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Under Fire Israel’S Enforcement of Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip

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Under Fire Israel’S Enforcement of Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip Under fire Israel’s enforcement of Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip Under fire Israel’s enforcement of Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip January 2014 Acknowledgements: Researched and written by Laura Ribeiro Rodrigues Pereira with support from Guillaume Charron and Emilie Arnaud. This document has been produced with financial assistance from theUK ’s Department for International Development (DFID). Its contents are the sole responsibility of, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Pales- tinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), and do not in any way reflectDFID ’s position on any of the issues covered. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is a world leader in the monitoring and analysis of the causes, effects and responses to internal displacement. For the millions world-wide forced to flee within their own country as a consequence of conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations, and natural hazards,IDMC advocates for better responses to internally displaced people, while promoting respect for their human rights. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) is a non-governmental organisation based in Gaza city. PCHR is dedicated to protecting human rights, promoting the rule of law and upholding democratic principles in the occupied Palestinian territory. Thanks to Jeremy Lennard for editorial assistance. Cover photo: Home destroyed in central Gaza in November 2012. Credit: Emad Badwan Published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Chemin de Balexert 7-9 CH-1219 Châtelaine (Geneva) Switzerland Tel: +41 22 799 0700 / Fax: +41 22 799 0701 www.internal-displacement.org This publication was printed on paper from sustainably managed forests. Table of contents Executive summary . 4 Recommendations . .6 Acronyms . 8 List of figures and tables. .9 Historical timeline . .10 Introduction. .14 1. Political and humanitarian context . .16 1.1 Historical developments and context . .16 1.2 Impact of ARA on displacement in Gaza . .20 1.3 Impact of ARA on Gaza’s health, education and water sectors . .21 1.4 Developments following the November 2012 ceasefire agreement . .22 2. ARA on land. .23 2.1 Israeli definition of ARA on land . .23 2.2 Impact of Israel’s enforcement of ARA on land . .25 3. ARA at sea . .34 3.1 Israel’s definition of ARA in Palestinian waters . 34 3.2 Impact of Israel’s enforcement of ARA at sea . 35 4. Legal analysis . 43 4.1 Applicable law . .43 4.2 Analysis of Israel’s enforcement of ARA on land. .45 4.3 Analysis of Israel’s enforcement of ARA at sea. .48 4.4 Accountability . 52 5. Conclusion . .55 Selected bibliography and further reading . 57 Annexes . .58 Notes . .63 Executive summary The Gaza Strip has suffered a long history of displace- affected by ARA on land and at sea. The restrictions ment. The majority of its inhabitants are registered as on land cover 62.6 square kilometres, accounting for 35 refugees with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Pal- per cent of agricultural land and 17 per cent of all land estine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and have in the territory. Of the total, 24.4 square kilometres have been displaced since 1948. Large-scale Israeli military been levelled and would require significant investment to operations have caused a number of acute periods of develop or farm. The restrictions have led to the annual displacement, set against a general backdrop of pro- loss of an estimated 75,000 tonnes of agricultural output, tracted displacement over several decades and with no worth around $50 million. Urban communities within ARA, prospects of durable solutions being achieved in the particularly those in northern Gaza such as Beit Hanoun, foreseeable future. The Israeli-imposed blockade, which have suffered repeated displacement as a result. In the has been in place for six years, means that those affected absence of accurate figures, however, the scale of the are unable to leave the territory. Palestinians living inside phenomenon is unknown. restricted areas and those whose livelihoods depend on them are particularly vulnerable to forced displacement, Around 85 per cent of the maritime areas authorised the repeated destruction of their property and threats to under the Oslo Accords are off-limits to the Palestinian their physical safety. Eighty per cent of Palestinians in fishing fleet, resulting in an estimated loss of 75 per cent Gaza are dependent on international aid and more than in monthly catch during sardine season and a 65 per cent 50 per cent are food insecure. rise in unemployment among fishermen since 2000. The use of access restrictions on land and at sea, the Issues related to internal displacement in the West Bank levelling of land, forced displacement and arbitrary de- feature prominently in humanitarian and policy discus- tentions as means of enforcing security zones has been sions, but there has been less focus on the impact of common practice since the start of the second intifada the occupation, blockade and access restrictions on dis- in September 2000, particularly in what have become placement in Gaza. There is no comprehensive database known in the international community as “access restrict- or tracking system in place, nor is there adequate under- ed areas” (ARA). These are in place along the fence that standing of the specific vulnerabilities of the large number runs the entire length of Gaza’s land border with Israel, of people displaced from ARA over the past decade. Any and at sea. humanitarian discussion of displacement in Gaza tends to define it narrowly as a shelter issue, leading to a response There is currently no clear or consistent definition ofARA . focused on damaged or destroyed housing. Israel has dropped leaflets and released military state- ments to inform Palestinians of new limits to its security The November 2012 ceasefire agreement between Israel zones, but these are not clearly marked on the ground and and Hamas, mediated by Egypt, raised hopes among are not in keeping with existing legal agreements such many Palestinians of an end to ARA. Within a month, how- as the Oslo Accords. In practice, Palestinian access is ever, at least two unarmed civilians had been killed and severely restricted within 1.5km of the fence and beyond 28 injured near the fence, and there is little indication that six nautical miles from the coast. This will serve as a those displaced from ARA have been able to return. Fish- definition for the purposes of this report. ermen also continue to be shot at and arbitrarily detained. In the six months following the ceasefire, 66 shooting Between 2006 and May 2013, 539 Israeli military incur- incidents targeting fishermen were documented. sions into ARA on land were documented, resulting in the detention of 150 Palestinians. During the same time As part of the research for this report, 12 focus group period, 544 shooting incidents were recorded, resulting discussions involving nearly 150 fishermen and farmers in at least 179 civilian deaths and 751 injuries. In the past were conducted, with sessions distributed evenly across two years, there have been an average of around seven Gaza. Farmers expressed serious concerns about access incursions each month. to food, health and education, and all participants noted a sharp decline in the quantity and quality of food they were According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Hu- able to cultivate. Nearly all farmers said they had seen manitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 178,000 Pales- their homes damaged or destroyed, but had received little tinians, or 12 per cent of Gaza’s population, are directly or no compensation and were heavily in debt. Seventy 4 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre | January 2014 Mohamed Saleh from Jabalia Camp shows his house that was destroyed during the Pillar of Defense. per cent said that either they or a family member had This report aims to analyse the cumulative impact of been injured by Israeli military activity in ARA in the past Israel’s enforcement of ARA with specific reference to ten years. In Beit Hanoun, a community where 85 per the November 2012 ceasefire. It focuses on the repeated cent of residents are farmers, 93 per cent of participants destruction of homes, greenhouses, orchards and fields said they had been unable to access their land in 2012 and with it local livelihoods, and highlights the forced because of the Israeli military’s use of live ammunition. displacement of Palestinians this has caused. The first Between 1997 and 30 November 2013, there were also section covers the humanitarian impact of Israeli en- 522 documented shooting incidents targeting fishermen forcement, and the second analyses its methods under at sea, resulting in nine civilian deaths, 47 injuries and international legal frameworks. The report also explores 422 detentions. potential means of protecting communities from further displacement through redress, accountability and the The report found Israel’s use of lethal force before ex- establishment of economic sustainability. hausting other non-lethal means of engagement to be in violation of international human rights law and standards. This is particularly alarming in light of Israel’s capacity to implement non-lethal measures of law enforcement in Gaza, as highlighted by its frequent incursions into ARA on land. On the basis of a legal precedent set by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the manner in which the Israeli military has used live ammunition in ARA could constitute grounds for in- vestigation under international law. Reckless disregard for the protection of civilian life that results in the wilful killing or serious injury of non-combatants, particularly during periods of relative calm outside military operations, can amount to a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Under fire | Israel’s enforcement of Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip 5 Recommendations To the Israeli government: To the Palestinian Authority (PA) and local authorities in the Gaza Strip: Israel should cease its collective punishment of the Palestinian population in Gaza in line with its obligations Local authorities should adopt coherent and coordi- under international law.
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