GAZA INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN September 2020 TABLE of CONTENTS
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IACP GAZA INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN September 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary of scenarios .......................................................................3 Planning assumptions .......................................................................5 Scope of interventions .......................................................................6 Emergency coordination structure .....................................................8 Annexes ...........................................................................................13 Annex 1: Gaza Joint Coordination Management Team ToR................14 Annex 2: Gaza Emergency Coordination Centre - Staff Listing ..........15 Annex 3: Emergency Coordination Centre ToR ..................................16 Annex 4: Joint Liaison Team ToR ......................................................17 Annex 5: Standard JCMT/ECC agenda – reporting format .................20 Annex 6: Summary cluster/sector SOPs ...........................................21 Annex 7: IDP coordination structure .................................................34 Annex 8: Shelter Management structure ...........................................35 Annex 9: IDP registration form ..........................................................36 Annex 10: Assessment, Monitoring and Reporting Forms .................39 Annex 11: Coordination template – infrastructure (ICRC) ..................40 Annex 12: Emergency stockpiles ......................................................41 Annex 13: Communications in Crisis ................................................42 Annex 14: Resource mobilisation ......................................................45 Disclaimer: This is an internal document for the humanitarian community in oPt and should not be widely disseminated nor be published. INTRODUCTION This plan aims to provide a common strategic planning framework for the Humanitarian Country team and humanitarian actors in the case of a large-scale emergency in Gaza. Included are: potential scenarios, their humanitarian and operational consequences, coordination and response provision. Response mechanisms for small-scale emergencies1 are not outlined in this plan. In such a situation, OCHA, in consultation with relevant clusters, may activate multi-sectorial Emergency Assessment Teams and decide on appropriate response arrangements.2 NOTE: Activation of the IACP is rather driven by caseloads of people in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance rather than by specific scenarios; consequently, it can be activated even if the situation does not match the scenarios. A case in point would be a natural disaster. As a relatively measurable target, the caseload of 10,000 new IDPs/ affected populations has been identified as requirement for the activation of the IACP. However, this is an estimation and much will depend on how the situation unfolds. Ultimately, it remains the prerogative of the HC to decide on the (non-)activation of the plan.3 1. Small-scale emergencies can be defined as a localized incident affecting certain communities in a given area (i.e. flooding, power outages, small-scale conflict). 2. Purpose, Trigger and Procedure of these teams are outlined in the SOPs for the Assessment Teams. Linked to the multi-sectorial assessment during small-scale emergency is the deployment of monitoring teams two weeks following an initial humanitarian response (see SOPs of the Monitoring Teams). Specific tools have been developed for that purpose, namely the Emergency Assessment Tool (EAT) and Emergency Monitoring Tool (EMT) - see small-scale emergency toolkit. The SOPs and tools have been developed by the Inter-Cluster Preparedness Team that conducts specific preparedness tasks and collaboratively works on strengthening preparedness capacity in Gaza. The set-up of this team was requested by the HC/HC. The Preparedness Team is chaired by OCHA and reports to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG). See TOR of the Preparedness Team. In addition, the health cluster has developed a 96-hours, incident-specific contingency plan that can be used to scale-up response to health-impacted emergencies, such as for the Great March of Return. 3. Also see paragraph on activation of the IACP as well as the timeline (see Section IV. Emergency Coordination Structure). 3 SUMMARY OF SCENARIOS4 EXTERNAL ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE 600,000 persons can occur, with most displacement from areas of military operations, areas close to the Scenario: Scenario: There are aerial and artillery strikes fence, east of Salah ad-Din road, the whole of northern against government offices, security positions and the Gaza, and significant parts of southern Gaza to main offices/bases of various Palestinian factions, including urban centres (Gaza City and Khan Younis) or to non- targeting within residential areas and of infrastructure urban areas. Damage to water, waste water, and power in Gaza such as bridges, roads and the power station. and communications systems will result in disruption Incursions by Israeli ground forces can occur throughout of public services and increased health hazards that the length of the Gaza Strip. Gaza may be divided into might affect all people in Gaza. Storage and distribution separated sections (east-west or north-south division). centres will be affected by military operations; stocks Israeli forces may re-occupy parts of the Gaza Strip for may be damaged or destroyed. The complete closure up to several weeks at a time. The ARA will be extended of the crossings preventing supplies, including fuel for further into Gaza along the north and eastern boundaries the GPP, or aid workers from crossing for a period of (beyond the current exclusion range declared by the days and intermittently for weeks and internal access Israeli authorities to be 100m). Palestinian armed groups difficulties will severely limit operations. Shortages will try to utilize offensive tunnels to infiltrate Israel and of a wide range of humanitarian supplies, but mainly indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire will affect southern food and water, will start to occur particularly after the Israel and other areas. A large-scale Israeli offensive 4 weeks. EOD capacity to address ERW contamination could be the result of or cause for internal violence and will be limited and will need to be strictly prioritized. In unrest in Gaza. addition, inability or challenges to contain and manage Access and operational implications COVID-19 may lead to a large-scale outbreak, which will Israel and Egypt intensify the closure on Gaza. Increased further complicate the response and add burden on an restrictions on the movement of goods (Kerem Shalom already fragile health system that struggles to cope with Crossing and Salah Al Din gate) and people (Erez the casualties and the regular caseload. Crossing and Rafah) can be anticipated. Access will be Priority needs:6 severely restricted within Gaza, particularly in the areas l Ensure treatment of the wounded and others in of military operations, which could expand to urban areas need of healthcare (chronic illnesses, ante-natal care west of Salah ad-Din road. An Israeli incursion would etc.). fragment the Gaza Strip and physically separate parts of l the Gaza Strip, increasing the need for decentralization Continue effort on COVID-19 containment: Rapidly of supplies. An imposition of curfews by Israeli forces in detect, accurately identify and promptly contain the areas under its control can be expected. Gaza could be spread. bi- or trisected into separated areas, most likely cutting l Protect populations trapped in conflict areas, northern Gaza and Gaza City off from the Middle Area especially women, children and PWDs. and South; people will head to central Gaza and pressure l Respond to internally displaced persons and other on urban centres is to be anticipated, as well as a push affected populationsSurge of EOD capacity and to non-urban areas. Extensive ERW is likely to impede mitigate the risk of explosive remnants of war access to sites or close UN premises until they can be (ERW) through preliminary risk assessments and cleared. 5 EOD capacity for Gaza will need to be surged. immediate threat mitigation measures. Impact: Military operations in densely populated areas l Carry out emergency food distribution and targeted will lead to significant civilian casualty rates throughout food assistance to the most vulnerable groups the conflict. Based on figures from “Operation Protective l Carry out NFI distributions to families whose homes Edge” there could be more than 2,500 fatalities and have been destroyed or severely damaged, ensuring more than 15,000 injuries requiring hospitalization. they respond to women's and girls’ needs (Dignity Internal displacement within the Gaza Strip of up to kits, clothing. etc.) 4. The Possibility to include another scenario on natural disasters was discussed, but has not been identified as a priority by the Preparedness Team, with the following justification: Floods are the most recurring natural disaster type in the Gaza strip, however, they do not require an activation of the IACP and can be handled with existing response capacities, including through the activation of cluster-specific response plans (such as WASH). The happening of a large-scale earthquake has equally been considered by the Preparedness Team, but the likelihood has been considered as very small. 5. See UNMAS’ ERW Risk Assessment Request Form (Annex 10). 6. The list of priority needs is not exhaustive, this will be informed