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BOOK REVIEWS

A BIT OF A MAVERICK

Pillsbury, Michael. The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. New York: Henry Holt, 2015. 319pp. $30

The Hundred-Year Marathon is the He is the author of original and defini- culmination of a lifetime’s work on tive books about the People’s Liberation Chinese security policy by Dr. Michael Army. He is also a bit of a maverick: a Pillsbury (1945–), an independent one-man show, rarely part of a team. China analyst based in Washington, Long a proponent of pro-China policies, D.C. The book is popular, not academic. including sale of weapons to Beijing in That said, it is by and large accurate the 1980s and 1990s, he has, as he tells and must be read and digested. it, changed his mind as he has learned At the outset, though, two issues must be more. While a “panda hugger” he was raised. One is the title. The other is the well treated and given much “access”— author. The title suggests, with no evi- which means access to people whose job dence, that somehow a secret Masonic is to deceive you, as well as hospitality. cabal has existed in China for a century, In 2006, however, he published an article having as its purpose the overthrow in the Wall Street Journal decisively of the United States as leading world repudiating his previous views—and felt power. Taken literally that would mean the back of Beijing’s hand until 2013. planning got under way in 1915, under Then he was able to return to China, President Yuan Shikai, continued during as Beijing sought to shore up support, Chiang Kai-shek’s watch, and then on faced with the South China Sea crisis, through Mao Zedong and beyond— to be discussed below (pages 129–30). which, bluntly put, is not history at all, Pillsbury is not to be believed without but classic tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory. question. He has had numerous run- China’s changing international behavior ins with counterintelligence officials over the last century is indeed difficult owing to his seemingly uncontrol- to explain, but it is most certainly not lable proclivity to leak secrets—to this the product of some arcane “Protocols reviewer, for example, in the passenger for the Replacement of America.” seat of his vintage Jaguar motorcar. As for Pillsbury, he is well-trained, hard- Here, however, we are reviewing neither working, and independently wealthy. the sales strategy nor the author of this book, but rather its argument.

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The book makes two fundamental distinct culture belonging to the Chinese contentions. First, Pillsbury states people must not be underestimated. that the Asian region and the United If one were to undertake a compre- States currently face the problem of hensive study of the view of force an unexpectedly aggressive China. within this cultural tradition, the first BOOK REVIEWS Second, he argues that this unpleasant consideration would be the extreme surprise is no more than the product pacifism expressed in the classics of of decades of official self-delusion Confucianism, created two millennia about Beijing, even when confronted in the past, and long official orthodoxy. with mountains of facts that supported The mainstream of Chinese thought— A BIT OF A MAVERICK opposite conclusions. This reviewer not a pretense but a conviction—sees agrees with these two points, albeit with superior virtue and civilization as the Pillsbury, Michael. The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the many academic caveats that will be way to genuine power, as is testified Global Superpower. New York: Henry Holt, 2015. 319pp. $30 spared. Disagreement arises only when by the vast corpus of classical writings, speculation begins about the future. memorized by scholars for generations For roughly forty years, from the Nixon and not forgotten today, as well as the diplomacy of the 1970s to about 2010, volumes of official memorandums on the idea that China could pose a threat foreign policy, in which opposition to militarily was considered so mistaken force is regularly the winning argument. as to be effectively beyond toleration Pillsbury, however, makes no claim to be in either academic or governmental writing about “China” in general or even circles. The insistent conviction was that broadly about today’s People’s Republic. “engagement” would transform China He says little about Confucianism be- into a strong economy, a friend, even an cause others have said much, and focus- ally, and most likely a democracy as well es instead on the all-but-forbidden tradi- (page 7). Among the few in Washington tion of writers on military topics, the not convinced by these arguments was bingjia whose heyday was also two mil- the longtime head of the Pentagon’s lennia ago, but whose influence has con- Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Mar- tinued, like an underground stream, ever shall, who did much to support Pills- since, to emerge today in what Pillsbury bury’s work through contract research. calls “the Chinese hawks,” or yingpai. China is of course a new country. The Seemingly overlooked by official Ameri- first states having that word as part of can estimates, these hawks have no truck their official names were founded in with engagement, are deeply antiforeign the last century: the Republic of China and anti-American, and seek Chinese in 1911; then after the Chinese civil hegemony to be achieved through war, the People’s Republic of China in deception, strategic dominance, and the 1949. Before that a myriad of states, use of particularly effective weapons some ethnically Chinese, some not, usually called in English, rather awk- rose and fell on the East Asian plain. wardly, “assassins’ maces” (shashoujian). To lump them all together as a politi- They do not lack influence. cal “China” to be treated as a histori- Pillsbury has come to know and un- cal entity having thousands of years of derstand this group by employing the history is a profound error, as specialists most elementary but often neglected now recognize. Still, the continuity of a methods of information gathering:

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namely, reading their work and having closest ally, in favor of China. (Japan long conversations with them (he speaks was of course kept in the dark.) But excellent Chinese). The results of years Mao was bored and somnolent as the of such research, by Pillsbury and others, two leaders spoke. Neither he nor any effectively upend the conventional wis- other Chinese ever took up this offer. dom of nearly half a century. The ques- How could so unrealistic an Ameri- tions that follow are: First, how did we can policy plan have come into being? go wrong? And second, what to do now? The answer is by wishful thinking and To answer the first question, “what went self-deception: in this case, aided by the wrong,” requires going back to President rigorously selective limitation of sources Richard Nixon and his national security to those that supported the policy adviser, Henry Kissinger. That China already adopted. Only a tiny secret would reenter the international system team knew of the plan. The books they was long a near certainty in their time. read were uniformly from the strongly Maoism was beginning to be recognized pro-Mao school of writing then current internally as having been an unmitigated (Kissinger, White House Years [Boston: catastrophe, not only for the Chinese Little, Brown, 1979], p. 1051). Other people, but also for the military—though books, many by better scholars, existed many foreigners still idolized the man. but were not consulted. Likewise, the The Soviet Union moreover presented speaker invited to the White House to China with a threat requiring a coun- enlighten the Americans was the erratic terweight. The only question was how Frenchman André Malraux. Others exactly China would return. Sadly, these were incomparably more knowledge- two Americans devised an utterly unre- able and available—to name but two, alistic plan that set our diplomacy on a the American Foreign Service officer course that, unsurprisingly, has brought Edward E. Rice and the Berlin profes- unexpected and baleful consequences. sor Jürgen Domes—but they were not Nixon and Kissinger seem to have even contacted. Thus, information that imagined a future in which an intimate had been intentionally biased formed Beijing–Washington political axis would the deepest foundation for our policy. supersede the entire then-existing But the longed-for axis between Beijing security system in Asia. Such a vision and Washington never came into be- seems the only possible explanation ing. Quite the opposite happened. for Nixon’s quite astonishing question Starting in the first decade of this to Mao when they met on 21 Febru- century, with now-retired leaders hold- ary 1972: “Is it better for Japan to be ing the reins, China openly changed neutral, totally defenseless, or it is [sic] its visible foreign policy to danger- better for a time for Japan to have some ous military adventurism, for reasons relations with the United States? The no one can explain. The change has point being—I am talking now in the not succeeded. Thus the conquest of realm of philosophy—in international Scarborough Shoal undertaken in spring relations there are no good choices.” 2012, which Beijing no doubt expected Put bluntly, Nixon seems already to to be a military cakewalk against the have decided, long before the meeting, Filipinos, has turned into a military to drop relations with Japan, then our and diplomatic standoff, drawing in

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more players, losing China prestige, and could present China with a nightmare showing no sign of ending (page 203). scenario in which it is at war with a It is as yet unclear that continuing multiplicity of capable adversaries irresponsible expansion will be the along a front of more than four thou- gravamen of President Xi Jinping’s sand miles, from India to Tokyo. foreign policy. China’s current leader Pillsbury speaks of the risk of prema- took power in November 2012 turely “asking the weight of the em- months after the Scarborough Shoal peror’s cauldrons,” or wending (page standoff began and while he has not 196), which sounds exotic. What it repudiated the policy he seems far means is showing your cards too soon. more intent on domestic reform. China has in fact done just this, with the China could even liberalize: recently consequences the Chinese sages would the down-market and often xenophobic have predicted: creating failure as others Beijing tabloid Global Times attacked react in time. My conclusion: we will Western “pro-China” scholars for certainly soon see a highly militarized insulting that country by explaining Asia; we may see some skirmishes or away repression as the only answer to worse (though recall that the Chinese otherwise inevitable chaos. “Western esteem most those victories achieved scholars have never imagined that without fighting; they abhor long-term, China might have a ‘peaceful demo- attritional war), but we most emphati- cratic transition,’” the tabloid observed cally will not see Chinese hegemony, (8 March 2015). These astonishing either in the region or in the world. words did not appear by accident: the ARTHUR WALDRON Global Times is wholly owned by the party’s most authoritative mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. Xi must be aware that even small external distractions will almost certainly derail domestic reform. Morris, David J. The Evil Hours: A Biography of As for what the rest of the world should Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. New York: Hough- do, obviously it is time to prepare: to ton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. 338pp. $27 rearm and deter seriously. The region, The numbers are staggering. In 2012 however, is responding so robustly the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs to Chinese aggression that Beijing is (VA) estimated that eight thousand alarmed. Japan today is not a mighty veterans take their own lives every year. power only because it chose to try Think about that—twenty-two people peace instead. Let no one doubt that if die every day of whom many, in pain Tokyo deems it necessary, it will emerge and having lost hope, have carried their again—indeed that is its current war with them for far too long. For direction—which would be perhaps the some it may have been recent fight- greatest imaginable setback possible ing in Afghanistan or Iraq; for others for the Chinese political and economic it may have been decades ago in the future. Nearly every other state in jungles of Southeast Asia. Regardless, Asia too, from India to the Philippines the trauma these people experienced and beyond, is rapidly and effectively knows no boundaries between deserts preparing military capabilities that and mountains, between marshes and

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oceans. Or as the great First World War Humvee in which Morris was riding poet Wilfred Owen said: “These are men was hit by an improvised explosive whose minds the Dead have ravished.” device. Battered and bent, the vehicle David J. Morris, former Marine infantry held together and the patrol was able to officer turned war correspondent, tells get back to its forward operating base. us that post-traumatic stress disorder, Morris escaped serious physical injury, or PTSD, as it is commonly known, has and after a short medical examination been called many things throughout his- he left Iraq and was back in Califor- tory: shell shock, combat exhaustion, the nia a week later. The explosion would blues, or simply being worn down and change his life. It would lead him on a played out. It’s a condition that “went long journey, trying to understand his unacknowledged for millennia . . . and is experience, through literature, research, now the fourth most common psychi- and writing. It left him with nightmares atric disorder in the United States.” Not and anger. It left him sitting in VA until 1980, when PTSD was added to the centers watching others suffer silently, psychiatric manual—the Diagnostic and with shaking legs and blank stares. Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Morris tells us, in beautiful, searing or DSM—did PTSD get more attention. language, that “we are born in debt, ow- Morris’s book is not only timely— ing the world a death. This is the shadow arriving at the end of two long wars— that darkens every cradle. Trauma is but it is grand in its ambition and scope. what happens when you catch a surprise Similarly to Siddhartha Mukherjee’s glimpse of that darkness, the coming approach in his Pulitzer Prize–winning annihilation not only of the body and book, The Emperor of All Maladies: A the mind but also, seemingly, of the Biography of Cancer, Morris covers the world.” And yet the world is still trying history of trauma and war; how trauma to understand how trauma affects us. affects the mind; the therapies that are Not surprisingly, the science is mixed. often used to fight it; the drugs that Some therapies have empirical evidence are prescribed to numb it; and some showing that they help trauma victims— alternatives to modern medicine. But whether it is combat trauma or one of what makes it truly a powerful book, the other big-T traumas that Morris beyond a journalist’s endeavor, is that describes. The big-T traumas are those PTSD is personal to Morris. His book is that are soul crushing—airplane an exploration that begins with basic yet crashes, extended combat, rape, physi- difficult questions: “Why does the world cal assault, and natural disasters. These seem so different after I got back from are the traumas that overwhelm our Iraq? Why do I feel so out of place now? brains and destroy our sense of time. What does one do with the knowledge The VA’s response to trauma patients, gained from a near death experience?” the “gold standard” therapies, focuses In October 2007, in the middle of the on two types: prolonged exposure and surge, Morris was imbedded with the cognitive processing therapies. Most Army’s 1st Infantry Division. While have heard of prolonged exposure. It is riding in a Humvee in the volatile essentially a reliving of the event, over neighborhood of Saydia in southwestern and over, in which the patient, with help Baghdad, his patrol was attacked. The from a therapist, is trying to change

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the stimulus to the traumatic event. Yet audience. Trauma and the suffering there is no consensus on what the best and pain that follow have been with us treatment for PTSD may be. For as Mor- since Homer’s time and will be with us ris notes, the “gold standard” treatments for many more years to come. David J. often do not account for those that Morris has shed much needed light on leave the program prior to completion. this all-too-human and -deadly thing.

Drugs are just as questionable. Some CHRISTOPHER NELSON drugs, like selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors—Prozac and Zoloft—have been around for years, and are the more popular drugs prescribed for PTSD. And like many of the therapies, some Jones, Charles A. More than Just War: Narratives patients find that the drugs help them. of the Just War Tradition and Military Life. Lon- Then there are drugs like propranolol, don: Routledge, 2013. 224pp. $120 (Kindle $33) originally developed to prevent heart Pedestrian forms of philosophical in- attacks, which now challenge our ethics novation often involve the application of on how we deal with trauma victims. old ideas to new cases. It should there- That is because propranolol, when fore come as no surprise that the creative provided correctly, can inhibit the bulk of what is published today on the brain’s ability to etch a traumatic event ethics of war achieves its novelty in your mind if taken within a few hours —when it does at all—by applying of the traumatic event. This is a drug the just war tradition to hitherto- that can disrupt the brain’s ability to unexamined aspects of contemporary embrace a memory; it can change our warfare, for example, drones and sense of self. Morris rightly raises the unmanned systems, cyber warfare, concern that messing with our “flight intelligence and covert operations, or fight response” can fundamentally asymmetric warfare, and terrorism. alter what we view as dangerous or not. Now, this is a useful thing to do; it has In the end, we are reminded that as expanded conceptual categories within humans we are idiosyncratic creatures— the literature on the ethics of war (e.g., each of us responds to traumatic events the jus post bellum and jus in intelli- in our own way. Therapies that work gencia). But it falls short of that deeper for some do not necessarily work for kind of philosophy that overthrows others. Just the simple act of listening preconceptions and generates entirely to our bodies—say, practicing yoga—is new areas of rational inquiry. This more a powerful therapy for some PTSD difficult (but potentially more fruitful) patients. As for Morris himself, he way to innovate in philosophy would does not discount anything that might call into question the entire edifice work for you, even if that is a moder- of knowledge that, through univer- ate amount of alcohol; if it works, then sity schooling or professional military consider it a remedy, or just another education, everyone takes for granted way to make it through the day. when discussing the ethics of war. The Evil Hours is not simply a book for Charles A. Jones does exactly this in his combat veterans and service members. provocative, original, fun-to-read, and It is a book that deserves a much wider tightly argued book More than Just War:

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Narratives of the Just War Tradition and bello and jus ad bellum assume the van- Military Life. Jones is Emeritus Reader in tage point of the state over the individual International Relations at the University and have a difficult time dealing with of Cambridge, and such a conceptual unorthodox forms of modern warfare. tour de force is exactly what one might Just war doctrine assumes a conception expect from a Cambridge don by com- of ethics that is rule oriented and largely parison to many military authors who ignores character—something actual understandably confine their work to militaries spend a lot of time cultivat- areas of their own tactical expertise. By ing. Finally, the doctrine’s origin is contrast, Jones offers perhaps one of the more wedded to religious theology than most interesting and penetrating theses most secular philosophers (like Michael about the ethics of war since Michael Walzer) and champions of international Walzer’s classic Just and Unjust Wars. law (like Yoram Dinstein) today admit. Jones shows that the pithy stories that Jones brings to light an intriguing di- appear in almost every book or ar- chotomy between the way practitioners ticle about the just war tradition, tales and authors closest to war account for its that narrate the tradition’s cumulative normative dimensions, on the one hand, development from venerable origins to and the narrowness of just war discourse postwar resurgence, mask important on the other. An intriguing question gets complexities crucial to understand- raised: How did this dichotomy between ing its applicability to contemporary theory and practice come about? More warfare. Since the 1960s, the resilience than Just War answers by offering a and ubiquity of just war discourse, different account of how the just war combined with continual reference to doctrine became what it is today, an ar- late-classical and medieval theologians tificial “tradition” unable to account for in contemporary texts, give the impres- the most interesting normative aspect sion that a continued and coherent of modern warfare—the phenomenol- “tradition” of thought about war existed ogy experienced by war’s participants and continues to develop. Yet, Jones themselves. An alternative tradition of argues, careful examination reveals that military ethics, Jones says, exists along- just war thinking was largely ignored side the just war doctrine. This tradition, from the middle of the seventeenth found in both film and literature, fills century only to be revived in the middle the experiential gaps that the just war of the twentieth. What is now spoken doctrine leaves barren. Any account of as if it were an unbroken tradition of military ethics that ignores both owes its veneer of coherence to resus- traditions will suffer from this neglect. citation by modern scholarship. Upon Perhaps the most intriguing part close examination, both selectivity and of Jones’s book offers a penetrating instrumentality characterize its revival. survey of a variety of authors within Alongside this historical critique, Jones this latter tradition. Works by William exposes contemporary just war doctrine Shakespeare, Sir Walter Scott, James for its implicit adherence to a set of as- Fenimore Cooper, Stephen Crane, sumptions that he argues are objection- John Buchan, Robert Louis Stevenson, able when applied to contemporary war- Joseph Conrad, Tim O’Brien, and Kurt fare. For example, the doctrines of jus in Vonnegut are featured. Since many of

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these will be familiar to students, More of armed conflict. Although the essays than Just War makes for an excel- are to some degree independent of each lent supplement to the curriculum other, they are united by Biggar’s clear at military service academies, war and consistent theological perspective. colleges, and civilian institutions. Anyone familiar with the culture of While the book’s strength rests in its “mainline” Protestantism and much ability to unmask the just war tradition liberal Roman Catholicism will recog- critically and outline its alternative, nize that these traditions, at least since there are several points where the author the Vietnam War, have moved strongly could have done more to substantiate toward positions that are to various the philosophical views that under- degrees close to pacifism. Some are gird the argument’s positive side. For straightforwardly pacifist—a position example, Jones leans quite heavily on the most closely identified with the Ameri- American pragmatism of John Dewey can theologian Stanley Hauerwas. Some without fleshing out the exact connec- Roman Catholic organizations such tions between Dewey’s epistemology as Pax Christi are on this end of the and his own. Nevertheless, since most spectrum as well. Others hold a position readers will be nonphilosophers such generally called “just war pacifism” in omissions are the slightest of concerns. that they continue to use the categories At over one hundred dollars (hard- of just war, but apply them in such a way bound), the book’s expense may that almost no actual conflict could meet be prohibitive for many. Routledge them (by, for example, interpreting “last is expected to offer a less expen- resort” as requiring one to do literally sive paperback sometime in 2015. everything conceivable short of war). A Meanwhile, an affordable digital position called “just peacemaking” has (Kindle) version is available. emerged in many denominations as pref- erable to just war, stressing anticipatory JOSEPH M. HATFIELD actions to be taken to prevent war over the necessity of the use of force in some circumstances. Biggar’s first two chapters address these trends directly, arguing against the coherence of the pacifist view Biggar, Nigel. In Defence of War. Oxford, U.K.: and in favor of a meaningful sense in Oxford Univ. Press, 2013. 384pp. $55 (paperback which Christian love can be manifest, $30) even in the midst of military conflict. Nigel Biggar is Regis Professor of Moral The next two chapters take up two cen- and Pastoral Theology and Director of tral principles of classic Christian just the McDonald Centre for Theology, war thinking: double effect (in which a Ethics, and Public Life at the Univer- given action is militarily desirable but sity of Oxford. This volume collects also has a foreseen, but not intended, seven essays on various aspects of the “evil” effect such as destruction of civil- just war tradition. It is very much a ian lives and property) and proportion- book of theological ethics, although ality. The principle of double effect has in strong dialogue with contemporary been under considerable criticism from philosophical just war thinking and the philosophers, who prefer to reduce it to international legal framework of the law

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utilitarian calculus, and from Christian bear no responsibility for the over- thinkers who worry that it smacks of all justice of the war, but only for the hairsplitting casuistry. Biggar strongly conduct within the war [jus in bello]). defends it, noting that a hallmark of dis- They challenge the “moral equality of tinctively Christian ethics is its attention soldiers,” which holds that soldiers on to the intentional state of the actor—an both sides are not culpable for the killing emphasis that reaches all the way back they do as long as they fight within the to the Sermon on the Mount. Christian bounds of the law of armed conflict. In ethics has always maintained what the their account, at least one side in any Germans call a Gesinnungsethik—an eth- war must be wrong in fighting it, and ic of intention. Therefore the “foreseen therefore the soldiers who prosecute that but not intended” requirement of double side are not morally equivalent to their effect captures that in an essential way. opponents. Biggar rigorously critiques The proportionality requirement of just this account, while granting it flows war appears on both the jus ad bellum from the ethical framework its advocates and the jus in bello sides of the just war are bringing to bear on the issue. But ledger. Biggar’s fourth chapter considers that is itself the problem, as Biggar sees it on the jus ad bellum side and takes up it: the older and deeper traditions of the most challenging of cases to test it: Christian just war, he asserts, provide World War I. In the face of widespread the resources and show the wisdom belief that World War I was a blunder of retaining the traditional account. and certainly not worth its vast toll, Biggar also challenges the complete Biggar argues that it indeed was worth it. adequacy of the current international While this reviewer didn’t find the argu- system in capturing fully legitimate ment completely persuasive, it is closely decisions to use military force in the first and carefully argued and provides an place. According to the legal framework excellent presentation of an uncommon- of sovereign states, possessed of politi- ly held and therefore provocative view. cal sovereignty and territorial integrity, Chapters 5 and 6 deal with questions of response to aggression is the “gold stan- the relationship of international law to dard” justification for the use of force. the parallel ethical tradition of just war. At least since the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Against black-letter-law fundamental- 1928, and certainly according to a close ism, Biggar strives in these chapters to reading of the Charter of the United establish the principle that the ethical Nations, states may use force only when tradition is deeper and may on occasion responding to aggression, when assisting trump the legal. Some contemporary another state responding to aggression, philosophers (most notably David Rodin or when part of a collective security ac- and Jeff McMahan) critique aspects of tion authorized by the United Nations. just war tradition from the perspec- Biggar uses the Kosovo conflict as one tive of a modern liberal rights-based that clearly falls outside that normative perspective. In particular, they attack legal framework and yet, he argues, was the traditional division of responsibil- absolutely necessary as an ethical matter. ity in war between the political leaders The book concludes with another who make the decision to go to war in hard case: the war in Iraq beginning the first place (jus ad bellum) and the in 2003. Against those who argue the soldiers who do the actual fighting (who war was justified on manufactured

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and dishonest grounds and not worth of commerce and communication open the cost, Biggar once again provides for their merchant navy and England’s a clearly argued case that the cost national economy. Threats included was justified. Whether readers come the inevitability of impossibly high away persuaded or not, Biggar’s argu- insurance rates during times of war, ment will sharpen their thinking. the combat capability of the overseas Biggar’s is very much a theological German East Asia squadron, and the book, and therefore mostly of inter- possibility of persistent predations by est to readers interested in a strong German raiders. British leaders also normative Christian argument. In that understood that, despite the size of context, whether one is persuaded on the Royal Navy, British assets would every detail or not, it is a welcome tonic initially be stretched thin, as most among the often shallow and sloppy British capital ships would be kept in thinking about war and the international home waters to respond to potential system from some Christian circles. action by their German counterparts. Yet there is value in the book even for Pattee discusses British efforts to over- readers who may not share the full come these threats. His review of British theological view. It certainly brings a involvement in insurance programs de- historical depth to the discussion that signed to keep merchant vessels in trade much contemporary philosophical just is fascinating and illuminates what must war thinking does not, detached as it is be one of the least known programs of from the long historical tradition in the the First World War. Strategies to deal West Biggar represents, and attempting with the German East Asia squadron, to grapple with the ethical problem of raiders, and shore-based supporting war with a comparatively small tool kit. communication systems are better known, but Pattee still does them justice. MARTIN L. COOK Taken all together, At War in Distant Waters is a useful addition to a com- plete account of the First World War. However, this book could have been Pattee, Phillip G. At War in Distant Waters: Brit- much more. For starters, the title is mis- ish Colonial Defense in the Great War. Annapolis, leading. Although the book chronicles Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013. 274pp. $59.95 actions taken in colonial waters, the Phillip Pattee, a retired naval officer and depicted purpose is much more aimed professor at the U.S. Army Command at defending Britain, not its colonies. and General Staff College, examines Nor does Pattee convincingly prove British efforts before the First World that Great Britain conquered German War to craft a global maritime strategy colonies to provide maritime secu- to deal with threats that were expected rity. Although some actions, such as to arise during a war with Germany. In the seizing or destruction of German doing so, he makes a compelling case high-frequency radio installations, were that British naval thinkers were not designed for this purpose, others, such completely fixated on the German High as the conquest of German Southwest Seas Fleet, nor were they unconscious Africa, were not. Britain could have of the critical need to keep the sea-lanes easily conducted limited operations and

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denied naval basing and support from nor submarines figured sufficiently in the German colonies. A major second prewar planning. Still, each of these African front, although sensible for challenges either demanded or resulted other reasons, was not needed to protect from evolving British strategies and seaborne trade. Additionally, the book both would seem worthy of inclusion. is surprisingly dry, when it definitely Still, when all is said and done, Pattee did not need to be so. The eradication of has contributed to a deeper understand- German raiders from the world’s oceans ing of British—and German—maritime is a remarkable story, complete with strategy in the First World War. By drama, excitement, and extraordinary shifting focus away from the North Sea personalities. Spee’s one-sided German and the clashes between the Grand and victory at Coronel and his subsequent High Seas Fleets, he has reminded the defeat at the Falklands were two of the reader that British maritime leaders major naval battles of the war, yet are understood global vulnerabilities and given short shrift by Pattee. The tale of planned to deal with them long be- Count Felix von Luckner and his raider fore the guns of August opened fire. Seeadler, although occurring after the raider threat was greatly diminished, RICHARD J. NORTON would provide a compelling illustration of the challenges in hunting down a gifted and tenacious raider captain. Pattee does relate the story of SMS Königsberg, but in such a brief man- Appelbaum, Peter C. Loyal Sons: Jews in the Ger- ner as not to do justice to the very real man Army in the Great War. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2014. 347pp. $79.95 concerns the cruiser created for the Admiralty, or the sheer magnitude of Centennial commemoration and obser- effort it took to destroy the warship. To vance of the First World War have gen- compound matters, Pattee claims the erated many books studying major and destruction of Königsberg was carried minor aspects of what was hoped would out by two mortar-equipped barges. be the “war to end all wars,” or as H. G. This is an error. To put Königsberg out of Wells titled a 1914 book, The War That commission, the Admiralty dispatched Will End War. It wasn’t; instead, it was the monitors HMS Mersey and HMS the first act of a century-long tragedy. Severn on a long and hazardous journey The present volume provides a sig- to the Rufiji delta, where Königsberg nificant study of the more than 100,000 was hiding, to sink it. For a book of German-Jewish and 320,000 Austro- this nature, this error is surprising. Hungarian Jewish soldiers serving during the war. One in eight was killed. While Pattee does include a description First World War historian Jay Winter is and evaluation of British operations in correct when he writes in the volume’s Mesopotamia—and ties these actions to foreword, “we owe a debt to Peter Appel- the strategic importance of oil—the book baum for bringing to light the Jewish el- is strangely silent on the Dardanelles ement in this tragic story.” The volume is campaign and the U-boat war. Perhaps groundbreaking in its scope and depth. this is because Pattee does not see the Mediterranean or Atlantic as “colonial” The volume consists of eight chapters waters, or because neither Gallipoli and four appendixes. The first chapter

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provides an overview of Jewish soldiers experience of German Jews. However, in the armies of the German states from Jews did serve in the Kriegsmarine the Prussian Wars of Liberation begin- aboard surface vessels and U-boats. The ning in 1813 until the beginning of the fourth chapter provides information First World War. The quest for respected on these activities, noting that the 1916 and accepted service was part of the census of Jews in the military (Juden- larger Jewish experience of nationalism zählung) registered 134 in maritime and participation in German society service. At least thirty were killed, some and met with varied results. Although in the May 1916 battle of Jutland. no Jew ever attended or graduated from Chapter 5 studies the experiences of the Prussian Military or Naval Academy, German Jews who served as physi- there were Jewish officers in the prewar cians, physician assistants, and medical Bavarian army and Austro-Hungarian orderlies. It shows that Jewish participa- army. The second chapter looks at mo- tion spanned the strata of society and bilization and German-Jewish attitudes reminds readers of the pain and trauma at the outbreak of the war. The outbreak of those who were wounded and dying. of the war furthered German-Jewish This chapter is enriched by the author’s patriotism. While there were dissent- knowledge and experience from his ing, pacifist Jewish voices, they were first career of forty years as a physician, largely ignored and overcome by Jewish microbiologist, and professor of pathol- organizations and individuals who ogy. The sixth chapter moves to the air published calls to volunteer. German- and looks at the approximately 250 Jews Jewish society responded at all levels and who served in airships and single-engine all ages. As the war progressed the initial aircraft. Several pilots were killed, zeal was replaced by calls for service several became prisoners of war, and based on duty (Pflicht) and honor (Ehre). others—such as Fritz Beckhardt, who German Jews entered service with hopes was credited with seventeen recog- and confidence of no anti-Semitism. nized kills—garnered fame and glory. They were misguided. The third chapter By 1916 there was rising anti-Semitism studies in detail the experiences and on the home front and rumors that opposing views of the war of two officers Jewish service and sacrifice were not who served on the western front, Julius comparable to those of non-Jews. The Marx and Herbert Sulzbach. This chap- seventh chapter recounts these rumors ter and the fourth chapter, which looks and perceptions and the solution of at diaries and memoirs from the front, the landmark Judenzählung. The final show the diversity of experiences and chapter provides an analysis, epilogue, perspectives of religious and nonreli- and transition to the interwar years. gious Jews, all fighting with national loy- In an attempt to counteract grow- alty, patriotism, and pride. The chapters ing anti-Semitism during the postwar also provide a good snapshot of ever- period German-Jewish veterans banded present Christian-Jewish sentiments. together in 1919 and formed the Reichs- With respect to naval matters and bund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten (Associa- the Kriegsmarine, there is little avail- tion of Jewish Front Veterans). One of able information on Jewish sailors. By the main activities was the publication of geography and profession, maritime a monthly newspaper and other works life was not a significant part of the

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attempting to neutralize anti-Semitic and the United States did not act against agitation. All of this effort was shattered this impending threat. While the Span- by the National Socialists after Kristall- ish Civil War began as an internal do- nacht (1938) and the anti-Semitism mestic matter between the newly elected experienced during the First World Spanish Republic and reactionary War culminated in the anti-Semitic Nationalist forces led by General Franco, tragedies of the Second World War. the conflict would draw in Germany and The present volume is Appelbaum’s Italy in support of Franco, and the Soviet second book addressing the Jewish Union in support of the Republic. The military experience of the era. The conflict pitted forces of Europe’s far left earlier work, Loyalty Betrayed: Jewish and right against each other, eventually Chaplains in the German Army during overshadowing the Spanish Republic’s the First World War (2013), received attempt to maintain power. Against this significant attention and acclaim and backdrop, Amanda Vaill follows the lives Loyal Sons is deserving of the same. and fates of three couples. She weaves their lives and fates into the larger fate Appelbaum delves deeply into pub- of Spain as Europe’s only stand against lished and unpublished diaries, letters, fascism collapses under the weight of and memoirs of those who served. For Franco’s forces in early 1939. In do- the first time, widespread personal and ing so, she provides the reader with an archival materials are gathered and overview of the political and military analyzed in a single source. The work events of the Spanish Civil War, as well is meticulously researched, well writ- as minibiographies of six eyewitnesses ten, and enjoyable to read. The author to the war in an eminently readable has produced a volume that bridges the and gripping account of the savage war chasm between studies for academic that ended with the fall of Madrid. specialists and works for general readers. It is a welcome addition to the military Vaill’s characters are presented in pairs. history bookshelf that is lively, engag- They are couples, romantically and ing, and thorough. The appendixes and professionally. The first to appear is numerous photographs are interest- the chief of the Spanish government’s ing and enhance the work. Loyal Sons foreign press office in Madrid, Arturo deserves a wide readership and will not Barea, and his future wife, Ilsa Kulcsar, disappoint even the most casual reader. an Austrian radical who has come to Spain after the war begins. Spain’s tragic TIMOTHY J. DEMY fate is most explicitly illustrated through Barea’s slow descent from moderately prominent government official to ordi- nary refugee, finally settling in France with Ilsa. His observations on the Spain Vaill, Amanda. Hotel Florida: Truth, Love, and of his youth contrast with the savagery of Death in the Spanish Civil War. New York: Farrar, the conflict between Republican and Na- Straus, Giroux, 2014. 436pp. $30 tionalist forces that takes place through- Spain was the only nation to take up out the book. Following Barea and arms against fascism in the years im- Kulcsar, Vaill presents the Hungarian- mediately preceding the outbreak of the born André Friedmann, who would Second World War. England, France, come to be known as Robert Capa,

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one of the greatest war photographers cooked over a fire. In fact Hotel Florida of all time. His relationship with the itself reads like a novel, and it is no similarly gifted and prominent photog- irony that the book concludes with the rapher Gerda Taro (Gerta Pohorylle) first sentence of For Whom the Bell Tolls forms much of the central narrative as Hemingway begins to type the first of the book. Finally, American novel- page, transferring his Spanish experi- ists, journalists, and war correspon- ence into his greatest literary work. dents Ernest Hemingway and Martha This book offers something for not Gellhorn are the third couple, rounding only the student of European history, out the book’s six main characters. military history, or literature. It is a Hotel Florida is much more than just an first-rate account of the political and account of the Spanish Civil War—or military events of the Spanish Civil the story of the six main characters War. It is also a deeply philosophical during those years. It is as much a story examination of the relationship among about the nature of truth and reality in war, truth, and propaganda. It asks hard wartime as it is a gripping narrative of questions that are immediately relevant the seminal conflict of the interwar years today even as the media landscape has in Europe. Vaill’s characters become who changed dramatically; the fundamentals they are through their interaction with of human nature have remained such the war, and they create themselves— that any of the main characters of this and the meaning of their own lives—as book could sympathize with reporters, much as they create accounts of the war’s photographers, and journalists today. I events, whether through the written highly recommend this brilliant book word or the photograph. Their stories to scholars and general readers alike. and pictures are in many cases used for JEFFREY M. SHAW propaganda purposes, and the charac- ters know this. However, the fine line between truth and propaganda largely disappears, if it is ever distinguishable in the first place. With the exception of Bayles, Martha. Through a Screen Darkly: Popu- Barea and Kulcsar, the characters want lar Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America’s Im- to be close to the fighting, to see the age Abroad. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, troops and the refugees and the destruc- 2014. 336pp. $30 tion caused by the war, so that they can This is a wonderful, wonderful book. capture its meaning and portray the It is very much more than even its tragedy to the world, which does not title and subtitle suggest. And it’s a seem to understand the importance great read even though it deals with of defeating fascism. A host of minor subjects and policy debates about characters appear, many of whom are which most of us would rather not fighters in the various International Bri- think because they’re either upset- gades (to include the famous Abraham ting, or too complicated, or both. Lincoln Battalion of American volun- teers). These characters might as well The first half of the book is devoted have walked right out of a Hemingway to the image of America that our low novel—tough whiskey drinkers hunting (and getting lower all the time) popu- fascists and eating trout and vegetables lar culture projects worldwide. When

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I embarked on reading it, I was in- be able to tell foreigners how Americans timidated by how much of our popular really regard Sex in the City (no one culture Martha Bayles proposed to cover takes the show as real or expressive of in detail by focusing on (seemingly) so his or her attitude toward life); be able many individual products. I felt I already to explain how certain things fit (or knew how vulgar and vile the mov- don’t fit) into the real American ethos ies and television shows we export are. (this is the advocacy part); know enough When the author started in on Sex in the about the local culture to understand City, I thought, “Well, better her than me the “push back” that should always be at least: somebody needs to know about sought; and, finally, tell the truth. this particular offense, but not me.” In addition to the foregoing, this book Then, I discovered that Bayles very clev- does several other things, and all of erly combined her assessment of how them excellently. Bayles is well versed in that television program gives a debased American political thought and history view of America with the reactions of —enough to produce a fine essay on interviewees abroad. Every example (and the American ethos that combines the there is a myriad of them in chapters historical, political, and cultural into “The American Way of Sex,” “Empire what is really American. Again, this is of Special Effects,” “Television by the an example of what every U.S. pub- People, for the People?,” and “From Pop lic diplomat should know and what Idol to Vox Populi”) proceeds in this those abroad might learn if public way. While she means us to look at and diplomacy were properly practiced. understand the attraction of and “push The book is also a thorough history of back” against American pop culture U.S. public diplomacy, from the first from place to place abroad, she provides master, Benjamin Franklin, through the excellent analyses of the indigenous pop shutting down of the U.S. Information culture and non-American influences. Agency (USIA) in 1999, to the pres- This takes one into society and politics ent. While she believes the abolition of as much as culture, religion, taste, and the USIA was a mistake, the book does inevitable interesting peculiarities. The not advocate its revival. This is because outcome is a nearly complete global Bayles is clearly more concerned with vision of popular culture that I don’t the content of government-provided believe can be found anywhere else. Of information about America since the course, Bayles means to show the guid- early 1950s (which is a distressing his- ing influence of American pop culture. tory) than she is about the institutions. In dealing with popular culture, Bayles On top of it all, Bayles treats most is slyly operating in the way in which related subjects—for example, the she will eventually commend that public experiment in “strategic communica- (or culture) diplomats proceed. She tions” as a kind of public diplomacy holds that public diplomacy is made up inflicted on the Department of Defense of four activities: listening, advocacy, after 9/11 (and terminated by Admiral culture and exchange, and news report- Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the ing. These ought to be discrete from one Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011); the history another but given equal importance. of the tight relationship between Hol- Accordingly, a cultural officer ought to lywood and Washington that secured

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the worldwide domination of American be new ground raids into Cambodia pop culture, while allowing its content and Laos to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh to sink lower and lower; the troubled Trail—the network that allowed Hanoi career of U.S. international broadcast; to supply communist forces in the and the Internet and social media. south, and that at its peak even in- And yes, she deals also with the problem cluded an oil pipeline from the Chinese of U.S. promotion of democracy abroad. border to the environs of Saigon. The To quote from the last sentences of the raid into Laos, code-named LAM SON book: “The premise of this book has 719, is the subject of Robert Sander’s been that a significant number, perhaps recent book Invasion of Laos, 1971. even a preponderance, of today’s tiny Despite the term “invasion” in the battles are being fought not in the news book’s title, LAM SON 719 was designed media but in the mundane realm of as a cross-border raid on the town of popular culture. The wisdom of America Tchepone. It was here communist mili- is clear and straightforward: political tary supplies were shifted from trucks to liberty can be sustained only by self- porters, bicycles, and pack animals. The governing individuals and prudently town had received attention from Amer- designed institutions. Yet when our ican military planners as early as the fellow human beings look at America Kennedy administration. Sander quotes through the screen of our entertainment, General Westmoreland explaining to what they see most darkly is a rejection General Abrams in March 1968, “I’d like of tradition, religion, family and every to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the kind of institutional restraint, in favor tickets.” Westmoreland’s plans called for of unseemly egotism and libertinism. at least four divisions to undertake the Attracted and repulsed by this image, assault. For its part, the government of they might be forgiven for not appreci- Saigon had been planning an operation ating the part about self-governance.” into Laos from at least 1965. In real- ity, as Sander notes, the United States KENNETH D. M. JENSEN had been conducting CIA and covert air operations in Laos since the 1950s. President Nixon’s policies of détente and outreach to China meant a reduc- Sander, Robert D. Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam tion of the chance that expanding the Son 719. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, war into “neutral” Laos would trig- 2014. 304pp. $29.95 ger Soviet or Chinese response. “The only chance we have is to initiate Congressional restrictions designed bold moves against the enemy,” na- to limit the war meant that American tional security adviser Henry Kissinger involvement in the 1971 operation confided in 1971. This was his advice to would be confined to supporting roles in the administration of President Nixon, artillery and fire support. Yet, as Sander which sought to end the Vietnam War points out, this was still a bloody battle by creating “peace with honor.” “Bold for the Americans. American casualties moves” would include two new strate- ran high, with over two hundred killed gies. One was resumed bombing of and at least 1,100 injured. Sander, who North Vietnam. The second would was a pilot during the battle, observes

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that “U.S. Army helicopter crews of a decision to launch a major military endured incomparably higher losses operation involving corps from two during this two-month operation in nations that did not share a common heavily defended airspace than during objective.” While President Nixon any other period of the Vietnam War.” “hoped to prevent the North Vietnamese The overall impact on the Ho Chi from launching an o ensive that could endanger, and even delay, withdrawal Minh Trail was limited but communist ff forces suffered at least thirteen thousand of American forces remaining in casualties, and the offensive blunted Vietnam,” South Vietnamese president any North Vietnamese attempts to Thiệu’s ultimate “objective was to give strike at withdrawing American forces. South Vietnam more time to prepare The withdrawal at the conclusion of to meet the North Vietnamese with- the operation was memorialized by out direct U.S. military assistance and journalists who photographed Army without sacrificing his best divisions.” of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) American frustration during the op- soldiers hanging on to the skids of eration was compounded by President returning American helicopters. Thiệu’s refusal to commit ARVN reserve The operation’s overall dismal results forces to the battle. Sander suggests that were not due to a lack of ARVN bravery, many of these unused ARVN divisions Sander argues, but to poor operational were less than combat ready. Many planning and politics. Indeed, the ARVN were hampered by soldiers who spoke suffered some 7,500 casualties out of regional dialects and had strong ties the seventeen thousand soldiers com- to their local areas and could not be mitted to the operation. Rather, the deployed far from home without fears of ARVN battle plan for LAM SON 719 “was desertion. ARVN readiness was affected complex, far too complex for a corps by another problem on which Sander commander and sta that had never does not dwell: “flower soldiers.” By the conducted corps-sized operations.” early 1970s, South Vietnam had as many ff as a hundred thousand “flower soldiers,” In Washington, the Army’s Vice Chief of soldiers who paid commanders to Staff, General Bruce Palmer, remarked continue civilian life as normal. In other that “only a Patton or a MacArthur instances the names of dead soldiers would have made such a daring move; were kept on the muster rolls so their an Eisenhower or a Bradley would commanders could collect their salaries. not have attempted it.” Yet, at the start of 1971, South Vietnam had such an There are apparent parallels between officer: General Tri, the daring corps LAM SON 719 and more recent events. commander who had led the success- It was revealed in November 2014 that ful Cambodia offensive. General Tri’s the Iraqi Army had fifty thousand “ghost bravado extended to his trademark soldiers” who similarly did not exist. swagger stick and stylish sunglasses. Likewise, where President Thiệu saw Tragically, General Tri died in a he- ARVN elite units first and foremost licopter crash en route to take com- as a force to crush potential rivals, in mand of the stalled Laos offensive. Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki had similar views of using military force to sup- Sander identified the operation’s relative press Sunni rivals. Thiệu was hesitant failure as “the unintended consequences

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about committing forces to LAM SON bodes ill for the U.S. ability to punish 719, and in 2014, when ISIS seized Chinese transgressions against inter- Fallujah, Maliki allowed the problem national order. He believes that current to fester. In neither case was suppres- U.S. force posture is inadequate be- sion of a hostile insurgency put above cause U.S. air and naval capabilities are the objective of maintaining a grip vulnerable to Chinese land-, air-, and on power—much to the frustration sea-launched cruise missiles and ballistic of Washington. As Henry Kissinger missiles. And future U.S. capabilities— would later say of LAM SON 719, it was the F-35 in particular—have insuf- an “operation [that was] conceived in ficient range to operate from existing ambivalence and assailed by skepticism, bases under the antiaccess umbrella [and] proceeded in confusion.” Today created by these weapons. To counter what was then the town of Tchepone lies the tactical and operational challenges abandoned, though the lessons of 1971 these weapons create he advocates the remain fresh. Sander’s work will likely Pentagon develop a new long-range remain the definitive record of the Laos bomber and long-range cruise mis- campaign until such time as archives siles able to penetrate Chinese airspace in Hanoi are made fully available. and hold critical targets at risk. He also promotes autonomous aerial projectiles JOSEPH HAMMOND based on a 1990s DARPA model to locate and destroy road-mobile mis- sile launchers. He argues convincingly that his acquisition proposals solve the likely tactical and operational problems Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, Amer- of a future war with China, but he does ica, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $37.95 not engage with the highly contested literature on the strategic effectiveness of Robert Haddick proposes a revised U.S. airpower. Without a theory of strategic strategy toward China. He argues— effectiveness, he fails to make the case agreeing with recent U.S. national that these new capabilities would sup- security strategies—that continued U.S. port his strategy and influence Chinese forward presence is the only option that decision making during crisis or war. supports the American objectives of “an open international economic system; Additional proposals are designed to respect for universal values around the threaten presumed Chinese fears. These world; and a rules-based international include encouraging America’s regional order that promotes peace, security, and allies to develop their own antiaccess opportunity through stronger coopera- capabilities on the First Island Chain, tion.” He articulates a two-front effort improving U.S. Navy blockading capac- to ensure China rises within the existing ity, developing irregular warfare capacity international structure: positive rein- among China’s minority populations, forcement of good behavior combined and developing antisatellite weaponry. with significant defense reforms to However, if China continues its policy of allow punishment of bad behavior. “salami slicing,” these weapons and plans Haddick discusses the nature of China’s will never see battle. By incrementally military modernization and how it challenging the existing regional order,

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China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS its objectives without risking war. Beijing Morton (DD 948). Notable authors ap- understands there is a threshold for U.S. pearing in On Tactics include Admiral military response and will continue to Woodward, RN, who commanded operate below it. An American president British forces in the Falklands War, and would be loath to fire the first shots over Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the the Chinese occupation of an uninhab- Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part ited island. Haddick therefore argues the of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel United States should develop policies to Books series, which is a collection of encourage China to follow the existing books containing some of the Naval international rules in letter and spirit. Institute’s most well-regarded articles Unfortunately, he does not detail these from Proceedings—and other sources— policies, leaving his strategy wanting. on such topics as naval leadership, Haddick states that strategy is about command, strategy, and cooperation. managing risk. While much of what On Tactics is well worth the reader’s Haddick proposes seems commonsensi- time, and appropriate for both junior cal, it is unfinished, and this poses risks. and senior officers. It benefits greatly Focusing only on punitive measures from Hughes’s insightful commentary against possible Chinese actions runs and tactful editing, which boils the com- the risk of ignoring the ways China bined length of the selected essays down has played by the rules while further- to a manageable 190 pages. Although the ing a mind-set where every develop- topic of tactics is broadly applicable to ment in the PLA’s modernization is all naval communities, surface warfare perceived as a threat to U.S. regional officers will probably have the easiest interests—regardless of Chinese inten- time relating to the selected essays. tions. This book should be read as part Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a of an ongoing and equally unfinished favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,” debate on how to handle a rising China. written by Hughes himself. “Missile IAN T. SUNDSTROM Chess” describes a game created by Hughes in which players sit down to play a traditional game of chess but with a ma- jor twist: the players have a fixed number of “missiles” that they must distribute Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute among their pieces as they see fit. The on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute pieces still move according to the rules of Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95 regular chess, but each time they capture The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics an opposing piece they expend one “mis- is a collection of thirteen essays as- sile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is sembled by Captain Wayne Hughes, depleted a piece can still move but can no USN (Ret.)—author of several books, longer capture. After he walks us through most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear Combat and Military Modeling for Deci- that despite its simplicity, missile chess sion Making. Captain Hughes is also nicely elucidates some of the most vex- an accomplished naval officer, having ing operational challenges with which a served as commanding officer of USS modern naval commander must contend.

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My only criticism of On Tactics is following his untimely death in 2012. that some of the selected essays veer In what is widely considered one of his into areas that could more aptly be major scholarly contributions, through described as “strategy” or “enterprise this pithy, well-researched book—rightly management.” For example, “Toward considered a classic—Wachman engages a New Identity” chronicles Admiral in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet to offer provocative coverage of histori- together long enough to test the tactical cal episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s doctrines flowing out of the recently status fundamentally. Some events raise founded Naval War College. Although penetrating questions about what might this is a fine essay, it does not provide have resulted had they ended differently; the reader with any particular insight other factors inspire critical questions into tactics. Rather, it provides insight about East Asia’s future. Wachman de- into why new tactics can be difficult to velops a theme of the strategic salience develop. Similarly, “Creating ASW Kill- of “imagined geography” as the best ing Zones,” although an excellent piece explanation for the significant variation on Cold War antisubmarine warfare over time in the association of Taiwan operations and strategy, does not pro- as part of Chinese sovereign territory vide much in the way of tactical insights in the minds of the leaders, and even on how to defeat the submarine threat. the populace, of mainland China. He The great advantage of this book, and does so through close examination of indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is key Chinese documents and terminol- that it makes many excellent articles and ogy as well as careful consideration of essays readily available to the reading their relative authority and reliability. public—essays that might otherwise Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen, have fallen by the wayside. Overall, Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Com- this volume is an excellent addition to munist Party, Mao Zedong, and even any personal library. The size of the possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially book and length of the articles make consider Taiwan to be part of China in it an excellent work for professional the sense that it is understood officially development, wardroom discussion, today. This approach raises compelling and thought-provoking conversation. questions about state formation and national identity that are critical to the CHARLES H. LEWIS understanding of international relations. Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined geography” is a global phenomenon and hardly peculiar to China. It is important to remember that Taiwan was formally Wachman, Alan M. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic incorporated into Qing administration Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stan- ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 272pp. in 1683, nearly a century before the $25.95 founding of the United States. One may contrast such historical events as the Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan American acquisition and incorpora- Wachman was a giant in the China, East tion of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude Asian studies, and international rela- that the factors Wachman considers do tions field who remains sorely missed

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not negate mainland China’s sovereignty agree are conducive to the develop- claim to Taiwan. Rather, it is primar- ment of a democratic political system. ily concerned for the maintenance of But the Taiwan question has been, and Taiwan’s democracy and the freedoms remains to this day, a fundamentally of its citizens that continue to inspire political one. While Taiwan’s geography Washington’s involvement long after has not changed, its political identity has the Carter administration abrogated varied tremendously. Since the end of the United States–Republic of China the Cold War, U.S. support for Taiwan Mutual Security Treaty in 1980. has arguably hinged on its rapidly lib- While Wachman clearly documents eralized political system, not its geo- Taiwan’s strategic salience (real and strategic significance. Taiwan is funda- perceived), other factors may be impor- mentally useful in a geostrategic sense tant as well. An alternative explanation primarily for the basing of capabilities might consider the challenge of Taiwan to facilitate its own defense. While some as a separate polity (e.g., democratic U.S. policy makers no doubt see geo- system). The vast majority of the other strategic benefits to the island’s present “lost territories” to which Wachman status even today, it is difficult to imag- compares Taiwan have never been ine Washington being willing to risk the separate polities; the few that have been expenditure of increasing amounts of have not persisted for significant periods blood and treasure if and when Taiwan’s of time. Hence, political salience may democratic system is no longer at stake. be an appropriate variable. In fact, the Should the day come when a major- challenge of Taiwan as a separate polity ity of Taiwan’s populace favors formal has emerged periodically throughout unification with the mainland—and history (e.g., through Dutch occupation, this popular will is expressed through Qing dynasty separatism under Ming a transparent democratic process with loyalist Zheng Chenggong, Japanese no external coercion—it is inconceiv- imperialism, Nationalist rule, and able that Washington could actively today’s multiparty democracy). China’s oppose such a transition on geostrategic imperial rulers initially viewed Taiwan grounds. There is, however, the disturb- as a remote, politically unorganized ing possibility that even if Washington’s hinterland. Subsequently, however, policy toward Taipei is not fundamental- as alternative political systems were ly geostrategic in motivation, policy ad- imposed or developed on it with identi- vocated by elements of China’s govern- ties and objectives potentially at odds ment (particularly the military) may be. with those of Beijing, it periodically Wachman does acknowledge related assumed heightened importance. This complexities and the difficulty of finding has geographic underpinnings in the conclusive evidence for his geostrategic sense that physical location rendered explanation. However one may view Taiwan susceptible to both influence and these sensitive issues—which remain conquest by foreign maritime powers hotly contested—Wachman has made a and later to technological acquisition, valuable contribution on a critical issue trade, and the attainment of per capita whose complex history and enduring gross domestic product at levels that significance are forgotten at the peril of the vast majority of political scientists all in the Asia-Pacific. The complexities

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Wachman introduces provide important colleague he was; all can benefit from considerations for the continuing debate his intellectual legacy, of which this over Taiwan’s future. Those fortunate book is an important, enduring part. enough to have known Wachman ANDREW S. ERICKSON personally know what a fine friend and

OUR REVIEWERS

Martin L. Cook is the Admiral James Bond Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics at the Naval War College. He received a PhD from the University of Chicago and taught at the United States Air Force Academy, the U.S. Army War College, and Santa Clara University, Calif. He is coeditor of the Journal of Military Ethics.

Timothy J. Demy is a graduate of, and professor of military ethics at, the Naval War College. He received a ThD from Dallas Theological Seminary and PhD from Salve Regina University. He is American managing editor of the Journal of Military Ethics and is coeditor of Military Ethics and Emerging Technologies (2014).

Andrew S. Erickson is Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College and member of the department’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He received an MA and PhD from Princeton University and a BA from Amherst College. Among his publications are Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (2014) and China in the Gulf of Aden (2015).

Joseph Hammond is a freelance journalist who has reported from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. He has written for a number of publications, including the Diplomat, the Economist, and the Atlantic Council’s website. He has also worked as a consultant on international aid projects related to conflict issues.

Joseph M. Hatfield is an active-duty naval intelligence officer and received a PhD from the Uni- versity of Cambridge. He is a recipient of the Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks Intelligence Junior Officer of the Year Award. He has published in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Armed Forces Journal, Harvard National Security Review, and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. His disserta- tion focused on the ethics of war.

Kenneth D. M. Jensen was the first executive director of the American Committees on Foreign Relations as well as a founding staff member and officer at the United States Institute of Peace. He holds BA and PhD degrees in history (with Russian minors) from the University of Colorado and also did graduate work at the University of Wisconsin and Moscow State University (USSR). His fourteen published books include The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy; The Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of 1946; and Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Present Danger.

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Charles H. Lewis is a surface warfare officer and graduate of the University of Washington. He served as electrical officer on USS Milius (DDG 69) and navigator on USS Denver (LPD 9). He is currently a surface navigation instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School Command in New- port, R.I., and is studying for a degree from the Naval War College.

Christopher Nelson is a career naval intelligence officer and graduate of the University of Tulsa and Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in New- port, R.I. His most recent assignment was as the ship’s intelligence officer on board the amphibi- ous assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), in San Diego, Calif.

Richard J. Norton is a professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College. He holds a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; he retired from the U.S. Navy in 1996, with the rank of commander. His most recent publications include “Through a Mirror Darkly: The Face of Future War, 1871–2005,” Naval War College Review, and “Feral Cities,” Marine Corps University Journal.

Jeffrey M. Shaw is Associate Professor, Strategy and Policy, College of Distance Education, Naval War College. He received a PhD from Salve Regina University and is the author of Illusions of Free- dom (2014) and is coeditor of the forthcoming three-volume War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict.

Ian T. Sundstrom is the communications officer on board USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51). He is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin and received an MA in war studies from King’s College London.

Arthur Waldron has been the Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania since 1997. He received a PhD from Harvard University and taught previously at Princeton University and the Naval War College. He is the author of many articles and books, including The Chinese (2015).

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