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Policy Briefing Policy Briefing Latin America Briefing N°11 Bogotá/Brussels, 20 October 2006 Tougher Challenges Ahead for Colombia’s Uribe I. OVERVIEW The FARC has been forced to retreat from large-unit movement to a more traditional guerrilla war but the movement is still strong. Both the government and the President Alvaro Uribe was overwhelmingly reelected insurgents are showing some flexibility about a possible in May 2006, two months after parties supporting him hostages-for-prisoners swap, which could eventually lead won large majorities in the Congress. The armed forces to full peace negotiations. However, their preconditions are stronger than they have ever been, and U.S. aid appears are far apart. Talks that the government has been holding in relatively secure. As he begins his second four-year term, Cuba with the smaller and weaker National Liberation Uribe seems to be in a stronger position to tackle Colombia’s Army (ELN) are more likely to produce a true peace long-standing problems: drug trafficking, the internal process sooner. conflict, continued lack of security and poverty in rural areas, corruption, and social inequality. But appearances The demobilisation of more than 31,600 paramilitaries may be deceiving. His governing coalition is fractious, of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) his popularity vulnerable to what a still powerful insurgency has removed many illegal armed units from the battlefield chooses to do. He has yet to define a comprehensive but the Justice and Peace Law (JPL), proposed by the second-term strategy for peace and development that Uribe government to entice them into surrendering, has addresses these issues and puts a priority on bringing rural been condemned by human rights groups and the UN High Colombia into the political, economic and social mainstream. Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCRC). The Constitutional Court ruled that some sections violated In response to public pressure, Uribe has been speaking both Colombian basic law and international legal norms, about his intention to pursue peace negotiations with the and serious questions remain about its implementation, country’s two main insurgencies but security, an area in the scale of reparations to victims and the functioning of which he achieved much during his first term, remains the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation his top priority. As defined in the “Democratic Security (NCRR). The government’s proposed regulations are Policy” (DSP) his first administration implemented, it is still being criticised for offering benefits to the paramilitaries the main reason for an approval rating around 70 per that the Court had ruled unacceptable. How successful cent but it could also prove to be his Achilles Heel. A the attorney general is in identifying AUC crimes, assets return of the conflict to the cities would weaken his and victims, and the NCRR is in protecting victims’ rights, popularity and mandate. That scenario is realistic as long will determine whether any of the wounds of more than as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) four decades of violence begin to heal. dominate large swathes of the countryside and paramilitaries, whether or not formally demobilised, continue to control Many questions await answers in the second term, criminal structures and use intimidation and violence in including whether the government will: local communities even if they no longer wear uniforms. take a more supportive attitude toward the The security policy has failed to weaken the rebels enough Constitutional Court ruling on the JPL by to force them to the negotiating table, and a military victory withdrawing regulations that conflict with that remains apparently unachievable. Part of the reason is decision, fund many more attorneys and provide the failure of the counter-drug policy to have any sustained other resources to the attorney general for impact on cocaine exports and thus on cash flows to the implementing the law, and require that all who armed groups. Drug revenues not only finance the FARC seek to obtain reduced sentences give full state’s and entice demobilised paramilitary groups to organise evidence on crimes, assets and victims if they are new offshoots, they also corrupt the military. A series of to obtain reduced sentences; scandals has hit the security forces, and corruption, abuse respond vigorously through law enforcement and of human rights and irregularities have undermined their security agencies against rearmed paramilitary credibility and professionalism. groups and paramilitary leaders who leave the detention zones, making their capture a priority equal to fighting the FARC; Tougher Challenges Ahead for Colombia’s Uribe Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N°11, 20 October 2006 Page 2 show flexibility in negotiations with the ELN and The FARC were the focus of military operations under seek advice from the observer governments; “Plan Patriota”,2 whose first major operation, Operation Libertad in 2003, was launched in Cundinamarca, the most rededicate efforts to achieve a hostages-for-prisoners developed and urbanised of Colombia’s departments (and exchange with the FARC as the first step in a long- whose capital is Bogotá). It was highly successful, term strategy to negotiate an end to the insurgency; pushing the insurgents back from Bogotá, dismantling and much of their kidnapping, extortion and military networks in demonstrate alternatives to FARC rhetoric and the area, and killing a senior commander, Marco Aurelio 3 drug traffickers’ blandishments by announcing and Buendía. funding a national rural governance initiative to bring the rule of law, state social services and economic The aim of putting police in all 1,098 municipalities of investment to the countryside. the country was achieved in 2004, with joint police- military operations conducted in the 168 municipalities If Uribe is to balance security with a social agenda, from which the security forces had been driven.4 A form however, he will have to find and dedicate substantial of national guard, “Soldiers of my Town”, was established, resources beyond donor funds, including by increasing which now has 598 platoons totalling 21,528 soldiers. Its tax revenues, perhaps by repeating the 1.2 per cent “war role is to help the security forces consolidate territorial tax” he imposed in his first year in office on the wealthiest control and free combat troops from much patrolling and Colombians. (This time it might be called a “peace tax” other routine tasks. It has had the secondary effect of and divided between security expenditures, rural investment making the local population more likely to back government and the JPL.) He has struggled in the past with an often forces since it now shares local security responsibility. recalcitrant Congress, but his electoral triumphs and the The increased police presence has not yet been followed reformed party system that has resulted from those up with a more comprehensive rural development program. successes and changes in the legislative framework mean he will be expected to carry out more of his initiatives Increasing the number of High Mountain Battalions, a than he could in the first term. If he cannot, the blame project begun under President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002), will fall directly on him. from one to seven has also been effective. These are stationed at key passes in the Andes, where they seek to cut guerrilla corridors and dislodge the rebels from their II. POLICY CONTINUITY OR strongholds. ADJUSTMENT? Funded and to a great extent planned by Washington under Plan Colombia,5 the war on drugs has intensified A. SECURITY POLICY 2 During President Andrés Pastrana’s term (1998-2002), the 1. First term successes military began a build-up of its combat forces with U.S. funds and training in the framework of “Plan Colombia” and “Plan President Uribe’s popularity is largely based on his success 10,000”. This aimed at shifting from a garrison-based force to in improving security, especially in the major urban one with greater mobility to confront the FARC. “Plan Patriota” areas.1 Historically, presidents restricted to a single four- has involved placing all branches under joint regional command year term tended to set short-term counter-insurgency structures. 3 strategies. Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, According to the FARC’s strategic concept, the war would published in June 2003, however, set out a long term have several stages before the final offensive to take power. project to re-establish (or in many areas establish for the From 1964 to 1994, it conducted a typical guerrilla struggle; from 1994 to 1998, it pursued a “war of movement” to control first time) the presence of the state throughout the national the eastern cordillera and block Bogotá; the last phase before territory. It identified as primary threats the insurgency, the final offensive was to be a “war of positions”, involving which it labelled “terrorism”, drug trafficking, money control of entire regions and departments. However, due to laundering, arms trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, and setbacks, the FARC has had to return to the guerrilla phase. homicides, and it set out strategic objectives and actions. Eduardo Pizarro, “Las FARC: ¿repliegue estratégico, debilitamiento o punto de inflexión?”, in “Nuestra guerra sin nombre: Transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia”, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), 2006, pp. 195-201. 1 For analysis of the 2006 Congressional and presidential 4 New bunker-style police stations were built in these areas, elections, see Crisis Group Latin America Report N°17, designed to resist attacks until reinforcements arrive. Uribe’s Re-election: Can the EU Help Colombia Develop a 5 “Plan Colombia”, a $10.65 billion five-year package, 65-per More Balanced Peace Strategy?, 8 June 2006. cent Colombia-funded, was conceived in 2000 by the Tougher Challenges Ahead for Colombia’s Uribe Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N°11, 20 October 2006 Page 3 on several fronts: spraying and manual eradication of drug 2.
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