A WOLA Conference Report | August 2005

JESS HUNTER

JESS HUNTER The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses By Kimberly Stanton WOLA convened a conference Introduction and summary of findings on April 19, 2005 to examine the state of the Colombian olombia’s internal armed conflict is nearly fifty years old. It has outlasted the cold conflict, its regional war and persisted in spite of repeated attempts to negotiate peace, some of which impact, and the role of the Csucceeded in decommissioning insurgent groups. The conflict has co-existed with international community. formally democratic institutions, but political exclusion has been a major cause of the This conference report violence. Colombia is a middle-income country with a wealth of natural resources, yet synthesizes the main findings nearly 60 percent of the population lives in poverty. The country has one of the most and recommendations of the progressive constitutions and one of the most innovative constitutional courts in Latin remarkable group of scholars, America, and has ratified virtually every international and regional human rights treaty. advocates, and practitioners Yet drug trafficking and corruption are pervasive, and the Colombian government’s human rights record remains among the worst in the western hemisphere. who participated. In 2000, the U.S. Congress gave bipartisan approval to Plan Colombia, a major foreign aid initiative with the stated goals of reducing drug crop cultivation, improving human rights and the rule of law, and promoting a peaceful end to the decades-old internal armed conflict. Renamed the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) in 2001, the six- year package has provided more than USD $4 billion in aid to Colombia. In spite of Plan Colombia’s broad aims, 80 percent of the assistance has been directed to the security forces.1 U.S. and Colombian officials regularly describe the aid program as effective and successful, citing statistics that indicate reductions in acreage planted with illegal drug crops and declining rates for some violent crimes. In February 2005 the Bush administration requested a renewal of the aid package for a seventh year with no significant modifications, and administration officials have signaled that significant United States involvement in Colombia will continue for the foreseeable future.

1 For a summary of U.S. aid to Colombia and the Andean region in recent years, see www.ciponline.org. The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact And Policy Responses

April 19, 2005 • 432 Russell Senate Office Building

8:30 am Registration and continental breakfast

9:00 am Welcoming remarks—Joy Olson, Executive Director, and Kimberly Stanton, Deputy Director and Director of Studies, Washington Office on Latin America

9:15 am PANEL I: THE STATE OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPACT Chair and moderator: Virginia Bouvier, U.S. Institute of Peace The idea of the  Alfredo Rangel, Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, on the internal military balance of the conflict (Mr. Rangel’s paper was presented by conference was Gastón Chillier, Washington Office on Latin America.) not to be utopian,  Socorro Ramírez, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, on the impact of the conflict on regional security and border security, including Brazil but to develop  Ana María Sanjuán, Center for Peace and Human Rights, Universidad recommendations that Central de Venezuela, on the regional political effects of the conflict, with particular attention to Venezuela build upon initiatives  Diana Ávila, Project Counselling Service, on the refugee and already in place and humanitarian situation in the border regions take advantage of 10:45 am Coffee Break opportunities that can 11:00 am PANEL II: RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT already be perceived. Chair and moderator: Marc Chernick, Georgetown University  Raul Rosende, UN Development Programme, on the role of the G24 and the international donor community  Javier Moncayo, Redprodepaz, on civil society’s role in constructing a durable peace, with attention to civil society-led peace-building efforts and the peace laboratories  Representative Luis Fernando Velasco Cháves, Colombian Congress, on the debate over a legal framework for the demobilization of armed actors  Susana Villarán, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, on norms and standards set by the Inter-American human rights system and their relevance to Colombia

12:30 pm Lunch (provided)

1:00 pm PANEL III: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Chair and moderator: Louis Goodman, School of International Service, American University  Daniel García-Peña Jaramillo, Planeta Paz and former Peace Commissioner, on the importance of international and regional diplomatic engagement  Gustavo Gorriti, La República Newspaper (Peru), on security, governance and rule of law  Morris Panner, Harvard University, on avoiding the consolidation of organized crime  James C. Jones, independent consultant, on comprehensive development strategies

2:45 pm Concluding Remarks

2 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses In this context, WOLA, with the support security in that context. of the U.S. Institute of Peace, convened But the current tendency a conference on April 19, 2005, to to conceptualize the examine the state of the conflict, its conflict primarily from regional impact, and the role of the a security perspective international community. Participants is having widespread from Colombia, neighboring countries, the perverse effects. The deep United States and multilateral agencies structural problems that were asked to consider what more can gave origin to the conflict and should be done by the international and still nourish it are community, including the United States, not receiving adequate to bring an end to the protracted conflict. attention. Meanwhile the The idea was not to be utopian, but to single-minded emphasis develop recommendations that build on a military solution upon initiatives already in place and has provoked a resurgence of security Susana Villarán of the Inter- take advantage of opportunities that can concerns in neighboring countries, to the American Commission for Human Rights discusses the Colombian already be perceived. Particular attention benefit of the armed forces and leaders with conflict during the conference, was paid to the cross-border aspects of the authoritarian tendencies. The contributions which was held in the Russell office conflict, and to the impact of the conflict that many local, regional or border building of the U.S. Senate. on democracy and rule of law. initiatives could make to peace-building tend to be undervalued in this context. This report provides a summary of the each panel’s presentations and The importance of increased Latin the accompanying discussion. Certain American engagement with Colombia themes recurred throughout the day. was a third theme throughout the day. For On every panel, profound concern was a variety of reasons—the practicalities expressed regarding the Colombian of addressing border problems, the government’s negotiations with illegal lessons of Central America, the election paramilitary forces, and their potential of new government leaders with fresh consequences for democracy and rule of political orientations, the risks to the law. The panelists argued forcefully that OAS of accompaniment poorly done, the the government’s focus on disarmament possibility that the U.S. and Europe may be rather than dismantlement, coupled exhausting their roles—the panelists saw with the paramilitaries’ deep, continuing both a need and opportunities for Latin involvement in criminal activity and American nations to assert leadership in their reliance on violence, threaten the search for long-term solutions to the Colombian democracy. Policy-makers Colombian conflict and its consequences. focused only on the threat posed by the One expected benefit from an expanded guerrilla movements are failing to grasp role for Latin America would be to clarify the risks inherent in the consolidation what Colombia is not—the cause of all the and legitimating of organized crime turmoil throughout the Andean region— in Colombia. Providing effective and what the Andean region is: a set of international support for truly democratic countries with serious problems that merit actors and institutions will be absolutely attention on their own terms. crucial in the coming months. Against the backdrop of these three themes, The need for more comprehensive the conference generated a set of specific analysis and more integral responses to findings and recommendations. The key the Colombian situation was a second findings can be summarized as follows: recurring theme. That Colombia is enduring an internal armed conflict is  While the Colombian security forces undeniable, and everyone recognized the have been strengthened since the state’s responsibility to provide effective late 90s, they are not within reach of

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 3 defeating the major remaining guerrilla fostering multi-sectoral participation in organization, the Revolutionary Armed development activities that respond to Forces of Colombia (FARC) on the the daily needs of the population. battlefield. The FARC’s command structure and operational capacity are  The lesson from other experiences largely intact, as has been demonstrated of counter-insurgency and counter- in renewed offensive attacks in recent terrorism in Latin America is that the months. A military strategy alone will greatest risk to democratic institutions not be sufficient to bring the internal tends to come not from the insurgents armed conflict to an end. or the terrorists, but from those fighting terrorism in democracy’s name. The  Illegal paramilitary organizations purported defense of democracy by non- have grown in size and strength, and democratic means has been the greater Illegal paramilitary consolidated political and economic source of damage to democracy. organizations gains under the current government, in have grown in size ways that threaten democracy and legal The findings suggest the following enterprise in many strategic regions of recommendations for the international and strength, and the country. community, including the United States: consolidated political and economic gains  The conflict’s impact on the borders  Fostering peace in Colombia should is multi-faceted, but derives less from be put back on the agenda of the under the current traditional military spillover than from international community. All government, in ways the disruption of daily life, including opportunities for multilateral diplomatic normal commercial relations, and engagement to bring an end to the that threaten democracy the increase in insecurity that have conflict, or to bring a Latin American and legal enterprise in accompanied the growing militarization or Andean perspective to bear on the many strategic regions of the borders. conflict, should be pursued. States with overlapping membership in the G24 of the country.  The U.S. focus on Colombia in and the OAS should seek to ensure that isolation from its regional context, and these efforts are mutually reinforcing. its reliance on bilateral rather than States should strongly support the multilateral approaches, has had a continued presence of all major UN number of unintended and problematic agencies in Colombia. consequences. These include the elevation of security concerns on  The international community should the national agendas of neighboring continue to pressure Colombia countries, to the detriment of attention to recognize the existence of an to problems of development and internal armed conflict and the democratic consolidation. humanitarian consequences, and to fully comply with all its obligations  An international consensus framework under international human rights and for responding to Colombia’s conflict, humanitarian law. informed by international human rights and humanitarian law and  International political and financial principles, has been developed through support for the negotiations with the the Group of 24 process, and is illegal paramilitary groups must be reflected in the London and Cartagena contingent on the existence of a legal declarations. framework that protects victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparations, and on  Many innovative initiatives are clear, verifiable steps by the Colombian underway in Colombia that are building government to fully dismantle peace and strengthening democratic underlying networks of financial and governance from the ground up, by political support.

4 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses JESS HUNTER  New forms of judicial collaboration to The presentations began prevent the consolidation of organized with a paper2 provided by crime in Colombia, including the Colombian security analyst broadened use of extradition and the Alfredo Rangel, director of full implementation of international the Fundación Seguridad y anti-corruption treaties, should be Democracia, which reviewed developed. Leaders of international the achievements and criminal organizations should be limitations of President investigated and prosecuted to the full Uribe’s “democratic security extent of domestic and international policy.” The policy has law. succeeded in placing the issue of security and the  The international community should need to strengthen the increase its political and financial state’s coercive capacity support for development and peace on Colombia’s national programs, as a critical contribution political agenda. Another to the construction of democratic major achievement is the governance throughout Colombian widespread perception territory. Recognition of the that internal security has interrelationships between development improved, as indicated and security, and development and by overall declines in the number A family displaced by the conflict democracy-building, should be of homicides, kidnappings, internal prepares to leave their home. incorporated into the design of foreign displacement and attacks of economic assistance programs. sabotage by guerrilla forces. Rangel attributed many of the improvements to  Political, business, and civil society the implementation of the democratic leaders in Colombia advocating the rule security policy, while also noting that some, of law often operate at great personal such as the decline in the homicide rate, risk. The international community pre-date the policy, and that other factors, should recognize and support these in particular the paramilitary ceasefire and leaders in order to help ensure that the guerrillas’ retreat, have played a role. their views are not excluded through violence. At the same time, the Rangel paper identified a number of weaknesses of the democratic security policy. From a military perspective, although the armed forces have Panel 1: increased in size, they appear to be reaching The state of the conflict the limits of their operational capacity. The and its regional impact rate of increase in the number of military actions is declining, as is the number of irregular combatants killed in combat. he first panel of the conference The guerrillas retain their capacity to examined the current state of the undertake attacks; in the first two years of Tinternal armed conflict and its the Uribe government, they carried out political, security and humanitarian impact as many actions as in the prior four years along the borders and in the Andean sub- of the Pastrana government. Although region. The regional perspective provided these were largely “low intensity” actions, by the panelists was particularly important, such as ambushes and the laying of land since so often discussion of the Colombian mines, they demonstrate that the guerrillas conflict focuses on its internal dimensions. retain the ability to carry out destabilizing

2 Alfredo Rangel, “La sostenibilidad militar de la seguridad”, talk prepared for the Foro Sostenibilidad de la seguridad democrática, 23 February 2005. Available on-line at www.seguridadydemocracia.org.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 5 JESS HUNTER actions in many parts of result is that Colombia is depending, de the country. While the facto, on the good will of neighboring counterinsurgency strategy countries for protection of its notoriously against the guerrillas has porous borders. had some successes, in particular in dismantling Second, Rangel raised serious questions FARC fronts around about the Uribe government’s strategy Bogota, Rangel’s analysis vis-à-vis the paramilitary forces. His does not lead him to believe analysis noted that the paramilitaries have that a military victory is just experienced a sustained period of growth around the corner. during the last two years, the only one of the illegal armed groups to have done Meanwhile, Colombia so. They possess significant economic experiences one illegal resources; are continuing to arm and roadblock and five recruit; are shaping and penetrating local hijackings every two and regional government, including days, principally in by managing investment resources of major cities. Night-time municipal and provincial administrations; traffic is still regularly and have infiltrated many agencies of interrupted on major the national government, including A Colombian Armed Forces highways, including the Bogota-Medellin the intelligence agencies. Although the soldier stands guard in Putumayo province. route. In some regions, in spite of a paramilitaries are currently engaged in heavy presence of security forces, illegal negotiations with the Uribe government, armed groups are still able to immobilize their power “has not been touched by transportation; the province of Arauca is the implementation of the democratic one example. While overall murder rates security policy,”3 and so if the talks have declined, statistics register a sharp fail, their position will allow them to increase in homicides in certain sectors of re-mobilize and re-arm most of their the population, especially mayors, ex- fronts. In Rangel’s words, “no Plan B mayors and teachers. The intensification exists in case the conversations with the of aerial herbicide spraying of drug crops paramilitaries break off.”4 by the Uribe government has not led to a significant reduction in the supply The effects of the conflict, the democratic of illegal drugs leaving Colombia. Such security policy and United States policy facts feed skepticism about the extent to along the borders and on the dynamics which effective state control has been of the Andean sub-region were the focus established in key parts of the country, and of the interventions by Socorro Ramírez challenge the government’s claims that of the National University of Colombia, the democratic security policy has been an Ana María Sanjuán of the Central overwhelming success. University of Venezuela, and Diana Ávila, executive director of Project Counselling The Rangel paper pointed to two Service. additional areas of concern that were focal points for discussion throughout the Ramírez began by analyzing the various conference. First, he identified an absence meanings encompassed in the concept of adequate attention to Colombia’s of the “regionalization” of the conflict. borders. Because the security forces are The most common is spillover, the idea focused on internal security, their presence that the military conflict itself would in the border regions is precariously thin, cross into neighboring countries and and they face problems of mobility. The become a factor of instability in the

3 Ibid., 4. 4 Ibid.

6 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses region. This has not occurred to the armed groups. Certain sectors of the degree many had expected and feared. normal economy are penetrated by the But guerrillas and paramilitaries regularly armed groups, such as taxis and border cross the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan transportation in Venezuela. borders, and since 1997, as the conflict has intensified, disputes among the illegal The humanitarian consequences of the armed actors for control of strategic conflict are highly visible in the border corridors in border zones have increased. regions. There are approximately 8,000 Although quantitative indicators do not Colombian refugees in Ecuador,5 and the support the argument that the conflict number in Venezuela is growing. As the is being fought primarily in the border number of people fleeing over the Ecuador regions, the impact on the borders is border has increased, the percentage of still significant. The disputes for control formal applications for refugee status The guerrillas retain have been accompanied by an increase in accepted has declined. At this time, terrorist attacks against infrastructure and about thirty percent of the cases are their capacity to the civilian population, political killings, being resolved in the applicants’ favor. undertake attacks; in massacres, forced displacement, and the In Venezuela, the number of recognized placement of anti-personnel mines. The refugees is low at 102 families,6 but the the first two years of increase in violence is a direct threat to UN High Commissioner for Refugees the Uribe government, the lives and well-being of inhabitants (UNHCR) reports receiving double the they carried out as of the border regions, and has penetrated number of applications of a year ago. the culture of daily life. Assassination Figures based on formal applications for many actions as in the has become a form of conflict resolution refugee status are the tip of the iceberg, prior four years of the in border communities, where local however, since most Colombians crossing Pastrana government. authorities are weak and the institutions of the borders choose to remain invisible, the state are barely present. Intimidation either by seeking shelter with local peasant of border residents by armed groups is communities along the borders, or moving serious, in particular on the border with inland to settle in the anonymity of larger Venezuela. towns and cities.

The borders are also characterized by an Although the problems of the border expanding war economy. The strategies regions are by definition transnational, of the illegal armed actors play a part Ramírez, Sanjuán and Ávila all noted the in this. For example, kidnappings in absence of the cross-border cooperation municipalities near the Venezuelan border needed to effectively respond. Colombia doubled between 1997 and 2002, and has sought and obtained from neighboring the cultivation of illegal drug crops was countries an increased military presence concentrated near the Ecuadorian and along the borders. But Uribe’s single- Venezuelan borders. But the war economy minded emphasis on security, and the role is also the product of daily commercial his very close alliance with the U.S. has interactions between border residents played in militarizing the Andean region and the armed actors, in a context of and the Amazon, have provoked a strongly limited economic opportunities. Besides negative response in some sectors in Brazil the illegal drug economy, which includes and Ecuador, making it more difficult the cultivation and sale of illicit crops to pursue more effective cooperation on and the sale of precursor chemicals, there border issues. is trafficking of arms and explosives, contraband gasoline, money laundering, In Venezuela, tensions created by the prostitution, and the proliferation of extraterritorial exercise of the democratic businesses set up to provision the illegal security policy in the case of Rodrigo

5 A similar number of Colombian refugees are present in Costa Rica. 6 The 102 cases cover include 249 individuals.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 7 Caracas Colombian conflict, and its suspicion of the growing strength of left-of-center popular movements in the Andean region are all factors that inhibit increased Orinoco regional cooperation.

VENEZUELA The panelists argued strongly that the tendency to view developments in the Andean region primarily from a security Bogota perspective—to “securitize” the agenda—is counter-productive. Sanjuán emphasized the contradictory aspects of the current COLOMBIA situation: never has so much been invested in security, with so little result. The Quito reigning premise is that more security is needed in order to strengthen democracy, ECUADOR BRAZIL but she argued that more democracy is needed to ensure greater security. The role of the armed forces in social and political life is being strengthened, in particular in Granda7 were greatly exacerbated when Venezuela and Ecuador, while democratic William Wood, the U.S. ambassador institutions remain weak, and civil and to Colombia, made public statements political rights are permanently restricted siding with Colombia. As a consequence, in the border regions. Colombia’s border PERU Uribe was forced to turn to Cuba to province of Arauca, described by Uribe as help mediate, and national security a laboratory for the democratic security shot to the top of Venezuela’s policy policy and characterized by a heavy agenda. Venezuela has come to identify presence of security forces, is one of the Colombia’s counter-terrorism policies as an most violent and conflict-ridden in the Lima immediate and tangible source of threats country, and generates a disproportionate to its own security. This perspective has share of denunciations of severe human been nourished by U.S. officials’ frequent rights abuses. In short, the current expressions of hostility toward the Chávez dynamic is having perverse results. Map showing Colombia’s government. By inserting itself into the borders and neighboring Granda debate, the U.S. government The panelists’ concluding remarks also countries. The effects of the conflict along the borders strengthened those in Venezuela who pointed toward several preliminary and on the dynamics of the believe that an eventual U.S. intervention recommendations. Andean sub-region were the against the “Bolivarian revolution” will focus of the presentations by Ramírez and Sanjuán. arrive via Colombia. All pointed toward the need and opportunities that exist for greater More generally, in the context of its engagement with the Colombian conflict strong alliance with Colombia, the on the part of neighboring countries. The U.S. preference for bilateral diplomacy security and humanitarian problems in over multilateral approaches, its failure the border regions clearly demand a more to recognize the social causes of the cooperative regional response. For this

7 Last December, Colombian authorities paid members of the Venezuelan security forces to seize FARC leader Rodrigo Granda in Venezuelan territory and deliver him to the Colombian authorities. The Colombians initially claimed they had apprehended Granda themselves in Colombia, but were later forced to admit that Granda had indeed been abducted from Venezuela. No international arrest warrant for Granda was in effect at the time. Granda’s passport bore several Colombian entry stamps, indicating that he had previously crossed the Colombia-Venezuela border freely and with some frequency. The incident caused a major crisis in the Colombian-Venezuelan bilateral relationship. The U.S. ambassador exacerbated the crisis by publicly siding with Colombia, despite the illegality of the Colombian authorities’ method of seizing Granda.

8 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses to occur, it is important not to view the involvement of political leaders who were problems simply as “contamination” from themselves refugees, and who recognize Colombia, and to leave aside recriminations. the importance of Latin American Along the borders, existing relationships and solidarity. extensive economic relations among diverse actors, including local governments, provide Ávila also identified specific issues the basis for a greater capacity to confront that require attention. These include violence, and should be strengthened. The protection for refugees8 and attention militarization of the borders is having the to their mental health needs, and opposite effect. One approach would be to the importance of strengthening the look at projects that integrate the borders; institutional capacity of local NGOs and recent initiatives and proposals by the service providers, especially in Venezuela. Andean Community provide an opening for More generally, Ávila emphasized the Ávila emphasized the projects along these lines. need to facilitate access by local actors to resources, in order to strengthen their urgent need to increase At the diplomatic level, participants capacities and to help consolidate existing the visibility of the recalled the decisive role that neighboring but fragile institutional spaces. countries played in resolving the Central humanitarian situation American conflicts of the 1980s, and Finally, Sanjuán called on the in the border regions. argued for encouraging greater engagement international community, especially the by Latin American governments in the United States, to reflect seriously on the Andes and beyond. The emergence of relationship between democracy and new government leaders with a different security. That greater security—meaning perspective and significant social backing, larger and better-equipped security forces, especially in the southern cone, offers and greater reliance on these forces for new opportunities. The Granda case is an an ever-widening set of objectives— example of conflict resolution from within strengthens democracy is not so clear. Latin America. Another is the dialogue that There was consensus among participants is occurring in the Southern Cone on Latin on the need to avoid the “securitization” America’s responsibility to contribute to of everything, especially development. resolving or stabilizing the situation in the Andean region through political means.

Ávila emphasized the urgent need to Panel 2: Controversies increase the visibility of the humanitarian and opportunities situation in the border regions. Statistics do not do justice to the extent of the he second panel brought key trauma that the refugees are experiencing. actors together to discuss their She also highlighted newer measures Troles and approaches to some of that demonstrate promise. These include the most important controversies raised technical services offices recently by the conflict. Panelists examined established in several border locations by the diplomatic and financial role of Venezuela’s National Refugee Commission. the international community, the Just now becoming operational, these are relationship between development improving the response to applications for and security, and the legal framework refugee status. Another positive initiative for the demobilization of illegal armed is the creation of refugee reception actors, all issues with implications for programs in the Southern Cone, with the the larger Andean region. In each case,

8 Ávila voiced concern about Venezuela’s decision, over the course of the last five years, to nationalize as many as 270,000 Colombians who were in the country without valid documents. While the process clearly improved the Colombians’ legal status, it did so without addressing the need to provide protection for those who were in fact refu-gees fleeing the conflict. UNHCR has also identified protection for Colombian refugees as an issue of concern.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 9 it became clear that ongoing activities are have emerged, and participation has contributing to peace-building even as the broadened over time. The human rights conflict rages, by strengthening civil society organizations and social movements organizations, fostering new alliances, and initially present have been joined by encouraging engagement with government. regional and ethnic movements, the private But the panel also highlighted the great sector, churches, and foundations. Rosende risks to democracy and rule of law that are emphasized the importance of these new inherent in the current dynamic. collective efforts for a country that is still in conflict, and characterized by very high levels of violence and polarization. The International cooperation practice of working together can become a and development form of peace-building. Raúl Rosende of the UN Development Twenty-four Programme in Colombia explained the Third, the G24 itself was created as an governments in the origins and significance of the Group of informal, ad hoc arena for dialogue and Americas and Europe 24 (G24) process, which has structured consultation. Participating countries international discussions of cooperation include four from Latin America, formed the “Group of with Colombia in a context in which the Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico; 24” at a conference country has many competitors for the Canada and the United States; all of the in London in order to attention of the donor community. countries of the European Union, and the EU itself; and Switzerland and Norway. foster coordination In July 2003, following earlier failed At the request of the participants, the of aid programs attempts, a donors’ conference for UN serves as technical secretary. There Colombia was held in London, with is a rotating presidency of the group and and policies toward several important results. First, the London a coordinating body made of up the past, Colombia. conference issued a statement, known as present and next designated president of the London Declaration (see box, page 25), the G24. To date, Sweden, Switzerland, which has become an obligatory point of Brazil and Canada have exercised the reference for the international community. presidency, with Spain next. Some working In terms of process, the Declaration groups have also been established. Beyond emphasized the need to re-orient and facilitating dialogue and exchange of coordinate international cooperation information, the G24 seeks to foster the programs, and affirmed the importance of coordination of cooperation programs civil society participation. Substantively, and can also provide a space for political it recognized the existence of an internal consensus-building, as circumstances armed conflict and the applicability permit. of international human rights and humanitarian law; highlighted the need The result of the London conference, for mechanisms to protect civil society then, was the creation of a process of leaders; committed signatory countries, dialogue leading to the construction of including Colombia and the United States, an international cooperation agenda for to implement the recommendations issued Colombia. The Colombian government by the UN High Commissioner of Human takes the lead in proposing priorities, but Rights (UNOHCHR); and called for in consultation with civil society and the strengthening government and multilateral donor community. To date, six thematic organization efforts to help bring about an priority areas have been identified: rule end to the conflict. of law, peace and reintegration of former combatants into society, development and Second, civil society organizations were peace programs, alternative development, present and actively involved in the humanitarian plan of action, and poverty. London meeting, and have remained Rosende emphasized the importance of the engaged since. Spaces for the articulation process, as well as the substance. The first and coordination of civil society demands donors’ meeting post-London, which took

10 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses place in Cartagena in February 2005, was conflict today is to construct from the local also characterized by a strong, consolidated up to the regional, then the national. A civil society presence. The meeting growing consensus on this approach reflects provided a key opportunity for governments exhaustion with a war that has lasted to consult with Colombia on the dialogue nearly 50 years, and in one form or another with paramilitary forces. The declaration touched most everyone’s lives. As a result, a emitted in Cartagena ratified the content of new, more collective leadership is emerging London, and included specific language on in Colombia that is proposing to construct the need for truth, justice and reparations the nation of the future beginning from in negotiation processes. the local.

By way of conclusion, Rosende identified Moncayo acknowledged that these efforts some lessons and challenges. First, it is alarm some observers, who wonder if they The London Declaration clear that donors’ forums can serve to will contribute to institutionalizing the catalyze dialogue among the international country, or instead favor fragmentation recognized the community, governments, and civil society and risk weakening the state. The concerns existence of an internal on the major issues they confront. Second, are evident in the polemical debate he strongly emphasized the importance over the recent massacre near the peace armed conflict and of countries’ joining forces to support community of San José de Apartado, in the applicability of cooperation programs of mutual interest, which some commentators have blamed international human in order to increase the programs’ impact the events on the community’s refusal to and legitimacy. Coordinating efforts is allow entry to armed actors, including rights and humanitarian fundamental in a politicized, conflictive government security forces.9 But from law; highlighted and polarized environment. Third, he Moncayo’s perspective, the fundamental the need to protect reiterated the importance of involving question is what kind of state is needed to civil society in the design of cooperation guarantee that the rights of a community civil society leaders; programs, and highlighted the positive like San José de Apartado will be respected, committed signatory effect this can have on attenuating beginning with the right to life. fragmentation. Finally, and by way of countries to implement entrée to the next presentation by Javier He argued that the question takes on added the UNOHCHR Moncayo, Rosende noted the challenge significance because the armed actors recommendations; and of making sure that peace-building takes have sought to use the issue of regional place not only at the diplomatic level, but autonomy to legitimize their proposals. called for strengthening reaches down to the ground and out to The guerrillas have spoken of regional efforts to bring about an the territories of Colombia. International autonomy as a way out of the internal donor support directly to local and regional armed conflict, and have insisted on the end to the conflict. peace-building initiatives is one way to need for regional peace dialogues. The respond to this need. paramilitaries have also made regional development their leitmotif. Jorge 40, the Javier Moncayo, director of Redprodepaz, paramilitary commander in the Sierra the Network of Programs of Development Nevada of Santa Marta region, speaks of and Peace, began with a personal reflection regional autonomy and insists that the that provided the context for the current government must not involve itself in debate over local and regional peace- the destiny of the regions. To back up his building initiatives. If something has position, he has two private armies, one a failed in Colombian politics, he argued, uniformed counterinsurgency force, and it is the tendency for everything to come the other a civilian force that roams the from the top down. The way out of the municipalities stealing public resources and

9 In March 2005, eight members of the San José de Apartado peace community, including three minors, were assas- sinated. Witnesses to the discovery of the bodies and to events prior to the massacre claim that the authors were members of the Colombian armed forces. Colombian government officials have asserted that the FARC were re- sponsible.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 11 extorting businessmen. He decides who Delmar Burgos, was elected mayor. With the candidates for local and provincial the community’s support, Burgos proposed elected office will be in at least three to clean up the municipality. Today the provinces, thereby advancing his plans. taxis are legally owned, the port highway is completely paved, and the Santa Rosa Moncayo then turned to contrasting hospital is one of the best equipped in the examples of regional peace-building region. The mayor combined community processes led by civil society, allowing backing with a strategy of engaging the examples to speak for themselves national government and international in terms of the nature of their impact agencies. When officials have raised doubts on governance. One of these is located about the security situation, Burgos has in the community of San Francisco, responded that he has 11,000 unarmed in the north of the Sierra Nevada of escorts, the inhabitants of the municipality, “My mother was 15 Santa Marta. There, political leaders to guarantee his security. The mayor when she had to hide had taken ten years and spent USD is also the director of an association of from bullets in the town $200,000 to construct a water tank and municipalities in Sur de Bolivar. A couple three of five kilometers of a planned of years ago another association led by where I was born. I have aqueduct that the community needed paramilitaries was organized to oppose lived in the midst of to supply itself with water. Two years the setting aside of territory for a peace violence during all ago the local politicians proposed that dialogue with the ELN guerrilla group. it would take another $300,000 to Burgos has worked systematically to attract these years . . . it is complete the project. Instead, one of the support away from the paramilitaries, in possible that my programs in the Redprodepaz network, the favor of the municipal association. His ProSierra Foundation, proposed that the work is serving to teach other mayors in the children, now in their community build the remaining section region that the best political work is done adolescence, have much itself. In three months residents were within the law. more war ahead . . .” able to complete the project at a cost of $25,000. The experience strengthened Observers of the development and peace Javier Moncayo social organization, led to a proposal for initiatives have also questioned whether a regional aqueduct, and allowed the the programs and communities are able community to force the armed groups to to confront the illegal armed actors. In respect its territory. this regard, Moncayo cited the example of the Consejo Regional de Cauca (CRIC), In a second example, also in the Sierra, a another member of the Redprodepaz group of small farmers decided to create network. CRIC played a key role in a health association. The association has negotiating the safe return of Arquimedes 20,000 affiliates, and played a key role in Vitonás, the mayor of Toribío, when he was detecting a recent outbreak of yellow fever. taken hostage by the FARC in September The association has proposed that mayors 2004. from throughout the region participate in municipal working groups to discuss In general, the development and peace community priorities for the use of scarce programs, which have a legal basis in the public health funds, and has traveled to 1991 constitution, serve as a catalyst to Bogota to negotiate a similar methodology bring communities together and facilitate for use by the national Ministry of Health. collective action on behalf of common goals. Redprodepaz brings together 17 such A third example is drawn from Santa programs located in major conflict zones Rosa del Sur, in Sur de Bolivar, a region and covering 29 percent of Colombia’s very affected by violence, corruption and municipalities, with a total population of drug trafficking. Five years ago all of the 230,000. The cost of the network’s programs taxis were stolen property. But the last is approximately USD $30 million per municipal elections prompted a high level year, a figure that compares very favorably of participation, and an active leader, with other major aid initiatives. The

12 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses participating communities have developed Velasco began by briefly describing three an evaluation instrument to help ensure sectors of the paramilitary movement. the effectiveness and transparency of the According to his analysis, one small sector programs. of the paramilitaries is made up of small farmers and peasants who tired of the The fundamental point, concluded “excesses” of the guerrillas—that is to say, Moncayo, is that peace cannot be atrocious crimes committed against the constructed by talking only with those who civilian population to which the state did have taken up arms. not respond—and decided to arm and defend themselves. A second sector is made In discussion, Rosende underlined the up of major drug traffickers who decided it growing importance of the development was cheaper to create their own protection and peace programs. For the UN, these forces than to continue paying taxes to the Moncayo gave examples programs are fundamental because they guerrillas. This sector has grown over time. are creating or assuring the conditions for The third sector, as large as the second, is of regional peace- democratic institutionality in the regions, made up of drug traffickers who realized it building processes led which is fundamental for Colombia given would be advantageous to participate in historic difficulties in consolidating the the Santa Fe de Ralito process in order to by civil society that central state. Two things are key: first, to obtain the political status that accompanies create the conditions support the extension of state institutions negotiation, and to protect themselves necessary for strong throughout the national territory, from extradition to the United States, an especially those that guarantee human outcome they fear. Velasco characterized democratic institutions. rights and protect the civilian population. this sector as the heirs to Pablo Escobar, Second, strengthening civil society and people who have used great violence, the communities is also fundamentally whose crimes weigh on the conscience, and important. In this sense, the development who are also engaged in illegal activities to and peace programs are a basic tool, finance the internal armed conflict. and different actors in the international community have begun to see them as key Velasco emphasized that Colombians have counterparts. The EU, UN, Sweden, Spain made the decision to negotiate with these and Holland are approaching the programs actors, and that the society knows with in this way. whom they are negotiating. But negotiation requires that the paramilitary phenomenon be confronted fully. The phenomenon is The paramilitary dialogue more than its rural armed expression; at The next two presentations shifted the this point the paramilitaries are seeking panel’s attention from international to defend their illegal activities, including and domestic approaches to diplomacy drug trafficking and the stealing of gasoline, and development, to domestic and by taking control of municipal and some international concerns regarding the provincial governments and public services, ongoing dialogue between the Uribe which in turn allows the laundering of government and illegal paramilitary illegal earnings. There are cases in which forces. Rep. Luis Fernando Velasco, a paramilitaries control the local clinics member of Colombia’s Liberal party from known as ARS,10 as well as lotteries and Cauca, presented the debate over the cable television franchises. All of these are legal framework for the demobilization economic activities that involve managing process. Rep. Velasco supported Mr. large amounts of cash, and so permit money Uribe’s election, but was also a member of laundering. The resulting economic power a coalition of legislators who presented an of the paramilitaries in turn allows the alternative to the government’s “peace and consolidation of political power locally and justice” bill. regionally, with national consequences.

10 “Administradores de régimen subsidiado de la salud,” literally administrators of the subsidized health regime.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 13 The most recent municipal and provincial unconstitutional because no one can elections illustrate the phenomenon. In be required to incriminate himself. But far too many towns, only one candidate Velasco responded that full cooperation can ran for mayor. In some provinces, only be a requirement in exchange for special one candidate ran for governor. Others treatment in the form of reduced penalties, interested in running were called and which is exactly what the government cordially told not to run, and those is proposing to offer. Full confession who persisted were assassinated. After is necessary in order to individualize the elections, paramilitary commander responsibility for specific human rights Salvatore Mancuso said that his forces crimes, and that in turn is necessary in controlled 35 percent of the Colombian order to be able to provide reparations to congress. victims of those crimes. For Velasco and other legislators, the issue is not whether “. . . if we have to Velasco described in detail the paramilitary or not there should be flexibility regarding swallow the frog, at least phenomenon in order to make clear that sentencing, but what the state should let’s do it well . . . the the very nature of Colombian democracy receive in exchange. The opposition’s is at stake in the current negotiations, position is that the state must be provided minimum that we and in the struggle over an appropriate with the information needed to completely can ask is that legal framework. Without questioning the deactivate the paramilitary phenomenon. [the paramilitaries] good faith of the government, Velasco emphasized the very significant differences A second key issue in the legislative help us find the truth, that exist between the government and debate is the government’s proposal the real truth . . .” an opposing coalition of legislators, to define paramilitarism as a political led by Sen. Rafael Pardo, regarding the crime. In Colombia, as in many other – Colombian objectives of the negotiations. In his countries, political crimes are not subject Congressman Luis view, the negotiations should lead to an to extradition. In addition, Colombia’s Fernando Velasco agreement at the level of the state, not just jurisprudence provides that all crimes an accord with the current government, “connected” to political crimes are if the outcome is to be sustainable. But also considered political crimes. The to date, the government’s conception of “connectivity” means that a paramilitary the process, which is limited to disarming who committed a crime such as drug the rural sectors of the paramilitary trafficking would not be subject to movement, has prevailed. Other groups in extradition for that crime. Velasco society—social organizations, the political pointed out the significance of this issue opposition, even some sectors of Uribe’s for the United States, in light of the supporters—agree that disarmament is many paramilitary leaders engaged in important and necessary. But they also negotiations with the Uribe government believe that the paramilitary phenomenon who are also subject to U.S. extradition should be deactivated. Arms are only one requests. At the time of the conference, the aspect of the expression of paramilitary government’s effort to make paramilitarism power, Velasco points out. If the a political crime had been defeated by a paramilitaries are allowed to consolidate vote in the Colombian Senate. But the their great economic power, like a powerful Minister of Interior had informed members mafia within Colombian democracy, that of the Congress that the government was democracy will be weakened. looking for ways around the defeat.

Velasco and his colleagues propose, first, Velasco drew his comments to a close that members of the paramilitary forces be by suggesting two possible scenarios. In required to collaborate fully with judicial the first, the negotiation will be done authorities by identifying themselves well, the paramilitary phenomenon and providing full confessions of their will be deactivated, reparations will be crimes. The government has argued possible, and illegal assets, including many that a confession requirement would be millions of dollars being held in financial

14 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses institutions outside of Colombia, will Rights (IACHR) and become available to finance a serious rapporteur for Colombia, land reform process and alternative complemented Rep. development. Part of the funds could also Velasco’s remarks with be shared with the countries in which a presentation on the they are found for use in the fight against norms and standards of the drug trafficking and addiction. Under this Inter-American human scenario, the negotiations process could be rights system as they apply a great opportunity. to Colombia. Colombia is a priority for the Inter- In the second scenario, if the negotiation American system, as seen in is not done well, the result could be the the 110 precautionary and consolidation of a “Mafioso” democracy, provisional measures that especially in coastal regions. If a mafia-like have been issued by the power controls the ports, through economic Commission and the Court. and political power, Velasco predicted The IACHR has issued that it would be relatively easy to corrupt three reports on the general human rights Representative Luis Fernando the security forces to obtain protection situation in Colombia, and the country Velasco Cháves of the Colombian Congress discusses the legal for illegal commerce. International also receives special attention in the framework for the demobilization shipping of illegal drugs would become Commission’s annual human rights report of armed actors. easier. Internally, legal businesses would to the OAS General Assembly. be forced to compete with well-financed criminal organizations that would no longer In February of 2004, the OAS Permanent maintain rural paramilitary structures, but Council charged the IACHR with advising rather security “offices” like those already the newly established Mission to Support denounced by the mayors of Bogota and the Peace Process in Colombia, known Medellin, complete with hired assassins on by its Spanish initials as MAPP/OEA. stand-by. What is at stake here is the very The mandate of the MAPP/OEA is to conception of democracy. verify any cease fire and cessation of hostilities, demobilization, disarmament What is needed, Velasco concluded, is not and reinsertion of illegal armed groups to end the negotiation process with the in Colombia. At this time the only such paramilitaries, but to insist on three basic process underway is the negotiation elements. First, the agreement must be between the Uribe government and the a national accord. The president should illegal paramilitary organizations. The convene the entire country to participate IACHR has understood this charge as in the debate. Second, the declared cease an integral part of its general mandate to fire must be respected, and those who promote and protect human rights in the have been kidnapped by the paramilitaries Americas. must be released. Third, the international community should continue to support Last December the IACHR issued its first the Colombian state in recovering the public report on the MAPP/OEA process.11 monopoly on arms. But the social and Villarán prefaced her presentation on the economic dimensions of the conflict report by emphasizing that the Commission cannot be neglected. Alongside the combat is fully aware of the magnitude, duration helicopters, there should also be resources and complexity of the Colombian conflict, for local projects that bring other means to that there are no easy solutions, and that bear to defeat those who rely on violence. the search for policies that will serve to deactivate the actors of the internal armed Susana Villarán, member of the Inter- conflict is fundamental. The Commission American Commission on Human is not among those labeled “idealists,”

11 The report is available on the OAS web site, www.oas.org.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 15 JESS HUNTER confronting the possible the commission of the crimes, and “realist,” but is to identify the legal and other factors that well aware that contributed to impunity. political solutions are required. The Second, there is a right to justice and key question, then, judicial clarification of the crimes is whether states’ committed during the conflict. According international to international common law and treaties, obligations impede states have a strict obligation to investigate the current these crimes, and to prosecute and sanction negotiation. The those responsible. Under international law, Commission has these crimes have no statute of limitations asked itself this and are not subject to amnesty; the state The father in this family was killed question, and believes the answer is no, can be held accountable for a failure to by paramilitaries during a massacre because the negotiation must be oriented apply due process. of eleven people in Cauca. toward not only disarming paramilitarism, but putting an end to the phenomenon. Any negotiation process must be oriented toward preventing the repetition of crimes, In its report on the MAPP/OEA, and in and guaranteeing that the phenomenon its most recent annual report, the IACHR being deactivated will not reappear. This lays out principles and norms directed is a fundamental issue present in Inter- at overcoming armed conflict and its American law and in international human consequences for the civilian population. rights law. States have the obligation to Based on the American Convention on combat impunity because impunity fosters Human Rights and obligatory by virtue the chronic repetition of human rights of the ratification of the Convention by violations. In this sense, the Commission sovereign states, these principles were the and the Court have established that, while focus of Villarán’s remarks. amnesties and pardons for taking up arms against the state may be useful in efforts According to the standards of the Inter- to achieve peace, amnesties or other American system, there exists, first, a right legislative measures that interfere with the to know the truth about crimes under investigation and prosecution of crimes international law perpetrated during the under international law are inconsistent conflict. This is a fundamental issue; with the Convention because they impede the victims of the armed conflict cannot access to justice and render ineffective the be invisible. There must be effective state’s obligation to guarantee due process. mechanisms to ensure that the civilian population—which includes indigenous Finally, the right of victims to reparations peoples, afro-descendent communities, is one of the pillars of the rule of law. How children, and displaced women who remain can the condition of equality under the law at the mercy of armed actors who have that makes possible recognition of victims’ used and continue to use violence—is not citizenship status and the recuperation of forgotten. Victims have a right to truth, trust in state institutions be reestablished? and this right cannot be renounced, as Reparation measures, which may be the Commission explains in its report. collective or individual, seek to remedy the Not only in Colombia, but as established damage suffered by the victim, including in prior cases before the Inter-American the sensation of ongoing violations, and are Commission and Court, a society in fundamental for achieving peace. its entirety has the right to the truth about the conduct of those involved in Villarán reiterated that the guarantee of no committing grave violations of human repetition requires the adoption of measures rights or international humanitarian law, that will prevent new violations of human to understand the conditions that made rights. This is the standard against which

16 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses a negotiation process must be continually Salvador and South Africa on the right to evaluated. Such measures include the truth; Guatemala on reparations; and on dissolution of armed parastatal groups; the the right to justice, Sierra Leone, where exercise of effective control over the armed guerrilla commanders are being prosecuted forces by civilian authorities; reserving and punished, and Rwanda. He also the use of military tribunals for service- emphasized that today the international related crimes only; strengthening judicial context has changed because of the Rome independence; and providing protection for Treaty and the establishment of the justice officials. International Criminal Court.

The IACHR report concludes by In response to a question about recommending the adoption of a accountability for the guerrilla movements, comprehensive legal framework that Velasco emphasized that those responsible Any negotiation process establishes clear conditions for the for crimes against humanity, whoever demobilization of illegal armed groups in they are, must be held accountable, or the must be oriented accordance with the Colombian state’s state will be held responsible. Massacres toward preventing the international obligations. The framework committed by the paramilitaries must be must take account of the situation of treated the same way as massacres by the repetition of crimes, and the 4,828 persons who have already guerrillas. For example, the recent attack by guaranteeing that the benefited from individual and collective the FARC against the civilian population phenomenon being demobilization processes that, from the of Toribío is not a political crime; the Commission’s perspective, are inadequate FARC will have to be held accountable for deactivated will not because they will result in impunity. it. Negotiations with the guerrillas and the reappear. In addition, genuine mechanisms of paramilitaries will be different, and should participation should be established, in be, because the origins of the phenomena secure conditions, for the victims of the are different. But it is absolutely clear conflict, to ensure their access to truth, that grave violations of international justice and reparations. humanitarian law committed by either side cannot be pardoned or amnestied. In discussion, Velasco called for clarification on the role of the OAS, which many Colombians view as not Panel 3: complying with its verification mandate. Comparisons and lessons Villarán emphasized the independence of the IACHR with respect to the OAS, The purpose of the third panel was to bring and with respect to the MAPP/OEA. She comparative experiences to bear on the noted that a second IACHR report on the discussion of the Colombian conflict, both MAPP/OEA process is planned for the end from other countries and from other times of the year, after a legal framework for the in Colombian history. The presentations demobilization is expected to be in place. drew attention back to the critical The report will examine that framework importance of dynamics within Colombia, in light of the norms and standards that while emphasizing that there are relevant have been laid out here. In addition, the lessons from other times and places that members or staff of the IACHR will travel should inform efforts by the international to Colombia four times during 2005. community to shape that internal dynamic.

A member of the audience asked whether Daniel García-Peña, director of Planeta Colombia was being held to a higher Paz and former peace commissioner under standard than other countries, in particular President Ernesto Samper, began by Central America in the 1990s. In response, noting that Colombia is no longer in the Rosende noted a number of experiences international spotlight in the way that it in other countries that establish clear was a few years ago. Only weeks before precedents, including Guatemala, El the conference took place, U.S. military

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 17 personnel were arrested smuggling cocaine. rights and democracy, the fact is that the A few years ago that would have been Europeans have taken a lower profile. As headline news, but today, surprisingly, it is a result of events like the 11th of March in not. The extradition of Simón Trinidad, Spain, the issue of terrorism, the growth the first political insurgent extradited to of the EU, and the Tsunami in Indonesia, the United States, has gone relatively Europeans are focused more on their own unnoticed in the new climate. While problems and situation. Colombia is still on the radar screens of some U.S. agencies, it no longer has their It is also important to understand attention as before. how President Uribe has affected the international stance of Colombia. Many Much of the change has to do with 9/11, of those who oppose Uribe have been and the resulting shift in U.S. priorities. so obsessed with him as an individual U.S. aid to Colombia For many years Colombia was the third that they have failed to understand the has not gone down, largest recipient of U.S. aid. Now it has profound effects he has had on Colombia but new priorities mean fallen to fifth, while Iraq and Afghanistan and on its relations with the world. Uribe’s have joined Israel and Egypt as recipients position has shifted. He came into office that Colombia no longer of greater amounts of aid. If legislation with some exaggerated expectations of has the attention of U.S. currently pending is approved by Congress, the world community and of the United officials as before. Jordan and Pakistan will receive more as Nations. He is a true believer in his well, and Colombia will fall to 7th place. It’s policies, and he had a very simplistic view not that Colombia’s aid has gone down; the of the world community, and of the UN numbers are basically the same. But new in particular. He believed that in the fight priorities in the world mean that Colombia of good against evil, the United Nations no longer has the privileged situation that was always on the side of the good, so he it may have had in the past. also really believed that he could bring the UN to support his efforts. Today he But the change also has to do with what is disillusioned with the UN, and almost has happened in Colombia. The peace disdainful. The removal of James LeMoyne process under Pastrana, which had elevated as special envoy indicates an Uribe who hopes for human rights, democracy and has relegated the UN and the international peace and made Colombia an attractive community to a secondary role. issue for the international community, has ended. Not only has the military conflict Uribe’s change is also due to pragmatic per se not spilled over the borders as some thinking. The Europeans did not come believed it would, but U.S. Amb. William through with much money compared to the Wood often talks about Colombia as an Americans, and the Americans don’t create island of stability and a success story, in as many problems, so Uribe has concluded comparison with Venezuela, Ecuador and that he doesn’t need the Europeans and Bolivia. Wood says that Colombia is a is better off in a definitive alliance with solution that should be exported elsewhere. the United States. For example, in the process from London to Cartagena, there When one adds to the mix that Europe was a change. The Cartagena declaration also has new priorities, it is fair to say that does not talk about an internal armed Colombia has a different place on the conflict, nor about a humanitarian crisis. agenda of the international community. These changes reflect the fact that the U.S. Europe today is not willing to fight with was much more active in defending the the United States over Colombia. On the Colombian position in Cartagena than it contrary, after the differences over the had been in London. Iraq war and other issues, Europe seems to be looking for ways to mend fences with The FARC’s loss of prestige has also the U.S. Although Europe continues to helped Uribe. If one compares how the express solidarity, and to talk about human FARC were viewed just five years ago in

18 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses Europe and the world, and even in the that the role of GARRY LEECH U.S., there is a growing sense that the the international FARC no longer have the kind of support community in or legitimacy as an international player that general will be they had in the past. also affected if it is perceived that All of these factors lead García-Peña to be the OAS, rather quite pessimistic as to the possibilities of a than playing a role negotiated settlement in the near future. of verification as After the re-election of President Bush, an independent there seems to be little leeway for changing and neutral party, U.S. policy. Many expected that the end is an apologist on of Plan Colombia would generate a whole the side of the new debate on whether or not to continue government and aid. But the aid request submitted by the AUC. President Bush continues the amounts and U.S. Special Forces train the distribution of the existing aid package, and Second, there are very important Colombian army. there does not seem to be much of a debate developments that have to do with the in the U.S. Congress. This suggests U.S. internal dynamics of the Colombian policy will continue as is for awhile. political system. For some it may be hard to understand how, when Colombia is Instead, the possibilities for peace in led by its most right-wing president in a Colombia, for the end of the long conflict, long time, one would also see the rise of depend much more on the internal the democratic left. But in García-Peña’s dynamics of the Colombian political view, the most significant development process than on what may happen in the toward peace has to do with the rise of that international arena. There are two issues democratic left, as seen in the electoral which could change the internal dynamics victories of Lucho Garzón in Bogota and and define the possibilities for the future, Angelino Garzón in the Valle de Cauca. and the next few months will be very key. This marks a qualitative shift in Colombian politics, and points toward a political The first issue is the impact of the solution to the armed conflict, rather than paramilitary demobilization process—for a negotiated settlement. Past thinking all the reasons already mentioned and has been that peace would begin with a because of the tendency to lump together negotiation with the guerrillas. Today there the guerrillas and the paramilitaries as if are reasons to think that Colombia may be they were the same phenomenon. There is different from El Salvador and Guatemala, no question, as Velasco said, that a massacre where the right wing negotiated peace with committed by the counter-revolutionaries a left-wing insurgency. Perhaps through a is to be equally condemned as a massacre profound change of the power structure, a committed in the name of the revolution. reformist, leftist government can enact a But it is also important to recognize that reform agenda similar to what is occurring in the FARC and the AUC are different Brazil with Lula, in Uruguay, and elsewhere phenomena, and the differences should not in Latin America, and there will be a be forgotten. The negotiation at Santa Fe new formula. It is not that there will be a de Ralito will determine the possibilities political solution without negotiations, but toward the future. Velasco and others have that negotiations will not come first, but as a raised the frustration with the MAPP/ consequence of political transformation. OEA process, which it was hoped would help correct some of the problems with In this context, it is important to look inadequate verification. But so far there again at the role of the international is not only the risk that the reputation of community. Perhaps the U.S. and Europe the OAS will be tarnished by its role, but have exhausted their possibilities of playing

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 19 such a key role. Clearly they will continue pessimism in the short-term regarding a to play a role, but there is a need to go new stage of peace-building, but optimism beyond the dichotomy in which the U.S. in the mid- to long-term. funds the war and Europe funds the peace. García-Peña proposed that Latin America Gustavo Gorriti, director of Peru’s daily is a reserve for future possibilities of peace. La República, spoke next, drawing on his In many ways, the region is as rich as the country’s experience confronting the U.S. or Europe, not in terms of funds but in insurgent group Sendero Luminoso. He political leverage. Given the new realities, began by stating explicitly that Colombia it is very significant that Lula has refused is confronting an internal war, that the to call the FARC a terrorist organization. situation is that of a guerrilla insurrection Although he has distanced himself from against a democratic government. One the FARC, he has left the door open for a can debate the nuances on one side or García-Peña expressed possible role in the future. The Venezuelan the other, but the characterization is pessimism in the short- situation is another factor. Consider again essentially correct. The topic, then, is one term regarding a new the Granda case. Granda wasn’t even of counterinsurgency, and the objective is invited to the meeting of the Venezuelan to understand to what extent a democratic stage of peace-building, Bolivarian Congress. People have lost government can adequately defend itself but optimism in the sight of the fact that the FARC are much from a guerrilla insurgency or the violence mid- to long-term. more Chavista than Chávez is a fan of the that it generates, without losing its own FARC. In short, Latin America could play nature. a much more significant role in the future. His first premise is that a democracy This does not mean that one can forget has never been defeated by a guerrilla about the United States. The Blueprint for insurrection. Nevertheless, many a New Colombia Policy12 is the kind of effort democracies have been defeated, or that should prompt more thinking in the abrogated, in the context of an internal future. It is also necessary to engage more war. How? Not by the insurgents, but by with the Republican party; one cannot sit the counterinsurgents supposedly charged back and wait for the Democrats to return with defending democracy. Does this mean to power. It was significant that Rep. Henry that internal defense, the more politically Hyde sent a letter to Uribe on the AUC correct way to refer to counterinsurgency, process, not from a traditional human is imminently self-destructive? No. Rather, rights perspective, but from a conservative the lesson is that identifying the correct war on terror perspective. The message was strategy or best method for response is that the AUC are a terrorist organization absolutely crucial, because the life of a that must be dismantled. Their funding democracy literally depends on it. While and networks must be attacked, much in the lesson may appear obvious, it is the same way that the U.S. is going after not. The history of contemporary Latin Al Qaeda. There is a need to re-think the America is a reminder of the devastating premise that Democrats want peace and consequences of confronting a national Republicans want war, and work more on security emergency in the wrong way. shared concerns that derive from a war on Now, in the classroom of today’s fight terror perspective. against terrorism, the classic dilemmas of counterinsurgency are returning. It is Finally, it is important for the international necessary, especially in nations that do not community to help Colombia by exerting cultivate historical or institutional memory, pressure on President Uribe to comply to return to these problems. with his own commitments, as expressed in the London Declaration and elsewhere. Gorriti described how he became In conclusion, García-Peña expressed enmeshed in the issue of counter-

12 Available at www.lawg.org or www.wola.org.

20 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses insurgency. In the early 1980s, at the But this is not what happened elsewhere. beginning of the Sendero Luminoso In Latin America, once the 30-year wave insurrection, the ravines around Ayacucho of guerrilla insurrections began in the 60s, were producing a daily toll of corpses. He the precarious democracies that sought to began to ask whether he was living in a implement developmentalist models were democracy. It was a precarious democracy, in almost all cases abrogated by military preceded by military rule, but it had a dictatorships nourished by the necessity constitution. Nevertheless, at the first signs of counterinsurgency. Latin America of an insurrection, the result was a daily during the 1970s was completely covered harvest of tortured and disappeared. by military governments that not only believed law and democracy were obstacles At the time, in interviews with military to the emergency measures the situation sources, Gorriti frequently received the demanded, but followed a doctrine that “A democracy has standard response: you don’t understand. imparted an almost religious overtone Things appear simple for civilians, he was to the war against communism they saw never been defeated told, but those charged with security know themselves as leading in the third world. by a guerrilla the enemy, and know by doctrine what The only exception was the Betancourt must be done. Actions that individuals government in Venezuela. insurrection. would not take as Christians or as moral Nevertheless, many persons must be taken under certain The United States, Gorriti argued, democracies have circumstances. The analogy was a surgeon with its fundamentally inorganic and confronted with the need to amputate in instrumentalist vision of counterinsurgency, been defeated or order to save the patient’s life, even though, collaborated fully with this national security abrogated, not by the at the end, little of that life remains. doctrine, profoundly opposed to democracy. From its collaboration on Operation insurgents, but by the Gorriti went on to argue that what Peru Condor, to subcontracting Argentine counterinsurgents then lived through, and what has been counterinsurgents at the beginning of the supposedly charged experienced in one or another form in many contra war against the Sandinistas, the U.S. parts of Latin America, occurred in the elevated the instrumental over the defense with defending context of a weak democracy. Perversely, of the central values that counterinsurgency democracy.” the regions where the insurgency was had supposedly been designed to protect. – Gustavo Gorriti growing were the regions under military control, which in turn also grew, in It is worthwhile to remember this history such a way that little by little Peruvian today, in the context of the war against democracy was eaten up by a cancer of terrorism, when tactics of the past, like internal regional military dictatorships that extraordinary rendition, are returning, metastasized throughout the organism— and when many of those involved in the until finally in 1992, with Fujimori and fight against terrorism are indicating by Montesinos, the democratic experience their actions that they see democracy as an ended and authoritarian rule returned. obstacle.

It is important to note that although An historical perspective, nevertheless, the war essentially ended in 1992 with may mislead. There are perhaps 130 years the capture of Abimael Guzmán, this of experience of confrontation between had nothing to do with the measures governments and terrorist threats, and the promulgated by Fujimori and Montesinos. results are clear. Both democracies and They were losing the war; they were dictatorships have been targeted, and in absolutely spooked, and they had nothing almost all cases, the democracies were better else in hand to try. It was a small, well able to confront the threat, in the long trained unit, that was formed in Peru but run, in a much more positive and efficient later received CIA support, that eventually fashion in the long run. On the other hand, won the war with just one accidental shot some authoritarian governments triumphed that wounded no one. and others were defeated.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 21 With regard issue for debate, there is also a need for a to how to clear and coherent understanding of the confront guerrilla potential that U.S. justice policy offers insurrections, the human rights movement, and the there are certain benefits it has already begun to provide. principles that Justice cooperation builds upon U.S. and governments Colombian policies to combat drugs, should recognize. money-laundering and corruption. These One is that the are policies that are in many ways unrelated objective of to human rights, except that if one does the war is not a Venn diagram of the intersection of to destroy the leading violators of human rights with enemy, but to leading money launderers, drug traffickers A meeting of the Organización establish or reestablish the active presence and generally really bad folks in Colombia, Feminina Popular (OFP). Space in which to operate for this civil of the state throughout the territory. A there is an unmistakable overlap. A justice society organization and others has government must establish a unified state, policy approach can begin to address one of been threatened by the conflict and always act in accordance with the the major underlying problems as a country and the government’s response. law. Functioning in accordance with the transitions from a political conflict that law is a small price to pay for the immense was oriented around left-right divisions, to legitimacy that results. a political conflict that has the potential to allow organized crime to become In short, Gorriti concluded, democratic institutionalized or embedded in the system legality properly understood is not an in a way that would be hard to reverse. obstacle, but an advantage. If the military is interested in the topic of counterinsurgency, In thinking about possible strategies, it civilians should be even more so. Militaries is important to recognize that the U.S. manage counterinsurgency, but it is civilian Justice Department has a role within U.S. lives that are lost. policy, but it does not have its own foreign policy. Often its goals are subordinated to Morris Panner spoke from the perspective larger political goals. Nevertheless, even if of a former U.S. prosecutor with one believes that U.S. justice policy over experience in bilateral investigations with the last few years has not been a model for Colombian prosecutors and police. His the region, there is still a deep and long first comment was that the picture Rep. tradition of outstanding adherence to basic Velasco painted of the consolidation of principles of justice principles that provide the power of organized crime throughout a lot of benefit. The question is how the the ports and along the coasts of Colombia two countries can collaborate to deal with was a very scary image. That led to the some of the worst actors of the conflict. question of the relationship between crime and human rights concerns, or To that end, Panner outlined some more specifically, between human rights initial steps. First, within human rights policy and aggressive, concerted U.S.- organizations, there should be a discipline driven law enforcement. Panner argued around building strategic cases. The worst that ten years ago, most people would offenders should be identified and aligned have said that those two things do not go with concerns that transcend politically together. But today, increasingly, people motivated discussions; for example, the are starting to appreciate throughout U.S. traffickers who have bought their way law enforcement and in the human rights into the demobilization process. Panner community how compatible human rights recalled Gorriti’s argument: one capture, and law enforcement goals are. that of Guzmán, changed the dynamic of the Peruvian conflict. Bringing a few very Panner went on to say that while Plan bad actors to justice can have a major Colombia is and should be an important impact.

22 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses JESS HUNTER Second, international human rights groups “rural,” is about 50 should consider bringing cases directly. In percent of the country. Latin American legal systems, people other Colombia is an than direct victims can have standing to electoral democracy, bring cases. but democracy also depends on well-being. Third, human rights groups should ask how the work being done by other agencies Jones turned to the in-country lines up with foreign policy many contradictions goals. In any foreign country, the embassy that plague alternative is the primary point of contact; everyone development (AD) reports to the ambassador. At the same programs. AD is an orphan child lying A Colombian farmer points to his corn crop, destroyed by aerial time, an agency like DEA does its own in a grey area between drug control fumigation intended to kill coca polygraphs and background checks of and development, unclaimed by either. plantings. the people it works with. Because of the Development takes time and patience. Leahy amendment, contacts like the DEA’s Favoring short-term counter-narcotics cannot have a background of human rights objectives over development leads to violations. sloppy development and many mistakes. In the rush for measurable drug control More generally, there is a need to push achievements, for example, the decision- the Colombia debate toward the issue of making process of the peasant household— rule of law in a multilateral and bilateral which ought to be an important focus of context. There is consensus in the U.S. development efforts—gets lost. Human and in Colombia that organized crime is rights, democracy, participation—all part of bad, and these actors should be in jail. nation-building—get left aside. Extradition has offered an opportunity for collaboration; it is a tool that provides a The law enforcement aspect can also safety valve for consolidating democracy, be contradictory. Are peasants who and gives those concerned about rule of law grow illegal crops treated as criminals another card to play. Expanding extradition or as small farmers? Jones compared beyond drug trafficking could have its the perspectives of the U.S. versus greatest weight as an element of an integral Europe. When Europeans look at the response to actors involved in organized drug problem, the first thing they see is crime. The threatened consolidation of poverty, and they tend not to condition political power by organized crime provides their aid. The first thing the U.S. sees, by an opportunity to use new tools to combat contrast, is that a law has been broken, these actors. and aid is conditioned on eradication of the drug crops. The problem with the The final presentation of the panel, by U.S. perspective is that it is less likely to James Jones, a former UN employee and resolve the problem over the long term. now consultant whose clients have included A development approach stands a much the UN and USAID, focused on prospects better chance of resolving the problem. for alternative development in Colombia, The U.S. increasingly takes the position drawing on lessons from counter-drug that forced eradication, before farmers efforts throughout the Andean region. have a sustainable alternative in place, He began with a reminder that the Andes is necessary before development can is a region of widespread poverty and occur. Much experience shows that to be marked inequality, and that Colombia is false. Forced eradication of impoverished the 9th most unequal country in the world. farmers has human-rights implications, Two-thirds of Colombians live on less and also compromises democracy and than the $3 per day poverty line. In rural participation, which is important to areas, 85 percent are poor, and the rural democracy. If the first manifestation of population, by new OECD definitions of the State, as in Colombia, takes the form

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 23 of armed helicopters and crop dusters, view, that potential should be pursued. state legitimacy and democracy are The solution to Colombia’s problems, and compromised. America’s problems, does not lie in guns and glyphosate. A further problem is that alternative development projects tend to get shunted In discussion, García-Peña reinforced to specialized agencies, which make them Jones’ characterization of the state of the inherently short-term. Development does Colombian economy, arguing that without not get mainstreamed or folded into major a doubt, levels of poverty and inequality development agencies such as ministries have grown. Another step backwards is of agriculture, transportation, health, and the government’s insistence that there education. is no armed conflict, or even a social and political conflict. On this point the If the first manifestation Returning specifically to Colombia, Jones country has regressed at least twenty years, of the State, as in noted that it is somewhat of a special case; if one compares Uribe’s statements with Colombia, takes the question always arises of how to do past presidents. The hopeful advance, alternative development in the midst of emphasized by Panner, Gorriti and Jones, the form of armed all the violence. One way to answer the is the widespread consensus throughout helicopters and crop question is to look back at 1998, when Latin America and across the political dusters, state legitimacy President Pastrana came into office, and spectrum in favor of democracy. The wedded drug control to the peace process. consensus is not just at the conceptual and democracy are He proposed undertaking alternative level, but is operational; it provides a compromised. development in areas controlled by the platform for engagement among a wide FARC. In exchange for FARC help in variety of protagonists, and gives the reducing drug crops, the State would international community great leverage. develop FARC-controlled rural zones. Yet within that democratic framework, Today, such a proposal seems unthinkable. the other great problems, including the But the fact that the peace laboratories challenges of development, remain to be have been able to go into conflict zones, resolved. build local interest, foster participation— all elements of good, sound development In discussion, García-Peña reinforced practice—shows that some progress Jones’ characterization of the state of the is possible. Their experience suggests Colombian economy, arguing that without that development activities can help a doubt, levels of poverty and inequality overcome violence, that the relationship have grown. Another step backwards is between achieving security and fostering the government’s insistence that there development is more interactive and less is no armed conflict, or even a social linear than is often assumed. and political conflict. On this point the country has regressed at least twenty years, Has alternative development, where it has if one compares Uribe’s statements with been tried, been successful? Jones argued past presidents. The hopeful advance, that there have been pockets of success emphasized by Panner, Gorriti and Jones, is throughout the Andes. In Colombia, the the widespread consensus throughout Latin kind of work described by Javier Moncayo America and across the political spectrum is an example. But if one looks at the in favor of democracy. The consensus is magnitude of the problem, the success not just at the conceptual level, but is is relatively small. The UN estimates operational; it provides a platform for that about 23 percent of farmers have engagement among a wide variety of received some sort of development help, protagonists, and gives the international not necessarily sustainable alternatives, community great leverage. Yet within that but some sort of help. That proportion is democratic framework, the other great very low, and means that the success is problems, including the challenges of more potential than actual. But in Jones’ development, remain to be resolved.

24 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses LONDON DECLARATION WOLA Staff Joy Olson Executive Director All Government representatives present expressed their full support for the democratically Geoff Thale elected Colombian Government and for all efforts to develop the fully functioning institutions of Program Director and a democratic state throughout its territory, based on respect for human rights and international Senior Associate for Cuba humanitarian law and the welfare and safety of all citizens, and to reform the country’s institutions. and Central America They expressed their support for the Colombian Government in its fight against conflict-related Lori Piccolo violence and illegal drug production and trafficking, underlining the need in so doing to respect the Development Director rule of law, human rights and, when applicable, international humanitarian law. Jason Schwartz Operations and Financial Manager They welcomed President Uribe’s commitment to seek a negotiated solution to the internal Gastón Chillier conflict in Colombia including through direct engagement with those illegal armed groups prepared Senior Associate, Human Rights, and to negotiate a peace agreement. They underlined the importance of the contribution of the UN. Security They offered their full continuing support to the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, and Jeff Vogt thanked the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Colombia for his contribution. Senior Associate for Economic Issues John Walsh They expressed their willingness to provide practical help to the Colombian Government and the Senior Associate for the Andes and Drug Policy UN in peace efforts. They called upon all the illegal armed groups to agree to a ceasefire and to enter a serious negotiating process to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. They condemned all Adriana Beltrán violent acts against the civilian population and elected representatives and called for the release of Associate for Guatemala and Media Coordinator kidnap victims, and the halting of narcotics trafficking. Laurie Freeman Associate for Mexico, Security, They expressed deep concern about the humanitarian crisis in Colombia, particularly the plight and Drug Policy of internally displaced persons, as well as the grave human rights and international humanitarian Elsa Falkenburger law situation. They voiced their strong support for the work undertaken by the Office of the UN Program Officer for Cuba, Central High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia. They noted with satisfaction the Colombian America, Brazil and Economic Issues Government’s pledge to implement the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner Ana Paula Duarte for Human Rights. They urged the Colombian Government to implement these recommendations Development Assistant promptly and to take effective action against impunity and collusion especially with paramilitary Katie Malouf groups. Program Assistant for Andes region and Hemispheric Security They welcomed the efforts of President Uribe to reform Colombian institutions in order to Kristel Muciño develop a fully functioning democratic state throughout its territory, based on the rule of law, Program Assistant for Mexico and respect for human rights, the safety and welfare of its citizens, social and economic reform and Drug Policy and Intern Coordinator sustainable economic development. They emphasized the importance of such measures, especially Coletta Youngers in rural areas that have borne the brunt of the conflict, in helping to achieve a peaceful solution. Senior Fellow They noted the significant role which the private sector could play in meeting some of these Rachel Neild challenges. Senior Fellow George Withers They welcomed the Colombian Government’s statement that they recognized and supported the Senior Fellow role of civil society and Non Governmental Organizations as important stakeholders in carrying out Edited by Tina Hodges reform, implementing development programs and defending human rights and moving towards a negotiated settlement of the internal armed conflict. They further welcomed and underlined the importance of the Colombian Government’s pledge to protect civil society leaders, including of trade unions, who have suffered threats against themselves and their families.

Finally, they agreed to review and refocus their cooperation programs with particular emphasis on contributing to the strengthening of state institutions, the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis, the protection of human rights, environmental activities and the development of alternatives to drug production. Having taken careful note of the Colombian Government’s priorities in these areas, they agreed to consider how to make their cooperation programs more effective in the light of the current situation in Colombia, with a view to a donors’ co-ordination conference to be organized by the Inter-American Development Bank at a date convenient to the Colombian Government and the donor community.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 25 Conference Speakers

Diana Ávila Paulette is Executive to Protect Journalists and the King of of the Narcotics Section of the U.S. Director of Project Counselling Spain Journalistic Prize in 1997. Department of Justice in Washington, Service (PCS), an international DC and Resident Legal Advisor in consortium of European and Canadian James C. Jones is a specialist on the US Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. cooperation agencies focused on international development issues, He is currently CEO of OpenAir, a humanitarian assistance, development, including the environment, health, private software company, and serves and advocacy in conflict and post- agriculture, and rural development, as a consultant to Harvard Law School conflict situations. With PCS since with 15 years of experience in Latin on drug strategy as well as intelligence 1992, Ms. Avila has many years of America. From 1997 to 1999, he reform in Peru and other Latin experience working to support and served as Latin America Regional American nations. Mr. Panner lived in protect Latin American displaced Advisor in Alternative Development Guatemala from 1988 to 1990 where and refugee populations and other to the United Nations International he directed the Guatemala Office groups affected by political violence. Drug Control Program. In that of the Harvard Center for Criminal She holds an MA in sociology from capacity, he worked closely with small Justice. He was named a German the University of Essex in Colchester, farmers growing coca and opium poppy Marshall Fellow in 2003. England. in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, and with national agencies using rural Socorro Ramírez is professor at Daniel García-Peña Jaramillo, is development for drug control. He the Institute of Political Studies Vice President of the Polo Democrático recently completed a Latin America and International Relations at the political movement; director of Planeta regional report and a major global Universidad Nacional de Colombia. She Paz, a popular peace organization; report for UN Office on Drugs and holds a doctorate in political science, and a political analyst and professor Crime assessing the use of Alternative specializing in international relations of political science at the National Development (or “Sustainable and analysis of contemporary political, University of Colombia. He has Livelihoods”) as a drug-control tool. economic and international problems. been closely involved with peace Ms. Ramírez has accepted multiple processes in Colombia for the last 15 Javier Moncayo, a physician and public visiting professorships in Colombia years, serving as High Commissioner health professional, currently serves and Venezuela, sits on the board of for Peace during the government of as the coordinator of the National CRIES, the Coordinator of Economic Ernesto Samper (1995-1998), advisor Network of Regional Development and Social Research of the Caribbean, to the High Commissioner (1994- and Peace Programs (Redprodepaz), is a member of the Presidential 1995), and advisor to the president of which includes 17 programs located Commission on Border Issues and the Senate for peace issues (1992). He throughout Colombia. The programs Colombia-Venezuela Integration was a resident scholar at the Woodrow seek to foster development and (COPIAF), and coordinates the Wilson Center and visiting faculty improve governance from the ground Colombia-Venezuela Academic Group. member at American University in up, using a participatory, multi-sectoral Her numerous publications include the 1998-1999. methodology. Three of the programs recent book, Intervención en conflictos have received major funding from the internos: El caso colombiano 1994-2003. European Union, and the UNDP has Gustavo Gorriti, co-Director of the supported the Network to facilitate major Peruvian daily La República, is the sharing of information and best Alfredo Rangel Suárez is Director of highly regarded for his groundbreaking practices. the Fundación Seguridad y Democracia investigative journalism on drug- (Security and Democracy Foundation), related corruption in Peru and a prominent Colombian think-tank Panama and for his in-depth work Morris Panner is a former U.S. focusing on defense issues, and is a on Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas and Federal Prosecutor who focused on columnist for the Bogotá daily El the government’s counterinsurgency Organized Crime and Terrorism cases, Tiempo. He has been an external response. For his reporting in exile particularly in Latin America. Mr. advisor to the Colombian Ministry during the Fujimori administration, he Panner served in the U.S. Department of Defense, advisor to the president earned the International Press Freedom of Justice from 1994 to 2000, including on national security, and consultant Award in 1998 from the Committee positions as Principal Deputy Chief to the Inter-American Development

26 Conference Report  The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses Bank, the United Nations, and the Party, has represented the province Susana Villarán is currently the Colombian National Department of of Cauca in the Colombian Chamber vice president of the Inter-American Planning. He is the author of three of Deputies since 1998. He is a co- Commission for Human Rights books and dozens of articles and essays sponsor with Sen. Rafael Pardo and of the Organization of American on the armed conflict and peace other legislators of a pending bill to States, and the rapporteur for processes in Colombia. establish a legal framework for the Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua. demobilization of paramilitary and She has served as Peru’s National Raúl Rosende currently serves as other illegal armed groups. He was a Ombudsman for Police, as a member Advisor to the Resident Coordinator delegate to past peace processes with of the governmental Committee of the United Nations Development the M-19 and Quintín Lame guerrilla to Restructure and Modernize the Programme in Colombia. His groups, and has authored legislation National Police, and as Minister for responsibilities include designing to facilitate an humanitarian accord Women. She is the former executive and implementing a strategy for between the Colombian state and secretary of the National Coordination conflict reduction and promotion insurgent groups. for Human Rights of Peru. of integrated development in war zones. He coordinated the donors’ Conference Moderators & Panel Chairs conferences for Colombia in London and in Cartagena; serves as the UNDP Virginia M. Bouvier joined the recently completed a book on peace liaison with governments and donors United States Institute of Peace negotiations and the armed conflict on conflict prevention and recovery; in January 2003 as program officer in Colombia (2005). He is also editor and provides strategic analysis and for the Jennings Randolph Senior and co-author of another study for the policy advice on disarmament, Fellowship Program. In addition to United Nations Development Program demobilization and reintegration authoring and editing a number of on Conflict Prevention and Early (DDR) issues. Prior to his arrival in books, she has written journal articles, Warning in Latin America, focusing Colombia, he staffed UN and OAS reports, and book reviews on aspects on the case of Colombia (2005). missions in Afghanistan, Guatemala of U.S.-Latin American relations, Currently he is working with a team and Nicaragua. U.S. foreign policy, Colombian peace of international scholars on a cross- initiatives, human rights, gender, regional research project on insurgent Ana María Sanjuán is the Director and political humor. Formerly, she groups and paths to settlement of of the Center for Peace and Human was an Assistant Professor of Latin internal armed conflicts sponsored Rights at the Universidad Central American literature and culture at the by the Norwegian Government and de Venezuela. She has served as a University of Maryland, and a Senior the Social Science Research Council consultant to the World Bank, the Associate at the Washington Office contributing research on the FARC Inter-American Development Bank, on Latin America. Bouvier has also guerrillas of Colombia and the Shining and the United Nations Development served as a consultant for the World Path of Peru. Programme. Ms. Sanjuán has Bank, Levi Strauss Foundation, Levi focused her research on issues of Strauss & Co., the C.S. Fund, and the Louis W. Goodman is Dean and justice, security, human rights and Women’s Leadership Conference of Professor of International Relations democracy. One of her most recent the Americas. at American University’s School of publications is “La violencia: apuntes International Service, positions he para su delimitación y estudio” in the Marc Chernick teaches in the has held since 1986. Previously Dr. volume Fin de la Violencia: Tema Department of Government and the Goodman served on the faculty of Yale del Siglo XXI, published by the Center for Latin American Studies University’s Department of Sociology Universidad Central de Venezuela. of Georgetown University. He and as Director of the Latin American Her analysis explores the historical previously taught and directed the and Caribbean Programs of the Social roots of Venezuela’s social and Latin American Studies programs Science Research Council and The political polarization and considers at the Johns Hopkins School of Woodrow Wilson International Center the longer term prospects for national Advanced International Studies and at for Scholars. The author of numerous reconciliation. Columbia University. He has written books and articles, Dr. Goodman’s widely on drug-trafficking, political current research focuses on democracy Rep. Luis Fernando Velasco Cháves, violence, and negotiated settlement building and civilian control of the an attorney and member of the Liberal to internal armed conflicts and has armed forces in Latin America.

Washington Office on Latin America  August 2005 27 About WOLA The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a nonprofit policy, research and advocacy organization working to advance democracy, human rights and social justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Founded in 1974, WOLA plays a leading role in Washington policy debates about Latin America. WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training and advocacy.

To Order More WOLA has a wide range of publications available on human rights in Latin America WOLA Publications and U.S. policy. WOLA also publishes a quarterly newsletter: “Cross Currents” in English and “Enlace” in Spanish. See our website for a complete list of publications and contact our office to order.

To Contact Us Washington Office on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20009 Telephone: 202.797.2171 • Facsimile: 202.797.2172 Email: [email protected] • Web: www.wola.org

ISBN: 09295-I3673 WOLA thanks the U.S. Institute of Peace for its generous grant in support of the conference. We also thank the Ford Foundation, the John Merck Fund, Stewart R. Mott Charitable Trust, Catholic Relief Services and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for their funding and support of our Colombia program.

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