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(Oontinuedfrom P. 271.) (I.) the Military History J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-14-05-02 on 1 May 1910. Downloaded from 487 MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR. By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL R. J. S. SIMPSON, C.M.G. Royal Army Medical Corps. -(Oontinuedfrom p. 271.) E.-THE DEVELOPMENT ON THE WESTERN LINE. THE heading of this section is perhaps misleading. Epidemic disease was prevalent to a considerable extent on the Western line -i.e., the line from De Aar to Kimberley-but the chief interest of this prevalence lies in that it was in all probability the precursor of the far more important epidemic in Bloemfontein, and possibly even of that in _Kroonstadt. -Hence; the story, beginning on the Western line, will be carried- on to include the -Bloemfontein outbreak. (i.) The Military History of the A rea concemed may be summarised as follows: from the beginning of the war, De Aar by copyright. and Orange River were occupied by small bodies of troops. Lord Methuen's force concentrated at Orange River in the week pre­ ceding November 20th; the advance to Kimberley began on the 22nd; the battles of Belmont, Enslin, and Modder River took place on November 23rd, 25th, and 28th respectively. From that date till the battle of Magersfontein, December 11th, and after that date, Lord Methuen remained in intrenched camp at Modder river. During December the number of troops on the line between De Aar http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ and Modder River was largely increased. Then followed (between January 28th and February 12th) the concentration of troops for the advance at various stations on the line south of Modder River. From February 11th to 13th various bodies of troops advanced into the Free State. Paardeberg was invested on February 17th, and operations continued there till the 27th. The main army, under Lord Roberts, concentrated at Osfontein on March 6th, and the advance to Bloemfontein began the following day. Our weekly returns cut the period at March 9th, the date of on October 1, 2021 by guest. Protected the last return before Bloemfontein was reached, which fits in conveniently with the final division of the troops of the advancing f~rce from those on the Western line. During the operations in the Free State, prior to the advance from Osfontein, sick were sent to the hospitals on the Western line from the field hospitals with the advancing force, but this ceased with the departure from J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-14-05-02 on 1 May 1910. Downloaded from 488 Medical Histm"y of the South African Wa.r Osfontein. Hence, up to that date, some of the sickness was recorded on the Western line, and not with the main army. (ii.) Approximate Strengths:- ' At De Aar and Orange River on 13.10.99 .. 2,200 .. App. 7, R.W.C. " Belmont . 23.11.99 .. 9,666 .. Offic. Hist., i., App. 6. " Modder River .. 28.11.99 .. 10,066 .. " Magersfontein . 11.12.99 .. 14,459 . " " " On the L. of C. (additional to 20.12.99 .. 11,000 . Times Hist., iii., p. 110. Lord Methuen) Detrained . 28.1.00-11.2.00 .. 30,000 . Offic. Hist. Including 1st Division (not in. 16.2.00 .. 41,000 .. p.337. cluding L. of C.) ~fain Army 6.3.00 .. 32,297 Offic. Hist., ii., p. 190. " at Bloemfontein 13.3.00.. 32,549 .. ii., App. 6. Advance to Pretoria 3.5.00 .. Main Army . 23,732 ) Two columns 17,931J 41 ,663 iii., App. 2. It is impossible to ascertain the average monthly strengths for the period, but from the figures given above we ma.y form some rough idea, as given below, of the average total strength of the troops sending their sick to the Western line :- by copyright. October . 1,300 December.. 20,000 February . over 50,000 November .. 2,000 January .. 25,000 It is most important to note that in the main army which left the Western line for Bloemfontein, the Guards Brigade had been exposed to infection since the first appearance of disease; the whole of the 19th Brigade and three-fourths of the 18th had been exposed on the Western line since the middle of December-that is, http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ during the development of the outbreak-so that over 10,000 men, or rather less than a third of the main army, had been exposed to prolonged infection' before entering the Free State. (iii.) The Composition of the Units.-Most contained a large proportion of Reservists, ranging from 40 per cent. in the 6th Division to 52 per cent. in the 7th. The force, under Lord Roberts contained at least 3,000 of' South African and Oversea Colonials, so that it was, on the whole, well seasoned with" salted" men. The 7th Division arrived in South Africa between January 23rd and February 3rd, and went direct to the Western line ;- on October 1, 2021 by guest. Protected (iv.) General Hygienic Conditions:- (a) The Topographical and Climatic Conditions were not favourable. Unlike Natal, the general characters of the area are those of an arid, treeless plain, broken by kopjies and don gas, very dusty, and reflecting all the incident heat. Over the whole of this area the mean maximum and wet bulb temperatures are relatively J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-14-05-02 on 1 May 1910. Downloaded from R. J. S. Simpson 489 high, even in South Africa; the heat and dust were excessive during the advance, and especially during the earlier operations in the Free State. During the whole period there were frequent thunder-storms accompanied by torrential rain, from which the men (during the operations in the Free State at least), in bivouacs, and at times with only their great-coats, suffered severely. Cb) Food Supplies.-After tbe loss of the convoy at Waterval Drift on February 15tb, the men received only half rations of groceries and bread till March 1st; from tbis date three-quarter rations. Meat was always plentiful, and an extra quantity was issued with the idea of compensating for the deficiency in the otber items. But frbm supply difficulties and tbe nature of the earlier operations in tbe Free State, it tben happened that bodies of men remained without food for comparatively long intervals. The difficulty of procuring firewood, too, complicated this question. In Bloemfontein there was a considerable shortage of food till ApriJ 7th, and to a less degree till April 17th. (c) Water Supply.-Tbis was usually bad, though some was better than others. Lord Methuen's force, and, indeed, a large by copyright. proportion of the troops on tbe line or concentrated on it tem­ porarily, depended mainly on tbe water of the Modder and Riet Rivers, which was thick, muddy, and liable to contamination. The fine, slimy mud clogged the filters which some units had, and at the best rendered their output small and slow, while often they could not be used at all. Treatment with alum resulted in some slight improvement, and boiling was also used as a means of purification, but to a limited extent from tbe want of fuel. At http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ Modder River, a few sballow wells, sunk about 30 feet from the river bank, gave water that was a little better than that taken direct from' the river. ' On the line away from the rivers the quantity was limited; the source was from wells. During February nine boreholes were put down between Orange and Modder River by the Cape Government for tbe military authorities. Of these, five were successful: one gave 6,000, one 8,000, and three 11,500 gallons per diem, sufficient for small bodies of. troops. The other four were abandoned at on October 1, 2021 by guest. Protected comparatively small depths, owing to the presence of hard rock. These bores were used for the troops on the line and during the concentration. The water was good. But water difficulties really became serious on the advance into the Free State. The supply was. scanty, so much so that' the line of advance was to some extent determined by the channels of the J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-14-05-02 on 1 May 1910. Downloaded from 490 Medical History of the South African Wat· Riet 'and Modd.er Rivers. There was a spring at Osfontein of limited output, otherwise the supply was from dams. When possible, the Royal Engineers went forward and laid down a length of hose and a hand pump, but the water was naturally foul, and deteriorated by the watering of horses and transport animals rendered uncontrollable by thirst. S6 long as the army was in touch with the rivers the supply was drawn from them, and notably at Paardeberg, where one section of the force drew its water from' the river below the Boer laager, where it was almost certainly highly contaminated. Bloemfontein before our occupation had a double supply; one, incomplete and not compulsory, from the water-works at Sanna's post (some 21 miles east of the town), where water was taken from the Modder, pumped through two reservoirs, one of which was provided with a sort of iiltering arrangement, and distributed to the town in pipes. The process of purification was inefficient, but the supply, on the whole, was probably better than the alternative, that from wells in and around the town. On our arrival the water supply had been cut off/ but the water-works by copyright.
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