CHAPTER 20

Moral Development and Moral Values Evolutionary and Neurobiological Influences

Darcia Narvaez

Morality covers the gamut of life—every action delve more pointedly into the underlying nature is governed by values—whether those we have and development of moral values. chosen or those we have implicitly absorbed. Most research in moral developmental psy- Our morality is shaped by multiple factors: chology has focused on isolated aspects of what we inherit, where we habitually put our moral functioning in individuals, such as moral attention, what actions we choose, and the per- reasoning and decision making in the face of ceptual sensitivities and capacities we develop hypothetical dilemmas (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; from how we were raised. All these shape our Haidt, 2001; Turiel, 1983). For some decades, values and character. As a result, the study of under the influence of moral philosophical moral development requires a transdisciplinary concerns, moral developmental psychology fo- and transmethodological approach. Disciplin- cused on moral reasoning development under ary contributions from evolutionary systems the theoretical direction of Lawrence Kohlberg theory, clinical studies, and developmental and and his (mis)interpretation of Jean Piaget (i.e., personality research each provide insight into “hard stage” theory; Lapsley, 2006). Kohlberg the moral development of humanity. Method- (1984) studied the development of justice-based ologies of study must also be broad and address valuing through the assessment of moral judg- both a universalist and an individual-difference ment and reasoning, emphasizing a deonto- approach. The former seeks to find basic pat- logical framing of morality—what comprised terns across humanity—individuals and societ- one’s duty according to logical rationality ies—whereas the latter takes into account the (Kant, 1949). But Kohlberg was also keen to diversity of influences on the development of distinguish among different sets of values and, an individual’s moral dispositions. In this chap- in particular, to defeat moral relativism. He ter, contributions from multiple disciplines and wanted to demonstrate empirically the moral methods are included in an examination of the superiority of the lawbreaking actions of civil development of moral values. rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and the moral inferiority of the law-upholding actions of an Adolf Hitler. His system assessed The Study of Moral Valuing the developmental shifts from preconventional to conventional to postconventional reasoning To begin, let’s examine a little history, from (where Martin Luther King, Jr.’s reasoning is moral judgment research to values lists, then categorized). Empirical studies of Kohlberg and

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the neo-Kohlbergian orientations that followed ham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009); however it is no- show, with little doubt, that cognitive matura- table that the content of such items are shaped tion in interaction with intensive and variable according to the particular interests of Christian social experience leads to greater sophisticated conservatives (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). reasoning, especially when measured in tacit Values list studies demonstrate that individual ways, such as with recognition measures, in- differences in value priority vary by nationality stead of with measures dependent on verbal and political orientation. However, just because fluency (Rest, 1979; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & particular values are favorably endorsed does Thoma, 1999). We might say that Kohlberg’s not mean that individuals act on those values in work was intended to measure moral values of particular situations. Similar to the judgment– intellectual thought—as measured by rationales action gap, there is often a value–action gap. For given for preferred actions in response to hy- example, social desirability inflates self-reports pothetical moral dilemmas. Kohlberg assumed of religious service attendance (Presser & Stin- that at the highest stage, an individual’s thought son, 1998), reflecting prescriptive values rather and action would align. But empirical evidence than being descriptive of actual behavior, which was thin for a relation between reasoning ca- is much lower, when time diaries are used in pacities and actual action. Noting the gap be- data collection (Brenner, 2011). This value–ac- tween making a judgment about what should be tion gap is well described by J. D. Vance in his done and action taken, broader conceptualiza- book Hillbilly Elegy (2016), in which he chron- tions of the propellants of moral behavior, such icles his upbringing in Kentucky. There, values as moral personality, were proposed (e.g., Blasi, of hard work, church attendance, and Christian 1983). Indeed, subsequent research has demon- behavior are widely espoused by community strated that self-reported second-order desires members yet also widely absent in those same (Frankfurt, 1988), desires about what desires people’s behavior. to have—one’s moral identity—influence one’s As mentioned, Kohlberg’s (1984) enterprise behavior beyond moral reasoning or judgment was driven by philosophical frames of explicit (Aquino & Reed, 2002). reasoning and moral intention as fundamental In another line of research examining the to an individual’s moral functioning. Values list types of values individuals profess, Rokeach prioritization studies are explicit tasks as well. (1979) identified lists of terminal values (e.g., a The study of explicit, verbalizable discourse world of beauty, wisdom) and instrumental val- has shown its limitations with the discoordi- ues (e.g., love, obedience), and determined that nation between advocacy and actual behavior. individuals prioritize them differently. More re- This is not a surprise, as psychology research cently and more systematically, Schwartz (1992, has shifted paradigms from a focus on the ex- 2005) identified a set of 10 values, tested them plicit to a focus on the implicit, understanding in 67 countries, and found similar distinctive that most human functioning emerges from au- structures across nations, and different cultural tomatic tacit processes not accessible to verbal motivational patterns. The values are placed explanation or, sometimes, awareness (Bargh into four main categories: openness to change & Chartrand, 1999; Reber, 1993). Which tacit includes self-direction and stimulation; self- processes guide behavior, including moral be- enhancement includes hedonism, achievement, havior, can change by situation in a unique per- and power; conservation is described by securi- son-by-context signature (Lapsley & Narvaez, ty, conformity, and tradition; self-enhancement 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Let’s bear embraces benevolence and universalism. Also these issues in mind as we examine morality in interested in cultural differences and based on more detail. Shweder’s (1993) earlier work contrasting the United States and India, Haidt (2012) focused What Influences Moral Values? attention on group differences in five (then six) values that he called moral foundations: Though What is a moral value? In this chapter, a moral most ethical traditions emphasize fairness and value is a perceptual–action feature of our caring for others, values of liberty, purity, hi- behavior, which can change situation by situ- erarchy, and ingroup over outgroup are also ation and moment by moment. Our actions highly prized by some individuals and groups. are always guided by what we perceive to be In fact, the latter values have been associated good in the moment. For example, if someone with American political conservatives (Gra- we like makes a joke at our expense, we take

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it as friendly teasing, but if someone we don’t further below, individual moral development is like does the same thing, we are insulted. Or, initially shaped by the community. Through our if we become upset after someone cuts us off experience with caregivers and the caregiving in traffic, lashing out in anger can feel like a environment as babies and small children, we fair or just action—tit for tat—a common re- develop the sensorimotor and neurobiological action in a culture of honor, in which feelings intelligence that undergird our social and self- that one was disrespected incite retaliatory be- habits that we carry forward into the rest of life havior (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Vance, 2016). (Siegel, 1999; Stern, 1985). In early life, these In contrast, when we maintain a mood of grati- experiences actually mold the very plastic but tude, we are more likely to help others (Moore immature neurobiology humans arrive with at & Isen, 1990; Morris, 1989). Strikingly, within birth, a neurobiology that expects particular an Amish community with cultural practices of supports to develop well. These neurobiologi- humility and grace, community leaders swiftly cal foundations continue to shape preferences forgave the actions of a neighbor who held their and values, undergirding social and moral life. daughters hostage, executed five and seriously Below, I examine these ideas more fully. wounded five others (before killing himself; Kraybill, Nolt, & Weaver-Zercher, 2008). Val- ues are reflected in the moods and mind-sets we Influences on Moral Values bring to a situation. Actions are guided by not only momentary valuing but also our habitual Let’s examine two general sets of influences choices about what looks good and feels right, on the development of moral values. These by the schemas we develop to filter events and comprise aspects of ethogenetic theory, which guide expectations (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). uses an evolutionary developmental systems For example, if we were brought up in a reli- perspective to describe how moral dispositions gious tradition, we likely learned to express are rooted in neurobiological structures that are gratitude before a meal. We learned to expect biosocially shaped by early experience and how thankfulness in our own behavior and that of those structures influence later moral orienta- others. Then, when thankfulness is not forth- tions and behavior (Narvaez, 2014, 2016, 2018). coming in self or others, we sense a violation See Figure 20.1 for a summary of both sets of of morals. In this way, our cultural upbringing influences. One I call vertical influences—how influences the moral values and expectations a certain person’s life is shaped. Most of the we carry with us. time, psychology researchers focus here, on un- Like all animals, we operate in a flow of derstanding how moral values emerge or change action (Bogdan, 1994; Varela, Thompson, & through childhood or what kinds of influences Rosch, 1991). Most of these guiding forces are engrave the life of the individual. The second implicitly held. Hence the importance of how set of influences on moral values concerns well cultivated one’s habits, characteristic dis- the horizontal influences (across generations). positions and intuitions are (Hogarth, 2001). Horizontal influences are inherited through Many human decisions and actions are carried evolutionary processes occurring over millions out automatically and without conscious control, of years, including both genetic and nongenetic based on social–perceptual habits and environ- inheritances (e.g., capacities for self-organiza- mental press (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), tion), as well as ancestral history (e.g., one’s with many neurobiological layers that influence grandparents’ experiences influences on one’s tacit conceptions but are not available to explicit genetic expression or phenotype) (Gluckman & description (Keil & Wilson, 2000). The subcon- Hanson, 2005). Research in anthropology, bio- scious mind, which guides our actions most of logical, and evolutionary sciences provide in- the time, has its own associative rationality, re- sights here. For example, the field of behavioral sponding to familiar situational patterns (Dam- epigenetics has demonstrated that some traits asio, 1999). This “adaptive unconscious” (Has- considered genetic (e.g., anxiety) are often epi- sin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005; Wilson, 2004) genetic, effected by one’s own early experience is rooted in subcortical emotion systems that or the experience of recent ancestors (Dias & we inherit as adaptations from our ancestors, Ressler, 2013; Meaney, 2001). which, to be good guides, must be shaped well Both types of influences, vertical and hori- by early experience with our caregivers (Pank- zontal, interact within the life course of an in- sepp & Biven, 2011). In other words, as I discuss dividual to create the nature of the person. We

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• Evolu�onary Horizontal • Extragene�c (e.g., Influences self-organiza�on) over generations • Ancestor experience

Ver�cal • Developmental nest • Socializa�on Influences • Self-chosen ac�vi�es during the life course

FIGURE 20.1. Ethogenetic theory: Horizontal and vertical influences on an individual’s development.

start with the horizontal, the inheritances from (Margulis, 1998). Indeed, humans are part of the ancestors. tree of life, sharing characteristics with species that emerged billions of years ago. For example, Horizontal Influences as Neil Shubin points out in Your Inner Fish: A Journey into the 3.5-Billion-Year History of the In this section, I examine evolutionary inheri- Human Body (2009), the spinal column that hu- tances that humanity receives. These include a mans share with other vertebrates evolved more deeply cooperative natural world, the evolved than 500 million years ago (humans have been moral sense and the evolved nest. around for about 2 million years). Human bod- Human beings live on a planet of beings that ies are themselves communities of cooperation, are highly interdependent, where many entities whose genetic material consists primarily (90– evolved to give and take in an endless, ever- 99%) of the genes of the trillions of microorgan- renewing cycle of mutualism (Bronstein, 2015; isms that form the microbiota that keep a human Worster, 1994). “Genes cooperate in genomes; body alive (Collen, 2015; Dunn, 2011). In other cells cooperate in tissues; individuals cooper- words, we emerged from cooperative systems ate in societies” (Rubenstein & Kealey, 2010, and we are cooperative systems. “Within our p. 78). (Yes, as Darwin [1859/1962] noted, there cells, the mitochondria that provide energy are is competition in nature—a common focus of descended from free-living bacteria that gave male scholars [Gross & Averill, 2003]—but it up their autonomy for a cooperative existence” plays a relatively minor role in the everyday (Denison & Muller, 2016, p. 41). workings of the biosphere that is largely symbi- Humans are assumed to have emerged from otic [Margulis, 1998].) One animal sloughs off evolutionary processes taking place over bil- its skin or other matter and another animal uses lions of years, inheriting many things beyond it for homebuilding or nourishment. The exten- genes (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). Based on etho- sive cooperation within biological systems is of logical and evolutionary sciences that gather and ongoing research interest. For example, in for- compare observations, evolutionary systems ests, old trees nourish the young—even of other theory offers a comprehensive list of human species (Wohlleben, 2016); in soil, a dynamic inheritances that include culture, the ecologi- heterogenous environment, there is greater bio- cal landscape, and self-organization (Griffiths diversity than among the life forms that live & Gray, 2001; Oyama, 2000a, 2000b). Within above the soil (Ohlson, 2014). Cooperation is so a lifespan, the individual will self-organize fundamental that in the natural world, very little around the opportunities and supports provid- changes across generations—most of what ex- ed. A key inheritance directly related to moral ists in one generation is conserved into the next values is the “moral sense.”

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The Evolved Moral Sense An answer is emerging. It now appears that the moral sense is largely developed after birth and Darwin (1871/1981) came to the idea of the requires particular kinds of experience, specifi- moral sense because he sought to counter the- cally humanity’s evolved nest. I discuss this in orists who argued that humans evolved to be the next sections. selfish. Instead, he identified components of a We can think of moral development like Leo “moral sense” through the tree of life in order Tolstoy’s discussion of happy and unhappy to show that morality was not contrary but fun- families in his novel Anna Karenina. He noted, damental to human nature. The set of charac- to paraphrase, that happy families are all alike teristics—empathy, social pleasure, concern but unhappy families are all unique. Similarly, for the opinion of others, memory for plans and moral flourishing looks similar across indi- outcomes in relation to pleasing the community, viduals as a form of dynamic, high-minded, and intentional self-control to fit in socially— self-controlled, flexible, selfless sociality with can be seen here and there in other animals. resilience (e.g., making amends) when setbacks Recent experiments support Darwin’s obser- occur. Harry Potter is a fictional exemplar of vation of animals. For example, rats will help these capacities. Nelson Mandela exemplified a a trapped peer instead of eating their favorite real person who characterized this type of moral snack, chocolate (Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety, & resilience. For example, he was able to move Mason, 2011). But Darwin contended that the past his anger and reconcile with his enemies moral sense culminates in human beings. If we even while spending 27 years as a political pris- understand that it is normal, based on ethologi- oner in his country of South Africa. In contrast, cal evidence, for humans to display the moral as with unhappy families, there are multiple sense described, then we should ask why some ways for individual moral development to “go people act with an “immoral sense.” How does a wrong” (which perhaps makes them more inter- group of humans lose the moral sense? esting as characters). There are individuals who Unfortunately, the opposite assumptions and do not display the evolved moral sense. They questions have been asked by scholars. As Ho are habitually low-minded, caught in fleshly (2010, p. 67) points out, contrary to Darwin’s pursuits (Al Bundy in Married with Children), views, neo-Darwinian theory emphasizes the impulsively lacking self-control (Homer Simp- competitive selfishness of humanity (which son from The Simpsons), rigidly hierarchical in was presumably constructed by sociopolitical social relations (Archie Bunker from All in the attitudes: “Victorian English society preoccu- Family), or unable to forgive (George Costanza pied with competition and the free market, with from Seinfeld). In the discussion ahead, I focus capitalist and imperialist exploitation”). Others on Sheldon Cooper (The Big Bang Theory), in- have pointed out the androcentric nature of neo- tellectually gifted but almost asocial, and Fran- Darwinian theory as well (Longino, 1990). The cis Underwood (House of Cards), ruthless in neo-Darwinian view, grounded in unverified treatment of others for his own desire for power. assumptions, resulted in the presumably para- You might have noticed that all the characters doxical question “How could altruistic behavior are male. It turns out that boys are particularly evolve (given that genes and the behavior they affected by early life care, when neurobiological control are fundamentally selfish)?” Instead, systems are shaped because they mature more based on evidence across nature, including hu- slowly physically, socially, and linguistically, manity, the question should be inverted: “Why and because they are affected more negatively do humans compete, given their natural social- by early life stress than are girls. As a result, ity?” And, one could extend the question: “Why boys are more vulnerable to neuropsychiatric do humans behave in selfish, aggressive ways disorders that appear developmentally such as when the moral sense is part of their heritage?” autism, early-onset schizophrenia, attention- Moreover, when we look more closely, we see deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and that across societies, the moral sense seems to conduct disorders (Schore, 2017). This may be vary in scope: Some societies show moral con- the reason that boys make for more variable and cern only for a subset of humans or, in many interesting characters in fiction. First Nations societies, include more-than- Sheldon Cooper (The Big Bang Theory) human entities (e.g., animals, plants, rivers). If seems to lack Darwin’s moral sense. In terms the moral sense evolved, why such variability? of behavioral economic theory, his basic social

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orientation was set to be more egoistic than em- pect a particular type of early care (Greenough pathic (Cory, 2016). He is not known for desir- & Black, 1992). Child well-being requires an in- ing or displaying its components—empathy, so- tense level of support on the part of the mother cial pleasure, concern for the opinion of others and community (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), a situ- or for pleasing the community. Sheldon displays ation that was available throughout most of hu- few social skills and instead shows extensive manity’s existence (Hrdy, 2009). difficulties with human relationships (and ani- How do we know what humanity’s evolved mal relationships for that matter). He is unable nest looks like? Substantive evidence comes to intuitively pick up the emotional signaling of from extant studies of nomadic foraging com- others. Instead, he requires instructed memori- munities around the world, the type of society in zation of social scripts. He has been told rules which the human genus spent 99% of its history for life by his mother and others, and has com- (Fry, 2006; Hrdy, 2009; Konner, 2005). Nomad- mitted many to memory, but they do not match ic foragers raise their children in a similar way up with his own anti- or nonsocial intuitions and wherever they have been observed around the reactions. Sheldon shows an obsessive–compul- world (Hewlett & Lamb, 2005). Anthropolo- siveness in needing to follow rigid scripts (e.g., gists summarize the communal caregiving that where to sit, how to knock on a door) and be- infants and young children experience across comes discombobulated when interrupted. His these groups: sense of superiority, along with his lack of com- mon sense make him an entertaining character, Young children in foraging cultures are nursed though his self-centeredness make him an irri- frequently; held, touched, or kept near others al- tating companion. What might have gone wrong most constantly; frequently cared for by individu- with Sheldon’s upbringing? The roots for moral als other than their mothers (fathers and grand- disarray often begin in early childhood, when mothers, in particular) though seldom by older toxic stress or poor care have greatest impact. siblings; experience prompt responses to their Early experience initially shapes moral values fusses and cries; and enjoy multiage play groups by engraving one’s neurobiology, influencing in early childhood. (Hewlett & Lamb, 2005, p. 15) one’s deep moral values, setting one on a bet- ter or worse trajectory in terms of social–moral To this list can be added soothing perinatal development. Enduring states in early life, such experiences and positive social support (Nar- as unmitigated distress, become traits—e.g., vaez, 2013). How much do these characteristics stress reactivity (Lupien McEwen, Gunnar, & matter for development? A great deal. It may be Heim, 2009), and the stress response necessar- best illustrated this way. Think about raising a ily puts attention on oneself. wolf in a human family: You will end up with a Let’s start by looking at species-typical de- wolf. But if you raise a human in a wolf family, velopment. Every animal has a nest that opti- you end up with a wolf-child (as has happened), mizes development of its young. Humans do an individual missing many characteristic too. In fact, one of the most important inheri- human attributes such as walking on their feet tances for the development of moral values (and instead of all fours, language, and social skills. Darwin’s moral sense) may be the evolved nest. In other words, humans are greatly affected by their experiences after birth. Though the focus here is on the evolved nest in early life, it should The Evolved Nest be understood that the evolved developmental As ethological observation has noted, all ani- system for human beings lasts for several de- mals provide a nest that matches up with the cades, as human beings need several decades to maturational schedule of their young in order to mature and need models and mentors along the optimize normal development (Gottlieb, 2002; way. West-Eberhard, 2003). Humans are no different. The evolved nest can be taken as a cross- Humans evolved a particular nest to provide the cultural baseline for optimizing normal human intensive care that human offspring need (Kon- development. We should not be surprised that ner, 2005). Humans are born highly immature when a child is missing some aspect of the compared to other hominids (and should be in evolved nest, he or she turns out more self- the womb at least another 18 months!) (Treva- centered or unwell. I discuss the moral develop- than, 2011). As a result, most brain development mental effects of the evolved nest in following occurs after birth. Thus, humans evolved to ex- sections.

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Vertical Influences (during an Individual’s Life 2007), as well as on many biological systems, Course) particularly in boys, that influence later psycho- logical functioning (e.g., greater stress reactiv- Vertical influences are those that occur within ity and anhedonia; Mueller & Bale, 2008). an individual’s life—what the individual expe- In terms of innate predispositions, socio- riences him- or herself or creates (after early emotional sensitivity specifically, researchers childhood shapes a self). In this section, I ex- have observed empathic response to crying amine how an individual is influenced by ex- peers in neonates, a type of empathy. Hoffman perience, especially by the evolved nest. The (2000) has mapped the development of empathy components of the nest interact with horizontal from this physiological resonance to graduated influences to shape the individual’s moral pro- awareness of the feelings and states of others pensities. through childhood, along with their interest But first, like a tourist guide, let me alert you in alleviated others’ distress (for a review, see to a couple of issues. Virtually all psychologi- Dunn, 2014). Beyond these early observations cal and neurobiological studies are performed of children’s empathic responsivity, children’s in civilized nations (settled and dependent on moral value development becomes an interac- forcibly extracting resources from places out- tion between horizontal influences and verti- side where they live) where rewards and pun- cal influences, that is, among evolved needs, ishments are used to socialize children. The biological capacities, prior and ongoing experi- studies are also typically performed in West- ence. Although studies of babies’ moral judg- ern-educated populations (those who know ment have indicated that babies have a mea- how to participate in the games of schooling surable sense of justice, generally preferring and of psychological experiments), typically in puppets that help others to puppets that hinder rich, industrialized nations with some degree others (Bloom, 2013), Jessica Sommerville’s of democracy (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, (2015) research program demonstrates that al- 2010). It turns out that the fact that most studies though infants generally show a preference for are performed in civilized nations may be the fairness and fair actors, individual differences most important fact for our attention here. Most are related to the degree of the parent’s disposi- of human history (99%) occurred before his- tional empathy. tory was recorded. It was spent in “unsettled” Turning to the evolved nest, we know from societies (i.e., small nomadic bands that forage animal research that when animals are deprived for food [some of which still exist today]; Lee of an expected experience and sensitive periods & Daly, 2005). As noted earlier, these societies are not supported properly, opportunities for provided the evolved nest and are immensely expected alterations close (e.g., Harlow, 1958; different in their assumptions about life, their Meaney, 2001). Complex behaviors (e.g., so- practices, and attitudes toward one another—all cial skills) are hierarchical and have sequences of which interrelate (for a review, see Narvaez, of sensitive periods for multiple subsystems. 2013). In these societies, most early learning oc- “Experience-dependent shaping of high-level curs informally through immersed experience, circuits cannot occur until the computations observation, and practice. Adults are not coer- being carried out by lower-level circuits have cive and everyone is considered to be his or her become reliable” (Knudsen, 2004, p. 1414). A own person, yet children need no external moti- particular, sensitive period opens up when there vation to follow the practices of those older than is sufficiently reliable and precise information, they (e.g., Endicott & Endicott, 2014; Morelli, when the circuit has adequate connectivity (ex- Ivey Henry, & Foerster, 2014). citatory and inhibitory) to process information, Before examining what influences moral and mechanisms are activated that allow plas- development, we must ask: What do children ticity. If all these factors are not in place, there bring to their life course? What is innate? It is will be no effect on the circuit. hard to sort out what moral characteristics are Three things are known to occur during a innate in human beings because of the largely sensitive period. (a) Axons are elaborated, and unknown effects of conception and gestation synapses are formed. (b) Axons and synapses on psychological traits, though we do know that are eliminated based on usage. (c) Synapse maternal depression and stress during pregnan- consolidation also occurs through cell adhe- cy have epigenetic effects on the child’s tem- sion mechanisms. A sensitive period ends when perament, increasing irritability (Davis et al., “the circuit’s landscape becomes resistant to

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change,” which is a permanent feature of criti- intensity and duration of emotional states (for cal periods (Knudsen, 2004, p. 1417). With the more detail, see Schore, 2002, 2003b). Disposi- passing of a sensitive period that is not critical, tions toward social anxiety or avoiding others change may occur later but require much more are reflective of poorly developed vagal tone, energy (sustained enriched experience). With stress response, and other self-regulatory sys- deprivation, circuits developed during matura- tems. tional sensitive periods are formed abnormally; In other words, sociality and morality are unable mechanistically to acquire typical pat- rooted in biology—in how well basic biological terns of connectivity, “they never respond ap- systems develop, all of which are influenced by propriately to social signals offered by members the evolved nest (for more detail, see Narvaez, of their own species” (Knudsen, 2004, p. 1420). 2014). For example, in early life, the brain’s Behavior analysis is typically unable to detect right hemisphere is the formative seat of vari- these neuronal deficiencies because higher ous systemic forms of self-regulation, such as functions tend to mask lower level abnormali- vagal tone (Porges, 2011; Schore, 2001, 2003a, ties in information processing, and because 2003b). If the evolved nest of support is not often the brain will use an alternative route to provided when expected, these systems can be make up for deficiencies as much as possible. underdeveloped or malformed, influencing be- What functions are scheduled to develop in havior regulation and sociality. Sheldon Cooper early life that undergird morality later? Psychol- of The Big Bang Theory shows the type of inca- ogist Daniel Stern (2010) wondered why babies pacities that are apparent with right-hemisphere are not ready to learn to speak until after the underdevelopment or dysfunction: the inability first year. He answered his question by noting to quickly pick up nonverbal social cues, awk- that babies ward social interactions, feeling threatened by intimacy, distress when the unexpected occurs have too much to learn about the basic processes and scripts are not followed (matching the “stiff- and structures of interpersonal exchange. In par- ness of mind” evident in patients with prefron- ticular, they have to learn the forms of dynamic tal lobe damage [Goldberg, 2002], an area that flow that carry social behavior. In addition, they has significant development in the first year of have to learn this before language arrives to mess it all up. The basic structures are all non-verbal, life [Schore, 1994]). analogic, dynamic Gestalts that are not compat- How do the components of the evolved nest ible with the discontinuous, digital, categorical influence moral values? As Darwin (1871/1981) nature of words. (p. 110, emphasis added) noted, adults in “less civilized” societies (than Britain in the 19th century) exhibited the com- Note that initially what is developed is the im- ponents of the moral sense (societies Darwin plicit mind, the mind that guides most of human encountered on his voyages followed the prac- behavior, undergirding dispositional traits and tices of nomadic foragers). If adult personalities characteristic values and goals. We can see that are a measure of cultivated moral values (an the implicit mind is initially shaped in early life, integration of bottom-up shaping and top-down shaping social capacities. cultural values), we can examine the recurring Assessments of attachment represent one patterns among adults from nomadic foraging indicator of how well neurobiological systems societies in which the evolved nest is com- were established (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1988). monplace. A word of warning: Some modern Schore’s (2003b) regulation theory contends scholars collapse nomadic foraging data into that attachment represents the right-brain hemi- other types of preindustrial societal data (e.g., sphere’s capacities, which develop more rapidly complex hunter–gatherers, tribes, chiefdoms), in the first years of life, for regulating biological misleading readers about the characteristics of synchronicity between organisms. Secure at- nomadic foragers (e.g., Fry & Söderberg, 2014; tachment is a signal of well-developed, socially Pinker, 2011; see Fry, 2013, for multiple rebut- significant neurobiology (e.g., vagus nerve tals). Also, one should remember that most soci- function: good vagal tone allows for intimate eties are and have been collectivistic rather than relationships; Porges, 2011). Insecure attach- individualistic, like the United States and other ment signals that neurobiological development countries where most psychological research has gone awry in some way. The insecurely at- has taken place (Henrich et al., 2010). In col- tached individual has difficulty regulating the lectivistic or communal societies, the emphasis is on maintaining harmonious connection with

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others, including with young children. Return- The neurobiological effects of each nest com- ing to nomadic foraging data, the findings are ponent on an individual’s health and well-being remarkable. Similar characteristics are noted are discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g., Narvaez, among the adults when we examine accounts Panksepp, Schore, & Gleason, 2013). Our labo- of first- and early-contact diarists (e.g., Span- ratory has been collecting correlational data on iards like Columbus) in response to meeting the relation of nest components to child well-be- indigenous peoples of the Americas (Siepel, ing and morality using standardized measures 2015; Turner, 1994), as well as anthropological of (3- to 5-year-old) children’s moral develop- studies of nomadic foragers in the last century ment (Kochanska, 1994) along with validated or so (e.g., Fry & Soulliac, 2017; Gowdy, 1998; measures of parenting attitudes and behaviors Ingold, 2005; see Narvaez, 2013, for a review). (Narvaez, Gleason, Lefever, Wang, & Cheng, Across nomadic foraging societies, adult per- 2016; Narvaez, Wang, et al., 2013). Here are a sonalities on average are reported to be gener- couple of examples of what we found using a ous, social, cooperative, egalitarian, and con- longitudinal dataset of mothers and children tent, with high sense of both communalism and observed and tested several times from 4 to 36 autonomy. In terms of behavior economics the- months (Narvaez, Gleason, et al., 2013). After ory, their personalities have been set to a more controlling for age, income, and education, as empathic than egoistic orientation (Cory, 2016). well as maternal responsivity (which is routine- In a recent study of forager–horticulturalists (a ly correlated with all positive child outcomes), non-nomadic people called the Tsimane, who greater affectionate touch throughout the early likely provide components of the evolved nest) years was correlated with the development of using Big-Five personality theory (Gurven, empathy, self-regulation, conscience, and intel- von Rueden, Kaplan, & Massenkoff, 2013), ligence. Perhaps most surprising to a modern researchers found a “big two”—communally audience, breastfeeding initiation correlated oriented factors of prosociality and industry. It with conscience and intelligence, while breast- appears then that the species-typical develop- feeding length correlated with the development ment system, the evolved nest, supports the de- of conscience and self-control. These results are velopment of prosociality and the evolved moral not surprising if one understands the content of sense. I examine this linkage further below. breast milk—thousands of ingredients tailored The evolved nest maintains close connection to the particular child at the time of ingestion between the child and the caring community. (Karra, Shobha, Udipi, Kirksey, & Roepke, The components of the evolved nest influence 1986), with building blocks for the immune all that the child becomes, from physiology to system and other major systems of the body/ sociality and morality, largely not only because brain (Goldman, Goldblum, & Hanson, 1990). humans are so immature at birth but also be- The results conform with findings regarding cause humans are much more shapeable than breastfeeding generally. For example, in a study any other animal through general plasticity of 14,000 infants, general developmental mile- and multiple epigenetic effects (mechanisms stones were reached more quickly the longer for activating genes, such as turning them “on” exclusive breastfeeding occurred, or to put it or “off”; Gómez-Robles, Hopkins, Schapiro, another way: the more infant formula consumed & Sherwood, 2015). Neurobiological capaci- instead of breastmilk, the greater the develop- ties shaped in early life infuse personality and mental delays (Sacker, Quigley, & Kelly, 2006). moral values. When one has an inflexible, eas- Neurobiological research is demonstrating the ily distressed psychobiology, one is less likely causal underpinnings of breast milk’s effects on to be openminded or openhearted toward ideas neurobehavioral organization and maturation, and people who are different. One will be more such as greater myelination among breast-fed closed off emotionally or easily shut down by children (e.g., Hart, Boylan, Carroll, Musick perceived threats (Schore, 2003b). Sheldon & Lampe, 2003; Khedr, Farghaly, Sel-D, & Cooper appears to have this type of psychobiol- Osman, 2004; see Gaber Rizk, 2014, for a re- ogy, which I have noted is more likely among view). The effects of breast milk on brain size boys stressed prenatally and/or postnatally. In and white matter are pronounced among boys contrast, with a flexible, agile neurobiology, participating in a randomized feeding trial at one will be socially oriented and maintain calm, preterm birth and brain-scanned in adolescence or quickly restore it, in the face of new experi- (Isaacs et al., 2010). Again, boys are more influ- ences and people. enced by early experience.

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It is not a surprise that components of the of purpose continue to be guided by these im- evolved nest might have such effects because plicit notions of, for example, social trust or multiple epigenetic effects take place in the distrust, personal competence or incompetence early life of mammals, especially humans, (Erikson, 1968). The empirical linkages be- who evolved to expect the intensive care their tween childhood traits and characteristic adap- evolved nest provides (Gómez-Robles et al., tations and adolescent identity and narratives 2015; Gudsnuk & Champagne, 2012; Kuzawa still need to be specified (Lapsley, 2015). We & Quinn, 2009). In short, early life experience can perform some theoretical linkages here. shapes temperament and dispositions based on the plasticity of the brain–body in early life. Moral Orientations Longitudinal observational studies show that children who experience mutually responsive We can see that explicit measures of moral rea- care in early life are more likely to demonstrate soning cannot capture the type of neurobiologi- the development of a (prosocial) moral self at cal development we’ve been discussing. Triune 5.5 years old, which includes committed com- ethics metatheory (TEM; Narvaez, 2008, 2014, pliance to parental values (demonstrated by fol- 2016) attempts to integrate the neurobiological lowing those values when the child is alone); and psychological literatures to explain the dif- this moral self in turn mediates socially en- ferent types of moral orientations we can have. gaged, competent, and prosocial behavior at age Measures of triune ethics orientations represent 6.5 (Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, a combination of what others perceive one to 2010). Thus, we can see how dispositional traits be like (the implicit self) and what one is aim- are shaped initially implicitly, with neurobio- ing for (moral identity) in social situations. An logical engravings of trust or distrust (Erikson, engagement ethic or relational attunement, 1950), according to the nature of early care, and representing the type of moral sense Darwin then elaborated with more deliberate family and identified, indicates well-functioning psycho- cultural practices. These dispositions include socialneurobiology. Self-protectionist ethics implicit schemas of self (e.g., good–bad), rela- such as social opposition and social withdraw- tionships (trustworthy or not) and the nature of al represent forms of social behavior noted by the world (safe–unsafe) (Narvaez, 2014). The clinicians when neurobiological systems have moral self emerges from the habitual activa- been toxically stressed. A variety of imagina- tion of moral schemas through reciprocal social tion ethics that use abstracting capabilities are experience, habitual family practices, and from based on these basic forms and are mentioned attention-drawing discussions that co-construct below. autobiographical memories. All of us are born with survival systems to With language development, children are keep us alive. They include the emotion sys- able to discuss feelings with family members, tems located in the extrapyramidal action ner- so that causes of inner states are linked to ac- vous system: fear, anger, panic/grief, and basic tions and outcomes, facilitating direct instruc- lust—all well mapped in mammalian brains tion from parents on these matters (Thompson, and integrated with the stress response (Pank- 2006). Caregiver verbal interactions have vari- sepp, 1998). When toxic stress takes place in ous effects. For example, even with toddlers, early childhood, survival systems are enhanced caregivers help the child review, structure, and and become dominant, while prosociality net- consolidate their memories in a script-like fash- works are underdeveloped (Niehoff, 1999). ion by how and what they elaborate in conversa- Survival systems kick in under stress and pro- tions with the child (Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, mote things such as territoriality, imitation, 1992; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). These conver- deception, struggles for power, maintenance sations help structure the child’s own self and of routine, and following precedent (MacLean, moral narratives (Lapsley & Hill, 2009). So, for 1990). When survival systems take over the example, whether the caregiver “talks and asks mind, they change perception of what seems questions about feelings and actions or about good in the moment (Sapolsky, 2004), and if clothes and looking good, he or she is guiding they trump other values and guide behavior, we the child to develop conceptual structures that can call them a self-protectionist ethic (Nar- form memories about the self. vaez, 2008, 2014, 2016). Protectionist ethics In adolescence, identity and purpose become indicate a hierarchical orientation (dominance more salient (Damon, 2008). Identity and sense or submission) to which survival systems are

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oriented to promote self-safety. Self-protection- him get what he wants. It appears that when ism becomes apparent as a mind-set when indi- they were babies, they were smart enough to viduals hold themselves apart from others, un- “go into their heads” when their needs were not able to relationally attune as an equal to others met, as a defense against early trauma/neglect (Laing, 1959/1990). When the stress response (Winnicott, 1965). Like those with avoidant at- is active, blood flow shifts toward mobilization tachment, they took a cognitive (i.e., emotion- for safety and away from higher order thinking ally disconnected) route to getting along in (Arnsten, 2009; Sapolsky, 2004). The shift can life, suppressing emotion, which at the same occur by situation and happen so quickly that time thwarted the development of emotional it is not apparent to the individual. Individuals intelligence during the early sensitive periods can dispositionally favor aggressing or with- of development (Crittenden, 1995). They both drawing, or shift between them opportunisti- show how a person can learn rules from ex- cally. Someone can shift quickly into aggres- plicit instruction that don’t match up with im- sion under particular circumstances, as with plicit understandings of the world. While such road rage (Deffenbacher, Deffenbacher, Lynch, a person may comply with others’ moral values & Richards, 2003). George Costanza (Seinfeld) when necessary, he has not internalized the val- offers a good illustration. When at a day care, ues—does not believe/understand/know them. he suddenly felt in danger from a perceived fire What kinds of moral orientations are Sheldon in the building. He starts to run out of the build- and Francis exhibiting? ing, impulsively pushing out of his way anyone Both Sheldon and Francis demonstrate pro- on his path, including children and an elderly tectionist ethics. Sheldon displays social with- woman. Most aggression in mammals obtains drawal enhanced by intellect into what I call from reactive self-defense, a dynamic intermix- detached imagination, which represents emo- ture of fear and anger (Blanchard, Blanchard, & tionally detached intellectualism, a type of Takahashi, 1977; Panksepp, 1998). People who moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). It does are dispositionally stress reactive will spend not attend to relational connections to others, more time in a protectionist mind-set and feel lacks a sense of responsibility to others, and slights when there are none, such as when they makes plans without a sense of long-term conse- are accidentally bumped (Dodge & Somberg, quences on the web of life (a common criticism 1987). This implicitly driven behavior will of Western society’s emphasis on intellect; e.g., be rationalized by the explicit mind (Taber & MacMurray, 1935/1999; McGilchrist, 2009). Lodge, 2006) as occurs with violent criminals Our studies have found that detached imagina- (Gilligan, 1997). My collaborators and I have tion correlates with personal distress and social shown that individuals whose childhoods were distrust (Narvaez, Thiel, et al., 2016). Recent more inconsistent with the evolved nest, which real-life examples of this mind-set include the increases chances for dispositional stress reac- bankers and mortgage brokers who caused the tivity (Lupien et al., 2009), were more likely to 2008 U.S. financial crash (illustrated in The Big have protectionist ethics and behaviors (Nar- Short [2010] by Michael Lewis). vaez, Wang, & Cheng, 2016); they also were Social opposition is a common outcome for more distrustful, behaved less prosocially, and insecurely attached children, displayed in ag- had lower integrity scores (Narvaez, Thiel, gression and noncompliance (Sroufe, Egeland, Kurth, & Renfus, 2016). This conforms with Carlson, & Collins, 2005). Francis Underwood neurobiological findings that stress reactiv- displays social opposition enhanced by intel- ity decreases emotional intelligence (Singh & lect, a vicious imagination, which represents Sharma, 2012). planful control or harm of others. It can take Let’s return to our two fictional characters. various forms such as not only revenge but also Francis Underwood (House of Cards, novel and pathological altruism (Oakley, Madhavan, & Netflix show) is a manipulative politician, a Wilson, 2012). In our studies, we found that vi- coldhearted, ruthless pragmatist out for power. cious imagination strongly correlated with inse- He was traumatized by an abusive father. Fran- cure attachment and trait aggression (Narvaez, cis Underwood is not as autistic (socially awk- Thiel, et al., 2016). ward in perception, sensitivity and behavior) as In summary, we have multiple ethical mind- Sheldon Cooper, but he has similar antisocial sets that can shift and change our moral orienta- attitudes. Neither cares much about other peo- tion in the circumstance or become disposition- ple, except instrumentally, using them to help al. Propensity for different ethical mind-sets

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are founded on how well one’s neurobiological wisdom is not necessarily age related (Smith & structures work, enhanced by personal choices Baltes, 1990). and cultural press. Narratives guide our lives, from cultural to What happens when early life goes well? In personal to biological narratives. Biological our studies with multiple-age adults, the en- “narratives” have deep neurobiological founda- gagement ethic is related to all around good tions in the implicit worldview a person carries functioning, as represented by secure attach- from patterns of experience in childhood (un- ment, mental health, perspective taking, em- less changed from later impactful experience), pathy, self-regulation, and prosocial behavior, reflected in a basic (dis)trust toward self and and, when abstracting capabilities are involved, sense of (un)safety in the world (Narvaez, 2011). a communal imagination is related strongly Just like deep cultural assumptions, these are to forgiveness, prosocial action, and integrity difficult to uncover through explicit narratives. (Narvaez & Hardy, 2016; Narvaez, Thiel, et al., However, in an individual whose early experi- 2016). I discuss optimal functioning more in the ences were inconsistent with the evolved nest, next section. neurobiological systems will be less regulated, leading to a disconnect between the individual’s natural inclinations and moral values learned Adult Lives explicitly. The focus of explicit life narratives will be on the self or on issues of self-control, Moral functioning involves the interrelation such as following rules, because, under condi- of several components: perception, sensitiv- tions of poor self-regulation, explicit attention to ity, and interpretation of situations; reasoning, rules is needed (Niehoff, 1999). This state is re- judgment, and reflection; motivation and focus; flective of Aristotle’s incontinence (in contrast implementation of action and follow through to virtue, in which desires and behavior align (Rest, 1983). Morally mature adults have honed without temptation). Individuals will be more their moral capacities and demonstrate the prac- oriented to punishment, and more threat reac- tical wisdom to coordinate them in ways that tive toward unscripted situations, outsiders, and young people typically lack (Hursthouse, 1999). the unfamiliar, as they did not learn the social What do we see in wise elders? Wise people agility that comes with evolved nest provision. display an engagement ethic, the ability to at- As noted earlier, they are more likely to show tune to others in face-to-face encounters with mental rigidity and the splitting (us-against- an egalitarian, open manner, showing Darwin’s them or black-and-white thinking) noted by cli- full moral sense, built on a well-functioning nicians in patients with early trauma (e.g., Fair- visceral–emotional nervous system on the hy- bairn, 1952; Lanius, Vermetten, & Pain, 2010). pothalamic–limbic axis (Panksepp, 1998) as In contrast, early experience consistent with well as a well-functioning right hemisphere the evolved nest results in good self-regulation (Schore, 1994). Data from adults who report a and coordination of neurobiological systems childhood more consistent with the evolved nest for sociality (e.g., vagus nerve; Porges, 2011). fit path models linking secure attachment, men- In a well-fostered individual, stress reactivity tal health (anxiety and depression), perspective did not develop to routinely draw attention to taking, and relational attunement with others in self concerns, so prosocial moral valuing and both negative and positive pathways (Narvaez, behavior come naturally most of the time. In- Wang, et al., 2016). Such capacities are con- deed, rescuers of Jews in World War II tended firmed by studies conducted by the Berlin Wis- to report warm relationships with their parents dom Project, in which, for example, those with (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). A well-developed in- higher scores on wisdom-related knowledge dividual bends his or her life toward prosocial- demonstrate other-enhancing values and a pref- ity and communality, and these are reflected in erence for cooperative social orientations rather the narratives he or she believes and discusses than protective ones (submission, withdrawal, about his or her life. Topics of his or her narra- dominance) (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003). In tives will be on the needs of others. studies of general wisdom, moral reasoning The research of Anne Colby and Bill Damon development was necessary but not sufficient (1992) shows what a communally oriented adult for the highest scores on wisdom, whose com- life looks like. In an attempt to study moral com- bination was more typical of older participants mitment, they systematically solicited nomina- (Pasupathi & Staudinger, 2001). Nevertheless, tions of moral exemplars, who demonstrated a

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sustained commitment to moral ideals that in- might have been initially molded by familial cluded a respect for humanity, a disposition to and cultural press. Moral values can change act according to those ideals, and a willingness top-down from therapeutic efforts or transfor- to risk self-interest for them. They also had to be mative experiences. inspirational to others and humble about their importance, while contributing significantly to their community. Colby and Damon summa- Conclusion rized the characteristics of the 23 people they interviewed. Exemplars were clear about what Each person is an embodied story—integrating they thought was right and what their moral re- the tale of not only human evolution but also sponsibilities were. It wasn’t that the exemplars their own lived experience. Moral learning, like had exceptional moral reasoning or judgment— all learning, is biosocial and embodied in our their moral commitment was much more than neurobiological systems. We are first construct- intellectual. Moral responsibility was central ed by the community of care (or undercare), to their self-identity, which was grounded in a including our biological and genetic functions, meaning greater than the self. Exemplars were within immersed relationships (Ingold, 2013). positive and optimistic about their work, dem- Thus, precursors to adult moral capacities are onstrating not only courage but also openness shaped by community caregiving practices. Mo- to personal growth throughout life. Most im- rality, including components of moral sensitivi- portantly, they exhibited a unity of personal and ty, judgment, motivation, and action, is initially moral goals, which has been confirmed by other bottom-up learning from relational immersion studies showing a blending of personal agency in early life (Kochanska, 2002). Implicit social- and communalism (Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, procedural knowledge that underlies conscious Lee, & Riches, 2011); that is, moral goals were thought and action is shaped by environments not viewed as a sacrifice or even a choice but with caregiver relations in which cognitive and became the means to attaining personal goals. emotional capacities develop together (Greens- As for everyone, moral actions were everyday pan & Shanker, 2004; Stern, 1985). occurrences, but for the exemplars, the range of The evolved nest emerges from our coop- concerns and depth of engagement were excep- erative history as a species and undergirds a tional; that is, their moral concerns had greater relational epistemology or worldview. Babies scope, intensity, and breadth than those of non- and children rely on a caring community to exemplars. provide for their needs, which thereby fosters Colby and Damon (1992) also documented the evolved moral sense: Experience becomes moral transformation. They discussed a case in internalized culture (Hall, 1976)—all the way which peers influenced a change in moral val- down to neurobiological structures. In other ues. Southerner Virginia Durr described how words, moral development is highly commu- she changed after she went to college when, for nal in construction and in execution. When the the first time, she encountered “colored” people evolved nest is provided, matching the matu- treated as equals. Over time, she made friends rational schedule of the child, it influences the and learned to care for them as equals, eventu- trajectory and type of moral development, af- ally becoming a civil rights activist. This aligns fecting dispositional traits, characteristic values with a more recent case in the news, the con- and goals, and integrative life narratives. The version of Derek Black (Saslow, 2016). Derek evolved moral sense is supported. However, was raised as a white supremacist and, as a when early life does not include the evolved child, started the white supremacist website for kids called Stormfront. But then he went to nest, leading to self-protectionist ethics, there is college (against his family’s wishes), made di- still hope. Life experiences can intervene and verse friends who, after they found out who he have the power to transform moral values and really was paused their relationships. But then behavior. they came back to him and initiated friendly dialogue about his beliefs, which over months ACKNOWLEDGMENT brought him to renounce white supremacism. Thus, characteristic values and goals, as well as I acknowledge the Templeton Religion Trust for its life narratives, may be altered by an individual’s funding of the Self, Motivation and Virtue project choices and relationships, even though these and the John Templeton Foundation for its funding

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