Tokugawa Response to the Shimabara Rebellion and Power Projection in Seventeenth-Century Japan
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THE LOGISTICS OF POWER: TOKUGAWA RESPONSE TO THE SHIMABARA REBELLION AND POWER PROJECTION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Matthew E. Keith, M.A., M.Ed. ***** The Ohio State University 2006 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Geoffrey Parker, Advisor Professor John F. Guilmartin ___________________________ Professor Allan R. Millett Advisor Graduate Program in History Copyright by Matthew E. Keith 2006 ABSTRACT How would America react if today’s top news story told us that over three million U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines, sent to southern Florida to quiet a regional rebellion against Federal authority, executed nearly 650,000 of their fellow countrymen in a single day? Violence of this scale and severity seems almost beyond our comprehension. However, a scenario of exactly these hideous proportions played out in southwestern Japan almost four centuries years ago. After a generation of peace in Japan, in 1637 peasants on Kyushu Island in southern Japan, distraught over horrible treatment at the hands of cruel lords, killed the local magistrate and took control of their village. The rebellion soon spread as peasants in village after village rose up against the taxation and collection methods that left them destitute, starving, and subject to routine torture. Christianity, introduced a century earlier by Portuguese Jesuits, re-emerged as a rallying ideology for the peasants whose numbers swelled to over 30,000. Within just a few weeks the Tokugawa Shogun, the central authority in early modern Japan, assembled and deployed an army of perhaps 150,000 soldiers to Kyushu (750 miles from the capital in present-day Tokyo) to confront the rebel peasants who took refuge in an abandoned castle. After a three-month siege, the castle fell to the central government army, and a general slaughter followed as almost 30,000 Japanese peasants were beheaded, burnt, or drowned. ii This dissertation examines the mechanics of how the Tokugawa were able to project military and political authority by fielding one of the largest, and potentially forceful, armies in the early modern world to confront and massacre their own subjects. It details the military, political, and economic apparatus used by the Tokugawa to mobilize, equip, and deploy an army greater than any European state could have at that time. This study will argue that the ability to maintain tremendous logistical ability, even during prolonged periods without war, underpinned the Tokugawa ability to project power, and thereby impose their authority on Japan for over two centuries. iii For Nancy and Yasuko iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance, guidance, and encouragement of many people. First, I would like to thank Professor Edward I-te Chen for instilling in me a love of Asian history and encouraging me to pursue graduate education. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professors Takeshi Morita, Mizuho Ogawa, and Hiroyuki Shioiri for their expertise and endless patience as they helped me navigate the world of early modern Japanese history and manuscript documents throughout a masters program at Saitama University, Japan. I am indebted to the Japanese Ministry of Education for providing funding for two years of study and research in Japan, and to the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation for a dissertation fellowship. I also wish to thank The Mershon Center, The Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, The Department of History, The Graduate School and The Center for International Studies at The Ohio State University for providing research funding. My thanks also go to Shinko Taniguchi of Waseda University for providing a number of introductions that are so crucial to research in Japan, and to Fujimoto Masayuki for his advice. Special thanks go to Matsumoto Masao, Director of the Hara Castle Cultural Center for his time and generosity. Thanks also go to Professors John F. Guilmartin and Allan R. Millett for their guidance and for helping shape some of the chapters. v My deepest appreciate goes to my dissertation advisor, Professor Geoffrey Parker, for many years of patient guidance and thoughtful suggestions. His wide-ranging expertise and attention to detail helped me avoid many mistakes. It has been a privilege to work with such and extraordinary historian and gentleman, and I appreciate the generosity with which he has shared his time and knowledge. Finally, I would like to thank Kay Freeman, Jonathan and Chris Hughes, and Dr. Michael and Susan Stanek for their support and encouragement. Any mistakes or errors contained herein are entirely my own. vi VITA March 20, 1970 ...................................................Born – Cleveland, Ohio U.S.A. 1992....................................................................B.A. Asian Studies, Bowling Green State University. 1994....................................................................M.A. History, Bowling Green State University. 1997....................................................................M.Ed. History, Saitama University, Japan. 1997 – 2006 ........................................................Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History Area of Emphasis: European, Military, and Asian History vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract....................................................................................................................... ii Dedication................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments....................................................................................................... v Vita............................................................................................................................. vii List of Tables .............................................................................................................. xi List of Figures............................................................................................................. xii Conventions ................................................................................................................ xiii Prologue...................................................................................................................... xiv Chapters: 1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 1 The Legend of Shimabara................................................................................ 1 Surrounded by Pen and Ink.............................................................................. 2 A Lasting Impression....................................................................................... 9 Strategy, Tactics, and Logistics........................................................................ 17 Why Study Logistics?...................................................................................... 20 Logistics, Power Projection, and Shimabara .................................................... 23 2. One Single Death............................................................................................. 30 Causes of Rebellion......................................................................................... 32 Elements of Rebellion...................................................................................... 37 The Local Setting ............................................................................................ 42 The National Setting........................................................................................ 48 Initial Response ............................................................................................... 51 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 56 3. Communication and Transportation ................................................................. 58 viii Time and Distance........................................................................................... 60 Development of the Infrastructure.................................................................... 62 Peacetime Use and Maintenance...................................................................... 69 Wartime Operation .......................................................................................... 71 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 78 4. Mobilization and Deployment.......................................................................... 83 Background ..................................................................................................... 86 Military Service............................................................................................... 87 Rice Allowances.............................................................................................. 95 The Composite Army at Hara .......................................................................... 101 Subsidizing War .............................................................................................. 115 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 123 5. “Feeding Mars” ..............................................................................................