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Integrated Information Theory: from Consciousness to Its Physical

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Integrated Information Theory: from Consciousness to Its Physical PERSPECTIVES the brain, leads to testable predictions, and OPINION allows inferences and extrapolations about Integrated information theory: consciousness. From phenomenology to physics The axioms of IIT state that every experience from consciousness to its physical exists intrinsically and is structured, specific, unitary and definite. IIT then substrate postulates that, for each essential property of experience, there must be a corresponding Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini and Christof Koch causal property of the PSC. The postulates of IIT state that the PSC must have intrinsic Abstract | In this Opinion article, we discuss how integrated information theory cause–effect power; its parts must also have accounts for several aspects of the relationship between consciousness and the cause–effect power within the PSC and they brain. Integrated information theory starts from the essential properties of must specify a cause–effect structure that phenomenal experience, from which it derives the requirements for the physical is specific, unitary and definite. Below, we substrate of consciousness. It argues that the physical substrate of consciousness discuss the axioms and postulates of IIT (see Supplementary information S1,S2 (figure, must be a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power and provides a means to box)) and describe the fundamental identity determine, in principle, the quality and quantity of experience. The theory leads — between an experience and a conceptual to some counterintuitive predictions and can be used to develop new tools for structure — that it proposes (FIG. 1). assessing consciousness in non-communicative patients. The first axiom of IIT states that experience exists intrinsically. As recognized by Descartes13, my own Consciousness is subjective experience To answer these questions, the experience is the only thing whose existence — ‘what it is like’, for example, to perceive empirical study of consciousness should is immediately and absolutely evident, a scene, to endure pain, to entertain a be complemented by a theoretical and it exists for myself, from my own thought or to reflect on the experience approach. The reason why some neural intrinsic perspective. The corresponding itself 1–3. When consciousness fades, as it mechanisms, but not others, should be postulate states that the PSC must also exist does in dreamless sleep, from the intrinsic associated with consciousness has been intrinsically. For something to exist in a perspective of the experiencing subject, the called ‘the hard problem’ because it seems physical sense, it must have cause–effect entire world vanishes. to defy the possibility of a scientific power — that is, it must be possible to make Consciousness depends on the integrity explanation10. In this Opinion article, we a difference to it (that is, change its state) of certain brain regions and the particular provide an overview of the integrated and it must be able to make a difference to content of an experience depends on the information theory (IIT) of consciousness, something. Moreover, the PSC must exist activity of neurons in parts of the cerebral which has been developed over the past intrinsically — that is, it must have cause– cortex4. However, despite increasingly refined few years1–3,11,12. IIT addresses the hard effect power for itself, from its own intrinsic clinical and experimental studies, a proper problem in a new way. It does not start perspective. A neuron in the brain, for understanding of the relationship between from the brain and ask how it could give example, satisfies the criterion for existence consciousness and the brain has yet to be rise to experience; instead, it starts from because it has two or more internal states established5,6. For example, it is not known the essential phenomenal properties of (such as active and inactive) that can be why the cortex supports consciousness experience, or axioms, and infers postulates affected by inputs (causes) and its output when the cerebellum does not, despite about the characteristics that are required can make a difference to other neurons having four times as many neurons7,8, or why of its physical substrate. Moreover, IIT (effects). A minimal system consisting of consciousness fades during deep sleep while presents a mathematical framework for two interconnected neurons satisfies the the cerebral cortex remains active. There are evaluating the quality and quantity of criterion of intrinsic existence because, also many other difficult questions about consciousness1–3,9. We begin by providing a through their reciprocal interactions, the consciousness. Are patients with a functional summary of the axioms and corresponding system can make a difference to itself. island of cortex surrounded by widespread postulates of IIT and show how they can be The axiom of composition states that damage conscious, and if so, of what? Are used, in principle, to identify the physical experience is structured, being composed of newborn infants conscious? Are animals that substrate of consciousness (PSC). We then several phenomenal distinctions that exist display complex behaviours, but have brains discuss how IIT explains in a parsimonious within it. For example, within an experience, very different from humans, conscious6? Can manner a variety of facts about the I may distinguish a piano, a blue colour, a intelligent machines be conscious9? relationship between consciousness and book, countless spatial locations, and so on 450 | JULY 2016 | VOLUME 17 www.nature.com/nrn ©2016 Mac millan Publishers Li mited. All ri ghts reserved. ©2016 Mac millan Publishers Li mited. All ri ghts reserved. PERSPECTIVES Experience Conceptual structure Purviewp Mechanism Purviewf 011 100 BCp ACc ABCf 010 1.0 001 0.5 0.083 110 0.0 000 ABCp ABc ABCf A 1.0 001 AC AB 0.5 0.167 010 0.0 C ABp Cc Af 100 1.0 Identity B 011 0.5 0.25 101 of state Probability 0.0 111 Ap Bc ACf 000 1.0 101 0.5 0.25 111 0.0 Φmax = 0.66 110 ABCp Ac Bf Physical substrate 1.0 0.5 0.25 0.0 φmax of A 000100010110001101011111 concept 000100010110001101011111 MAJ Concept OR AND Logic gate ON B C Logic gate OFF Probability of past states AND Probability of future states Boundary of experience D Figure 1 | An experience is a conceptual structure. According to inte- red; ON is 1 and OFF is 0). The vertical axis representsNature Reviews the probability | Neuroscience of each grated information theory (IIT), a particular experience (illustrated here from state (for consistency, the probability values shown are over the states of the the point of view of the subject) is identical to a conceptual structure spec- entire complex and not just over the subset of elements constituting the ified by a physical substrate. The true physical substrate of the depicted purview). In this example, five of seven possible concepts exist, specified by experience (seeing one’s hands on the piano) and the associated conceptual the mechanisms A, B, C, AB, AC (all with φmax>0) in their current state (which structure are highly complex. To allow a complete analysis of conceptual are labelled as Ac, Bc, etc.). The subsets BC and ABC do not specify any con- structures, the physical substrate illustrated here was chosen to be cept because their cause–effect repertoire is reducible by partitions extremely simple1,2: four logic gates (labelled A, B, C and D, where A is a (φmax=0). In the middle, the 16-dimensional cause–effect space of the com- Majority (MAJ) gate, B is an OR gate, and C and D are AND gates; the straight plex is represented as a circle, where each of the 16 axes corresponds to one arrows indicate connections among the logic gates, the curved arrows indi- of the eight possible past (p; blue arrows) and eight possible future states cate self-connections) are shown in a particular state (ON or OFF). The anal- (f; red arrows) of the complex, and the position along the axis represents ysis of this system, performed according to the postulates of IIT, identifies a the probability of that state. Each concept is depicted as a star, the position conceptual structure supported by a complex constituted of the elements of which in cause–effect space represents how the concept specifies the A, B and C in their current ON states. The borders of the complex, which probability of past and future states of the complex, and the size of which include elements A, B, and C but exclude element D, are indicated by the measures how irreducible the concept is (φmax). Relations between two green circle. According to IIT, such a complex would be a physical substrate concepts (overlaps in their purviews) are represented as lines between the of consciousness (Supplementary information S1 (figure)). The conceptual stars. The fundamental identity postulated by IIT claims that the set of con- structure is represented as a set of stars and, equivalently, as a set of histo- cepts and their relations that compose the conceptual structure are identi- grams. The green circle represents the fact that experience is definite (it cal to the quality of the experience. This is how the experience feels — what has borders). Each histogram illustrates the cause–effect repertoire of a it is like to be the complex ABC in its current state 111. The intrinsic irreduc- concept: how a particular mechanism constrains the probability of past ibility of the entire conceptual structure (Φmax, a non-negative number) and future states of its maximally irreducible purview within the complex reflects how much consciousness there is (the quantity of the experience). ABC. The bins on the horizontal axis at the bottom of the histograms rep- The irreducibility of each concept (φmax) reflects how much each resent the 16-dimensional cause–effect space of the complex — all its phenomenal distinction exists within the experience.
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