Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 613–639 621

Trybuna1 Konstytucyjny Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, 2011. Komunikat Wilczak, D., 2010. ‘PiS to sekta i ruch wywrotowy’. Norman Davies dla prasowy po og1oszeniu wyroku dotycza˛cego Kodeksu wyborczego. Newsweeka. Newsweek Polska. http://www.newsweek.pl/drukuj/ http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/Rozprawy/2011/k_09_11.htm (accessed 62831 (accessed 2.12.11.). 11.12.11.).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.05.006

The 2011 general elections in Peruq

Noam Lupu*

Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Castelló 77, 28006 Madrid, Spain article info

Article history: Received 15 September 2011 Accepted 14 March 2012

1. Background 2. Candidates and parties

Peruvians went to the polls on 10 April 2011 to select The combination of García’s unpopularity and internal a new president and a new slate of legislators.1 Peru’s party disputes meant that his own party, the American president serves a five-year term and is prohibited from Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolu- consecutive re-election, so the incumbent Alan García was cionaria Americana, APRA),3 failed to offer a successor ineligible to compete. In case no candidate garnered candidate. Mercedes Aráoz Fernández, García’s Minister of a plurality of the votes in the first round of balloting, Economy and Finance, was nominated by the party in a runoff was scheduled for 5 June. November, but she withdrew her candidacy less than two Peru’s 130-member unicameral Congress is renewed in months later. More generally, the Peruvian party system its entirety every five years, concurrent with the first has long been unstable – Mainwaring and Scully (1995) round of the presidential contest. Members are elected classified it as “inchoate”–with new parties emerging from each of the country’s 25 departments,2 with seats regularly as electoral vehicles for individual politicians. So allocated by population and ranging from one seat in it is no surprise that five candidates, with the backing of Madre de Dios (pop. 92,000) to 36 in Lima (pop. 7.6 m). a variety of parties and cross-party alliances, were The congressional seats are assigned to parties by competitive in this contest. Altogether, ten candidates proportional representation using the D’Hondt formula competed for the presidency and 13 parties presented and a 5% threshold. An alternative to the 5% nationwide congressional lists.4 threshold is that a party must win 5% of the congressional Three candidates competed for the mantle of continuity delegation of at least two departments. Voters can use with the major policies of the García administration. The preferential votes to determine the order of candidates most prominent of these was Alejandro Toledo, who within each party list. preceded García in the presidency and whose moderate economic policies García had largely left in place. Backed by his Possible Peru (Perú Posible) party, Toledo staked out a centrist position. Despite his lead in the early days of the q Editor’s Note: Due to an administrative error, two notes were campaign, he was heavily criticized for his allegedly lavish commissioned on the recent Peruvian elections. In order to be fair to both lifestyle and accused of abusing alcohol and cocaine. Still, authors and to recognize the time they spent on this work, we publish as the first person of indigenous descent to be elected both in this issue. Apologies to Professors Lupu and Schmidt for the duplication. Hopefully, readers can benefit from having alternative perspectives on this eventful contest. * Tel.: þ34 91 435 4240x201; fax: þ34 91 431 5135. E-mail address: [email protected]. 3 APRA considers itself a regional movement, so its official party name 1 Also elected were Peru’s five delegates to the Andean Parliament. is the Peruvian Aprist Party (Partido Aprista Peruano). 2 Peru is split into 24 departments, but for electoral purposes the 4 An eleventh minor candidate withdrew just weeks before the elec- Province of Callao also has department status. tion, but remained on the ballot. 622 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 613–639 president in Peru, he continued to appeal to some rural Surrounded by her father’s advisors, she was widely poor voters. expected to follow his mix of pro-business policies, broad Leaning in a more centre-right direction was Pedro- social programmes, and hardline anti-crime strategies. And Pablo Kuczynski, a former official of the International she seemed to attract many of his supporters, including Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as Toledo’s business and media elites as well as the rural poor. Reports Minister of Economy and Finance and then Prime Minister.5 even emerged during the campaign that the Peruvian Kuczynski and his newly-minted Alliance for Great Change intelligence services were supporting Fujimori’s (Alianza por el Gran Cambio) emphasized maintaining campaign.8 macroeconomic policies but promised to fight corruption, to legalize the country’s large informal sector, and to 3. Issues double spending on education. The Alliance brought together four centrist and centre-right parties, including Under both the Toledo and García administrations, the the Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano)of Peruvian economy had improved steadily. Between 2001 Lourdes Flores, a prominent presidential contender in and 2011, GDP grew on average 5% annually, despite the 2006. Kuczynski appealed mostly to urban middle-class global recession. Poverty rates fell considerably and voters, seen by poor Peruvians as a political insider and employment increased particularly in the exporting a rich gringo (he holds an American passport). regions along the Pacific coast. These improvements were The third centrist candidate was Luis Castañeda, due in part to the boom in prices for Peru’s abundant a popular former mayor of Lima initially considered the mineral commodities: gold, silver, and copper. But they campaign favourite, backed by the National Solidarity were also the result of government policies that maintained Alliance (Alianza Solidaridad Nacional). The Alliance price stability and attracted investment and trade. included his own National Solidarity party as well as the Still, the distribution of these economic gains was far centrist remainders of the parties that had backed the from equal. Access to basic public services was uneven and leftist Ollanta Humala in 2006 and former president unemployment rates remained persistently high in the Alberto Fujimori in 1990. Castañeda’s platform differed southern and central highlands. Many poor voters were little from those of Toledo and Kuczynski, and his lack of therefore unsatisfied with the status quo and looking for an charisma and lacklustre campaign limited his appeal to alternative, more redistributive economic model. While the Lima and its environs. three moderate candidates – Toledo, Kuczynski, and Cas- The anti-incumbent candidates were those seen to tañeda – promised some expanded social policies, Humala be ideologically more radical. On the left was Humala, and Fujimori clearly represented more dramatic deviations a former army officer who had lost the 2006 runoff election from existing policies. to García by a razor-thin margin. Humala, now backed by A related concern was the prevalence of social conflict. his Peru Wins (Gana Perú) party, moderated many of his Conflicts had been arising frequently in the poorer high- 2006 stances, comparing himself with Brazil’s moderate lands, where mining companies and police clashed with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva instead of Venezuela’s fiery Hugo local, often indigenous, communities over environmental Chávez (Schmidt, 2007). He even replaced the red shirts he and economic issues. During García’s administration, had worn in the earlier campaign with a suit and tie. But these conflicts reportedly led to over 190 deaths. Humala while he diligently vowed to continue existing macroeco- proposed to fight these conflicts by involving local nomic policies, he stressed the need for broader social communities and labour unions in decision-making over policies in his “letter to the Peruvian people.”6 He promised resource extraction. The three centrist candidates, mean- to raise the minimum wage, impose a windfall tax on while, offered shades of continuity with García’s strategy mining companies, and provide pensions for the elderly. of sending police and the military to break up conflicts. On the opposite end of the spectrum was Keiko Fuji- The most hardline position came from Fujimori, who mori, a member of Congress and the daughter of impris- recalled her father’s success in forcefully quelling rural oned former president Alberto Fujimori,7 backed by her insurgencies. party, Force 2011 (Fuerza 2011). Her campaign repeatedly referenced the more popular aspects of her father’s tenure, 4. Results including his successful fight against insurgent groups and his massive redistributive programmes. Naturally, she Turnout for the April election was about the same as in made little reference to his authoritarian impulses and his the 2001 and 2006 electoral cycles, at 83.7%. With five administration’s rampant corruption, though she previ- competitive candidates, there was little doubt that the ously suggested that she would consider pardoning his presidential contest would require a runoff. As the first conviction for corruption and human-rights abuses. round approached, polls showed Kuczynski, Humala, and Fujimori ahead of the rest. In the event, Humala and Fujimori took the top shares of the vote and prepared to 5 The Prime Minister in Peru is the head of the cabinet, appointed by compete in the runoff (Table 1). The three main centrist the president and approved by Congress. candidates combined garnered nearly 44% of the vote, 6 The letter was apparently based on a similar move by Lula in his first primarily from voters in and around the capital city. But successful presidential campaign in 2002. Indeed, Humala hired some of Lula’s campaign advisors. 7 Keiko Fujimori had served as the country’s First Lady after her parents divorced in 1994. 8 Diario 16, 23 May 2011. Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 613–639 623

Table 1 Results of presidential elections in Peru, April and June 2011.

Candidate Party First round Second round

Votes Votes (%) Votes Votes (%) Ollanta Humala Peru Wins 4,643,064 31.7 7,937,704 51.4 Keiko Fujimori Force 2011 3,449,562 23.6 7,490,647 48.6 Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski Alliance for Great Change 2,711,332 18.5 Alejandro Toledo Possible Peru 2,289,540 15.6 Luis Castañeda National Solidarity Alliance 1,440,242 9.8 Other candidates with less than 1% 104,065 0.7 Total 14,637,805 100.0 15,428,351 100.0

Blank votes (% of total votes) 1,477,696 (8.8) 116,335 (0.7) Null votes (% of total votes) 584,233 (3.5) 921,711 (5.5) Total votes (turnout) 16,699,734 (83.7) 16,466,397 (82.5) Registered electorate 19,949,915

Source: National Office of Electoral Processes (http://www.elecciones2011.onpe.gob.pe/). having split the centrist vote, all three failed to qualify for parties and alliances competing for congressional seats were the runoff. The second round of the presidential contest largely electoral vehicles for the presidential contenders. As was thus to be fought between the relative extremes of a result, Humala’s Peru Wins took the largest proportion of the ideological spectrum, Humala and Fujimori. Mario votes, followed closely by Fujimori’s Force 2011 (Table 2). Vargas Llosa, the Nobel laureate and former presidential Toledo’s Possible Peru and Kuczynski’s Alliance for Great candidate, called it a choice between “AIDS and terminal Change attracted roughly equal vote shares, a few cancer.”9 percentage points ahead of Castañeda’s National Solidarity Both candidates turned to courting moderate voters. Alliance. Because of malapportionment in the allocation of Humala continued to moderate both his proposals and his seats to each department, these vote shares do not translate rhetoric during the runoff campaign. He backed away from perfectly to seat allocations. Indeed, the parties with great- earlier promises to block exports of natural gas, instead est support in overrepresented rural regions – Fujimori’s assuring voters that he would respect existing contracts. He Force 2011, Toledo’s Possible Peru, and particularly Humala’s also took on some of Toledo’s economic advisors and cour- Peru Wins – garnered a greater share of seats than their ted the former president’s tacit endorsement. Fujimori also share of the vote. made some attempts to moderate her position, admitting Relative to the previous Congress, the biggest gains “mistakes” made by her father and promising to respect his were made by Force 2011 and Possible Peru, owing no conviction. Yet this concession, on the heels of an unfav- doubt to the increased prominence of their presidential ourable poll, was at best half-hearted since she also referred candidates. In 2006, Toledo was barred from re-election to her father as “Peru’s best president”. Thus, despite the and Fujimori did not run.10 Humala’s Peru Wins, which legitimating endorsements of Kuczynski and Castañeda had benefited from his earlier presidential bid, made only (and tacit support from outgoing president García), Fujimori modest gains in Congress. All these gains came primarily at was inexorably linked to her father’s legacy. Indeed, at her the expense of García’s APRA; with no presidential candi- victory rally following the first round of voting, supporters date to headline it, APRA lost almost all of its congressional chanted her father’s popular nickname, “Chino.” Memories seats. The fact that APRA – once considered Peru’s only of the rampant corruption of the latter’s tenure led several institutionalized party – was unable to retain its seats prominent conservatives – Vargas Llosa among them – to without a presidential candidate suggests that its apparent back Humala. Throughout the runoff campaign, Humala comeback in 2006 was more the result of García’s electoral emphasized Fujimori’s links to her authoritarian father success than voters’ support for the party itself. while she in turn highlighted his radical past. On the eve of the runoff election, election polls showed 5. Implications Humala and Fujimori in a statistical tie. With turnout almost identical to the first round, Humala won the close Peru’s stock exchange plummeted 12.5% in the days election by a margin of less than three percentage points following Humala’s second-round victory, and the presi- (Table 1). The number of blank and null votes declined dent-elect’s honeymoon of popularity dissipated in dramatically from the first round, suggesting that voters a matter of weeks. But he moved quickly to reassure either felt more compelled or found it easier to choose markets by naming moderates – some from the outgoing a candidate in the runoff. García administration – to key economic posts. He also The legislative election results largely mirrored the first- went on a foreign tour that pointedly omitted Venezuela. round presidential voting. This is unsurprising given that the Striking a conciliatory tone, he told reporters he would

9 The 2006 runoff between Humala and García, whose 1985–90 10 Alberto Fujimori had tried to contest the 2006 presidential race from administration ended in economic disaster, was similarly presented by exile in Tokyo but was eventually disqualified by the electoral authorities the Peruvian press as a search for the lesser of two evils. (Schmidt, 2007). 624 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 613–639

Table 2 Results of legislative elections in Peru, April 2011.

Party Votes Votes (%) Seats Seats (%) Change Peru Wins 3,245,003 25.3 47 36.2 þ2 Force 2011 2,948,781 23.0 37 28.5 þ24 Peru Posible 1,904,180 14.8 21 16.2 þ14 Alliance for Great Change 1,851,080 14.4 12 9.2 2 National Solidarity Alliance 1,311,766 10.2 9 6.9 þ4 American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) 825,030 6.4 4 3.1 32 Radical Change 347,475 2.7 0 – þ0 Fonavists of Peru 170,052 1.3 0 – þ0 Other parties with less than 1% 405,829 3.2 0 – þ0 Totals 12,839,144 100.0 130 100.0

Blank votes (% of total votes) 1,737,059 (10.4) Null votes (% of total votes) 2,125,133 (12.7) Total votes (turnout) 16,701,336 (83.7) Registered electorate 19,949,915

Source: National Office of Electoral Processes (http://www.elecciones2011.onpe.gob.pe/).

consider pardoning Alberto Fujimori on humanitarian balance the need to convince markets (and Possible Peru) grounds if the former president’s health deteriorated. of his commitment to moderate economic policies with the Humala’s rapprochement with Toledo and Possible Peru, need to reassure his supporters and his party that he will both during and after the runoff campaign, is clearly not renege on promises to redistribute the fruits of Peru’s a pragmatic attempt to build a legislative majority bloc. economic growth and resource wealth. Maintaining such a coalition will require a delicate balancing act. Members of Humala’s own Peru Wins References have already criticized the new president’s economic appointments, an ominous sign that they have no intention Mainwaring, S., Scully, T.R., 1995. Introduction: Party Systems in Latin of following the president to the ideological centre. Toledo America. In: Mainwaring, S., Scully, T.R. (Eds.), Building Democratic and Possible Peru are reluctant to formalize an alliance, Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp. 1–34. concerned not to hamper their own electoral chances Schmidt, G.D., 2007. Back to the future? The 2006 Peruvian general in five years’ time. To be effective, Humala will need to election. Electoral Studies 26 (4), 813–819.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.03.004

AIDS or cancer?: The 2011 Peruvian elections

Gregory D. Schmidt*

Department of Political Science, The University of Texas at El Paso, 500 West University Avenue, El Paso, TX 79968 0547, USA article info

Article history: Received 5 March 2012 Accepted 14 March 2012

1. Background Alberto Fujimori, to be their president in 1990. Fujimori had considerable success in tackling Peru’s formidable problems After a decade of economic decline and increasing but he systematically undermined the country’s democratic political violence, Peruvians elected a political outsider, institutions and was openly contemptuous of political parties, relying instead on a series of electoral vehicles that he and his advisors tightly controlled. The main challenge to * Tel.: þ1 915 747 7973; fax: þ19157476616. him came from various independent movements built E-mail address: [email protected].