Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 1
Iamblichus, Protrepticus VIII translation, text, apparatus criticus, commentary DSH and MRJ 2013viii28
4.5-8: The title suggests that there are two major topics in the chapter, probably corresponding to 45.6-47.4, on the common conceptions, and 47.6-48.21 about the difference between the apparent and the real good. 4.5 u(pomnh&seij: This word is also used in the chapter headings of X (4.15), XVII (5.16) and XXIII (6.23-24). 4.5-8 a)po_ tw~n … a)po_ tw~n: On the a)po_ + genitive construction in Iamblichean titles and transitions see note on the chapter heading of VII (4.3). 4.5 tw~n koinw~n e0nnoiw~n: Did Iamblichus supply these words or borrow them from his source? The individual terms of this expression are used by Aristotle but not the exact expression koinai\ e!nnoiai which is, however, found later for example in Euclid (his term for "axiom"), and the title of Plutarch’s treatise peri\ tw=n koinw=n e)nnoiw=n pro\j tou\j stwikou/j. This state of affairs does not exclude, of course, the possibility that Aristotle used the terms in the Protrepticus. For e!nnoiwai see Somn. 462a28; HA 10.636b22; Metaph. 12.1073b12; Motu. 701b17; NE IX 1171a32, b14, X 1177a15, 1179b15. Aristotle also uses similar notions in connection with ta\ e)/ndoca (Top. 100a20, etc.) such as tw=n koinw=n docw=n (997a20-21; cf. APr. 1.24.416b13-22, APo. 1.10.76a37-b2, Metaph. 1005a23-27) and Phys. 4.6: ta_j koina_j peri\ au)tw~n do&caj (213a21-22) and Metaph. II 1: tij koinw&saito tai=j docaij (993b12-13), and II 2, ta\j koina\j do/caj (996b28). Aristotle recommends the rhetorical use of common maxims, “for because they are common, since they are agreed upon by all, they are assumed to be correct: dia_ ga_r to_ ei]nai koinai/, w(j o(mologou&ntwn pa&ntwn, o)rqw~j e1xein dokou~sin (Rhet. 1395a11-12). For commentary on the epistemological function of common conceptions in Aristotle, see Ross, Analytics, 56-57; Hankinson, Kind-crossing, 37 and n46. 4.7 e0nargw~j: This word is used in several chapter headings and openings; see note on VII (4.3-4).
45.4-6 attribution: Rose included it; Walzer rejected it by printing it within square brackets; Ross included it (in one of his rare changes vis-à-vis Walzer); and then Düring rejected part of the sentence with square brackets. We see all the typical signs of an Iamblichean navigational passage, with repetitive phrasing. 45.4 ou) xei=ron: Düring cites NE 1127a14 and Pol. 1316b33 as parallel uses of the idiom. 45.4-5 tw~n koinw~n e0nnoiw~n: See note above on the chapter heading at 4.5.
45.6-15 attribution and voice: With respect to 45.12-15 Düring (Attempt, 258) notes that “one or two sentences are suppressed”. It does seem that something has dropped out; we are not sure how much, or on what grounds Düring ventured his estimate. Flashar Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 2
(Fragmente, 189) suggests that the sentence interrupts the thought—is it a worthless interpolation? It seems to us not to be, because without 45.12-15 the argument of 45.6-12 is not complete. With it, we can reconstruct the logic of the argument fairly easily, as follows: (1) Madness and folly are to be avoided as forms of mental illness. (Evidence for this: everyone tries to avoid madness and folly, and no one would choose madness, even combined with great power and wealth.) (2) Intelligence is the opposite of madness and folly. So, (3) just as being mentally ill is to be avoided, so being intelligent is to be pursued. But as for attribution, suspicion falls on this as a continuation of Iamblichus’ voice from the previous sentence. The expression neanikwta&taj (45.9) is non- Aristotelian and late; the term zw/ein (45.10) is Ionic in dialect, which may indicate that in this zone there was quotation of an Epic poet or a speaker of Ionic dialect such as Heraclides of Pontus. But if this is a bridging passage it seems to contain a considerable amount of paraphrase, and to relate closely to the content of P.Oxy. 666-- the idea being that having wealth and power is not choice-worthy without wisdom, and in fact constitutes a kind of madness. Thus our best guess is that this is an Iamblichean paraphrase of a speech, perhaps by 'Heraclides of Pontus', given in response to the speaker of P.Oxy. 666. 45.6 dh_ ou}n: Düring notes that the expression is common in Plato but rare in the Aristotle corpus. But see GC 321a32; and [Aristotle], Physiognomy 806a19; Prob. 878a4. 45.7 ou)dei\j a2n e3loito zh~n: A solidly Aristotelian idiom, cf. NE 10.2 ou)dei/j t' a2n e3loito zh~n paidi/ou dia&noian e1xwn dia_ bi/ou (1174a1). The trope of under what circumstances one would not choose not to live underpins the argument of EE 1.5: “About many other things it is not easy to judge well, but most difficult on that which judgment seems to all easiest and the knowledge of it in the power of any man—viz. what of all that is found desirable in living, and what, if attained, would satisfy our desire to live. For there are many consequences of life that make men flee away from life, such as disease, excessive pain, storms, so that it is clear that from these starting points it would have been desirable were one given the power to choose not to be born at all” (1215b15-22). Aristotle goes in the EE to name three kinds of living that would not be worthwhile: living the life of a plant (or asleep), a brute animal, or a child. Each of these “common conceptions” is represented below in the Protrepticus, which seems to show that part of EE I is a reworking of Protrepticus material. 45.7 e)p’ a)nqrw&pwn: a)p’ was omitted or deleted by some MSS which served as the basis for the earliest printed editions; but Pistelli, following F, restored this preposition, which is however difficult to construe; then Vitelli conjectured kat’ a)/nqrwpon, and Düring proposed to delete megi/sthn as well as a)p'; but Allan argued that these modifications are unnecessary (‘Explanatory Notes’, 233). We prefer to conjecture e)p’ a)nqrw&pwn, with e)pi/ in the sense of LSJ s.v. e)pi/ A.III.1 “in authority over”. 45.8-9 e0cesthkw_j me/ntoi tou~ fronei=n kai\ maino&menoj: Plato uses the examples of madness, illness, and dreaming in Theaet. 158bff. 45.9 maino&menoj: Cf. P.Oxy. 3699.a.ii.15. 45.9-10 ta_j neanikwta&taj h(dona_j zw&ein xai/rwn: The word zw/ein has stimulated many conjectures, being unfamiliar or unrecognized; but it is in fact simply a dialect form more suited to epic poetry or Ionic prose than Attic prose, where it would be written zh=n. Aristotle might well be quoting here a phrase from an Ionic Epic author, like Il. 24.525-7; see note in Allan, ‘Explanatory Notes’, 233. Our candidate for this is Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 3
Heraclides of Pontus, to one of whose works he alludes in saying “not even if he were going to ‘live enjoying the wildest pleasures’,” perhaps recycling one of his phrases. While there seems to us to be little difficulty in construal, this unfamiliarity has occasioned several needless conjectures that yield synonymous results: zw/ein] dia/gein Vitelli; zwh=j diatelei=n Bignone; zwh\n e)/xein Gigon, as well as one that alters the idea of the verb: zw/ein] diw/kein Diels, which yields “not even if he were going to enjoy pursuing the wildest pleasures.” 45.12-13 tw~n d' e0nanti/wn e9ka&teron: The logic of Aristotle’s reasoning here and through 46.18 proceeds from a table of opposites. One side is associated with the good and valuable, and the other with their opposites, the bad and worthless (and so forth). For Aristotle’s account of opposites, see Metaph. V 10 (1018a25ff.). 45.13 to_ me\n feukto&n e0sti to_ de\ ai9reto&n: Cf. above VII 41.31 and below 10.56.11. APr. 68a28; Top. 135b15; NE 6.
45.15-18 attribution: It is not clear whether this is pure quotation or whether Iamblichus has intervened. Since it seems to us that this is likely to be Iamblichus' own navigational remark, we leave it in plain text and do not take a strong position on the voice. 45.17-18 w(j marturou~sin ai9 koinai\ e1nnoiai: See above note on the chapter heading at 4.5.
45.18-25 attribution and voice: 45.21-22 kaqo&son ai0sqa&nontai tou~ fronei=n kai\ geu&esqai du&nantai tou&tou tou~ pra&gmatoj: Pistelli brackets tou~ fronei=n (“abesse malit”, p.xi). As Allan argues, Rose’s transposition of tou= fronei=n post tou= pra/gmatoj, gives the sense “perceive and thereby have the capacity to taste the thing called wisdom” and is “ingenious, since it fits in with the account of the development of knowledge in the Analytics” (Allan, ‘Explanatory Notes’, 234-235). But emendation may be unnecessary if, as might be suggested by NE 9.1170a30-33, Aristotle thinks that one can have perception of both perception itself and of thought. Düring asserts that the received text “cannot be right” (Attempt, 258), but his problem is with ai0sqa&nontai, which apparently does not give the right sense; he would have the text read qigga/nontai or a(/ptontai instead. 45.22 geu&esqai: Rep. 582c, NE 1179b16. 45.23-24 kai\ dia_ tau&thn ou1t' a2n mequ&wn : Düring comments that something seems to be missing from the argument (Attempt, 259). But we do not agree: it is because those of us with any wisdom regard other things as nothing that we would not put up with a diminishment of our intelligence. 45.24-25 ou1te paidi/on ou)d' a2n ei[j h(mw~n u(pomei/neien ei]nai dia_ te/louj to_n bi/on: Aristotle makes a similar argument about the prospect of lifelong childhood in NE X 2 (1174a1ff.) and MM 1185a2. 45.25 dia_ te/louj to_n bi/on: Is to_n bi/on an interlinear gloss as Düring argues, following a suggestion of Scaliger, Attempt, 259? Although it may seem redundant, or even harsh, this does not seem to be sufficient reason to delete it from the text.
45.25-46.7 attribution and voice: Both of the arguments about sleep (its not being of positive value even if enjoyable; and its harboring the false) are paralleled in the Corpus, but the exact formulation of the Protrepticus is nowhere else found. Tertullian (de An. 46) discusses the notion of whether Saturn was the first one to dream, and part of his thought there has been attributed to the Protrepticus (= Ross, Protr. frag. 20), but we consider that fragment dubious (see our discussion of it on pp. NN); see, however, Waszink, 'Traces of Aristotle's Lost Dialogues', 145-149. 45.25-46.4: See below XI 57.2-4 where Aristotle connects being awake with perception and life and enjoyment. For the argument that a human could not be happy in eternal sleep see NE I 13 (1102b5-11), X 8 (1178b18), and EE I 5 (1216a2-10). 46.4-7: The images that appear to us in sleep are instanced in the definition and discussion of the false in Metaph. VII 29, “Among the things that are false some are always so others sometimes so. For there are things that are not the same as the things that exist, although they are things that exist, but their nature is to appear either not to be what they are or to be what they are not, for example the skiagraphia and the things in dreams. For these are something, just not that which they are made to appear”: tou&twn ga_r yeu~doj to_ me\n a)ei\ to_ de\ pote/: ou3tw ga_r ou)k o1nta tau~ta), ta_ de\ o3sa e1sti me\n o1nta, pe/fuke me/ntoi fai/nesqai h2 mh_ oi[a& e0stin h2 a4 mh_ e1stin (oi[on h( skiagrafi/a kai\ ta_ e0nu&pnia: tau~ta ga_r e1sti me/n ti, a)ll' ou)x w{n e0mpoiei= th_n fantasi/an (1024b20-24; on skiagraphia see below on 47.8). Appropriately, Aristotle is not so resolute in the opening of his scientific investigation of the matter in de Ins. 1, “As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly dismiss it with contempt or give it confidence” (462b12). For further discussion, see: Chroust, 'Nature of Dreams', and D. Gallop’s comments in Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams. The phrase ei1dwlo&n e0sti kai\ yeu~doj a3pan might be a citation from tragedy, to judge from the metre.
46.8-18 attribution and voice: The passage rhetorically follows on the previous two paragraphs, making a rhetorical progression through madness, dreaming, and now death, to the inductive conclusion, reached through the logic of opposites, that one should pursue intelligence. This passage in particular seems to be getting at an etymology of philosophy by giving speculative etymologies of both filoj and sofia. The passage should be closely compared with Philoponus in Nic. Arith. Intr. 1 1.9-14 (see pp. NN). 46.8 to_ feu&gein de\ to_n qa&naton: See above note on 41.31. 46.10-11 to_ skotw~dej kai\ to_ mh_ dh~lon, fu&sei de\ diw&kei to_ fanero/n kai\ to_ gnwsto&n: An apparent difficulty is that to_ fanero_n provides an inadequate contrast with to_ skotw~dej kai\ to_ mh_ dh~lon and provides a mere synonym as we read below (46.19), for dh~lon: kai\
46.18-21 attribution: Although this seems continuation of the etymology of philosophy contains some valuable information, it seems to have undergone serious compression, probably at the hands of Iamblichus. It resembles other “fast-forward” paraphrases in this respect. Although it contains nothing anachronistic or otherwise impossible as far as Aristotle is concerned, we leave it in plain type to indicate that this is probably compressed paraphrase. 46.18 dhloi= ou}n tau~ta safw~j o3ti: There seems to be serious compression here. On the ocularcentric metaphor, see Top. 108a11; Metaph. 982b19-20; NE 1096b29; Rhet. 1411b12. 46.18-19 safw~j … to_ safe/j: There may be a suggestion here about the "etymology" of sofo/j. 46.19
46.22-47.4 attribution and voice: Although it is clear that some argument about property was made in the Protrepticus (e.g. the discussion of wealth, etc. in P.Oxy 666, DCM xxvi, etc.), it does not seem to be included by Iamblichus in anything like a complete form. This passage seems to contain a relic of dialogue at 46.25, and this speaks in favor of its authenticity, but the sketch-like presentation of the argument forces one into doubt. 46.22 pro_j dh_ tou&toij: It is not clear what is the reference of tou&toij. It could be to “these
46.24-26 e0pi\ fronh&sewj ou) th~j au)th~j oi]mai deo&meqa pro&j te to_ zh~n mo&non kai\ pro_j to_ zh~n kalw~j: Düring argues that ou) th~j au)th~j oi]mai deo&meqa implies that “there are two kinds of fro/nhsij, practical wisdom for the life of the ordinary man, and a higher kind of fro/nhsij h(/tij gnw/setai th\n a)lh/qeian for the philosopher who alone possesses the necessary qualifications for a good life” (Attempt, 260). This seems right, because Aristotle applies it to both practical wisdom (“for the purposes of living”) and theoretical wisdom (“for the sake of living well”). Both practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom are fully within the semantic range of the term, as Aristotle here argues, and this is why we use translate with the term “intelligence”, which in English likewise expresses an intellectual virtue with both practical and theoretical application. The distinction made here also makes it clear that there is no need to see Aristotle's conception of as developing from one sense used here into another sense used in Nicomachean Ethics VI, as Jaeger did. For a fuller treatment of these issues, see commentary on XII. 46.25 oi]mai: Appears to be a relic of dialogue; cf. 47.20 46.26-27 toi=j me\n ou}n polloi=j pollh_ suggnw&mh tou~to pra&ttein: The linking particles me\n ou}n need explanation. For this reason, it seems that something has dropped out through a process of compression, also because there is no clear antecedent for tou~to (the most plausible candidate is zh=n mo/non at 46.25), although tou~to does not necessarily need an antecedent but can be proleptic. On suggnw&mh, cf. Isoc., Hel. 7. 47.2 pa&nta po&non u(pome/nein: Rose would rather read ponei=n for u(pome/nein on rhetorical grounds; Düring was tempted by the conjecture, but we are not. How would the corruption to u(pome/nein have arisen? Is it actually finer rhetoric?
47.5-6 attribution: Although the first part of the sentence follows a typical transitional formula of Iamblichus, the second part seems to be a paraphrase or even “borrowed” phrase from the source (as for example in the opening of VI), as opposed to pure invention or metatextuality. Iamblichus is generally more formulaic in his transitional formulae. 47.5 Gnoi/h d' a1n tij to_ au)to: Cf. the opening of chapter 7: I)/doi d' a1n tij to\ auto\ (41.6; cf. 50.19-20 and 53.2). 47.5 a)po_ tou&twn: Iamblichus, in this bridge passage, indicates that he is moving on to another topic. Düring interprets the rest of the chapter as inspired by the discussion of Phaedo 64a-70b (Attempt, 261). 47.6 qewrh&seien u(p' au)ga_j: cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 500. 47.6 a)nqrw&peion: a rare form, a)nqrw&pinon being usual in the Corpus. a)nqrw&pinon is used by poets and Plato, but there is not much evidence of regular later usage.
47.6-21 attribution: Attributed to Aristotle’s Eudemus by Flashar, Fragmente, p. 190 (but printed as his Protrepticus frags 44-45). 47.8 skiagrafi/an: The skiagrafi/a or theatrical background-painting that Aristotle seems to have in mind here is designed to create an optical illusion that distorts Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 7 the perception, e.g. of size. The present reference may not have been the technical concept of skiagraphia at work in the painter’s studio (which may have had more to do with patterns of coloration; see E. C. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting, Leiden, 1978, though she does not refer to the evidence in the Protrepticus). But the idea of creating a perspective illusion is at work in the references to skiagraphia in the corpus: Metaph. V 1024b23 (quoted above, see note on 46.6-7) and Rhet. 1414a9; cf. [Alex.] in Metaph. 432.16-433.8 and 82713-14. The idea of skiagraphia as an optical illusion is used by a metaphor frequently in Plato, see: Phd. 67e-69c; Rep. 4.522e-523c; 583b-584c; 586ac; 10.602d-603a; Parm. 165c; Cri. 107d; Leg. 2.663bc. 47.8-10 to_ mhde\n ei]nai to_n a1nqrwpon kai\ to_ mhde\n ei]nai be/baion tw~n a)nqrwpi/nwn: This remarkably pessimistic statement is paralleled in the gnomological tradition: “(From Aristotle:) ‘for what is a human being? -- a pattern of weakness, a captive of opportunity, a plaything of Fortune, an image of deterioration, a balance-beam between resentment and misfortune; and the rest is phlegm and bile’” (Stobaeus, Eclogues 4.34.60 Hense = 52 Searby = 81 Gigon). See also in the Greek Anthology 10.70 (in which Aristotle is named) and 10.80. Note: Plato also said that “a human being is a plaything of a god, and this is a great point in his favour” (Leg. I 644d; cf. VII 803c). 47.10-11 i0sxu&j te ga_r kai\ me/geqoj kai\ ka&lloj ge/lwj e0sti\ kai\ ou)deno_j a1cia: cf. EE 1.4.1215b6-14 “stature, beauty, and wealth”. Cf. Isoc., Ad Dem. 6: “Time uses up beauty, or disease ravages it; and wealth is the servant of vice rather than of nobility, affording the conveniences of easy living, while encouraging the youth to pleasure; and physical strength with intelligence brings advantages, but without intelligence does more harm to the one who has it, and even though it adorns the bodies of those who cultivate it, it detracts from the disciplines of the soul.” These parallels show Gigon's proposed deletion of ka&lloj to be a misguided one that would strip a significant detail away from the text. Beauty is in fact a central theme of the lost work; see commentary on Protrepticus VI, 38.5, above. 47.11 ka&lloj te para_ to_ mhde\n o(ra~n a)kribe\j dokei= ei}nai toiou=ton: Düring argues that ka&lloj te cannot be right and conjectures mo/nwj ga/r para\ to\ mhqe\n o(ra=n a)kribe/j (citing parallels at Top. 142a8, Phys. 258a2; Cael. 289b33). Like Gigon (see previous note), Düring seems to have missed the point of the argument. The speaker is arguing that beauty only appears to be the kind of thing that it is because we see nothing accurately (going on to argue that if we could see accurately, we would not consider those objects we now consider beautiful to be beautiful). Now this does not seem to be Aristotle's view, since he argues in Parts of Animals I 5 that "we should venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste, for each will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature's works in the highest degree, and the end for which those works are put together and produced is a form of the beautiful. If any person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man. For no one can look at the elements of the human frame--blood, flesh, bone, vessels, and the like--without much repugnance" (645a21-30, tr. Ogle). But notice the direct engagement of the Parts of Animals passage with the argument found here in the Protrepticus. What can account for this somewhat dissonant voice is the dialogue interpretation, so that this view (expressed by, e.g., Heraclides of Pontus), was answered by Aristotle himself, who will have argued along the following lines: "in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things has the advantage... their Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 8 greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest of the heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy ... if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet nature, which fashioned them, gives amazing pleasure in their study to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy" (645a1-10, tr. Ogle). In fact we do find quite similar language to this in IX: "the animals are surely things that have come to be by nature, either absolutely all of them or the best and most honourable of them; for it makes no difference if someone thinks that most of them have come into being unnaturally because of some corruption or wickedness" (50.27-51.4). So beauty is very much at issue in these passages, and the "Eyes of Lynceus" passage that follows (see next note), and so Düring and Gigon were wrong to remove it from the discussion here. 47.13 ble/pein o)cu_ kaqa&per to_n Lugke/a fasi/n: Bywater was the first to perceive as an echo of this part of the Protrepticus (‘Lost Dialogue’) in Boethius’ Consolation III 8: "How slight, how fragile is the tenure of those who boast of bodily goods! Can you surpass the elephant in size, the bull in strength, the tiger in speed? Look to the vastness, the durability, the speed of the heavens, and cease to marvel at those cheap possessions. No less than for these qualities, the heavens are admirable for the reason by which they are ruled. As for beauty, how swift is its passing— more fleeting than the flowers of spring! If, as Aristotle says, men had had the eyes of Lynceus, so that their sight could pierce through obstacles, would not the body of Alcibiades, so fair on its surface, have seemed most foul when its inward parts were seen? So it is not your own nature, but the weakness of the eyes which see you, that makes you seem beautiful." (Boethius, Consolation III 8, tr. Ross, Protr. fr. 10a, p. 40). Boethius must have remembered this passage either through Cicero’s Hortensius or else through some other access, either direct or mediated through another source, to Aristotle’s Protrepticus. The fact that he mentions Aristotle by name indicates that his source was the original, unless Cicero had also mentioned Aristotle by name, which is itself good evidence of Aristotle’s text. In this text, the keen eyesight of Lynceus gets applied to the beautiful young Alcibiades, a scenario that seems to be also derived from a passage in [Plato], Alcibiades, in which Socrates says to Alcibiades, “your beauty is just beginning to bloom; I shall never forsake you now, never, unless the Athenian people make you corrupt and ugly ... the ‘people of great-hearted Erechtheus’
47.16 timai\ de\ kai\ do&cai ta_ zhlou&mena: There seems to be significant compression here. Cf. NE 1096b16-19, where honors are treated as things intrinsically valuable. Cf. Rhet. 1360b34. 47.17 tw~n a)idi/wn ti: cf. Tim. 37ce; Soph. 216c; Euripides frag. 910 N. 47.18-19 ti/ d' e0sti\ makro_n: Düring refers to this as a common rhetorical trope; cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.94; [Plut.] Consol ad Apoll. 19; Bignone, Nouve testimonianze, 234; see also Pohlenz’s review of Bignone, 518n1. 47.19 ti/ poluxro&nion: see Dirlmeier’s note on NE 1123a8, p. 369. 47.20 oi]mai: appears to be a relic of dialogue; cf. 46.25. 47.20 bi/ou braxu&thta: The theme of the shortness of human life was evidently treated again by Aristotle, either in Protrepticus or elsewhere, according to this report in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: “But what age can truly be called old? What possession of man is lasting? ... Because we have nothing more, we call this lasting; all these things are called long or short according to the proportion of each that is given to each of us. By the river Hypanis, which flows into the Pontus from the direction of Europe, Aristotle says there are born little creatures which live for but one day. One of these that has died at the eighth hour has died at an advanced age; one that has died at sunset is decrepit, especially if it is on a midsummer day. Compare our longest life with eternity; we shall be found as short-lived as these little creatures” (Cicero, Tusc. I.94, tr. Ross, fr. 10a, p. 40). Similarly, Seneca reports a complaint by Aristotle about our short lives: “Aristotle’s quarrel with the nature of things is most unsuitable to a wise man. He says that nature has indulged the animals so much that they live for five of our generations, while man, born to so many and such great achievements, has so much nearer a limit fixed for him” (Seneca, Brev. Vit. 1.2, tr. Ross, fr. 10a, p. 40). However, the common element of these two reports, that human life is short, is an insufficient basis for ascribing these ideas to the Protrepticus, as did Ross, who located them among other texts within his fr. 10a: the only information from Cicero that can definitely be ascribed to Aristotle is that there are very short-lived creatures in Europe; and the particular complaint of Seneca is out of place in this context in the Protrepticus, where Aristotle complains of the foolishness of people with misplaced priorities, not of the miserliness of nature towards people.
47.21-48.9 attribution: This passage continues in the same high rhetorical register and moves towards the same conclusion in the following section, and thus seems to be from the same author (Aristotle) and in the same voice (e.g. Heraclides of Pontus). The dissonance between the view of the soul-body relationship mentioned here (with the gruesome analogy to the methods of torture of the Tyrrhenian pirates) and Aristotle's own account in On the Soul seems to show that this cannot be in Aristotle's voice; a fortiori it cannot be part of a continuous oratorical discourse advocated in its entirety by Aristotle. The dialogue interpretation, then, provides a solution to the integration of this passage with the rest of Aristotle's Protrepticus. 47.21 e)a\n] ti/j a!n: Kiessling’s minimal change restores the rhetorical (or dialogical) question elegantly; it is preferable to Vulcanius’ conjecture, because it preserves the indefinite pronoun necessary to complete the previous thought, and it is equally easy to explain its occurrence. 47.21-48.9: Attributed by Flashar (Fragmente, p. 190) to the Eudemus, but printed by Flashar as Protrepticus frag. 46. 47.21 ei0j tau~ta ble/pwn: Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 10
47.22 oi[j: As Kiessling noted, Arcerius’ conjecture to dative plural gives a superior sense: we are put together for something, namely e0pi\ timwri/a| (47.24). 47.23 fu&sei sune/stamen: cf. Tim. 66c; frequent in the Corpus (Bonitz 731a18-27). 47.25 oi9 a)rxaio&teroi le/gousi: Compare VP 18: "Labors are good, but pleasures are in every way bad; for, since one has come for punishment, one must be punished” (49.8-10). In the course of developing a speculative etymology for the word sw=ma, Plato seems to distinguish the present etymology from the Orphics, however: “some people say that the body is the tomb (sh=ma/) of the soul, on the grounds that it is entombed in its present life, while others say that it is correctly called a sign (shmai/nei) because the soul signifies whatever it wants to signify by means of the body. I think it is most likely the followers of Orpheus who gave the body its name (sw=ma), with the idea that the soul is being punished for something, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is securely kept (sw/|zhtai) – as the name sw=ma itself suggests – until the penalty is paid; for, on this view, not even a single letter of the word needs to be changed” (Crat. 400c1-10, tr. Reeve; cf. Ep. 7.335a; Dodds, Grg., 381). Burkert comments that "we may suppose that, if it is not Orphic, it is likely to be Pythagorean" (Lore, 248n47, cf. 168n14; see further: Huffman, Philolaus, 402; Zhmud, Early Pythagoreanism, 201). 48.2-3 h( su&zeucij toiou&tw| tini\ e1oike pro_j to_ sw~ma th~j yuxh~j: Cf. the Greek Anthology 10.88. 48.2-9 w3sper ga_r tou_j e0n th|~ Turrhni/a| fasi\ basani/zein: As Düring points out, the tense of the verb fasi\ indicates that it is still be said to this day. Cf. Phd. 82; NE 1115b28 and 1148b22 for other tribes. This unforgettably gruesome metaphor for the conjunction of soul with body came back to haunt readers of Cicero’s Hortensius, according to Augustine who quotes a passage from its “last part”: "How much better and nearer the truth than yours were the views about the generation of men held by those whom Cicero, as though led and compelled by the very evidence of the facts, commemorates in the last part of the dialogue Hortensius! After mentioning the many facts we see and lament with regard to the vanity and the unhappiness of men, he says: “From these errors and cares of human life it results that sometimes those ancients – whether they were prophets or interpreters of the divine mind by the transmission of sacred rites – who said that we are born to expiate sins committed in a former life, seem to have had a glimmer of the truth, and that that is true which Aristotle says, that we are punished much as those were who once upon a time, when they had fallen into the hands of Etruscan robbers, were killed with studied cruelty; their bodies, the living with the dead, were bound as exactly as possible one against another; so our minds, bound together with our bodies, are like the living joined with the dead.” (Contra Jul. 4.15.78, tr. Ross 10b, p. 41). Cicero’s reference to what “Aristotle says” is surely a reference to this passage of his Protrepticus, and intended to be understood as such. It was hence also from here that Cicero also borrowed the argument that we are born to expiate past sins. Clement of Alexandria refers to “the barbarian method of exacting penalties, they are said to bind corpses to the bodies of their captives, and so they would rot together (Protrep. 1.7.4). On these parallels see Brunschwig, ‘Pirates’ (but Brunschwig incorrectly assigns the fragment to the Eudemus), and Bos, ‘Eudemus and Protrepticus’, 36f. See also a parallel in the gnomological tradition: “the same man
48.4 Turrhni/a|: Arcerius’ conjectural emendation is certain, because in the parallel passage in his Hortensius, Cicero paraphrases the present passage (see above note), attributing the idea to Aristotle, and calling the bad guys “Etruscan robbers,” in other words Tyrrhenian pirates. This is also clear from the description of Etruscan torture in Virgil’s Aeneid : “a form of torture whereby living men were roped to dead bodies, tying them hand to hand and face to face to die a lingering death oozing with putrefying flesh in this cruel embrace” (8.485-486).
48.9-21 attribution: Attributed by Flashar (Fragmente, 190) to the Eudemus, but printed as Protrepticus frag. 47. 48.9 ou}n: Düring argues that this can “hardly” refer to the previous stretch of argument and concludes that something is missing. But his reasoning here is muddled by his conviction that this is the peroration of the whole Protrepticus and that a liberal rearrrangement of ideas is justified. 48.11 e0n h(mi=n: cf. above in chapter 7.43.2. 48.11-13 nou~ kai\ fronh&sewj: tou~to ga_r mo&non e1oiken ei]nai tw~n h(mete/rwn a)qa&naton kai\ mo&non qei=on: PA 656a8, 686a28-29; GA 2.3 (736b28); and NE 10.7 (1177a15, b27-30, 1179a22). Cf. Diog. of Ap. fr. A19; Diller, Hermes 76 1941, 374-380. Also: Isoc., Ad Demon. 19; Pl., Leg. 875c. 48.13 para_ to_ th~j toiau&thj duna&mewj du&nasqai: para\ plus infinitive with "causative" sense; cf. Phys. 239b31 (Düring, Attempt, 265). 48.14 o( bi/oj a1qlioj fu&sei kai\ xalepo&j: For the argument that many of life’s events are so difficult that it may have been better not to have born at all, see above note on 45.7 citing EE 1215b. Furthermore, Aristotle argues, many events which don’t involve noble pleasure are not worth living for, nor would a life be worth living, no matter how long it lasted, if it consisted only of things that people do and experience for the sake of other things. And likewise a life that includes the pleasures of food and sex would not be worth living if it does not include any awareness provided by cognition and sense perception, for in that case it would be indistinguishable from that of a dumb animal. Even more so for the pleasure of sleep: that would be a vegetable life (1215b24- 1216a5). Aristotle was not alone among Greek thinkers in the sentiment that life may in fact not be worth living. Socrates offers a selection from the poets in the ps.-Platonic dialogue Axiochus: “It would take too long to go through the works of the poets, who prophesy with inspired voices the events of life while deploring life itself. I shall quote only one of them, the most important one, who said, 'Such is the way the gods spun life for unfortunate mortals, / that we live in unhappiness,” and “Since among all creatures that breathe on earth and crawl on it / there is not anywhere a thing more dismal than man is.' And what does he say about Amphiaraus? 'Whom Zeus of the aegis loved in his heart, as did Apollo, / with every favor, but he never came to the doorsill of old age.' And he who bids us, 'Sing a dirge for the newly born; he faces so much misery' – what do you think of that?” (referring to Homer, Iliad xxiv.525-26 and xvii.446-47 and Odyssey xv.245-46; translations by Lattimore) and Euripides, in his lost play Cresphontes (frg. 452 Dindorf; Axiochus 367d-368a, tr. Hershbell). Epicurus turns this kind of protreptic theme to good effect in the Ep. Menoec. (D.L. X.126) with reference to Theognis. 48.15-16 w3ste dokei=n pro_j ta_ a1lla qeo_n ei]nai to_n a1nqrwpon: Metaph. 1.2.982b28f.; NE 10.7.1177b26ff. See in general Sedley, ‘becoming like god’. Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 12
Cicero reports that “man (as Aristotle says) is born as a sort of mortal god to do two things – for understanding and for action (Fin. 2.40).” The idea that through the achievement of wisdom we become as much as possible like the immortal gods was expressed by Plato in an influential passage in the Timaeus: “If a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp. And to the extent that human nature can partake of immortality, he can in no way fail to achieve this: constantly caring for his divine part as he does, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives within him, he must indeed be supremely happy” (Tim. 90bc, tr. Zeyl). Plato offered another important statement of this idea of coming close to divinity, this time involving moral virtue as well as intellectual virtue: “That is why a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with wisdom” (Theaet. 176ab, tr. after Levett; cf. Phdr. 253a, Rep. 500d, 613ab). 48.16-17 ‘o( nou~j ga_r h(mw~n o( qeo&j’: Aristotle here quotes a fragment attributed to Euripides (frg. 1018 Nauck). On the attribution of the words to Anaxagoras, see the next note. The idea that our thinking minds are divinities in us is one which Aristotle shared with Plato, who gave mythological expression to it in the major speech in Phaedrus, as well as a scientific explanation of it in Timaeus (see previous note). The very end of Cicero’s dialogue Hortensius also gave expression to this idea, according to a report by Augustine: "Commending this contemplative wisdom ... Cicero says at the end of the dialogue Hortensius: “To us ... who spend our lives in philosophy this is a great hope – that if that by which we feel and think is mortal and perishable, we shall have a happy setting ... and a rest from life; if, on the other hand, as the ancient, the greatest and by far the most famous, philosophers thought, we have minds eternal and divine, then we should reflect that the more these minds have been constant in their courses – in the use of reason and in the desire of discovery – and the less they have mixed and implicated themselves in the vices and errors of mankind, the easier will be their ascent and return to heaven.” Then, adding this very clause and summing up his argument, he says: “Wherefore – to bring my speech at last to an end – if we wish either to be quietly extinguished when we have lived our life with these skills, or to move without delay from this to a far better home, all our interest and concern must be bestowed on these studies.” (De Trinitate 14.19.26, tr. after Ross; cf. Tusc. 1.44-47 and Barigazzi, ‘Sulla fonti del libro I delle Tusculane di Cicerone’, RFIC 76 (1948), 161-203; (1950), 1-29). However, although this is excellent evidence about Cicero’s dialogue, it is far weaker evidence about Aristotle’s work than it has been taken to be by previous scholars. No doubt it is right to include Aristotle among the “greatest and most famous” philosophers who held that “we have minds eternal and divine;” but Plato must also be numbered among these, and a closer look shows that Platonic elements dominate at this point of Cicero’s speech. The “great hope” of the philosopher was memorably expressed by Socrates at Phaedo 67bc and Apology 40 and 41c, where the dilemma offered by Cicero (death is either extinction or departure) likewise governs the whole structure of Socrates’ argument; also distinctively Platonic are the hope that the circuits of the intelligence are “constant in their courses” (Timaeus 47bc), and the idea that living badly will hamper our “ascent and return to heaven” (Phaedrus 248a-e). Not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Diogenes of Apollonia and other earlier thinkers shared the view that the intellect is a divine part in us, a small portion of god (see Diller, Hermes 76 (1941), 374-380). So it was a mistake to accept this text as evidence for anything about Aristotle's doctrinal commitments, and a worse mistake to accept it as evidence about this work of Aristotle, as was done by Rose, Walzer, and Ross. Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 13
48.17 ei1te 9Ermo&timoj ei1te 0Anacago&raj ei]pe tou~to: Without knowing more about the lost Euripides tragedy entitled Cresphontes which apparently contained the idea that "intelligence is the god in us" (see note above on 48.14), it is hard to know how to interpret the apparent uncertainty of Aristotle (or the speaker in his work) about whether it was Anaxagoras or Hermotimus to whom the remark should really be credited. Düring followed Bignone into error in regarding these words as an interpolation by Iamblichus, as “not on a level with the dignified style of this peroration” (Attempt, 266). But we don’t know enough about the rhetorical strategy of Aristotle’s whole work (or of its speakers, if it had speakers) to know whether this sort of interjection would be out of place; and in any case this kind of insertion has no parallel in any other quotation of Iamblichus. Hermotimus is mentioned by Aristotle in Metaph. 1.3, “When one man said that intelligence was present, as in animals, so throughout nature, as the cause of the world and all its order, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with the random talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly adopted these views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with expressing them earlier” (984b15-20). See: Waszink, 'Traces of Aristotle's Lost Dialogues', 139-144; Burkert, Lore, 152 and nn. 177-178; M. Ditienne, 'Les Origines', Rev. Philos. 89 (1964) 167-178; Betegh, 'The Next Principle', 117-118; Zhmud, Early Pythagoreanism, 152. Hermotimus was associated with Anaxagoras because they were from the same city, and Hermotimus was engaged in some kind of Shamanic activity; Anaxagoras is also mentioned below in chapter 9.51.11, see note there for references to Anaxagoras as the type of intellectual man in Aristotle’s Ethics. To the point of the present reference, Aristotle credits Anaxagoras with the discovery of intellect (nou=j) as a cosmic principle in Metaph. 1.3 (984b15-20). 48.18 kai\ o3ti ‘o( qnhto_j ai0w_n me/roj e1xei qeou~ tinoj’: Aristotle quotes a half-line of poetry from a lost work otherwise unknown to us. 48.18-20 h2 filosofhte/on ou}n h2 xai/rein ei0pou~si tw|~ zh~n: This is perhaps the most drastic formulation of the conclusion filosofhte/on that we see often in this work: see also VI (37.9, 37.19), VII (41.14), XII (60.8); POxy666.iii.55-56. For Aristotle’s view that living is valuable as such, see GA II 1.731b30; NE IX 9.1170a25-b3, 1175a19; Pol. III 6.1278. 48.20 a)pite/on e0nteu~qen: Cf. in XII, e)ntau=qa (60.10 and note); Grg. 512b; Theaet. 176ab; Phd. 65b. DCM 23.70.6. 48.18-21 ta_ a1lla ge pa&nta fluari/a tij e1oiken ei]nai pollh_ kai\ lh~roj: The conclusion of this dense paragraph is a rhetorical flourish, such as might have ended one of the speeches, if there were speakers in Aristotle’s work. For the trope in general, see the Greek Anthology 10.123 (Aesop). Düring was convinced that these were the last words of Aristotle’s whole work: “Only one thing is pretty certain, namely that the last sentence of the Protrepticus is preserved in B110” (Düring, Attempt, 1961, 37). Curiously, he gives no reason for this conviction, which we regard as mistaken (judging by the parallel of the Plato excerpts in chapters 13-19, in which Iamblichus never reverses or rearranges the order of the texts that he cites). But previous generations of scholars had become convinced of this, on the very insecure basis of the report from Augustine (quoted above, see note on 48.16-17) about how Cicero’s dialogue ended. These scholars include: Hirzel, Protrep., 87; Rose, Fragmenta (1886), fr. 61; Jaeger, Aristot., 102n2 (German ed.); Bignone, Perduto I, 90 & Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VIII 14
97-98; Düring, Attempt, 37; Schneeweiss, Protrep. (1966), 228; Mansion, Contemplation, 67; Slings, Clit., 336-339; Mansion, Contemplation, 67n1). Düring may have simply felt that the point had somehow been established, so that the last sentence of Cicero’s dialogue struck him, oddly, as “modeled on the last sentence of the Protrepticus, but entirely different in purport” (Attempt, 267). Indeed they do make different points: Aristotle’s conclusion is that if we had to exist without cognitive awareness, we might as well not bother to live; Cicero’s conclusion is that, whether death is extinction or departure, we must seriously apply ourselves to the study of philosophy. 48.22-25 attribution: the static metatextuality, obtuse style, lack of progression, and use of superlatives reveal this passage as an Iamblichean closing. This is a good example, perhaps the best, of the contrast between the texture of Aristotle’s text and the texture of Iamblichus; coming after the rhetorical climax of this speech (we think it is a speech delivered by ‘Heraclides’, perhaps his last in the work), the contrast is very great. 48.22