers usually have less of a chance to hold tenured jobs and are paid lower wages than their full-time co-workers. Ibid, at 109. For general discussion about the relation between non standard work and low wages, see Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 139.
273 and have improved their education and employment skills. However, statistical data shows that wage differences still exist and that women continue to earn less than men.m In fact, the overall earning gap has not changed much over the years. In 1972, women's average monthly wage was 59 percent of men's wages. In 1995, the women-to-men ratio was 58 percent and in
2002 it stood on 61.5 percent.119 As men tend to work more hours per month than women, the earning gap is narrower with respect to the hourly wage - the average hourly wage of
Israeli women in 2002 was 81 percent of that of Israeli men.120 There are several explanations to the phenomenon of the gender wage gap in Israel. According to Kraus's research, one reason for the gap is that women have less work experience given that they invest less time in the labour market due to their household and child-rearing responsibilities, which are not equally allocated within the family. Many Israeli women are also concentrated in only a few occupations mat are less economically rewarding. A high proportion of women work in female-dominated occupations, which are characterized by low salaries,121 in the public
Meir Yaish & Vered Kraus, "Hie Consequences of Economic Restructuring for the Gender Earnings Gap in Israel, 1972-1995" (2003) 17 Work, Employment & Society 5 at 14. 118 In 1964, the Israeli legislature enacted the Equal Pay (Male and Female Employees) Act that required employers to pay their male and female employees equally for the same work. The scope of this law was very limited: It referred only to "salaries" rathertha n other benefits and covered only male and female employees who are employed in "essentially equal" positions, fa 1996, new legislation, which had the same title, was introduced to replace the old Act. The Act requires employers to provide equal pay for those men and women who perform "equal work", "essentially equal work" and "work of equal value". Positions are "equal in value" if they demand equal qualifications, effort, expertise and responsibilities and if they are being performed in a similar working environment. It also expands the definition of "wage" to include any form of remuneration, reward or benefit given to employees, directly or indirectly. Overall, the legislation in the area of pay equity did not lead to any substantive improvement in the gender wage gap, and only a few complaints have been filed under the Act before the courts. For more about the limitations of the 1996 Equal Pay Act, see Ruth Ben-Israel, "Equal Pay: Illusion or Reality?", in Anat Ma'or, ed., Women in Israel (Israel: Sifiiyat Po'alim, 1997) 14 (Hebrew). 119 Central Bureau of Statistics, supra note 8 table 12.42; Yaish & Kraus, supra note 117 at 13-14. See also Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 133-134.The fact that the overall gaps have remained stable during the years is explained by looking at service industries in the public sector. Many women have entered the growing service industries, mostly into the service employment in the periphery sector where women are paid lower wages than men. One study points out that the gender earnings gap in the periphery services sector was the widest among all segments of (he labour market. This pattern has overshadowed the general decrease in the wage gap in other economic sectors. See Yaish & Kraus, supra note 117 at 20-21. 120 Central Bureau of Statistics, supra note 8 table 12.42. 121 Kraus, Secondary Breadwinners, supra note 110 at 253.
274 sector, where the earnings gap is higher than in the private sector and in non-standard work that, as mentioned above, offers women poorer working conditions. Nonetheless, even if women have the same work experience, education, and even if they invest the same efforts and amount of time in their workplace, they are still at a disadvantage with respect to their wages.123 This, as extensively discussed in the literature, reflects patriarchal conceptions and structures of family life, as well as women's role as primarily being mothers and housewives, thus being secondary earners. Moreover, there are deep-rooted prejudices and biases about women's abilities and priorities.124 These biases have found their way into job-evaluation schemes that are used by employers to evaluate the importance of different jobs and to determine workplace wage policies.125 In addition to these significant factors, one should remember that women might face other discriminatory practices that can indirectly affect their ability to secure financial stability. One of these practices is sexual harassment. For many women, even if they do not experience a direct incident of sexual harassment, the
Kraus, Secondary Breadwinners, supra mote 110 at 202. 123 Ibid, at 202-203; Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 134. For similar discussions in non- Israeli literature, see Pat Armstrong & Hugh Armstrong, The Double Ghetto: Canadian Women and their Segregated Work, 3ri ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1994) at 43; Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) at 148-149. 124 Kraus, Secondary Breadwinners, supra note 110 at 254. For similar arguments in non-Israeli literature see Nan Weiner & Morley Gunderson, Pay Equity: Issues, Options and Experiences (Toronto: Butterworths, 1990) at 9; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Harvard University Press, 1987) at 24; Vicki Schultz, "Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VE Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument" (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749 at 1800-1803; Judy Fudge & Patricia McDermott, "Putting Feminism to Work", in Judy Fudge & Patricia McDermott, eds., Just Wages: A Feminist Assessment of Pay Equity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 3. 125 Pat Armstrong & Hugh Armstrong, "Limited Possibilities and Possible Limits for Pay Equity: Within and Beyond the Ontario Legislation", in Judy Fudge & Patricia McDermott, eds., Just Wages: A Feminist Assessment of Pay Equity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 110; Nan Wiener, "Employment Equity and Pay Equity: Similarities, Differences and Integration" (1994) 2 C.L.E.L.J 16 at 18-19. Trade unions sometimes also take part in perpetuating the gap earnings. In her research on unions and women, Marion Grain provides an overview of the historical and ideological background of unions and their failure to address many women's concerns. She claims that unions' underestimation of women's issues is based on gendered stereotypes and the assumption that "women's primary interests and talents lay in homemaking and caretaking". This assumption has led unions to adopt a family-wage ideology that not only gives priority to men's work and payment increments but also paternalisticalry portrays women as the weaker group in need of protection. Marion Crain, "Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor" (1991) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155 at 1162-1165. For more about the limited bargaining power of women with respect to the gender wage gap, see Judy Fudge, "The Paradoxes of Pay Equity: Reflections on the Law and the Market in Bell Canada and the Public Services Alliance of Canada" (2000) 12 C.J.W.L 311.
275 workplace is still considered to be a masculine and hostile environment. This is especially true for many single mothers who have abusive husbands and experienced different forms of family violence.126
3. Ignoring Care Work
Another key factor that usually limits women's route into the labour market is their childcare responsibilities. The traditional structures of the family and the labour market have resulted in a gendered division of labour between men and women, and the attachment of women to the role of caregivers. Following many other feminist scholars, Ruth Lister indicates that "the sexual division of labour... is characterized by the allocation to women of the unpaid domestic housework and childcare (the tasks of reproduction), whether or not they are also engaged in paid employment (the sphere of production)."127 This reality applies to Israel, as it does elsewhere. Until the late 1970s, in many Israelis families, the husband was the sole breadwinner and the wife was the sole caregiver. Today, most families in Israel are made up of two wage earners.128 However, despite the fact that many married women have now entered the labour market, the division of household activities has not changed much.
For a general discussion of sexual harassment in Israel and the legal response, see Orit Kamir, "Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination or an Injury to Human Dignity?" (1998) 29 Mishpatim 317 (Hebrew); The Israeli Women Association, "Sexual Harassment: Background and Current Status", online at: http://w\vAv.ivvn.org.il/innerEn.asp?newsid=168 (last visited on June 5, 2008) 127 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 130. The division between productive and reproductive work has been widely discussed and criticized in feminist literature. Scholars have demonstrated that in practice women's unpaid work at home has a direct effect on the productive world of the market and that without women taking care of domestic tasks, men would not be able to participate in the labour market. This demonstrates the unjust understanding of domestic work as 'unpaid'. See Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) at 182-200; Kerry Rittich, "Transformed Pursuits: The Quest for Equality in Globalized Markets" (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 231 at 242-245; Gwedolyn Mink, "Wage Work, Family Work and Welfare Policies" (1995) 1 Feminist Economics 95. Halperin-Kaddari also highlights this phenomenon in Israel: "Israel is no exception in its failure to considerhousework, child care, and other forms of care work for the computation of the gross national product; nor are these included in the Central Bureau of Statistics workforce statistics. This results in a distorted account of the Israeli workforce, which excluded these women from the statistics and reinforces the view that they do not participate in the economic growth of the country". Halperin-Kaddari, Women in Israel, supra note 5 at 113. 128 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2007, table 5.15; SyMe Fogiel-Bijaoui, "Families in Israel: Between Familism and Post-Modernism", in Dalha N. Izraeli et at, eds., Women in Israel (Tel Aviv: Kibuts-Poalim, 1999) 107 at 116 (Hebrew).
276 Women still cany the primary responsibility for childrearing and other household tasks, and devote more time to these activities than their spouses, while men devote most of their time to the labour market.129
Being caught within the sphere of caregiving and other domestic chores, women often find it hard to carry the double burden of paid and unpaid work. The unequal division of household responsibilities not only perpetuates women's traditional role as wife and mother but also affects their position in the labour market. Women's domestic work limits their employment opportunities and the time they can devote to jobs or to developing their human capital. As the discussion above indicates, women's 'second shift' in the home is one of the key factors that explain women's lower wages, their concentration in low-skilled occupations and in part- time jobs, and their inability to attain higher status positions in the workpl ace. Single mothers, in particular, face the unique difficulty of balancing paid work with caregiving. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, being the sole parent in her family, a single mother has to take care of all daily needs of her children by herself She needs to take care of their education, food, doming, health, social activities and other issues. She does not have a partner to share these chores with and, if her child is sick or needs help, she has to put everything aside to be with her child. If she needs to work long hours, she has to make special arrangements for the children that usually require payment. Aside of these daily chores, she alone must provide her children with love and attention, without a partner to share the stress and difficulties of parenting. All of these factors make it extremely hard for single mothers to join the workforce, and find a job that will allow them to fulfill their caregiving responsibilities, especially given mat they need to find someone to look after their children while they are at
129 Ibid, at 124-125. See also Barbara SwirsM, Daughters of Eve, Daughters ofLilith: On Women in Israel (Israel: "The Second Sex" Publishing House, 1984) at 160-165 (Hebrew). According to research conducted by Dafha Izraeli regarding dual-career couples in Israel, "women continue to do about two-thirds of the family work". Dafha N. Izraeli, "Balanced lives - Pursuing Professional careers and Meeting Family Obligations: Israeli Perspectives", in Shimon Shetreet, ed., Women in Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998) 141 at 148.
277 work. These challenges are surely not exclusive to single mothers, and many women in two- parent families also deal with the double burden of paid work and domestic work. But when it comes to single mothers, they have much less flexibility in the way they choose to balance their responsibilities in these two areas. Moreover, many single mothers have a history of poverty and a low standard of living that makes it even harder for mem to manage both work and daycare on a tight budget.130
Built upon a gender-neutral model, the duty to work does not accommodate women's distinctive needs as mothers and, in the case of single mothers, as lone caregivers.
Understood in gender-neutral terms, the requirement of all citizens to join the workforce and the identification of the full citizen with the independent wage earner ignore women's heavy double burden of paid work and childcare responsibilities, and undervalues the importance of care work to society.131 As Young indicates,
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequences of work-first policies is that they effectively abolish any recognition that care work in the home is an important and dignified form of work that deserves social support,132
Recent amendments to the Income Support Act make this point very clear. Supposedly, women who do not find suitable work are still entitled to income support benefits. The problem begins with the definition of a 'suitable work', because when a refusal to take a
130 The recent study regarding the ability of single mothers to enter the labour market supports these arguments. It shows a clear link between single mothers' likelihood to join the workforce and the age of their children: the younger the children are, the more caregiving responsibilities single mothers face and their chances of entering the labour market are lower. See Achdut, supra note 105 at 101 -103. See also Minow, supra note 80 at 829-830. For more about the unique challenges single mothers face, see Patricia M. Evans, "The Sexual Divisions of Poverty: The Consequences of Gendered Caring", in Carol Baines et al, eds., Women's Caring: Feminist Perspectives an Social Welfare (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 169; Annemette Sorensen, "Women's Economic Risk and the Economic Position of Single Mothers" (1994) 10 European Sociological Review 173. 131 Eva Feder Kittay, "Welfare, Dependency and a Public Ethic of Care" (1998) 25 Social Justice 123 at 124. 132 Iris Young, "Autonomy, Welfare Reform and Meaningful Work", in Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen Feder, eds., The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003) 40 at 51. See also Siim, supra note 99 at 19.
278 proposed job is not considered to be legitimate, it disqualifies women from receiving benefits.
According to the Income Support Act, 'suitable work' is any work mat suits the person's physical condition, health and training or education. The regulations specifically indicate that family status is not relevant to the definition of suitable work. These regulations, thus, do not differentiate between full-time and part-time work, and they do not take into consideration whether a certain job requires long hours or evenings shifts. A possible refusal to take a job because of alack of childcare or a conflict between working hours and family responsibilities is unjustifiable. If, for instance, the employment centre offers a single mother a job, which includes late shifts or very early morning shifts that do not allow her to drive her children to school, she must take this offer and if she refuses, she is not entitled to welfare benefits. A refusal to work overtime is also seen as unjustified and it disqualifies the women from benefits. These regulations obviously ignore the unique situation that single mothers and women who cannot afford alternative child care arrangements find themselves in. Even if they can find alternative care, the situation forces them to give priority to work over caregiving when their children are very young. These requirements can result in children who have to spend most of the day without any meaningful interaction with their parents133
The lack in childcare services and facilities in Israel is another factor that makes it extremely difficult for single mothers to fulfill the duty to work. In light of the requirement to find apaid job, they face the need to make proper arrangements in order to care for their children.
However, while single mothers are required to join the workforce, sometimes for long hours, daycare services have not been extended to cope with the increased demands of work; the
For more about the regulations regarding 'suitable work', see Einat Albin. "Income Maintenance Law and its Impact of Poor Women's Right to Equality in the Labour Market" (2005) 11 Labour, Society & Law 155 (Hebrew).
279 hours of operation remain unchanged and unsuitable for a regular working day.
Furthermore, given that women's wages in the market are relatively low and the cost of childcare is not reduced or further subsidized by the state, single mothers' paid work income usually cannot cover the cost of childcare services.135 This leaves women with two options, neither of which are acceptable: to join the workforce without proper supervision for their children, or to refuse a job offer and to stay at home without the ability to provide for themselves and their children.136 Indeed, the Government declared several times that it would take measures to expand daycare services, but in practice, not enough has been done. Most children in Israel do not have access to subsidized daycare facilities and most women are not entitled to subsidies in this area137
In light of this problematic treatment of care work, many women find it difficult to find work that meshes with their family responsibilities. Not findingajo b means that they do not fulfill the duty to work, thus being denied welfare benefits. Built upon the principle of 'sameness',
Daycare services typically operate until 4:00pm but, in many facilities, parents are required to pay an extra fee after 1:00pm. The schedule for these services was set many years ago when most people in Israel used to work six days a week. In recent years, when the labour market moved to a five-day working week, the working day became longer, but daycare services did not adjust their schedules to the changes in the labour market. The result is that these services do not provide sufficient help for working single mothers who need to find other more expensive arrangements if they work long hours. Daycare services do not fit the schedules of mothers who work full-time. It should also be mentioned that in Israel, all children have the right to publicly funded education The legislation that governs public education applies to all children three years of age or older. However, after several amendments to the law, it applies only to children older than the age of five. This means that children aged three and four are not entitled to publicly funded daycare. In January 2003, a petition was filed in the High court of Justice against narrowing the exemption from the employment test and requiring mothers to small children to enter the labour market. The petition refers to and discusses the lack of daycare for young children. See Bachatin et al v. The Ministry ofFinances (not published) sections 84-94 (The petition can be found at h.ttp://w\vw.itach.org.il/poelet/]inks/atii,a mivhan tasuka tod.doc , last visited: June 15, 2008). 135 Frances Raday & Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, "Where are they going to work?", Haaretz (11 August 2003) (Hebrew). Trie petitioners in the Bachatin case rightfully argue that, since it is very likely that single mothers will be able to find only temporary and unstable jobs in the labour market, there may be times when they are out of work but still need to pay for daycare services to keep their child's place. This of course leads to a further economic burden. See the Bachatin petition, supra note 134 section 99. 136 The Bachatin petition, supra note 134 section 82. 137 For more about the lack in daycare facilities, see Nitza Berkovitch, "The Israeli Model: Two Breadwinners, One Caregiver", A Lecture iPresented in the Fiflh Annual Conference of Adva Centoe (October 2006) (Hebrew); Ruth Sinai, "The Steady Increase in the Percentage of Working Women Stuck at 50%", Haaretz (22 March 2004) (Hebrew); The Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Women, Protocol 101: Single Mothers-An Overview (June 2,2004) (Hebrew).
280 the duty to work ignores the experience of women in relation to caregiving and perpetuates a highly gendered practice in society. The duty to work also fails to recognize the diverse ways women interact with the practice of care and the differences between those who live with a partner and those who live alone. Previously, the general exemption from the employment test under the Income Support Act applied to all parents, but was, in practice, aimed at mothers with children under the age of five. Under the Single-Parent Families Act, single parents, most of whom are women, receive another exemption from the employment test until their children are seven years old. These two different rules reflected the understanding that single mothers face more difficulties in accommodating caregiving and paid work than most women do, thus they should be given a longer exemption from the requirement to join the workforce. In practice, most women who used the exemption were single mothers, since married mothers had another source of income, namely, their husband's salaries, while single mothers needed the state to step into the 'missing husband's shoes. Today, the duty to work refers to all women with children under the age of two, regardless of their marital status. It no longer differentiates between single mothers and mothers who have partners that can help them cope with the requirement to join the workforce. Single mothers must work now as a precondition to obtaining welfare support. Society no longer recognizes their unique
138 expenence.
It should be noted that a recent precedential decision of the District Court in Tel Aviv, delivered in April 2008, made an important step toward recognizing the economic value of care work The petitioner in this case asked the court to recognize daycare expenses as a tax deduction. The petition was successful. The Court explained that many parents are not able to participate in the labour market without finding proper supervision for their children, usually by placing children in a daycare. Parents would not be able to earn an income without this supervision. The cost of daycare, the Court ruled, is an essential expense for producing income. For these reasons, the cost of daycare should be recognized as a deduction against tax liability. See ITA 1213/04 Peri v. Income TaxAsessor, Dan Agglomeration (not published yet). This decision is significant, of course, in acknowledging the value of caregiving. Its implications, however, are limited and questionable. First, as a decision of a District Court, it does not obligate other courts in Israel. The tax authorities are also appealing the decision before the Supreme Court, Second, it is argued that instead of pointing at the state's responsibility to subsidize daycare, the Court rules that the high cost of daycare is unavoidable. It perpetuates the gap between women who earn high salaries and can afford expensive daycare, and women who earn low salaries, do not reach the relevant tax level to enjoy this new deduction. In other words, this new deduction, it is argued, is significant only for women who earn high salaries. These women will join the workforce
281 To conclude this discussion, not only is care work marginalized as a practice within the
'duties discourse', but it is also being ignored in the structuring of the duty to work. By and large, welfare reform fails to recognize how women's unpaid caregiving in the domestic sphere shapes and influences their ability to enter the public sphere and to take part in what society considers to be an essential part of citizenship. This limitation contributes to the invisibility of women's work at home. It ignores the fact that women, and especially single mothers, may suffer from what Lister calls 'time poverty', which takes place when they try to combine caring responsibilities with paid work.139 Indeed, as mentioned above, the duty to work appears to be 'gender-neutral', as it treats women as potential breadwinners and approaches bom men and women as workers. Thus, in theory, it departs from the previous structures of the welfare state that undervalued care work and assumed that women were mainly caregivers who relied on their husbands' support.140 However in practice, as the discussion here demonstrates, the duty to work still undervalues care work and maintains the private domestic sphere of unpaid care work separate from the public sphere of the labour market. It still forces women to adopt masculine patterns of work that overlook women's unpaid caregiving responsibilities. Ignoring women's care work impedes their route into the workforce and hampers them in the domestic sphere of the family. Only this time, they do not regardless of the new tax deduction because they can choose to work in part-time positions and spend longer hours witti their children instead of sending them to daycare. Poor women, who will not enjoy this tax deduction, are left with the struggle to find suitable and affordable arrangements for their children. See Tali Haroti-Sover, "A Rulling for Rich Women", Haaretz (8 April 2008) (Hebrew); Avirama Golan, "Revolusion on Paper", Haaretz (9 April 2008) (Hebrew). 139 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 33-34,132. The notion of 'time poverty' can be actually understood in two ways. First, because of their domestic responsibilities, women have less time to devote to labour market participation, and thus have less ability to find a good job that ensures economic independence. Second, due to the gendered division of labour and the fact that they carry a double burden of paid and unpaid work, women have much less leisure time and experience stress and exhaustion more frequently. 140 Much literature can be found about the gendered structure of the welfare state and its intrinsic assumption about women's role as caregivers. See, for example, Ruth Lister, "She has Other Duties - Women, Citizenship and Social Security", in Sally Baldwin & Jane Falkkighaia, eds., Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model (New York: Harvester, 1994) 31; Kate Nash, "Feminism and Contemporary Liberal Citizenship; The Undecidabiiity of 'Women'" (2001) 5 Citizenship Studies 255 at 262-264; Wendy Sarvasy, "Beyond the Difference versus Equality Policy Debate: Postsuffrage Feminism, Citizenship and the Quest for a Feminist Welfare State" (1992) 17 Signs 329.
282 necessarily have someone to rely on since many are not married and the state has backed away from its responsibility to provide a sufficient safety net. Thus, the structure of the welfare state has not changed much, despite the different treatment of women, and it still continues to marginalize mem, especially if they are poor single mothers.141
Part IV: The Implications of the Duty to Work
The discussion so far illustrated how the duty to work, structured according to a gender- neutral model of citizenship, impedes women in many ways from becoming full citizens. In light of the obstacles they face in the labour market and the lack of true recognition of their care work, many women and, in particular single mothers, find themselves incapable of fulfilling the new citizenship duty. Not being able to fulfill the duty to work, women's citizenship is negatively affected, both as individuals and as part of the collective. Most feminist scholars, as indicated in the introduction, focus on two consequences of the duty to work. First, under the current structure of the welfare state women cannot independently provide for their own financial needs, thus they suffer poverty and are categorized as 'the undeserving poor'. Second, welfare reform pushes single mothers into a two-parent family model, where they find a partner to support them, thus limiting their autonomy to choose a preferred family model and, in some cases, exposing them to abusive relationships from which they try to escape. These critiques look at women as individuals: women who are economically dependent and poor, and who are being pushed to the traditional structure of the family.142 What underpins these critiques are two values, independence and autonomy,
141 For a further discussion of the current gender-differentiated model of the welfare state, see Anna Korteweg, "The Construction of Gendered Citizenship at the Welfare Office: An Ethnographic Comparison of Welfare-to- Work Workshops in the United States and the Netherlands" (2006) 13 Social Politics 314. 142 Of course, the experience of each woman reflects and affects the experience of women as a group. I acknowledge that the current literature fails to refer to women as a group with common characteristics and experiences, but that this kind of analysis looks at women as individuals (who form a group) and not as part of a collective. In other words, this analysis fails to look at the broader nationalist/collectivist implications of not fulfilling the duty to work, but focuses only on the experience of women in their private everyday lives.
283 which are central not only to feminist analysis in general, but also to a feminist analysis of liberal citizenship in particular. The focus here is on the autonomy to choose a family model and on social rights that are aimed to achieve economic independence. These critiques, therefore, reflect familiar notions of liberal citizenship that are integrated into a discussion of citizenship duties. In other words, an analysis typical to a 'rights discourse' is incorporated, indeed in a useful way, into the 'duties discourse'. My critique looks also at the situation from a collective perspective and moves away fromth e 'rights discourse' to better understand the unique implications of the 'duties discourse'. Not fulfilling the duty to work means that women do not take part in a new civic virtue, i.e., contributing to the recovery of the Israeli economy. By no longer being virtuous, or at least, being virtuous to a lesser extent, women may lose their attachment and sense of belonging to the collective. The following discussion begins with the common critique regarding women's economic dependence and its relation to family regulation under welfare reform. I then develop a new critique concerning the welfare reform as being an obstacle to women's belonging to the Israeli collective.
A. Poverty and Economic Dependency
As part of the ongoing phenomenon of 'the feminization of poverty',143 the most obvious implication of welfare reform on women in Israel is the decrease in their standard of living.
Many welfare benefits, as mentioned earlier, were cut as part of the welfare reform. In addition, women, especially single mothers, who failed to join the workforce faced a further
143 Historically, in most societies, women have bome more than their share of poverty. Many women did not work for wages but focused on household activities, and those who had paid work usually earned very little, thus could not necessarily provide all their needs. However, since most women relied either on their fathers or husbands for economic support, for many years their poverty was hidden and not much attention was given to their welfare needs. The discovery of women's poverty was part of the emerging feminist movement that put the problems of working-class women and women of color on their agenda. For a general discussion of the 'feminization of poverty', see Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 140-141; Linda Gordon, Pitied but not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 6-8; Diana Pearce, "The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare" (1978) 11 Urban and Social Change Review 28.
284 denial of welfare support. This in return led to a lack of sufficient resources for their everyday needs. Even if women managed to enter the labour market, given all obstacles described above, it is unlikely that the job they would find would provide for all their basic needs and would decrease the likelihood of them needing welfare support.144 Paid work, as Ruth Lister explains, "does not guarantee an exit from poverty; nor is it appropriate for all those who rely on benefits for their main income".145 In practice, therefore, these women in need move from being poor welfare claimers to being poor workers who struggle to survive on low wages. For them, the recent welfare reform and the duty to work mean a fast road to poverty. The unemployment rate among single mothers indeed increased from 13.7 percent in 2002 to 15.9 percent in 2003.146 The poverty rate among single-parents families increased from 25.3 percent in 2002 to 27.6 in 2003.147 Furthermore, the Nl indicates that, while in 2002 the welfare system helped reduce the poverty rate among single parents by 54.8 percent, in 2003, after implementing most changes in the welfare system, transfer payments lowered this poverty rate by only 47.8 percent.148 Indeed, the data provided by the Nil regarding poverty rates does not refer separately to single mothers, but to single-parent families as a whole.
However, since about 90 percent of all single-parent families are headed by women, this data points to similar trends among single mothers as well.149 Certainly, many single mothers already faced a lower standard of living before the welfare reform, but they could cope with
Minow. supra note 80 at 829; Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 108. 145 Ruth Lister, "Towards a Citizens' Welfare State: The 3 + 2 'R's of Welfare Reform" (2001) Theory, Culture & Society 91 at 92. 146 Ruth Sinai, "Working More, More Desperate", Haaretz (25 June 2004) (Hebrew). 147 NIL 2003 Poverty Report (Jerusalem, 2004) at 15. 148 Ibid. For more about the increased rates of poverty following the welfare reform, see Michal Krumer-Nevo & Adi Barak, "Service Users' Perspectives on the Benefits System in Israel: A Participatory Action Research" (2006) 40 Social Policy & Administration 774. For a general discussion of women and poverty in Israel, see Hanita Brand, "The Feminization of Poverty: 11th Annual Conference on Women's and Gender Studies and Feminist Theories, Tel Aviv University" (2003) 6 Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues 245; Krumer-Nevo, Women in Poverty, supra note 98 at 46-47. 149 The Bank of Israel also indicated that welfare reform led to an increase of the poverty rate among single mothers. See Plog, supra note 52 at 33.
285 the lack of resources with the help of the welfare system. The Single Parent Families Act acknowledged their difficulties in finding paid work and ensured them a safety net. This safety net provided them with enough resources to stay just slightly above the poverty line or to avoid sinking too deeply into poverty. Today, single mothers cannot turn to the state and thus become even poorer. Being denied access to social rights, these women are forced to rely on others forfinancia l support, usually their husbands or male partners. When it comes to single mothers, since relying on the state is not an option anymore, they have to turn to their families, friends and charity organizations that may be able to address their financial needs. In that sense, economic dependency is shifted from the public sphere of the welfare system and the labour market to the private sphere of family and friends as the situation was in the past.150 m any case, no matter who they turn to for help, many women cannot find economic relief and they and their children quickly fall into the cycle of poverty. The element of economic dependence, thus, becomes more and more dominant in women's and single mothers' lives.
Much has been written in feminist literature about women's poverty and how economic deprivation is a crucial barrier to women's full and equal citizenship. As Ruth Lister writes,
"economic independence has always been aprecondition of women's liberation"151 and that
"poverty is corrosive of citizenship both as a status and as practice, undermining rights and the ability to fulfill the potential of citizenship".152 Put differently, poverty is an obstacle for achieving personal freedom, self-determination and self-realization. Poverty is a barrier to the enjoyment of life, both in the private and the public spheres, as it "gives a person little
Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 111. 151 Ruth Lister, "The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics; Balancing Paid Work, Care and Citizenship" (2002) 31 Economy and Society 520 at 521. 152 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 81 at 141.
286 freedom of movement and a feeling of poweriessness". Poverty also prevents women from participation in public life. Without adequate resources, for instance, women lose the ability to acquire the needed skills and education to enter the labour market. Poverty, therefore, perpetuates women's inferior status in society as it locks them in the private sphere where their caregiving activities are invisible. Poor single mothers, as Iris Young puts it, are
"marginalized to a private realm beyond the interaction of free and full citizens with one another".154 Poverty also increases the level of stress in the lives of single mothers who already experience guilt, anxiety and emotional pressures as being the lone caregivers in their families. In addition, poverty precludes single mothers from keeping their homes and it prevents them from providing themselves and their children with adequate education, health or clothing.155
Not being able to meet the new civic virtue of economic independence, once again single mothers become less than full citizens. It is true, as discussed earlier, that single mothers, as is the case with all other women, never really enjoyed the status of full citizenship. Their ability to fulfill other duties of citizenship was limited and the institution of motherhood could not provide them with a social and economic status similar to that of men. Today, the welfare reform deepens their status as second-class citizens. Moreover, single mothers are alienated from all other married or single women who do achieve self-sufficiency through the market or their husbands' salaries. This is a clear departure from the past, since during the years previous to welfare reform in Israel, the Single Parent Families Act gave single mothers, or at least aimed to give, a similar economic starting point compared to other women. The welfare
153 Tove Stang Dahl, Women's Law: An Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987) at 111. See also Ruth Lister, Poverty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 20G4)at 165-166. 154 Iris Marion Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values" (1995) 105 Ethics 535 at 548 [Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence"}. 555 For more about the economic difficulties of single mothers, see the discussion above near footnotes 26-34 See also Evans, supra note 130 at 180-188.
287 system replaced the support other mothers in two-parent families enjoyed in the labour market. Today, while all other women can still fall back on similar guarantees provided by their spouses or the labour market, single mothers are left isolated from the state's support, and thus are differentiated from other women in terms of their economic dependency.
B. Promoting the Institutions of Marriage and the Two-Parent Family
In the past, the phenomenon of single motherhood enjoyed a certain degree of legitimization in Israel. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter III of the thesis, the institutions of marriage and the two-parent family have been always glorified and central in the Israeli society.156 For many years, the single-parent family was considered by many to be a 'broken family', especially where divorcees or single mothers 'by choice' were concerned.157 However, single parents initially were not completely condemned. During the early years of statehood, most single mothers were war widows who enjoyed special positive status in the Israeli society. They enjoyed the reflected glory of their dead husbands who had given their lives for the nation and, as war widows, were entitled to special benefits from the Ministry of Security. Single motherhood was therefore associated with making a contribution to society.158 Furthermore, in certain circles, being a single mother was considered to be better than a childless unmarried or married woman. This attitude accompanied an ongoing process of changing values among the Israeli society that slowly accepted divorce and single mothers 'by choice' as legitimate, ordinary and common phenomena This process of legitimizing the single-parent family ultimately manifested itself, as noted above, in the Single-Parent Family Act, which aimed to provide equitable conditions for single parents and married couples. Many members of the
Knesset emphasized the changing norms in society. As one MK declared, "I admire the
156 See the discussion in Chapter IH near footnotes 69-70, 133-141. 157 See the discussion above in this chapter near footnotes 22-25. 158 Helman, supra note 61 at 14.
288 willingness of women who decide, at a certain age, to give birth without marriage and raise a child knowing that the burden of caregiving will fall only on their shoulders ... our society must encourage these women to cope with their situation, which is a positive phenomenon in my opinion...".159 Another MK declared mat "the social stigma regarding unmarried mothers that was widespread in the past does not exist anymore in modern society.. .".16° One more
MK stated that "today there are people, mostly women, who decide to divorce or to raise children without marriage. We know that in the past, society condemned these women.
Today society does not condemn them... ",161 And another MK presented a similar position:
"until a few years ago, divorced families were referred to as broken or problematic families...
But as divorce became a common phenomenon, we adopted another approach according to which we need to help these families headed mostly by one person, usually women".162
Notwithstanding the growing positive attitude toward the single-parent family, the institutions of marriage and the two-parent family still enjoyed supremacy in the Israeli society.163
159 MK Abraham Poraz (Center Party - Shinui)), Knesset Minutes, Vol. 10 at 1209, December 10, 1991 (my translation). 160 MK Raanan Cohen (Labour), Knesset Minutes, Vol. 10 at 1204, December 10, 1991 (my translation). 161 MK Naava Arad (Labour)), Knesset Minutes, Vol. 10 at 1212, December 10,1991 (my translation). 162 MK Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino (Labour)), Knesset Minutes, Vol. 10 at 1214, December 10, 1991 (my translation). 163 Recent research in Israel deals with the way law promotes and gives priority to the institutions of marriage and the two-parent family. Ronen Shamir and Daphna Hacker look at three case-laws dealing with custody issues. The question before the courts was whether to allow a mother to immigrate with her son to England, where she intended to build a new family, despite the objection of the father who stayed in Israel. The courts approved the request of the mother and justified this decision, and others like it, by arguing that the child would benefit from living in a two-parent family and by pointing to the mother's right to form a new family rather than staying in Israel as a single mother. The courts presented the two-parent family as a more stable environment for the child. The best interest of the child was therefore linked to the traditional structure of the family that was given priority over the single-parent family. See Daphna Hacker &. Ronen Shamir, "Concepts of Motherhood, Fatherhood and Family in Israeli Courts: A Case Study" (2003) 5 Israeli Sociology 311 at 324-326 (Hebrew). In another paper, Daphna Hacker demonstrates how certain legal regulations encourage the institution of marriage as being especially important for women. For instance, the 1992 Housing Loans Act aims to help married couples to cope with the cost of housing. While couples are entitled to these loans right after they get married, single women are entitled to such loans only when they reach the age of 30. Single women are also entitled to smaller loans than married couples. Another example concerns welfare law. While a married woman who stays at home and focuses on household activities is categorized as a 'housewife', a single woman who makes the same choice is considered 'unemployed'. Fertility law also distinguishes between single persons and couples. Adoption law and procedures gives priority to couples over single people and surrogacy is limited only to couples. In the past, certain regulations dealing with fertility treatments were also more restrictive for single
289 Recent welfare reform and the 'duties discourse', in my opinion, have contributed to the priority given to these two institutions. Not being able to fulfill the duty to work results, as we saw above, in poverty and economic dependency. These, in return, can conceivably push single mothers to marriage and the traditional two-parent family; similarly poverty and dependency could force married mothers to stay in unwanted relationships rather than becoming single mothers. Indeed, unlike welfare reforms in other countries, the current welfare reform in Israel was not accompanied by a direct and outspoken attack on the choices single mothers make regarding their family life. Furthermore, the institution of single parenting itself was not really blamed as the cause for the 'crisis of welfare'.l64 Rather it is the welfare system itself that is seen as being responsible for encouraging welfare recipients from not moving into the labour market. Yet, in practice, the welfare reform may have an indirect impact on single mothers' family choices. If single mothers want to guarantee their membership in society, or at least improve their status in it, they have to find a way to be self- sufficient. Since they cannot always secure their status through the labour market, single mothers are compelled to find a partner to support them. In other words, since citizenship is conditioned upon being economically independent from the state, single mothers have to choose between the labour market and the institution of marriage. By cutting and limiting single mothers' welfare benefits, welfare reform pushes them into poverty and fromther e into marriage.165 Within the traditional structure of the family, single women can find a partner to
women than for married women. See Hacker, "Beyond Old Maid' and 'Sex and the City"', supra note 58 at 934- 944. See also Daphna Hacker, "Single and Married Women in the Law of Israel: A Feminist Perspective" (2001) 9 Feminist Legal Studies 29. 104 Indeed, as discussed below, many people in Israel directly expressed a negative attitude toward single mothers themselves, seeing them as parasites who abuse the welfare system. However, politicians and policymakers tend to blame the system itself. The official/formal approach has avoided attacking single mothers for their familial choices. 165 For a similar critique of the welfare reform in Canada, see Dorothy E Cfaunn & Shelly A.M Gavigan, "Welfare Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the 'Never Deserving' Poor" (2004) 13 Social & Legal Studies 219 at 233. For a further discussion of promoting marriage through welfare reform in the US, see Mimi Abramovitz, "Welfare Reform in the United States: Gender, Race and Class Matter" (2006) 26 Critical Social Policy 336 at 340-346; Anna Marie Smith, "The Politization of Marriage in Contemporary American
290 financially support them or share in childcare responsibilities, thus making it easier for them to join the workforce and earn a living, even if it is in a limited capacity. The duty to work thus undermines the legitimacy previously given to the institution of single motherhood and glorifies marriage as being preferable to other family models.166 By pushing single mothers into marriage, the welfare reform functions as a tool for modifying single mothers' familial and sexual behaviour according to the 'norm' of the traditional structure of the family. The duty to work, according to this line of argument, operates as a mechanism for moral regulation. We saw above how the duty to work dictates a certain model of mothering that forces women to adjust their caregiving activities to the demands of the labour market. Here again the 'duties discourse' interferes with and modifies yet another aspect of women's lives in the private sphere - their familial and sexual choices.167
In her research on mothers, citizenship and independence, Iris Young analyzes the argument according to which a two-parent family is the preferable family structure since it can best guarantee the welfare of women and children.168 Aside from showing that this argument is not necessarily accurate, Young argues that under this scenario, "mothers should subordinate
Public Policy: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Personal Responsibilities Act" (2001) 5 Citizenship Studies 303. 166 For similar arguments in the Israeli literature, see Amir Paz-Fucs, "Welfare Reform between Capitalism and Patriarchy: The Appropriation Act and the Cut in the Income Support Benefits of Young Unemployed and Single Mothers" (2004) 10 Labour, Society & Law 339 (Hebrew). 167 Again, it is important to emphasize that the welfare reform in Israel did not explicitly attack the single mothers' choices of family life. Single mothers were indeed blamed from being lazy and unmotivated to enter the labour market, but for the most part they were not accused of having children out of wedlock. The duty to work, therefore, serves to modify the moral-functional aspects of single mothers' lives, meaning being unemployed, but not necessarily the moral-sexual/familial aspect of their lives. For further discussions of the moral regulation of single mothers' behaviour in different welfare reforms around the world, see Anne Barlow & Simon Duncan, "Supporting Families? New Labour's Communitarianism and the 'Rational Mistake': Part I" (2000) 22 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 23; Jean Carabine, "Constituting Sexuality through Social Policy: The Case of Lone Motherhood 1834 and Today" (2001) 10 Social & Legal Studies 291; Margaret Little, "Manhunts and Bimbo Blabs: The Moral Regulation of Ontario Single Mothers" (1994) 19 Canadian Journal of Sociology 233; Margaret Little, No car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit: The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 1920-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1998). 168 Young analyzes William Galstan's arguments in bis book Liberal Purposes where he claims that society should reward two-parent family since it promotes better child care than tire single-parent family, thus single mothers should be encouraged to enter marriage to ensure their children welfare.
291 themselves to and be dependent on men, even if they would rather parent on their own, for the sake of nurturing the independence of their children".m In light of the unequal power relations and division of labour within the family, pushing single mothers into marriage perpetuates their inferior status and subordination. Given the current gendered structure of marriage, Young explains, "women often [are] dependent on men and often suffer power inequality and various degrees of domination by men both in and outside the home".170
Giving priority to the institution of marriage "ignores the fact that for many mothers leaving marriage [or] choosing not to enter [it] is not a frivolous and selfish pursuit of pleasure, but a matter of escaping unjust subordination".171 A recent study of women's 'stories of poverty' in
Israel presents similar conclusions. Michal Krumer-Nevo studied the life stories of married and single mothers who face poverty. Although this study does not refer to the changes in the welfare system or the duty to work itself, it nevertheless provides useful insights about how poverty pushes women to choose a two-parent family, where they often suffer violence and subordination. The women who participated in the study were living on welfare for years and their children were considered to be at risk. Throughout the interviews, Krumer-Nevo revealed how marriage was sometimes a solution to poverty and that women may choose marriage as a way to solve lack of housing. She also reveals how poor women were trapped in abusive relationships without the ability to leave and begin independent lives. Marriage, as
Iris M Young, "Mothers, Citizenship and Independence", supra note 154 at 544. 170 Ibid, at 545. Ruth Lister also stresses the danger in pushing women to be economically dependent on their husbands as it might result in powerlessness and erosion of emotional and physical autonomy. See Lister, Citizenship, supra note 81 at 111-115. See also Leah Vosko, "Mandatory Marriage' or Obligatory Waged Work: Social Assistance and Single Mothers in Wisconsin and Ontario," in S. Bashevkin, ed., Women's Work is Never Done: Comparative Studies in Care-Giving, Employment, and Social Policy Reform (New York: Routledge, 2002), 165-200; Abramovitz, supra note 165 at 344. 171 Ibid. Janet Mosher points at another problematic aspect of the "idealized family" agenda. The current welfare reform does not allow single mothers to maintain their economic independence before they are prepared to make a permanent commitment and enter marriage. Being pushed into a two-parent family, many single mothers will enter marriage with much less resources than their partners thus their inferior position in the family is determined even before they enter marriage. It is likely that this unequal economic standing will influence women's status in the future. Janet Mosher, "Managing the Disentitlement of Women: Glorifies Markets, the Idealized Family and the Undeserving Other", in Sheila Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 30 at 40.
292 this study shows, is an institution that women seek as an escape from poverty, but it is also an institution that further traps them in poverty and violence.172
In sum, marriage has become not merely a practical solution to poverty but a route to full membership in Israeli society. The institution of marriage is drafted as part of the 'war on poverty' and as a means of achieving national goals. In the name of national projects and membership in the Israeli collective, single mothers may have to adopt a certain family model that is contrary to their own values and does not fulfill their wishes. While the institution of motherhood lost some of its centraliry and valued status once women were introduced to the duty to work, the institution of marriage was implicitly mobilized into the discourse of citizenship to replace the duty to work for women who could not gain full membership through the labour market. Marriage thus becomes an essential element in the structure of citizenship in Israel.173 Under a regime that attaches much importance to economic independence and encourages mothers to stay in a two-parent family, women's citizenship is less than full, since they lose two elements of their citizenship. First, they do not enjoy the autonomy to choose their preferred family type but have to prioritize the two-parent family, and second, within this family structure, it is likely that they do not enjoy personal or economic independence, but rather have to subordinate themselves to their husbands or male-
174 partners.
Michal Krume-Nevo, "I got married to Get Free of Home: Young Women living in Poverty in Israel" (2005) 4 Qualitative Social Work 51; Krumer-Nevo, Women in Poverty, supra note 98 at 96-97. See also Roni Strier, "Gendered Realities of Poverty: Men arid Women's Views of poverty in Jerusalem" (2005) 79 Social Service Review 344 at 355-356. 173 Under the former structure of women's citizenship in Israel, marriage was not a necessary aspect of women's route to citizenship. While women were expected to be mothers, as part of their duty toward the collective, the institution of marriage was not considered to be a precondition for Ml membership, but rather an inherent traditional element of society. 174 For more about the interaction between the institution of marriage and women's second-class citizenship, see Vogel, supra note 108.
293 C. The Undeserving 'Others'
Welfare policies have the effect of categorizing welfare recipients as 'deserving' and
'undeserving' poor based on the assumption that they are at fault for becoming impoverished and that that they lack the resources to escape from poverty. The 'undeserving' poor, as
Michael Katz explains, are those who either fake dependence or become independent because of their deviant behaviour, bad choices or moral weakness. They are seen as helpless and passive, unable to break the cycle of poverty on their own. The 'deserving' poor, on the other hand, are those who seem to truly try to work their way out of poverty, mainly by entering the labour market and earning a living. Marked with the stigma of willful poverty, laziness or immoral behaviour, the category of the 'undeserving poor' is used to limit the boundaries of the welfare state and justify low benefits or no benefits at all.175 Analyzing welfare reforms in
Canada during the 1990s and the moral regulation of the 'never deserving' poor, Dorothy
Chunn and Shelley Gavigan argue that recent welfare policies are marked with an expansion of the 'undeserving poor' category, where those who had previously been considered the
'good poor' were now seen as 'undeserving':
Indeed, virtually no one is considered 'deserving'; even those who do receive social assistance are viewed as temporary recipients who must demonstrate their willingness to work for welfare and who ultimately will be employed as a result of skills and experience gained through workfare and other government-subsidies programmes.176
Generally speaking, single mothers have moved back and forward between being categorized as the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' poor. In the past, single mothers were seen as
175 Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon books, 1990) at 9-23 [Katz, The Undeserving Poor]; Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001) at 341-342 [Katz, The Price of Citizenship]. 176 Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 165 at 231.
294 deserving special support from the state. Given their caregiving responsibilities, the general assumption was that they would not work outside their homes. If the lack of work led them to poverty, they were considered the 'deserving poor' and special laws were enacted to provide them with welfare support.m Today, in many societies, single mothers who do not manage to join the workforce are gradually classified as the 'undeserving poor'. Chunn and Gavigan explain mat, as part of the ideological shift regarding the welfare state, "solo-parent mothers who historically were more likely to be deemed 'deserving' than were childless men and women are no longer 'privileged'".178 In other words, the narrow ideological view of a restricted welfare state and the requirement to join the labour market were accompanied by a growing hostility toward unemployed single mothers who thus became the 'undeserving poor'.179 The reliance of single mothers on the state came to be considered illegitimate, since they did not work and were not making a contribution to society. While, in the past, they were pitied but considered to be deserving of support from society, today they are portrayed as unproductive and 'parasites'.180 The public discourse concerning deserving/undeserving single mothers has also become laden also with a normative judgment about their mothering.
Katz, The Undeserving Poor, supra note 175 at 67-68; Kittay, supra note 131 at 126. Categorizing single mothers as the 'deserving poor' was closely connected, Kittay explains, to the fact that most of them were widowed or abandoned domestic mothers. In other words, welfare dependency in the case of single mothers was somewhat connected to proper, legitimate sexual or marital behaviour. Ibid. 178 Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 165 at 231-232. For more about the shift from 'hapless' to 'bad', see Patricia M. Evans & Karen J. Swift, "Single Mothers and the Press: Rising Tides, Moral Panic and Restructuring Discourses", in Sheila Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 73. 179 Kittay also explains that blurring the boundaries between 'deserving' and ^undeserving' welfare recipients reflects the shifting expectation in society that women will enter the labour market, given the greater equality and increased opportunities they enjoy today: "the removal of obstacles to women's employment has opened the door to characterizing all unemployed poor women as undeserving". Kittay, supra note 131 at 127. This belief in the ability of the 'improved' labour market to provide single mothers with jobs ignores, of course, the burden of unpaid work single mothers carry in their homes. Classifying single mothers as the 'undeserving poor' is closely connected to the problem of excluding care work fromth e 'duties discourse', as discussed above. See also Mink, "Feminists, Welfare Reform and Welfare Justice", supra note 78 at 149. 180 Karen J. Swift & Michael Birmingham, "Location, Location, Location: Restructuring and the Everyday Lives of 'Welfare Moms'", in Sheila Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 93 at 98. For more about seeing single mothers as a social threat on morality, see Simon Duncan & Rosalind Edwards, Lone Mothers, Paid Work and Gendered Moral Rationalities (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999) at 28-31. See also Joel Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Blame Welfare, Ignore Poverty and'Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 150-159.
295 A 'good mother' is a mother who participates in the labour market, independently provides for her children's needs and sets a good example for them, thus raising them to be good productive citizens. This mother is the 'deserving' mother. The poor unemployed single mother is the 'bad', 'undeserving' one, who does not act in the best interests of herself or her children.181
In many societies, single mothers have always experienced a certain degree of stigmatization, which has increased greatly under recent welfare discourses. In Israel, the attitude towards single mothers was in the past, as noted above, relatively positive. For the most part, single mothers have not been stigmatized for not working and for raising their children outside the traditional structure of the family. It was better, socially speaking, for a woman to be a single mother than to be married with no children. Moreover, as discussed above, the Single Parent
Families Act recognized them as the 'deserving poor' who should be subsidized by society due to their difficulties in finding a paid job and balancing it with their family responsibilities.182 Recent welfare reform signals a departure from the attitudes of the past.
Today, as single mothers become even poorer, they are no longer seen as the 'deserving poor'. Today they are the 'undeserving poor' who are blamed for being lazy and not motivated enough to work even though they are able to do so. These notions were put forward by the media and through public discussion, and the reform was accompanied by a massive public attack on single mothers. The media portrayed them as 'unproductive persons' and as "a non-productive segment of society, weighing down persons who work and
For more about the notion of the 'undeserving poor' and the stigma attached to poor single mothers, see Martha A. Fineman, "Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse", in Martha A. Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds., Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood (New York: Columbia University Press 1995) 205 at 211-213; Orloff, "Explaining US Welfare Reform", supra note 80 at 106. For a general discussion of stigmatization of single mothers, see Nancy E. Dowd, "Stigmatizing Single Parents" (1995) 18 Harv. Women's L.I 19. 182 See the discussion above near footnotes 37-46.
296 serve in the army". As the Israel Women's Network indicates, "the media quoted the
Finance Minister who pointed a ringer at single-mothers, presenting them as a group of parasites who were not interested in working".184 Politicians and public figuresemphasize d frequently that welfare reform was aimed at benefiting all employed citizens by lowering their tax levels. Single mothers, thus, became distanced from 'taxpayers' who deserve social support based on their contribution to the national treasury.183 These pronouncements also perpetuated the idea that single mothers 'choose' not to work and therefore are not genuinely in need and, as a result, do not deserve welfare support. In this way, single mothers are also being distanced from the poor who are 'truly needy' and who have a 'real' reason for not working, thus entitling them to be part of the 'deserving' poor. Either way, whether they are differentiated from the working poor and those who are notpoor on the one hand or the 'real' poor without jobs (i.e., the truly needy) on the other hand, single mothers are categorized as
'undeserving' and pushed into the margins of Israeli society. If in the past they were pitied and perceived as unfortunate because of their inability or failure to cope with the challenges of single parenthood, today they are targets for blame as 'bad' mothers who make the wrong choices in their lives and have no right to drain public resources.
Moreover, as part of being the 'undeserving poor' who rely on social assistance, many single mothers face never-ending surveillance of their homes, their child caring activities and their personal lives. One recent study in Israel documented the experience of single mothers (and
Swirski et al, "Two Years of Destructive Policies", supra note 71 at 6; Swirski et al, supra note 10 at 13. The belief that single mothers are parasites and a burden on society was widely expressed in the print media, as well as on the Internet. For examples, see Han Bertz, "Extorting or being Exhausted?", NFC (News First Class), (7 November 2003) (online at http:/Avww.nfc.co.il): Yael MshalL "Parasite Parenthood", Ynet (10 July 2003) (Hebrew) (online at www.vnet.co.ir): Gil Ronen, "Manipulation of Misery", Maariv (13 My 2003) (Hebrew). 184IWN, We Keep Running, supra note 24 at 8. For a portrayal of single mothers' experience with poverty and the stigma attached to it see, Strier, supra note 172 at 352-354. 185 Analyzing welfare reforms in Canada, Janet Mosher argues that by distancing single mothers from taxpayers, the state could achieve greater support for cutting social funding. In perpetuating the dichotomy between welfare recipients and taxpayers, Mosher maintains, "the state, rather than working to promote equality, plays a significant role in perpetuating the negative stereotype that is at the core of discrimination against welfare recipients [who are] generally poor [and] women in particular". Mosher, supra note 171 at 47.
297 other welfare recipients) with the welfare system. The participants talked about ongoing investigations on behalf of the National Insurance Institution that were aimed to make sure there is no violations of the law and that single mothers are not abusing the welfare system.
The inspectors investigate whether single mothers share their lives with male partners and whether they have a car or other electronic appliances, which might indicate that they hide undocumented income. Under these investigations, single mothers felt that they are perceived by society as parasites and undeserving of welfare support.186
D. 'Not Belonging': Women, Belonging and die Duty to Work in Israel
Beyond these implications, one aspect has not been greatly explored in the literature. What is the implication of not fulfilling a.duty to work? The discussion above addressed the price of not becoming self-sufficient or economically independent. As explained, if single mothers do not work, they do not achieve economic self-sufficiency and consequently they face poverty, or being pushed into the institution of marriage where they may not enjoy autonomy and independence. In addition, they are stigmatized as the 'undeserving poor'. These are all consequences or implications of not working. However work is only one part ofth e equation.
The second part is the notion of duty. What consequences do single mothers face if they do not fulfill the duty to work? As I argued in the first chapter, fulfilling a citizenship duty provides the individual with a 'sense of belonging' and social attachment. Duties are thus a
Krumer-Nevo & Barak, supra note 148 at 782-783. In 2002, the definition of a 'couple' under the Income Support Act was changed from 'a man and a woman who live a family life and share a household' to 'a man and a woman who are publicly known as a couple and who live together'. This change was aimed to broaden the exemption for income support benefits and to classify more individuals as having financialsupport , and thus not entitled to welfare benefits from the state (this is known in other countries as the 'man-in-the-house' rule). This change resulted in a great deal of interpretative confusion by the courts and by NO's investigators. It also opened the door to further surveillance of single mothers' lives. See Shiri Regev, Revealing Realities beyond the Formal Law: Untold Stories of Israeli Single Mothers Living on Welfare, an unpublished master thesis submitted to the Stanford Program in International Legal Studies, Stanford University (2006). In recent years, several petitions were filed in the labour courts against the way NH's investigators treat single mothers. These single mothers are represented by ITACH, The Association of Women Lawyers for Social Justice. For an overview of these petitions see the association's website at http://www.itach.org ll/poelet/bebttuach asp (last visited June 5, 2008). For similar experiences of single mothers in Canada, see the discussion in Chapter VI near footnotes 86-89.
298 precondition and a route to social attachments. They are 'political projects of belonging'.
Drawing on Nira Yuval-Davis's writing about 'political projects of belonging', I argued earlier that the duty to work, among other duties of citizenship, is an example of such a mechanism of belonging. The duty to work distinguishes and builds boundaries between those who work and those who do not. How do women experience the boundaries set by the duty to work? How is their belonging affected when they do not fulfill the new duty? A few scholars have looked at the experience of women who live in certain social structures that create or shape the boundaries of belonging. Most of these writings, however, focus on migrant women or women within minority groups who experience difficulties in being recognized and assimilated.187 There is almost no scholarship dealing with the gendered aspects of belonging and citizenship duties. The following account of single mothers and the duty to work in Israel is, therefore, an innovative one and relies on a general discussion of recognition and belonging, the gendered aspects of citizenship duties, and the experience of other groups with different types of duties in Israel. Since there is no empirical data that results from an investigation of how the duty to work shapes women's sense of belonging, the following discussion cannot provide a detailed scientifically tested account of how welfare reform has changed single mothers' feeling of belonging. The discussion here aims to point to possible experiences that women and single mothers may have that affect their sense of belonging in Israeli society.188
See, for example, Nira Yuval-Davis et al, "Secure Borders and Safe Haven and the Gendered Politics of Belonging: Beyond Social Cohesion" (2005) 28 Ethnic and Racial Studies 513, which examines recent gendered politics of migration and belonging in Britain; Nira Yuval-Davis & Marcel Stoetzler, "Imagined Boundaries and Borders" (2002) 9 The European Journal of Women's Studies 329, which examines how women imagine and experience national borders and boundaries in a way that reflects their marginalization in their societies. 188 It is important to note that my aim here is not to demonstrate that belonging necessarily has a certain gendered dimension. I do not argue that women experience feelings of belonging in a different way than men experience it, or that a sense of belonging has a special meaning for women that is different from than that of men. These assumptions all may be true, but it is beyond the scope of my thesis and research to present a sociological or psychological account that tracks feminine aspects of the feeling of belonging. Such an account should be carefully examined not to draw conclusions that present all women as a homogeneous group that experience certain feeling in a similar way (like the assumption that all women experience mother-child feelings).
299 Women who do not join the workforce or do not achieve economic self-sufficiency may experience a lack of belonging and attachment to the Israeli collective. Being able to establish a sense of belonging to the nation might have, in my opinion, special importance for single mothers, given that they already deviate from the 'normal' family model that is so central in
Israeli society. Belonging, as argued in Chapter I, can be achieved not only through fulfilling duties but also by meeting other grounds. A person who does not share, for example, a certain normative behaviour or certain social values may not be able to establish common ground with his or her fellow citizens. Indeed, as already mentioned earlier, single mothers in Israel initially did not face a radical stigmatization in the same manner that single mothers faced in other countries around the world. Nevertheless, single parenthood, especially single motherhood by choice, is still an unusual and infrequently occurring phenomenon in Israeli culture. Even today, single motherhood is considered to be an abnormal form of family life.
Given that single mothers are exposed to these attitudes, they may long for another route into mainstream society that can provide them with a sense of belonging. Introducing a new duty of citizenship, such as the duty to work, has the potential, at least in theory, to provide single mothers with mis kind of alternative route. For many single mothers, however, this is not the case.
When a duty is structured in a masculine fashion, or when its fulfillment involves being subject to masculine norms and experiences, the ability to gain a sense of belonging is limited to those who adjust well to these masculine norms and practices. Put differently, boundaries built around masculine standards might have a differential impact on women who are forced
Furthermore, I do not intend to argue here that only women or single mothers face a lack of belonging due to not fulfilling the duty to work There are other groups in society that cannot meet the requirement of this new duty, such as disabled people or older people who face major difficulties entering the labour market. It is likely that members of these groups will also experience a lade of belonging. My modest purpose here is to point to another damaging effect of the welfare reform on women in general and single mothers in particular, an experience they may share with other marginalized groups in society.
300 to cope differently with practices and institutions of belonging. This is precisely the case, in my opinion, with the duty to work and its impact on women and single mothers in Israel. As demonstrated in the previous parts of this chapter, the duty to work is indeed built around masculine practices and norms, and does not take into account the unique difficulties that women face when they balance caregiving with labour market participation. At the same time, this duty (as could any other duty of citizenship) takes part in creating or maintaining a boundary of belonging within the Israeli collective that divides those who contribute and from those who do not. This contribution is understood in terms of working and becoming self-sufficient in order to help the Israeli economy recover. Single mothers, who do not fulfill the duty to work because of their inability to combine paid work with caregiving, find themselves on the wrong side of the boundary line. They cannot demonstrate true civic virtue, given mat they do not contribute to the national project of bring about Israel's economic recovery. They do not take part in promoting the progress of the nation and achieving collective goals. They do not act from within and are seen by the rest of the population as focusing on their own self-interests. Because there is a tension between their personal experience as lone caregivers and their inability to join the workforce, on the one hand, and the public's interest in maintaining a strong economy, on the other, single mothers cannot take part in the current national struggle, and cannot show or affirm their loyalty to the collective. Their belonging, therefore, is in danger. Formally, of course, they are still part of the Israeli collective and the majority group. Their legal affiliation with the state is not threatened. However, to not belong, it is argued, means "to be constantly vulnerable to the accusation of trespass - even when in legal terms it is utterly groundless".190 In more
189 For a general discussion of how narratives of nation and borders are articulated in a masculine manner, see Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, "Imagined Boundaries", supra note 187 at 336-339. 190 John Crowley, "The Politics of Belonging: Some Theoretical Considerations", in Andrew Geddes & Adrian Favell, eds., The Politics of Belonging: Migrants andMinorities in Contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 15 at 17.
301 substantive terms, thus, single mothers' belonging is in jeopardy in regard to their ability to create or maintain social bonds and ties. By not being able to show their commitment and loyalty to national goals, single mothers may face alienation and isolation.191 In the two-tier system of citizenship that was discussed in Chapter n, where society is divided into national collectivity and civil society, single mothers move from the tier of those who attend to the common good and enjoy full membership to the tier of those who gain only partial membership.
The impact of the duty to work on women, and especially single mothers, shifts here from the individual to the collective dimension. This is not to say that the experience of poverty and economic dependency does not affect women as a group. Certainly, when many women face certain circumstances that disadvantage all of them individually because they are women, this results in an overall marginalizing outcome that may have future consequences for other women. The collective dimension that I refer to here, however, has a different meaning.
Single mothers' social exclusion from society is constructed here not only in terms of poverty and being excluded from the labour market, an experience that each one of them deals with separately within her own private life, but also in terms of not belonging to the national collective where those who contribute to the collective are located. The duty to work creates
For a similar analysis with respect to women and military service in Israel see Yael Yishai, "Between the Flag and the Banner: Dilemmas in the Political Life of Israeli Women", in Esther Fuchs, ed., Israeli Women's Studies: A Reader (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005) 190; Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997) at 97. Similar arguments are discussed by scholars who write about the demand of minority groups or immigrants for recognition. Indeed, there is a vast literature dealing with the notion and theories of recognition. The demand for recognition has a strong element of belonging, as these groups are usually aimed at becoming an equal and full part of a community or a nation. The focus of the literature on recognition, however, is more about the process of recognizing these groups' unique characteristics and experiences in a way that respects them and allows them to maintain their distinctiveness while still becoming an integral part of society. Belonging here is something that their groups aim to achieve or that they have to prove by adopting certain references of the local dominant group. More about recognition and belonging, see Riva Kastoryano, "Citizenship and Belonging: Beyond Blood and Soil", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 120; James Tully, "Reimagining Belonging in Circumstances of Cultural Diversity: A Citizen Approach", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 152; Yasemin Soysal, "Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-making: Organized Islam in European Public Spheres" (1997) 26 Theory and Society 509.
302 new boundaries of 'otherness', this time not just in terms of being a member of the
'undeserving poor', but also in terms of those not contributing to society and thus not being able to establish a sense of belonging. hi fact, bom the duty of motherhood and the duty to work call women to take part in
(re)producing and guarding the borders of the Israeli collective but, at the same time, both duties create boundaries within the Israeli collective that disadvantage women. The duty of motherhood, as discussed in Chapter EI, was a central part of the demographic battle during the first years of statehood when women were called to increase the birth rate to achieve a
Jewish majority in the new state. This Jewish majority was necessary to ensure the existence of Israel within the borders that were set prior and during the War of Independence in 1948.
Through their ability to give birth, women became the guardians of the national borders and the biological reproducers of the members of the national collectivity.192 This duty and role, however, created boundaries within the collective. One boundary was created between those women who produced the 'future soldiers and workers' - thus joining the rest of the population on one side of the boundary line - and those who did not give birth and found themselves on the other side of the line. At the same time, as was shown in Chapter m, the duty of motherhood perpetuated women's inferior status within the collective, thus contributing to the social and economic boundaries between men and women in Israeli society. A similar line of argument applies to the duty to work. This time, instead of reproducing members of the nation, women are called to guard the nation in terms of work.
Maintaining the national borders depends, it is argued, on a strong economy, thus women are expected to uphold the boundaries of the collective by participating in the labour market and reducing welfare costs. Here again, the duty creates boundaries between those who work and
192 Nira Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction in Israel", in Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, Women-Nation- State (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989) 94.
303 contribute, and those who cannot meet the new requirement to work and are thus considered to be parasites and a burden on society. Again, a double boundary is created: the duty to work, as argued above, perpetuates women's traditional roles in the private sphere and is structured in a way that separates women from the public sphere of the labour market. Many women who do not fulfill the duty to work, especially single mothers, are also categorized as those who do not contribute to national efforts. In both these processes of boundaries- forming, women are called to partake in protecting the borders of the national collectivity, but in practice, some women will be marginalized either because they are unable to fulfill this mission or because these boundaries perpetuate gendered hierarchies.
Conclusions
In the early years of statehood, Israeli women were expected to contribute to the national effort through the traditional female roles as mothers. This created a gender-differentiated route into citizenship that responded to women's unique experience as mothers, but at the same time, perpetuated their lower status within society and their inferiority to men. This route established women's commitment, loyalty and belonging to the national collective but did not allow them to attain full and equal citizenship. Today, women are expected to contribute to the national effort by joining the labour market and being self-sufficient, in the same way men are. This route, although defined in gender-neutral terms, has a disproportionate impact on women, especially single mothers. The duty to work ignores the difficulties women face in entering the labour market and finding decent jobs that provide them and their families with sufficient resources. The duty to work also ignores women's caregiving responsibilities and subordinates the practice of care to paid work in the labour market. Structured according to male norms, the duty to work does not allow women, and in particular single mothers, to fulfill its requirements. Not being able to fulfill the duty to work,
304 women might face certain consequences. They are exposed to poverty and become dependent on their husbands or the state for support. They may also be pushed unwillingly into getting married or trapped in unhappy marriages, and thus do not have a real choice regarding the type of family relationship they want. In addition, many are also categorized as the
'undeserving poor' and are exposed to stigmatization and humiliation. Finally, functioning as a 'political project of belonging', the duty to work serves as abarrier to women establishing a sense of belonging and social attachment to the Israeli collective.
305 Chapter VI Expanding the 4Duties Discourse': Care as a Citizenship Responsibility
Part I: Beyond the Gender-Neutral and the Gender-Differentiated Models of Citizenship A. The Principle of 'Diflermtiated Universalism' B. Care and the Principle of 'Differentiated Universalism' Part II: Care as an Independent Practice of Citizenship A. Can Care be Understood as a Practice of Citizenship? B. Does this Process Endanger Women's Status? The Concerns and Responses 1. Diminishing the Value of Paid Work for Women and their Position in the Labour Market 2. Perpetuating the Gendered Division of Labour 3. Increasing Women's Dependency C. Stay-at-home Motherhood under 'Differentiated Universalism' Part HI: Care within the 'Duties Discourse': A Duty or a Contribution? Part IV: The Importance of Establishing Care as an Alternative to the Duty to Work
The discussion in the previous chapter showed that the duty to work and the circumstances for its fulfillment overlook gendered practices of mothering. Built on a gender-neutral model of citizenship, the duty to work in Israel is shaped around masculine norms and fails to accommodate women's unique experience as mothers, thus diminishing their citizenship. In light of the gendered structure of the duty to work, many women still have to struggle for full inclusion in the 'duties discourse' and many find themselves unable to fulfill it. Care work, as discussed throughout the thesis, has not been clearly positioned within the 'duties discourse' and has not been recognized as a dominant contribution to the national effort.
306 Caregiving was considered more as an ordinary role to be carried out by women than as a practice that fulfills a national goal. In the face of women's difficulties to meet the new paid- work requirement, two solutions can be found: adjusting the labour market to fit women's experience as mothers, thus allowing them to fulfill the duty to work, or recognizing care work as an alternative practice that can replace, at least for a certain period of time, the requirement to enter the labour market. These two paths, by no means, contradict each other or serve as alternatives to each other. On the contrary, both should be fully explored and developed to allow all women, in different stages of life, the freedomt o balance paid work and family responsibilities, as they see fit. Both solutions return to a gender-differentiated model of citizenship, as they are aimed to acknowledge and take into account the unique experiences of women as mothers and caregivers.
In this final chapter of the thesis, I choose to focus on the second alternative that gives women the chance to be stay-at-home mothers without being excluded from the 'duties discourse'.11 argue that care work is an expression of active citizenship responsibility and should be integrated into the 'duties discourse' as a basis for full membership.2 In both solutions described above, the element of care work indeed plays a role in restructuring women's path into citizenship. Nevertheless, I see a difference in the way care is treated in both solutions. In the first,wher e the aim is to bring women into the labour market, care is a side constraint that affects the way we structure women's path into the labour market. In this path, although being recognized as a valuable and important aspect of women's lives, care is
1 Of course, care work as a citizenship responsibility should not be exclusive to women and should apply to men as well. Any policy that is aimed to ensure full and equal integration of women into citizenship should encourage men to share equally in caring responsibilities with women. In this chapter, however, I refer mostly to women since they are unable today to fulfill the duty to work, and they will thus gain the most benefit from the new structure of the 'duties discourse'. 2 A word about terminology: when addressing the notion and practice of care, I alternately use in this chapter different terms such as caregiving, care work or unpaid activities. All these terms are aimed to reflect the practice of 'holding a family together' and attend to the needs of other family members. Naturally, my focus here is on caring for children, but the discussion can have important positive implications for people who take care of other family members, like the elderly.
307 not considered to be an independent, separate component of the 'duties discourse'; it is merely a factor that needs to be accommodated. However, in the second path, where the aim is to allow women to stay outside the labour market without limiting their citizenship, care becomes the focus of discussion; it earns autonomous standing and is directly integrated into the 'duties discourse' as a contribution to society and a practice of citizenship. In other words, in the second path, care is 'upgraded' from a consideration to a practice of citizenship. Most feminist scholars, who analyze the interaction between care and women's citizenship, usually avoid treating care as an independent component of citizenship. They do acknowledge that care is a crucial aspect of citizenship, but instead of placing it as an independent basis for full citizenship, they prefer to focus on the relation between care and other aspects of women's lives that take place in the public sphere. My purpose, as mentioned, is to understand care work as an independent practice of citizenship that can be a possible alternative to the duty to work and can be used as a basis for full inclusion in society.
How do we establish the practice of care as a basis for full citizenship? What is the strategy for expanding the 'duties discourse'? One possible way is to re-conceptualize the duty to work and to argue that the activity of caregiving should be understood to be work.3 In other words, the duty to work itself would be expanded to include the practice of care. That way, stay-at-home mothers would be able to argue that they actually fulfill the current duty to work by taking care of their children at home, thus should not be denied welfare benefits. A second possibility is to link caregiving to citizenship, not as work, but as an act of contributing to society. Here, instead of expanding the concept of work and the scope of the duty to work itself, we expand the 'duties discourse' as a whole by adding another form of
3 This argument, that care is work, has been already discussed in the feminist literature. See the discussion in Chapter V near footnotes 127-141.
308 active participation in citizenship. I prefer to follow the second strategy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the focus of the discussion here is not necessarily on the element of'work' in the duty to work, but on the element of the 'duty'. Once we argue that the duty to work should include caregiving activities, we place the focus on a comparison between work performed in the labour market and care work performed at home, and on an ongoing evaluation and questioning whether caregiving is productive enough or not to be considered
'work'. In other words, if we choose the first strategy, the focus is placed on comparing the notions of'work' and 'care'. In the second strategy, the focus shifts to the core elements of the 'duties discourse', which is the centre of this thesis as a whole. Looking at caregiving as a form of contributing to society, the focal point is not on the 'work' element but on the
'duty' element. This makes, in my opinion, a stronger argument when addressing a 'duties discourse' and establishing a practice as a basis for social attachment and belonging.
The discussion in this chapter is structured in four parts. The firstpar t presents the familiar analysis within current feminist scholarship of caring responsibilities and the way to reform different institutions to ensure women's care work does not prevent them fromenterin g the labour market and gaining full citizenship. These arguments are introduced through Ruth
Lister's notion of 'differentiated universalism', which is aimed at recognizing women's unique life experience in a way that guarantees them equal status. The second part of the chapter addresses the possibility of acknowledging care not just as a factor in women's life that should be accommodated, but also as an expression of active citizenship. Similar to the discussion of motherhood as a practice of citizenship, presented in Chapter EI of the thesis, I argue that care work contributes significantly to society and therefore should be recognized as a practice of citizenship and as an alternative to paid work. Then three concerns regarding this recognition are discussed; that is, diminishing the importance of paid work for women and their position in the labour market; perpetuating the gendered division of labour; and
309 increasing women's dependency on men or the state. While these concerns are valid ones, they should not impede care work from becoming an independent practice of citizenship.
Instead, they should be accommodated to ensure women's full and equal citizenship. Once care work is established as part of the 'duties discourse', the third part of the chapter turns to address whether care should be formulated as a 'duty' or a 'responsibility'. To avoid intervention in women's private lives and to ensure that they have a real choice in the way they balance paid work and caring responsibilities, I argue that care should be defined as a
'contribution' and 'responsibility' rather than a 'duty' of citizenship. Finally, the fourth part concludes the discussion of care with highlighting in more detail the importance of incorporating the practice of care into the 'duties discourse'.
Part I: Beyond the Gender-Neutral and the Gender-Differentiated Models of
Citizenship
A. The Principle of'Differentiated Universalism' and the Gender-Inclusive Model
Let us go back to women's dilemma of 'equality versus difference'. Ruth Lister, as discussed in the previous chapters, presents two paths to enter citizenship. The first one is the gender-neutral path that is built on the principle of universalism and brings women into citizenship on the same terms as men. This path, it is argued, is problematic, since it requires women to be similar to men and does not take into account gendered structures in society that limit women's ability to meet the requirements for achieving full citizenship.4 The second path into citizenship is the gender-differentiated model that is built on the principle of particularism. It is aimed to accommodate women's different needs and experiences in a way that enables them to enter citizenship on different terms than men, while still allowing
4 For a further discussion of the gender-neutral model of citizenship, see the arguments presented in Chapter V near footnotes 81-95.
310 them to achieve full inclusion. This path is also problematic because it runs the risk of perpetuating women as 'different' and their place in the private sphere. Historically, it also failed to fully recognize and value women's domestic work.3 As Kate Nash presents these two alternatives, "either women are taken to be equal to men, in which case their specific capacities as women are unrecognized and their citizenship is substantively unequal; or else women are taken to be different, with the consequent risk that the rights citizenship allows and the obligations it imposes will again be substantively unequal".6
During the last decades, scholars have tried to resolve the tension between equality and difference, between universality and particularity, within the discourse of citizenship. Ruth
Lister proposes the principle of 'differentiated universalism' to overcome mis tension. In response to the question whether it is possible to bring together a framework of difference and diversity with the principle of universalism that lays at the heart of citizenship, she argues that even though
[t]he tension between universalism and diversity cannot be erased, this does not
mean that they are 'irreconcilable', as reconciliation does not have to mean the
suppression of opposites. Tension can be creative, pointing the way to what we
might term a differentiated universalism in which the achievement of the universal
is contingent upon attention to difference... if the notion of citizenship is to be of
theoretical and political value to women, in all their diversity, it has to integrate both
universalist and pluralist perspectives in addressing the central issue of exclusion
from citizenship.7
5 For a further discussion of the gender-differentiated model of citizenship see the arguments presented in Chapter III near footnotes 24-29. 6 Kate Nash, "Feminism and Contemporary Liberal Citizenship; The Undeeidability of 'Women'" (2001) 5 Citizenship Studies 255 at 255. 7 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003) at 91 [Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives}
311 What stands behind Lister's proposal is the idea that women's unique experiences shouldbe taken into account within the discourse of citizenship, and that the differentiated route into citizenship must enable them to become equal members of the polity. She explains that the concepts of equality and difference are not necessarily inconsistent - "they only become so if equality is understood to mean sameness... in fact, the very notion of equality implies differences to be discounted or taken into account so that, despite them, people are treated as equals for specific purposes".8 In other words, for Lister, equality means treating people differently according to their differences, but still ensuring their differences do not put them at a disadvantage. Integrating differences should lead to equality in results, allowing the citizens to be different but equal. She refers to her approach as a 'gender-sensitive' model of citizenship and indicates that
[t]his construction must take as a touchstone the creation of the conditions that facilitate the meeting of human need and the exercise of caring responsibilities in such a way as to ensure that all individuals can develop and flourisha s citizens. In this way, diflerence is incorporated into strategies for gender equity without reference to potentially essentialist notions of women's qualities and nature.9
What Lister suggests, put simply, is that women should not be asked to be similar to men and they should not be asked to stand up to masculine norms and practices. She takes the
Ibid, at 97-98. Lister argues that equality and difference are relational and that men and women are both similar and different. This argument is presented and developed by Martha Minow who suggests a shift from focusing on the distinctions between people to the relationships within which they are perceived. Since every individual belongs to one or more categories, even those who fit into the 'superior' or 'normal' category, all individuals are different from each other. Minow addresses the question of how to treat these differences, and in her view, people's individual characteristics, their "difference", should be understood as relational to other people's characteristics within a group - such as a family, employment or educational relationship. The difference itself is the product of the relationship, the result of comparison between people within the relationship, and often a matter of perspective. Thus, each individual must be looked at from his/her perspective within the relationship. If we see the difference as residing in the person rather than in the social context of the relationship, we cannot fulry understand our role in ignoring or perpetuating the difference. See Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and America Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 9 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 101.
312 gender-differentiated model and aims to restructure it to achieve a more equal and just inclusion of women in citizenship. Women should not necessarily change; it is society that needs to rethink and reconstruct gendered practices and institutions that limit women from becoming equal citizens. Recognizing women's different experiences should not result in perpetuating power relations in society and women's inferiority to men. To achieve that,
Lister argues, we should stop thinking along the opposing lines of equality and difference, but to understand that difference can and should result in equality. This should lead to a gender-inclusive model of citizenship that allows women to enter all practices of citizenship and achieve full membership without giving up their unique needs and experiences.
B. Care and the Principle of'Differentiated Universalism'
Lister applies her concept of'differentiated universalism' to various aspects of women's life in order to present possible strategies that synthesize equality and difference. One of these is care work. She argues, rightfully, that the unequal burden of family responsibilities prevents women from full inclusion in citizenship:
It is... within the public and the private spheres and the interrelationship between the two, as governed in particular by the sexual division of labour and time, that die practical barriers to women's citizenship lie.10
Lister presents a few steps that should be taken to set this barrier aside and allow women to enter the labour market and achieve full citizenship. The principal idea behind these steps, in accordance with the notion of differentiated universalism, is that women are not expected to
10 Ibid, at 119. Lister's arguments regarding the public-private divide ami the need to recognize and value women's caring responsibilities from the private sphere reflect mainstream discussions within feminist scholarship. For similar arguments, see Susan Moller Okin, "Gender, the Public, and the Private", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 116 at 117-124; Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) at 10-13; Pat Armstrong, "Restructuring Public and Private: Women's Paid and Unpaid work", in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 37.
313 ignore or put aside caring responsibilities, and that the way to understand and accommodate care work should not disadvantage them but should bring them to an equal standing with men. The first step is to reconstruct the public-private dichotomy. This dichotomy, Lister argues, should not be treated as a given but rather as a certain gendered structure that originated in times when men positioned women within the private sphere, attached them to domestic tasks that prevented them from entering the public sphere, and devalued these domestic activities in comparison to public activities. She further argues that the boundaries between the public and the private spheres are not fixed,bu t rather interact in a close way.
Care work is a good example here as it takes place in the private sphere, but has a major impact on both men's and women's ability to function in the public sphere.11
Once the public-private divide is broken down, the second step toward a better articulation of care work is to change the sexual division of labour to encourage more men to take on caring responsibilities. This means deconstructing the gendered meaning and distinction of the activities taking place in the private sphere, as well as allowing more women to participate in the public sphere. Unless men and women fully share caring responsibilities,
Lister explains, women will not be able to freely develop as public citizens and their "ability to enjoy full and equal access to the polity and to the labour market, together with the social rights that derive from the latter, will be compromised".12 For this purpose, governments should introduce policies to make it possible for men to take a more substantive role in
11 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 120-125. See also Birte Siim. Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 19; Susan B. Boyd, "Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview", in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 3 at 13. This also illuminates how men and women have different relationships to the public and private spheres and different paths within them that are affected by the power relations between men and women in society. Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 125. For a further review of the current sexual division of labour, responsibilities and time, see ibid, at 130- 133. 12 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 135. Lister is aware of the fact that sometimes men's involvement in domestic activities, especially care duties, is not to the benefit of the children, as in the case with violent and abusive fathers. Ibid.
314 caring responsibilities. One of the most important measures is equalizing the wages between men and women within the labour market to ensure that the gendered division of labour within the family is not influenced by economic considerations.13
Finally, the third step concerns guaranteeing public support for the care of children so that women will be able to join the workforce. This, Lister rightfully argues, is a crucial element
in the equation of women's citizenship.14 Such public support may include different means; the most common are publicly subsidized daycare and parental leave. At the same time, the labour market needs to be restructured to allow women more flexibility with working hours, thus enabling them to better accommodate caring activities with paid work, and ensuring that such flexibility does not lead to lower working conditions and payments.15 All these
measures are of significant importance and must be carefully examined to ensure that
women who choose or need to combine paid work with caring responsibilities can participate in the labour market on equal terms with men, or on different terms but in a way that does not disadvantage them down the road. Only if those measures are in place, Lister
claims, will citizenship become gender-inclusive and not merely gender-differentiated.
Lister's analysis indeed takes into account women's experience as caregivers and is aimed
to reformulate pubic practices of citizenship by recognizing and responding to certain
gendered structures in a way that guarantees equality. Once the labour market can better
For a further discussioa about the need to eliminate the gender wage gap as a means of ensuring a more equalized division of care work between the sexes, see the discussion below near footnotes 60-61. 14 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 134. 15 For more about the need to provide daycare and flexible working arrangements see Nancy Fraser, "After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the Welfare State" (1994) 22 Political Theory 591 at 601-602; RuthFeldman et al, "Parental Leave and Work Adaptation at the Transition to Parenthood: Individual, Marital and Social Correlates" (2004) 25 Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 459; Barbara S. Okun et al, "The Public Sector, Family Structure and Labor Market Behavior: Jewish Mothers in Israel" (2007) 34 Work and Occupations 174; Christine Hung, "Thoughts on Tax Reform and Policy: The Deduction for Childcare Expenses" (1997) 15 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 251; Angela Campbell, "Proceeding with "Care": Lessons to Be Learned from the Canadian Parental Leave and Quebec Daycare Initiatives in Developing a National Childcare Policy" (2006) 22 Can. J. Fam. L. 171; Joan C. Williams & Holly Cohen Cooper, "The Public Policy of Motherhood" (2004) 60 Journal of Social Issues 849.
315 accommodate care responsibilities, women will be better at fulfilling an active dimension of citizenship, namely the duty to work. These strategies take into account women's multiple activities in the private sphere, thus ensuring gender equality in labour market participation that, in turn, gives women a more equal way into the 'duties discourse'. If these strategies are truly implemented, women will more likely be included as active citizens.
Part II: Care as an Independent Practice of Citizenship
The main solutions described above, regarding the difficulty of balancing paid work and care work, mostly focus on improving childcare services and encouraging fathers to be more involved in care work. These solutions indeed have the potential to promote women's citizenship in a major way. However, they are not sufficient for several practical reasons: encouraging fathers to share more domestic activities does not help single mothers who have the sole responsibility for their children; improving childcare services does not help women who can only find jobs that require night shifts or driving a long distance, because these services are usually provided in the mornings and early afternoons. In addition, these solutions might help only in the long-term, since welfare policies tend to be implemented in a very slow and gradual way, and in the meantime many mothers are unemployed and deprived of welfare support. Furthermore, both in the short- and long-term, many mothers may still find it difficult to leave very young children for long periods of time under the care of others while they are working in the labour market. Many mothers, thus, still face and will likely continue to face a number of years the inability to balance paid work and caring responsibilities. These mothers devote most of their time, or at least a significant portion of it, to care activities. This reality presents, beyond the practical difficulties, a few principal questions. How should society understand these care activities? Should these women remain excluded from citizenship or should care be recognized as a practice of citizenship that
316 provides women with full inclusion and belonging, even if they focus on domestic care activities?
My position, as already noted, is that care should be recognized as an autonomous practice of citizenship that is part of the 'duties discourse' and serves as an alternative to the duty to work. The basis for such recognition, as the following discussion will elaborate, is that care work makes a significant contribution to society, like other practices that are considered today to be citizenship duties. In return for fulfilling a social responsibility, mothers should be fully or partially exempted fromth e duty to work, at least for a certain period of time, and should receive welfare support in return for their care activities.16 It should be noted, though, that recognizing care work as a practice of citizenship does not mean establishing an unlimited exemption from the duty to work, or other duties of citizenship. All duties and practices should be balanced, based on the needs and resources of society. Today, however, this balance does not adequately exist, as care work is completely excluded from the 'duties discourse'. The proper balance can take different forms, such as a full exemption of mothers from the duty to work during a certain period of time and a partial exemption mat allows mothers to work only part-time, while receiving partial welfare support from the state that supplements their salary earned in the labour market.n
Lister, as many other scholars, does not see care as an independent expression of citizenship, but as a barrier to women's full inclusion. Care, as the discussion above demonstrated, is a factor that needs to be accommodated to ensure that women participate and enjoy all aspects
16 This exemption should apply to single and married mothers, since both face the difficulty of combining paid work with family responsibilities. The scope of the exemption might be different, though, for single mothers given the unique challenges of single parenthood, as discussed in the previous chapter. 17 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the practical implementation of these different scenarios for stay-at-home parenthood. One of the major questions is, of course, how to estimate the payments for care activities and how to provide the payments toparent s (for example, as cash benefits or through the tax system). For a further discussion of the needed measures, see the discussion below near footnote 56-59.
317 of the life of a citizen. She is aware of the argument that care should be recognized as an activity of value in its own right, and that in that case it may require society to support women who choose to be stay-at-home mothers.18 She is reluctant, however, to support such a position and prefers to shift the sexual division of labour to promote women's access into the labour market.19 For her, "paid work is part of what it means to be a mother".20 Indeed, toward the end of her book, Lister briefly admits that asking single mothers to fulfill the duty to work is quite problematic and she agrees to exempt them from the obligation to be available for paid work. As the basis for this position, she indicates the principle of 'fair reciprocity' and the idea that care should be recognized as a responsibility of citizenship.
However, she does not provide a profound discussion of these notions, but instead relies on practical justifications, such as the resistance of single mothers to take on paid-work obligations and the difficulties in their entering the labour market and making a sufficient living. She also narrows the exemption to the first or two years of lone parenthood.21 In other words, according to Lister, care work is valuable to citizenship but it is not an act of citizenship. Earning still takes precedence over caring activities and the labour market is the route to full citizenship.
Should care work be incorporated into the 'duties discourse' and be given the status of an independent practice of citizenship? Similar to Lister, most scholars do not easily support such a position, even though they agree that care is a crucial element that impacts women's
18 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 178. 19 Lister is not alone in this position. The mainstream opinion among feminists is to give priority to the labour market over stay-at-home motherhood. Many feminists, thus, have supported welfare reforms that push unemployed women to join the workforce. See, for example, Barbara Bergmann & Heidi Hartmann, "A Welfare Reform based on Help for Working Parents" (1995) 1 Feminist Economies 85; Heidi Hartmann & Barbara Bergmann, "Get Real! Look to the Future, not the Past" (1995) 1 Feminist Economics 109. For a further review of this position, see Gwendolyn Mink, 'Terninists, Welfare Reform and Welfare Justice" (1998) 25 Social Justice 146 at 149; Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare's End {Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) at 128 [Mink, Welfare's End]. 20 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 193. 21 Ibid, at 192-193.
318 citizenship. They believe that care should indeed be properly valued and taken into account when restructuring different practices of citizenship, but they do not take the next step to recognize care as an alternative to paid-work obligations that would allow women to choose full-time motherhood with the support of the state. In Chapter IE, I presented the dispute among scholars regarding which practices could be part of the 'duties discourse' and whether motherhood should be recognized as a practice of citizenship. The objection for expanding the concept of citizenship to include motherhood stood on two lines of argument: first, it was argued that the notion of 'citizenship duty' could not be expanded to include practices from the private sphere. Second, it was argued that incorporating motherhood into citizenship might run the risk of perpetuating women's attachment to the private sphere and increasing their dependence on men. Similar arguments are relevant here when addressing the question of care as an alternative to paid-work obligations. The following sections address these arguments and the possible responses. While the discussion in Chapter HI referred to the broad meaning of motherhood and paid special attention to the practice of giving birth, the discussion here focuses only on the practice of care.
A. Can Care be Understood as a Duty of Citizenship?
Let us go back to the position presented by Kathleen Jones on the need to redesign the
'duties discourse' in responding to gendered structures and practices. To quote her argument again:
If die scope of politics is broadened by the aphorism "the personal is political," then
the arenas for political action (the architecture of public space), the depth of
personal commitment and connection to political activity, and the forms of political
319 participation are transformed. Correspondingly, new duties and responsibilities are
added to the obligations of members of the political community.
Scholars are strongly divided around the question of whether private sphere activities can be understood as 'active participation in citizenship'. In short, one of the main objections rests on the argument that 'active participation' is strongly attached to the 'political* aspect of citizenship and is located therefore in the public sphere. Personal and intimate activities that take place in the private sphere may indeed affect the capacity to act as a citizen but, under this position, they are not part of citizenship in its active political sense. The 'political' sphere, thus, cannot be expanded to include private sphere activities, such as care work.
From this perspective, it is quite likely that care activities would also be excluded from the category of 'active participation', thus precluding its incorporation into the 'duties discourse' as an independent alternative practice of citizenship.
Whether motherhood or any other private sphere activity can answer the 'political' aspect of active participation is not necessarily relevant, in my opinion, to determining whether a certain activity can be integrated into citizenship. The problem with this position, as already argued in Chapter M, is that it focuseso n the 'political' element of citizenship. Care work may not be a 'political' form of active participation and it surely does not take place in the political arena, but active participation in citizenship does not have to refer to or originate in the sphere of politics. The 'duties discourse' should not be limited to the political arena or to political participation. It is true that civic-republican citizenship was traditionally understood mainly as participation in political debates and decision-making. The citizen was expected to be self-sufficient and independent from the constraints of private matters, thus being free to devote his time to political participation. This reality, however, resulted from the
22 Kathleen B. Jones, "Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity" (1990) 15 Signs 781 at 787.
320 masculine structure of citizenship, including the civic-republican one, according to which only men were considered to be citizens who are obligated to fulfill certain civic virtues.
However, if we look at the theory itself, the core ideabehind the notion of'citizenship duty' is that the citizen is expected to make a contribution to the common good, which is needed for society to exist and survive. Citizenship within the 'duties discourse', as discussed in
Chapter I, should be understood in terms of contributing to society and actively participating in those activities needed for the fulfillment of the common good. The political arena, in my opinion, is just one possible place for participation and contribution.23
Lister, it should be noted, recognizes and accepts that under recent welfare reforms, paid work is being established as a duty of citizenship. Unlike her argument regarding the practices of motherhood and care, she does not argue that labour market participation is not
'political' and thus cannot be integrated into the 'duties discourse'. The reason for this, I assume, must be that paid work is still located in the public sphere and therefore, although not 'political' in nature, still fits the traditional understanding and structure of citizenship practices. In fact, Lister categorizes paid work as part of the social element of citizenship, a classification that does not prevent this practice from being recognized as a duty of citizenship.24 The willingness to recognize paid work as a form of 'active participation', while at the same time excluding unpaid care work from this definition, contributes to perpetuating the hierarchy between paid and unpaid work and consequently the inferior
23 For a further discussion, see Chapter HL near footnotes 66-68. 24 Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 167, 176-177, 190-194. One of the common arguments against including practices from the private sphere into the 'duties discourse' is that under civic- republicanism the individual is expected to place the public concerns above his or hers personal interests and private sphere activities, such as giving birth and cbildcare, are seen to fulfill personal interests of the individual. However, participation in (he labour market, although taking place in the public sphere, first and foremost serves individuals' personal interests. Usually, when citizens join the workforce, they do so to fulfill their own needs, aspirations and ambitions - rather than the interests of the general society. There is no difference, in this respect, between paid work and care work. Both serve personal needs, but at the same time fulfill the general interest of society. There is no reason, therefore, to distinguish between paid work and care work, and both should be understood to be an important contribution and civic virtues in society. Both, then, should be recognized as independent grounds for inclusion in citizenship.
321 position of women in society. Furthermore, Lister's dual positions regarding paid work and unpaid care work indicate, in fact, that the real question here is not whether a practice is considered to be 'political', 'civil' or 'social';25 it is whether a certain practice should be considered as an 'active participation, in citizenship. The answer to this question lies, in my opinion, in the notion of'contribution' and the recognition of care work as a contribution to society that fulfills the common good.26
Many scholars, indeed, agree that care work contributes enormously to society. In a recent paper regarding the welfare reform in the US, Iris Young examines the latest welfare policies aimed to make people self-sufficient.27 She explains that what stands behind these policies is the ideal that people should make a social contribution to society, and argues that even though this is aproper expectation, it is wrong to understand social contribution only in terms of having a paid job. There is no doubt, Young argues, that some paid jobs make an important social contribution, but other paid jobs, she adds, can be socially wasteful to the general welfare or even harmful in their effects. At the same time, she continues, there are many activities that are not paid, but still make an enormous contribution to society, such as care work:
Of course, today we can find several other categorizations and sub-categorizations of citizenship according to different aspects of people's lives, such as sexual citizenship, ecological citizenship and economic citizenship. I put aside this tendency to create and define new forms of citizenship, since I believe that the question of whether a practice should be defined as an obligation of citizenship is not related to its classification under a specific category. 26 For a similar position with respect to the practice of motherhood and the contribution of giving birth, see Carole Pateman, "Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship", in Gisela Bock & Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference (London: Routledge, 1992) 17. 27 Iris Marion Young, "Autonomy, Welfare Reform, and Meaningful Work", in Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder, eds., The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2003) 40 {Young, "Autonomy"].
322 Many unpaid or poorly paid activities contribute centrally to the social good. Paramount among these is caring for children and other family members, and doing housework for them and oneself.28
Young also points at the paradox of society not acknowledging care activities that women perform regarding their own children as work, while at the same time when these women care for other children (sometimes even at the same time caring for their own children), these activities are recognized as apaidjob.29 She then argues in favour of allowing parents, including poor mothers and single mothers, to better combine paid work and caring responsibilities.30 In another piece, she takes a further step and claims that care work should be supported by society. Here again, in response to the position that social contribution is measured in terms of earning a living in the labour market, she argues that the notion of social contribution should not be identified with having a job. She then adds that
...dependency work makes a vast and vital social contribution... a just society would recognize dependency work as the significant social contribution it is by giving those who do it decent material comfort.31
Later on in the paper, Young repeats this last point and argues that those who perform care activities in the privacy of their homes "must be socially supported in a decent life",32 and
Ibid, at 48. Young's critique is also directed at placing the value of self-sufficiency, in terms of economic independence, as superior to other values. She argues that by promoting the value of self-sufficiency, the meaning and scope of people's autonomy is being narrowed. Welfare policies, in her opinion, narrow poor people's ability to freely choose and determine what kind of a job they would like to perform. Moreover, people cannot be autonomous today if they are not self-sufficient, because once being dependent on society, they are not considered to be autonomous. Autonomy and self-sufficiency are linked together. Young argues in favour of the notion of interdependence that acknowledges the fact that most people depend on each other in one way or another, and therefore the principle of mutual aid should be the norm. Ibid, at 45-47. 29 Ibid, at 49. 30 Ibid, at 52. 31 Iris Marion Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values" (1995) 105 Ethics 535 at 551 [Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence"]. nIbid. at 552.
323 one of the aims of public policies should be to materially support care activities, whether they are performed in or outside the home/3
Many would agree with Young that care has a public value and makes a contribution to society. Indeed, both in Israel and in other countries around the world, parenting is believed to be one of the most important and difficult tasks in society.34 While most scholars do not translate care from a social contribution to a practice of citizenship, in recent years, we find a few scholars taking a further step and using the notion of 'care as a social contribution' to constitute care as an integral part and as a practice of citizenship. Raia Prokhovnik, for example, argues that caring and nurturing, understood as parents' 'natural obligations', should be "recognized and valued as ethically-grounded 'civic obligations, as part of citizenship".35 Similar to my position above, she also objects narrowing the notion of active citizenship to the political arena alone, an understanding that excludes other economic and social activities. Her justification for integrating care work into citizenship rests on the argument mat citizenship is "a matter of the recognition of a grant social status, which is not conditional upon the degree and kind of political participation a person undertakes".36 Full
Ibid, at 555. See also Mink, Welfare's End, supra note 19 at 19.
34 See, for instance, Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 176; Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" (1980) 6 Feminist Studies 342; Carol Pateman, "Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship", in Gisela Bock & Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference (London: Routledge, 1992) 17 at 22. In (lie Israeli Literature, see Daftia Izraeli, "The Gendered World of Work", in Dafha Izraeli et al, eds., Sex, Gender and Politics: Women in Israel (Tel Aviv: Hotsa'at ha--Kibuts ha-me'u-had, 1999) 167 at 170 (Hebrew); Ruth Ben-Israel, "Disability Insurance for the Housewife and What's Next?" (1977) 12-13 Social Security 87 at 93-95.
35 Raia Prokhovnik, "Public and Private Citizenship: From Gender Invisibility to Feminist Inclusiveness" (1998) 60 Feminist Review 84 at 88. 36 Ibid, at 95.
324 citizenship status, according to Prokhovnik, should be given to women based on their activities in the private sphere, even if they are not politically active.37
In their paper about care and civic engagement, Pamela Herd and Madonna Meyer also argue that "care work, defined as the daily physical and emotional labor of feeding and nurturing citizens, is an active form of participatory citizenship with far-reaching civic benefits".38 Care work, in their opinion, constitutes a significant form of civic activity and a way many citizens meet their citizenship obligations. Herd and Meyer rest their analysis on civic engagement scholarship. It is different from the 'duties discourse' scholarship in its way of justifying why a certain practice should be understood as a civic activity. They refer to several factors that must be present for an activity to be recognized as a civic engagement: the activity must be voluntary and altruistic in nature, and must also fosterreciprocity , social ties and social trust. In addition, it must be unpaid and indirectly related to the state.39 While most of these elements do not apply to a duty of citizenship, the underlined assumption here, in my opinion, is that a certain activity contributes to the general good. As Held and Meyer indicate, such activities "will improve the health of a democracy".4* The family, they explain, is one of the key measures of civic engagement within civil society. It is a crucial part of a healthy society, since it produces social capital, fosters social ties among
Prokhovnik does not justify her position by arguing that care work is a form of contribution to society. She argues that a citizenship status should be granted to women who perform domestic activities because these activities represent different aspects and choices of women's lives. She also argues that the skills and insights gained from motherhood enrich other activities of women, both in tee public and the private sphere. Ibid, at 96- 97. Although agreeing wife her analysis of women's relation to citizenship, I do not find these justifications solid enough to explain why care work should be an integral part of citizenship. Acknowledging care work as part of citizenship merely because it reflects an important part of women's lives does not explain the relationship between this activity and citizenship. It opens the door to the argument that any activity that characterizes a certain group in society should be recognized as a practice of citizenship, without laying the ground for such recognition. Nevertheless, Prokhovnik's position signals a better understanding of the notion of ' active citizenship', thus being part of a general approach in which care work is considered to be a practice of citizenship. 38 Pamela Herd & Madonna Harrington Meyer, "Care Work: Invisible Civic Engagement" (2002) 16 Gender & Society 665 at 666. 39 Ibid, at 674.
325 individuals in society and places much attention on educating children to become better citizens. They further argue, rightfully, that if care work that occurs outside of the family is considered to be a form of civic engagement and a practice of citizenship (since it is a form of participation in the labour market), there is no reason to exclude care work that occurs within the family merely because this activity takes place in the private sphere.41
In a similar way, Linda McClain also argues that care work has an enormous public value that should be supported by the state. In addition to giving other rationales, McClain justifies her position by turning to certain ideas of civic-republicanism. She explains that care work fosters children's development and capacity forself-government . Parents fulfill an important role in preparing their children to take their place in society as responsible and self- governing persons. Indeed, she indicates, the tradition of civic-republicanism is 'manly' in its nature and strongly connected to the notions of independence and political participation; however, despite its gendered structure, this tradition has also viewed families as 'seedbeds of civic virtue' and has understood care work done within families, by women, as an essential and required element in civil life:
... the idea of families as "seedbeds of civic virtue" - and of virtues, generally, helpfully connotes that families, in a good society, serve as places or sources of growth or development of capacities and virtues important to being good citizens and good people... families also provide necessary caregiving that nurtures human development and fosters human capital.42
41 Ibid, at 674-677. 42 Linda C. McClain, "Care as a Public Value; linking Responsibility, Resources and Republicanism" (2001) 76 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1673 at 1690. She also refers to the economic value of care work that provides a subsidy to society. Ibid, at 1687.
326 This relatively new approach, which recognizes care work as a civic activity and as a practice of citizenship, signals a new understanding of the notion of 'active citizenship'.43
Although not directly focusing on or aiming at the 'duties discourse' and the notion of citizenship duty, these writings broaden the concept of active citizenship in a way that allows recognizing care work as a practice of citizenship that can serve as an alternative to the duty to work. This fresh approach is not a widespread one. Most leading scholars in the area of gender and citizenship avoid taking this position, partly because they believe that the
'duties discourse' should be limited to the political/public sphere and mostly because they are worried about possible consequences that women might face. This is the wrong position, in my opinion. Care work should be recognized as a civic virtue and be incorporated into the
'duties discourse' as a possible alternative to the duty to work. If the idea behind the 'duties discourse' is that individuals ought to be active and carry out activities that ensure a successful existence of society, then care work should be included in this discourse as being a major contribution to society.44 Caring for children should be understood to be a practice that plays a central role in establishing and maintaining a strong society, just like other activities, such as military service and labour market participation.
It should be noted that, in a recent publication, Lister softens her position somewhat and is more willing to accept that citizenship can be practiced in the domestic space. While arguing that "the act of caring is not in itself an act of political citizenship... the practice of caring might indeed represent political citizenship. This suggests therefore that it is not valid to assume a priori that political citizenship cannot be practiced within domestic spaces". She even indicates that "the key determination of whether or not an action constitutes citizenship should be what a person does and with what public consequences, rather than where they do it". See Ruth Lister, "Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential" (2007) 11 Citizenship Studies 49 at 57. Although not recognizing directly that care is an expression of citizenship responsibilities, Lister's statement implies that when a person contributes to society and is involved in an act with positive public consequences, then this act might be consider as an 'act of citizenship'. Caregiving, as I argued above, answers the criteria presented by Lister. 44 This is not to say that any practice or activity that contributes to society should be automatically recognized as a practice of citizenship that forms a connection between citizens and fulfills the common good. Once an activity is recognized as a practice of citizenship, it may establish a demand for entitlements; therefore a decision about whether this activity should be understood as part of the discourse of citizenship needs a serious and careful examination. Writing a thesis, for instance, makes a contribution to society, but I doubt if it will be recognized as fulfilling a social responsibility or as an 'active participation' in society - not because the element of 'contribution' does not exist but rather because of other considerations such as high degree and level of contribution to society, which are found in the practice of cbildcare but not necessarily in writing a thesis.
327 B. Does this Process Endanger Women's Status? The Concerns and Responses
Aside from the theoretical question of whether care can be recognized as a citizenship practice, scholars also point out that, in practice, this process can be harmful to women themselves. As the discussion in Chapter m demonstrated, constructing motherhood as a duty of citizenship created many problems for Israeli women, even though it had the benefit of providing a route for them into the national collective. Similar arguments to those presented with respect to the duty of motherhood can be examined here when looking at the institution of care work. Lister, among others, argues that when positioning care as an alternative to the duty to work, the importance of paid work to women may be pushed aside, and it may have a negatively affect on the achievements of women's long struggle to enter the labour market and enjoy equal opportunities and working conditions. In her own words,
... we might be losing sight of the value - social and psychological as well as economic - of paid work for many women ... there is a danger that this difference- based stance could lead to policies, either now or in the future, that encourage women to stay at home, either deliberately or not... there are fears that policies, which, in effect, pay women to stay at home to care for children will cement the gendered division of labour and have a damaging longer-term impact en women's labour market position.45
Lister explains that the payments for care activities at home are likely to be lower than the salaries earned in the labour market, especially for men, thus it is more likely that women will be the ones to stay at home, which would likely deepen the gendered division of labour in the domestic sphere. These payments, she adds, would also conceivably widen the class gap since it is more likely that less educated and trained women would choose to stay at
45 Ruth Lister, "The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics: Balancing Paid Work, Care and Citizenship" (2002) 31 Economy and Society 520 at 524-525 [Lister, "The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics"].
328 home, while more educated and trained women would continue to participate in the labour market.46 While these reasons mostly apply to women with male partners, when it comes to single mothers, Lister's explanation for not prioritizing or promoting the care work alternative
... [is] rooted in the strand of feminism which has seen paid work as the key to women's economic well-being, independence and citizenship and also in the belief that paid work offers the best route out of poverty.47
For Lister, as already discussed above, the solution for women and single mothers should be found in the labour market, as long as adequate daycare facilities are provided, and that the labour market is regulated to shorten the working day and to allow more flexibility to employees with family responsibilities.48 If these conditions are met, then it is almost certain, according to Lister, that 'citizenship as care' will trump 'citizenship as paid work'49
- a statement indicating that Lister clearly gives priority to paid work over care work in the hierarchy of citizenship practices.
All these concerns are certainly valid and legitimate given women's ongoing struggles for inclusion in public sphere practices and the continuing lack of sufficient attention to their interests. Similar concerns were introduced in Chapter M of the thesis with respect to the institution of motherhood and its incorporation as a practice of citizenship. And indeed, as was shown with respect to the 'duty of motherhood' in Israel, women did not gain full
46 Ibid, at 525. See also Frazer, supra note 15 at 609. 41 Lister, "The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics", supra note 45 at 528. Another concern that Lister presents is that if public policies focus on allowing women to stay home with their children, it will not only perpetuate their attachment to the domestic sphere but also that it will make it "less likely that the various concerns of women as mothers and carers will be articulated in the public world of the palis and economy, thereby further weakening their position in the private sphere". Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 178. In other words, the fear here is that, if fewer women participate in the public sphere, their interests will disappear frompubli c debates and will not be considered when restructuring public sphere practices. 48 Lister, "The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics", supra note 45 at 526-529. 49 Ibid, at 529.
329 citizenship, even though they carried out a duty of citizenship. Their attachment to the institution of motherhood prevented them from fulfilling other duties and perpetuated their inferiority in society. Nevertheless, as I argued earlier, these concerns should not impede the recognition that care work has a value of its own and that it should be fully integrated into citizenship as a practice that can stands on its own. These concerns need to be addressed within public policies, and effective solutions and remedies must be adopted to avoid perpetuating women's lower status.
Lister's reasoning points to three possible damaging consequences of paying women to stay at home and care for their children: diminishing the importance of paid work and women's position in the labour market; perpetuating the gendered division of labour; and increasing women's dependency on men or the state. The following sections address these concerns and point at possible solutions. It is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, to address in great detail possible public policies or practical solutions. I will briefly present a few potential ways to overcome these concerns, and focus mainly on the more theoretical question of women's dependency.
1. Diminishing the Value of Paid Work and Women's Position in the Labour Market
It is argued that providing women with payments for staying at home with their children may motivate them to give up paid work.50 This, in return, can diminish the importance of paid work for women's citizenship and weaken their position in the labour market. Women have struggled for years to join the work force and improve their working conditions, and
50 Interestingly, this argument does not equally refer to men who would be paid for care work. The general assumption, it seems, is that even if we offer payments to men to stay at home with their children, they would still choose the labour market over stay-at-home parenthood. This is probably a result of the deeply gendered structures of the market and the family, as well as deeply rooted beliefs and expectations in society. It is assumed that due to the traditional and 'natural' attachment of women to the domestic sphere and toth e role of motherhood, providing women with payments for care work would drive them even more to give priority to stay-at-home parenthood over labour market participation.
330 'going back home' might reverse this important process. I do not findthi s concern to have a very strong basis for several reasons. First, research indicates that many women prefer joining the workforce to staying at home full-time, and, if the labour market allows for this, they will also prefer a full-time job to apart-time one.51 The reasons for these preferences are grounded not only in the desire to earn a better income man what is available through welfare payments, but also in the desire to integrate into a social network, meet new friends, improve skills, and face intellectual or social challenges. Many interviews, for example, with unemployed single mothers in Israel indicate that these women aspire to join the workforce if labour market conditions permit it.52 During the months when single mothers protested against welfare reform, there was almost no indication that they wished to stay at home rather than enter the labour market. Their main argument was mat the welfare system
should provide them with a minimal safety net if the labour market could not offer jobs that would take into account and accommodate their caring responsibilities.53 It is quite likely, therefore, that even when women are offered the opportunity to stay at home, many will still favour joining the labour market, even if in the short term they may face lower salaries and
difficulty in balancing paid work and caring responsibilities. The number of women who eventually choose to stay at home with their children beyond the allowable time for
See, for example, Gwendolyn Mink, "The Lady and the Tramp (H): Feminist Welfare Politics, Poor Single Mothers and the Challenge of Welfare Justice" (1998) 24 Feminist Studies 55 at 61 [Mink, "The Lady and the Tramp"]; Janet E. Mosher, "Welfare Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen", in Margot Young et al, eds., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 119 at 129 [Mosher, "Welfare Reform"]; Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, "Work, Welfare and Single Mothers' Economic Survival Strategies" (1997) 62 American Sociological Review 253. 52 Tamar Rotem, "They are Lost Without their Small Grocery Store", Haaretz (7 August 2006) (Hebrew); Michal Grinberg, "Each One has a Different Background, but They All Share the Dream of Economic Independence", Haaretz (7 January 2007) (Hebrew). See also Yedid Organization, "Talking about Work: A Special Project for Employment Empowerment in Dimona" (17 April 2005) (online at http://www.vedid.org.il/NewsMain.asp?id=350) (Hebrew) (Lat visited: June 15, 2008); The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment, Press Release, "139 Single Mothers Began studying toward a Degree in Management and Industry", 22.5.2007 (Hebrew). 53 Ynet, "Vicky Rnafo answers Netanyahu: I want a Solution Now" (14 July 2003) (Hebrew); Ruth Sinai, "Working More, More Desperate", Haaretz (25 June 2004) (Hebrew); Ruth Sinai, "Governmental Grants did not Succeed in Increasing the Salaries of Most Single Mothers", Haaretz (19 April 2005) (Hebrew).
331 maternity leave is likely to be relatively small. It is also unlikely that this small number of women will in practice prevent women's access to the labour market or their ability to be mobile within it. In fact, if we look at the Israeli case during the last two decades, when the number of single mothers on welfare rose, women's overall position in the labour market improved; the number of women in the workforce increased; the gender wage gap slowly narrowed down; and more women found their way to higher management positions.54
Second, even if an increased number of women choose to stay longer at home caring for their children, this should not necessarily weaken the overall position of women in the labour market, or the ability of women who stay at home for a length of time with their children to rejoin the workforce. Certain measures can be taken to ensure that women can integrate back into the labour market after staying at home for a certain period of time. In fact, these are the same measures that are now being implemented as the Government tries to push the unemployed from welfare to work. These measures include, for example, training programs that allow women to reshape their skills or learn new skills that will be in demand when their time at home is over. Another possibility is to encourage employers, by tax reductions or special grants, to hire women seeking work after caring for children and to open doors forthe m to return to the labour market.55
Third and last, it is important to establish, as noted above, mat the possibility of stay-at- home motherhood is an alternative to paid work and not a replacement. Women should be given the choice to be stay-at-home mothers, but also the choice of joining the labour
54 This is not to say, of course, that women's position within the Israeli labour market is good or improving in a satisfying manner. As indicated in the previous chapter, despite the slow improvement in their overall position during the last decades, women still suffer from a clear inferiority in their workplace and different forms of discrimination. There is, however, no indication that women's place has diminished as a result of the increase in the number of stay-at-home mothers. 55 For similar steps that were taken in Israel in the recent years, although not in a very sufficient way, see the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment, The Program to Integrating Single Parents in the Labour Market: An Information Letter for Single Parents (August 2004) at 3-4 (Hebrew). See also the discussion in Chapter V near footnotes 53-58,102-107.
332 market. Not all women share the same ambitions or desires in the area of parenthood and they may also differ in the way they balance paid work with caregiving. It should not be assumed, therefore, that stay-at-home motherhood would always be the first choice for women. Such an assumption, or policy, would bring us back to the problem of essentialism, as discussed in Chapter IH with respect to the assumed desire of all women in Israel to become mothers. Governments must therefore take all measures to strengthen women's position within the labour market and provide the conditions for balancing paid work with caring responsibilities, so that women will be able to fulfill the new duty to work and gain full citizenship through the route of the labour market. Any attempt to establish care as a practice of citizenship must leave enough room to allow all women to join the workforce and earn a sufficient income. Women should be encouraged to enter the labour market, but not as a necessary substitute for care work. If these conditions are met, I believe that the value of paid work and women's position within the labour market would not diminish but rather would provide them with a strong path into citizenship, side-by-side with care activities.
2. Perpetuating the Gendered Division of Labour
Many scholars share the concern that cash payments for staying at home with children
would perpetuate the gendered division of labour within the family, women's attachment to
domestic roles and the traditional dichotomy between public and private spheres. These
concerns are valid and must be seriously addressed, especially in light of women's past
experience as the main caregivers in the family, a role that has contributed to their poverty
and dependency on men. Naturally, these concerns refer mainly to mothers within dual-
parents families, where the unequal and gendered division of labour between mothers and
fathers is more evident. These concerns, however, apply also to single mothers since many
333 of them are divorcees who share with the fathers of their children the burden of care activities. The solution here, in my opinion, is composed of three integrated factors. First, adequate cash payments must be provided to parents who choose to stay at home with their children. These payments should be directed to the parent who stays at home, and must be sufficient to meet his or her needs while outside the labour market.56 The current Israeli welfare system provides women with 100 percent of their previous income for only 14 weeks of maternity leave.57 If women wish to take more time, they can take unpaid leave for a certain period of time, depending on how long they worked before giving birth. The other option is to be exempt from the employment test through the Income Support Act, which provides benefits at a much lower rate compared to previous incomes. These benefits, however, can barely keep women above the poverty line.38 It is necessary then to adequately
compensate for care activities to help prevent stay-at-home mothers from going into poverty
and hardship. Aside from providing decent benefits for everyday needs, the welfare system should also guarantee that women are not penalized for taking a leave of absence in the form
of not being able to claim future welfare benefits, such as pension and elderly benefits. In his proposed reform to the Canadian welfare system, Paul Kershaw recommends linking participation in maternity and parental leave programs with eligibility for a public pension.
Beyond the economic reasoning for such a move, Kershaw indicates that this link "would
make explicit that informal care provision is just as much a social responsibility as paid
work. It would overtly signal that caregiving counts as critical work performance alongside
3 These payments should take into account previously earned income to maintain the standard of living before taking leave to stay at home with the children. They should also reflect the importance and value of care work. For more about the need to provide caregiving allowances, see Ben-Israel, supra note 34 at 95; Fraser, supra note 15 at 606; Mink, "The Lady and the Tramp", supra note 51 at 58-63; Mink, Welfare's End, supra note 19 at 148-150; Nancy Folbre, "Holding Hands at Midnight: The Paradox of caring Labor" (1995) 1 Feminist Economics 73 at 86-88. 57 The law sets a maximum sum for maternity leave. However, this sum is relatively higher than most women's salaries in the market, and in practice most women receive maternity benefits at the same rate as their previous incomes. For men, however, (he situation is different, as the discussion below elaborates. 58 See the discussion in Chapter V near footnotes 143-155.
334 labour force participation when the public determines eligibility for its paramount social citizenship benefit".59
Second, the gender wage gap in the market must be eliminated. This is a crucial element for any plan aiming to uproot the gendered division of labour within the family. Even if cash payments are provided for stay-at-home parents, it is unlikely that these payments will match the income earned in the market. Even if care work is properly valued, many jobs in the market will always pay higher salaries, especially in management positions or in high- demand industries and occupations, where men are also likely to be located. As long as men earn more than women, many of them will be reluctant to take a long leave and lower their standard of living, thus it will be mothers who stay at home with their children while the fathers continue participating in the labour market.60 Once the gender wage gap is eliminated, a more equalized division of labour within the family is likely to occur.61
Third, measures implemented encouraging fathers to play a bigger role in caring for children. As Nancy Frazer puts it, the aim is "to induce men to become more like most women are now - that is, people who do primary care work".62 In many countries, indeed, such a process has already taken place and an increased number of fathers devote more time
Paul Kershaw, Carefair: Rethinking the Responsibilities and Rights of Citizenship (Vancouver: UBS Press, 2005) at 145. It should be noted that, while Canadian citizens are entitled to public pensions, there is no public pension program in Israel aside from minimal benefits for the elderly. Israeli citizens are entitled to a pension only if their employers choose to participate in a pension plan, or if they independently sign a pension plan and put aside a monthly payment. The idea of a mandatory pension plan is currently being discussed in the Israeli parliament. For more about the issue of public pension in Israel, see Yaaeov Lavi & Avia Spivak, "The Impact of Pension Schemes on Saving in Israel" (1999) 31 Applied Economics 761; Eran Tarkel & Avia Spivak, "Toward A Mandatory Pension Act" (2001) Economic Quarterly 317 (Hebrew); Adva Centre, Should the Mandatory Pension Act Lock Like This?, A Position Paper (Tel Aviv, 2006) (Hebrew). 60 Frazer, supra note 15 at 608. 61 For further discussions about the connection between the gender wage gap and the sexual division of labour within the family, see Pat Armstrong & Hugh Armstrong, The Double Ghetto: Canadian women and their segregated work (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1994) at 12-14,41-45; Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) at 141-176; Morley Gunderson, "Viewpoint: Male-Female Wage Differentials: How can tttat be?" (2006) 39 Canadian Journal of Economics I at 14. See also the discussions in Chapter V near footnotes 117-125. 62 Frazer, supra note 15 at 611. See also Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do about It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 235-236.
335 to their children and other domestic activities. In the UK, several measures have been taken to challenge the traditional gendered division of labour. Fathers, for example, are allowed to take six months of paternity leave when mothers are going back to work. This measure,
Lister argues, still suffers from several limitations. Fathers do not have an independent right to this leave but depend on the mother's willingness to split maternity leave with them.
They are also paid at a relatively low flat rate.63 In Israel, a similar step has been taken in recent years to shift the gendered culture of work and to emphasize men's role in childcare.
Men are allowed to take a parental leave following the maternity leave of their female partners. The leave itself is, however, very short - only three to six weeks out of total of 14 weeks of maternity leave formothers. 64 As in the case of the UK, the success of the program is limited by the lower benefits paid for this leave, which are significantly lower than the income of many fathers.65 Not only do these low rates prevent fathers from taking a more substantial role in childcare, but they also reflect a lack of acknowledgment of the value and importance of care activities. In practice, between 1998 and 2005, about 150 fathers took parental leave per year, only 0.2 percent of all fathers who were entitled to this leave.66
These two limitations - the length of the leave and the rate of benefits paid for it - must be amended to ensure mat providing parents with cash payments for care activities does not
63 Ruth Lister, "Children (but not Women) First: New Labour, Child Welfare and Gender" (2006) 26 Critical Social Policy 315 at 318-319. A similar critique is directed toward the Canadian welfare system and the treatment of fathers who take parental leave. See Kershaw, supra note 59 at 131-132. 64 Men are allowed to take a parental leave only if their wives choose to shorten her maternity leave. Parental leave must also be continuous. Recently the length of maternity leave was extended from 12 to 14 weeks. It was suggested that the extra weeks would be given to women only if their husbands also take two weeks of parental leave. That way, the extension of the leave would serve as an incentive for men to take part in the parental leave. The proposal, however, was not adopted. See the 2006 Bill Women's Employment Act (Amendment - Parental Leave for Men). See also Guy Davidov, "A Leave for Men Only", Haaretz (4 April 2007) (Hebrew). 65 As noted above, the rate of parental/maternity leave is set at 100 percent of the previous income, but up to a certain amount. While for most women, this sum is usually higher than their monthly income, but for many men this sum is lower than their monthly income, thus it is more economically efficient for men to stay in the labour market than taking a parental leave. See Ruth Sinai, "Only 157 Men took Parental Leave in 2005", Haaretz (28 August 2006) (Hebrew). 66 Merav Sarig, "Parental Leave for Men", Haaretz (25 June 2004) (Hebrew).
336 perpetuate the traditional culture of labour within the family. In addition to the changes in the welfare system, certain changes must take place in the labour market structure, especially in the norms regulating employment hours. In Israel, as in many countries around the world, men tend to work overtime many days of the month, resulting in them having less time to devote to domestic activities. Any policy framework aimed at encouraging men to participate in care activities should adopt certain initiatives that reduce standard full-time work hours or further limit the number of overtime hours employees are allowed to work.68
3. Increasing Women's Dependency
One of the main concerns about stay-at-home motherhood is increasing women's dependency on men or the state. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, once women decide to stay at home rather than join the labour market, they must rely on another resource to provide them with some income. A few women might depand on their savings or family money. Most women, however, have no such option and will have to turn to their male partners, in case of cohabited women, or to the state, in the case of single mothers. They become, in these circumstances, 'dependents'. Even if benefits are paid separately and directly to cohabited women, thus eliminating their dependence on their partners, they still
To further encourage fathers to share more caring responsibilities, Kershaw suggests that a substantial portion of parental leave should be reserved exclusively for fathers, and if they decide not to take leave, this reserved time should be reduced from the total leave that mothers and fathers can share. See Kershaw, supra note 59 at 139. 68 Ibid, at 139. The UK has taken certain steps to encourage part-time employment that would allow fathers to take upon themselves more caring responsibilities and mothers to better combine paid work with caregiving. See Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Fairness at Work, CM 3968 (London: The Stationery Office, 1998); DTI, Balancing Work and Family Life: Enhancing Choice and Support for Parents (London: The Stationery Office, 2003); Mark Jeffery, "Not Really Going to Work? Of the Directive on Part-Time Work, 'Atypical Work' and Attempts to Regulate It" (1998) 27 Industrial Law Journal 193; Joanne Conaghan, "Women, work and Family: A British Revolution?", in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (United States: Oxford University press, 2002) 53. Such initiatives must carefully examine and guarantee employment and welfare rights for part-time workers who currently suffer from poorer working conditions and less employment protection. See Aileen McColgan, "Missing the Point? The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000", (2000) 29 Industrial Law Journal 260; Aileen McColgan, "Family friendly frolics? The Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999" (2000) 29 Industrial Law Journal 125; Arne L. Kalleberg, "Part-Time Work and Workers in the United-States: Correlates and Policy Issues" (1995) 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 771.
337 depend on the state for financial support. This is a almost certain scenario. Women who stay outside the labour market are, inevitably, dependent on others for financial support.
Being dependents, as discussed in the previous chapter, these women are often exposed to stigmatization, limited choices and abusive relationships. Beyond these concerns, allowing women to stay at home with their children while they rely on public funds is contrary to a traditional and dominant component of the 'duties discourse': self-sufficiency. As Young puts it, "independence is an important citizen virtue in the modem democratic republic, because it enables citizens to come together in public on relatively free and equal terms".70
This tradition, of course, applied to the male-citizen, who was the head of the family and independent of domestic activities for which women were responsible. This understanding of self-sufficiency, then, created the gendered division of labour and saw women as non- citizens or, at best, second-class citizens who could not achieve independence. Even today, this notion of self-sufficiency, as discussed earlier, is very central in the discourse of citizenship: those who are not independent are not considered to be full and equal citizens.71
Being such a central component of citizenship, it is understandable why many scholars are so reluctant to incorporate structures that increase women's dependency into citizenship.
Iris Young refers to the dilemma of promoting the practice of care in society that idolizes self-sufficiency. She proposes differentiating between the two meanings of independence: autonomy and self-sufficiency. Autonomy here means "to be able to meet choices about one's life and to act on those choices without having to obey others, meet their conditions, or fear their threats and punishments", while self-sufficiency means "not needing help or
Thus, women may escape poverty, but still become economically dependent on the state. Frazer, supra note 15 at 608. 70 Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence", supra note 31 at 546. n Ibid, at 547.
338 support from anyone in meeting one's needs and carrying out one's life plans". The current understanding of independence, Young explains, links together these two concepts since only those who provide for themselves enjoy the autonomy in their personal lives.
Others, and women among them, who do not meet their own needs, and are unable to freely make choices and plans, face unequal power relations with those upon whom they depend.
This link, she argues, leads to injustice and should be broken. Autonomy and self- sufficiency should not be linked together; those who are not self-sufficient should still be autonomous and full citizens in society. The ideal of independence as self-sufficiency should be withdraw from the value of autonomy: "independence as being able to make choices about one's life without coercion or threat should be thought of as a liberal right, respected equally in all citizens".73 What Young rightfully argues, in other words, is that independence in its economic meaning should not be seen as a crucial condition of citizenship. Otherwise, asking women to achieve economic independence leads back to the traditional structure of citizenship and merely applies it to women, while ignoring their unpaid work at home. This would not undermine the masculine model of citizenship and independence.74 Young then argues that society must provide those who do not have a paid job for achieving autonomy with proper material resources. Caregivers will not be self- sufficient but they will still be independent in the sense of being autonomous.75
72 Ibid, at 548-549. Young's initial suggestion is that the notion of independence should not continue to be considered as a basic civic virtue. However, in light of the wide identification people experience with this value, she suggests redefining the meaning of independence. 73 Ibid, at 550. See also her discussion in Young, "Autonomy", supra note 27 at 43-46. 74 See also Susan James, "The Good-Enough Citizen: Female Citizenship and Independence", in Gisela Bock & Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992)48 at 55-57. 75 Being autonomous, however, means more than just receiving adequate material support. It also means that such support should be given in a way that allows the recipients to control their lives and make decisions in a free and unconditional way. Providing caregivers with welfare benefits opens the way to a process of regulating their private lives, thus special measures should be implemented to avoid this consequence. The issue of caregivers' privacy and freedom from state interference will be discussed below when addressing the definition of care as a 'duty' or a 'responsibility'.
339 However, even though they may become autonomous in their private lives, welfare recipients would still face the negative stigma of being 'dependents' since they cannot independently provide for themselves through the labour market, thus relying on the state for support.76 What is needed in this situation, therefore, is not merely providing caregivers with material support that allows them to be autonomous, but also uprooting the negative connotation of 'welfare dependency'.77 A useful concept here is that of 'interdependence'.
Young maintains that most citizens in society require some level of material support and, at some point of their lives, they experience dependency in one way or another. She refers to it as an 'intricate economic interdependence'.78 There is an obvious interdependence between paid work in the labour market and unpaid work in the home. As indicated earlier and, as many feminist scholars have pointed out, the distinction between the salary-earner (the independent) and the caregiver (the dependent) is extremely artificial, since the former depends on the latter to perform all the domestic activities, thus allowing the other to participate in the labour market Both the salary-earner and the caregiver therefore depend on each other. As Diana Pearce indicates,
Those in paid employment outside the home environment could not be "independent" without the support system provided by the home or its surrogates, such as "housewives" and day care centers. Such workers' "independence" could not occur without the hidden and unrecognized dependence the workers have on
76 See also the discussion about the 'undeserving poor' in Chapter V, near footnotes 174-185. 77 For an analysis regarding the roots of the negative connotation of 'welfare dependency', see Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "A Genealogy of 'Dependency'; Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State", in Nancy Fraser, ed., Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections an the "Postsocialist" Condition (New York: Routledge, 1997) at 121. 78 Young, "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence", supra note 31 at 549. Such dependency occurs even within the labour market itself, as employees depend on their employers, and employers themselves depend on economic forces and changes. Both employees and employers, thus, depend on others for their livelihood. It is artificial, therefore, to understand paid work as a source of independence, unless we narrow the notion of 'independence' to independence from the support of the state. This understanding, however, reflects political and ideological interests that intensify disrespect for unpaid work preformed in the domestic sphere. See also Eva Feder Kittay, "Welfare, Dependency and a Public Ethic of Care" (1998) 25 Social Justice 123 at 135.
340 others. At the heart of this false dichotomy, of course, is the devaluation of the work that women perform, as those who take care of "dependents" as well as "independents".79
In the same manner, society depends on caregivers to nurture the next generation and fulfill their responsibilities towards their children. This care work, on which society depends and which results in the dependency of caregivers, should be recognized as a social contribution that obligates society to attend to the well-being of the caretaker.80 Once society recognizes the importance of care work and attaches a true value to it, then the dichotomy between
'dependency' and 'independency', and between paid work and care work, is uprooted. Only such an agenda, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon argues, can rehabilitate dependency as a
'normal' human quality that does not necessarily reduce self-esteem.81 To further support their position, Fraser and Gordon distinguish between socially necessary dependence that is an "inescapable feature of the human condition, experienced particularly intensely in the beginning and end of the life cycle" and surplus dependence that is "rooted in unjust and potentially remediable social institutions".82 This distinction, they go on to explain, can be
useful to revalue socially necessary dependence:
This means challenging the hyperbolic masculinist-capitalist view that the normal human condition is independence and that dependence is deviant. It entails building and institutionalizing respect for the activity of caring for those who are necessarily dependent... then, what is now the unpaid and unrecognized care-giving work of
79 Diana Pearce, "Welfare is Not for Women: Way the War on Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty", in Linda Gordon, ed., Women, the State and Welfare (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990) 265 at 275. See also Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, supra note 7 at 109-110; Young, "Autonomy", supra note 27 at 46-47. 80 Kittay, supra note 78 at 134-135. 81 Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "Dependency Demystified: Inscriptions of Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State" (1994) 4 Social Politics at 22-23. 82 Ibid, at 24. This distinction rests on Herbert Marcuse's distinction in Eros and Civilization (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995) between socially necessary repression and surplus repression.
341 women would be revealeda s cracial to society, and the surplus dependence that currently adheres to those who perform this work would be eliminated.83
The concept of 'interdependence' has indeed the potential to uproot the negative stigma attached to the notion of welfare dependency. To incorporate this idea of reciprocal dependency into public discourse, a clear statement must be made by politicians and public figures regarding the new understanding of welfare dependency. It must emphasize that
'dependence' is not a dirty word and that 'interdependence' is the norm. This can be done through public campaigns, parliamentary discussions and documents, legislation, the media and the education system.
C. Stay-at-home Motherhood under the Principle of Differentiated Universalism'
To briefly summarize the discussion above, I turn back to Lister's notion of 'differentiated universalism'. I see no reason why stay-at-home motherhood cannot rest upon this principl e, providing that all measures mentioned above are implemented. The principle of
'differentiated universalism', as discussed, is aimed at building a bridge between equality and difference. This bridge intends to pave the way for women to enter citizenship on their own terms, by allowing them to maintain their experiences and interests, without running the risk of perpetuating their inferiority in society. In other words, women should be able to enter citizenship as 'different' but also enjoy equal standing with men. This principle reflects a shift from focusing only on women's differences or the dichotomy between sameness and differences to a wider understanding of gendered practices and institutions in society. If applied to the 'duties discourse', the principle of'differentiated universalism' opens the door
Ibid, at 24.
342 to two possible strategies. The firston e is to allow women to carry out the same duties that men fulfill, but to reformulate the conditions for fulfilling these duties in accordance with women unique experiences, thus ensuring that women can fulfill the duty, and gain the benefits of carrying it out. Lister applies this strategy to the practice of paid work, and argues that women's route into the labour market should accommodate their unique experiences and needs in such a way that ensures equal social and economic standing. The labour market, as a highly gendered institution, should be restructured to recognize and accommodate the challenges women face when combining paid work with caregiving.
The second strategy that implements the principle of'differentiated universalism' is to adopt into the 'duties discourse' practices from the private sphere that characterize many women's lives, and to reform them in such a manner that guarantees women equal citizenship. In other words, under this strategy, women could participate in practices that are different than those practiced by men, and still enjoy full and equal citizenship. The practice of care, in my opinion, if shaped according to the ideas presented above, reflects the principle of
'differentiated universalism'. Integrating care work into citizenship through the 'duties discourse' allows women to choose full-time motherhood, as a basis for their inclusion in citizenship, and at the same time contribute to the common good of their society. Under this structure, women's inclusion in citizenship through gendered practices must be shaped to give them equal status, despite their different locations and diversity. For this purpose, as discussed above, the proper value of care for citizenship must be recognized. Cash payments need to be made to women who stay at home to care for their children, and proper measures
84 These two strategies are very similar to the two strategies presented in Chapter HI when discussing the integration of the notion of difference' into the 'duties discourse. The main distinction between these two sets of strategies is in their focus and result. The 'difference strategies' were aimed to bring women into citizenship based on their differences. The main concern of this approach was to respond to the previous agenda that focused on the principle of sameness and to take into account women's differences. The principle of 'differentiated universalism' is built upon these ideas but takes another step to ensure that taking into account women's differences does not disadvantage them in the long run, and to provide the necessary tools to ensure equality, even when women enter citizenship on different terms.
343 must be established to ensure women's access to education and training once they decide to rejoin the labour market. All of this will provide a policy framework that incorporates care into citizenship without undermining the progress for gender equality. Under this model, women would be able to shift between being the citizen-earner and the citizen-carer without weakening their position in the labour market in the long run. Women would be able to enter citizenship in a way that both recognizes gendered practices and guarantees equal citizenship, bom in terms of rights, opportunities and independence, as well as in terms of belonging to their collective.
Part EH: Care within the 'Duties Discourse': A Duty or a Contribution?
When unpaid care work is incorporated into the 'duties discourse', special attention should be given to defining care as a 'duty'. Do we really want to create a 'duty' for women toward society regarding the care of children? In my opinion, policymakers should refrain from defining care work as a 'duty' but rather should label it as a 'contribution' or
'responsibility'. This has much to do with one possible limitation of the 'duties discourse', namely, the stigmatizing of those who do not fulfill the duty. Ctoce care work is defined as a
'duty', it may evoke a strong negative reaction within society toward women who give priority to labour market activities over caring responsibilities, as is commonly expected for most women to do. In fact, even today when care is not integrated into the 'duties
discourse', women who do not devote 'enough' time to their children are already viewed in
a disapproving way. Societal expectations already present women with the constant
dilemma of how to balance paid and care work. Integrating care work into the 'duties
discourse', of course, should aim not to perpetuate this stigma Rather, any chosen policy
should approve women's choice to devote their time to care work, while also approving
344 women's choice to give priority to paid work. This can be achieved by implementing public policies with a clear message that 'care as asocial responsibility' is aimed to serve as an alternative to the duty to work and that it is by no means women's sole or primary responsibility. Integrating care work into the 'duties discourse' does not mean that society creates a new obligation for parents, which is more likely to fall on women. The idea here is to recognize a practice that already exists in society and that many women choose or are pushed to fulfill as part of their everyday responsibilities. Care work, which is already present in society, should not be constituted as a new additional citizenship duty for all citizens, but rather be given its true recognition as a social responsibility that many citizens carry out. Sufficient measures, as mentioned above, must be taken, therefore, to integrate women into the labour market in a way that values and responds to their caring responsibilities, thus leaving women with the real alternative to choose labour market participation. When care work is understood to be a 'contribution' and 'responsibility' rather than a 'duty toward society', it leaves the door open to balancing this practice against other forms of participation, thus allowing women to contribute to society through the labour market. Women who choose to minimize caring responsibilities will not, and should not, be seen as not fulfilling a 'duty', but rather as choosing to contribute to society on different terms. Refraining from defining care as a 'duty' makes it easier for society, I believe, to understand that this practice can be balanced against other activities women choose in the course of their lives.
Another concern here is the danger of over-supervising women's choices and practices in their private life. Scholars have warned that public measures can conceivably interfere with different aspect of women's private and intimate lives. If governments decide to support
85 This applies as long as all parents fulfill their basic parenting obligations, as reflected in the criminal code.
345 women and provide them with certain payments for the time when they stay at home and care for their children, some people may argue in favour of supervising these women's lives to make sure that they indeed devote their time to care activities. This supervision is even more justified, in the eyes of the public, when certain behaviour is defined as a 'duty' rather than as a contribution to society. A good example of the dangers in supervising women's private lives is the case of the 'men-in-the-house' rule under welfare legislation in Ontario.
As of 1995, welfare regulations in Ontario provide that two people of the opposite sex who live together are assumed to be spouses and therefore are not entitled to welfare benefits, unless they can prove that they are not spouses and do not financially support each other.
This came to be known as the 'no-man-in-the-house' regime.86 Since the introduction of the new regulations, and in order to prevent welfare fraud, much effort has been directed to confirm that single mothers indeed do not have a spouse that fulfills their needs while they claim welfare support.87 Consequently, women's lives in Ontario have become subject to invasive investigations. Aimed to verify that single mothers indeed do not live with a spouse, the Ontario government is taking a number of measures seeking to locate men in the homes of single mothers. As Janet Mosher indicates, "women are watched, interrogated, and required to answer questions about the most intimate details of their lives and subject to home visits. Their landlords, neighbors, their children's teachers, and a multitude of others who may have 'evidence' relating to intimate aspects of their lives are questioned. Their
Janet Mosher, "Managing the Disentitlement of Women: Glorified Markets, the Idealized Family and the Undeserving Other", in Sheila Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 38-40 [Mosher, "Managing the Disentitlement of Women"]. This rule already existed in previous welfare legislation in Ontario but was abolished over the years. In 1995, as mentioned above, it was incorporated again into the welfare system. For more about the history of the man-in-the-house rule, see Margaret Hillyard Little & Ian Morrison, "The Pecker Detectors are Back: Regulation of the Family Form in Ontario Welfare Policy" (1999) 34 Journal of Canadian Studies 110 at 113- 118. 87 This was part of an overall effort to eradicate welfare fraud, not only by single mothers but by other welfare beneficiates as well. The Ontario government established a 'snitch line', whereby citizens could anonymously report suspected welfare frauds.Mosher , "Managing the Disentitlement of Women", supra note 86 at 43.
346 privacy is virtually ignored". Due to the complexity of defining who a spouse is for the purpose of welfare support, measures are taken to supervise and police single mothers' intimate relationships with men. in their study of the 'man-in-the-house' rule, Margaret
Little and Ian Morrison bring forward a few examples of the dozens of questions single mothers need to answer in the process of determining their welfare entitlement. These include: Do you and your co-resident have common friends? Does your co-resident ever do your (or the children's) laundry? Who takes care of you and your co-resident when either of you are ill? Do you ask your co-resident for advice regarding the children? Does your co resident buy you a birthday present? This process, Little and Morrison argue, clearly adds anxiety to single mothers' personal lives.89
In Israel, a similar 'man-in-the-house' rule was adopted under the recent welfare reform and a 'special fraudunit ' was established by the ML To implement and enforce the new regime, the Nil conducts investigations to findou t whether single mothers share a household with a male partner. As a result of the ambiguous language of the law and misinterpretation on behalf of the investigators, many of these investigations look for evidence of sexual and casual relationships, instead of findingevidenc e of substantive economic support indicating
a shared household and a long-term relationship. These investigations include home visits
and questioning of neighbors, including asking about intimate aspects of women's lives,
Ibid, at 44. This atmosphere can be especially harmful, Mosher rightfully indicates, for abused women. Abusive men may threaten to call, or may actually call, the snitch line to falsely report that women share their lives with other men. This way, they can maintain their power over abused women and prevent them from receiving the welfare support that is needed to leave an abusive relationship. Ibid. See also Janet Mosher et al, Walking on Eggshells: Abused Women's Experiences of Ontario's Welfare System, Final Report of Research Findings from the Woman and Abuse Welfare Research project (April 2004) at viii; Mosher, "Welfare Reform", supra note 51 at 130-131. 89 Little & Morrison, supra note 86 at 121-123. The problem with these questions, as Little and Morrison indicate, is not merely that they invade women's privacy, but also that they are very ambiguous and are aimed at establishing an 'objective' picture for relationships that are very subjective in their nature. Ibid, at 122. See also Bruce Porter, "Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights, Equality and Citizenship", in Margot Young et al, eds., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver; UBC Press, 2007) 77 at 83-84. For a similar discussion about the intervention in single mothers' privacy under the Personal Responsibility Act in the US, see Mink, Welfare's End, supra note 19 at 71-73.
347 such as sleeping arrangements and sexual habits. Investigators also search houses, and open closets and drawers to find signs of men staying in the house. Single mothers, who were examined and questioned by the MI, found these investigations to be insulting and humiliating. They testified that, as a result of these investigations, their lives were filledwit h constant fear and anxiety. They felt powerless, helpless, watched and followed, especially given that investigators can surprise them at unexpected hours and that every interaction with the people around them might be part of an ongoing surveillance of their lives.90
Similar consequences could occur, if one were to implement welfare arrangements in Israel that would allow women to claim benefits directly for caring activities. In the past, single mothers were almost automatically exempted from the employment test and entitled to welfare benefits under the Income Support Act. The only criterion for benefits was the age of the child. The assumption behind the Act, as discussed earlier, was that single mothers have difficulty finding paid work in light of their sole caring responsibilities. However, welfare benefits were not paid in return for performing care activities. They were provided to prevent poverty. This can explain, perhaps, why single mothers were not investigated with respect to care activities.91 Today, if care work is integrated into the 'duties discourse' and financially supported, the Israeli authorities might certainly demand verification that women are indeed fulfilling care activities. This might also lead to investigations into whether someone else is sharing these care activities, similar to the investigations regarding the 'man-in-the-house' rule. Indeed, it might be justified to take particular measures
90 See Shiri Regev, Revealing Realities beyond the Formal Law: Untold Stories of Israeli Single Mothers Living on Welfare, Unpublished Master Thesis (Stanford University 2006). See also Michal Krumer-Nevo & Adi Barak, "Service Users' Perspectives on the Benefits System in Israel: A Participatory Action Research" (2006) 40 Social Policy & Administration 774 at 782. See also the discussion in Chapter V near footnote 185. 91 Indeed, as other welfare recipients who declare that they do not work, certain investigation were done to ensure that single mother do not work and receive salaries in the informal economy, while reporting that they are unemployed. Such an investigation, if performed in a reasonable manner, is indeed justified to prevent welfare fraud.
348 ensuring that women actually devote their time to care activities rather man, for example, hiring a nanny or sending their children to daycare, while spending their time elsewhere.
These measures, however, should be designed and implemented in a way that respects women's privacy and does not put value judgments on their childcare decisions. For instance, instead of presenting single mothers with a detailed questionnaire about the personal aspects of their lives, they should firstb e asked to describe different aspects of their caring activities and even to provide statements from relatives or friends who can provide useful information. Only if such information is not sufficient or seems to be inaccurate, should an active investigation on behalf of the welfare authorities take place.
Part IV: The Importance of Establishing Care as an Alternative to Paid Work
The discussion has so far focused on the question of whether care work can, from theoretical and practical perspectives, be part of the 'duties discourse' of citizenship. I argued that care work should be recognized as a contribution to society and, as such, should be integrated into the 'duties discourse' as an independent practice of citizenship. This justifies, in my opinion, allowing parents to be paid for staying at home with their children, for a certain period of time, as an alternative to the duty to work. One might still ask why it is necessary to classify care work as a practice of citizenship. Can we not just go back to the previous welfare agenda that exempted parents from the employment test under the Income Support
Act? One might also ask why it is so important to place care as an independent practice of citizenship, given that from a public policy perspective, welfare arrangements might not be dramatically different then the ones we findtoday . In other words, even if care is recognized as an alternative to the paid work obligation, it is somewhat reasonable to assume that, in practice, the change in the welfare system would not be so dramatic. It is quite unlikely that governments would turn back the clock and bring back the same generous welfare
349 arrangements we saw in the past. M Israel, for example, before the welfare reform, single parents with children up to the age of seven were exempted fromth e employment test under the Income Support Act, and today only single parents with children up to the age of two enjoy this exemption. All other single parents face the duty to work. Even if my position is generally adopted, in light of budgetary considerations and public opinion, it is unlikely that the exemption will go back to cover single parents with children up to the age of seven. At most, the age limit might rise fromtw o years old to three or four years old. All other parents of young children would still be required to fulfill the duty to work and therefore a full change in policy would not be likely to happen. In that case, again, one might ask why is it necessary to go through the process of placing care work inside the 'duties discourse' as a practice of citizenship.
These questions can be answered in different ways and in this finalpar t of the chapter I wish to present a few initial thoughts that might be helpful. First, it seems that even small changes in the welfare system, such as increasing the age limit by a year or two, are still changes that go against the current agenda and need to be strongly justified. Recognizing care work as part of the 'duties discourse' is important for restructuring the welfare system, based on the strong values and norms. Instead of understanding the purpose of welfare as reflecting charity, pity, shame and a solution to poverty, welfare should reflect the idea that society takes upon itself the responsibility to support parents in return for contributing to the common good through care work. Returning to the welfare system in Israel, welfare benefits have never truly mirrored the idea that care work is a form of contributing to society. The
Single-Parent Families Act, for instance, indeed recognized the difficulty of balancing paid work and caring responsibilities, but it did not reflect a clear statement that care work carries with it a major input for society. Even though a few statements could be found in parliamentary documents indicating the contribution of mothers through the care of their
350 children, the general idea behind the Single-Parent Families Act was to help poor families cope with economic hardship and to move above the poverty line.92 The result of Ms Act was, on the one hand, to improve single parents' quality of life but, on the other hand, to deepen the stigma attached to the poor, especially single mothers who were seen as taking advantage of public funds.93 Once care work is recognized as an important contribution to society that justifies parents staying home with their children for a certain period of time, welfare law and policies needs to reflect a clear statement that affirms the new approach toward caring responsibilities. Welfare benefits for stay-at-home parents must be given as an incentive for contributing to society rather than as charity or goodwill. Only such an inclusion of care into citizenship, as an independent practice, fully recognizes its true importance to society and constitutes care as work, rather than a voluntary activity of parents.
Second, recognizing care as an independent practice of citizenship makes it easier to justify the allocation of funds needed to give parents the opportunity to stay at home and to take care of their young children, without falling into poverty, and later on, to participate in training programs that will allow them to rejoin the labour market. Budgetary considerations are always very complex, especially in countries like Israel where security expenses are very high, the economy is frequently in recession and many other needy groups demand welfare support.94 Any distribution of payments to stay-at-home mothers will require cutting funds allocated to other national purposes. It is thus important to set a strong basis for such distribution, especially in light of the difficulty of allocating resources to stay-at-home mothers who some mistakenly assume do "nothing productive'. If care activities are
92 See the discussion in Chapter V near footnotes 37-46. 93 More about stigmatizing single mothers see the discussion in Chapter V, near footnotes 23-25. 94 These groups include poor and needy populations like the ultra-orthodox, Arabs, new immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia, Holocaust survivors, the elderly and disabled people.
351 understood to be a form of productive work and a contribution to the common good, it is likely that any funding allocations will be more acceptable and welcomed by society and policymakers.
Finally, going back to the notion mat runs through the whole thesis, it is important to recognize care as an independent practice of citizenship in order to open another route of belonging for women in Israel. As demonstrated earlier in the thesis, belonging to the Israeli collective is established, among other means, through the 'duties discourse'. Citizens are required to fulfill certain duties to gain their membership in and attachment to society. In the past, women's main route into citizenship was through the practice of motherhood. Its main focus was on childbirth, while caregiving was given a minor position within the 'duties discourse' and was not fully acknowledged. Recently, as discussed above, women are required to carry out the duty to work, similar to men, but in light of the gendered structure of the labour market and the lack of recognition for caring responsibilities, women's ability to fulfill the new duty is limited, as is their ability to establish a 'sense of belonging' through the practice of work. Being a 'political project of belonging', the duty to work fosters the boundary within the Israeli society between those who work, and therefore belong, and those who do not.
Incorporating care work into the 'duties discourse', in such a way that does not perpetuate their social and economic standing, can provide women with a unique opportunity to establish a 'sense of belonging' and stronger ties to Israeli society. This route has special importance because it does not require women to enter the public sphere if they wish to gain belonging. While the practice of paid work, similar to military service, forces women to constantly balance participation in the public sphere with their responsibilities in the private sphere, the practice of care allows women to remain in the private sphere for a certain period
352 of time, while still allowing them to establish roots of belonging through the unique experience of parenthood. Since the boundaries of belonging are created through people's images and understanding of particular types of behaviour that situate a person on one side of the boundary line, establishing such an opportunity is important to firmlyconstitut e the practice of care as a valuable contribution, rather than merely a practice that needs to be accommodated when fulfilling other practices of citizenship. Under this structure of the
'duties discourse', women get the chance to fosterthei r connection to the Israeli collective and further develop a sense of belonging. Being part of the 'duties discourse', the practice of care allows women to cross the boundary of belonging set by the duty to work and join those citizens who are seen as contributing to society's success, without them needing to cross the boundary between the public and the private spheres. In other words, the practice of care becomes a site of belonging. Through this new site of belonging, single mothers who are considered today as 'undeserving' others will become the 'good citizens'.95 They will no longer be seen as a threat to the values and ideals of the Israeli society. Standing in line with the accepted and expected behaviour of the 'good mother-citizen', the practice of caregiving will allow single mothers to move inside the margins of society and establish strong social ties and attachments that can also help them better cope with the heavy burden of single parenthood. They will become full and respected citizens.96
It is important, as mentioned above, to design care work as a practice of citizenship in such a way that will not disadvantage women who favour paid work over caregiving, or women who choose alternative (but safe) ways to meet their family responsibilities. In other words, it is important not to constitute care as a site of belonging that sets new boundaries within society separating those who are engaged in care activities and those who do not. The aim here is not to create new sites of exclusion and to place women again on the 'wrong' side of the margins. For these reasons, as emphasized earlier, care should be an alternative practice within the 'duties discourse' and not a replacement to other duties of citizenship or a mandatory practice to all women. 96 For more about challenging the boundaries set through workfare policies, see Janet E. Mosher, "Welfare Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen", in Margot Young et al, eds., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 119 at 127-129.
353 Conclusions
The 'duties discourse' in Israel, as showed in the previous chapters, does not recognize caregiving as an independent practice of citizenship. Women who fulfill care activities are not seen as fulfilling a duty of citizenship. If they do not fulfill the duty to work, i.e., participate in the labour market and earn a living, they are constituted to be second-class citizens. In this chapter, I argued that care should be incorporated into the 'duties discourse' as an independent practice of citizenship and as an alternative to the current duty to work.
Given its enormous contribution to society, the practice of care should be recognized as a social responsibility that entitles those who fulfill it to support from the state. Women who choose to focus on caregiving should be seen as contributing to the common good in an equivalent manner to those who contribute by fulfilling the duty to work in the labour market.
This new structure of the 'duties discourse' should be carefully designed to avoid perpetuating women's lower standing in society. For this purpose, certain measures should be adopted, such as appropriate cash payments for stay-at-home parents and initiatives to motivate fathers to share more domestic responsibilities. In addition, incorporating care into the' duties discourse' should not place an obligation on women to care for their children in a manner prescribed by society, and their privacy and autonomy should be carefully upheld and respected. If these measures are put in place, the practice of care will become a 'site of belonging' and will allow women, especially single mothers, to remain in the private sphere, while still achieving full membership, a sense of belonging and attachment to Israeli society.
354 Conclusions
Women have always faced duties and responsibilities. Despite their success in uprooting biases
and inequalities, women in many countries are still associated with the domestic sphere, where they are expected to give birth, look after their children and take care of the household. For
many years, in many societies, women were not required to fulfill any further activities.
Choosing full-time motherhood was legitimate and totally acceptable in the eyes of society. If women entered the labour market, on joined any other public institution, they usually did so
because of their own needs or desires. Today, in addition to their traditional responsibilities as
mothers and housewives, women are frequently required to enter the labour market and make a
living. This requirement, in many countries, has recently been translated into a duty of
citizenship. Citizens are expected to be economically independent and to make a real effort to
find a paid job as a condition for receiving welfare support. In other words, welfare rights are
conditioned upon labour market participation. Full citizens are therefore only those who have
paid employment.
My thesis explored the interaction between women and the duties of citizenship. The duty to
work provided a useful case study through which we can learn how women are integrated into
the 'duties discourse' and how the gendered nature of duties and societal institutions limit
women's path to full citizenship. The thesis began by looking at the duty to work, its justifications and the implications of not fulfilling it. I first presented how the duty to work is
commonly understood in mainstream literature, that is, it reflects the expectation that the citizen
will enter the labour market and become economically independent as a precondition to welfare
support. Those who do not meet this requirement are deprived of social rights and categorized
355 as 'undeserving'. Moving beyond this mainstream approach, I argue that the duty to work is a
'political project of belonging'. It is a form of serving and contributing to society that provides a way of establishing social attachment and a sense of belonging. Those who carry out the duty to work contribute to the common good and enjoy a supportive environment if they are in need of welfare assistance. In other words, by fulfilling the duty to work, citizens can achieve belonging and draw their strength from their community.
Israel provides a unique case study of a 'duties discourse' that reflects the interrelationship of the concepts of contribution and belonging, in conjunction with the principle of economic independence. I showed that historically citizenship for the Jewish majority was structured around a civic-republican model that underlined the duties of the citizens and required them to participate in nation-building as a path for achieving both rightsan d social attachment. The duty to work was part of this structure. It served as a route to belonging in mainstream society.
Today, under recent welfare reforms, the renewed duty to work is built again upon the notion of contributing to society. Israeli citizens are called to help in the recovery of Israel's economy.
They are required to find a paid job and be self-sufficient as a means of contributing to national goals. Those who hold a position in the labour market can prove their loyalty to society and are able to create social ties. Those who are left without a paid job have a limited ability to establish a sense of belonging, and to find a way out of poverty and hardship.
After exploring the new framework of the duty to work and its presence in Israeli society, I examined how women are included in the 'duties discourse'. This part of the thesis began by reviewing the debate about whether practices in the private sphere can be integrated into citizenship. I argued that the institution of motherhood should be considered as a practice of
356 citizenship, given its contribution to the common good of Israeli society as a whole. To demonstrate the gender-differentiated structure of a 'duties discourse', I examined Israeli women's 'duty of motherhood' during the early years of statehood. I showed how legal discourses and social policies constituted the practice of motherhood as a duty of citizenship.
This structure of citizenship, I argued, was beneficial to a certain degree because it recognized motherhood as part of citizenship and as a basis for belonging and inclusion in society.
Nevertheless, I further argued, this path did not allow women to gain full citizenship. Women were exposed to public pressure and interference concerning their decisions to become mothers.
It was assumed that all women aspired to have a child. Women who could not give birth were pitied, and women who chose not to give birth were stigmatized as selfish persons who failed to contribute to nation building. Furthermore, integrating motherhood into the 'duties discourse' was not accompanied by recognition of the true value of motherhood, as care-giving activities did not provide women with any financial benefit. In fact, under this gender-differentiated structure of citizenship, women were trapped in the private sphere, where they had to rely on their husbands to provide for family needs. In other words, they were subjected to gendered structures that perpetuated their inferior status. Being attached to the 'duty of motherhood, women were also limited in their ability to fulfill other duties of citizenship, such as military service.
Following the discussion of the 'duty of motherhood', I turned to discuss women's exemption from the early duty to work in Israel. I showed that the gender-differentiated structure of citizenship was again very problematic for women as they were not considered equal partners in this duty. For the most part, women were not expected to fulfill the duty to work and the assumption was that they should be able to give priority to motherhood over labour market
357 participation. Although many women worked and contributed to the process of nation building,
I argued that their work did not provide them with a route to citizenship in the same way as is did for men. Being exempted from the duty to work, women had one less path to inclusion and belonging in Israeli society. They also faced many obstacles in trying to join the workforce. In other words, this differentiated allocation of duties perpetuated gendered social structures and left women with only second-class citizenship.
While the early 'duties discourse' in Israel was structured according to a gender-differentiated model, as reflected in the 'duty of motherhood' and the exemption from the early duty to work, the current duty to work reflects a gender-neutral structure of citizenship. All citizens, both men and women, are required to join the workforce. In other words, women's citizenship is today conditioned on having a paid job and being economically independent of state support. If in the past, women's main duty toward the Israeli collective was motherhood, today they have to balance motherhood with the renewed duty to work. I argued that because the current duty to work is structured according to a gender-neutral model, it fails to recognize women's interests and does not take into account their experience as mothers or make accommodations for the conditions they face. This is especially true when it comes to single mothers who face unique difficulties in balancing paid work with caregiving. The duty to work reflects a certain national priority, where paid work is glorified and women are expected to help in the recovery of the economy, even at the expense of providing adequate care-giving activities. Under recent welfare reforms, Israeli women are required to enter an unfriendly labour market that presents them with many barriers to obtaining a job that meets their financial needs. The duty to work does not take into account women's unequal burden of family responsibilities and does not offer suitable solutions for women, especially single mothers, who have small children and
358 cannot easily find reasonably priced child-care arrangements. In light of these limitations, I argued that many women cannot fulfill the duty to work and face a number of consequences.
Many become impoverished or suffer a lower standard of living. They receive harsh criticism and are stigmatized as the 'undeserving poor'. They are also pressured into marriages with traditional two-parent structures where they have to rely on men for financial relief. In addition,
I argued that the duty to work functions as a 'project of belonging' that limits women's route into mainstream society, as well as their ability to build social ties and achieve a sense of belonging with the Israeli collective.
Following the discussion of the current duty to work, I turned to examine how to restructure the
'duties discourse' to better integrate women into citizenship. Given the contribution of care- giving activities to society, I argued that care should be recognized as an active social responsibility and therefore as a practice of citizenship that can serve as independent grounds for full membership. Women (and men) should be given the opportunity to stay at home with their children, for a reasonable period of time, without being excluded from the 'duties discourse'. In other words, under this structure of citizenship, caregiving is a possible alternative to the duty to work mat serves as a basis for full inclusion in society. In practice, this approach needs to be accompanied by policies to challenge the unequal division of labour in the family and to ensure that women's place in the labour market is not jeopardized. These policies may possibly include cash payments for stay-at-home parents, as well as initiatives to eliminate the gender wage gap and to encourage fathers to take on more care-giving activities. These measures, I further argued, should be part of a broader agenda aimed at uprooting from the welfare discourse the negative concept of 'dependency' and at replacing it with the notion of
'interdependence' in order to reflect and highlight the value of caregiving and its contribution to
359 society. Only when care is folly recognized within the 'duties discourse' will women would have a real chance of gaining full membership and belonging in society.
sk sic sic stc sic sic
The summer of 2003 was very dramatic for single mothers in Israel. Together with many supporters from NGOs, Parliament, academia, and other disadvantaged groups, single mothers gathered to protest against the welfare reform. The media consistently reported and provided comment on these protests and politicians spent much time addressing the issue of single mothers. It was one of the main items on the news for a number of months. Eventually, the protest gradually weakened and faded. The Government introduced a few minimal initiatives to improve single mothers' access into the labour market. Further statements and interviews provided on behalf of the Ministry of Finance gave the impression that 'things had worked out' and that 'everything was under control'. As their concerns were pushed aside, single mothers returned one-by-one to their homes, to deal individually with the new reality. Today, five years after the welfare reforms were introduced, the matter of single mothers is hardly discussed.
They receive some public attention a few times a year, when the National Insurance Institution and other NGOs release their data concerning the rate of poverty in Israel. Even then, the focus in not on single mothers themselves and the difficulties they face, but on their children.1 My thesis is an attempt to make single mothers the centre of attention again and to examine, through their experience with the welfare reform, the interaction between work, care, and belonging in
Israel.
1 There are a few organizations that make real efforts to support single mothers in their everyday struggles. These attempts, however, are usually done out of the public eye and do not receive enough attention in political and public debates.
360 Further research is needed to fully understand the implications of the duty to work on women.
As noted in Chapter V, the literature usually focuses on examining women's lack of autonomy, rights and economic independence. These are indeed real and serious consequences of welfare reform around the world, including the Israeli reforms. More attention should be given, however, to women's experience of being isolated and denied a real chance of belonging or gaining attachment to their society. In particular, an empirical study is needed to look into patterns of belonging and lack of belonging. More knowledge of what a 'sense of belonging' means for women (especially single mothers) and how they experience a lack of belonging to
society is essential. This is important not only for a better understanding of the implications of the 'duties discourse' but also for a better understanding of the measures that should be developed and implemented to ensure women's status as full citizens.
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Chapters in Books
Abraham-Vis, Sharon. "Damaging the Democratic Process and Employees' Rights in General and Women's and Elderly in Particular", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem. The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) 25 (Hebrew).
Anthias, Floya. "Belonging in a Globalizing and Unequal World", in Nira Yuval-Davis et al, eds., The Situated Politics of Belonging (London: Sage Studies in International Sociology, 2006) 17.
Anthias, Floya. & Yuval-Davis, Nira. "Introduction", in Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, Women-Nation-State (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989) 1.
Armstrong, Pat. "Restructuring Public and Private: Women's Paid and Unpaid work", in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 37.
Armstrong, Pat & Armstrong, Hugh. "Limited Possibilities and Possible Limits for Pay Equity: Within and Beyond the Ontario Legislation", in Judy Fudge & Patricia McDermott, eds., Just
383 Wages: A Feminist Assessment of Pay Equity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 110.
Avnimelech, Moria. "Security and Welfare", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) 45 (Hebrew).
Avnon, Dan. "Introduction: Why the Israeli Democracy does not have a Developed Civic Tongue", in Dan Avnon, ed., Civic Tongue in Israel (Tel Aviv: Magnes 2006) 1 (Hebrew).
Barak-Erez, Daphne. "The Israeli Welfare State: Growing Expectations and Diminishing Returns", in Eyal Benvenisti el al, eds., The Welfare State, Globalization and International Law (Berlin: Springer, 2004) 103.
Barak-Erez, Daphne. & Gross, Aeyal. "Social Citizenship: The Neglected Aspect of Israeli Constitutional Law", in Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, eds., Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford: Hart Publications, 2007) 243.
Ben-Dor, Gabriel. & Pedahzur, Ami. "Civil-Military Relations in Israel at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century", in Uzi Rebhun & Chaim Isaac Waxman, eds., Jews in Israel- Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 2004) 331.
Benish, Avishy. "Chronicle of Social Damage: From Damaging the Unemployed to Damaging the Public Sector's Employees", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem. The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) 55 (Hebrew).
Ben-Israel, Ruth. "Equal Pay: Illusion or Reality?", in Anat Ma'or, ed., Women in Israel (Israel: SifriyatPo'alim, 1997) 14 (Hebrew).
Ben-Shahar, Erik. "Comments regarding Unemployment", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) 34 (Hebrew).
Berkovitch, Nitza. "Citizenship and Motherhood: The Status of Women in Israel", in Yoav Peled & Adi Ofir, Israel: From a Drafted Society to a Civil Society (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institution, 2001) 206 (Hebrew).
Bernstein, Deborah. "Female Workers and Pioneers in the Second Aliya: Hopes and Disappointments", in Mordecai Naor, ed., The Second Aliya, 1903-1914 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1985) 145 (Hebrew).
. "Human Being or Housewife: The Status of Women in the Jewish Working Class Family in Palestine of the 1920s and 1930s", in Deborah Bernstein, ed., Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State Israel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 235.
384 . "Economic Growth and Female Labour: The Case of Israel", in Yael Azmon & DafhaN. Izraeli, eds., Women in Israel: Studies of Israeli Society, Volume VI (New Brunswick: (Transaction Publishers, 1993)67.
Boyd, Susan B. "Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview", in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 3. Conaghan, Joanne. "Women, Work and Family: A British Revolution?", in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (United States: Oxford University press, 2002) 53.
Cousineau, Marc. "Belonging: An Essential Element of Citizenship: A Franco-Ontarian Perspective", in William Kaplan, ed, Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993) 137.
Crowley, John. "The Politics of Belonging: Some Theoretical Considerations", in Andrew Geddes & Adrian Favell, eds., The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 15.
Dietz, Mary G. "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 378.
Doron, Abraham. "Welfare Policy in Israel - Developments during the 1980s and 1990s", in David Nahmias & Gila Menachem, eds., Public Policy in Israel (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1999)437.
. "Fifty Years of Social Security in the Making: A Participant's Journey", in Asher Ben- Arieh & John Gal, eds., Into the Promised Land: Issues Facing the Welfare State (London: Praeger, 2000) 87.
. "Tendencies in the Development of the Israeli Welfare Policy", in Moshe Naor, ed., State and Community (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004) 37 (Hebrew).
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists", in Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed., The Family in Political Thought (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts, 1982) 51.
. "Antigone's Daughters", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 363.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. "After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 1.
385 . "Welfare States without Work. The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 66.
. "Towards the Good Society, Once Again?," in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Why We Need a New Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1.
Evans, Patricia M. "The Sexual Divisions of Poverty: The Consequences of Gendered Caring", in Carol Baines et al, eds., Women's Caring: Feminist Perspectives on Social Welfare (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) 169.
Evans, Patricia M. & Swift, Karen J. "Single Mothers and the Press: Rising Tides, Moral Panic and Restructuring Discourses", in Sheila Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 73.
Fineman, Martha A. "Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse", in Martha A. Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds., Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood (New York: Columbia University Press 1995) 205.
Fogiel-Bijaoui, Sylvie. "From Revolution to Motherhood: The Case of Women in the Kibbutz, 1910-1948", in Deborah S. Bernstein, ed., Pioneers andHomemakers: Jewish Women in Pre- State Israel (Albany: State University of New York, 1992) 211.
. "On the Way to Equality? The Struggle for Women's Suffrage in the Jewish Yishuv, 1917-1926", in Deborah Bernstein, ed., Pioneers andHomemakers: Jewish Women in Pre- State Israel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) 261.
. "Familism, Postmodemity and the State: The Case of Israel", in Hannah Naveh, ed., Israeli Family and Community: Women's Time (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003) 38.
Fraser, Nancy. & Gordon, Linda. "Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract-Versus-Charity", in Bart Van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994) 90.
. "A Genealogy of 'Dependency': Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State", in Nancy Fraser, ed., Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition (New York: Routledge, 1997) 121.
386 Freedman, Marcia "Theorizing Israeli Feminism, 1970-2000", in Kalpana Misra & Melanie S. Rich, eds., Jewish Feminism in Israel: Some Contemporary Perspectives (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002) 1.
Freeman, Marsha. "Women, Law, Religion and Politics in Israel: A Human Rights Perspective", in Kalpana Misra & Melanie S. Rich, eds., Jewish Feminism in Israel: Some Contemporary Perspectives (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002) 57.
Fudge, Judy. & McDermott, Patricia. "Putting Feminism to Work", in Judy Fudge & Patricia McDermott, eds., Just Wages: A Feminist Assessment of Pay Equity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 3.
Gal, John. "Values, Categorical Benefits and Categorical Legacies in Israel", in Asher Ben-Arieh & John Gal, eds., Into the Promised Land: Issues in the Welfare State (Westport: Praeger, 2000)115.
Hedetoft Ulf. "Discourses and Images of Belonging: Migrants between New Racism, Liberal Nationalism and Globalization", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 23.
Hedetoft, Ulf. & Hjort, Mette. "Introduction", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) vii.
Helman, Sara. "Rights and Duties, Citizens and Soldiers: Conscientious Objection and the Redefinition of Citizenship in Israel", in Nils Butenschn et al, eds., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000)316.
Hemerijck, Anton. "The Self-Transformation of the European Social Model(s)", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Why We Need a New Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)173.
Herzog, Hanna "Homefront and Battlefront The Status of Jewish and Palestinian Women in Israel", in Esther Fuchs, ed., Israeli Women's Studies: A Reader (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005) 208.
Hider, Aziz. "The Effects of the Economic Plan on the Arab Sector", in Na'amika Zion, ed., Marathon of Responses and Alternative Proposals to the 2003 Governmental Economic Plan (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003) 57 (Hebrew).
Honohan, Iseult. & Jennings, Jeremy. "Introduction", in Iseult Honohan & Jeremy Jennings, eds., Republicanism in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006) 1.
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James, Susan. "The Good-Enough Citizen: Female Citizenship and Independence", in Gisela Bock & Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London. Routledge, 1992) 48.
Kastoryano, Riva. "Citizenship and Belonging: Beyond Blood and Soil", in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 120.
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Leisink, Peter. & Coenen, Harry. "Work and Citizenship in the New Europe", in Harry Coenen & Peter Leisink, eds., Work and Citizenship in the New Europe (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993)1.
Lister, Ruth. "She has Other Duties - Women, Citizenship and Social Security", in Sally Baldwin & Jane Falkingham, eds., Social Security and Social Change: New challenges to the Beverage Model (New York: Harvester, 1994) 31.
King, Desmond S. "Citizenship as Obligation in the United States: Title II of the Family Support Act of 1988", in Ursula Vogel & Michael Moran, eds., The Frontiers of Citizenship (Houndmils: Macmillan, 1991) 1.
Kymlicka, Will. "Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: Friends or Enemies?", in Anita Allen & Milton Regan, eds., Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 131.
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. "Welfare Employment", in Lawrence Mead, ed., The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty (Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press, 1997) 39.
Meir-Glizenstein, Esther. "Ethnic and Gender Identity of Iraqi Women Immigrants in the Kibbutz in the 1940s", in Margalit Shilo elal, eds., Jewish Women in the Yishuv and Zionism: A Gender Perspective (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press, 2001) 109 (Hebrew).
Mosher, Janet. "Managing the Disentitlement of Women: Glorifies Markets, the Idealized Family and the Undeserving Other", in Sheila Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life (Toronto. Oxford University Press, 2000) 30.
. "Welfare Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen", in Margot Young et al, eds., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 119.
Myles, John. "When Markets Fail: Social Welfare in Canada and the United State", in Gosta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 116.
Okin, Susan Moller. "Gender, the Public, and the Private", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 116.
389 Orloff, Ann. "Ending the Entitlements of Poor Single Mothers: Changing Social Policies, Women's Employment, and Caregiving in the Contemporary United States", in Nancy Hirschman & Ulrike Liebett, eds., Women and Welfare: Theory and Practice in the United States and Europe (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001) 133.
Pateman, Carole. "Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship", in Gisela Bock & Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference (London: Routledge, 1992) 17.
Pearce, Diana. "Welfare is Not for Women: Way the War on Poverty cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty", in Linda Gordon, ed., Women, the State and Welfare (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990) 265.
Peres, Yohanan. & Katz, Ruth. "The Family in Israel: Change and Continuity," in Lea Shamgar- Handelman & Rivka Bar-Yosef (eds.), Families in Israel (Jerusalem: Academon, 1991) 9 (Hebrew).
Phillips, Ann. "Introduction", in Ann Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 1.
Pierson, Paul. "Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies", in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 410.
. "Post-Industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare State", in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 80.
Porter, Bruce. "Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights, Equality and Citizenship", in Margot Young et al, eds., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 77.
Raday, Frances. "Women in the Israeli Law", in Dafha Izraeli et al, eds., The Double Bind, Women in Israel (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House Ltd., 1982) 172 (Hebrew).
. "The Concept of Gender Equality in a Jewish State", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 18.
. "Women, Work and the Law", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 178.
390 . "Women's Human Rights: Dichotomy between Religion and Secularism in Israel", in Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ed., Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads (New York: Routledge, 2005) 78.
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Rosenhek, Zeev. "The Crisis of the Israeli Welfare State and the Process of Globalization", in Moshe Naor, ed., State and Community (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004) 46 (Hebrew).
Rosenhek, Zeev. & Shalev, Michael. "The Contradictions of Palestinians Citizenship in Israel: Inclusion and Exclusion in the Israeli Welfare state", in Nils. A. Butenschon et al, eds., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East (NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000) 288.
Rosen-Zvi, Ariel. "Rabbinical Courts, the Halacha and the Public: A Very Narrow Bridge", in Ariel Porat, ed., Religion, Liberalism, Family and Society: A Collection of Articles by Ariel Rosen- Zvi (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 2001) 143 (Hebrew).
Safir, Marilyn P. "Religion, Tradition and Public Policy Give Family First Priority", in Barbara Swirski & Marilyn P. Safir, eds., Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991) 57.
Schiff, Gary S. "The Politics of Fertility Policy in Israel", in Paul Ritterband, Modern Jewish Fertility (Leiden: Brill, 1981)253.
Shafir, Gershon. & Peled, Yoav. "Introduction: The Socioeconomic Liberalization of Israel", in Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, eds., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000) 1.
Shalev, Michael. "Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy", in Garshon Shafir & Yoav Peled, eds., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization (Oxford: Westview, 2000) 129.
Shava, Menashe "The Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733-1973, in light of Religious Divorce in Israel", in Menashe Shava, ed., Selected Topics in Family and Private International Law (Tel Aviv: The Israel Bar-Publishing House, 2000) 213. Slaughter, M. M. "The Legal Construction of 'Mother'", in Martha A. Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds., Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation ofMotherhood (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 73.
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394 . Summary of Developments and Trends in Social Security 2003 (Jerusalem: National Insurance Institute, 2004). . Annual Report 2005 (Jerusalem, 2006). . Estimation Research of the Welfare-to-Work Program, Second Report (Jerusalem, 2007) (Hebrew). . Estimation Research of the Welfare-to-Work Program, Forth Report (Jerusalem, 2007) (Hebrew)
. Poverty Report 2005-2006 (Jerusalem, 2007).
. The Implementation of the Law for Integrating Income Support Recipients into Work, Second Report (Jerusalem, 2007) (Hebrew). Parliament Committee on the Status of Women, Protocol 101: Single Mothers —An Overview (June 2,2004) (Hebrew).
State Comptroller, Several Aspects of the Welfare-to-Work Program (Jerusalem, 2007) (Hebrew).
Other Recourses Adva Centre, Should the Mandatory Pension Act Look Like This?, A Position Paper (Tel Aviv, 2006) (Hebrew).
Berman, Eli. "Subsidized Sacrifice: State Support of Religioun in Israel" (1998) paper presented at the International Conference on the Economics of Judaism and Jewish Observance, Israel.
Glikman, Anya. et al, "A New Israeli Family? Sex Roles and Labour Division in the Family in the beginning of the 21 Century", Public Opinions, The B.I. and Lucille Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research, Israel (2003).
Gronau, Reuben, ed., Macroeconomic Policy 2002-2003 - The Tenth Annual Conference, July 2002, Position Paper No. 34 (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2002) (Hebrew).
Helman, Sara "Let us Help them to Raise their Children into Good Citizens: Single Parents' Families Act and the Wages of Care-giving in Israel", Paper Presented at the Meeting of the International Sociological Association Committee on Poverty and Welfare (Chicago, 2005)
Israel Women Network, "Single Mothers", in Women in Israel - Information, Data and Commentary (Jerusalem: IWN, 1995) (Hebrew).
. We Keep Running, But are We Getting Somewhere Ebe? Israeli Women in 2005, A report submitted to the Beijing +10 conference (March 2005).
395 Kaol-Granot, Efrai "Single-Parent Families", Background Paper submitted to the Committee for the Advancement of Woman's Status (May 2004).
Mosher Janet E. et al, Walking on Eggshells: Abused Women's Experiences of Ontario's Welfare System, Final Report of Research Findings from the Woman and Abuse Welfare Research project (April 2004).
Plog Karnit. et al, The Single-Parent Families Act, Employment Supply and Poverty, Research Paper, Bank of Israel (July 2005) (Hebrew).
Shiri Regev, Revealing Realities beyond the Formal Law: Untold Stories of Israeli Single Mothers Living on Welfare, an unpublished master thesis submitted to the Stanford Program in International legal Studies, Stanford University (2006).
Swirski, Barbara. "Income Support Benefits" (Tel Aviv: Adva Centre, 2003).
Swirski, Shlomo. et al, Government Allocations to the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Sector in Israel (Adva Centre, 1998).
Swirski, Shlomo. & Konor-Atias, Etty. Social Situation Report - 2004 (Tel Aviv: Adva Centre, 2005) (Hebrew).
Vartzberg, Rachel. "The Damage to Women following the Income Benefits Cuts under the 2003 Proposed Budget and the Program "From Welfare to Work1", a Background Paper submitted to the Committee of the Advancement of Women's Status (August 2003) (Hebrew).
UK, Department of Trade and Industry, Fairness at Work, CM 3968 (London: The Stationery Office, 1998). UK, Department of Trade and Industry, Balancing Work and Family Life: Enhancing Choice and Support for Parents (London: The Stationery Office, 2003).
Press Releases
Basok, Moti. "8 Mothers and Fathers Began Marching to Jerusalem; 8 More Begin Today", Haaretz (14 July 2003).
_. "The Minister of Finance of the Top Echelon", Haaretz (12 August 2005) (Hebrew).
Bertz, Ran. "Extorting or being Exhausted?", NFC (News First Class) (7 November 2003) (Hebrew).
CBS, "Manpower Survey for the Year 2004", Press Release (28 February 2005)
. "Average Wages per Employee Post in 2004", Press Release (9 March 2005).
396 Davidov, Guy. "A Leave for Men Only", Haaretz (4 April 2007) (Hebrew).
Eglash, Ruth. "Putting Down Roots in Wisconsin", Jerusalem Post (8 January 2007).
. "Olmert to Establish Special Panel to Amend Wisconsin Plan", Jerusalem Post (6 February 2007).
Grinberg, Michal. "Each One has a Different Background, but They All Share the Dream of Economic Independence", Haaretz (7 January 2007) (Hebrew).
Golan, Avirarna. "Revolution on Paper", Haaretz (9 April 2008) (Hebrew).
Haroti-Sover, Tali. "A Ruling for Rich Women", Haaretz (8 April 2008) (Hebrew).
Herskovich, Alon. "Eli Yishai Presents Comprehensive Changes in Wisconsin Plan", Nana (19 September 2005) (Hebrew).
Kim, Hanna. "July War", Haaretz (18 July 2003) (Hebrew).
Mishali, Yael. "Parasite Parenthood", Ynet (10 July 2003) (Hebrew).
Mualem, Mazal. "We are Out of Patience, Said the Protesters", Haaretz (31 July 2003) (Hebrew).
Netanyahu, Benjamin. "The Benefits Perpetuated Poverty", Yediot Aharonot (10 September 2004) (Hebrew).
Raday, Frances. & Fogiel-Bijaoui, Sylvie. "Where are They Going to Work?", Haaretz (11 August 2003) (Hebrew).
Rivkin, Sheri. "The Second-Class Poor", Haaretz (25 November 2004) (Hebrew).
Rom, Ittai. "In all Reforms We Do Not See a Creation of Jobs", Globes (3 February 2007) (Hebrew).
Ronen, Gil. "Manipulation of Misery", Maariv (13 July 2003) (Hebrew).
Rotem, Tamar. "They are Lost Without their Small Grocery Store", Haaretz (7 August 2006) (Hebrew).
Sarig, Merav. "We Love You Giving Birth", Haaretz (1 November 2002) (Hebrew).
. "Parental Leave for Men", Haaretz (25 June 2004) (Hebrew).
Sinai, Ruth. "2000 Demonstrated against the Economic Plan", Haaretz (1 May 2003) (Hebrew).
. "Knafo and 7 Others are on a Hunger Strike", Haaretz (8 September 2003) (Hebrew).
397 . "Single Mothers Do Not Make Use of Job Offers", Haaretz (3 September 2003) (Hebrew).
. "Knafo's Achievement: Fighting for Job Opportunities and not for Benefits", Haaretz (24 September 2003) (Hebrew).
. "Working More, Desperate More", Haaretz (25 June 2004) (Hebrew).
. "90 Percent of the New Employees Earn less than 5000 shekels a Month", Haaretz (31 October 2004) (Hebrew). . "Governmental Grants did not Succeed in Increasing the Salaries of Most Single Mothers", Haaretz (19 April 2005) (Hebrew). . "Only 157 Men Took Parental Leave in 2005", Haaretz (28 August 2006) (Hebrew).
Yediot Aharonot, "Netanyahu: No One will Escape Work Anymore" (1 August 2005) (Hebrew).
Ynet, "Vicky Knafo Answers Netanyahu: I Want a Solution Now" (14 July 2003) (Hebrew). Yoaz, Yuval. & Sinai, Ruth. "A Parliament Committee Approved: A Single Mother that Studies Will Not Lose her Income Support Benefits", Haaretz (28 January 2008) (Hebrew).
Online Resources
New Family Organization, The 2007 Family Report, online at: http:/ynewfamilv.org.il/pagel69.html?amp (Last visited on Sep. 11,2007) (Hebrew).
The Israeli Women Association, "Sexual Harassment: Background and Current Status", online at: http://www.iwn.org.il/innerEn.asp?newsid==168 (last visited September 19,2007).
Yedid Organization, "A Critique of Wisconsin Decision to Open an Industrial Sewing Course", 01/02/2007.
Yedid Organization, "Talking about Work: A Special Project for Employment Empowerment in Dimona", 17.4.2005 (online at http://www. yedid. org.il/NewsMain. asp?id=350) (Hebrew).
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