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+(,121/,1( Citation: 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 2003 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) Wed Aug 10 06:21:28 2011 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0023-9186 THE "BAD SCIENCE" FICTION: RECLAIMING THE DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION WENDY E. WAGNER* I INTRODUCTION Imagine a world in which the proponent of a legal reform bears the burden of showing that a problem exists. Ideally, the reformer would also be expected to produce some evidence that the reform would actually address the identified problem and would not, on balance, make matters worse. In that world, there would be no Shelby Amendment' and no Data Quality Act,2 and professors would not meet to discuss the merits of "Daubertizing" agency science.' None of these three "good science" reforms are supported by meaningful evidence that the purported problem-"bad science," or more precisely, science that is methodologically unsound-occurs with any regularity in administrative deci- sionmaking. The proponents of these reforms are even more hard-pressed to establish that their reforms will not make the science-related problems in public health and environmental regulation worse rather than better. Indeed, existing evidence suggests the former is more likely to be the case. In this imaginary world in which legal reformers must satisfy minimal, logi- cal prerequisites, this suite of good-science reforms-much less the administra- tive resources needed to implement them--cannot be justified. While the sci- ence underlying existing regulations is hardly perfect, it is far better than it will be once the reform proposals are implemented. This Article argues that the good-science reforms miss the mark and have the potential to cause significant damage to already crippled administrative processes. Part II presents background information relating to the sources of dissatisfaction with regulatory science and how the three most popular reforms Copyright © 2003 by Wendy E. Wagner This Article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/66LCPWagner. * Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. I am most grateful to John Applegate, Rob Mays, and Sid Shapiro and the participants in this Sym- posium for their suggestions and comments on an early draft of this paper. Thanks also to Natalie Asturi, Ashley Kever, Christopher Smith, and Hope Williams for helpful research assistance. 1. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 122 Stat. 2681 (1998); see infra text accompanying notes 19-23. 2. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 144 Stat. 2763 (2001); see infra text accompanying notes 24-28. 3. See infra text accompanying notes 29-30. HeinOnline -- 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 2003 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:63 purport to address these concerns. Part III details the absence of any compel- ling justification for the reforms, and Part IV discusses why they will be detri- mental to agency processes and to the cause of good science. The final part considers the "rebuttal problem"-another way to frame the problem underly- ing the consternation with the way science is incorporated into regulatory policy. This refraining captures the real dissatisfaction with agency rulemaking, which lies not with the science, but with the absence of clear policy direction as to when a body of science sufficiently rebuts a protective assumption and per- mits a less stringent standard. Addressing this policy gap will accomplish far more than any of the good-science proposals. II How SCIENCE IS INTEGRATED INTO REGULATION Science teases policymakers with the prospect of providing definitive guid- ance for regulatory decisionmaking. But in reality, the information that most scientific research provides to health and environmental regulation is incom- plete and inconclusive, both in identifying and in quantifying the risks that these hazards pose. This Part considers the ways in which science disappoints and complicates regulatory decisionmaking and identifies the ways in which the good-science reforms hope to overcome these science-based complications. A. The Problems Science Presents to Environmental Regulators Since science is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient for environmental decisionmaking, it is important to locate "good science" concerns on the larger map of regulatory science problems. "Science" is, according to the Supreme Court, knowledge that can be supported by a "scientifically valid.., reasoning or methodology."4 This generally requires a hypothesis capable of being tested in a replicable way or the use of methods that scientists have generally accepted as valid.' Extrapolation from one or more validated scientific studies to a larger policy question-for example, the appropriate standard for a particular pollut- ant-is typically not science, since such "weight of the evidence" judgments cannot be supported by a testable method. Instead, these larger risk assess- ments combine scientific knowledge (for example, toxicity tests on animals) with science-policy judgments (for example, dose-response assumptions).6 4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 5. See id. at 593-94 (listing four factors that assist in determining what constitutes scientific knowl- edge). 6. For example, although science can provide information on the fatality rates in cities with dif- ferent levels of fine particulates, the effects of fine particulates on the lungs of laboratory rats, and even possible physiological mechanisms by which fine particulates might cause severe health effects like arrhythmia, this accumulated scientific knowledge still falls quite short of revealing the concentration at which fine, air-borne particulates will cause fatal effects in only one out of every one million persons. See generally Jocelyn Kaiser, Showdown over Clean Air Science, 277 SCIENCE 466 (1997) (detailing the debate over whether available scientific studies can provide sufficient information to determine a "safe" level of particulates in ambient air). HeinOnline -- 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 64 2003 Autumn 2003] THE "BAD SCIENCE" FICrION Accordingly, most decisions in public health and environmental regulation break down into a series of sub-decisions that alternate or zigzag between sci- ence and science-policy. FIGURE 1: THE ZIGZAG OF SCIENCE AND SCIENCE-POLICY ScienceA5IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION Science- 1 \Q3 4 (Q6 Policy Consider, for example, a common issue addressed by regulatory agencies: the appropriate protective standard for a particular pollutant in a specific medium, such as drinking water. The first, overarching question an agency must address when faced with this decision is the amount of human risk the agency (or, often, Congress) is willing to tolerate, a question that is safely outside the realm of pure science. After deciding on a protective goal of, for example, tolerating only one cancer out of every one million persons exposed, the agency's analysis breaks down into a series of discrete questions. Some of these questions can be answered by science alone. Some, however, cannot, and the most that science can do is to point to several of the most plausible options. Science can, for example, identify the level of high-dose exposure that pro- duces tumors in fifty percent of mice exposed to the pollutant (Q2), but it leaves unanswered how regulators should extrapolate from this type of study to humans. In the absence of definitive human testing, science cannot answer, for example, whether all tumors or only those that are malignant should be counted (Q1), or how to extrapolate from high to low does (Q3) or from animal to man (Q4).' Based on this conceptualization of regulatory decisions as involving a zigzag between science and science-policy questions, we can expect at least three dis- 7. These extrapolatory questions can certainly be informed by science. For example, recent dis- coveries in toxicology are refining the ability to predict the shape of the dose-response curve for carci- nogenesis in specific categories of toxins. See, e.g., Marvin Goldman, Cancer Risk of Low-Level Expo- sure, 271 SCIENCE 1821 (1996) (discussing research that suggests cancer does not follow a linear dose- response curve and that a zero-threshold assumption might no longer be supported by the evidence, at least in some cases). But, in most cases, an unverifiable extrapolation must be made between mecha- nistic theories and the exposure level at which humans are unlikely to be affected. Even this two- dimensional zigzag oversimplifies the fluidity of policy and science. For example, deciding which data sets or studies to select or analyze (for the points above the line) also constitutes a mixed science-policy decision. For a more extended discussion of this zigzag of science and policy, see Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622-27 (1995). HeinOnline -- 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 65 2003 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:63 tinct problems to arise in the incorporation of science into regulation. First, the scientific studies on the