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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 1 Text The Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to the Section 1. All persons born or natural- United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, ized in the United States, and subject to the as one of the Reconstruction Amendments. The amend- jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United ment addresses citizenship rights and equal protection States and of the State wherein they reside. No of the laws, and was proposed in response to issues re- State shall make or enforce any law which shall lated to former slaves following the American Civil War. abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens The amendment was bitterly contested, particularly by of the United States; nor shall any State deprive Southern states, which were forced to ratify it in order any person of life, liberty, or property, with- for them to regain representation in Congress. The Four- out due process of law; nor deny to any person teenth Amendment, particularly its first section, is one within its jurisdiction the equal protection of of the most litigated parts of the Constitution, forming the laws. the basis for landmark decisions such as Roe v. Wade Section 2. Representatives shall be appor- (1973), regarding abortion, and Bush v. Gore (2000), re- tioned among the several States according to garding the 2000 presidential election. The amendment their respective numbers, counting the whole limits the actions of all state and local officials, including number of persons in each State, excluding In- those acting on behalf of such an official. dians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for Pres- The second, third, and fourth sections of the amend- ident and Vice President of the United States, ment are seldom litigated. However, Section 2’s refer- Representatives in Congress, the Executive and ence to “rebellion and other crimes” has been invoked Judicial officers of a State, or the members of as a constitutional ground for felony disenfranchisement. the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the The fifth section gives Congress enforcement power. The male inhabitants of such State, being twenty- amendment’s first section includes several clauses: the one years of age, and citizens of the United Citizenship Clause, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Due States, or in any way abridged, except for par- Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause. The Citi- ticipation in rebellion, or other crime, the ba- zenship Clause provides a broad definition of citizenship, sis of representation therein shall be reduced in overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott the proportion which the number of such male v. Sandford (1857), which had held that Americans de- citizens shall bear to the whole number of male scended from African slaves could not be citizens of the citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. United States. The Privileges or Immunities Clause has been interpreted in such a way that it does very little. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of Pres- The Due Process Clause prohibits state and local gov- ident and Vice President, or hold any office, ernment officials from depriving persons of life, liberty, civil or military, under the United States, or un- or property without legislative authorization. This clause der any State, who, having previously taken an has also been used by the federal judiciary to make most oath, as a member of Congress, or as an offi- of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, as well as to cer of the United States, or as a member of any recognize substantive and procedural requirements that State legislature, or as an executive or judicial state laws must satisfy. officer of any State, to support the Constitu- The Equal Protection Clause requires each state to pro- tion of the United States, shall have engaged vide equal protection under the law to all people within in insurrection or rebellion against the same, its jurisdiction. This clause was the basis for Brown v. or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court decision But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of that precipitated the dismantling of racial segregation, each House, remove such disability. and for many other decisions rejecting irrational or un- Section 4. The validity of the public debt necessary discrimination against people belonging to var- of the United States, authorized by law, in- ious groups. cluding debts incurred for payment of pensions 1 2 2 ADOPTION and bounties for services in suppressing insur- the first time in American history that Congress was able rection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. to muster the votes necessary to override a presiden- But neither the United States nor any State tial veto.[9] Despite this victory, even some Republicans shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in- who had supported the goals of the Civil Rights Act be- curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against gan to doubt that Congress really possessed constitutional the United States, or any claim for the loss or power to turn those goals into laws.[10][11] The experience emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, also encouraged both radical and moderate Republicans obligations and claims shall be held illegal and to seek Constitutional guarantees for black rights, rather void. than relying on temporary political majorities.[12] Section 5. The Congress shall have power Over 70 proposals for an amendment were drafted.[13] to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro- [1] In late 1865, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction visions of this article. proposed an amendment stating that any citizens barred from voting on the basis of race by a state would not be counted for purposes of representation of that state.[14] 2 Adoption This amendment passed the House, but was blocked in the Senate by a coalition of Radical Republicans 2.1 Proposal by Congress led by Charles Sumner, who believed the proposal a “compromise with wrong”, and Democrats opposed to [15] In the final years of the American Civil War and black rights. Consideration then turned to a proposed the Reconstruction Era that followed, Congress repeat- amendment by Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, edly debated the rights of black former slaves freed which would enable Congress to safeguard “equal pro- by the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation and the 1865 tection of life, liberty, and property” of all citizens; this [15] Thirteenth Amendment, the latter of which had formally proposal failed to pass the House. In April 1866, the abolished slavery. Following the passage of the Thir- Joint Committee forwarded a third proposal to Congress, teenth Amendment by Congress, however, Republicans a carefully negotiated compromise that combined ele- grew concerned over the increase it would create in ments of the first and second proposals as well as ad- the congressional representation of the Democratic- dressing the issues of Confederate debt and voting by ex- [15] dominated Southern states. Because the full popula- Confederates. The House of Representatives passed tion of freed slaves would now be counted for determin- House Resolution 127, 39th Congress several weeks later ing congressional representation, rather than the three- and sent to the Senate for action. The resolution was fifths previously mandated by the Three-Fifths Compro- debated and several amendments to it were proposed. mise, the Southern states would dramatically increase Amendments to Sections 2, 3 and 4 were adopted on June their power in the population-based House of Represen- 8, 1866 and the modified resolution passed by a 33 to 11 tatives, regardless of whether the former slaves were al- vote. The House agreed to the Senate amendments on lowed to vote.[2][3] Republicans began looking for a way June 13 by a 138-36 vote. A concurrent resolution re- to offset this advantage, either by protecting and attract- questing the President to transmit the proposal to the ex- ing votes of former slaves, or at least by discouraging their ecutives of the several states was passed by both houses [16] disenfranchisement.[2][4][5] of Congress on June 18. In 1865, Congress passed what would become the Civil The Radical Republicans were satisfied that they had se- Rights Act of 1866, guaranteeing citizenship without re- cured civil rights for blacks, but were disappointed that gard to race, color, or previous condition of slavery or in- the amendment would not also secure political rights for [17] voluntary servitude. The bill also guaranteed equal ben- blacks, in particular the right to vote. For example, efits and access to the law, a direct assault on the Black Thaddeus Stevens, a leader of the disappointed Radical Codes passed by many post-war states. The Black Codes Republicans, said: “I find that we shall be obliged to be attempted to return ex-slaves to something like their for- content with patching up the worst portions of the an- mer condition by, among other things, restricting their cient edifice, and leaving it, in many of its parts, to be movement, forcing them to enter into year-long labor swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and the storms [17][18] contracts, prohibiting them from owning firearms, and by of despotism.” Abolitionist Wendell Phillips called [18] preventing them from suing or testifying in court.[6] it a “fatal and total surrender”. This point would later be addressed by the Fifteenth Amendment. Although strongly urged by moderates in Congress to sign the bill, President Johnson vetoed it on March 27, 1866. In his veto message, he objected to the measure because 2.2 Ratification by the states it conferred citizenship on the freedmen at a time when 11 out of 36 states were unrepresented in the Congress, Ratification of the amendment was bitterly contested.
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