POLITICAL & SECURITY Monthly bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS VIITORUL www.moldova.org STATEWATCH No 5, August 2005

The Bulletin is a bilingual monthly publication aiming to provide analysis on various elements of domestic and foreign policy, as well as on some issues of special interest for Moldova. In order to accurately monitor the major trends and developments, the Institute of Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) “Viitorul” calculates the Political and Security Statewatch (PSS) indicators. The PSS indicators are calculated using a special methodology.* The Dynamics of PSS Indicators for the Period July-August, 2005 The indices in the table below demonstrate a positive trend troughout the last six months. The positive dynamics allows us to constatate a releatively stable political environment in Moldova. However, the interpretation of the perceptions in the expert pool denoted that the relative stability is shattered by numerous shortcomings in all fields of public policy.

Indicator May-June June-July July-August Dynamics Average Average Average Domestic Policy 3,7 3,25 3,18

Foreign Policy 3,6 3,09 2,99

Security Policy 3,68 3,19 3,11

The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the highest value and 5 is the lowest 1. Domestic policy

he beginning of the Parliamentarian the inter-ministerial activity regarding of the Moldova-EU Action Tvacation placed the Government European Integration. The Ministry plan, signed in February 2005 of Moldova under the close watch of the of Foreign Affairs and European at Brussels. The universalistic public opinion. Integration (MFAEI) was officially and general approach of the acing the imperative of assigned to coordinate the monitoring of Action Plan can create serious Fimplementation of its delayed the implementation of the Moldova-EU hardships for those interested in its strategic agenda, the Government has Action Plan. The Ministry of Economy implementation. Although the state had a hectic month. The previously set and Commerce (MEC) was assigned to institutions were encouraged to Program of the Government was the elaborate a single system of monitoring take immediate action to fulfill the main inspiration for the Government’s and evaluation of the progress of requirements set in the Moldova- actions. On April 19, 2005, the Action the central public authorities in the EU Action Plan, hope for its timely Plan for the Implementation of the implementation of the Moldova-EU execution is little. The Plan is Government Programme finally received Action Plan. unprotected from uninterested, reticent or incompetent politicians. its approval from the Parliament. A new here are important internal factors It is highly probable that conscious Commission was created to coordinate that threaten the implementation T inactiveness by the Action Plan * The calculation methodology of the Political and Security Statewatch Indicators implementing authorities will The PSS methodology is a synthetic model designed to evaluate the perception of a pool of 10 independ- ent experts on political and security risks in tree areas: Domestic Policy, Foreign Policy and Issues of hamper the European integration Special Interest. The PSS monitoring contributes to the identification of potential and effective threats process for Moldova so far. First, that impact the stability of public institutions and assures the coherence of early warning analyses. The the Action Plan is addressed to PSS rating should not be considered an absolute indicator. The reason for PSS indicator is to form general ideas. The dynamics of PSS indicators can be found throughout the text of the PSS and reflects the rhythm “the whole country”, not to specific and the direction of democratic changes occurring in Moldova. To find out more about the methodology, executive institutions, thus failing check the addenda. to assign the responsibilities among

1 the implementation bodies. Second, Action Plan, sound internal reform of seasonal job, with fixed start and numerous public officials have been the Government is indispensable. The end dates, but rather as a long-term very clear about their irritation with the political reform recommended by the commitment. priorities set in the Moldova-EU Action European experts could be the only he Prime-Minister reported to Plan, but more, with the possibility of efficient solution, but only in the case the Parliament a 25 percent them being monitored in a much more when the reform will target the “big T staff cut in the Government. He also scrupulous way fish”, not the clerks and committed to wage a new war on than before. There “The personnel in the central the lower personnel, as it “bureaucracy” in the Government. is hardly anyone admninistration was cut by 25 did by now. The staff cuts, however, touched in the Government percent.” Prime Minister Vasile hese facts seem only the clerical or low-ranked to accept that Tarlev said. to leave EU personnel. unprecedented The criteria by which the dis- T uninterested. After audit. Therefore, missed staff was selected are still new institution was created to having decided on everyone is trying implement the new internal a mistery. the clause of “refused A to escape acquiring “reform” in the government. finality” for the acceding more responsibilities for any portion This kind of actions have been countries, the European Commission is of the Action Plan. The resistance by repeatedly performed every two more interested in the reform’s substance, the bureaucratic apparatus is a serious years. The effect is still pending. rather in the implementation format used obstacle for the Government. Both The 2001-2005 period was by far by the Moldovan Government. However, stimulating and coercive resources not a constant progress of reform, the format of the reform is crucial for the available to the President and the but rather a mixture of stagnation, successful implementation of the Action opposition are inefficient in taming the reaction and bureaucracy. Even the Plan. The way the Moldovan authorities bureaucrats in the executive structures administration of the Presidential will distribute of the state. Third, the implementation office has among themselves of the Action Plan requires the use of suffered from the implementation unprecedented competencies given to “…in the last six months, the effi- the flourishing responsibilities the executive structures, the readiness ciency of utilization of labor force bureaucracy in required by the Action for which, Tarlev’s government has has grown by only 4 percent. the executive Plan is, therefore, never shown. Finally, the Moldova-EU apparatus. uncertain. It looks like These figures prove that we still Action Plan requires a solid financial The “the Fifth the authorities in the have not stepped on the path of base. The Budget for the year 2006 does Column” in the Government regard the economic modernization. We not contain chapters for this matter, thus Government the Action Plan as just are still following the traditional implying that the Government plans to are consciously another extra-burden on path of extensive development. “ finance the implementation of the Action holding the their responsibilities, Vladimir Voronin Plan from donated funds. reform on place, not as a Government thus authoring similar approach by the program. The hazard that Action Plan a slow, but steady decline of the Government towards the will be implemented for the sake of A state. The tactics of the executive Strategy for Economic Growth and preparing an acceptable report for the bureaucracy has been very efficient. Poverty Reduction jeopardized its EU, rather than for the benefit of the Their only concern with the reform implementation. To avoid the same country is apparent. The Moldova-EU is keeping their own positions and thing happening to the Moldova-EU Action Plan should not be regarded as a privileges intact. It could happen The PSS indicator reflects the stability level in the Domestic that the Parliament will unblock Policy for the period of July-August, 2005 the reform process in the right way. However, it is still uncertain whether The PSS Indicator the Parliament would be able to use the required power checks to 2,8 outweigh the Government in such a political matter as the reformation 3 of the executive body of the state. If 3,18 not, it is possible that the Parliament 3,2 3,25 will lose the control over the 3,4 Government, which could trigger harmful reactions for the Moldovan 3,6 democracy. 3,73 3,7 3,8 n august 10, 2005, the July- April-May May-June June-July OGovernment adopted a August decision that reformed the State Chancellery and changed its name Domestic Policy 3,73 3,7 3,25 3,18 into Government Apparatus. After The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the highest value and 5 is the lowest the elections, changes have been The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the highest value and 5 is the lowest 2 made throughout the Government. The tolerance towards rise in the price for as consequence, for the main executive branch became short of one of fuels, that will, eventually, boost the household commodities, mostly gas its layers: the Departments. Nevertheless, prices for all other commodities, can and central heating. The coming the reform looks much like relocation. trigger serious mass protests. fall looks to be a hard time for the The former Departments have been Tarlev government. The Premier he ruling party’s tactics of keeping replaced by Collegiums within the will have to re-assess his role in the the opposition “on a short leash” various ministries. T Government and learn to share the turned out to be a success. Nevertheless, power with President Voronin. This he dynamism of the executive’s a country ruled by a single party could has become truer, since the current Tactivity can only be explained hardly be labeled as pluralist democracy. power arrangements speak in favor as response to the President Voronin’s The Government and the Opposition of a new political reform in the criticism towards the Government, which tend to cooperate only in the matters of executive sector. he made public during the last session of European integration and settlement of the Parliament. Interested primarily in the conflict in Transnistria. As for the ther expectations for the the accomplishment of his own electoral rest of the cases, the ruling party has Ofall of 2005 are linked promises, the President declared then narrowed the opposition’s options down to the restart of the legislative that:”… we should say it straight, that to a set of controversial policies. On process that is likely to continue, such rhythm [of development] will not the bigger picture of internal political for the next months, under the allow us to create 300 thousand new stability, the ruling party continues to sign of partnership between the jobs, nor to assure a medium wage of decrease the democratic quality of the ruling party and the opposition. 300 UD dollars”. Voronin demanded that political decisions taken in the country. The parties will have a hard time the Government searches for “… new Although the fake peace in the internal resuscitating public interest for the management methods, new development politics in Moldova brings political local public elections. The parties strategies, other than the ones we use stability, we should beware of the will have to dismantle the pervasive now.” However, the President’s discourse constantly decreasing quality of decision- belief that the voting results are did not stress the need to bring new making and governance. The risks facing already set and that the result of people into the Government. Thus, the the Moldovan democracy are as follows: the elections would not change important structural changes could prove the annihilation of the opposition, the much in the lives of the people being meaningless. degeneration of the democratic decision- anyway. As the timing for a new making process by the excessive round of elections is not yet right, he President’s verve destroyed the bureaucratization of the Government, the parties and the Central Election illusion that the current government T the concentration of power in the hands Committee will have to figure is immune to criticism. The second signal of the country’s President, the social out a way through the imminent for the stabilization of the Government tensions spurred by the incompetence of elections. Their only options are and the political system came from the the bureaucratic apparatus and the stuck scarce: either surviving through masses. The decisions to halt the imports reform of state institutions. These risks another round of inconvenient, but of second-hand goods and the new could trigger a chain reaction that will legal elections, or, making essential cultural policy of the Government rose hamper the implementation of the state’s changes in the electoral legislation. waives of dissent in the masses. The first strategic programs. This is just a short decision resulted in street protests, while nother hit of the political life description of the real reasons of political the second one took the form of press in Moldova is the reformation stagnation of Moldova. A advocacy. The fact that the Governmental of the Communist Party that could decisions were so easily taken and again, Forecast: result in the resignation of Vladimir so easily repudiated, demonstrates clear Voronin as president of the Party. signs of the Government’s incompetence espite of a month of This could trigger conflicts, as and shortsightedness in approaching DParliamentarian vacations in the party is notorious for its rigid executive decisions. The success of Moldova, political life in August has internal order. the second-hand merchants created a been vibrant, partly because of the good precedent for other economically early warnings of social dissent with the challenged groups. There are grounds domestic policy of the Government in for that in the nearest future. The recent Chisinau, partly because of the pervasive executive decisions to liquidate street frustration with the broken electoral merchants on the streets of the capital promises. The social tensions are fueled city, powered by the Government’s tacit by the boost of prices for gasoline and, Addendum What is the PSS Indicator ? The indicator denotes the basic trends of the democratic changes happening in Moldova, through a qualified evalua- tion of the variables representing concepts of domestic and foreign policy, as well of some special interest issues. The PSS indicator is calculated in function of the answers given by a group of independent experts. The role of the expert group is to assign values of 1 to 5, to the variables measuring the above-mentioned concepts. The value 1 represents the highest level of intensity of a variable, 5 being the lowest. The evaluation of the results was done by using an evaluation table.

3 I. Domestic Policy List of Questions: Points Q1 Is the political system in Moldova democratic, pluralist and viable? 3,03 Q2 How efficient are the central public authorities (the Parliament, the Government, etc) of Moldova? 2,83 Q3 How transparent are the decisions taken by the central public authorities in Moldova? 3,75 Q4 How efficient is the cooperation between the Government and the opposition in Moldova? 2,95 Q5 To what extent is the Television in Moldova objective and professional, when covering public and political issues? 3,58 Q6 To what extent are the fundamental human rights and freedoms protected in Moldova? 2,97 Q7 Is the Justice impartial and objective in Moldova? 3,27 Q8 How would you rate the progress in the implementation of the Poverty Reduction strategy and the Moldova-EU Action Plan? 3,15 Q9 How would you rate the living standards in Moldova? 3,28 Q10 How would you appreciate the role and initiative of the civil society in Moldova? 3,03

The dynamics of domestic policy sub-indicators for July-August 2005

0

1

2

2,83 2,95 2,97 The values are 3 3,03 3,15 3,03 3,27 3,28 calculated on an in- July- 3,58 verted scale, where 3,75 August 4 1 is the highest Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 value and 5 is the lowest 2. Foreign Policy ugust 2005 was the right time espite an unprecedented favorable the President interrupted his vacation to Ato make use of the advantages Dsituation, the foreign policy of meet with his counterparts, thus feeding gained last month in the field of foreign Moldova remains ambiguous. The the press with expectations of a real policy by the Moldovan authorities. Government in Chisinau continues to sensation. The sensation was, though, The adoption of the law on the status surprise the world with the simultaneous a different one. Rather than publicly of the breakaway Transnistrian region, orientation towards the EU and the expressing his country’s frustration with added to the important developments Commonwealth of Independent States the Community, the President signed in opening an EU Mission in Chisinau (CIS). Moldova’s participation within the 15 of the summit’s 17 documents and and further talks on bringing European CIS has been the main political drawback had a taboo-less conversation with the observers on the Moldo-Ukrainian for its European integration, placing Russian President, Vladimir Putin1. border have been a strong complement Moldova into Russia’s influence zone. Following the Snegur-Eltin era clichés, to the existing options of resolving the That is, at least, how Europe views it it. the two presidents decided upon conflict in the breakaway region of n August 2005, the timing to reviving the shattered Moldo-Russian Transnistria. These, together with the Irevise the rationale of relations. The presidents start of the works on the elaboration of also exchanged Moldova’s membership in Despite of the the Individual Partnership and Accession the Community was next promises to cooperate international context Plan (IPAP) between Moldova and to perfect. That is why, the in the resolution of the NATO, set new requirements for the August 26 CIS Summit that allows for a drastic Transnistrian issue. The Moldovan Government. These important in Kazan, Russia, was a change, the foreign policy only valuable remark developments offer Moldova a rare squandered chance for of Moldova remains from the part of the possibility of reorienting the course of Moldova. All hopes had ambiguous. Moldovan president, its foreign policy towards European and been vested in the Moldovan though, was that Euro-Atlantic integration. President, Vladimir Voronin. Following Moldova would only cooperate with a long absence in the works of the CIS, the CIS states in a way, which will not

4 conflict with the Moldova-EU Action Plan. As for the Customs Union of CIS, it is and the Union of Russia and Belarus, The same approach was used before by another political chimera. Rather than proves again the heterogeneity of the former president of Ukraine, Leonid opting for a free of barriers customs zone, regional interests of the member Kuchma. Are we witnessing a déjà vu? the parties advocate for a customs space states. During the 14 years since 3 evertheless, the bilateral meeting where “civilized restrictions” are applied. its inception, CIS has magnified the Nwas nothing more than an exchange For Moldova, these “civilized” measures existing differences between the states of courtesy declarations and did not yield take, as a rule, the form of import and disintegrated the ex-Soviet space. for Moldova. Russia did not change its restrictions on agricultural goods applied CIS has become a community whose decision taken earlier this month, to deliver by Russia whenever the official Chisinau members are integrating with different misbehaves, in Russia’s speeds in different fuels to Moldova for world prices. Neither Created to attenuate the did it lift the import restrictions against terms. CIS has become directions. negative consequences of the for the Moldovan agricultural goods. As one of Russia’s tools of Georgia, Ukraine for Putin’s promises concerning settling controlling Moldova. fall of USSR, the Community and Moldova the Transnistrian conflict, they do not give Nevertheless, Moldova of Independent States (CIS) have turned to much hope either. Well, not until Russia cannot refuse to did not succeed in replacing the European stops perceiving Moldova as a “buy one, trade with either of the Union, nor did it become Union and NATO, get one free” (Moldova + Transnistria) the CIS countries, an international organization, Turkmenistan quit promotional package. This very optic is Russia in particular, nor a political, military, nor the Community as they markets of right during the systematically reinstated by important economic block. officials of the Russian Duma, while in great importance for Kazan summit, “business trips” in Tiraspol. the Moldova economy. Moldova could the Central-Asian states formed an and should, though, switch to a bilateral exclusive alliance and shoot glances to IS has never been more anachronistic approach in its economic relations with China, while Russia and Belarus opt than now. The CIS became a C the CIS states, free of the “civilized” for a common state. Moreover, the CIS “tolerated evil” for Moldova, because communitarian constraints of an unfair space is home to competing structures, of its constant lack of yield. In his press trade environment, subjected to the largely supported by the West. This is declaration, Vladimir Putin emphasized political will of the strongest one. Political the case of GUAM4, which is heavily that in 15 years since the inception of regulation from the part of Russia has supported by the Unites States of the CIS, “… it has become clear that taken the place of rule of “economic law”, America, as counterweight to Russia in the present goals and foundations of which is almost absent is the CIS. At the the Europe-Caucasus-Asia region. the Community are based on outdated end of August 2005, the Government of forms and methods, fact that numerous he internal fragmentation of the Moldova spoke for the denunciation of colleagues [of Mr. Putin’s] have repeatedly CIS is amplified by aggressive the Agreement on the Statute of the CIS T mentioned.” 2 impulses by Russia. Following its Economic Tribunal, enacted on July 6, “divide et impera” strategy, Russia has reated with the aim to attenuate the 1992. The reason has been stated clearly: been fueling numerous security risks in consequences of the fall of USSR, C the tribunal is inefficient and has almost the region by placing its troops on the the Community of Independent States full failure rate when resolving economic territories of its independent CIS co- did not succeed in replacing the former disputes between the members of the members and by supporting separatist Union, nor did it become an international Community. tendencies throughout the former organization, a political, USSR. Therefore, CIS is military nor economic block. The PSS indicator reflects the stability level in the Foreign a Community of unequal That is especially true for Policy for the period of June-August, 2005 members, the written Moldova, as it has never arrangements of which participated in the military The PSS Indicator are not respected. The CIS initiatives of the CIS, nor has environment is hostile Moldova signed any document 0 to the respect of state regarding military cooperation sovereignty and integrity, within the Community. 1 of the rules of free trade oldova has not and cooperation and of 2 Mbeen invited to join course, human rights. the Community’s Single kraine has a big Economic Space (SES). 3 stake in what is Economically speaking, CIS is U 4 going to happen in the notorious for its shortcomings July- April-May May-June June-July CIS, especially in its and exclusivist approaches. August Western part. Engaged in The SES is torn by internal Foreign policy 3,5 3,6 3,09 2,99 a fierce competition for conflict, where its members The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the regional primacy against are frequently recurring to highest value and 5 is the lowest Russia, Ukraine shows economic sanctions against clear signs of weakness. each other. The most vivid of all are he proliferation of alternative sub- Moscow cheered the destitution of the Russia and Ukraine. Russia sees the SES initiatives and structures, such as Ukrainian Government lead by Yulia as an asymmetric tariff regime for its T GUAM and the Shanghai Cooperation Timoshenko. Moscow still hopes to own benefit while Ukraine insists on a Organization, the Central Asian Union see Ukraine reorienting towards the bilateral model of economic relations. 5 CIS. This would not have been possible due as a natural fact, will demonstrate sound absence of a convenient export regime to Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushenko’s skepticism and reticence towards the states for Moldova, Chisinau should consider ambitions to become a hegemon in the of the CIS region. The crisis in Ukraine switching to bilateral a bilateral regime Western CIS, rather than a vassal of the seriously deteriorated the image of the with the CIS countries. Kremlin. However, the internal conflicts countries previously praised for their he summit showed that the and the uncertainty on the external field, democratic revival. Therefore, the crisis TMoscow-driven structural reforms determined by the fluctuation of foreign in Ukraine can have a great impact on in the CIS are not congruent with the opinion towards Ukraine, make the short- Moldova. The instability in the neighboring interests of Moldova. Membership in term future of this country very volatile. country, paired with the shift in EU’s the CIS is, at least inefficient, if not Contrary to the June declarations by optics for the region, endangers the carry- counter-productive for the settlement President Yushenko, Ukraine decided to out of the Timoshenko government’s of the Transnistrian conflict, as it is for join the Single Economic Space of CSI. decisions regarding Moldova, especially the process of European integration and However, the Ukrainian officials have those referring to the efficient overseeing fighting poverty in Moldova. Moldova stated that the reform of the CIS, especially of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and should keep good relations with the CIS in the economic sector, is far from being covering the smuggling “black hole” members, deeming their important share completed. Just like the other members of in Transnistria. The risks could have in the exports of Moldova. Therefore, the SES, Ukraine is trying to maximize its been stopped if Yushenko had a team of a bilateral approach would be much gains from the reform. That is not good valuable and competent people, partisans suitable for the further conducting of news for Moldova. Ukraine’s slight turn to the Ukraine’s European vocation. a pro-European policy by Chisinau. to the CSI endangers the attempts to settle Unfortunately, his surroundings have been Molsova should also consider to be the Transnistrian crisis and, thus assure its seriously infected by individuals who more active in GUAM and, possibly, sovereignty. are in the service of the local nationalist in the new Community of Democratic urkmenistan’s withdrawal and the oligarchy. As consequence, the political Choice. There are good grounds for Tretreat of the Russian troops from crisis in Ukraine is very likely to promote that, according to the declarations of Georgia are another proof of that the a new “Kuchma”-style approach to the the Prime Ministers of Moldova and Community is approaching its widely relations with the neighboring countries. Azerbaijan, who agreed, via phone, to predicted natural end. On August 12, 2005 Forecast: strengthen cooperation between the two the presidents of Georgia and Ukraine ollowing the multi-dimensional countries. The opening of a Moldovan made a call to the leaders of the Black obsoleteness of the CIS, economics Embassy in Baku is a sure first step. Sea region to create an alternative to CSI: F Endnotes 5 would be the only reason for Moldova the Community of Democratic Choice . to keep its membership in the CIS. 1. The declaration of Vladimir Voronin, Mikhail Saakashvili and Victor Yushenko President of Moldova, INFOTAG Newsline, The economic aspect of Moldova’s August 29, 2005. invited the leaders who share the idea of participation in the Community was 2. The declaration of President Vladimir Putin, NATO enlargement and Europeanization seriously deteriorated following Russia’s at the closing press conference of the CIS summit of the region delimited by the Baltic, Black in Kazan, Russia. INFOTAG Newsline, August decisions to suspend Moldova’s privileges 29, 2005 and the Caspian seas, to attend a high of buying Russian fuels for reduced prices level forum to set the base for the new 3. http://www.newsukraina.ru/news.html?nws_ and to impose import restrictions on id=414984&date=2005-06-24 community. agricultural goods from Moldova. These 4. A group of states, namely Georgia, Ukraine, he latest developments in Ukraine privileges were the original reasons for Azerbaijan and Moldova, formed in 1996, looking are another pillar of the argument of to enhance regional economic cooperation T Moldova, as for the other ex-Soviet states, through development of an Europe-Caucasus-Asia vulnerability of the CIS. The outbreak of to join the CIS. The absence of these vital transport corridor. It has also become a forum for the political implosion in Kyiv gives Europe benefits, together with Moldova’s exclusion discussion on various levels of existing security serious reasons to doubt about the stability problems, promoting conflict resolution and the from the Single Economic Space of the CIS elimination of other risks and threats. of the whole region. From now on, Europe, and its orientation goals towards the EU, 5. V. Socor, Saakashvili-Yushchenko “Borjomi unlike the United States, that perceived the poses a serious and natural question about declaration”: Europe from the Atlantic to the destitution of Timoshenko’s government the need of this costly membership. In the Caspian, Politicom, 16 august, 2005. Addendum II. Foreign Policy The values are calculated on an List of Questions: Points inverted scale, where 1 is the highest Q1 Is the foreign policy of Moldova more stable and efficient now than several months ago? 2,83 value and 5 is the lowest Q2 To what extent is Euro-Atlantic integration a priority of Moldovan foreign policy? 2,5 The dynamics of foreign policy sub- Q3 To what extent is the foreign policy connected with the national interest of Moldova? 2,75 indicators for July-August 2005 How would you appreciate the role of international and regional organizations in fostering Q4 2,53

the state of law and the economic reform in Moldova? Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q 9 Q 10 0 Q5 How would you rate the image of Moldova from an outside perspective? 3,55 0,5 Q6 How would you rate the relations between Moldova and Ukraine? 2,73 1 1,5 Q7 How would you rate the relations between Moldova and Russia? 4 2 Q8 How would you rate the relations between Moldova and Romania? 2,45 2,5 2,5 2,53 2,45 2,83 2,75 2,73 3 2,95 Q9 To what extent are the interests of Moldova connected to its membership in the CIS? 3,6 3,5 3,55 3,6 July- August Q10 Is Moldova protected by international agreements and strategic partnerships? 2,95 4 4 4,5

6 3. Issues of Special Interest

n august 2005 the Initiatives regarding troops will start yielding results. As for he problem is that neither of Ithe settlement of the Transnsistrian now, the best the Moldovan government TChisinau, EU, nor the United conflict were in the sole competence of the can do is to isolate the separatist regime, States protest. The formal association Chief of Moldovan State. Despite of the which would allow Moldova make the best of the US and EU to a format con- efforts made by the Parliament, the core of use of the regional alliances and become a structed Moscow officials compro- the policy-making mechanism was set in “special issue” on the EU security agenda. mises the chances of a more efficient the President’s entourage. As for the Gov- ot even the narrowest geopoliti- implication of the West in settling ernment, it did not stay aside and adopted Ncal reasons could persuade the US the Transnistrian conflict. Moreover, two important decisions: one relating to and the EU to tolerate separatist enclaves, there is no international legal basis to guarantees for the Transnistrian population or similar structures on the border be- justify the “special role” of Russia and and the other to the regulation of exported tween Moldova and Ukraine. That is why Ukraine in the framework of the pen- goods from Transnistria. The resolutions the federalization scenarios have failed, tagonal negotiation format. Whereas, were adopted within just two days from ruining Russia’s plans and orienting all the only legitimate subject to accept their creation. The reason for the rush was the actors towards a Georgia-scenario for the mediation services is no one else, the will to synchronize the resolutions Moldova. That is why Igor Smirnov, the but the Government in Chisinau. It is with a decision by Timoshenko’s govern- self-proclaimed Transnistrian leader keeps curious that the diplomats in Chisinau ment to allow the import of goods from on declaring that: “Physical, political and are not using to the fullest extent this Moldova and Transnistria solely on the legal opportunity, nor are they using basis of documents wearing the The PSS indicator reflects the stability level in the Security Policy their bilateral relations Moldovan Customs stamps. An- for the period of July-August, 2005 with the big Europeans: other reason for the rush was Germany, the Great Britain the start of the EU monitoring The PSS Indicator and France. Nor are they mission on the Moldo-Ukrain- reaching out to the “new ian border. 0 Europeans”, who would more thorough analy- 1 have a word to say to sup- A sis of the Moldovan port the reformation of the President’s political discourse 2 negotiations format on the denotes that the last month’s Transnistrian issue. 3 Transnistria-oriented actions ately, Moldova’a could be framed into a more 4 actions to settle the July- L general strategy, called “The April-May May-June June-July Transnistrian problem have August Voronin Plan”. Recently an- been the following: four nounced in New York, the plan Security Policy 3,79 3,68 3,19 3,11 joint Moldovan-Ukrainiean is viewed as a common ap- The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the customs checkpoints have proach of the ruling party and highest value and 5 is the lowest been created in Briceni- the opposition to the settlement Rososani, Medveja-Zelio- of the Transnistrian conflict. The aim of military guarantees are indispensable for noe, Larga-Kelmentsi and Giurgiules- the plan is to isolate the separatist regime Transnistria in the process of settlement ti-Reni; a permanent EU mission for in Transnistria and to decrease Russian of the territorial dispute; and only Russian monitoring the joint checkpoints was hegemony in the region. In the meantime, peacekeepers can offer such guarantees.” formed. the plan denotes a greater investment Smirnov also said he would not be against esides giving guarantees, into the people of Transnistria as the new Ukrainian peacekeepers. His position is BMoldova opened the access to “agent” of democratic changes, indis- the following: the least possible number of the Common European Market to the pensable to the settlement of the conflict. international peacekeepers and maximum population and the businesses from According to the plan, he solidarity of the powers to Russia in the settlement process. Transnistria, on the basis of Moldovan people will be gained by the use of attrac- The stubbornness and courage demon- certificates of origin, of course. tive social and economic incentives. strated by the separatist leaders could only his scenario would be perfect if be explained by massive Russian backing. he second resolution allows the it wasn’t for the Russian factor Russia is the power behind the Transnis- T legalization Transnistrian busi- and its weaponry. The most recently, T trian conflict. Russia continuously down- nesses, thus, attracting them into the the political crisis in Ukraine put new plays the legality of the pentagonal format constitutional field of Moldova. Chisinau hurdles on the way of implementing of negotiations for the settlement of the hopes that these measures, together with the above-mentioned strategy. The Transnistrian conflict1, according to which an efficient and EU monitored control Russian side is restlessly supporting the US and the EU are assigned observer of the Transnistrian sector of the Moldo- the thesis that the evacuation of the status, rather than having, as implied by Ukrainian border, will eventually topple Russian troops and armament depends the political circumstances, the full rights Igor Smirnov’s regime by bringing it into on the political solution of Transnis- of mediators. The main argument of the economic strand. trian problem, which, according to the Russian officials is: “These are the OSCE his is the pivot of Voronin’s strategy; Russian officials, takes the form of rules!” Tat least until the EU mission of the legalization of the unlawful separa- border and the evacuation of the Russian tist regime of Transnistria, be it via

7 “internationally-observed” elections2, or towards Transnistria. However, that should sector of the border. The greater risk by placing the legitimate and the separatist not intimidate Moldova from carrying out is, however, that the mission could get government on equal footing in the proc- actions to protect its citizens, which is the an improper mandate: that advocated ess of negotiations (see the Kozak Plan main mission of every state in the world. for by the Ukrainian side. The mandate and the plan issued by the Bertrand Rus- Forecast: regards border monitoring exclusively sel University). Other solutions also came he overall picture of Moldovan policy in the terms of countering the smug- to light through the idea of “simultaneous Tduring last month demonstrates a gling of weapons. The Moldovan side demilitarization of both Moldova and the positive development in the pro-Euro- should insist on the terms agreed upon Transnistrian region” by means that would Atlantic discourse. The changes are in the international conventions, and require the absurd and useless Russian generated partly by the larger effort to redeem the definition of “contraband” military presence. This solution would also internationalize the “conflict with Russia”, as: all goods exported over the border enable Russia with exclusive powers to partly by the efforts of the Moldovan au- of Moldova at the transportation of formulate the policy of Euro-Atlantic “non- thorities to reform the security sector. The which, the necessary customs proce- Integration” of Moldova. As confirmation Moldovan leaders are in constant search dures were not respected, or the export could serve the two newly-issued settle- of new persuasion resources to boost of which Moldova did not agree on. ment initiatives: the new Russian conflict the interest of the Great Powers towards For the month to come, it is probable settlement plan and the OSCE project on Moldova, fact that provokes irritation in that Russia will intensify the political “consolidation of trust between the parties the political circles of both Russian and and economic pressure on Moldova. of the Transnistrian conflict through simul- Transnistria. Even if progress is obvious, it The Government in Chisinau should taneous demilitarization of Moldova and should not provoke self-satisfaction, as the continue advocating for more Euro- Transnistria”. As for the Russian plan, the future tasks are very demanding in both pean implication into the settlement of Moldovan authorities were informed about courage and resources. The behavior of the Transnistrian conflict. The political it by the press. the main parties shows that the negotia- crisis in Ukraine could be a good envi- t present, the orientation of presi- tion process is unlikely to have an imme- ronment for new settlement scenarios Adent Vladimir Voronin’s initiatives diate restart. Each of the sides is trying to appear. The job of the Moldovan towards the Transnistrian conflict is both to make best use of its own advantages: negotiators is to avoid the occurrence interesting and courageous. Ignoring the Moldova- of the Western support, while of Kozak Memoranum-like solutions. separatist government favors the people- the separatists – of the Russian backing. Endnotes: oriented, upward paradigm of toppling Ukraine is busy regaining the trust of the 1. Moldova, the representatives of the separatist the separatist regime in Transnistria. The West while settling the conflict between the government of Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE opportunities offered in the Moldovan con- oligarchic groups connected to the power 2. The elections are intended to be monitored stitutional space outweigh those advertised in Kyiv; that is why it is likely to show by the OSCE by the chauvinist propaganda. It is obvious only peripheral interest towards securing that the relevant structures of the Transnis- the Moldo-Ukrainian border. This situa- trian Ministry of National Security (MGB) tion will make it both risky and difficult started a campaign to discredit Moldova, for the EU representative in Moldova to especially its democratic foundations and organize a timely installation of the border the actions of the Moldovan government monitoring mission on the Transnistrian

Addendum

III. Security Policy The values are calculated on an inverted scale, List of Questions: Points where 1 is the highest value and 5 is the lowest Q1 How would you rate the stability of the security sector in Moldova (the SSC, SIS, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs)? 2,78 The dynamics of security policy sub-indicators Q2 Is the security of Moldova sufficiently protected by the international and regional for July-August 2005 agreements and treaties signed by Moldova? 2,75 Q3 How would you grade the course chosen by the public authorities in Moldova in the matter Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q 9 Q 10 of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict? 2,63 0 To what extent is Moldova protected from „energy blackmailing” from the part of other Q4 0,5 countries? 3,9 1 Q5 Are the Moldovan institutions able to counter the contraband, smuggling, illegal arm and drug trade? 3,17 1,5 Is Moldova able to deal with a foreign aggression or military intervention from abroad? 2 Q6 3,55 2,3 July-August Q7 How would you rate the place of Moldova within the Euro-Atlantic collective security 2,5 2,63 2,782,75 3 2,95 space? 2,3 3,17 3,35 Q8 To what extent does Moldova need to develop its internal defense capabilities? 2,95 3,5 3,55 Q9 To what extent the „neutrality clause” corresponds to the national interest of Moldova? 3,95 4 3,9 3,95 Q10 How would you rate the efficiency of the policies countering corruption and organized 4,5 crime, including the transnational crime? 3,35

This bulletin is published with the generous support of GMF (German Marshall Fund of the United States). GMF is an American institution promoting exchange of ideas and cooperation between the United States and Europe in the spirit of the post- World War II Marshall Plan. The opinions expressed by the means of this publication belong solely to its authors. The PSS Team: Ghenadie Mocanu, Timur Onica. In order to subscribe to the distribution list of Political and Security Statewatch bulletin, please contact our Publications Department by: Email: [email protected] or call: + 373 22 22 18 44, www.viitorul.moldova.org

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