Public Participation in the Development of the Zenit Arena

State, space and society: Public participation in the development of the Zenit Arena

Luuk Peters s1793802 Master’s thesis Russian and Eurasian Studies Leiden University Faculty of Humanities Supervisor: Dr. M. Bader Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg i

State, space and society: Public participation in the development of the Zenit Arena

By Luuk Peters Leiden University MA Russian and Eurasian Studies s1793802 Supervisor: Dr. M. Bader Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg

Cover picture: own work Logo Leiden University: Leiden University Logo Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg: ii Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the result of an intensive research, conducted in the Netherlands, Moscow and Saint Petersburg. During the last six months, I have come to learn a lot about spatial planning, governance and societal developments in Russia. In particular, I learned a lot about doing research and how to cope with difficulties, setbacks and disappointments that inevitably pop up while researching a delicate topic such as the Zenit Arena.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to those who contributed in any way to my research and without whom I would not have been able to conclude it. First and foremost, I would like to thank my respondents for providing me with priceless and revealing insights in the nature of local spatial planning processes in Saint Petersburg, as well as elsewhere in Russia. Thanks to their contributions, I feel that I have obtained a solid grasp on the practice of governance networks in Russia and the role of society in them. I am also thankful to the Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg for providing me with assistance, advice and a scholarship without which I would not have been able to conduct my research in Russia. Furthermore, I would like to express my appreciation for the supervision of Dr. Max Bader.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friends in Moscow and Saint Petersburg for helping me out whenever I stumbled across a difficulty during my research and also for giving me the exact appropriate amount of distraction.

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Contents

Acknowledgements ...... iii Introduction ...... 1 1. Academic overview ...... 3 1.1 Planning theory: Planning as a collaborative process ...... 3 1.1.1 Emergence of collaborative planning ...... 3 1.1.2 Motives for collaborative planning ...... 4 1.1.3 Critics ...... 4 1.2 Civil society in Russia ...... 5 1.2.1 The Soviet legacy ...... 5 1.2.2 The turbulent 1990s ...... 6 1.2.3 Civil society in contemporary Russia ...... 6 1.3 Decision-making culture ...... 8 1.3.1 Institutionalization of public participation ...... 8 1.3.2 Limitations ...... 8 1.4 Russian spatial planning ...... 9 1.4.1 Soviet planning ...... 9 1.4.2 1990s: Starting from scratch ...... 9 1.4.3 Spatial planning in contemporary Russia ...... 10 1.5 The urban context of Saint Petersburg ...... 12 1.5.1 Civil society ...... 12 1.5.2 Spatial developments ...... 12 1.5.3 Instrumental case: The Gazprom Center ...... 13 1.6 Conclusion ...... 14 2. Methodology ...... 15 2.1 Document analysis...... 15 2.2 Semi-structured expert interviews ...... 17 2.3 Street interviews ...... 18 3. Zenit Arena: Chronology of concern ...... 19 3.1 Timeline ...... 19 3.2 Concerns during planning ...... 19 3.2.1 Necessity ...... 19 3.2.2 Kirov Stadium ...... 20 3.2.3 Primorsky Park Pobedy ...... 20

3.2.4 Livability on Krestovsky Island ...... 21 3.2.5 Fans ...... 22 3.3 Concerns during construction ...... 22 3.3.1 Price increase ...... 22 3.3.2 Reduced quality of the stadium ...... 25 3.3.3 Delay ...... 25 3.3.4 Social budget ...... 26 3.3.5 Rumors about working conditions ...... 26 3.4 Conclusion ...... 26 4. Legislative framework ...... 27 4.1 The legal grounds of public participation in spatial planning ...... 27 4.2 The legal grounds of public participation during the construction ...... 29 4.3 FIFA World Cup 2018 and Confederations Cup 2017 ...... 30 4.4 Implications for the development of the Zenit Arena ...... 31 4.5 Conclusion...... 33 5. Attitude of the authorities...... 34 5.1 Public hearings and discussions in the case of the Zenit Arena ...... 34 5.1.1 Public hearings on zoning issues ...... 34 5.1.2 Public discussions on public procurements ...... 35 5.2 Manipulation of public hearings and discussions ...... 35 5.2.1 Communication ...... 35 5.2.2 Date and time ...... 36 5.2.3 Venue ...... 37 5.2.4 Buying support ...... 37 5.2.5 Subjective mediation ...... 38 5.2.6 Ignoring comments...... 38 5.3 Authorities’ attitude towards engaging society ...... 39 5.3.1 Expert-elitist approach ...... 39 5.3.2 Significance ...... 40 5.4 Conclusion ...... 40 6. Attitude of society ...... 41 6.1 Public response to developments ...... 41 6.1.1 Responses to issues during planning ...... 41 6.1.2 Responses to controversies during construction ...... 42 6.1.3 Informal activism ...... 44 6.2 Formal public participation ...... 45

6.2.1 Awareness of formal possibilities ...... 45 6.2.2 Participation in public hearings ...... 46 6.3 Public attitude towards participation: Six types ...... 47 6.3.1 “Policy is for policy-makers”-type ...... 47 6.3.2 “They won’t listen anyway”-type ...... 47 6.3.3 “This doesn’t concern me”-type ...... 48 6.3.4 “Interested, but too much effort”-type ...... 48 6.3.5 “Interested, but don’t know how”-type ...... 48 6.3.6 “I actively participate”-type ...... 49 6.4 Society and state ...... 51 6.4.1 Collaborative planning: as much as tolerated ...... 51 6.4.2 Personal relations ...... 52 6.4.3 Mutual distrust ...... 52 6.5 Conclusion ...... 53 Conclusion.….……………………………………………………………………………… ...... 55 Bibliography ...... 57 Appendix: Topic lists semi-structured interviews………………………………………………………………………………65

Introduction

“Our World Cup has helped break many stereotypes about Russia. People have seen that Russia is a hospitable country, a friendly one for those who come here. Largely, this has been achieved by the efforts of our football fans. ”

Vladimir Putin, 6 July 2018

In the midst of the World Cup in Russia, Russian president Vladimir Putin received FIFA president Gianni Infantino to discuss the tournament. The mood was cheerful, as the organization – to the public eye – appeared to be flawless. In a joint press statement, Infantino complimented Russia stating that the World Cup was “exactly how Russia is”. Putin exploited the opportunity to tackle his fiercest Western critics by pointing at Russia’s hospitality and friendliness, for which he specifically thanked the Russian people (Reuters, 6 July 2018; The Guardian, 6 July 2018). Putin’s phrase “our World Cup” seems to suggest that the tournament was a collective success. Indeed, the tournament has been propagated as an event for the entire country, enabled by the joint effort of public, private and societal actors. But to what extent was this true? What was civil society’s function in the organization of the World Cup? Was there a role for civil society in the decision-making around World Cup-related developments? And what is civil society’s function in formal decision-making in general? This thesis sets out to examine whether civil society is integrated in local governance networks in Russia, by focusing on a spatial development project related to the World Cup - the stadium in Saint Petersburg (hereafter Zenit Arena). There were several reasons for selecting this case. Firstly, spatial decision-making processes should to some extent be participatory, since interventions in public space by definition concern the public. Secondly, the stadium– being part of the World Cup – was among the country’s priority spatial developments and closely related to local and federal leaderships, which makes it a suitable case for studying the relationship between authorities and society. Thirdly, the turbulent history of the development of the stadium implies that the Zenit Arena has been the topic of a fierce societal debate, which gives society all the more reason to participate. Fourthly, because of the project’s scope and amount of attention given to its development, the Zenit Arena is firmly anchored in the collective memory.

This thesis aims to provide insight in the nature of formal decision-making processes in Russia and hereby contribute to the existing planning theory and literature on participatory governance, as well as to literature studying civil society in (semi-)authoritarian states. By analyzing public participation in a particular case, an important understanding of how the seemingly democratic principle of public participation in practice works out in Russia can be obtained. The research question that this study aims to answer is the following:

What does the development of the Zenit Arena reveal about the involvement of civil society in Russia in decision-making and the relationship between society and state?

This research question will be answered according to the following structure. Chapter 1 starts off by providing an overview of the academic literature on the function of public participation in spatial planning, Russian civic culture and the peculiarities of Russia’s spatial planning system. Chapter 2 outlines the methodology exploited to collect data. In chapter 3, the development of the Zenit Arena

1 will be reviewed, after which chapter 4 discusses the legislative framework. Chapter 5 analyzes the attitude of the authorities towards involving civil society in decision-making. In conclusion, chapter 6 outlines the societal attitude towards participating in formal decision-making networks and the relationship between state and society.

1. Academic overview

This chapter reviews the relevant academic literature, grouped in five topics: planning theory, development of civil society in Russia, decision-making culture in Russia, Russia’s spatial planning system and the particular urban context of Saint Petersburg.

1.1 Planning theory: Planning as a collaborative process Spatial planning has increasingly been understood as an interactive process in which a wide variety of stakeholders participates. In planning theory, focus shifted from rational planning, emphasizing the end result of a spatial project, to a process-based discourse that Healey (1996; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2015) describes as collaborative planning. A collaborative planning process contains five core features. First, inclusion of all stakeholders is required. A spatial project concerns not only planner and user, but anyone who has a certain interest: concerned civilians, entrepreneurs, environmentalists etc. Each actor seeks to influence outcomes in their desired way. Second, the planner acts as central mediator and is obliged to consider all concerns and interests. Third, all decisions should be reached by means of collaborative communication. Fourth, location-specific context, qualities and legislation have to be taken into account. Fifth, as by definition planning remains a governmental activity, the authorities remain responsible for facilitating the process (Healey, 1998, p. 16-17).

1.1.1 Emergence of collaborative planning The collaborative planning discourse is rooted in socio-economic developments in Western societies throughout the twentieth century. Rapid urbanization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century paired with social problems, such as injustice, disorganization and polarization. The urban population segregated and its interests were diversified among various societal groups and cultural milieus. (Healey, 2002; 2015). Economic development empowered the increasingly educated population to pursue their own interests. Spatial planning had to cope with the fact that due to the decreased homogeneity, consensus was a lot harder to find (Healey, 2003; Needham, 2005). Spatial development was hindered, as blueprint-planning proved to be incapable of adapting to a new, dynamic and empowered society. Instead, the fragmented socio-spatial dynamics and increased multiplicity of urban life required diversity in urban decision-making. Spatial plans had to be tailored to the specific contexts of the neighborhood, city or region (Healey, 1996; Spit & Zoete, 2009). In Western societies, this increased urban heterogeneity fit within the emerging mainstream of democratic thinking. In the twentieth century, a new sense of public realm emerged: people felt increasingly detached from the traditional administrative apparatus and wanted to actively contribute. The increased notion of democratic values and willingness to participate was reflected in planning. (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1971; Friedmann, 1998; Needham, 2005.)

A more recent aspect that stimulated the collaborative nature of planning, is the (partial) retreat of the state from some traditional activities. The state has given more room to the market to take responsibility. Public-private partnerships started dominating the realm of spatial planning. During planning processes, the planner is concerned with generating consensus, requiring a less directive approach and instead urging to be responsive to the diverse concerns of stakeholders (Friedmann, 1998; Needham, 2005).

Urbanization, diversification, democratization and privatization imply that rational planning is outdated. The technocratic idea of implementing top-down plans to effectively fulfill ambitions fell short in a bottom-up society, where both market and civic actors demanded to play a bigger role (Healey, 2015). The single truth that was assumed in blueprint-planning was challenged by the multiplicity of rationalities that emerged (Davy, 2008; Hartmann, 2012).

1.1.2 Motives for collaborative planning The first underlying motive, is the democratic principle: it is only just to involve civic and market actors in decision-making. This ‘inclusionary ethic’ (Healey, 1996, p. 224) emphasizes the authorities’ moral duty to translate this to the decision-making arena: in a democratized society, people do not only expect a socially just distribution of pros and cons of decisions, but also to have a say in the decision-making itself. This is closely connected to the notion of the ‘Right to the City’, grounded in the ideas of Henri Lefebvre: the everyday experience of consuming a city entitles one to shape it (Purcell, 2013). According to Harvey (2003, p. 939), “the ‘Right to the City’ is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it after our heart's desire.” In this context, the interactivity of spatial planning has become a necessity for both society and planner: it delivers to the societal demands of inclusivity, while simultaneously serves as societal legitimization of the plans (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2008). Second, collaborative planning enhances the quality of the plan through deliberation. Planners can benefit by learning from diverse rationalities (Healey, 1996; Davy, 2008; Verweij et al., 2013 ). Collaboration can generate synergy, leading to new, creative and innovative ideas. Also, it can reduce costs. (Klein & Van Twist, 2007). Third, participation can shape participants’ sense of themselves and their community (Healey, 2003, p. 111). Civilian involvement can enhance social coherence in a fragmented urban landscape.. To societal actors, participation is not just about having access to urban resources: “it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city.” (Harvey, 2008, p.23). Lastly, a Habermassian interpretation of the function of civil society in the public sphere implies that a broad range of stakeholders can serve as a watchdog: “Its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings meaningful” (Habermas, 1991, p. 2). This function of civil society is particularly relevant in planning processes for spatial plans that are of great social or economic significance. Collaboration with a broad range of civic and market stakeholders can diminish the opportunity of disturbances (Flyvbjerg, 2008; Priemus,2008)

1.1.3 Critics Despite consensus about the necessity of engaging stakeholders, the concept of collaborative planning has been criticized for being overly optimistic. The major criticism addresses the feasibility. Booher (2008) questions the possibility of total inclusivity in a heterogeneous and fragmented society. Boonstra and Boelens (2011) add that collaboration is often not complete or genuine, for it is the planner who decides whom to include. Assuming that the planner aims to implement plans close to his initial ideas, it can be tempting to ignore opposing ideas. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that participants with diverging rationalities through deliberation can design a strong plan. Often, different expectation make it complicated to find common grounds (Healey, 1996). Lastly, Hajer and Zonneveld (2000) argue that the inclusion of a variety of actors all too often serves as a support machine: actors are included to legitimize plans that the authorities already decided on. These criticisms are not to say that collaborative planning is utopian; they merely emphasize the importance of attitude of the planner.

Healey (1996, p. 2) describes the task of the planner as follows: “[Planning] requires ways of 'giving voice' to all members, even though they cannot all be 'present' in any discussion. It requires sorting through an array of issues—problems, arguments, claims for policy attention, ideas about what to do, fears of what will happen—to identify those which, for the various members, it makes sense to pay attention to. It involves moving beyond learning about the ways of understanding, and the agenda of ideas already available among community members, to developing new ideas about what to think, what to care about and what to do.” In practice, collaborative planning sometimes seems difficult to maintain. Moreover, the theory is based on democratizing developments in Western societies. But how does collaborative planning hold in societies that followed another development path? The remainder of this chapter discusses the nature of spatial planning in Russia, by addressing developments in Russian civil society and political culture, the planning system inherited from Soviet times and the urban context of Saint Petersburg.

1.2 Civil society in Russia

1.2.1 The Soviet legacy During Soviet times most social and political activity was controlled by the state. Rather than voluntarily, participation through civilian movements was seen as a patriotic duty (Ljubownikow et al., 2013; Buxton & Konovalova, 2013). Autonomous organizations were frequently suppressed, frustrating the development of a genuine participatory culture. (Bahry & Silver, 1990). However, it is a common misconception that civil society was completely inert. Grassroots movements existed on the lowest level (Ljubownikow et al., 2013). This activity was informal, apolitical, economic and individualized, rather than a collective attempt to influence policy-making. Most people did not believe they could influence policy and where not interested in doing so (DiFranceisco & Gitelman, 1983; Bahry & Silver, 1990). For collective participation, civil society lacked trust vis-à-vis institutions. Ljubownikow et al. (2013) describe the Soviet society as an hourglass society, in which elite and lower class were largely separated, with only marginal possibilities to interact (figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Hourglass society (After Ljubownikow et al., 2013, own editing)

1.2.2 The turbulent 1990s The transition of the 1990s affected civil society in Russia in many ways. Privatization implied that the state withdrew from many of its responsibilities. The void that emerged had to be filled by civil society, which was not ready to do so. Partly, it was filled by mafia-like networks, seeking to exploit the state’s weaknesses. Rather than stimulating an autonomous civil society, over-withdrawal gave room for excessive self-enrichment. Moreover, civic movements were limited in their activities due to lack of resources. Attracting funding from foreign donors solved this issue. In many respects, foreign funding had positive effects: for example, it stimulated dialogue on human rights and feminism. However, it also implied that the agendas of the movements were set by foreign actors, undermining the societal legitimacy of civic organizations. This hampered the development of an active civil society. Nevertheless, society fragmentized and grassroots movements emerged and progressed (Ljubowknikov et al., 2013; Buxton & Konovalova, 2013).

1.2.3 Civil society in contemporary Russia The inheritance of the Soviet past and the 1990s has shaped civil society in present-day Russia. The absence of free-market relations not only affected economic thinking, but also social processes. Social capital, understood by Makarenko (2015) as “a system of horizontal connections whereby people are able to arrive at creative solutions and come together for socially meaningful purposes, including in the political domain”, still has to be built. However, civic culture is slowly but steadily developing. Significantly, adaptation to market relations taught people to rely less on the state (Makarenko, 2015). According to Greene (2017), “self-reliant Russians are not a peripheral social group, not a marginal class, but a significant and growing group.” Furthermore, Breslauer (2017) argues that this group is not a passive mass. Rather, they can be activated when demanded. However, the overall level of regular civic engagement remains marginal. Pollsters by Levada, conducted between 2006 and 2016, reveal that the majority of Russian civilians does not feel it can actively influence public policy. In 2016, 87% answered the question “Can people like you influence government decisions in the country?” with “probably not” or “definitely not” (table 1.1). When the same question was asked regarding the region, city or neighborhood, a similar pattern was revealed (table 1.2). Moreover, in 2016, 80% indicated that they were (probably) not ready to actively participate in local, regional or national politics (table 1.3). However, the fact that 18% indicated that they are personally ready to participate reveals that, albeit by a minority, demand for civic participation in decision-making exists (Levada, 2016). Also, civil society made some achievements that should not be underestimated by filling in voids left open by the government, such as charity, arts, human rights and education. Furthermore, grassroots self-organizational initiatives emerged in the form of business associations and homeowner organizations (Makarenko, 2015). However, these successes remain poorly known to the public. The rarity of successes prevents civil society to develop itself as a partner for the state.

Table 1.1: Can people like you influence government decisions in the country? (Levada, 2016)

Feb.06 Oct.07 Feb.10 Jan.12 Mar.13 Mar.14 Mar.15 Aug.16 Definitely yes 2 3 2 4 3 1 3 1 To some degree yes 13 21 12 15 10 11 15 11 Probably not 39 31 34 28 35 38 38 38 Definitely not 45 41 51 51 49 47 40 49 It is difficult to say 2 5 2 2 4 3 4 1

Table 1.2: Can people like you influence decisions in your region, city, neighborhood? (Levada, 2016)

Feb.06 Feb.10 Jan.12 Mar.13 Mar.14 Mar.15 Aug.16 Definitely yes 3 2 3 2 1 4 1 To some degree yes 21 16 21 14 18 18 16 Probably not 36 34 27 34 38 35 38 Definitely not 39 46 47 46 41 39 43 It is difficult to say 2 2 4 4 2 4 2

Table 1.3: Are you personally ready to play a more active role in politics? (Levada, 2016)

Feb.06 Feb.10 Jan.12 Mar.13 Mar.14 Mar.15 Aug.16 Definitely yes 5 5 3 3 2 5 3 To some degree yes 14 14 14 13 17 18 15 Probably not 30 31 31 35 39 33 34 Definitely not 47 46 47 45 36 38 46 It is difficult to say 4 4 6 5 6 7 2

Differentiation in development has led to uneven patterns of civic engagement. Zubarevich (2015) provides a model of Russian regional differentiation by distinguishing between four Russia’s. First Russia comprises the cities of over 500.000 inhabitants, where people enjoy higher educational and living standards, are connected to the world and have more job opportunities. The tertiary sector is bigger than elsewhere and a small business sector is well-developed. These conditions allow ‘angry urbanites’ to emerge, particularly in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, targeting the moral deficit of Putinism: the vertical power structure, human rights and corruption. Second Russia includes the smaller cities (50.000 – 250.000; cities between 250.000 - 500.000 can be classified in both First and Second Russia). In these cities, the share of industrial employment and the public sector is larger. Small business development is hampered by the lack of consumption power and institutional constraints. People heavily rely on the authorities, since they either work in the public sector or in a subsidized industry. Public activism is lower and instead of politically motivated instigated by economic factors. Third Russia encompasses towns and settlements, with a declining population that is distanced from the state. People do not actively participate in formal frameworks, but rather provide for vital services themselves. Large parts of the population are independent from the state, whereas those working in the public sector cling onto their jobs. Fourth Russia comprises underdeveloped republics in the North Caucasus and South Siberia where the center-periphery relations of First, Second and Third Russia do not reflect reality. Urban economies are clan-based and

7 the shadow economy predominates. The clan system, power struggles and ethnic and religious conflicts hamper societal modernization, leading to low levels of participation (Zubarevich, 2015).

1.3 Decision-making culture Decision-making in Russia shows a remarkable selectivity of usage of development theories. On the one hand, the emergence of an engaged private sector and active civil society are verbally being encouraged, while on the other hand the power vertical remains strong (Kinossian & Morgan, 2014). Indeed, market actors participate, but participation occurs in environments that are highly patronized, where rule of law is weak and nepotism prevails. Authorities encourage bottom-up initiatives, while still acting as regulating structure. Thus, even the market and civic participants in decision-making are de facto controlled by the authorities (Hale, 2017).

1.3.1 Institutionalization of public participation The Russian government verbally recognizes the importance of the role of society in governance. In many areas, governance networks including civil society have been established by the authorities to gather expertise and reduce institutional dysfunctionalities (Kropp & Schuhmann, 2016). According to Owen (2016, p. 352), there are three reasons to integrate civil society in decision-making. First, it is argued that civilians are the backbone of economic development as they come up with innovative ideas. Second, civil society can monitor and prevent corruption. Third, involving civilians can shrink the bureaucracy and enhance efficiency. Public participation was institutionalized in March 2005, when the Federal Public Chamber was established as a mediating agent between state and society. Its tasks were to assess legislation, monitor the government and to ensure freedom of speech (Chebankova, 2012, p. 398; Owen, 2016, p. 342). Furthermore, throughout the 2000s a wide variety of civic forums, public-private partnerships, think-tanks and similar initiatives were established. (Chebankova, 2012, p. 398; Aaslund et al., 2016, p. 148-149).

1.3.2 Limitations However, there are significant limitations for genuine participation. It is argued that the Public Chamber merely serves to “legitimize the government’s increasingly authoritarian policies” (Buxton & Konovalova, 2013, p. 777). Its members are in equal proportions being selected by the president, regional governments and public organizations. This leaves little room for independent organizations, especially since many public organizations involved are linked to the authorities. (Chebankova, 2012, p. 399). Moreover, legislation constrained the development of inclusive governance networks. For instance, the federal law on NGOs impeded the registration of both new NGOs as well as the re- registration of established organizations. The activities of NGOs were further limited by the notorious ‘foreign agents law’ in 2012, requiring NGOs that receive foreign funding to register as a foreign agent (Ljubownikow et al., 2013; Aaslund et al., 2016). Perhaps even more significant than this constraining legislation, is the consequence of the overall weakness of rule of law. This mplies that even legislation that would oblige civic participation can easily be ignored (Kropp & Schuhmann, 2016).

Many governance networks have de facto been captured by the elite. Civic organizations that the authorities consider to be loyal are allowed to participate, whereas the inclusion of oppositional actors is often avoided. The possibility of participants to critically interfere is, in many cases, modest. This hampers civil society from developing into a critical watchdog (Aaslund et al., 2016; Buxton, 2016). Paradoxically, the seemingly pluralist structure of the networks serves as a democratic

8 legitimization to the regime. Another factor is that governance networks seldom concern high-level decision-making. Rather, they are decorative bodies without actual decision-making power. Lastly, the normative nature of policy-making in Russia implicates that whoever wants to influence policies needs to be legally well-informed. Usually, government institutions have the best legal resources, whereas civilians lack a grasp of legal knowledge (Aaslund et al., 2016).

1.4 Russian spatial planning Russia’s spatial planning apparatus had a different development from the Western models. In the centralized Soviet system, local and regional planning systems were virtually non-existent. In post- Soviet Russia, a spatial planning system had to be built from scratch. This section covers the development from Soviet planning, through the turbulences of the 1990s, into a more localized and differentiated organism.

1.4.1 Soviet planning Spatial developments in the Soviet Union were characterized by centralization, standardization, industrialization, economization and absence of legislation. Industrial cities were seen as the motors of economic development and essential for egalitarian space. Planning apparatuses in most cities, however, were absent (Hamm, 1977). General Plans for cities were drawn by Gosstroy, the State Committee for Construction, according to the directives from Gosplan, the State Planning Committee responsible for economic planning. This made spatial planning an ultra-centralized field, executed for the city instead of with the city (Shaw, 1983, p. 394; Shove & Anderson, 1997, p. 214). Until the late 1970s, General Plans for cities all over the Soviet Union were designed in Moscow or Leningrad (Iyer, 2003, p. 207). Essentially, all city plans addressed similar matters – economic development, infrastructure, housing – and norms for constructions were standardized according to the minimal needs, lacking notion for local contexts and disparities, leading to visible uniformity of city landscapes (Golubchikov, 2004). Another feature of Soviet spatial planning was its focus on industrialization and economic development. Gosplan’s directives were economically driven and targeted a rapid increase of production. Thus, economic planning predominated in the majority of General Plans (Obolensky- Ossinsky, 1935; Huzinec, 1978; Shaw, 1983). Moreover, the long-term objectives of the General Plan (which usually set the development aims for 25-30 years) were trumped by Gosplan’s five-year plans targeting rapid development. This different horizon and preference given to the five-year plans meant that General Plans seldom were fully fulfilled (Hamm, 1977, p. 64; Iyer, 2003, pp. 206-207. Lastly, the Soviet planning system lacked legislation, as the centralized command nature did not require a legislative framework. The lack of private ownership meant that property rights were not an issue. Mediation between different groups was not necessary (Golubchikov, 2004). Overall, this centralized, standardized and economized nature of spatial plans, without notion for local circumstances, led Hamm (1977, p. 67) to conclude that “ironically, in the land of superplanning, urban plans did not exist in half of all Russian cities”.

1.4.2 1990s: Starting from scratch After the collapse of communism, spatial planning had to cope with unanticipated problems. The sudden introduction of market mechanisms, property and appreciation of location resulted in the realization that the old system was no longer suitable. In the light of the broader trend of state withdrawal, the central authorities rapidly retreated from spatial developments, leading to an ad hoc model of laissez-faire development (Golubchikov, 2004; 2017; Dixon, 2010). Among the new trends was the transfer of decision-making from Moscow to the regions. In many regions, decentralization

9 disrupted existing networks in favor of the regional administrations, who exploited this power to pursue short-term political goals rather than long-term spatial development. Decentralization was carried out in the absence of a local planning apparatus and institutional infrastructure, which enabled local elites to capture the spatial development resources for their own benefit.

The planning apparatus had to be aware of a new urban context. According to Golubchikov (2016, p. 607), “the urban is the central stage where ideology mixes with the everyday, through which the societal change is mediated; new meanings, social relations, and class divisions are construed; and through which ideological transition achieves its practical completeness”. New market systems of consumption, properties and location introduced a new type of society, with more variation, inequality and social differences. Furthermore, a more market-based society gave ordinary citizens the notion that they could achieve things themselves (Shove & Anderson, 1997). Fueled by the euphoria with which the introduction of ‘the market’ had been received, the central authorities responded by retreating from spatial planning, leaving developments over the “the market” (Golubchikov, 2004).

Despite all changes, many outdated, inflexible Soviet laws and regulations still applied (Shove & Anderson, 1997, p. 217). The planning system was still centered on Gosstroy, which was gradually losing its grip over local developments. The lack of a legislative framework allowed for an unprecedentedly high number of construction permits being awarded, enabling rapid constructions by private parties seeking to obtain quick rents (Shove & Anderson, 1997, p. 217; Golubchikov, 2004, p. 233). The notion of necessity of a legislative framework grew. This culminated in 1998 with the adoption of the Urban Development Code. It addressed issues that previously had not been taken into account, such as sustainability and appreciation of public participation. Within the hierarchic structure, the General Plan remained the key document; however, in contrast to the Soviet era, the General Plan now had to be designed at the local level considering the local context. The Code was influenced by Western models of spatial development, and attempted to create some structure in the chaotic developments of the 1990s. However, is was only limitedly successful in providing an all- compassing framework. The sheer copying of Western-style documentation was often not suitable for the Russian contexts. Furthermore, the Code was criticized for contributing little to an actual reform of spatial planning at the local level, as the framework for governance was not strong enough. Most General Plans for cities still stemmed from the 1970s or 1980s, when they were centrally designed. By 1999, for over 3000 cities, only about 200 cities had modernized General Plans (Golubchikov, 2004). Decentralization, a renewed urban context and the legislative vacuum resulted in the development of Russian spatial planning in an undefined and uncontrolled monster which resulted in haphazard constructions instead of long-term plans. Between 1990 and 1999, Russia’s built up land (excluding roads) increased from 30.000 km2 to 54.000 km2 (Golubchikov, 2004, p. 233).

1.4.3 Spatial planning in contemporary Russia In 2004, Russia’s spatial planning system was given new impetus by the introduction of a new Urban Development Code. This Code aimed to overcome the shortcomings of its predecessor and introduced a new hierarchy of spatial plans, putting more responsibilities in the hands of the municipal administrations. General Plans remained dominant, containing a map of the functional areas of the city, boundaries and provisions on territorial planning. Contrary to their Soviet equivalents, General Plans are not considered directives, but rather to set out general development goals. The General Plan became the basis for a new type of documentation: the Rules of Land Use

10 and Development. The Rules contain more specific sub-zoning, ordinances and regulation for developments and are in this way close to the European and American zoning plans. The Rules cover a smaller territory than the General Plans; whereas the General Plan outlines the general development of the entire city, the Rules are designed for every city district. The third document in the hierarchy, the Territorial Planning Project, establishes the zoning and development regulations of a particular land plot or a smaller territory within a city district (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 29 December 2004). This new hierarchy (figure 1.2) of spatial planning documents aimed to establish a stronger legal framework for spatial development decisions which would make the decision-making process more transparent (Dixon, 2010; Beregovskih et al., 2010).

Figure 1.2: Structure of spatial planning documents (own work)

The 2004 Code was promulgated as an attempt to increase the extent of civic involvement in spatial decision-making. Notably, the Code obliged the organization of public hearings on the design of those spatial planning documents, as well as on amendments to these documents (Golubchikov, 2004; Beregovskih et al., 2010). The framework for public participation in spatial decision-making will be analyzed in more detail in chapter 4.

In Russian spatial planning, the mayor/governor remains the key figure, with public-private relationships resembling a vertical structure with the mayor/governor at the top. In this structure, spatial developments are dependent on the whims of the person in charge. Planning is a reflection of the mayor/governor’s vision, rather than a compromise (Iyer, 2003, p. 207; Golubchikov, 2004, pp. 240-241). This is particularly evident in Moscow (under development-minded mayors Yuri Luzhkov and Sergey Sobyanin), and Saint Petersburg (under former governor Valentina Matvienko). Throughout the 2000s, these cities witnessed numerous ambitious construction projects, which were initiated and led by the authorities, aimed at improving the cities’ international image and attracting more private investments (Kinossian, 2012).

For the first fifteen years after the collapse of communism, a coherent national strategy has been absent. The desire to design such strategy culminated in 2005 in the Draft Strategy of Socioeconomic Development in the Russian Federation. This strategy was based on the assumption that the principle

11 of equalization under socialism had led to a misallocation of urban resources. Instead, development had to be focused on a number of urban agglomerates, which would act as locomotives of economic growth, with Moscow and Saint Petersburg as ‘world cities’. Although this draft was never formally approved, it indicated the government’s vision on spatial development, targeting the attraction of large international corporations, foreign investments and institutions. (Golubchikov, 2010, p. 633; 2017; Kinossian & Morgan, 2014, p. 1684). A specific element of this strategy has been the organization of mega-events as a catalyst of development. Examples of this are the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok, the Summer Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. (Kinossian & Mogan, 2014, pp. 1679; Golubchikov et al., 2014, pp. 628-629; Golubchikov, 2017). According to Kinossian and Morgan (2014, p. 1691), the organization of these events is characterized by direct federal intervention at the local level and the temporary suspension of planning procedures.

1.5 The urban context of Saint Petersburg

1.5.1 Civil society According to its Strategy of Economic and Social Development of up to 2030 (2014), Saint Petersburg “has always adhered to the European values of the development of society”. The fact that civil society is more multinational, multicultural and higher educated than in most regions, makes its more diverse and active than Russia’s averages. The city’s socioeconomic lead over the other regions besides Moscow allows for above average living standards, which in turn stimulate urban activism (Aaslund et al., 2016). However, the authorities acknowledge that although civil society in the city is “sufficiently developed […], the state of civil society and the development of its institutions in Saint Petersburg, as well as in Russia as a whole, cannot be considered appropriate for the level of countries with developed democracies.” (Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg, 13 May 2014).

Yurchak (2011) argues that spatial characteristics are among the main contributors to the above average civic culture in Saint Petersburg. This is strongly connected to urban aesthetics and the European architecture that distinguishes Saint Petersburg from other Russian cities. During late socialism, informal social milieus that more and more wished to distinguish themselves from the collectivity of socialism were emerging. Saint Petersburg’s unique architectural traits were key in the notion of society as having a distinct identity. In Yurchak’s words (2011, p. 8) “urban aesthetics provided these people with means of becoming ‘non-Soviet’ persons”. The social groups that emerged around the idea to emphasize spatial attributes would develop into the city’s first largescale oppositional movement in 1987, when the city administration decided that the monumental hotel Angleterre had to be demolished and rebuild to modern standards. Thousands of people took to the streets to demonstrate against the demolition. These events marked the emergence of largescale civic awareness and activism grounded in the idea of preserving the city (Yurchak, 2011).

1.5.2 Spatial developments By the mid-1990s, the authorities of Saint Petersburg had acknowledged the need for a structuralized spatial planning system. The Committee on Urban Development and Architecture sought to improve by gaining inspiration from western examples. Staff members were schooled at European and American universities and cooperation agreements were signed with the EU and Barcelona (Dixon, 2010, p. 40). A city strategy was completed by 1996 and found its legal basis in the adoption of a new General Plan in 2005. In the General Plan, the main development goals for the period up to 2025

12 were set as “a stable improvement in the quality of life of all segments of the population”, “preservation of architectural heritage” and “the formation of Saint Petersburg as a multifunctional city integrated into the Russian and world economy”. The General Plan distinguished seven types of functional zones: residential zones; public- and business zones; production zones; zones of engineering and transport infrastructures and objects of external transport; agricultural zones; recreational zone; and special purpose zones (such as cemeteries, landfills and military facilities) (Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg, 21 December 2005). Based on the General Plan, Rules of Land Use and Development were developed for all municipal districts and adopted in 2006. Urban activists viewed the Rules as a step in the right direction, as it provided a more coherent and transparent framework (Dixon, 2010). Also, laws were adopted to ensure public involvement in the decision-making. These laws are to be analyzed in chapter 4.

One of the focus points of the new strategy was the integration of Saint Petersburg in the world economy. The ‘world city’ scenario for Saint Petersburg traces back to the first post-Soviet mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, whose neoliberal policies were based on privatization and attracting financial institutions with the aim of rapid integration in the global system. However, this did not have the desired result: the urban economy plummeted, leading to Sobchak losing the 1996 election to Vladimir Yakovlev, who became governor. Yakovlev let go of the global ambitions and focused instead on solving the city’s most acute local problems. When Putin became president, the development of Saint Petersburg was given a new impulse by the establishment of foreign companies and firms in the city. Nevertheless, the level of foreign direct investment remained low at the entrance of new governor Matvienko (Turnbull, 2005, p. 220; Golubchikov, 2010, pp. 631-632). Her term (October 2003 - August 2011) was development-minded, desiring to raise the city onto the global level. This was included in the Concept of Socioeconomic Development of Saint Petersburg until 2025 that introduced the desired development of the city into “a world city open to the world and Russia’s largest international center for business, political, and cultural interactions” (Golubchikov, 2010, p. 633). One of the aspects in the strategy to become a world city, was the implementation of large construction projects that Matvienko repeatedly referred to as “locomotive projects”, intended to boost foreign investments and serve as catalyst to the city’s economic development (Dixon, 2010, p. 36). These included the construction of the new ring road, the dam in the Gulf of Finland, the Marine Façade and the new headquarters of Gazprom (Golubchikov, 2010). Under Matvienko’s successor Georgy Poltavchenko, the construction boom came to an end.

1.5.3 Instrumental case: The Gazprom Center The attempt to turn Saint Petersburg into a world city clashed with societal concern about identity on various occasions, the most significant being the development of a new Gazprom headquarters. This project has been an instrumental case of civic dissatisfaction with the authorities’ globalized policies and evidence of the value of civic activism. In November 2006, the idea of constructing a skyscraper that would serve as Gazprom’s new head office was announced. For the authorities, the construction of the skyscraper was of major importance, as it would lure Russia’s biggest energy company to Saint Petersburg. It was a symbol for the city’s ambitions. The opted location was the area of Okhta, across river Neva from the Smolny Cathedral in the inner city. The choice sparked dissatisfaction as it would affect Saint Petersburg’s skyline. Saint Petersburg’s signature characteristic is its low-rise skyline. For preservation of this urban landscape, throughout history height regulations were incorporated in the planning system. For centuries, buildings could not exceed the height of the Winter Palace (23.5 meters), although exceptions were made for church domes and spires, such as the dome of Saint

Isaac’s Cathedral (101.5 meters). Although in Soviet times high-rise buildings were introduced in Saint Petersburg, the city center remained largely unchanged (Dixon, 2010, p. 35; Lavrov & Perov, 2016, p. 191). The announcement of a 396 meter tall skyscraper severely violated these norms. In reaction, the Union of Architects of Russia boycotted the design competition and the UNESCO World Heritage Committee hinted to remove the inner city from the World Heritage List were the project to be implemented (Golubchikov, 2010, p. 638; Lavrov & Perov, 2016, p. 193). Dissatisfaction was not limited to professionals: it also ignited fury among citizenry. This was demonstrated by largescale public protests in 2007, known as ‘Marches for the Defense of Saint Petersburg’. At first small and disorganized, the Marches quickly gained size and weight, with approximately ten thousand civilians going out to the street. For some time, the authorities were unwilling to consider the complaints. However, in December 2010, president Dimitry Medvedev announced the relocation of the skyscraper from Okhta to Lakhta, an area on the north shore of the Gulf of Finland nine kilometers away from the city center. Although it is impossible to assess whether the public outcry was the decisive factor in the decision to relocate the skyscraper, it is highly probable that the public protest contributed to his decision at least to some extent (Yurchak, 2011).

1.6 Conclusion In sum, well-performing spatial planning processes have a collaborative character, to comply with civilians’ Right to the City. Also, the inclusion of different viewpoints and expertise could enhance the quality of the spatial project. For society, it can help shaping self-awareness, identity- and community-building and social capital. Lastly, civil society can act as critical arbiter or watchdog. However, this notion of collaborative planning developed in the context of Western-style processes of urbanization and democratization, when authorities realized that an increasingly diverse, critical and engaged society had a role to play in decision-making. Civil society in Russia developed differently. It is therefore doubtful whether the collaborative planning theory holds when applied in a Russian context. The remainder of this thesis analyzes the involvement of civil society in spatial planning processes in Russia, in particular in Saint Petersburg. Civil society in this city is understood to be the most active in Russia. Spatial developments are of particular concern, as the city’s architecture and historical center shape a unique identity which people are willing to protect. This has been the motor of the development of the urban civic culture and continues to play a big role in civic activism.

2. Methodology

This research builds on the analysis of three components. Firstly, the frameworks of legislation and planning documentation have been analyzed. The second pillar has been the attitude of the authorities towards involving society in the decision-making processes. Lastly, civil society’s attitude towards participating in the decision-making process has been examined. These components have been investigated by means of three qualitative research methods: document analysis, semi- structured expert interviews and street interviews.

2.1 Document analysis To analyze the legal possibilities to participate in spatial decision-making processes, three kinds of documents have been examined: legislation, spatial planning documentation and reports of public hearings that were conducted during the development of the Zenit Arena.

Legislation of three sorts has been analyzed. Firstly, the relevant spatial planning legislation at federal and regional level was examined. The dominant federal law for spatial developments is Federal Law 190-FZ: The Urban Planning Code of the Russian Federation (2004). On the level of Saint Petersburg, there have been two laws concerned with engaging the public in spatial decision-making: Regional Law 114-20: On the procedure for the participation of citizens and their associations in the discussion and decision-making in the field of urban development in the territory of St. Petersburg (2004) and its successor Regional Law 400-61: On the order of organizing and holding public hearings and informing the public in the implementation of urban planning activities in St. Petersburg (2006). Another relevant regional law, was Regional Law 29-10: On the Rules of Land Use and Development of Saint Petersburg (2009). The analysis of these documents served to examine the provisions that empower the public to participate during the spatial planning process. By doing so, the legal possibilities for civil society to engage have been examined, as well as the obligations for the authorities to include civil society actors.

The second type of legislation, addresses the role for civil society during the construction of the Zenit Arena. These included the Federal Laws on public procurement and bidding for state contracts, specifically 94-FZ : On placing orders on the delivery of goods, implementation of works and rendering service for state and municipal needs (2005) and 44-FZ: On the contract system in the sphere of procurement of goods, works and services for providing state and municipal needs (2013). Also, the presidential decree 596: On the long-term state economic policy; federal governmental order on Public discussion of the purchase of goods, works and services for state and municipal needs on the sum of above 1 billion rubles (2012); and governmental decree 835: On approval of the Rules for the implementation of mandatory public discussion of the procurement of goods, works, services to ensure state and municipal needs (2016) have been analyzed. On the level of Saint Petersburg, governmental decree 1095: On the system of procurement of goods, works, services to meet the needs of St. Petersburg (2013) and deputy inquiries On the organization of a public discussion of large purchases for state needs in St. Petersburg (6 September 2012) and On the procedure for conducting public discussions on large purchases of goods (works, services) for state and municipal needs (22 November 2012) were examined.

The third type of legislation encompasses specific legislation introduced for the FIFA World Cup: Federal Law 108-FZ: On the preparation and holding in the Russian Federation of the FIFA 2018 FIFA World Cup, the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 and amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation (2013). This law was examined to investigate whether the World Cup affected the legislative framework for public participation. The legislation has been analyzed according to the scheme below.

Table 2.1: Analysis scheme legislative documents

Topic Aims Signs General principles To examine whether the legislation Terms such as ‘stakeholders’, acknowledges a role for civil society in ‘participation, ‘right’, ‘fair’ etc. spatial decision-making Provisions for To examine the relevant legislative Terms such as ‘public hearings’, public documents contain legal obligations to ‘communication’, ‘participants’, participation involve the public in decision-making ‘appeal’, proposal’, ‘consideration’ etc. Exceptions To assess whether there are exceptional Terms such as ‘expiration’, cases in which the provisions that stipulate ‘suspension, ‘invalid’, ‘exemption’ public participation can be eased or ignored etc.

Shortcomings To assess aspects that are not covered by Vagueness, ambiguity, absence of the legislative document that could be concrete procedures and/or relevant for public participation measures , absence of certain provisions Other peculiarities To examine whether there are other signs or provisions in the legislation that could be relevant for public participation

Besides legislation, the relevant spatial planning documentation has been taken into examination, including the General Plan (2005), the Rules of Land Use and Development (2006 and 2009) of Saint Petersburg and the Territorial Planning Project (2007). The inclusion of public participation in these spatial planning documents was investigated using the analysis scheme in table 2.2.

Lastly, reports of public hearings that were conducted during the construction process were analyzed to examine to what extent these public hearings in practice accounted for real participation of civil society during the construction process.

The document analysis has been successful in outlining the legislative framework in which public participation in spatial decision-making is anchored. However, the method has a significant limitation. The weakness of rule of law implies that whatever is stated by law, might not match practice. By analyzing legislation and spatial planning documentation, one can get a good grasp of the legal framework and rights of civil society to be engaged, but conclusions about the practice of ‘collaborative’ processes cannot be drawn. To analyze the practical nature of decision-making processes, one needs to wield additional methods.

Table 2.2: Analysis scheme spatial planning documents

Topic Aims Signs Functional zoning To examine whether or not the Terms such as ‘function’, ‘zone’, development plan of the Zenit ‘assignment’ etc. Arena fit within the relevant spatial planning documents Signals of public participation To assess whether the spatial Terms such as ‘public hearings’, documents contain evidence of ‘communication’, ‘participants’, public participation in the ‘appeal’, proposal’, decision-making process that ‘consideration’ etc. resulted in the spatial document Exceptions To assess whether there are Terms such as ‘expiration’, exceptional cases in which the ‘suspension, ‘invalid’, zoning regulations can be ‘exemption’ etc. amended Shortcomings To assess aspects that are not Vagueness, ambiguity, absence covered by the spatial of concrete procedures and/or document measures Other peculiarities To examine whether there are other signs or provisions in the legislation that could be relevant for the development of the Zenit Arena

2.2 Semi-structured expert interviews Eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts on spatial planning and actors involved in spatial processes. To gain insight into spatial decision-making in Russia, a member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction, a professor at the School of Urbanism at the Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the director of a city architectural firm and a Saint Petersburg-based lawyer, specialized in spatial law, were interviewed. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with four regular participants in spatial development processes. Among them was the initiator of Krasivy Peterburg (Beautiful Petersburg). This online platform collects and disseminates information on all spatial development projects in Russia. Launched in 2012, it is currently the largest civic organization in spatial matters in the city. Another interview was held with a coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod (Living City), an NGO concerned with preservation of cultural and historic spatial objects in Saint Petersburg. Two more interviews were conducted with ‘urban activists’ from the Center of Independent Social Research (hereafter CISR), where they initiated the project City in Dialogue, aiming enhance the role of civil society in spatial developments in Saint Petersburg. Also, a then sportive director of Football Club Zenit – obviously a major stakeholder – was interviewed. Zenit’s fans, being regular visitors of the stadium, had interests in the development as well. Therefore, an interview was held with a representative of the overarching organization of Zenit’s supporters’ associations. Lastly, a journalist of the sports-magazine Championat was interviewed about the stadium’s development. Topic lists for all interviews are included in the appendix.

This list covers various stakeholders in the development of the Zenit Arena. However, a very significant factor is lacking: the point of view of the local authorities. Although the administrations of Saint Petersburg, the Petrogradsky district and the Chkalovskoe munipality, as well as the Committee on Urban Development and Architecture of Saint-Petersburg were all approached for an interview, the only response was provided by email by a representative of the Chkalovskoe municipality: “informing the population by the authorities of the municipal self-government of the municipality of Chkalovskoe is carried out in accordance with the law”. Although cooperation of the authorities would have benefited the research, the list of interviewees is still considered sufficient, as the points of view of all other stakeholders have been covered. Moreover, the urban activists proved capable of providing insight in the attitude of the authorities towards public engagement.

2.3 Street interviews Lastly, with the aim of getting understanding of societal responses to the Zenit Arena, fifty-two street interviews were held in the Krestovsky Park Pobedy where the stadium is located, in the residential area adjacent to this park, as well as in the stadium itself during two football matches of Zenit. Despite the relatively small n, the street interviews proved valuable in providing insight in public awareness of and interest in the possibilities of participation.

Table 2.3: Topiclist street interviews

Topic Aims Questions Awareness To get an impression of societal - Are you aware of the issues regarding the awareness of the development development of the Zenit Arena? process of the Zenit Arena, - Are you aware of the controversies surrounding the Zenit Arena Interest To get an impression of the - What do you think about the stadium in societal interest in the general? development process of the - What do you think about the demolition of Zenit Arena the Kirov Stadium? - What do you think about the delay? - What do you think about the cost overrun? - What do you think about the corruption? Participation To get an impression of societal - Did you know about the organization of awareness of the opportunities public hearings? to participate and willingness to - Did you participate in them? do so - Would you have participated? Why (not)?

3. Zenit Arena: Chronology of concern

This chapter sketches the societal debate about the Zenit Arena It assesses to what extent there were reasons for civil society to be interested in a participatory role in the decision-making. First, a brief chronology of the stadium’s development will be provided.

3.1 Timeline The idea of a new stadium emerged in the early 2000s. It got impetus when Matvienko became governor. In December 2004, the decision was made to build a new stadium on the western part of the Krestovsky Island. (Government of Saint Petersburg, 28 December 2004). In August 2006, a $250 million valuing bid from the Japanese architectural bureau Kisho Kurokawa Architects & Associates won the tender for the stadium’s design (Tass, 2007). Initially, it was assumed that it would be financed by Gazprom, but in November 2005, the city announced it would finance the stadium itself. In return, Gazprom would become a local tax resident. In December 2006, a $225 million contract was closed with Sintez-SUI (renamed into Avant later) which was to become the general contractor (Government of Saint Petersburg, 2016; Zhegulev, 2016). In August 2007, construction started and the target date for completion was set in March 2009 (Zenit Saint Petersburg, 19 August 2007). The first setback was felt in April 2008. Due the global financial and economic crisis, cost of works and building materials skyrocketed: Avant adjusted the estimated costs to $574. However, three months later, it appeared that Avant had not taken into account extra costs related to the preparation of the land plot. The contract price further increased (to $970 million in Q1 2008 prices). Unhappy with this increase, the authorities terminated the contract with Avant (Government of Saint Petersburg, 2016; Tass, 2017). A new contractor was found in December 2008, when the authorities signed a contract with Transstroy, a company within the Basic Element Holding, owned by aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska. The project gained federal prominence in 2009, when Russia filed a bid for the organization of the FIFA World Cup 2018. After the World Cup was awarded to Russia in December 2010, construction costs would again rapidly rise (to be discussed in more detail below), leading to an estimated price of $1.4 billion in October 2012. As a result, the government decided to get rid of non- core elements in the design. In July 2016, the contract with Transstroy was terminated following a payment dispute. In August 2016, a contract was signed with Metrostroy, which would finalize the construction. The first official match was played on 22 April 2017, just two months before the start of the FIFA Confederations Cup and more than eight years behind the initial schedule (Tass, 2017).

3.2 Concerns during planning Matvienko repeatedly portrayed the stadium as a gift to the city. Initially the majority of society stood positive towards receiving this gift (Cheburnaya, 2014). Nevertheless, there were several issues related to the prospect of such stadium on the Krestovsky Island.

3.2.1 Necessity At the time of planning, there were two stadiums fit for professional football in Saint Petersburg: the Kirov Stadium and the Petrovksy Stadium. Zenit exploited the Kirov Stadium from 1950 until 1992, moving to the Petrovsky in 1994. Both stadiums underwent major reconstructions for the hosting of the Goodwill Games in 1994, ten years prior to the announcement of the Zenit Arena. Some people therefore questioned the necessity of constructing a new stadium:

“I do not understand why it was necessary to build a new arena. We already had the Petrovsky stadium and the Kirov Stadium. They could have just renovated one of those stadiums.” (street interview R21).

The stadium was strongly linked to the organization of the World Cup. This required a stadium that would meet all modern standards. The present stadiums did not meet those standards and a new stadium was deemed necessary. Some societal actors questioned the organization of the World Cup and thereby the need for a new stadium:

- “The World Cup is just for a few weeks, and it is a big question whether we need it at all. For our local football matches, the old stadiums were good enough.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod). - “I think [the World Cup] stirs a very complex feeling inside everyone. On the one hand, it is part of our identity, we present ourselves. On the other hand, we present ourselves only for a month and then we realize that we emptied our entire budget.” (interview urban activist CISR).

To some, the fact that the stadium was to be financed by public money was reason of concern. In their view, the city should have prioritized other activities that would better serve the public good. The coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod expressed her concern as follows:

“I think they should not have built the stadium at all. I think they should have spent that money on renovation of old buildings that are deteriorated, or infrastructure, or any other problem that the city faced.”

3.2.2 Kirov Stadium The Zenit Arena was planned at the exact location of the Kirov Stadium, which implied that the latter had to be demolished. When Zenit moved to Petrovsky, the stadium lost its regular purpose. After the Goodwill Games in 1994, it went out of use (except for several matches of Zenit’s and Russia’s youth teams; interview journalist Championat). Despite losing its regular function, for those concerned with conserving architectural monuments, the stadium’s was of importance due to its architectural structure. Also, for historians, the stadium’s grandeur symbolized the ambitions and resilience of post-war Leningrad (Galkina, 22 January 2016). It was seen as a monument and an object of Saint Petersburg’s heritage. So when the announcement was made that the Kirov Stadium had to be demolished in favor of the new hypermodern construction, to some it felt that “a Japanese flying saucer fell on an architectural monument of federal significance, connected with the historical memory of the metropolis” (Galkina, 22 January 2016).

3.2.3 Primorsky Park Pobedy The effects of the stadium on the adjacent Primorsky Park Pobedy, were another reason of concern. This park is particularly important in the local minds, as it was established on the initiative of citizens after the Great Patriotic War (interview urban activist CISR). When the Zenit Arena was announced, there came concern about potential damage to the park, related to the expected inflow of people visiting the park. Whereas the Kirov Stadium did not regularly host events, the Zenit Arena would attract up to 60,000 spectators, of which many would traverse the park. People were concerned that the park would turn into a “continuous garbage dump” (Bumaga, 2017), including “mountains of plastic, glass and trash” (Galkina, 22 January 2016). During a street interview, a respondent stressed

20 that she had feared the influx of “drunk and loud football fans”, a prospect that in her opinion threatened the calm and comfort of the park (street interview R14).

3.2.4 Livability on Krestovsky Island The Zenit Arena was expected to affect the nearby residential area. Despite the fact that the construction plot and the residential area were separated by the Primorsky Park Pobedy (figure 3.1), it was nevertheless argued that the Zenit Arena could negatively affect the residential climate on the island, as many spectators would cross the residential area on their way to the stadium. The area is considered to be an elitist area, with luxurious apartments where the wealthiest reside in gated communities (figure 3.2). In the proximity of this “prestigious oasis” (DP, 8 December 2016), it was argued, a new gigantic stadium would not be desired. The expected influx of football fans could lead to problematic traffic congestion and increase of noise and trash caused by the “invasion of drunken crowds of football fans” (DP, 8 December 2016; street interview R33). Moreover, some feared that the real estate prices in the neighborhood would drop (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg; interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod; interview spatial lawyer; Galkina, 2 October 2017).

Figure 3.1: Satellite image of the Krestovsky Island, with the Zenit Arena in the west, Krestovsky Park Pobedy in the center and the residential area in the east (Yandex Maps, 2018).

Figure 3.2: Gated community on the Krestovsky Island (own photo) 3.2.5 Fans The interview with the representative of the fan associations clarified that most fans were receptive of a new stadium, as the Petrovsky Stadium did not fulfill their desires. Nevertheless, according to the representative of the fan associations and the former director of Zenit, the fans had some concerns. Many feared an increase of the ticket prices to cover the construction costs. Moreover, the more fanatic supporters were afraid that the fact that the new stadium could receive more spectators would come at the expense of the atmosphere in the new stadium. However, the overall mood towards the Zenit Arena was positive upon the beginning of the construction as, to quote Zenit’s former director, the stadium was “not fit for contemporary football.”

3.3 Concerns during construction The most heated public debate took place during the construction period. The decade of construction has been characterized by an accumulation of scandals, flaws and controversies.

3.3.1 Price increase The Zenit Arena’s most controversial trait has been the exorbitant price increase. When the design was presented in 2005, the costs were estimated at 6.6 billion rubles ($250 million). The ten years of construction witnessed dramatic escalations. In 2016, the authorities announced that the final costs were 42.5 billion rubles (Government of Saint Petersburg, 2016). However, when Alexey Navalny (2017) calculated the costs by adding up all the contracts that went through the system of state procurement, he concluded that the price exceeded 48 billion rubles. Crime Russia did the same and reached a final outcome of 50,666,793,464.23 rubles, or an astonishing $1,375,366,897.74 based on the currency rates at the moments the contracts were concluded. This dramatic cost overrun was caused by both external factors (such as economic and financial crises, the fall of the ruble currency rate, price increase of construction materials etc.), as well as by wrongdoings that were intrinsically related to the construction process.

The major controversy evolved around the largescale practice of corruption surrounding the construction of the Zenit Arena:

- “It was so unbelievably corrupt, you cannot even start to imagine it.” (interview former director Zenit). - “The development of the stadium was a very long and sad scheme of corruption, for years.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg) - “It was one of the most scandalous objects in Saint Petersburg.” (interview urban activist CISR).

Larceny commenced directly after construction started in 2007; general contractor Avant managed to spend five billion rubles (roughly $200 million) on hammering piles and constructing berths for cargo. In 2013, a criminal case was opened against Avant for a 500 million rubles overstating of the estimates (Zhegulev, 2016). Within a year, the estimated costs had risen from $250 million to $970 million, after which the contract with Avant was terminated. However, after a new general contractor (Transstroy) was found, things further escalated. The most high-profile case was the arrest of Marat Oganesyan, vice-governor from 2013 to 2015. On Oganesyan’s recommendation, Transstroy concluded an agreement with TDM for the supply of video screens in February 2014. The screens were never delivered and the advance, valuing 50 million rubles, disappeared through shell firms. Oganesyan was arrested in November 2016 and pleaded guilty to the charges of embezzling 50 million rubles in November 2017 (Crime Russia, 11 July 2016; 16 November 2016; 18 November 2016; 10 January 2017; Zhegulev, 2016; Tass, 2017; RIA Novosti, 8 November 2017). Another criminal case was opened in May 2017 for accepting a bribe valuing 18 million rubles from StroyElektroMontazh, a subcontractor for the stadium’s lighting (Crime Russia, 5 May 2017). Ogansesyan’s successor Igor Albin was tasked to tackle the rampant corruption and sought confrontation with Transstroy; Transstroy wanted to be compensated for increased construction costs, but Albin was unwilling to inflate the budget any further. In July 2016, Transstroy sent an open letter to governor Poltavchenko to express its grievances with Albin. According to the company, Albin “completely discredited our work and ruined the construction management system”, after which Transstroy accused the vice-governor of bullying. However, it appeared that Transstroy had overplayed its hand with its appeal to Poltavchenko and the contract was terminated (Zhegulev, 2016). A new contractor, Metrostroy, was found in August; however, the signing of a 952 million rubles contract with this company later was recognized by the Federal Antimonopoly Service as a violation of the legislation, as the contract was concluded without organizing a tender (Crime Russia, 28 December 2016; 2 June 2017). Whereas an accurate estimation of the total embezzlement during the construction process goes beyond the scope of this thesis, it suffices to state that the level of corruption was exorbitant.

Another reason for the cost overrun was the accumulation of construction errors. From the start, it appeared that the main bureau that was hired to implement Kurokawa’s design and work out the parameters (KBViPS), lacked the experience to do so. For example, it turned out that the foundation of the stadium was not compatible with its weight, and therefore had to be strengthened using a specific, more expensive, type of concrete (Zhegulev, 2016). Kurokawa’s sudden death on 12 October 2007 also complicated matters; according to Moustafaev (2017), Kurokawa’s blueprints had not been translated into Russian, which resulted in repeated misinterpretation of the directives. Most mistakes, however, have been attributed to Transstroy. The poor quality of the retractable

23 roof was one of the biggest issues. Between July 2008 and January 2011, the estimated construction price increased by $200 million because of errors in the roof’s design. Problems persisted afterwards, including leakages that several times resulted in a flooding inside the stadium (figure 3.3). In August 2016, parts of the expensive roof plates were blown away by a summer storm. In response, Albin, aiming to publicly downplay the construction flaws stated this damage was not caused by the storm, but by the cormorants living on the shores of the Gulf of Finland (Meduza, 2017).

The presence of a retractable roof implied that the pitch could not receive the amount of sunrays necessary for maintenance. Therefore, it was opted to construct a pitch that could be rolled out of the stadium. During an inspection in 2016, FIFA concluded that the rails for the roll-out pitch had been crookedly constructed. Transstroy had chosen to construct an aluminum alloy, which affected the vibration level of the pitch so much that it failed to comply with the international standards (interview former director Zenit; Zhegulev, 2016; Tass, 2017) . According to Zhegulev (2016), during a secret test match the pitch resembled a trampoline, with “players jumping around almost like the ball they play”.

Figure 3.3: The 'quality’ of Transstroy's construction works related to the roof (Government of Saint Petersburg, 2016)

The World Cup further increased construction costs. When the World Cup was awarded to Russia, the stadium’s design had to take specific FIFA requirements into account. Some of these requirements differed from the standards according to which already constructed parts of the stadium had been built (interview former director Zenit; interview journalist Championat). The tribunes that had partially been constructed had to be amended to increase the angle of incidence by 15% (Zhegulev, 2016). Also, several new regulations (security, fire safety etc.) required amendments to the stadium’s structure. Furthermore, in 2016, a press center intended for the Confederations Cup was constructed directly next to the stadium – on the one spot where the pitch could be rolled out of the stadium to receive air and sunlight. Thus, it had to be deconstructed and relocated to a nearby plot (interview journalist Championat; interview representative of Zenit’s fans’ associations). According to the local authorities, the cost increase related to the organization of the World Cup and Confederations Cup amounted 9.5 billion rubles (Government of Saint Petersburg, 2016).

3.3.2 Reduced quality of the stadium The dramatic cost overrun has had serious impact on the quality of the stadium. For cost saving reasons, the stadium was stripped off features that were initially planned (Tass, 2017). Initially, Saint Petersburg was supposed to get a very modern and well-equipped stadium, including lounges, facilities for disabled people, food courts etc. (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg). When the stadium was delivered in, it included none of these. Being the exploiter of the Zenit Arena, Zenit established some of these facilities themselves, but the stadium is still very elementary, which is not consistent with the construction price:

- “It is one of the most expensive stadiums in the world and there is no visible reason for that.” (interview urban activist CISR). - “It is not a stadium of world level. You would expect much more for this money. More services and better quality.” (interview spatial lawyer)

Some design errors have not been solved. For example, from approximately 250-300 seats, spectators are unable of seeing one of the goals (figure 3.4). Although 250-300 might be a relatively small amount in comparison with the total capacity good sightlines should be guaranteed for everyone in a stadium of this costs.

Figure 3.4: Sightline during the match Zenit Saint Petersburg - SKA Khabarovsk (own photo 13 May 2018,). 3.3.3 Delay The construction of the Zenit Arena faced tremendous delay. Initially, the target date of finalization of the stadium was set in March 2009, but the first official match was played in April 2017. Reasons for this delay were (among others) Kurokawa’s death, construction failures, corruption and bureaucratic delays. The delay was regarded as one of the main reasons for termination of the contract with Transstroy (Veth, 2017; Tass, 2017).

3.3.4 Social budget Another reason for debate has been the exploitation of the city’s budget for social services to conclude the construction. In August 2016, less than a year before the Confederations Cup, the stadium was far from completion and the budget had been emptied. Saint Petersburg’s authorities reallocated 2.6 billion rubles from the city’s social construction budget to the completion of the Zenit Arena, of which 925 million rubles intended for healthcare facilities, 505 million rubles for schools, 313 million rubles for pre-school educational institutions, 126 million rubles for cultural establishments and 88 million rubles for a residential building in Kolpino (Zhegulev, 2016; Tass, 2017).

3.3.5 Rumors about working conditions Lastly, there has been worry about the working conditions at the site. According to Melnæs (2017), between 2007 and 2017 there has been a constant inflow of migrant workers from Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Moreover, he believes that there were also workers from North Korea. In Melnæs’ article, an anonymous source states that these migrant workers made up for about 80% of the workforce. A significant part of these migrant workers had to work under deplorable working conditions, such as extremely low salaries, long working hours and neglect of safety regulations. According to Lysenko (2017), five workers died during the construction. According to the interviews with the initiator of Krasivy Peterburg and the spatial lawyer, as well as street interviews (R12, R21, R27 and R43), the rumors about the poor working conditions were widespread and persistent.

3.4 Conclusion In sum, the Zenit Arena was not developed without a hitch. Both during the planning as during the construction process, there were reasons for societal concern. Before construction was started, there were questions about the necessity of a new arena, the loss of the monumental Kirov Stadium, the effects of the Zenit Arena on the Primorsky Park Pobedy and the residential area. Furthermore, Zenit’s fans were worried that ticket prices would skyrocket and that the atmosphere would worsen. However, the biggest controversy broke out during the construction of the stadium. The biggest controversy was the dramatic cost overrun caused by corruption, construction errors and regulations related to the World Cup. Furthermore, the enormous delay, exploitation of the city’s social budget and rumors regarding the poor working conditions were reasons of societal concern. As there have been several reasons to be concerned, one could expect civil society to be interested to exert influence, claim its ‘Right to the City’ and participate in the decision-making process. Chapter 4 examines the legal framework for participating in spatial decision-making.

4. Legislative framework

Chapter 4 discusses the framework that determines the legal basis of public participation. This framework concerns legislation in two fields: spatial planning; and public procurement. The entrenchment of public participation in both fields of legislation (at federal and regional level) is outlined.

4.1 The legal grounds of public participation in spatial planning Spatial developments in Russia are grounded in the Urban Development Code (2004, amended dozens of times). It provides the framework for public participation in spatial decision-making, as it considers “participation of citizens and their associations in the implementation of urban development activities” among the basic principles spatial planning. The Code vows to ensure “the freedom of such participation” (article 2, paragraph 5). The most notable attention to public participation is given in article 5.1, proscribing the organization of public hearings on the design and amendments of planning documentations “with a view to observing the human right to favorable living conditions, rights and legitimate interests of the owners of land plots”. The article describes the participants of public hearings and outlines the procedures for the organization and conducting of public hearings. However, article 5.1 was introduced in the Code on 29 December 2017, which implies that during the planning of the new football stadium in Saint Petersburg article 5.1 still had to be written. The Code of that time did not contain an article proscribing the organization and conducting of public hearings as extensive. Nevertheless, public participation was addressed in the ‘old’ version by articles 24, 28, 30, 31, 33 and 46. Article 24, on the preparation and approval of the General Plan, entitles “interested persons to submit their proposals to the draft General Plan” (paragraph 10). Likewise, paragraph 15 of article 24 establishes stakeholders’ right to appeal against the General Plan in court “if their rights and legitimate interests are violated or may be violated following the approval of the General Plan”. Furthermore, article 24, paragraph 11, obliges the authorities to organize public hearings when preparing a General Plan. Those public hearings have to be organized according to article 28, addressing the peculiarities of public hearings on draft General Plans. This article states that “public hearings on draft General Plans […] and on projects that provide for changes to General Plans” are to be held in each city district (paragraph 3). Articles 30, 31 and 33 address the involvement of the public in the design of or amendments to the Rules of Land Use and Development. Paragraph 3.4 in article 30 establishes the provision to hold public hearings in during the development of new Rules or in case of amendments to the current. The procedure for the preparation of new Rules is discussed in article 31. Paragraph 3 determines that the Rules have to take the conclusions on the results of public hearings into account. Within ten days after processing the conclusions of the public hearings, the head of the administration decides on the approval of the draft (paragraph 16). Paragraph 3.5 of article 33 on the procedure for amending the draft Rules gives individuals the right to propose amendments to the Rules in cases where “as a result of application of the Rules […], damage is caused to the stakeholders. Lastly, article 46, paragraph 5 proscribes that Territorial Planning Projects (and proposed amendments) are subject to mandatory consideration at public hearings (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 29 December 2004).

The relevant regional laws are Law 114-20: On the procedure for the participation of citizens and their associations in the discussion and decision-making in the field of urban development in the

27 territory of St. Petersburg (2004) and its successor: Law 400-61: On the order of organizing and holding public hearings and informing the public in the implementation of urban planning activities in St. Petersburg (2006). Law 114-20 specified the public as “any citizens or legal entities whose rights may be violated as a result of proposed urban development, in particular citizens registered not more than 100 meters from the object of urban planning solutions.” (article 1.5). By article1.6-8 of this law, public discussion of spatial planning documentations was mandatory. Public discussion was defined as “a procedure that includes: informing citizens, their associations and legal entities; conducting discussions in public hearings; collection and consideration by authorities of Saint Petersburg of the proposals and remarks of the interested public”. Article 7 established that the public hearings on drafts of spatial planning documentations were to be announced in “printed media used for the publication of official information messages of spatial planning projects”. Public hearings were considered valid if they were attended by a representative of the authorized body, a representative of the Committee on Urban Development and Architecture of Saint-Petersburg and a representative of the developer (article 8.2) . The results of public hearings were of recommendatory nature (Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg, 25 February 2004). In 2006, the law was replaced by Law 400-61, which still is in operation today. Among the additions that Law 400-61 made to its predecessor, were more details about the exhibition of the documents (article 6) and the notification and organization of the public hearings. Article 5, paragraph 1 stipulates that “an information message on the conduct of public hearings on documentation is published by the authorized body and placed on the official site of the urban planning authority of Saint Petersburg or the authorized body on the Internet”. The announcement is also required to be published in printed media. Article 7 proscribes the protocol for the organization of public hearings, including the provision that the organizing authorities should provide for “a room suitable for public hearings […] equipped to demonstrate the documentation in question, to record audio recordings of public hearings, and to meet the accessibility requirements for people with disabilities”. Like its predecessor, Law 400-61 states in article 7 (paragraph 2) that the public hearings are considered valid if a representative of the authorized body, a representative of the Committee on Urban Planning and Architecture and a “representative of the organizer of the preparation of documentation” take part. Regarding the announcement of the public hearings and publication of the conclusions, the law adds the obligation of publishing on the website of the Committee and the organizing authorities (Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg, 5 July 2006).

In sum, the federal Urban Development Code and the two regional laws on the participation of citizens provide for several means of public participation. Most importantly, legislation proscribes the mandatory discussion of spatial planning documents in public hearings and consideration of the results. Moreover, it grants citizens the right to propose amendments to the spatial plans and to appeal against the plans in court. Nevertheless, the legislation has a few shortcomings. For instance, public hearings are validated by the presence of representatives of the authorities’ institutions. However, it does not stipulate a minimum number of civic participants. A public hearing might be declared valid even when no civilians are attending. Furthermore, legislation determines that public hearings should be announced on the website of the Committee on Urban Development and Architecture , the website of the municipal district, and in printed media. However, it does not stipulate in which printed media the announcement should be published; this could be an outlet with a very low circulation. Moreover, invitations to the public hearings are only sent to officials, and not to civic stakeholders. Potential civilian participants in public hearings should inform themselves,

28 instead of being actively invited. Another shortcoming relates to the proscription of the conditions that the venue of the public hearings should meet. The venue should be “equipped to demonstrate the documentation, to record audio recordings of public hearings, and to meet the accessibility requirements for people with disabilities”, but it does not have to measure a minimum size. This gives room for authorities to organize public hearings in venues that are too small to host all interested stakeholders. Lastly, as the conclusions of the public hearings are of advisory nature, which implies that they can easily be ignored. These peculiarities make spatial planning processes controllable for the authorities.

4.2 The legal grounds of public participation during the construction As the Zenit Arena was state-funded, legislation on public procurement should also be assessed. Up to 2012, legislation on public procurement did not proscribe a role for the public. Federal Law 94-FZ: On placing orders on delivery of goods, implementation of works and rendering service for state and municipal needs (2005) established the procedures for tenders, the conditions that participants in tenders have to fulfil and the publication of information on state orders, but it did not include a formal procedure for actively involving the public (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 21 July 2005). Aiming to tackle the rampant corruption in the country, on 7 May 2012, Putin issued presidential decree 596: On the long-term state economic policy. In this decree, it was stated that “a report on the implementation of measures to ensure mandatory public discussion of the placed orders for the supply of goods (works, services) for state and municipal needs in excess of 1 billion rubles” was to be submitted (President of the Russian Federation, 7 May 2012). This resulted in a governmental order in August 2012: Public discussion of the purchase of goods, works and services for state and municipal needs on the sum of above 1 billion rubles. It requested the organization of public discussions on the closure of all state contracts exceeding 1 billion rubles, based on the principles of “openness” and “transparency of public discussion”. Article 2 outlines the procedure by which public discussions should be organized. At the first stage, participants register at the official site for state orders. After registration, participants receive access to the forum, where they can comment on the specifics of the tender. All comments are published on the official site and the organizing authorities have to respond within two working days. After the first stage, a protocol containing all received comments and responses is set up. Based on the analysis of this protocol, the Federal Antimonopoly Service decides whether the tender can be organized. The second stage of the public discussion consists of the organization of public hearings in which the tender is to be discussed, no later than ten days before the application deadline to participate in the tender. All participants in the first stage have to be invited by email; other interested persons are notified by an announcement on the official site for state orders. At the hearings, representatives of the regulatory bodies and the responsible authorities have to be present to validate the hearing. Participants in public hearings have the right to ask questions about the expediency of the order, the reasonableness of the price and the provisions of the bidding documentation. The authorities have to respond to all questions. The results of the hearings are published no later than five days before the application deadline of the tender (Government of the Russian Federation, 2 August 2012). In 2013, the compulsory public discussion of public procurements was stronger anchored in Russia’s legislation by the adoption of Federal Law 44-FZ: On the contract system in the sphere of procurement of goods, works and services for providing state and municipal needs. Article 20, that entered into force on 1 January 2014, established the mandatory public discussion of public procurement. Article 112, paragraph 3 confirms that public hearings (during the period 2014-2016)

29 are only mandatory in case the contract price exceeds one billion rubles. Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 5 April 2013; Ilina, 2017).

Regional legislation on public procurement that included the mandatory organization of public discussion, was non-existent until 2012, when the presidential decree (May) and governmental order (August) requested the authorities to organize public discussions. Although the governmental order was just of advisory nature, the authorities of Saint Petersburg self-imposed the provisions mentioned on their public procurement procedures. Thus, from 1 September 2012, the authorities of Saint Petersburg organized public discussions on procurements exceeding one billion rubles (Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg, 6 September 2012; 22 November 2012). The 2013 Federal Law 44-FZ on public procurement was implemented in Saint Petersburg by governmental decree 1095: On the system of procurement of goods, works, services to meet the needs of St. Petersburg (Government of Saint Petersburg, 30 December 2013).

4.3 FIFA World Cup 2018 and Confederations Cup 2017 This generally holds for state-funded spatial developments. However, according to the member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction, on certain projects, it can be elaborated by additional laws. These laws can eliminate the obligation of public discussion, arguably because it is too time-consuming. This occurs on projects that are considered important to the authorities. According to the member of the Duma Committee’s expert Council, the FIFA World Cup was seen as such:

“Sometimes in Russia, the authorities try to realize ‘special projects’ by ‘special law’. The construction of the stadiums for the World Cup was created by such special law, because it was a very important project for the country’s leadership. Special project, special law.”

This ‘special law’ is Federal Law 108-FZ: On the preparation and holding in the Russian Federation of the FIFA 2018 FIFA World Cup and the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 and amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation (2013). It was introduced to ease the organization of the World Cup and Confederations cup by temporary relaxation of certain legislative acts “with a view to efficient, qualitative and timely preparations for the conduct of sports competitions” (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 7 June 2013). The relevant amendments were adopted on 3 July 2016 by Federal Law 266-FZ: On modifications of Article 1 in the Federal Law “On the contract system in the sphere of procurement of goods, works and services for providing state and municipal needs” and the Federal Law “On the preparation and holding in the Russian Federation of the FIFA 2018 FIFA World Cup and the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 and amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”. These modifications were adopted in the context of the upcoming Confederations Cup. At that time, a number of stadiums were still far from completion, which urged the authorities to hurry in order to be prepared in due time. The amendments introduced the inclusion of clause 8 in article 1, paragraph 2 of Federal Law 44-FZ (which obligated the organization of public discussions on public procurements exceeding one billion rubles), stating that this law would not apply for the

“implementation of construction control in the process of construction, reconstruction and (or) overhaul of infrastructure facilities intended for the preparation and holding of the FIFA 2018 FIFA World Cup and the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017, procurement of goods, works, services related to […] the FIFA 2018 FIFA World Cup and the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017”.

So, from July 2016, the law on public procurement was temporarily (until after the World Cup) declared invalid for contracts related to the construction of the World Cup stadiums. Public discussion of procurements exceeding one billion rubles, was thus no longer mandatory.

In sum, since September 2012, the authorities in Saint Petersburg obliged the organization of public discussions of procurements that amounted more than one billion rubles. In 2013, this provision was introduced in the federal legislation by means of Federal Law 44-FZ, that entered into force in January 2014. However, in July 2016, additional legislation related to the FIFA tournaments placed all public procurements related to those tournaments outside the framework of this law, eliminating the obligation of the organization of public discussions. This leads to conclude that public discussion on public procurements was only mandatory for the procurements that a) exceeded one billion rubles; and b) took place in the period between 1 September 2012 and 3 July 2016.

4.4 Implications for the development of the Zenit Arena Now that the legislative framework for public participation in spatial decision-making has been outlined, its implications for the decision-making regarding the Zenit Arena can be assessed. As argued, for the adoption or amendments of all spatial planning documents, the mandatory organization of public hearings is required. However, the chosen location has a remarkable peculiarity: there was already a stadium in place at the western part of the Krestovsky Island - the Kirov Stadium. It had been entrenched in Saint Petersburg’s spatial planning documentation for over half a century, making the location very convenient: the zoning was already equipped for a stadium, so amending documentation was not necessary. For instance, in the General Plan (figure 4.1), the area was zoned as recreational zone P0 (R0): “a zone of sports facilities and beaches with the inclusion of engineering infrastructure facilities associated with servicing this zone” (Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg, 21 December 2005). In the Rules of Land Use and Development (figure 4.2), the area was also designated as recreational ТР-02 (TR-02): “zone of recreational destination - sports facilities with the inclusion of engineering infrastructure facilities.” As demonstrated (figure 4.3), the Territorial Planning Project that established the construction of the Zenit Arena in 2007, complied with these documents. The specific land plot was given the function P (R), indicating its recreational purpose. Because the stadium plan was in compliance with all the spatial documents and no amendments had to be made, public hearings were not required. According to the coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod, this was “a gap in the law that was convenient for the planning of the new stadium”. The spatial lawyer confirmed that, “there was no problem with the zoning, as a stadium existed there the whole time.” There were just three moments when public hearings related to the zoning regulations of the area had to be organized: in March 2007, when temporary regulations for the construction was to be introduced (State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan,30 March 2007); in June 2014, when amendments to the Territorial Planning Project were proposed (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 26 May 2014a); and in June 2014, when the land surveying had to be discussed (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 26 May 2014b). However, neither of these hearings could directly affect the plans for the stadium, as the decision to construct a stadium had already been taken by March 2007 and the construction was well underway by June 2014. Thus, instead of directly affecting the stadium itself, those public hearings merely discussed amendments made to the surroundings of the Zenit Arena. Evidence of other public hearings on zoning issues related to the Zenit Arena or its surroundings is absent.

Figure 4.1: Functional zoning of the western part of the Krestovsky Island in the General Plan, 2005 (Zemelniy Vopros, 2015)

Figure 4.2: Functional zoning of the western part of the Krestovsky Island in the Rules of Land Use and Development, 2006 (Peterland, 2016).

Figure 4.3: Functional zoning of the western part of the Krestovsky Island in the Territorial Planning Project, 2007 (State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan, 2007).

Regarding the procurement of state contracts, the organization of public discussions was mandatory for procurements exceeding one billion rubles that were concluded between 1 September 2012 and 3 July 2016. Of the total number of contracts during the construction period (46 contracts), only four procurements met both conditions:

1. Contract 0172200002613000184: After a tender, a 12.3 billion rubles contract was signed with Transstroy for the completion of the Zenit Arena. In the tender, Transstroy was the only interested party. (Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, 19 November 2013). 2. Contract 0172200002614000244: A contract valuing 1.8 billion rubles related to the adaptation of the cultural heritage site Primorsky Park Pobedy to the modern use of a corridor to the new stadium, was signed with Transstroy after a tender (Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, 6 November 2014). 3. Contract 0172200002614000248: An additional seven billion rubles contract on the completion of the construction of Zenit Arena was signed with Inzhtransstroy-SPB, a regional branch of Transstroy (Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, 10 November 2014). 4. Contract 2783000234216000036: A contract worth 1.8 billion rubles related to the construction of control posts and entrance gates was signed with the construction company LEOKAM (Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, 6 April 2016).

4.5 Conclusion In sum, during the development of the Zenit Arena, the procurement of four contracts were the only procurements where involvement of the public was formally required. During the planning process, the organization of public hearings was not obligatory, as the construction of the newly planned stadium did not contradict the spatial planning documents that were already in place. Regarding zoning issues, public hearings were only obliged on three occasions. The next chapter portrays the practice of the decision-making process, focusing on the attitude of the authorities towards engaging the public in the decision-making process in the development of the Zenit Arena.

5. Attitude of the authorities

In this chapter, the focus will be shifted to the practice of public participation related to the Zenit Arena. By doing so, the attitude of the authorities towards engaging civil society in decision-making can be portrayed.

5.1 Public hearings and discussions in the case of the Zenit Arena The number of public hearings and public discussions organized by the authorities during the development process of the Zenit Arena has been very marginal. There is only evidence of four public hearings were organized; three related to zoning issues on the territory and one discussing the public procurement of a state contract with Transstroy.

5.1.1 Public hearings on zoning issues The decision to build a stadium on the western part of the Krestovsky Island could be made without consulting the public and the authorities indeed did not organize public hearings. This decision was taken in full compliance with all relevant legislation, thus from the legal point of view there were no objections. However, from the moral point of view, the decision not to engage the public can be considered dubious. The reason why it is not necessary to engage the public in cases where spatial developments do not require amendments to the functional zoning, lies in the assumption that the character of the space will not be altered too much as long as the development fits the current zoning. Despite the fact that in technical terms the Kirov Stadium and the Zenit Arena share the same function, in reality the regular purposes of the two stadiums diverged a lot. Whereas the Kirov Stadium had been out of use for a decade, the Zenit Arena would regularly attract up to 60,000 football fans and concert visitors to the stadium, with all the consequences for the surroundings (e.g. traffic congestion, trash, noise etc.). So, whereas in technically the space was not altered, in practice the area would undergo a huge transformation. Thus, although not legally required, it could be considered ‘the right thing to do’ to consult the public on the plans to construct a new stadium.

Despite the fact that the object of the stadium was not a zoning issue, on at least three occasions, public hearings concerning spatial regulations on the western part of the Krestovsky Island were organized. The first one took place on 19 March 2007 and addressed the introduction of temporary regulations to smoothen the construction (e.g. temporary closure of the park; State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan, 30 March 2007). A second public hearing concerned minor amendments made to the Territorial Planning Project for the western part of the Krestovsky Island. (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 26 May 2014a; 11 July 2014a). Thirdly, also on 30 June 2014, a public hearing was organized discussing the land surveying of the territory’s boundaries. (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 26 May 2014b; 11 July 2014b). However, neither of these hearings addressed the stadium as the main topic of discussion. Rather, during the public hearings, other developments and regulations on the territory were discussed. The decision to construct a stadium had already been made without any public engagement.

5.1.2 Public discussions on public procurements For the procurements of four out of 46 contracts, the organization of public discussions was obliged by legislation. However, for three of those contracts there is no evidence of any public discussion, digitally nor physically. The only procurement for which evidence of a public hearing is available, concerns the 12.3 billion rubles contract with Transstroy for the completion of the Zenit Arena. The tender for this contract, in which Transstroy was the only participant, was organized on 1 November 2013 and the first (digital) stage of the public discussion took place from 2 to 6 October. The second stage of the public discussion – the public hearing – was conducted on 11 October. The contract was concluded on 19 November 2013 (Government of Saint Petersburg, 15 October 2013; Fontanka, 15 October 2013; Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, 19 November 2013).

5.2 Manipulation of public hearings and discussions During the development of the Zenit Arena, the authorities allowed little room for public participation by organizing few public hearings and discussions. However, as demonstrated by the expert interviews, even in cases where the authorities organize public hearings and discussions, this does not automatically imply genuine public participation. Occasionally, the organizing authorities deliberately manipulate public hearings. Although not necessarily illegal, the tricks that authorities occasionally apply make sure that the balance shifts in their favor. Based on the results of the expert interviews, six different ways by which the outcome of the public hearings can be distinguished.

5.2.1 Communication Legislation proscribes that the public hearings should be announced on the website of the organizing authorities, as well as in printed media. However, the legislation does not stipulate in which printed media this announcement should be published. The chosen media might be a popular outlet, but it can also be a local paper with a very low circulation. When opting for such outlet, it becomes harder for citizens to inform themselves about upcoming public hearings:

“Sometimes it is not easy. They can announce a public hearing in some small newspaper and you will never know about it.” (interview spatial lawyer).

As the only obliged place for publication the announcement is the website of the organizing authorities, and people do not tend to visit such website regularly, it is very common to miss out on the published information. Often, civilians only learn about public hearings when they have already taken place (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg; interview spatial lawyer). The announcement of the public hearing of 19 March 2007 was published in Stroitelny Ezhenedelnik (Building Weekly), the information magazine of the Agenstvo Stroitelnikh Novosti (Agency of Construction News) (State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan, 30 March 2007). Although the exact circulation is unknown, by checking on the agency’s social media accounts, the agency’s societal reach can be estimated. As of July 2018, its accounts are followed by 2492 subscribers on VK, 730 on Facebook, 232 on Twitter and 33 on Youtube (Agenstvo Stroitelnikh Novosti, 2018). These numbers strongly suggest that the agency’s reach is limited in a city of approximately 5 million inhabitants. The public hearings on 30 June 2014 were announced in the Information Bulletin of the Administration of Saint Petersburg, which is a governmental and not a mass media outlet (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 11 July 2014ab). The public hearing on the public procurement of the contract with Transstroy on 11 October 2013 was only announced on the website of state procurements (Government of Saint Petersburg, 15 October 2013).

Moreover, by legislation, inviting government officials to public hearings is mandatory. However, legislation does not proscribe the mandatory invitation of civilian stakeholders. Actively informing direct stakeholders about public hearings and inviting them is not required and the authorities deliberately choose not to invite societal stakeholders to the table (interview spatial lawyer; interview member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction). As the authorities put no effort in inviting societal stakeholders, societal actors have to inform themselves.

Inadequate communication makes it difficult for civilians to find out about public hearings. As a consequence, public participation in the public hearings can be very low. The legislation does not form any obstacle; a low turnout does not affect the validity of the public hearings. These communicative manipulations lead to conclude that the authorities willingness to inform the public:

- “There is not much communication. Authorities do not provide a lot of information about developments.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg). - “There are such abuses when they hide information and do not inform the public about meetings.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg). - “In Russia, the authorities are not so communicative.” (interview representative fans’ associations). - “The authorities are professional. Professional enough to perform such procedure. But no one can find this information.” (interview spatial lawyer). - “They never communicate with us.” (street interview R18).

5.2.2 Date and time A second way to manipulate public participation, is by organizing public hearings on inconvenient dates and times. For example, in many cases, public hearings are organized during working hours, excluding many working people from participation (interview spatial lawyer). Sometimes, authorities decide to organize public hearings on special days. In the case of the Gazprom skyscraper, a public hearing was organized on 1 September 2007 at 09.00. In Russia, 1 September is a widely celebrated day on schools as it marks the start of the schoolyear. Thus, people having school-going children were excluded from participation (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod). According to the coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod, the choice of date and time strongly depends on the attitude of the administration of the particular district):

- “In my district [Kalininsky], they always do hearings after 18 PM, so they care about the people. The Gazprom skyscraper was planned in Krasnogvardeysky district. There, they always have hearings at 09.00 or 10.00 , so that nobody can come there.”

For the Petrogradsky district, where the Zenit Arena is located, this appears to be not such a stringent issue: the public hearings related to the development of the stadium were conducted at appropriate dates and times: on Monday 19 March 2007 at 18.00, on 14 June 2014 at 18.00 and 19.00 and on 11 October 2013 at 18.00 (State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan, 30 March 2007; Government of the Petrogradsky District, 26 May 2014ab; Government of Saint Petersburg, 15 October 2013).

5.2.3 Venue Public hearings can be manipulated by the choice of the venue. According to the member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction, deliberately opting for a venue that is too small to host all the interested parties is a widespread practice. In Saint Petersburg, this occasionally occurs, e.g. when the Gazprom skyscraper was discussed; despite the extraordinary public interest in the case, the authorities of the Krasnogvardeysky district decided to organize the public hearing in the ordinary hall for public hearings, which can accommodate 100 people. Although it cannot be verified that the authorities deliberately opted for this venue in order to exclude criticasters from participation, local urban activists strongly suspect this was indeed the case (interview spatial lawyer; interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod; interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg; interview urban activist CISR).

Regarding the development of the Zenit Arena, it seems that the authorities did not opt to organize public hearings in too small a venue. The public hearings on 19 March 2007 and 30 June 2014 were, as usual, organized at the municipality hall of the Petrogradsky district (State State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan, 30 March 2007). Likewise, the public hearing on 11 October 2013 was held in the premises of the Committee on Urban Development and Architecture (Government of Saint Petersburg, 15 October 2013).

5.2.4 Buying support Russian authorities are highly suspected of paying certain to participate and express their loyalty to the authorities’ plans, by direct payments, raising their pensions etc. (interview former director Zenit; interview spatial lawyer; interview city architect; interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg. The member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction recalls a public hearing that she attended:

“There was a hearing at 19.00. But at 17.00 a special group of people, mainly municipal and governmental employees, came and occupied all places in the room. And when the public wanted to join this meeting, it was impossible because there was no place to sit. The organizers said: ‘everything is full, it’s impossible to come. Later you can read the results of this discussion in the paper’.”

The hiring of civil servants, students, societal ‘activists’ and other “grey mice” (interview former director Zenit) to attend public hearings and express support, is considered a widespread practice:

- “to change the balance in the meeting and to force an advantage.” (interview city architect) - “to occupy all spots and exclude critical participants” (interview member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction - “to follow the interests of the city.” (interview spatial lawyer - “to support any proposal made by the authorities.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg) - “to make a particular opinion prevail.” (interview city architect) - “to manage a majority.” (interview city architect)

Although suspicions about this practice are persistent, it is practically impossible to verify. In the case of the Zenit Arena, there are no indications that the buying of support in public hearings has

37 occurred. Nevertheless, regular participants (urban activists for Krasivy Peterburg, Zhivoy Gorod and CISR, as well as the spatial lawyer) in spatial decision-making processes all claim that it occurs..

5.2.5 Subjective mediation In a well-functioning collaborative planning process, it is assumed that a mediator ensures a fair discussion and equal discussion. However, this assumption can be utopian. Regular participants in public hearings in Russia (the city architect, spatial lawyer, urban activists for CISR, Krasivy Peterburg, Zhivoy Gorod) claim that subjective mediation can bias the hearing:

- “They just say: ‘We do not have time, we cannot accept any other comments’. Of course, you can submit your proposals or objections in writing, but then they probably will not read it.” (interview spatial lawyer). - “People come up with comments, and the authorities tell them to put it on paper. They just avoid any discussion at that time. […] They change the discussion into some kind of bureaucratic process that excludes all critical opinions. People cannot respond.” (interview city architect).

Such mediation disturbs the dynamics of any public hearing, as the governmental opinion predominates the debate. There is no room for critical commenting, which undermines genuine participation of the public.

5.2.6 Ignoring comments Although the authorities are legally obliged to consider all comments and proposals, this is not always taken seriously. According to the spatial lawyer and coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod, the authorities easily ignore comments and proposals that are not in line with their own plans. The coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod referred to the case of the Gazprom skyscraper, where thousands of letters by angry citizens were simply ignored. The coordinator of Krasivy Peterburg stated that “the authorities only listen at the times when it is convenient for them.”

Thus, when these kinds of manipulative tools are employed, processes that seem to engage the public in spatial decision-making processes, might in practice not be as collaborative as they may seem. The “mechanisms to make it winnable for one particular party […] are a widespread practice in Russia.” (interview spatial lawyer). Accordingly, sometimes public hearings are only organized because it is legally required to include the public:

- “They have to do it, but they do it in the way that is most convenient for themselves.” (interview city architect). - “All these kinds of events are not real. They are organized because they must be organized by law.”(interview representative fans’ associations). - “Of course we have formal procedures to discuss spatial plans, but this is only formal.” (interview member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction) - “It is a special game.” (interview spatial lawyer)

In these cases, the engagement of the public in spatial decision-making through organizing public hearings merely serves to grant the plan some ‘democratic’ legitimization, rather than to genuinely involve civil society .

5.3 Authorities’ attitude towards engaging society In Russia, many spatial projects are treated from an expert-elitist approach, relying on the elite and with little trust in society. However, in some projects this expert-elitist approach is more dominant than in others. Depending on the significance of the project, there are indeed examples of spatial decisions that were taken following genuine collaboration with engaged civilians.

5.3.1 Expert-elitist approach Spatial planning in Russia can be considered an expert-elitist practice, characterized by dominance of the elite and an overall distrust towards societal actors. The authorities are the main actor in spatial developments and initiate most spatial plans. The city architect acknowledges that decision-making on all levels Russia is centered around a strong boss who views himself as the rightful decision- maker, based on experience or mandate:

“It is very much focused on a person. If that person sees himself as a very ‘bossy boss’, then that will affect the process. […] It is a way of self-definition: ‘I am in charge, I take the important decisions myself’.”

In Saint Petersburg, this was particularly visible in Matvienko’s development-minded spatial policies. During her term, constructions were booming and several megaprojects were launched with the aim of attracting (foreign) investments. The construction boom ended when current governor Poltavchenko took office, which underscores the dependence on the strongman’s personal wishes when it comes to spatial developments (interview spatial lawyer; interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod; interviews urban activists CISR). The expert-elitist approach takes the form of strong distrust towards the public, as demonstrated by the arsenal of measures that the authorities occasionally take to prevent civilians from participating and to skew the outcome of public hearings. This distrust is deeply rooted in Russian governance. Authorities do not see civil society as an equal partner that they can negotiate an agreement with:

- “They see these people as a strange mass of stupid people who do not know what they are talking about. Government representatives just do not believe it is possible to talk with this folk.” (interview urban activist CISR). - “Matvienko was very much favoring the developers. She thought we [civil society] were the enemy.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod)

Although urbanists and planning theorists believe that every citizen has a ‘Right to the City’, in the technocratic expert-elitist perspective, society is not considered an equal conversation partner. The idea of increasing the quality of the spatial plan by collaborating with multiple societal actors, has not gained much ground in Russian governance. It led the city architect to conclude that

“In Russia, there is a very different understanding of ‘the civilian’ than in the West. There is a ruling class at the top, and the rest is far below.”

5.3.2 Significance Notwithstanding the distrust in society’s potential value in decision-making processes, there are remarkable differences regarding openness and level of public engagement in different projects. Some projects witness a (relatively) high degree of public participation. The extent to which the authorities allow civil society to participate and contribute varies, depending on the significance of the particular project. In decision-making processes on the level of the neighborhood, there is a relatively high level of pluralism, public participation and constructive dialogue (interview spatial lawyer; interview city architect; interview urban activists CISR). The coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod referred to a plan to construct a 25-storey building in a park in her neighborhood. After consulting with residents, vice-governor Albin decided to annul the plans. However, on issues that exceed the level of the neighborhood or city district, in which the stakes are higher, the decision-making process is much less open and transparent. This depends on the interests of several forces in the city: landowners, project developers, investors and political forces. When certain political forces enter the arena, the decision-making process closes down to the public. The extent of real public participation decreases, as the political order aims to manage the governance process in order to achieve its political goals as conveniently as possible.

From the start, the Zenit Arena has been a strategic object; at first for governor Matvienko as a flagship project in her desired ‘world city’, later, when Russia was awarded the organization of the World Cup, it became a federal project directly related to the image of the president (interview member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction; interview professor HSE; interview spatial lawyer; interview former director Zenit). Related to this, was the fact that some influential oligarchs (most significantly Deripaska) were involved and exploited the construction of the stadium to enrich themselves (Zhegulev, 2016; interview coordinator Krasivy Peterburg; interview spatial lawyer. Investigating their exact role demands thorough research – possibly it will never be clarified – and therefore goes beyond the scope of this thesis: at this place, it suffices to conclude that their involvement closed the doors for the public to engage in the decision-making process:

- “Can you object to the president in Russia? I do not think people can say anything against this project in general.” (interview spatial lawyer) - “To go against a friend of Putin, you need to be a very powerful man to withstand the threats that are coming at you.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg).

5.4 Conclusion In sum, the extent to which the authorities engaged civil society in the decision-making process concerning the development of the Zenit Arena was limited. There is evidence of four public hearings that had been organized). The expert-elitist approach has been dominating the decision-making around the development of the Zenit Arena. The case demonstrates a very low interest in involving the public in decision-making. Reasons for this are a very low trust in society’s capacities to contribute anything to policy-making and the high stakes of the project for regional and federal authorities, as well as for businessmen with Kremlin-connections. The last chapter focusses on the interest among the public to participate.

6. Attitude of society

This last chapter focusses on the civilian perspective towards participating in decision-making. In conclusion, the relationship between authorities and society will be analyzed.

6.1 Public response to developments Public interest in spatial issues in Russia highly depends on awareness; in Russia, it is not evident that civil society knows what is going on in their city. Then, in case people are aware, it is important to what extent people are concerned about it enough to get actively engaged. In chapter 3, several issues related to the planning and construction of the Zenit Arena were mentioned. Here, the extent to which these issues activated people and led them to become engaged in the matter is analyzed.

6.1.1 Responses to issues during planning Before the construction started, questions related to the necessity of a new stadium, the demolition of the Kirov Stadium, the effects of the stadium on the adjacent Primorsky Park Pobedy and residential area and the effects for Zenit’s supporters were raised. However, the results of the expert interviews and street interviews demonstrate that none of these issues sparked significant public response and formed no inducement to get actively engaged. Urban activists for Zhivoy Gorod, Krasivy Peterburg and CISR acknowledged that although questions concerning the necessity of the stadium emerged in society after the plans were announced, these questions did not awake public engagement. People questioned the necessity of a new stadium, but this concern was not translated into active engagement. According to an urban activist at CISR, this phenomenon occurs regularly when spatial developments that are deemed unnecessary are announced:

“This happens all the time. They announce development plans that make you think: do we really need this?, but at the end of the day people accept it.”

The demolition of the Kirov Stadium was a second potential trigger of public interest. However, resistance to the demolition did not enjoy broad societal support. Instead, it were mostly professional architects who were protesting to prevent demolition. According to the coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod, the lion’s share of society stood indifferent towards the demolition of the stadium due to absence of understanding:

“Nobody cared. It was not some pretty palace. You have to understand something about the architecture to understand this.”

Thirdly, the development of the Zenit Arena was thought to negatively affect the adjacent Primorsky Park Pobedy. Judging by the expert interviews and street interviews, although some were afraid that the park would indeed be damaged by the stadium, this did not result in active engagement:

- “I was not happy with the construction of a stadium next to the park, but there was nothing we could do about it.” (street interview R17) - “The park itself is an important place and people care about the developments, but eventually hardly anyone resisted.” (interview urban activist CISR).

The inflow of football fans on the island was thought to negatively affect the livability on the island; specifically, traffic congestion, security issues, noise and garbage were felt as potential threats to the residential climate on the island. However, although the completion of the stadium indeed resulted in an increase of influx of visitors and traffic congestions, the attitude of the inhabitants towards the idea of a new stadium in their direct proximity can be characterized by apathy and inertia:

- “The inhabitants of the Krestovsky Island are mostly rich people, the elite. I think they do not care.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod). - “Some roads are almost permanently closed. But for the inhabitants this seems not to be a big problem. They live in their bubble.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg). - “People living there are rich and most of them have several apartments in the city. During particular events they just move to another one. This really was not an issue for them. In general, they are not very active in spatial developments.” (interview spatial lawyer).

The fans of Zenit had several concerns related to the atmosphere, facilities in the stadium and ticket prices, which they expressed via several fans’ associations that represented the interests of the fans in the new stadium. However, this interaction was not with the authorities, but with the exploiter of the stadium, FC Zenit. According to the representative of the fans’ associations, there was “zero communication” with the local authorities. Thus, the participation of the fans related to the Zenit Arena happened outside of the formal planning decision-making framework and was limited to consultation with Zenit.

In sum, although civil society was aware of the issues related to the planning of a new stadium on the western part of the Krestovsky Island and questions were indeed raised, these issues did not trigger massive public resistance to the development at the time. The potential issues related to the planning of the planning were felt, but not considered a reason to become actively engaged.

6.1.2 Responses to controversies during construction During the construction of the Zenit Arena, public awareness of the wrongdoings related to the stadium increased. Dissatisfaction grew, particularly concerning the enormous price increase, corruption and the excessive delay. Although the exact costs remain unknown, to society it was clear that the cost increase was excessive. To the urban activists, this was particularly worrisome because the stadium was partly financed from the city budget. However, the understanding that the public budget is made up of tax payers’ money is not widely shared among society:

- “There is no understanding that public money is in fact money for the community.” (interview former director Zenit). - “People do not see the public budget as their own tax money.” (interview city architect).

This became particularly apparent in 2016, when 2.6 billion rubles was allocated from the city’s social construction budget to the completion of the stadium. Although this budget targeted social investments, it was used to complete the stadium as the Confederations Cup was rapidly approaching. According to the city architect, spatial lawyer and urban activists for Zhivoy Gorod, Krasivy Peterburg and CISR, society easily accepted the allocation of the social budget as it understood the urgency of the completion of the stadium.

The biggest scandals related to the construction of the Zenit Arena concerned the rampant corruption. As widespread as corruption maintains to be in Russia, the Zenit Arena is considered an outstanding case due to the size and scale of the embezzlements. Nevertheless, judging by the expert interviews, the societal response to it was rather tame. Corruption is such a well-known phenomenon that civil society is used to it:

- “This is standard practice in Russian. We have such cases in every region, in every city, at the federal level.” (interview representative fans’ associations). - “I think about corruption, people think that there is so much of it you cannot do anything.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod) - “It’s not the only corruption case. It’s one among many. It’s only interesting because it’s the most expensive one. Otherwise it’s just one of many and people react in the same way. We all know it happens.” (interview urban activist CISR) - “It is quite a typical situation in Russia when projects increase drastically in price and money is being stolen. It is normal for Russia.”(interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod) - “I was not shocked by the corruption events during the process of construction. In Russia, they usually steal.” (interview initiatior Krasivy Peterburg).

Habituation leads people to react cynically to corruption cases. In the case of the Zenit Arena, this became apparent by the amount of jokes about corruption related to the construction. Particularly, the arrest of former vice-governor Oganesyan was a popular topic:

- “There were also a lot of jokes about the man in power [Oganesyan] going to jail.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg) - “I think most of the people liked Oganesyan’s arrest. They liked the idea that someone finally got caught. There was a lot of malicious pleasure.” (interview professor HSE Moscow) - “Well, it [corruption] is basically a joke already.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod).

Although society expressed disapproval of corruption, people consider corruption to be a part of the system (interview spatial lawyer). Corruption is not seen as an issue that can generate active public engagement. In the words of a urban activist at CISR, “for corruption people would not go out on the street.” Although society responded cynically and apathetically to the corruption related to the Zenit Arena, this is not to say that people are indifferent towards corruption. In fact, it is a topic of societal concern.

Another reason behind the enormous increase of the construction costs referred to the many construction failures during the ten years of construction. Civil society reacted to these construction errors in a similar fashion to its response to the corruption: people were not surprised that so many things went wrong. The construction errors and the reduced quality of the stadium that resulted from them, were taken for granted by the biggest part of society. The citation below symbolizes the typical response:

“That is Russia. A lot of things are done not by professionals.” (interview representative fans’ associations) .

The tremendous eight year delay also stirred some disapproval. However, as had been the case with the corruption and the construction errors, there has been a general acceptance that this is simply part of the system:

- “It is normal that projects are not completed in due time.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod.) - “Everyone thought it [the delay] was unbelievable, but that is Russia.” (interview former director Zenit). - “I am still wondering how this [delay] has been possible, but apparently these things happen here.” (interview journalist Championat).

Lastly, during the construction process there were persistent rumors about deplorable working conditions for the (migrant) construction workers, including rumors about fatal casualties. This caused some societal stir; however, as there was no evidence, this did not last very long (interview journalist Championat).

In sum, although civil society was aware of the issues related to the construction of the Zenit Arena and dissatisfaction with the stadium grew, these issues did not trigger active public resistance to the project. The potential issues related to the construction of the stadium thus were felt, but not sufficient to generate public interest in participation.

6.1.3 Informal activism As a consequence of the limited public interest, informal public activism was low. It can be concluded from the expert interviews and street interviews that society did not reach out to the streets. The citations below show that the absence of protest movements and demonstrations is a persistent element of Russian civic culture and that even the corruption, delays and mistakes of the Zenit Arena could not trigger people to organize themselves:

- “I do not know what has to happen, what kind of case could boast big protests.” (interview representative fans’ associations). - “We were joking that people will go out on the street if they will be restricted to grill. Not for abstract things.” (interview urban activist CISR).

The only public domain in which society expressed its opinion on the Zenit Arena, was the internet. As the stories of corruption, mistakes and delays slowly trickled down, the Zenit Arena became a popular topic of online mockery, particularly memes mocking the corruption, construction mistakes and delay (figure 6.1) (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod; interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg). An example of this, was the creation of Twitter account ‘Krestovsky Cormorant’ after Albin said that the damage to the roof in 2016 was caused by cormorants. This account, that pretended to represent the cormorant responsible for the damage, became a platform for mockery (Meduza, 14 September 2016). Thus, informal activism was limited to online discussions, jokes and mockery. In the words of the coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod: “It’s just complaining on VK, and the people who complain don’t do real things […]People protest, but people protest from their sofa. ”. However, this is not to say that society was unaware of or indifferent towards the developments. As the former director of Zenit put it:

“The ordinary citizen knows about everything, has an opinion about everything, but that’s where it ends.”

Figure 6.1: "Piter in 2050" (Fishki, 31 December 2016). 6.2 Formal public participation As described in chapter 5, there were at least four occasions during the development period of the Zenit Arena on which the public could formally participate: three public hearings related to zoning issues and one discussing the public procurement of a state contract with Transstroy. Here, the actual extent of public participation in these hearings will be assessed.

6.2.1 Awareness of formal possibilities As explained, it can be difficult to become aware of upcoming public hearings. In the case of the Zenit Arena, the societal awareness of public hearings was extremely low. None of the respondents in the street interviews was able to remember any public hearing in relation to the Zenit Arena. Even among the direct stakeholders and the expert community, there has been very low awareness about the organization of the public hearings:

- “I never heard that there were public hearings. That is a surprise for me. […]Even in the expert community, I have never heard of this.” (interview urban activist CISR). - “I do not know about any public hearing.” (interview former director Zenit). - “Maybe they [the authorities] did organize public hearings, but I did not know about them.” (interview representative fans’ associations

The low public awareness can partly be attributed to lack of public interest to participate. However, according to the urban activists for Zhivoy Gorod and Krasivy Peterburg, public awareness of the public hearings on the Zenit Arena was low because the authorities wanted it to be low:

- “There are only specific cases when the authorities want the public to be aware and to actively participate. The stadium is not such a case.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod).

- “I do not think that there were many public hearings, because it was a strategic object and they just wanted to start building it, without explaining why.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg).

6.2.2 Participation in public hearings Low awareness translated into an extremely low public participation in public hearings. The public hearing on 19 March 2007, discussing the introduction of temporary development regulations, was attended by nine civilians. They asked questions related to the electricity grid; the square in front of the stadium; the capacity, purpose and ownership of the stadium; a reterritorialization of the zoning area; the engineering calculations; the new ring road; the accessibility of the stadium; and “the architectural memory of the Kirov Stadium”. During the hearing, the authorities provided answers to the questions and “considered the proposals”, after which the draft regulations were “reviewed, discussed and approved.” (State Research and Design Center of Saint Petersburg General Plan, 30 March 2007).

The public hearing on the amendments of the Territorial Planning Project for the western part of the Krestovsky Island (30 June 2014), had an even smaller attendance: only two civilians showed up at this meeting. This led one of the participants to question the validity of the hearing:

“The Chkalovskoe municipality has 22,000 inhabitants. There are only two people here, so I think that there is no reason to recognize this public hearing” (participant of the public hearing, in: Government of the Petrogradsky District, 11 July 2014a).

However, according to the authorities, there was no reason to declare the hearing as invalid:

“The number of participants is not established by law. The procedure for conducting hearings is fully observed. When holding public hearings, all interested parties were provided with equal opportunities for expressing their opinions. We believe that there is no reason to recognize public hearings held as not in accordance with the law.” (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 11 July 2014a).

The public hearing on the land surveying, also on 30 June 2014, was attended by five civilians. Their questions and proposals concerned the legality of the draft land survey; the applicability of the draft land survey with other planning documents; the transport-pedestrian scheme; the ring road; and the protection of cultural heritage on the territory. The authorities replied to all questions; however, according to one participant, the authorities responded in a unsatisfactory manner:

“It is impossible to accept these public hearings, since those present have not received reasoned answers to the questions asked.” (participant of the public hearing, in: Government of the Petrogradsky District, 11 July 2014b).

The authorities replied that the participant’s comment should be “submitted in writing and included in the conclusion of the results of public hearings” (Government of the Petrogradsky District, 11 July 2014b). Thus, no substantive reaction was given. All the proposals made by the participants were rejected and the draft land survey was approved.

The last public hearing, on 11 October 2013 at the Committee on Urban Development and Architecture, referred to the 12.5 billion rubles contract with Transstroy. According to the authorities, “based on the results of the open public hearing, it was decided to continue the

46 procedure for placing the order without making changes.” (Government of Saint Petersburg, 15 October 2013). Allegedly, this decision was taken after consulting civilians. In reality, no civilian showed up. The hearing was organized as the second stage of public discussion within the legislative framework of public procurement (chapter 4). This first stage, which included the online discussion of the state order, took place from 2 to 6 October and received only one comment: a user with the nickname ‘kolomen23’ answered ‘yes’ to all the questions (Argumenty i Fakty, 15 October 2013; Fontanka, 15 October 2013).

So, although there were some formal events in which the public could have participated, actual public participation has been marginal to even zero. Moreover, besides the very small number of civilian participants, those who were present complained that the public hearings did not encompass any real public participation, as they felt their remarks were not seriously considered.

6.3 Public attitude towards participation: Six types The low participation in public hearings related to the Zenit Arena is narrowly connected to the attitude of the public towards participating in formal frameworks. During the research, six types of attitudes towards participation were identified. It should be stressed that this classification is not an attempt to classify society into a societal order, but merely serves as a tool to analyze public attitudes towards participation.

6.3.1 “Policy is for policy-makers”-type The “policy is for policy-makers”-type believes that policies should be designed by an elite with a professional background. It sees no role in decision-making for society, as it believes that ordinary civilians lack knowledge and experience to make the right decision. This type does not view itself as expert of public space and stakeholder who is entitled to a ‘Right to the City’. The following citations demonstrate such attitude:

- “People want someone to take the decisions for them. They always want some kind of tsar.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod) - “That is none of my business.” (street interview R2) - “This topic is far away from me. I can only talk to you from my position as a football fan.” (street interview R15). - “Why should I participate? I am not a planner nor an architect.” (street interview R41)

This group cannot easily be activated by any event, for their reason not to participate is deeply rooted in their notion of what society should be like and the role division between civil society on the one side and authorities on the other.

6.3.2 “They won’t listen anyway”-type The “they won’t listen anyway” type is characterized by a high degree of skepticism towards the authorities. According to this group, participating in formal processes is useless as they feel that the authorities will not allow them to genuinely participate and contribute. This group is highly cynical towards any institutionalized civic engagement:

- “Many people just do not want to be a part of bla-bla-bla demonstrations.” (international urban activist CISR).

- “Most people I talked to, do not believe that something depends on them. They say: ‘it is so bad, but if they have decided, they will do it anyway.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod). - “In many projects, people make the consideration: ‘how big is the chance of succeeding if we resist to it now?’. They are always calculating.” (interview city architect). - “They know it cannot make any difference anyway. (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg).

This group is not totally dismissive of participation in general, but the dominance of the authorities in governance networks prevents them from participating. This type can only be activated once they view the organizing authorities as a cooperative partner, instead of the enemy. Currently, this notion is absent in this group.

6.3.3 “This doesn’t concern me”-type The “this doesn’t concern me”-type refers to the attitude to be only interested in participating in matters in which someone has a direct interest. For this group, an issue should be tangible and visible in order for them to participate; issues such as corruption and wasting of public money are considered too opaque to be of direct concern to an individual. To many people, the Zenit Arena was not of direct concern:

- “If something affects someone directly, he is more inclined to engage than in the case of a stadium somewhere at the edge of the city.” (interview city architect). - “This has nothing to do with me.” (street interview R27) - “I am not a football fan, so I am not interested.” (street interview R3).

This type can be activated once he/she acknowledges the direct interest he/she has in the matter.

6.3.4 “Interested, but too much effort”-type The “interested, but too much effort”-type, refers to someone who is intrinsically interested to participate, but fails to do so because there are too many obstacles. In particular, lack of time is considered a reason not to participate, as revealed during the interviews:

- “People are just busy, they have no time. Some of them share the values and slogans, but when you work five days and have a family, you just do not have time for these kinds of things.” (interview urban activist CISR). - “For some, being active is almost a job of its own” (interview city architect). - “I would have participated in the public hearings about the Zenit Arena, if I would have had had time.” (interview representative of fans’ associations). - “People have no time and energy to participate.” (interview professor HSE Moscow).

This type could become active if the barriers to participate would be lowered. However, as was revealed in chapter 5, occasionally the organizing authorities deliberately put those barriers in place, to prevent civilians from participating.

6.3.5 “Interested, but don’t know how”-type A fifth type is characterized by willingness to become engaged, but is frustrated to do so by a lack of knowledge and experience. They are deterred by the bureaucratic nature of formal decision-making processes: it simply is too difficult to find out what to do (interview spatial lawyer; interview urban activists CISR). This can be attributed to the authorities’ attitude towards public participation:

“If people would be informed about public hearings on forehand, they would be ready to participate. Because we see that people are interested in what happens in their city. People want to be a participating civil society.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg).

Even when civilians are intrinsically motivated to participate, their lack of knowhow, experience and connections may prevent them from participating. As the authorities fail to deliver this, civic platforms (e.g. Krasivy Peterburg, Zhivoy Gorod) see for themselves role to play in informing and educating civil society.

6.3.6 “I actively participate”-type Lastly, there are the active participants. This group can be divided into those people who participate on personal title out of individual interest, and people who collectively organize themselves, engage in manifestations and try to influence the spatial agenda. The latter can be described as urban activists, meaning:

“people, mostly young, with absolutely different disciplinary backgrounds, but concerned about the development of the city, the urban space and urban development and committed to improve it.” (interview urban activist CISR )

Urban activism in Saint Petersburg is on the rise. Most urban activists are dealing with specific aspects of spatial developments (preservation of monuments; green areas; sustainability; (public) transport. Krasivy Peterburg acts as an all-encompassing platform. It bundles all information on upcoming and previous spatial developments (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod; interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg; interview urban activists CISR).

There are two types of spatial projects that yield significant public participation: spatial objects that directly infringe upon people’s lives; and spatial objects that endanger the identity of the city. In situations where people consider the planned policy to directly affect their own lives, a significant degree of public engagement and formal participation can be noted:

- “People are very concerned about the roads, because there, problems are quite visible. And it concerns everyone, because everyone drives, walks, bikes and thinks: ‘what is wrong with this?’. Infrastructural projects are very participatory.” (interview urban activist CISR). - “At the level of the neighborhood, there is a lot of participation. These concern very basic, personal objects. If someone wants to construct a playground, it does not take any effort to initiate a project and find supporters.” (interview city architect). - “Topics of interest can be very elementary. A mother walking in the park with her baby, finding there are no benches to rest. Someone who is drinking a coffee to go and cannot find a garbage bin on the street. People show real interest in these low-level problems.” (interview coordinator Krasivy Peterburg). - “People are interested to participate in cases that directly concern their private wellbeing; issues that come close to the heart and stomach.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod)

The relatively high degree of public participation in such projects has two explanations. First, as such projects are very relatable to the public, public interest is high. Second, the low significance to the authorities of such projects, implies that entry barriers to participate in decision-making processes for these projects are relatively low.

The other projects that spark above average public engagement, are the projects that are considered to damage the identity of the city. The Gazprom skyscraper was the most iconic example of such; in the words of the professor at HSE Moscow, the demonstrations were “bigger than anything” and the initiator of Krasivy Peterburg referred to it as “the second revolution, after the one in 1917.”. The project activated more than ten thousand civilians to get out on the street, driven by their local patriotism and cultural pride. The idea of a skyscraper in the historical, city center was felt “as if the authorities spit in their faces” (interview professor HSE Moscow. The coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod noticed an unprecedented public interest to engage:

“People in St. Petersburg love their city and it really hurt when the skyscraper was planned. We just felt it was wrong and something was needed to be done.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod).

Since the first demonstrations in spring 2007, the Marches for the Defense of Saint Petersburg evolved into largescale activism that continued even after the skyscraper had been relocated; nowadays, Marches for the Defense of Saint Petersburg are organized on annual basis, addressing all kinds of spatial developments. The Gazprom skyscraper has been a landmark case for public engagement, but it was not the only occasion when society showed remarkable interest to protect the city identity. For instance, in 2017 thousands of people demonstrated against the transfer of control over the iconic Saint Isaac’s cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church. To the activists, the cathedral was a public good that represented architectural and cultural heritage and for that purpose should remain accessible to everyone (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod; interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg; interview urban activist CISR; interview spatial lawyer).

Although there are topics that seem to appeal to the public and grassroots urban movements have emerged, the “I actively participate”- type remains marginal compared to the non-participants in the city. The majority of society is “not ready to participate en masse.” (interview member of the expert Council for Urban Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations and Construction). For example, the coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod –by all respondents considered to be the most active and significant NGO concerned with preservation of monuments - said that the NGO has “a few dozens” of regular supporters. She estimated the maximum reach of Zhivoy Gorod to be 400-500 civilians – with the notable exception of the case of the Gazprom skyscraper. According to all respondents, Krasivy Peterburg is the biggest and most influential spatial developments-related civic platform in the city. Its VK group enjoys approximately 55.000 followers and up to 100.000 people can be reached. Although not insignificant, in a city of approximately five million inhabitants, this group is still marginal.

The lack of informal activism and public participation in formal decision-making processes related to the Zenit Arena exemplifies this marginal public interest to participate. Although society had several reasons to be concerned and get engaged, informal engagement and formal participation were very limited. Not even the rampant corruption and the exploitation of public budgets were considered to be of direct interest to the lion’s share of the urban society. The city architect explained this lack of interest by pointing at the distance between a project such as the Zenit Arena and the public:

“If something concerns someone directly, he is more inclined to get involved then in the case of a stadium somewhere at the edge of the city.” (interview city architect)

So, the Zenit Arena was considered to be neither of direct interest to civil society in Saint Petersburg, nor was it a project that endangered the identity of the city since the chosen location was outside of the city center. This helps explaining why public participation in this development project was so low, even though awareness about the plans and development was high.

In sum, the majority of Saint Petersburg’s civil society is not active in formal and informal discussions on spatial developments. There are several reasons not to participate: some think of decision-making to be an elitist activity, in which no role for society can be envisaged; some are highly cynical towards the authorities; others are simply not bothered about the particular topic; some think it takes too much effort to participate; and others lack knowhow, experience or connections to participate. According to the professor at HSE Moscow, “about most developments, 80-90% of the citizens are not engaged at all.”. Public participation in the particular case of the development of the Zenit Arena was low, because most people did not consider the object to affect their own interests, nor to be a violation to the city’s identity.

6.4 Society and state Based on the results of the research, three major conclusions about the society-state relationship can be drawn: 1) Collaboration between state and society in policy-making depends on the extent of toleration of involving societal actors by the authorities; 2) Interaction between state and society highly depends on personal connections; 3) The distrust among state actors towards society is mutual.

6.4.1 Collaborative planning: as much as tolerated Although examples of real public participation and collaboration between society and state are notable and significant, a nuance should be made. As the results of the interviews with societal actors demonstrate, collaboration between state and society in policy-making goes as far as the authorities tolerate. There are examples of spatial projects showing a high degree of public engagement and constructive dialogue between state- and societal actors. In particular, this holds for low-key spatial projects in the neighborhoods, such as playgrounds, parks and green services:

“In projects in my neighborhood, I have been at meetings with officials who listened to me and made the decisions I wanted them to.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod).

However, when the significance of the project increases, the authorities gradually tolerate society less and less to participate. In projects with higher stakes, public participation therefore is low. This was demonstrated by the case of the development of the Zenit Arena, as the authorities organized only a minimal amount of public hearings and public attendance in these hearings was very low.

When the decision-making process concerning the Zenit Arena is assessed according to the five features of a collaborative process in Healey’s definition, as described in chapter 1, it can only be concluded that this process did not meet the preconditions of a true collaborative process. First, a collaborative planning process requires including all stakeholders. This has not been the case as participation from societal actors has been minimal. Second, the planner should act as mediator, considering all concerns and interests of the various stakeholders. In the case of the Zenit Arena, the planner did not seriously consider all interests, as the societal respondents in the interviews, as well as participants in public hearings, did not feel like their opinions were seriously taken into account. The third precondition determines that decisions have to be reached following deliberation with all

51 stakeholders. This has not been the case, as the few public hearings did not demonstrate any constructive dialogue between authorities and society. Moreover, the decision to construct a stadium was taken without any deliberation with societal actors, since the legislation did not require the authorities to do so. The fourth (the consideration of local contexts) and fifth (governmental responsibility) features were present. However, given the absence of the first three features, this does not suffice to qualify the decision-making as a collaborative process.

6.4.2 Personal relations A second element of the state-society relationship, is the distance between society and authorities dependence on personal relations to get in a dialogue with state actors. It has become apparent that the authorities are often inaccessible to the public. The complexity of the formal bureaucratic structures prevents civilians from participating, as many do not know how to get in touch with the authorities, let alone how to hold a constructive dialogue. According to the coordinator of Zhivoy Gorod, the extent of participation and the chance of succeeding is highly dependent on personal connections. She referred to a case when an apartment block was planned in a park near her home. After appealing to the authorities multiple times without any response, she wrote to Nobal laureate Zhores Alferov, who then wrote a letter to Poltavchenko, after which she was invited to speak to vice-governor Albin and the project was cancelled. During the development of the Zenit Arena, personal connections were crucial for communicating with the authorities:

“Sometimes you would need to go through five, six doors before you got to the right person. That was not so easy. Luckily, in my function, my connections allowed me to skip a few doors.” (interview former director Zenit).

6.4.3 Mutual distrust In chapter 5, it was concluded that spatial decision-making processes are characterized by distrust among the decision-makers towards civil society. This distrust is mutual. Based on the results that were derived from the expert-interviews, “there is a huge distrust towards everything that has to do with the authorities” (interview city architect). According to the spatial lawyer and the urban activists for Zhivoy Gorod, Krasivy Peterburg and CISR, there is a vivid feeling among society that “people do not want to have to do anything with anything official, because they do not trust the intentions.” (interview coordinator Zhivoy Gorod). This is grounded in a deep-rooted suspicion of state officials to pursue their self-interest, rather than the interests of the city. The mutual distrust between authorities on the one side, and society on the other, has resulted in a clear division of state and society (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg; interview urban activist CISR):

“There is a huge chasm between state and society. The authorities are on the top and the population is on the bottom.” (interview initiator Krasivy Peterburg)

The conclusions of this research can be incorporated in the model of the hourglass society (Ljubownikow et al., 2013), introduced in chapter 1. Public participation follows a similar pattern, with a clear role division between state- and societal actors and a small area of interaction. Figure 6.2 schematically displays spatial decision-making processes in Saint Petersburg using the model of the hourglass society, adjusted to the six different societal attitudes towards public participation and the different levels of spatial decision-making. The lower half of the hourglass displays the biggest obstacle to public participation on the side of the public: the more participatory the attitude, the

52 smaller the relative proportion of this attitude in society, indicating that the “I actively participate”- type is only a marginal group compared to the disengaged mass. Interaction between society and state takes place in the area where the top of the bottom half (the “I actively participate”- type in society) meets the bottom of the top half (the municipal level of decision-making). As the level of significance of the spatial project increases, decision-making is distanced further from society, diminishing the possibilities for even the most active societal actors to formally participate.

Figure 6.2: Hourglass-structure of spatial decision-making processes (own work) 6.5 Conclusion In sum, although societal awareness of the development of the Zenit Arena and the issues that were connected to it was high, public interest to claim the ‘Right to the City’ and participate in decision- making processes has been zero to marginal. From societal point of view, the absence of activism can be explained through five particular societal attitudes towards public participation. Firstly, some civilians view policy-making as a state activity in which society has no role at all to play, for it lacks

53 experience, knowledge and resources to do so. Secondly, cynicism towards authorities discourages civilians to participate in state-dominated decision-making processes. Thirdly, some tend to engage only in cases that directly affect themselves or the identity of the city. Fourthly, people who might be interested to participate, are discouraged because the benefits do not outweigh their effort. Fifthly, some are prevented from participation by their lack of understanding how to do so. Projects that show remarkable public engagement, either concern the micro-level of the individual, or the macro- level of city identity. Regarding the relationship between society and state, three important conclusions can be derived from the research. In some spatial projects, such as projects at the level of the neighborhood, there is notable collaboration between state and society. However, real collaboration goes as far as the authorities tolerate society to take part. This extent of tolerance depends highly on the scope of the project; small-scale projects in neighborhoods tend to be collaborative in nature, whereas public participation in projects of significance to the city (or even federal administration) is kept low. Lastly, mutual distrust leads to a distinct division between society and state.

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the involvement of civil society in governance processes in Russia by analyzing the formal decision-making around the development of the Zenit Arena in Saint Petersburg as a case study, aiming to answer the following research question:

What does the development of the Zenit Arena reveal about the involvement of civil society in Russia in decision-making and the relationship between society and state?

Although planning theorists disagree on the desired form, there is consensus that well-performing planning processes should contain at least some level of civilian engagement. Collaborative planning processes ought to contain five features: 1) inclusion of all stakeholders; 2) fair consideration of all interests; 3) decisions are made by means of deliberation; 4) local contexts are taken into account; 5) the authorities are responsible for the course of the process. Collaborative planning is necessary to comply with civilians’ Right to the City. Also, it can enhance the quality of the spatial project. For civil society, it can help shaping self-awareness. Moreover, civil society can act as watchdog in a planning process.

The analysis of decision-making related to the Zenit Arena provided valuable insights in the nature of Russian governance. Despite the bumpy development of the Zenit Arena, that from the start was characterized by controversies and irregularities, public participation in the formal decision-making was marginal to even zero. During the ten years of development, there were very few public hearings and even fewer real participation. The extent of public participation in Russia appears to depend on two factors: tolerance of the authorities towards society and society’s affinity with a specific project. On the side of the authorities, there is an expert-elitist approach to decision-making based on an overall distrust in civil society’s capacities, as well as on the significance of a project to political and economic actors. In the case of the development of the Zenit Arena, which was a project of high significance at both local and federal levels, this expert-elitist attitude has been visible in the near absence of public hearings or consultations organized by the authorities. Legislation does not form an obstacle to this expert-elitist approach, as it seems to be designed to make decision-making controllable. During the planning of the Zenit Arena, the spatial legislative framework enabled the authorities to take the decision to construct a stadium on the Krestovsky Island without any consultation with society. During the construction of the Zenit Arena, specific legislation introduced for the FIFA World Cup extended the authorities’ control over the decision-making process by further limiting society’s possibilities to participate in discussions on public procurements. Moreover, in cases– not just the Zenit Arena – where public hearings are organized, legislation leaves room to the authorities to apply manipulative tricks to steer the public hearings in the desired direction. Lastly, authorities easily decide to ignore comments and proposals that are not to their liking. So, judging be the preconditions that determine a collaborative planning process, it can only be concluded that the decision-making concerning the Zenit Arena was not nearly collaborative and participatory, since: 1) not all the stakeholders – such as concerned civilians – were actively included in the decision-making process; 2) not all interests and concerns were seriously considered; 3) decisions were not made on the basis of deliberation among equals, as there has been almost no deliberation.

However, the almost total absence of formal public participation in the decision-making concerning the Zenit Arena cannot solely be attributed to the expert-elitist attitude of the authorities. On the side of society, there was a clear lack of interest to engage, both formally and informally. Despite the fact that there were numerous reasons to engage in formal decision-making processes and awareness of the developments related to the Zenit Arena was high, awareness of the organization of public hearings and participation in the hearings were extremely low to even zero, as the civilian turnout at the public hearings demonstrate. It was concluded that there are six different public attitudes towards public participation: 1) people may not participate because they believe decision- making is solely a governmental activity; 2) people may not participate because they lack trust in anything related to the government; 3) people may not participate because they do not consider the particular project to concern them 4) people may be interested, but not participate due to the perceived amount of effort it takes; 5) people may be interested, but participate due to a lack of knowledge; 6) people may participate because they are concerned about something. The latter group, however, is very marginal in comparison to the non-participants. Projects that do tend to yield higher public participation either affect someone at the individual level, or damage the identity of the city. The Zenit Arena was neither of such project.

These findings have revealed three important characteristics of the relationship between state and society: 1) Collaboration between state and society in policy-making depends on the extent of toleration of involving societal actors by the authorities, which in turn depends on the amount of value the elite attaches to the respective project; 2) Interaction between state and society highly depends on personal connections; 3) There is a mutual distrust between state and society. Notwithstanding cases that do show significant levels of public participation – most notably projects on the level of the neighborhood and other projects that directly affect individuals’ lives –, decision-making tends to be not collaborative and participatory in nature, as both authorities and society lack interpersonal trust that is necessary for deliberation.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, it needs to be borne in mind that this research analyzed just one particular development project – although here and there references were made to other projects. The research can therefore be elaborated by focusing on more cases for a coherent comparative analysis. Or, following Zubaverich’s angle of approach, the research could be expanded to other cities or regions to analyze patterns of regional differentiation of public participation. Another underexposed aspect in this research has been the socioeconomic profile of civilian (non-)participants in governance. With this in mind, further research is needed in order for more definite conclusions on the nature of decision-making processes in Russia and the role that civil society plays.

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Appendix: Topic lists semi-structured interviews

Topic list semi-structured interview with member of the Expert Council for Town Planning Activity under the State Duma Committee on Land Relations

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions Function To determine the specific expertise - What is your professional background in spatial planning? of the interviewee and/or his/her - What is your function as a member of the Expert Council? link with the Zenit Arena Spatial planning system To assess the development of Pre-1991 - What were the effects of the centralization of spatial planning? Russia’s spatial planning system and - What were the effects of the focus on industrialization? its current functioning 1990s - How did a new urban context affect spatial planning? - How did the entrance of market relations affect spatial planning? - What happened when the state withdrew Contemporary Russia - What are the most significant developments in today’s spatial planning system? - What is the role of civil society in contemporary spatial planning? - Have the most significant problems been overcome? - Which problems are still persistent? Urban Development To assess Russia’s legislative General provisions - What does it mean when an object is considered to be of ‘federal Code (2004) framework for spatial decision- significance’? making - Are there exemptions for the federal cities? Provisions related to public - To what extent is public participation guaranteed by article 5.1? participation - What were the provisions for public participation prior to the introduction of article 5.1 in 2017? Shortcomings - What has not been established by the UDC? - Are there exceptions? Attitude of authorities To assess the willingness of the Dominance of elite in decision- - To what extent are decision-making processes dominated by the towards engaging the authorities to include the public in making process (local) elite? public decision-making - What is the importance of personal relations? Compliance with legislation - Do the authorities always organize public hearings when they are legally obliged? 65

Interest to include the public - Are authorities interested to collaborate with civil society? Participatory culture of To assess the current state of civil Civil society in Russia - Is Russian civil society aware of the legal instruments of civil society society and its interest to participate participation? in spatial decision-making - Is civil society interested to participate in spatial decision-making? - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - In what kinds of projects does civil society actively participate? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog? Civil society in Saint Petersburg - What is specific for civil society in Saint Petersburg? - What are the spatial issues of interest to Saint Petersburg’s civil society? Development of the To assess the peculiarities and topics Planning process - Were there any difficulties in the planning of the stadium? Zenit Arena of concern related to the Construction process - What were the reasons for the delay? development of the Zenit Arena - What were the reasons for the costs overrun? - What was the extent of corruption? Public response to the To assess the reaction of civil society Public response to the planning - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena in Saint Petersburg to the of the Zenit Arena - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the Zenit development of the Zenit Arena and Arena? public interest to participate - Were people interested to participate in the planning process? Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? construction-related aspects of - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision-making processes? - Were people interested to engage in informal activism?

Topic list semi-structured interview with professor School of Urbanism at the Research University Higher School of Economics Moscow

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions Function To determine the specific - What is your professional background in spatial planning? expertise of the interviewee his/her link with the Zenit Arena Civil society in Saint Petersburg To assess the current state of Awareness of Right to the - Is civil society in Saint Petersburg aware of its urban function? civil society and its interest to City participate in spatial decision- Activism - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. making demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog? Interest in formal - Is civil society interested to participate in spatial decision-making? participation Issues of interest To assess the spatial issues - In what kinds of projects does civil society actively participate? that are of concern to civil - Are these topics specific for Saint Petersburg? society in Saint Petersburg - Is the case of the Gazprom center an instrumental case?

Public response to the Zenit To assess the reaction of civil Public response to the - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? Arena society in Saint Petersburg to planning of the Zenit Arena - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? the development of the Zenit - Were people interested to participate in the planning process? Arena and public interest to Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? participate construction-related aspects - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? of the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision-making processes? - Were people interested to engage in informal activism?

Topic list semi-structured interview with city architect

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions Function To determine the specific expertise of - What is your professional background in spatial planning? the interviewee his/her link with the - What is your experience in spatial planning in Saint Petersburg? Zenit Arena Attitude of authorities To assess the willingness of the Dominance of elite in - To what extent are decision-making processes dominated by the (local) towards engaging the authorities to include the public in decision-making process elite? public decision-making - What is the importance of personal relations? Compliance with - Do the authorities always organize public hearings when they are legally legislation obliged? Interest to include the - Are authorities interested to collaborate with civil society? public Participatory culture of To assess the current state of civil Civil society in Russia - Is Russian civil society aware of the legal instruments of participation? civil society society and its interest to participate in - Is civil society interested to participate in spatial decision-making? spatial decision-making - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - In what kinds of projects does civil society actively participate? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog?

Civil society in Saint - What is specific for civil society in Saint Petersburg? Petersburg - What are the spatial issues of interest to Saint Petersburg’s civil society? Public response to the To assess the reaction of civil society in Public response to the - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena Saint Petersburg to the development planning of the Zenit - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? of the Zenit Arena and public interest Arena - Were people interested to participate in the planning process? to participate Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? construction-related - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? aspects of the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision-making processes? - Were people interested to engage in informal activism?

Topic list semi-structured interview with spatial planning lawyer

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions Function To determine the specific - What is your professional background in spatial planning? expertise of the interviewee his/her link with the Zenit Arena Spatial planning system To assess the development of Pre-1991 - What were the effects of the centralization of spatial planning? Russia’s spatial planning system - What were the effects of the focus on industrialization? and its current functioning 1990s - How did a new urban context affect spatial planning? - How did the entrance of market relations affect spatial planning? - What happened when the state withdrew Contemporary Russia - What are the most significant developments in today’s spatial planning system? - What is the role of civil society in contemporary spatial planning? - Have the most significant problems been overcome? Which problems are still persistent? Legislative framework To assess the federal and regional Legislation on public - What are the provisions that guarantee public participation in federal legislative framework for spatial participation in spatial legislation? decision-making planning processes - What are the provisions that guarantee public participation in regional legislation? - Are there exceptions? - What are the shortcomings of the legislation? Legislation on public - What are the provisions that guarantee public participation in federal participation in public legislation? procurements - What are the provisions that guarantee public participation in regional legislation? - Are there exceptions? - What are the shortcomings of the legislation? Civil society in Saint To assess the current state of civil Awareness of Right to the - Is civil society in Saint Petersburg aware of its urban function? Petersburg society and its interest to City participate in spatial decision- Activism - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. making demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog? Interest in formal - Is civil society aware of the possibilities to participate in formal procedures? participation - Is civil society interested to participate in formal procedures? 69

Attitude of authorities To assess the willingness of the Role of elite in decision- - To what extent are decision-making processes dominated by the (local) elite? towards engaging the authorities to include the public making process - What is the importance of personal relations? public in decision-making Compliance with legislation - Do the authorities always organize public hearings when they are legally obliged?

Interest to include the - Are authorities interested to collaborate with civil society? public Public hearings To assess the practice of public Organizational procedure - How are public hearings organized? hearings in spatial planning - Does this procedure guarantee that the public hearings are conducted in a decisions fair way? Conduct - How are public hearings conducted? - Does this guarantee a fair process? Processing of results - How are the results of the hearings processed? - Is the opinion of civic participants genuinely taken into account? Public response to the To assess the reaction of civil Public response to the - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena society in Saint Petersburg to the planning of the Zenit Arena - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? development of the Zenit Arena - Were people interested to participate in the planning process? and public interest to participate Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? construction-related aspects - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? of the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision-making processes? - Were people interested to engage in informal activism? Decision-making To assess the process of the Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the planning process of the Zenit process of the Zenit decision making regarding the planning process Arena? Arena Zenit Arena and the extent of - Were there public hearings organized? public participation in it - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society? Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the construction process of the construction process Zenit Arena? - Were there public hearings organized? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Topic list semi-structured interview with urban activist NGO Krasivy Peterburg

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions

Function To determine the specific expertise of - What is your personal background in spatial planning? the interviewee his/her link with the - What are the activities of Krasivy Peterburg? Zenit Arena - What is the reach of the organization?

Civil society in Saint Petersburg To assess the current state of civil Awareness of Right to the - Is civil society in Saint Petersburg aware of its urban function? society and its interest to participate in City spatial decision-making

Activism - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog? Urban activists - Who are active in spatial planning issues? - Are there more organizations like Krasivy Peterburg?

Interest in formal - Is civil society aware of the possibilities to participate in participation formal procedures? - Is civil society interested to participate in formal procedures? Issues of interest To assess the kinds of spatial issues Spatial issues - What spatial issues are of concern to civil society in Saint that are of interest to civil society Petersburg? Identity - What is the importance of city identity to civil society in Saint Petersburg? Attitude of authorities towards To assess the willingness of the Role of elite in decision- - To what extent are decision-making processes dominated by engaging the public authorities to include the public in making process the (local) elite? decision-making - What is the importance of personal relations? Interest to include the - Are authorities interested to collaborate with civil society? public Public hearings - How are public hearings organized? - How are public hearings organized - Does this procedure guarantee that the public hearings are conducted in a fair way? 71

- How are the results of the hearings being processed? - Is the opinion of civic participants genuinely taken into account?

Public response to the Zenit To assess the reaction of civil society in Public response to the - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit Arena Saint Petersburg to the development planning of the Zenit Arena Arena? of the Zenit Arena and public interest - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the to participate Zenit Arena? - Were people interested to participate in the planning process? Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? construction-related aspects - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? of the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision- making processes? Were people interested to engage in informal activism? Decision-making process of the To assess the process of the decision Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the planning Zenit Arena making regarding the Zenit Arena and planning process process of the Zenit Arena? the extent of public participation in it - Were there public hearings organized? - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society? Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the construction construction process process of the Zenit Arena? - Were there public hearings organized? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Topic list semi-structured interview with urban activist NGO Zhivoy Gorod

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions

Function To determine the specific - What is your personal background in spatial planning? expertise of the interviewee - What are the activities of Zhivoy Gorod? his/her link with the Zenit Arena - What is the reach of the organization?

Civil society in Saint Petersburg To assess the current state of Awareness of Right to the City - Is civil society in Saint Petersburg aware of its urban civil society and its interest to function? participate in spatial decision- making Activism - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog? Urban activists - Who are active in spatial planning issues? - Are there more organizations like Krasivy Peterburg?

Interest in formal participation - Is civil society aware of the possibilities to participate in formal procedures? - Is civil society interested to participate in formal procedures? Issues of interest To assess the kinds of spatial Spatial issues - What spatial issues are of concern to civil society in Saint issues that are of interest to civil Petersburg? society Identity - What is the importance of city identity to civil society in Saint Petersburg? Attitude of authorities towards To assess the willingness of the Role of elite in decision-making - To what extent are decision-making processes dominated engaging the public authorities to include the public process by the (local) elite? in decision-making - What is the importance of personal relations? Interest to include the public - Are authorities interested to collaborate with civil society?

Public hearings - How are public hearings organized? - How are public hearings organized - Does this procedure guarantee that the public hearings are conducted in a fair way? - How are the results of the hearings being processed? - Is the opinion of civic participants genuinely taken into account? Public response to the Zenit Arena To assess the reaction of civil Public response to the planning - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit society in Saint Petersburg to of the Zenit Arena Arena? the development of the Zenit - Did the demolition of the Kirov stadium provoke public Arena and public interest to response? participate - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? - Were people interested to participate in the planning process?

Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? construction-related aspects of - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision- making processes? - Were people interested to engage in informal activism? Decision-making process of the Zenit To assess the process of the Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the planning Arena decision making regarding the planning process process of the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena and the extent of - Were there public hearings organized? public participation in it - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society? Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the construction process construction process of the Zenit Arena? - Were there public hearings organized? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Topic list semi-structured interview(s) with urban activists Center of Independent Social Research

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions

Function To determine the specific - What is your personal background in spatial planning? expertise of the interviewee - What are your activities in the CISR? his/her link with the Zenit Arena - What was your project ‘City in Dialogue’ about?

Civil society in Saint To assess the current state of Awareness of Right to the City - Is civil society in Saint Petersburg aware of its urban Petersburg civil society and its interest to function? participate in spatial decision- making Activism - Is civil society interested to engage in informal practices (e.g. demonstrations, protests, urban activism)? - To what extent can civil society be a critical watchdog? Urban activists - Who are active in spatial planning issues? - Are there more organizations like Krasivy Peterburg?

Interest in formal participation - Is civil society aware of the possibilities to participate in formal procedures? - Is civil society interested to participate in formal procedures? Issues of interest To assess the kinds of spatial Spatial issues - What spatial issues are of concern to civil society in Saint issues that are of interest to civil Petersburg? society Identity - What is the importance of city identity to civil society in Saint Petersburg? Attitude of authorities To assess the willingness of the Role of elite in decision-making - To what extent are decision-making processes dominated towards engaging the public authorities to include the public process by the (local) elite? in decision-making - What is the importance of personal relations? Interest to include the public - Are authorities interested to collaborate with civil society?

Public hearings - How are public hearings organized? - How are public hearings organized - Does this procedure guarantee that the public hearings are conducted in a fair way? - How are the results of the hearings being processed? - Is the opinion of civic participants genuinely taken into account? Public response to the Zenit To assess the reaction of civil Public response to the planning - How did civil society react to the plan to develop the Zenit Arena society in Saint Petersburg to of the Zenit Arena Arena? the development of the Zenit - Did the demolition of the Kirov stadium provoke public Arena and public interest to response? participate - Were there public concerns about the plan to develop the Zenit Arena? - Were people interested to participate in the planning process?

Public response to the - How did civil society react to the delay? construction-related aspects of - How did civil society react to the cost overrun? the Zenit Arena - How did civil society react to the corruption? - Were people interested to participate in formal decision- making processes? - Were people interested to engage in informal activism? Decision-making process of To assess the process of the Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the planning the Zenit Arena decision making regarding the planning process process of the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena and the extent of - Were there public hearings organized? public participation in it - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society? Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the construction process construction process of the Zenit Arena? - Were there public hearings organized? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Topic list semi-structured interview with former sportive director FC Zenit Saint Petersburg

Topic Aims Subtopics Questions

Function To determine the specific - What was your function at FC Zenit? expertise of the interviewee - To what extent where you involved in the stadium project? his/her link with the Zenit Arena

Interests of FC Zenit To assess the stakes of FC Zenit Idea of a new stadium - What were the reasons behind the idea of a new stadium in the development of the - Who initiated the new stadium? stadium - Did FC Zenit need a new stadium Ownership - Who is the owner of the new stadium? Gazprom connection - What was the link between FC Zenit and Gazprom? - What has been Gazprom’s role in the development? Interests of FC Zenit’s fans To assess the interests of FC Communication with fans - How did FC Zenit communicate with its fans? Zenit’s fans in the development - Was there active collaboration with the fans to fulfill their of the new stadium and the way demands? FC Zenit tried to take them into Attachment to former stadium - Did the fans want to leave the old Petrovsky stadium? - Were fans attached to the Petrovsky or to the older Kirov account stadium? Demand for new stadium - Did the fans want a new stadium? Ticket prices - What were the concerns of the fans about the effects on the ticket prices? - How did FC Zenit take these concerns into account? Atmosphere - What were the concerns of the fans about the effects on the atmosphere? - How did FC Zenit take these concerns into account? Interests of inhabitants of To assess the interests of the Communication with inhabitants - How did FC Zenit communicate with the inhabitants of Krestovsky Island inhabitants of the Krestovsky Krestovsky Island? Island in the development of the - Was there active collaboration with the inhabitants of Krestovsky Island to fulfill their demands?

new stadium and the way FC Livability - Were the inhabitants of Krestovsky Island concerned about Zenit tried to take them into the effects of the Zenit Arena on the livability? account - How did FC Zenit take these concerns into account?

Primorsky Park Pobedy - Were the inhabitants of Krestovsky Island concerned about the effects of the Zenit Arena on the Primorsky Park Pobedy? - How did FC Zenit take these concerns into account? Interaction with authorities To assess the interaction In general - How does FC Zenit communicate with the local authorities? between FC Zenit and Saint - Does FC Zenit actively collaborate with the local Petersburg’s authorities authorities? The case of the Zenit Arena - How did FC Zenit communicate with the local authorities with regards to the Zenit Arena? - Did FC Zenit actively collaborate with the local authorities with regards to the Zenit Arena?? Societal concerns during the To assess the issues that were Delay - How did society respond to the delay? construction process of the Zenit present in society related to the Arena construction of the Zenit Arena Cost overrun - How did society respond to the cost overrun? - How did society respond to the construction failures? Corruption - How did society respond to the cases of corruption? - How did society respond to the arrest of vice-governor Oganesyan? Workers’ rights - How did society respond to the rumors about the violation of construction workers’ rights? Exploitation of social budget to finish - How did society respond to the fact that 2.6 billion rubles construction were allocated from the city’s social budget to finish the construction of the stadium? Development process Zenit To assess the process of the Decision-making during the planning - To what extent was the public involved in the planning Arena decision making regarding the Zenit process process of the Zenit Arena? Arena and the extent of public - Were there public hearings organized? participation in it - Did FC Zenit actively participate? - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society? -

Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the construction construction process process of the Zenit Arena? - Were there public hearings organized? - Did FC Zenit actively participate? - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Topic list semi-structured interview with representative of FC Zenit’s fans’ associations

Topic Aims Subtopic Questions

Function To determine the specific - What is your personal interest in the Zenit Arena? expertise of the interviewee his/her link with the Zenit Arena

Fans’ organizations To assess how FC Zenit’s fans Structure - How are the fans organized in associations? organize themselves and serve their own interests Membership - How many members do the fans’ associations have

Activities - What kinds of activities do the fans’ associations do?

Interaction between fans To assess the ways the fans In general - How do the fans communicate with FC Zenit? and FC Zenit interact with FC Zenit and how - Is there active collaboration with FC Zenit to fulfill the fans’ they collaborate to serve their demands? interest The case of the Zenit Arena - How did the fans communicate with FC Zenit regarding the development of the Zenit Arena? - Was there active collaboration with FC Zenit to fulfill the fans’ demands? Interaction between fans To assess the ways the fans In general - How do the fans communicate with the authorities? and Saint Petersburg’s interact with the local authorities - Is there active collaboration with the authorities to fulfill authorities and how they collaborate to the fans’ demands?

serve their interest The case of the Zenit Arena - How did the fans communicate with the authorities regarding the development of the Zenit Arena? - Was there active collaboration with the authorities to fulfill the fans’ demands? Interests of fans in Zenit To assess the interests and Demand for new stadium - Was there a demand for a new stadium among the fans? Arena concerns of the fans regarding - Why (not? the development of the Zenit Emotional attachment - Were the fans emotionally attached to the Petrovsky Arena? stadium? - Were the fans emotionally attached to the old Kirov stadium? 80

Ticket price - What were the concerns of the fans related to the ticket prices? Atmosphere - What were the concerns of the fans related to the atmosphere in the stadium? Societal concerns during To assess the issues that were Delay - How did society respond to the delay? the construction process of present in society related to the the Zenit Arena construction of the Zenit Arena Cost overrun - How did society respond to the cost overrun? - How did society respond to the construction failures? Corruption - How did society respond to the cases of corruption? - How did society respond to the arrest of vice-governor Oganesyan? Workers’ rights - How did society respond to the rumors about the violation of construction workers’ rights? Exploitation of social budget to finish - How did society respond to the fact that 2.6 billion rubles construction were allocated from the city’s social budget to finish the construction of the stadium? Development process Zenit To assess the process of the Decision-making during the planning - To what extent were the fans involved in the planning Arena decision making regarding the process process of the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena and the extent of - Were there public hearings organized? public participation in it - Were the fans aware of public hearings? - Were the fans interested to actively participate? - Did the fans actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve the fans?

Decision-making during the construction - Were there public hearings organized? process - Were the fans aware of public hearings? - Were the fans interested to actively participate? - Did the fans actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve the fans?

Topic list semi-structured interview with journalist Championat

Topic Aims Subtopic Questions

Function To determine the specific expertise - What is your professional expertise in relation to the cas of the interviewee his/her link with of the Zenit Arena? the Zenit Arena

Societal concerns during the To assess the issues that were Necessity - Did society think that the city needed a new multipurpose planning process of the Zenit present in society related to the stadium Arena plans of the development of the Zenit Arena Costs - What did society think about the initial costs of the stadium?

Public funding - How did society respond to the fact that the stadium was to be funded by public money? Societal concerns during the To assess the issues that were Delay - How did society respond to the delay? construction process of the present in society related to the Zenit Arena construction of the Zenit Arena Cost overrun - How did society respond to the cost overrun? - How did society respond to the construction failures? Corruption - How did society respond to the cases of corruption? - How did society respond to the arrest of vice-governor Oganesyan? Workers’ rights - How did society respond to the rumors about the violation of construction workers’ rights? Exploitation of social budget to finish - How did society respond to the fact that 2.6 billion rubles construction were allocated from the city’s social budget to finish the construction of the stadium?

Decision-making process of the To assess the process of the Decision-making during the planning - To what extent was the public involved in the planning Zenit Arena decision making regarding the process process of the Zenit Arena? Zenit Arena and the extent of - Were there public hearings organized? public participation in it - Was civil society interested to actively participate? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Decision-making during the - To what extent was the public involved in the construction construction process process of the Zenit Arena? - Were there public hearings organized? - Were the authorities interested to involve civil society?

Current mood in society To assess the current societal Zenit Arena - What does society think about the stadium nowadays? opinions about the Zenit Arena - What do the fans think about the stadium nowadays and the organization of the FIFA FIFA World Cup - What does society think about the organization of the World Cup World Cup?