Introduction
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Notes Introduction 1 At the rate of publication of secondary literature on Wittgenstein no bibliography can be up to-date. Still relevant, however, are Lapointe, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Comprehensive Bib liography, 1980; V.A. Shanker and S.G. Shanker, A Wittgenstein Bibliography, 1986; Gabel, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Comprehensive Bibliography of International Theses and Dissertations, 1988; Frongia and McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide, 1990; Philipp, Bibliographie zur Wittgenstein-Literatur, 1996. 2 Such quantitative research must, of course, be well defined in the terminology of research methods. For example, the adage "on Wittgenstein" should be clarified. Does any text that mentions Wittgenstein merit inclusion in the research? Or does Wittgenstein have to be the obvious object and focus of the text? And what about chapters in books, footnotes that re fer to Wittgenstein, or use of Wittgensteinian catchwords ("language-games," "form of life," "language as use")? These difficulties must be addressed before one can begin to sum up the on-Wittgenstein oeuvre. 3 The two outstanding anthologies are Shanker, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1-5, and Canfield, The Philosophy ofWittgenstein, Vol. 1-15. 4 E.g., Copi and Beard, eds., Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus; Arrington and Glock, eds., Wittgenstein and Quine; Pitcher, ed., Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Essays. 5 E.g., Block, ed., Perspectives on the Philosophy ofWittgenstein; Griffiths, ed., Wittgenstein: Centenary Essays; Vesey, ed., Understanding Wittgenstein; Winch, ed., Studies in the Phi losophy ofWittgenstein. 6 I will have more to say on the question of interpretation in general and "legitimate interpre tation" in particular in Part I. 7 The term "story," with the concomitant threesome (plot, hero, time), is taken from the study of narrative. See especially Paul Ricouer's analysis of narrative, as propounded in Time and Narrative. 199 200 NOTES 8 Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy, p. ix, x. 9 The doing of interpretation does, sometimes, rare times, involve a certain recounting of past doings, but this is rarely a story of interpretation; at most it may be a chapter in the story. Such are, e.g., Williamson, "Recent Canadian Work on Wittgenstein: 1980-1989," and Stem, "Review Essay: Recent Work on Wittgenstein, 1980-1990," which are this side of storytelling, as opposed to purely bibliographical listings and reportage. 10 See, especially Canfield, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Vol. 9, The Private Language Argument. 11 A very partial story does subsist in Stem's "Review Essay: Recent Work on Wittgenstein, 1980-1990," in Section 2: Recent Work on Rule-Following. 12 And I do not here engage in the explicit historical game of finding the real origin, Le., of looking into the question of whether Wittgenstein was the first, really the first, to use the word, or phrase, or expression. When I say "Wittgensteinian in origin" I speak of a con sensual recognition of the Wittgensteinian use as being at a crucial, first junction. 13 In Part I, I will address the issues of interpretation: what is interpretation as differentiated from analysis and application, what are the limits of interpretation, what is legitimate in terpretation, and what is, most emphatically, overinterpretation. 14 Nevertheless, two philosophers that compete with Wittgenstein in their "vulnerability" to extremes of inconsistent interpretations are Rousseau and Nietzsche. 15 Mundle puts it sharply, when referring to only one instance of such inconsistency, Pitcher's anthology (Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations): " If, in some future age, a phi losopher should come across Pitcher's anthology but not Wittgenstein's book, he would .. .infer that if the authors of these essays are discussing a single book called 'The Philosophical Investigations', they must be referring to different editions involving radical revisions." A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy, p. 4. 16 Von Wright, "A Biographical Sketch," in Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p. 20. 17 Letter from Alfred Kazin to his son Michael Kazin, in 1984, quoted in Dissent magazine, Fa111998. 18 I do not intend to go into the nuances and intricacies of hyper-exact labels of the philoso phical and cultural milieus we inhabit - especially in academia. That there are now philosophical schools espousing post-postmodemism, or that postmodernism is now con sidered passe by some pedants, is not relevant to my intentionally broad labeling. Chapter 1 1 I say "a" story rather than "the" story for the very express reason that this is not the only possible story. Indeed, we should welcome the telling of several such stories, each high lighting a different plot and thereby illuminating a different meaning to Wittgenstein interpretation. I only hope that it is, in its way, a unique story. 2 The list of books addressing the construct of interpretation (rather than engaging in the activ ity of interpretation) in the past two decades runs to the hundreds. This may be seen as a modem, or even postmodem, reincarnation of the classical interest in hermeneutics leaning on the theoretical rebirth of the subject in the nineteenth century with Schleiermacher. Suf fice it, for us, to adopt the phrase "the interpretive tum" in order to characterize the present focus on ways of reading. See Hiley, Bohman, Shusterman, eds., The Interpretive Tum: Philosophy, Science, Culture. 3 Hintikka, "An Impatient Man and His Papers". NOTES 201 4 See, e.g., Nyiri, "Ludwig Wittgenstein as a Conservative Philosopher"; Schulte, "Wittgen stein and Conservatism". 5 Beyond psychology and philosophy there is, of course, the classical (and post-classical) debate concerning the issue of authorial intent, and authorial authority, in literary studies, which is both too deep and too wide to merely touch upon here, while we still adopt a clear stand: "But the text is there, and the empirical author has to remain silent" (Eco, "Between Author and Text"). 6 These conundrums, concerning the relations between personal circumstances, affinities, and traits and a philosopher's philosophy, are recently, and admirably, addressed in Klagge, ed., Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. Asking these questions explicitly are think ers such as Monk ("Philosophical Biography: The Very Idea"), who sees biography as a genre specifically suited to achieving Wittgensteinian understanding, and Conant ("Phi losophy and Biography"), who, while showing that philosophical biography (as "a mode of representation of the life of an individual philosopher that aspires to facilitate the under standing of that individual qua philosopher") is possible, ends his article with the irony that "[t]here are however, may worthwhile ways to spend your time other than reading phi losophical biography" (p. 42). Other articles in that volume may provide a refutation of, or, at the least, raise misgivings about our ability to delimit "philosophical" interpretation. 7 This is somewhat reminiscent of the Hegelian threesome, art, religion and philosophy as being different paths to the same goal of understanding, taken to a multiplicity more in keeping with the signs of current times. 8 For a different perspective on the relevance of Wittgenstein' s own comments on reading for reading Wittgenstein, see Nordmann, "The Sleepy Philosopher: How to Read Wittgen stein's Diaries". Nordmann points out that Wittgenstein could have been taken to lead us to his diaries (and notebooks, and correspondence) as evidence for understanding his phi losophy; on the other hand, he should be taken seriously as telling us that his philosophical remarks are clear as they stand, with no demands for interpretively unearthing philosophi cal doctrines. 9 Eco, The Role of the Reader. 10 Rorty, "The Pragmatist's Progress". 11 Light can also be thrown on the connection between use and interpretation by mention of Wittgenstein's "influence" on a philosopher's thought. This aspect of Wittgenstein's re ception in the philosophical community was canvassed in a special issue of Philosophical Investigations (vol. 24/2, 2001), on occasion of Wittgenstein's 50th Iahrzeit. Several Witt gensteinian scholars (interpreters and users), including Cavell, Conant, Diamond, Dilman, Hacker, McGuinness, Palmer, Phillips, Rhees, Schulte, von Savigny, von Wright, and Winch, related their views of Wittgenstein' s influence on their work. 12 One outstanding hero in the interpretive-users crowd is Cavell. His interpretation of the later Wittgenstein will emerge as a definitive station in the story I tell about re-interpreting the Investigations, yet he takes his own interpretation so seriously as to implement it in his own style of doing philosophy. 13 Eco, "Overinterpreting Texts," p. 48. 14 In fact, the only place I can be blamed for a tum to that kind of overinterpretation is in my own project: I am, in a certain sense, interpreting the myriad of interpretations. But, in an other sense, I have denied the label of interpretation and so can barely be thought of as overinterpreting. 202 NOTES 15 How novel this family is, whether at the end of the mainline standard families or providing a contrast to any standard, is one of the questions that will occupy us in the sequel. But see Crary's introduction to The New Wittgenstein, eds., Crary and Read. 16 "Standard" and "mainline" will be interchangeable throughout. 17 See especially Moyal-Sharrock, "The Third Wittgenstein,