Belarusian Ideology

Valer Bulhakau FROM THE RHETORIC OF BROTHERLY UNITY TO THE RHETORIC OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION. ARTEFACTS FROM CONTEMPORARY OFFICIAL BELARUSIAN IDEOLOGY

1. ever, they differ from the rest of the press since they are allowed to cover politically and ideologically im - The list of Belarusian media containing elements portant topics and problematic issues on their own. of official ideology is both limitless and limited at the They are the ones who generate the “politically cor - same time. In reality, every issue of hundreds of state rect” examples and stereotypes that lower level ad- newspapers, bulletins and magazines is a mouth - ministrative units (i.e. the regional and workers ’ piece for directives programmed by the current re - press) can go on to implant into the mass conscious - gime in Belarus, and state radio and television are ness with varying degrees of devotion. Under Lukashism there are actually not so many of these publications, which include the liberal daily Sovietskaya Byelorussia , the Belarusian-language, Belarus-centric daily Zvyazda , and the very present - able magazine Belaruskaya Dumka . We will start there.

Whatever Lukashenka and his Lukashites might say, the breakdown of “decades of hard-earned con - tacts” came as a relief for them in 1991. This was the last year of Moscow ’s active presence in Belarusian cultural issues and, to some extent, media. How that annoyed representatives of the traditional Belarusian elite! Previously, Moscow was the cultural medium between Belarus and the Western world. The poten - tially dangerous ideas of political and cultural plural - “The March of Freedom – 3,” Minsk, Oct. 1 st, 2000. ism, building a civil society, multiculturalism, and Photo: IREX/ProMedia religious freedom (which endangered the very es- sence of the political regime) used to make their way also sweating over the same task. Not all the printed to Belarus after transiting via Moscow. Traditionally, media are able to provide reports of equal value, the West was still Public Enemy No.1, while Moscow however. One gets the feeling there is a kind of (i.e. its liberal and pro-Western elite) gradually turned kitchen somewhere, where dishes heavily spiced into Public Enemy No.2. with ideology are being prepared for widespread This specifically colonial type of enlightenment public consumption. disappeared from Belarus together with the collapse The real name of this kitchen is the Belarusian of the USSR. Previously, the world ’s leading intellec - presidential administration. Work to ideologically in- tual, cultural, artistic and other knowledge was never doctrinate the masses is constantly underway within transmitted to Belarus directly, but in a roundabout certain sub-departments of this administration ’s nu - way via the imperial centre. Objectively, the loss of merous branches. This is where the country ’s “infor - this cultural communication channel was convenient mation security” is deployed as an invisible shield for some of the conservative and revanchist-minded against invisible enemies. Belarusian power elite. Since Minsk did not possess The almighty presidential administration is only anything like the intellectual potential that Moscow co-founder of a mere handful of publications. How - did, education came to a near standstill. A cultural

54 vacuum formed, thus creating a situation where Secondly, the Belarusian regime ’s main objective new, culturally-relevant ideas and practices from is currently to survive politically, not just to unite and abroad became inaccessible, while the old ones had become a subject of the Russian Federation. Official already lost their relevance. This vacuum has al- Minsk is integrating with official Moscow selectively, lowed a nihilist-reactionary return to the deceased only in areas which guarantee relative stability to spiritual heritage of the recent Soviet past. permit its continued existence. We are faced with a paradoxical situation — once it had gained its independence, Belarus only man - aged to grow even more distant from Europe. How long this communication breakdown will last de - pends not only on political, but also on cultural fac- tors. As long as serious Western politicians remain unaware of this, one should not expect any serious change in Belarus. This lack or shortage of intensive cultural com - munication with the West morally legitimises the rul - ing group of people who pose as guardians of supposedly pristine Soviet values in Belarus today. Strictly speaking, however, there is nothing left for them to do but exist as social parasites in this re - spect, since they are simply unable to come up with any radically different ideas for their own survival. Apart from this, the Belarusian regime is also fairly successful at using the ideology of integration with Russia in order to have a more effective influence on public opinion, and reap its political dividends. These two points (the nihilist-reactionary return to the So - viet system of values, plus the persistent promotion of pro-integrationist ideology) are vital for one to start understanding the main traits of contemporary Belarusian ideology. That is, of course, if one does not mention social-populist rhetoric.

Despite all the official statements and reassur - ances, the integration of Russia and Belarus has never been “all-inclusive.” It has always been limited to clearly-marked economic and military domains, and one cannot speak of any serious integration in, for example, cultural, educational or information pol - icy. There are several explanations for this : Firstly, for president Lukashenka, the concept of “Russia” implies something different to the usual symbolic interpretation. For the Belarusian presi - “The Chain of Not Indifferent People” in frames dent, “Russia” is not so much a geopolitical reality or of a campaign “We Want to Know the Truth!”, th a real country with its own problems, but rather a tra - Minsk, June 6 , 2001. dition of despotic rule. In other words, because Photo: IREX/ProMedia Lukashenka has opted for “Russia,” he has chosen despotism and uncontrolled power. The kind of Rus- Thirdly, as far as the present-day situation and sia Lukashenka prefers is associated with crude, un - psychology of political leaders is concerned, the couth masters who seem completely uneducable; a Muscovite recentralisation process accelerated by “Russia” where the political will of its leader, who our Eastern neighbour ’s power elite has dealt a pow - represents the state and its interests, is everything, erful blow to any “all-inclusive” integration between whereas the will of the individual is meaningless. The the two countries. This process will probably lead to fact that such a picture of “Russia” can only exist in a Russia becoming a unitary state. fantasy world is a constant source of disappointment Increasing the strength of the centre while weak- to Lukashenka. However, no matter how hard you ening the authority of the regions (including by redis- fight it, Russian despotism is unbeatable, and its ap - tributing the tax payments system and other financial pearance in contemporary Russian politics has al- sources to benefit the metropolis as one can see in lowed Lukashenka to raise his hopes that his Russia today) makes the political integration of our imagination and objective reality will actually coin - two countries rather problematic. This is because the cide someday. Belarusian leader could once have aspired to the sta-

55 tus of a major regional leader with gleaming pros- In turn, the “little homeland” probably only pects of making a career for himself in the “centre” (if evokes recollections of the family home, herds of one imagines hypothetically that Belarus were to join cattle at dawn, the first snows at Dziady (a day of re- Russia). Nowadays, however, he can only count on a membrance for the dead), morning mist over the provincial governor’s post, with his authority under fields at harvest time, and a stork flying overhead. In the constant control of newly-appointed “presidential short — pleasant, ordinary things. deputies”. One should also not forget that In his uncommonly profound and searching anal - Lukashenka has had the taste of power for a long ysis The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Com - time. He has grown accustomed to trips abroad and munism in the Twentieth Century , Zbigniew meetings with foreign guests, being the “supreme Brzeziñski stated that the transition into post-com - commander-in-chief”, and extending his power into munism would be accompanied by a nationalist dic - the agricultural sector, heavy industry and construc- tatorship phase for certain Eastern European tion projects. Lukashenka might experience psycho- countries. The disappearance of communism from logical trauma were he to move to a new position,so highly-Sovietised societies with a “totalitarian social he would never agree to it voluntarily. organisation model” would lead to a vacuum that Consequently, the current Belarusian regime is us- could be filled by nationalistic ideology. “... Stirring ing the epithet of integration “between two brotherly up nationalism undoubtedly reinforces authoritarian nations” to its own ends — it is greeted and welcomed tendencies. It strengthens the institutions of power whenever it correspondsto the regime’sunderlying in- that are most capable of making effective use of na- terests and, vice versa, is ignored or neglected when- tionalistic symbols for a dictatorial regime, thus halt - ever it threatens the existing power structure. ing the development of democracy.” Unfortunately, we have to admit that this forecast 4. has come true in Belarus. The seven years of Lukashenka’s rule have been spent not on building up Lukashenka is a truly nationalistic politician, but it a civil society,but a power-pyramid type of nationalis- is another matter that his nationalism is specifically tic dictatorship, i.e. an authoritarian mechanism of Eastern European, yet not at all Eurasian, and he cer- rule. More proof that Lukashenka’s regime is a nation- tainly has no opposite number in the West. At first alistic dictatorship is its aggressively intolerant atti- sight, Lukashenka ’s nationalism lacks dominant na- tude towards cultural, political, and other differences. tional features. It would be wrong to say that Independent Belarusian culture, the Polish national Lukashenka is a Russian nationalist, for example. In minority, and sexual minorities alike are being perse- reality, Lukashenka ’s nationalism dates back to the cuted (along with organisations representing them), time when Russia had yet to become a nation state but the regime turn a blind eye to militarised semi-fas- with a specific national identity, and its starting point cist groups like Russian National Unity, whose mem- is so-called “Soviet patriotism.” bers used to meet and train at a stadium near the Lukashenka is promoting a specific form of national- water’ sports palace in downtown Minsk. No doubt ism known as gosudarstvennichestvo (= “state con- the regime feels closer to them ideologically. trol”) in Russian. Additionally, he has a particular soft This nationalistic dictatorship is not afraid to em - spot for his “little homeland” (the Shklov district), and ploy barbaric methods in order to neutralise noncon - Belarus as a whole. Lukashenka’s national pride awoke formity. Shedding the blood of protesters at peaceful in the far from nationalistically-structured Soviet soci- opposition rallies has become common practice in ety, and is therefore based on two ideological concepts Belarus, and the recent disappearances of prominent : the “greater homeland,” which is to be understood as politicians and businessmen have shown that the the “state,” and the “little homeland,” which implies a country is developing according to the Latin Ameri - certain living environment. In this case, the “greater can “Pinochet” model. The Belarusian political lead - homeland” sets the highest level of (crypto)national ers have definitely crossed the line that makes them identity responsible for rational activity, while the “little criminally liable for their decisions and actions. homeland” represents its lowest echelon that is responsible for direct emotional reactions. 5. Therefore, it should be emphasised that the main inspiration for Lukashenka ’s nationalism should be President Alaksandar Lukashenka is always proud seen as “pride” for a “state” in which national feel - of how close he is to “the people.” He constantly ings have always been suppressed. This “state” emphasises that his policies are supported and should be perceived in the broadest sense, as a huge praised “by the people.” The advertising slogan territory, an extensive state apparatus, and an un - “Alaksandar Lukashenka is with the people” figured usually strong military capability that includes a in his election campaign back in 1994. The official me- hypertrophically efficient army and airforce. It is also dia are also forever proclaiming Lukashenka’s un- a social security system designed to ensure a pov - breakable bond with “the people.” erty-free existence, plus international peace and or - However, in a nationally-underdeveloped society, der. It goes without saying that the prototype for this the concept of “the people” is rather specific. Con- “state” was in fact the far less attractive Soviet state. tent-wise, it does not correspond to the concept of a Once the latter had passed away, it only grew even “nation” or a “civil society.” In a pre-national society, more alluring to its sympathisers. “the people” is a community that emerges in a terri-

56 tory over a period of time, and is united by a certain fore, one can say the Belarusian economic and level of consumption and ideological indoctrination. power elites are in a state of fusion . Furthermore, not all social groups or strata are part of Since he is interested in his own political survival, “the people.” The Lukashenka era has shown that one the Belarusian president has recently begun sending cannot count the anti-collaborationist section of the out cautious feelers into new business elites to try Belarusian intelligentsia as being with “the people” and woo their support. In this respect, the results of (“since it is always distant from the people,” as the the autumn 2000 elections to Lukashenka ’s “house saying goes), just like the business elite is not con- of representatives” were highly indicative, because trolled by the Lukashenka administration. In short, several dozen loyal businessmen and entrepreneurs “the people” does not include independent journalists were voted in as deputies. Having sensed the in- and opposition party activists, but rather steel-smelt- creasing potential of this relatively new social group ers, bobbin-winders, wool-spinners, manual labour- and economic force, the Belarusian president will be ers, agricultural workers, militiamen, border guards, striving to procure a mutually-beneficial compro - and Belarusian servicemen. mise with them in the future. In the Belarusian situa - This vulgar concept of “the people” is employed tion, such a compromise might be restricted to as a means of political manipulation and extends to satisfying a few of their economic demands, as long segments of Belarusian society which depend di- as they remain politically loyal to the authorities. rectly on the state. “The people” implies workers I would also like to say a little about the economic from the state system, state industrial sector, and reasons behind policies that have been designed organisations funded by the state budget, i.e. areas specifically to escalate Belarus ’ political isolation which used to be the backbone of the totalitarian during Lukashenka ’s term of office. The fact is that Soviet state. This kind of “people” has no common the stability and sustainability of the current regime cultural or religious identity, let alone a national can only be guaranteed by maintaining the current identity. It is united in its general, subservient de- economic structure. In Belarus, military-industrial pendence on a totalitarian state it hopes will guaran- enterprises set up under Soviet rule have never un - tee its well-being. dergone any serious reforms. Like other major Lukashenka is not a protégé of “the people,” but branches of the Belarusian economy, they concen - of those forces which stand behind this so-called trate mostly on the Russian market. On the one hand, “people” that so obediently voices their interests . In this orientation suits Lukashenka perfectly, since he reality, Lukashenka is both the protégé and the hos- is essentially offering political cover for this one-track tage of Belarusian state elites that formed back in So - economy. On the other hand, the Belarusian eco - viet times, and are still a force to be reckoned with nomic elite (heads of state or state-controlled facto - today. Once he had achieved the full extent of his po - ries, plants and other industries) are eternally litical power, he mostly began to serve the interests indebted to Lukashenka who is, de facto , providing of the Belarusian military-industrial complex and for them. Politics and economics are on an equal agro-industrial lobby. footing when any significant change in the economy The fight over which candidate would be most ca- leads to political change, and vice versa. pable of consistently maintaining these interests was Belarus ’ international isolation is beneficial to the main intrigue behind the 1994 presidential elec- Lukashenka because it ensures the economic sta - tions. By using aggressive pre-electoral slogans, it tus quo . After all, a large influx of foreign capital was Lukashenka, not Vyacheslav Kebich, who man- would mean a complete rupture of the existing eco - aged to mobilise widespread support from Belarusian nomic order in Belarus, with fatal consequences for society. Independent politicians didn’t even have the the political leaders and the political line they have slightest chance at those elections, since they were been following. The aforementioned political and standing for nothing but phantom expectations of be- economic equality would be destroyed once and for ing able to provoke a sudden explosion of national all, and Belarus would be drawn into Europe and the consciousness among the masses. European economic community by the iron hand of It is no coincidence that even after Vyacheslav market mechanisms. Kebich was no longer actively involved in politics, This is what the first Belarusian president fears Alaksandar Lukashenka still saw him as his most more than anything else. His political statements and threatening competitor in the struggle for power. actions designed to escalate Belarus ’ international Lukashenka ’s main political capital is that he is isolation are increasingly strained, deliberate, and ar- trusted by lobbyists from the military-industrial com - tificial, like a mandatory political ritual. plex and other mainstay branches of the economy, Belarus ’ political leaders are only satisfied by a and enjoys strict control over senior armed forces, purely cosmetic presence of foreign capital in the militia and secret service officers. His impetuous, un - country. The fast-food chain McDonalds , Siemens & restricted social populism only comes second but, Bosch ’s own-brand domestic appliance shops, and a contrary to what certain analysts have stated, actu - small Coca-Cola factory in Minsk are just necessary ally assists him. To all intents and purposes concessions the regime has to agree to. In actual Lukashenka, being a pragmatic politician, has con - fact, Belarus is a black hole on the world trade map. cluded an obscure “non-aggression pact” with these Consequently, true power for Lukashenka means lobbyists, allowing them a certain degree of eco - having total or near-total control over the Belarusian nomic freedom in exchange for loyalty to him. There - economy. Understanding this helps in devising

57 methods to counter Lukashist policies in Belarus. Ba- However, a negative Russian cultural tradition had al- sically, in order to assure the cultural and economic ready been outlined by literary figures like “Europeanisation” of Belarus, one must augment the Smerdyakov and Sharikov. It incorporates the dark private sector and support independent cultural inside of Russian society, with its qualities like spiritual stitutions, as well as guarantee the political condi - indigence, obscurantism, vindictiveness, pettiness tions necessary to obtain large-scale investments of and treachery. This tradition was directly encouraged foreign capital. by the long-term communist experiment performed in the country, in which whole social groups and 6. classes perished along with their unique cultural heritage. In the West, socially-relevant cultural values and President Lukashenka ’s likes and dislikes, partic - practices have traditionally been shaped by the ularly in politics, clearly point to the type of culture in higher echelons of society, whereas in the Soviet Un- which he was brought up and developed as a per - ion the opposite happened. The dominant culture son. Lukashenka ’s political priorities show a devo - came from the lower reaches of society — whether it tion to vulgar, functional approaches. “Vulgar be the working class that led the proletarian revolu- functionalism” is a specific product of Russian cul - tion, or the poverty-stricken rural population. The tural circles. Proponents of “vulgar functionalism” domination of this type of culture essentially signalled are marked by their focus on the socially-valuable at- the triumph of the unenlightened mind. tributes of strength and power. He is excited by voli - A few words must also be said about the Soviet tional, suggestive decisions, even if they are “army” and “prison camps.” These institutions have completely imprudent politically or economically. He traditionally had a major influence on Soviet society. actually treats culture as if it were a social institution Under Soviet totalitarianism, a great number of peo - designed to gloss over the existing social order. Cul - ple went through the “camps,” and practically all of ture and literature are one and the same to him — a the male population served in the “army.” The nega - waste of time, a fruitless occupation. For him, real tive type of Russian culture began to take on particu - creativity is to be found on the construction site or by larly nasty, anti-humanist forms in the “army” and the fireside at home, for that is where true values are “camps.” Very few people were able to withstand its created. According to this logic, cultural products are intrinsic amorality, depravity, degeneration and de - ephemeral and vaguely suspicious. If things are left pression. You will understand what I mean if you lis- to go on “haphazardly” the way they are, however, ten carefully to the Russian spoken by unskilled they might cause social disturbances in future which middle-aged or older workers. Here, language is an the authorities did not anticipate. infallible indicator of the mental traumas and cultural In the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Belarus, it has influences they were exposed to. been the Ministry of Culture’staskto prevent thisfrom The criminal regime of “nomenclaturist capital- happening.This institution has always had a predomi- ism” built by Alaksandar Lukashenka again shows just nantly controlling function, including through its ex- how habits and routines picked up in the “camps” clusive support of cultural projects, initiatives and have become rooted in people’s minds. Apparently, institutions which are beneficial to the regime. Cul- Lukashenka has still not gone beyond the psychology tural events organised by the current Belarusian Min- of a “godfather” with his politics, offering “protection” istry of Culture clearly show that the “vulgar in exchange for servitude and obedience. functionalist” approaches are alive and well among the power elite. The Ministry’s sphere of influence in- 7. cludes the Belarusfilm studios, several dozen state theatres, museums and galleries, a network of librar- Lukashenka himself established the style for offi- ies and cultural centres, youth centres, and a variety cial Belarusian ideologists with his incomparable lin- of clubs and societies — that’s almost everything. guistic outpourings, such as “Russian Orthodox In its present form, the Ministry of Culture is at- atheist” and “lousy fleas” (N.B. said when referring to tempting to preserve the past instead of supporting businessmen). Compared to this, quotes like the contemporary cultural experience. A more fitting “Gorbachev’s pseudo-perestroika,” “adventurist jok- title for this body would be the “Ministry for the Con - ers” and “backroom conductors” (as uttered by Vladi- servation of Soviet Cultural Heritage.” mir Velichko, a “Meritorious Cultural Figure of the The issue of Russian culture deserves a separate Republic of Belarus, Academician of the International mention. Now, more than ever before, there is a dis- Academy of Organisational and Management Sci- tinct cultural dichotomy in modern-day Russia. One ences,” editor-in-chief of Belaruskaya Dumka maga- Russian cultural tradition is very positive. At its roots zine, and one of the main Belarusian ideologists to lie the colossal, spiritual works of Aleksandr boot); or Igor Akshevskiy’s “political shapeshifters Radishchev, Aleksandr Herzen, Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor slicing into a single, living organism,” “small-town Dostoyevsky, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Kazimir guardsmen who have already tried on the emperor’s Malevich, Andrey Bely, Daniil Kharms, Aleksandr robes in secret,” “well-wishers from abroad” and “the Solzhenitsyn and Andrey Sakharov. This tradition is market maelstrom” just seem like truisms. Here are a characterised by its spiritual searches and insights, few more examples of similar creativity — “The logi- progressive artistic experience, European intellectual cal crash of democratic illusions” (from Vsevolod context, and world-acclaimed cultural achievements. Yanchevskiy, “First Secretary of the Central Commit-

58 tee of the Byelorussian Patriotic Youth Union”); Belarus and Russia appear to be one and the same, “Western thought offers us no alternative, forcing us then this contrast starts to seem more credible. to wear its worn-out raincoat covered in holes” (from Spurious reasons are thrust upon us in order to Vitaliy Smirnov, “Professor and Dean of the Foreign justify the contrast, but the quality of arguments Policy Department of the Belarusian Presidential Man- used in this controversy wouldn ’t stand up to any agement Academy”); “The abyssof the rampant mar- kind positive evaluation. “For example, where does ket and the anarchy of independence” (from the rallying cry of ‘Let’s Join Europe! ’ come from?” “Kandidat of Philosophy” Vasiliy Novikov); “Oedipus, exclaims Boris Lepyoshka, a philosophy teacher Freud,and other complexes” (from another “Kandidat from Berastsye. “It comes from the mythologisation of Philosophy”, Boris Lepyoshka). of history because, after all, “Europe” has crushed Vsevolod Yanchevskiy is right in saying that “ We and burned the Belarusians, baptised them into its have become very nasty and aggressive over the last faiths, quashed any protests, and snatched or fifteen years (since the beginning of perestroika) .” 1 bought up all our best intellectuals.” 4 Belarusian ideologists do not conceal the fact that This same Lepyoshka, conditioned by their job is aimed at “ideological hardening of the neo-Slavophilic dogma, goes yet further in his falsifi - masses.” The aforementioned Velichko writes “We cations of history — “Looking at our historical expe - need general values for development which can then rience, we have often been forced into a become part of a strong internal ideology.” 2 He pro-Western position, but let ’s examine what emphasises not “new,” but “general values,” imply - Westernism has brought the Slavs. Take the 17 th cen - ing traditional Soviet ones which have only been par - tury for example — Princess Sofia and Grand Duke tially reinterpreted and supplemented, then Golitsyn were fascinated by the Catholic Europe of reassembled into one system. Austria and Poland, whereas Peter the Great was With rare exceptions, these linguistic construc - captivated by Protestant Holland. Neither one of tions from Belarusian ideologists tend to be based them ever brought us anything good, however.” 5 not on rational arguments, but on emotional im - Basically, this is the tenacious nationalist in pulses and affective mobilisation of “simple peo - Lepyoshka talking, since he only associates Slavism ple ’s” subconscious fears, using tried-and-tested with the Slavonic nations that did not yield to West - KGB methods. Essentially, these ideologists are ern influence. The next step would be to identify Sla- mere minstrels of Soviet people ’s frustrations, al- vonic traditions with Russian traditions. though their songs are more like collective hysteria The longer the Russification of Belarus goes on, overloaded with nationalistic phraseology. the closer Russia will become for us. This is the gist of the argument proffered by Belaruskaya Dumka 8. writer Larisa Yakovenko — “It is difficult to under - stand people who are fighting for a union with any - Nothing characterises Belarusian ideology better one, whether it be America or Europe. But this is not than its orientation towards the Russian cultural context. the case with Russia, which is close to us in spirit, In Belaruskaya Dumka, one can find countless refer- with blood ties and a common history which one ences to various authoritative Russian figures (Dmitriy cannot dismiss or rewrite.” 6 Mendeleyev, Fyodor Abramov, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Belarusian ideologists would simply be unable to Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin)but next to nothing about survive without Russia. They need it most of all in or - Belarusians. Sometimes, some of our homespun ideo- der to disguise their own futility. Without it, they logical operatives simply identify themselves with Rus- would just be a band of paranoiacs but, with it, they sians, and Belarus with Russia — “For instance, tell me can be a united family capable of intimidating the how I am supposed to call my own brother a foreigner whole world with nuclear weapons again. just because he lives in Nizhnevartovsk and is a citizen Belarus’ true economic interests do not always co- of another country?And what about my eldest son and incide with Russia’s.It is appropriate that this is under- grandson, also Russian citizens who recently settled stood better by people who directly define the down in the beautiful Russian city of Kostroma?”, asks country’s economic policy. Ivan Shakola, president of Igor Akshevskiy.3 a state-owned national food concern, writes that Russia is also a strong argument in the contro - “Russia has also been implementing a package of de- versy with the West (as the Belarusian ideologists fensive measures since 1998. In spite of our common imagine or would like to imagine it). They understand customs zone, it has taken steps to defend its own perfectly well how comical and incomparable it is to market from products manufactured in Belarusian place Belarus and the West into sharp ideological op - sweet factoriesusing imported raw materials.We can position to one another. However, if one makes also expect more of this kind of exclusionist policies in the near future.” 7 Then he adds — “Is it better to

1 Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 7 (2000), p. 13. 4 Ibid., No. 7 (2000), p. 60. 2 Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 6 (2000), p. 5. 5 Ibid. 3 Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 6 (2000), p. 188. 6 Ibid.

59 support our own domestic sugar production, or im- ports from Poland, Russia or Lithuania?.” 8 And yet, a 20-year old Malorussian, One must assume that this Manichean split per - Heeding the wisdom of your testaments, sonality will also be defining the Belarusian leader - Has bound his soul to thee, Belarus, ship ’s policies in future. On the one hand, And fallen in love with thy people and land. 10 Belarusians will feel what they want to feel –political rapprochement with Russia will continue, ending in Belarusian State University lecturer Mecheslav complete unification of the political systems. On the Chasnovskiy specialises in unusually tendentious other hand, all future behaviour will be dictated by coverage of Polish economic reforms. His invective Belarusian economic interests (and the regime ’s is also directed against “Polish reformers” (“Polish own economic interests). reformers have failed to grasp that liberal market economies operate differently in the USA and West - 9. ern European countries” ) and “liberal platforms” in general (“... liberal platforms have not even justified In the minds of Belarusian ideologists, “The themselves economically, despite the fact that those West” stands for the complete opposite of “Russia.” in favour of maintaining the liberal status quo claim “Russia” is familiar, but “The West” is alien. “Russia” them to be a success” ).11 brings good and enlightenment, but “The West” Chasnovskiy claims his point of view is based on brings evil and hopelessness. “Russia” will give the his “concern for simple people.” He writes — “The world afuture, but “The West” is preparing global de- ones who lost the most due to the reforms are peo - struction. Thus, these ideologists ’ inability to see the ple who were guaranteed social security and em - world the way it really is, not just in black-and-white, ployment by the previous system, particularly is reaching its climax. workers and peasants.” 12 But this was not enough for Moreover, these home-grown Velichko and him, and by the end of his article he had expanded Lepyoshka types have very little idea what “The his arguments to state — “During the reforms, work - West” means. To them, the concept usually signifies ers and peasants were the first to lose out. The inter - the active prohibition of the Soviet system of values esting thing is that craftsmen and entrepreneurs also in all areas of society, plus a complete rejection of the felt they had suffered when they started finding it Soviet way of life. Of course, this concept is not taken hard to buy groceries. All these losses negated the geographically, but in a purely ideological sense. great hopes of society. Practically everyone who “The West” is a collective aggressor composed not thought the transition from totalitarianism to democ - of separate countries, but one hostile political bloc. racy was positive ended up losing out.” 13 The fact is that Belarusian ideological workers are So there you have it. People “who thought the also under-informed because “The West” is a unified transition from totalitarianism to democracy was concept to them as well. None of them ever states di - positive” lost out. This loss, Chasnovskiy feels, was rectly that Germany, Holland or Spain are the West. accompanied by a whole nightmare in which “About The USA, however, is an exception to this rule, and is two-thirds of the adult population were forced to try really seen as a separate partner [of the West]. and make ends meet — their consumption of elec- In the eyes of the Belarusian ideologists, the tricity, hot water and heating went down, they had to frontline countries of “The West” are Ukraine and Po- deny themselves any luxuries, repair old things in - land. To them, each of these countries represents a stead of buying new ones (or buy only discount highly undesirable development model in its own way, goods), turn to their relatives for support, spend their and all appropriate means are used to discredit them. savings on food, and refuse hire-purchase or other Therefore, Vladimir Velichko casts doubts on how benefits. They lost their aims and plans in life, and democratic the last Ukrainian elections were, saying began living more modestly from day to day.” 14 “During the recent Ukrainian elections, Leonid Chasnovskiy sees the reduced role of the state in Kuchma’s team successfully applied Yeltsin’s sure-fire the national economy as the reason behind the Pol- “reformist president versus red revenge” scheme”; ish “economic disaster” — “... The Poles... have lost Igor Akshevskiy criticises Ukrainian agricultural pol- their buying power because the state has refused to icy — “Thank God our fields aren’t overgrown with offer them security and guaranteed employment.” weeds like in neighbouring Ukraine, but are bountiful Chasnovskiy ’s reasoning is that — “As a result, mar - and bear rewards for the diligent hands of the peas- ket mechanisms actually made it harder to achieve a ants”; 9 and Bronislav Sprynchan, a poet of Ukrainian high degree of social solidarity and consolidation. If descent, wants to change the country’s name from anything, they probably contributed to increased in - “Ukraine” to “Malorussia” (= “Little Russia”): security and [social] differentiation.” 15

7 Ibid ., No. 7 (2000), p. 26. 12 Ibid., No. 6, p. 105. 8 Ibid., p. 29. 13 Ibid., No. 6, p. 109. 9 Ibid ., No. 6 (2000), p. 8. 14 Ibid., No. 6, p.106. 10 Ibid., p. 188. 15 Ibid., No. 6, pp. 105–108. 11 Ibid ., No. 6 (2000), p. 104.

60 However, Chasnovskiy’s strained falsifications Belarusian Agricultural Academy, attributes the fol - cannot compare to the things Belarusians think and lowing statement to one famous American politician say about the United States of America. Here, “eco- – “Responsible Western politicians are coming to the nomic arguments” fade into the background, and na- conclusion that they must change their countries ’ tionalist rhetoric and psychoses take over. Prof. Yuriy strategies. For example, US vice-president Albert Kharin,PhD,head of the Belarusian State University of Gore admitted that “Consumerist market civilisation Radio and Computer Engineering’s philosophy de- has not only exhausted itself but, what ’s more, it has partment, informs us in alarm that — “Violence has driven American society into a dead end, and is lead - become a model in their daily lives of some school- ing our planet towards its destruction.” 19 Surely this children. In the USA, there have been numerous is a falsification? cases where adolescents have shot their own class- Heightened international isolation always causes mates.” To Prof. Vitaliy Smirnov, head of the increased paranoia inside a country. Undoubtedly, Belarusian Presidential Management Academy’s for- the unofficial leader of “paranoid tendencies” in offi- eign policy department, there is no difference be- cial Belarusian ideology must be Belaruskaya tween fascist Germany and the USA today, which he Dumka’s editor Vladimir Velichko. According to him, considers to be “neo-fascist” — “National ideas are “The West” has launched an “undeclared war” born out of the development of society, become a against Belarus — “An undeclared war which has en- mass phenomenon, and are then put into practice. tered the public consciousness, and is being waged This is how fascism and the fascist ideology appeared on several fronts at once. These include the destruc- in Germany, and how the USA’s current neo-fascism tive economic reforms they are imposing,the flood of and world dictatorship ideology emerged.” 16 sects, youth drug abuse, the prevention of childbirth Vitaliy Smirnov ’s verdict is clear — “... Western under the naïve pretext of ‘family planning’, etc..” 20 thought offers us no alternative, but dictates and im - This statement clearly shows that Belarusian ide- poses its templates and notions of “progressive de- ologists are trying to blame the country’s internal velopment” onto us with no heed for concepts like problems on external influences. The saddest thing is national sovereignty, statehood, love for one’s that this kind of interpretative model still finds its sup- homeland, patriotism, national pride, etc. Behind all this lies the triumph and craftiness of the victors. It is in their interests to give us inferiority and historical guilt complexes, and turn us into the outcasts of modern civilisation.” 17 Vasiliy Novikov, PhD. suspects that “The West” is guilty for the slowing of social progress in post-Soviet republics — “...A small group of Western countries is currently defending its egotistical interests left, right, and centre; creeping in disguised as new concepts, and attempting to force its system of values onto the rest of mankind.” Then he expresses his hope that “... crossing the threshold into the third millennium, mankind will say goodbye forever to the Western Eu- ropean mentality paradigm which has been forming throughout the entire existence of bourgeois Western society. This is essential if true human values are to develop and replace the limited illusionsand interests of class and civilisation.” 18 The Belarusian ideologists ’ claims against “The Happening of journalists, 1996. West” vary greatly. For example, Prof. Valentin Akulov, PhD. is concerned by the “superfluous” porters in Belarusian society. It is most convenient to law-abiding nature of Western citizens — “In the offload one’s entire burden of responsibilities onto past, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cre - someone else. On a personal level, this is nothing ated “new men,” but modern Western democracy more than areturn to infantility,but if it ison anational produces “new citizens” — robot men who live ac- level, this kind of attitude tends to get marred by xe- cording to the program they call their legislative sys- nophobia and nationalism. The quasi-logical syllo- tem.” Without stating his sources, Kandidat of gisms in support of this read approximately as Philosophy Fyodor Prikhodko, head of the political follows: a) the country’s economic, cultural, political science and philosophy department of the and other systems are near-perfect; b) system break-

16 Ibid., No. 7–8. 19 Ibid., No. 6. 17 Ibid., No. 7, p. 8. 20 Ibid., No. 6, p. 10. 18 Ibid., No. 7.

61 downs occur exclusively due to outside forces; c)it is “in Belarus, the combined strength of the anti-presi - therefore only possible to stabilise the system once dential media is much greater than that of the state those forces have been neutralised.Only a fool would media,” and this can be put down to his personal de - be able to find any signs of perfection in the votion to the president. Belarusian state system, however. Like all authoritar- These remarks by Belarusian ideologists are sup- ian regimes based on a pyramidal control system,it is posed to make you think the independent media are in a constant state of crisis, but overcoming this crisis just foreign bodies in our society, inspired artificially would mean destroying the state model. by “The West,” not objective social processes. In so doing, they exaggerate “The West’s” role in all kinds 10. of ways. Not only is it maintaining its presence on the Russo-Belarusian Union State’s information market, Belarusian ideologists also loathe “The West” be - but it is also expanding.“Isn’t this why those Babitsky cause it supports the independent press and opposi - types who criticise the Russian troops in Chechnya tion in a variety of ways. Vladimir Velichko confirms have been multiplying like Colorado beetles re- this, saying — “... Western countries are not mean cently?” , exclaims Vladimir Velichko poetically. One when it comes to the electronic and printed media. can sense his KGB training by the way he speaks In the past, our press was looked after by the CPSU, about the Belarusian opposition — “This method... is but today the “independent” publications are com - being used so blatantly by our noisy opposition. Out pletely dependent on Oligarch Oligarchson, and of their minds with freedom, these people create per- have turned into a collective disinformer, manipula - manent confrontations, duping any journalists with a tor and agent provocateur.” 21 pathological penchant for “hot stories,” inflaming Belarusian political reality is unique because, from anti-Belarusian feelings in the former Soviet Union the ruling regime’s point of view, independent media and abroad, provoking the isolation of their own are equally or perhaps even more of a threat than con- country, and mocking its recent history. Seemingly ventional political opposition. They are the main target harmless political propagandist events are in fact im- for Lukashist propaganda, and every reasonably im- moral, because they ruin friendships with other na- portant Belarusian ideologist feels it their duty to drag tions and spread delirium.” 25 the independent media’s name through the mud. It is revealing that the ideological machine sees For example, the aforementioned Yuriy Kharin the “Belarusian opposition” as a fairly homogenous stresses the spiritual damage caused by the opposi - mass or “dark force” (like “The West”). Belarusian tion media — “The mass media (especially televi - ideologists use the same tools for the “Belarusian op - sion) are cultivating an atmosphere in the society of position” as they do for the “The West.” Valentin the CIS which is giving rise to reduced moral stan - Akulov states — “Who could doubt, for example, that dards, irrational thinking, and the dehumanisation of the people and the people alone have the right to de- culture.” 22 Belarusian State University tutor and cide how to organise their own home, how to live in Kandidat of Philosophy Yegor Konyev is convinced it, who to make friends with, and who they should that the media are also subverting the Belarusian just stay on good terms with. I don’t even think the economy — “As you know, the lack of foreign invest - Shushkevich/Grib/Sharetskiy trio of former parlia - ment in our economy is the most damaging conse - mentary speakers would argue with that. But when it quence of the “information vacuum” which the came down to a referendum on vital issues for the foreign media have created around Belarus.” 23 people, it turned out that the people were “sick” and Vsevolod Yanchevskiy, chairman of the Byelorussian “dumb.” Not people at all, just a “herd of cattle.” 26 Patriotic Youth Union, almost puts the non-state me - It is very difficult to read Belaruskaya Dumka and dia on a par with the political opposition — “... In similar publications without feeling disgusted. The Belarus, the combined strength of the anti-presiden - world has changed, but Belarusian ideologists have tial media is much greater than that of the state me - remained exactly the way they used to be — brutal, dia. The most popular Russian TV channels and incorrigible, bloodthirsty, and low on intellect. Since more than ten Belarusian opposition publications they are more like common ignoramuses than social have been denigrating Belarus and its authorities scientists, they have never managed to surpass their with painful regularity for several years now... The ideological predecessors or those who inspired opposition periodically organises small demonstra - them, e.g. Black Hundred members like Salanevich. tions in Minsk, but they are never broken up unless Moreover, it sometimes seems as if Lukashenka is someone starts throwing sticks and stones at the mi - playing a devilishly subtle game — by giving the ide - litia.” 24 Newly-hatched “House of Representatives” ologists carte blanche for their extremist displays of deputy Yanchevskiy is obviously lying when he says

21 Ibid., No. 6, p. 9. 25 Ibid., No. 6, p. 9. N.B. Andrey Babitsky is a Radio Liberty journalist who was arrested 22 Ibid., No. 8, p.42. by Russians in Chechnya in January 2000 for “participating in an illegal armed forma - 23 Ibid., No. 8, p. 142. tion,” but the real motive was presumably the anti-war tone of his reports on the events. 24 Ibid., No. 7, p. 15. 26 Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 6, p. 123.

62 xenophobia and nationalism, he appears to be a period in its history where it needs a national idea “moderate,” “rational” politician in comparison. just like a lost traveller needs a path. The Belarusian idea is something both the right and the left, believ - 11. ers and atheists could agree on; something that would be supported by Belarusians, Russians, Jews Whatever they might say, the Soviet Union has and Poles alike — citizens of all nationalities living in been gone for a long time, but the independent Re- the republic.” Note that, strictly speaking, this is not public of Belarus is still alive in spite of all its woes. so much “Belarusian” or a “national idea,” but some Belarusian ideologists will still need to re-evaluate third kind of “subnational” concept designed to unite the Soviet legacy one day in order to come up with “the multinational Belarusian people” in social soli - promising methods for developing the country. darity and material prosperity — “... The basis for the It turns out that Vsevolod Yanchevskiy, who has Belarusian idea should be a desire to strengthen hu - yet to turn 25, likes to dwell on the man potential... Our basic values should be a healthy “Brezhnevian-Andropovian Soviet Union” — “Life way of life, decent education, effective health care wasn ’t so bad in the Brezhnevian-Andropovian So- services, and reasonable [personal] requirements.” 32 viet Union, just fairly boring. We discovered later that In order to achieve social, political and national it wasn’t so bad compared to the perestroika and harmony, afew more decisive measures must be ap- post-perestroika periods, but we were already an- plied : banning all political parties, cutting ourselves noyed by the boredom before that.” 27 off from Europe (Larisa Yakovenko writes — “So far, Belarusian ideologists are also faced with the task we are poor relatives, if not simply strangers to “Eu - of showing the current political regime in a positive rope — Our Common Home,” and this will be the light. They are prepared to contrast it with the Soviet case for a long time to come. This is because we regime in order to make it seem a little better — “We were raised in different circumstances and live in dif - should not evaluate our political regime according to ferent conditions, with our Belarusian Slavonic men - whether it is liked or corresponds to someone ’s tality and Russian Orthodox religion” ), and making ideas about democracy, but should concentrate on Russian Orthodoxy the state religion (in Boris its newer components instead, since they are more Lepyoshka ’s view — “... Russian Orthodoxy is the progressive than those of the previous regime.” The choice of many centuries, like the orientation to - author of this remark, Fyodor Prikhodko, adds — wards Eastern values in the civilised sense” ). “... Here, we will never have communism and the Just what kind of future are the Belarusian ideolo - plenty it promised, or capitalism like in the West.” 28 gists preparing? One where Belarus would be Rus- The new “more progressive” system that is being sian-speaking and Russian Orthodox, free from built in Belarus could be described not just as “mar - political parties and independent media; one where ket socialism,” 29 but also as “social-capitalism.” This Belarusian society would not transform into a civil was hinted at by Nikolay Yegorenkov, head of the in- society, but stay just the way it is — as a conglomer - ternational relations department at Gomselmash (the ate of internally- and externally-dependent people. Gomel state agricultural machinery plant) — “So - It depends on us alone as to whether Belarus will cial-capitalism is the same social system that Lenin really develop along these lines or not. described as the “civilised cooperatives” system, that is to say socialism.” 30 Belarusian ideologists obviously fail to compre- hend that they are discrediting the regime when they write that the political order being built in Belarus does not conform to generally-accepted “ideas about democracy” or “foreign stereotypes” of “human rights, democracy and sovereignty.” 31 History has seen a great number of regimes which did not con- Valer Bulhakau form to generally-accepted “ideas about democracy,” , born in 1974. In 1995 graduated from the including German nazism, Italian fascism, and Soviet philology ’ faculty of the Belarusian State University, in 1998 — post-graduated from the faculty of history of communism. Every single one of them rejected “for- Belarusian literature. Candidate for a doctor ’s degree at the eign stereotypes” of “human rights, democracy and Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sci - sovereignty,” but we all know how they ended up. ences in Kiev. Editor-in-chief of the “Arche” magazine, and a Naturally, “social-capitalist” Belarus ought to co-ordinator of an analytical group, created to publish the have its own “national idea.” Fyodor Prikhodko puts book “Belarusian Political Scene After the Presidential Elec - tion ‘2001.” it this way — “... Belarus is currently going through a

27 Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 7, p. 13. 31 Cf. Vitaliy Smirnov — “... We should not fear false accusations of violating human 28 Ibid., No. 6, pp. 38–40. rights, democracy and sovereignty. We should have our own attitudes towards these 29 A famous quote from Lukashenka, circa 1997. concepts, and they should not depend on imposed foreign stereo - types” (Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 7, p. 24). 30 Belaruskaya Dumka , No. 6, p. 44. 32 Ibid., No. 6, pp. 38–40.