Racism and Conceptual Analysis: a Defense of the Wittgensteinian Approach Alberto G
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Purdue University Purdue e-Pubs Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 8-2016 Racism and conceptual analysis: A defense of the Wittgensteinian approach Alberto G. Urquidez Purdue University Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Urquidez, Alberto G., "Racism and conceptual analysis: A defense of the Wittgensteinian approach" (2016). Open Access Dissertations. 871. https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/871 This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact [email protected] for additional information. RACISM AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: A DEFENSE OF THE WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University by Alberto G. Urquidez In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2016 Purdue University West Lafayette, Indiana ii Para mi mamá, Elena Urquídez, y la memoria de mi papá, Elías Urquídez, con amor iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project could not have been completed without the support of many. First and foremost, I thank my family. –– Before I was capable of comprehending the cold and hard prospects of someone from my background achieving a higher education, I already knew that I must go to college. My parents, Elena and Elias Urquidez, are wholly responsible for this feat. They are also responsible for much more than I could ever hope to repay. Their constant sacrifice (income, time, mind, and body) continues to be a constant source of sustenance for my siblings and I; for this I am forever grateful. I began my college career in 2001, the same year of my father’s death. Thereafter, it was my mother’s love, support and encouragement that sustained me. Mamá, te amo mucho y te agradesco por todo tu sacrificio! My gratitude and love extends to my siblings, Joel, Gabriel and Samuel Urquidez. You have supported me, each in your own way, and I thank you for that— also, I am very thankful for my nephews, whom I miss very much! I am fortunate to have had the long-term and long-distance support of my extended family in the U.S. and in México (these divides have always been too wide!). Because of you, I have come to understand the value of that simple reminder, ‘I’m very proud of you!’ and ‘Todos en la familia estamos muy orgulloso de ti!’ There are too many aunts, uncles, cousins, and family iv to thank, so I will only mention mis tios/tias Martha, Milu, Licha, Lola, Lizzy, and Angel, and my cousins/primos, Ricky, Stevie, Lupe, Olga, Junior, Gin, and Pati. To my entire family I want to say: I love you all, y saludos a todos! My wife, Marielynn Herrera-Urquidez, has endured much and has sacrificed even more. You have been involved in every aspect of this project from day one, and you have been involved in so much more. You deserve more than this brief mention for your undeserved patience, extended love, and sincere belief in me and my work. We have suffered and grown together, and we will continue to do so as this journey continues. I love you so much! It is my pleasure and honor to thank the faculty that have taught me so much at the various academic institutions I have attended. This is especially true of Dorothy Stark, who single-handedly sparked by enduring love for philosophy. Other notable faculty include Dr. Scott Bartchy, Dr. Calvin Normore, Dr. James Rocha, Dr. Patrick Horn, Dr. Masahiro Yamada, and Dr. Daniel Smith, for their mentorship, friendship and support. Finally, I am grateful to my dissertation committee, Dr. Christopher Yeomans, Dr. Rod Bertolet, and Dr. Jacoby Carter—thank you for taking an interest in my work! A special thanks is due to my dissertation advisor, mentor, and friend, Dr. Leonard Harris, for both his patience with me and continual support. He believed in my ideas and nurtured them from their inception. I have learned and profited much from the friendship and philosophical acumen of my Purdue University cohort and colleagues. Here I only mention a select few: Rockwell (Rocky) Clancy, Justin Litaker, Jacob Kuhn, and Christopher Penfield. I v would also like to thank the great friends I have had throughout the years, of which I can only mention a few: Loreley, Sarah, Morgan, Shawn, Jaime, Everardo, Gina, Juana, Bernard, Charlie, Nancy, Orlando, Tony, and Mario. Substantial portions of this dissertation were written during my 2014-2015 tenure at Phillips Exeter Academy. I am appreciative of the support of everyone there, I miss you guys! I am especially grateful for Rosanna Salcedo’s mentorship and friendship—a person who, from day one, went well beyond her duties as dissertation coordinator. This project, I hope, stands as a testament to the value of those individuals and organizations that vested time, energy and funding in my intellectual development. This includes travel grants from the Purdue Philosophy Department, the William L. McBride Graduate Student International Travel Grant, and from the Summer Institute in American Philosophy (SIAP). Very dear to my heart are those organizations that furnished me with the tools to succeed in graduate school, tools I would have otherwise lacked. Noteworthy are the Academic Advancement Program at UCLA, the McNair Scholars Program at Claremont Graduate University, the Ford Foundation for honoring me with a Predoctoral Fellowship from 2008-2011, and, once again, Phillips Exeter Academy for awarding me a dissertation fellowship. vi PREFACE My dissertation develops a philosophical defense of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s purely descriptive (or clarificatory) approach to conceptual analysis within the context of the philosophy of race. Wittgenstein is famous for saying that philosophy leaves everything where it is. By this he means that philosophy describes ordinary usage and does not explain, justify or criticize it, since neither its goal nor its result is a kind of hypothesis or theory. He argues that perspicuous clarification of ordinary usage results in the dissolution of philosophical confusion.1 The language to be analyzed in this dissertation is philosophical discourse in conjunction with ordinary usage of ‘racism’ and its cognates (e.g., ‘racist,’ ‘racial disregard,’ ‘racial disrespect,’ and so on). My defense of Wittgenstein can be helpfully framed as a reply to a common and plausible concern of normative philosophers: “Why should we (normative philosophers) take Wittgenstein’s philosophy seriously when our interests are fundamentally at odds with his? He settles for mere description, we do not. He seeks 1 The terms theory and analysis mark a significant conceptual distinction; however, the terms we use to mark it are not as important as the distinction itself. It might be argued, for example, that pure description/clarification is a kind of theory. In that case, I would allow the objector to retain her use of these words. To this I would reply that we must then differentiate two distinct kinds of theory, namely, theory that aims at, and results in, the definition of a concept-term and theory that aims at, and results in, the clarification of existing definitions. vii clarity for its own sake whereas we think clarity should subserve other ends; further, we believe that it is sometimes important to reform and revise ordinary language for the sake of achieving other, more important, ends. Therefore, a purely descriptive approach to normative concepts is either of little or no value to us.” The objection can also be motivated by observing that an important disanalogy differentiates normative philosophy (moral, social and political philosophy) from philosophy of science and metaphysics. Many if not most philosophers who analyze concepts such as language, understanding, knowledge, pain, necessity, etc., are interested in understanding them as such. For they want to know what ‘pain’ signifies, not some novel reconstruction of what it could (or should) signify. Thus, it is easy to appreciate the value of pure description in these fields. The same, however, is not true of normative concepts such as racism, sexism, pornography, justice, and so on. Normative philosophers are often motivated by practical concerns which they think it important to resolve, and resolution often requires revising the target concept. However, if philosophical analysis should aim at revising ordinary usage, then a philosophical approach that aims at leaving ordinary usage where it is seems to both miss the point and get us nowhere. A partial reply to this line of objection is that the Wittgensteinian philosopher need not object to revisionist and prescriptive theories; certainly, I have no objection to revisionist definitions of ‘racism.’ If normative analyses of ‘racism’ are possible and valuable, it does not follow that clarificatory analyses of ‘racism’ have no value for normative philosophy. The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate this value; to viii show that the philosophy of racism can greatly benefit from Wittgenstein’s purely descriptive method, which aims at conceptual clarity for its own sake. To this it might be objected that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is incompatible with normative approaches that ‘do not leave everything as it is.’ The objector, however, conflates incompatibility with distinctiveness. ‘Philosophy leaves everything as it is’ is not a philosophical thesis, a claim about what philosophy must be. To dispel with this notion, I argue (in the introduction and chapter 1) that his definition provides a rule for the use of ‘philosophy.’ As such, it is one among many norms for doing philosophy. Consider the rule, ‘The king moves one square at a time.’ If someone were to introduce the rule ‘The king moves exactly as the queen does,’ the latter would not contradict the former since it would not undermine the game of chess.