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The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902

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The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 ( 383 ) CHAPTER XI MAGERSFONTEIN EisiNG almost imperceptibly from the north bank of the The terrain the bridge, the veld, covered with scanty grass Modder by ^joj^gj^ and scrub and dotted with bushes of thorny, sweet-scented Biver and ^^^^'^®^ ®^'- mimosa, stretches away for five miles till it is bounded by the low rock-strewn ridges that run diagonally from Lange- berg Farm on the north-west, across the railway near Merton Siding, and for three miles south-east till they terminate in the sharp promontory of Magersfontein Hill, 150 to 200 feet high, jutting out into the boundless horizon eastwards like the prow of a battleship seen against the open sea. Behind Magersfontein a mass of kopjes extends northwards for two or three miles, then sinks down to rise again in a second slightly higher line of hills running from east to west from Scholtz Nek Farm, by Spytfontein Siding, to where it joins the first series of ridges near Langeberg. North of this second ridge come a few scattered kopjes and then a twelve miles stretch of level into Kimberley. The railway makes its way through the lower western half of this complex of hills, but the main road from Modder Eiver to Kimberley goes round it to the east, skirting the foot of Magersfontein Hill, past Bissett's Farm to Scholtz Nek, crossing and recrossing the tall wii^e fence that marked the frontier between Cape Colony and the adjoining republic. East and south-east of the road the open veld spreads away indefinitely to the horizon, hardly broken to the eye by the sinuous furrow of the Modder passing almost midway between Jacobsdal and the Magers- fontein heights. Such was the stretch of country that still lay between Lord Methuen and his goal. — 384 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA Boers During the niglit that followed Methuen's Pyrrhic victory Spytfontein ^t Modder Kiver the Boers fell back upon Jacobsdal as has and Schoitz already been related, and were there joined by the rest of ' -Dec. 4. Cronje's Mafeking contingent which had come up too late to take part in the action. Early next morning (Nov. 29), in pursuance of the decision of a midnight krygsraad, the com- bined force moved north across the Modder and laagered near Brown's Drift, about nine miles east of Modder Eiver Bridge. That same afternoon Cronje and the greater part of the com- mandos again moved north to Schoitz Nek and Spytfontein, and at once began digging trenches and building sangars along the summits of the heights for several miles on both sides of the railway. The rest followed on the 30th, but in ac- cordance with the peculiar tactics already noted in connection with the first part of Methuen's march, the laagers were not moved to Spytfontein, but left ten or twelve miles away on the flank of Methuen's probable line of advance, the main laager being moved, as a precaution, four or five miles east to Eondavel Drift, and the others scattered about between it and Abon's Dam. Jacobsdal itself, though nearly twice as far from the positions selected as from Methuen's camp, and practically undefended, still remained the principal base of supplies for the commandos, and it was not till President Steyn's anival from Bloemfontein on December 3 that the greater part of the ammunition and stores left in the village were removed to the laagers. Friction Steyn's visit to the front was due to the serious friction between ]^]^^^ ]^^(j arisen between the Transvaal and Free State laagers Federals. n ^ ^ ^ Steyn's visit m consequence oi the poor spirit the Free Staters had shown on the 28th. Immediately on receipt of Cronje's report on laa^Ts^ Dec. 3-7. the battle Kruger had despatched the following earnest and characteristic appeal to his brother President : " The Lord is with us . and if we now retreat it can only be due to cowardice. I am convinced that it is the want of unity that compelled us to abandon our positions. My age forbids my taking the field with my sons or I would be there now . Your Honour must impress upon officers and burghers that they must hold out to the death in the name of the Lord 1 With this resolve and strengthened by prayer I trust that we shall win the victory ; MAGERSFONTEIN 385 for Christ hath said,* * He that will save his life shall lose it, and " he that loseth it for the truth's sake shall save it.' Steyn had given effect to this appeal in an open letter addressed to his officers and burghers, in which he expressed his deep regret that so many burghers had stayed behind in the laagers while their brethren resisted the enemy, and asked how they could expect help from above if they were not bound together in unity and love. But not content with mere writing he had at once set off, accompanied by his chief counsellor and guide, Abraham Fischer, and now successfully used his personal influence to compose the feud between the two contingents, and to inspire his burghers with a better spirit. On the 7th he left again for Bloemfontein. It is impossible not to admire the activity and resolu- tion President Steyn showed as the leader of his people throughout the war which his own weakness and vanity had chiefly contributed to bring about. In the fateful months that preceded the ultimatum he had been the mere tool of abler and less scrupulous men like Kruger and Fischer, but through all the long struggle that followed he was to be the heart and soul of the national defence, the very incarnation of uncompromising reckless resistance to the end. At Spytfontein the Boer force was still further strength- Boers rein- ened. Immediately after Belmont the Free State Govern- ^^^J^^^^j^g^ ment had decided to recall some of its burghers from Natal men. to meet Methuen. Some 800-1000 burghers of the Heilbron, Kroonstad and Bethlehem commandos, under Commandants Piet de Wet, N'el and Naude, left Natal about November 26, passing through Elandsfontein on the 28th, and joining Cronje three or four days later. With them came contin- gents from the Ficksburg and Ladybrand commandos, who had up to this been engaged in watching the Basuto border. From the force besieging Kimberley the Bloemhof and Wol- maranstad Transvaalers and sundry Free State contingents now also came across to Spytfontein, bringing the total force at Cronje's disposal up to nearly 8000 men. De la Eey's * See St. Mark viii. 35, where however it is "for my sake and the gospel's." The adaptation is characteristic, VOL. II. 2 C 386 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA attempt to bar Methuen's advance at the Modder Pdver was thus, even if not a complete success, amply justified by the result, for it enabled the Boers to more than double their force before Methuen was ready to move again. Boers But the final battle which was to decide the fortunes advance to of Methuen's column was not destined to take place Magersfon- at tein and Spytfontein or Scholtz ISTek after all. On December 2 intrench at la Eey, in the course of a reconnaissance, came to the foot of ridge. De Dec. 4. conclusion that the Boer position was faulty and could be effectively shelled by long-range artillery from the northern extremity of the Magersfontein group of kopjes. Eeturning to laager he strongly impressed upon Cronje the advisa- bility of abandoning the Scholtz Nek position for a more advanced one at Magersfontein, where the English would be obliged to attack across perfectly open ground. Cronje at first regarded the suggestion with disfavour, and it is said that only Steyn's intervention enabled De la Eey to secure the execution of his scheme. At any rate it was not till December 4 that the Boers abandoned their northern lines and took up a new position in front of the Magers- fontein ridges, the main laager being once more moved forward to Brown's Drift. Here at Magersfontein, in full view of the British camp at Modder Eiver, they at once began intrenching for the frontal attack which they fully I expected as soon as their slow adversary should be ready to renew his march. A certain amount of trench and " schanz " work was done on the upper slopes of the kopjes. But the most striking feature of the Boer defences was a single line of trenches excavated on the level ground in front of the kopjes and running right along the foot of the whole range. The conception of this field work, one of the boldest and most original conceptions in the history of war, was once again due to De la Eey, whose insistence, backed by the experience of the effects of horizontal fire at Modder Eiver, carried the day against Cronje's contemptuous dislike of innovation. The trenches themselves were made from three to four feet deep and narrow—an important feature, designed to give protection from shrapnel fire, which reached its fullest development later at Paardeberg—and STORMBERG DEC. 10. 1899. OIR£C T/O/VS ^ Britis/i/nfantry ^H Br/t/sh Moi/ntec/ infantry. m^ Boers i|i| \\' . ArCU/ery Spollmcad, aai'lUh L;. MAOEBSFONTEIN 387 the excavated soil in front was so skilfully masked with tufts of scrub and branches of mimosa that the trenches were scarcely visible a hundred yards away. As a still further protection against artillery fire the trenches were pushed forward from 100-200 yards in front of the clearly defined foot of the heights.
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