The Vietnam War and the 'Miracle of East Asia'
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Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 4, Number 3, 2003 The Vietnam War and the ‘Miracle of East Asia’ PARK Keunho (Translated by Hiroko Kawasakiya CLAYTON) Introduction Remarkable economic development in East Asia after the latter half of 1960s provided a tremendous shock against the perception relating to the North–South problem that the economic gap between the north and the south continues to widen. Unsurprisingly, a lot of research interest centres on the resolution of the issue, with the development structure of the East Asian economy in particular being analysed from various angles. Due to such interests, it cannot be denied that much research, including that analysing the progress of economic growth in East Asia, tended to search for general theories of economic development for present day developing countries. The effects of the Vietnam War, which cannot be ignored in Asian economic development, have until now hardly been verified. This can be attributed to the thinking that accidental factors, including the Vietnam War, should be abstracted from economic development theory. Most research so far, including that examining the impact of the Vietnam War on the Asian economy, is merely about Vietnam-related procurement. The effects of the Vietnam War on economic development in Asia included not only cash revenue aspects due to ‘Vietnam-related procurement’, but also a profitable climate in international economic relationships, which played a definite important role. For the East Asia region, temporary revenues, such as those from Vietnam-related procurement, were surely significant. However, rather than that, issues, including the development of America’s Asian policy and its economic impact on the East Asia region, are more important.1 Specifically, it is necessary to examine not only Vietnam-related procurement, which was temporary, but also how continuous economic aid and the global trading market contributed to economic development in the East-Asia region. While doing this, I would also like to examine in detail how the Vietnam War impacted on economic development in Korea. Issues regarding the Korean army’s dispatch of troops to Vietnam are recently garnering attention in Korean society in various forms. Many issues, including the harm to Korean troops caused by defoliant used during the Vietnam War and after-effects problems, such as post-war neurosis, and issues such as civilian massacres by Korean troops, have not yet been explicated. This paper aims to examine these issues as well. In particular, the issue regarding the civilian massacre by Korean troops is significant in the sense that the Korean people, who had been seeing themselves as victims, began to face their own wrongdoings. The pursuit of American government responsibility in the ‘NoGeunRi Massacre’, in which American soldiers killed civilians during the Korean War, and the responsibility of the Japanese government regarding comfort women, while leaving to one side the issue of the Korean army massacring civilians, were also because these were seen as unforgivable problems. In January 2000, the ‘Korean Truth Committee on the Vietnam War’ was formed in cooperation with 12 NGO groups, and has been working to investigate the truth and to promote a campaign for Truth and Reconciliation concerning the Vietnam War. In this way, responsibility not only as victims, but also as wrongdoers, has begun to be pursued. Furthermore, the enormous scale of the massacres, as well as the distinct possibility that they were done indiscriminately, adds to this issue. However, it is a reality that the reasons such ISSN 1464-9373 Print/ISSN 1469-8447 Online/03/030372–27 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1464937032000143760 The Vietnam War and the ‘Miracle of East Asia’ 373 massacres occurred have not yet been clarified, despite their significance. This, needless to say, is largely due to the fact that the truth of the issue has not yet been revealed, and that research on the topic has been deficient. Thus, this paper aims to examine the background of the genocide of Vietnamese civilians based on materials including notes and testimonies by Korean soldiers who participated in the Vietnam War, and on a damage fact-finding inquiry by a Korean NGO. The Vietnam War and the ‘Miracle of East Asia’ ‘Special support for Southeast Asia operations’ and Vietnam-related procurement ‘The Vietnam War, which developed into large-scale combat in 1965, the turning point of the war came in January 1969 when President Johnson stopped bombing North Vietnam, ended in 1975 with the North and South Vietnam were unified after the collapse of the South Vietnamese government.’ The Vietnam War, which lasted 11 long years between 1965 and 1975, had an immeasurable impact on the economies of Asian countries. After March 1965, when President Johnson started sending US combat troops to Vietnam, the Vietnam War escalated and US intervention into Vietnam became full-scale. 1965 can be seen as the turning point of the expansion of the Vietnam War. The number of US soldiers sent to South Vietnam sharply increased to 180,000 in 1965 from 23,000 at the end of December 1964. At its peak, that number rose to as high as 550,000 in 1968. As Table 1 shows, military spending began increasing rapidly from the latter half of 1965 in line with the escalation of the Vietnam War. In the budget for fiscal 1965 (July 1964 to June 1965), before the intensification of the war, US national defence spending had decreased from 52.7 billion dollars to 48.6 billion dollars. However, spending increased to 55.9 billion dollars in fiscal 1966, to 69.1 billion dollars in fiscal 1967, and to 80.2 billion dollars in fiscal 1969. The major part of the increase in national defence spending after fiscal 1965 was due to ‘Special Support for Southeast Asia Operations’. This increase in national defence spending could also be seen as an increase in expenditure on the Vietnam War. Although only 103 million dollars was appropriated as Special Support for Southeast Asia Operations in the fiscal 1965 budget, that number rose sharply to 5.8 billion dollars in the budget for fiscal 1966. Furthermore, in fiscal 1967, this exceeded 20 billion dollars, and at its peak in 1969 rose to 28.8 billion dollars, accounting for 36% of the national spending, 16% of the federal budget and 3% of GDP (US Department Commerce 1975). Following the start of the withdrawal of US troops along with the end of the bombing of North Vietnam in 1969, war expenditures started gradually to shrink, decreasing to 9.4 billion dollars in 1972. At the time of the Korean War, national defence spending accounted for 12.5% of US GDP, of which 6–7% was actually spent directly on the Korean War. In contrast, national defence spending accounted for 9% of GDP during the Vietnam War, of which only 3% was expendi- ture for the Vietnam War. From the perspective of its ratio to US GDP, spending on the Vietnam War was only half that on the Korean War. However, the total amount of direct expenditure on the Korean War was 69 billion dollars, while that on the Vietnam War was 148.8 billion dollars. Expenditure on the Vietnam War largely exceeded that on the Korean War because the Vietnam War lasted longer and the scale was larger than the Korean War (US Department Commerce 1975). Needless to say, the occurrence of Vietnam-related procurement was based on the ‘Special Support for Southeast Asia Operations’ resulting from full-scale intervention in the Vietnam War by the US. Within ‘Special Support for Southeast Asia Operations’, overseas military spending, which the US army directly used for purchases of goods and services overseas, was distributed to South East Asian countries through (1) US army spending; (2) munitions goods 374 Park Keunho Table 1. American national defence budget and the Vietnam War Federal National Annual Defense Special Support for (Unit: Hundred Million Dollars) Spending Spending Southeast Asia Operations (A) (B) (C) C/A C/B 1964 1186 527 0% 0% 1965 1184 486 1 0% 0% 1966 1347 559 58 4% 10% 1967 1583 691 201 13% 29% 1968 1788 794 265 15% 33% 1969 1846 802 288 16% 36% 1970 1966 793 231 12% 29% 1971 2114 768 147 7% 19% 1972 2319 774 94 4% 12% 1973 2465 751 63 3% 8% 1974 2684 786 31 1% 4% 1975 3134 853 15 0% 2% (Source: US Department Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1975.) The Vietnam War and the ‘Miracle of East Asia’ 375 Figure 1. US Foreign Military Expenditure (Source: US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Feb. 1992, April 1975) supplied to US troops in Vietnam; and (3) spending by US soldiers on leave. When looking at this from an economic viewpoint, the effect of Vietnam-related procurement on South East Asian countries was extremely large. As Figure 1 shows, US foreign military expenditure rapidly increased after 1965, along with the development of the Vietnam War, from 2.95 billion dollars in 1965 to 3.76 billion dollars in 1966 and to 4.86 billion dollars in 1969. In line with this increase, US military expenditure in the Asian region increased sharply from about 1.1 billion dollars in 1965 to 1.8 billion dollars in 1966, 2.5 billion dollars in 1968, and to 2.7 billion dollars in 1969. The US government estimated its Vietnam-related procurement was about 1billion dollars in fiscal 1966, 1.5 billion dollars in fiscal 1967, 1.9 billion dollars in fiscal 1969, and totalling 10.8 billion dollars in the period between 1965 and 1972 (see Figure 1). When comparing the size of Vietnam-related procurement with the GNP of the countries around Vietnam, the ratio remained slightly less than 1% in 1965, but sharply increased in 1968 to 7.8% for Singapore, 4.7% for Thailand and 3.5% for Korea (Bank of Japan Research Department 1970: 4–7).