DOCSLIB.ORG

SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT: SOUL, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE and WILL Willem Devries

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT: SOUL, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE and WILL Willem Devries 8 SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT: SOUL, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE AND WILL Willem deVries THE TEXTS scholars. To some degree, this situation derives from the fact that one part of the PSS, Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS) the Phenomenology of Spirit – the middle occupies an important place in his system. The third that sits between the Anthropology and system has three major parts: the Logic, the the Psychology – corresponds to the first five Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of chapters of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit Spirit. The Philosophy of Spirit itself has three ( PhG ) with the same title. The literature on parts: the PSS, the Philosophy of Objective PhG is massive, and the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Absolute Spirit. the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical The PSS, then, stands at the transition from Sciences ( Enc ) gets lost in its shadow. nature to spirit and thus contains important Effectively, many Hegel scholars substitute material concerning the relation of nature the 1807 volume for the PSS when think- and spirit. Furthermore, objective spirit con- ing about Hegel’s system. PhG is far more cerns the various forms of relation among detailed than the Phenomenology in Enc agents within a rational society; subjective (though Hegel clearly changed his mind on spirit analyses the elements necessary for or some issues after writing the former), and is presupposed by such relations, namely, the a text of sweeping vision. The historical as structures characteristic of and necessary to well as systematic contexts of PhG and Enc the individual rational agent. The PSS analy- differ. It is a major interpretative challenge in ses the fundamental nature of the biological/ Hegel scholarship to understand the relation spiritual human individual along with the between the large, complex, and sometimes cognitive and the practical prerequisites of ungainly PhG , which was billed as an intro- human social interaction. duction to Hegel’s systematic philosophy, and Given the importance of Hegel’s PSS, the the compressed, telegraphic Phenomenology level of scholarly attention it has received is of Spirit that occupies a place within the disappointing. Only his philosophy of nature encyclopaedic system. The focus here is currently receives less attention from Hegel solely on the latter. 133 99781441195128_Ch08_Fpp_txt_prf.indd781441195128_Ch08_Fpp_txt_prf.indd 113333 110/3/20120/3/2012 111:08:521:08:52 PPMM SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN (Descartes, for instance, defends such a claim INDIVIDUAL: SOME HISTORICAL at the end of the Second Meditation: see CONTEXT Descartes Oeuvres [AT] VII:33.) Thought is identified with the processes of composition The concern to understand the nature of the and analysis operating on ideas. Our knowl- human individual that dominated early mod- edge of the existence and characteristics of ern philosophy from Descartes and Spinoza material bodies is taken to be mediated by through Locke, Hume and Kant is also the knowledge of our own mental states, thus central concern in Hegel’s PSS. But Hegel remaining always more problematic than approaches the issue in a radically different self-knowledge. way from his pre-Kantian predecessors. I will These assumptions were shared broadly start by summarizing the common assump- among Kant’s predecessors, but there were tions shared among Kant’s predecessors. numerous specific differences. The rational- Pre-Kantian thinking about the individ- ists believed that the simple ideas are highly ual’s relation to the material natural world, abstract and innate in the very structure of the internal resources native to humans and the mind, and that a great deal of knowledge the basic prerequisites of human relation- about the fundamental structure of the world ships adopted a common generic theoreti- is encoded in them, affording insight into cal framework that we can call (following necessary truths concerning the supersensible Locke) ‘the new way of ideas’. This frame- realm and our spiritual nature. The empiri- work assumes a deep ontological distinction cists, in contrast, thought that the simple ideas between extended material objects (bod- are particular sensory images, from which all ies) and immaterial, thinking or experienc- our other ideas are derived or compounded ing objects (minds). 1 Bodies are thought to by de facto faculties (such as innate abilities interact according to rigorously mathema- to compare or to abstract ideas) in accord- tizable and exceptionless laws of nature of ance with certain laws of association. The the kind being discovered by the then emerg- dialectic of empiricist thought led empiricism ing new sciences of astronomy, mechanics to a rather unhappy scepticism according to and optics. Causation is generally conceived which conclusions that reach even a little of along mechanistic lines, and teleological beyond the senses cannot be justified, and the causation and explanation are also generally only necessities we can cognize are trivial. rejected. Minds, in contrast, contain (consist Kant began to revolutionize this frame- of?) ideas , usually characterized in terms of work. He enriched the framework of ‘ideas’, their representational content, that interact distinguishing in a meaningful way between according to normative rules of reason. 2 Ideas sensory and conceptual representations, and are taken to have a fundamentally composi- employing the logical forms of judgement to tional structure: there is a supply of simple provide a more sophisticated notion of the ideas that can be compounded into complex relationships among representations. He rec- ideas – though the forms of composition rec- ognized that representations in a judgement ognized in this framework were quite limited. are combined with a modal force that signals It is also a standard pre-Kantian assumption that the combination is not merely subjec- that minds have some form of immediate and tive association. Kant argued that the innate transparent access to the ideas they contain. architecture of the mind determines certain 134 99781441195128_Ch08_Fpp_txt_prf.indd781441195128_Ch08_Fpp_txt_prf.indd 113434 110/3/20120/3/2012 111:08:521:08:52 PPMM SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT complex representations to be necessarily characteristics, abilities, etc.? Hegel rejects true. Yet he also argued that these judge- this reading: the philosophy of subjec- ments can hold true only of the phenomenal tive spirit ‘is concerned with cognition of world revealed by sensory experience. The human truth, with that which is true in and supersensible realm remains beyond our ken. for itself, – with essence itself as spirit’ ( Enc Kant thus tried to validate more knowledge §377). Merely including knowledge of the than the empiricists thought to be obtain- characteristics and foibles of those around us able (namely, knowledge of the necessary is also ruled out by this test. The philosophy structure of the phenomenal realm), without of mind looks for the truly universal across acceding to rationalist metaphysical preten- all humans. Hegel then identifies two ways sions concerning the supersensible realm. this universal project has been approached But Kant remains mired in a highly dualis- recently: first, so-called rational psychology; tic framework: the distinction between the second, empirical psychology ( Enc §§377–8). phenomenal and the noumenal cannot be Both these approaches are faulty, however, overcome, so that human beings can neither because mired in the ‘categories of the under- know the nature of reality as it is in itself, nor standing’. This means that certain aspects can they know themselves as free, rational, of the phenomenon under consideration are moral agents. In the end, Kant denies knowl- regarded as ‘separate and fixed’ ( Enc §378A) edge to make room for faith. and form an independent basis from which all other aspects are to be derived. Empirical psychology reaches towards the universal by generalizing from empirical SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: observation of particular spiritual faculties: HEGELIAN REVISIONS In empirical psychology, it is the particu- Hegel is deeply dissatisfied with both larizations into which spirit is divided the metaphysics and the methodologies which are regarded as being rigid in their limitation, so that spirit is treated as a employed by his predecessors, so dissatisfied mere aggregate of independent forces, that he proclaims that ‘Aristotle’s books on each of which stands only in reciprocal the soul, as well as his dissertations on its and therefore external relation to the special aspects and conditions, are still by far other. ( Enc §378A; Petry translation the best or even the sole work of speculative adapted) interest on this general topic’ ( Enc §378). Understanding why Hegel is so dissatisfied Empirical psychology however cannot dem- with his predecessors’ paradigm is important onstrate the ‘harmonious integration’ of the to grasping his approach. powers or faculties it discovers, that is, the Let us start with Hegel’s complaints about necessary unity they must exhibit in order to methodologies commonly used in the philos- exist as powers of a unified spirit. ophy of mind. The philosophy of spirit aims Rational psychology or pneumatology at cognition of spirit itself; it is the execu- concerns itself, not with empirical research tion of the ‘absolute command, Know thy- and data, but ‘with abstract and general self ’. Is this an injunction to know oneself determinations, with the supposedly unmani- in a narrow sense:
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Theoretical Models of Consciousness: a Scoping Review
    brain sciences Review Theoretical Models of Consciousness: A Scoping Review Davide Sattin 1,2,*, Francesca Giulia Magnani 1, Laura Bartesaghi 1, Milena Caputo 1, Andrea Veronica Fittipaldo 3, Martina Cacciatore 1, Mario Picozzi 4 and Matilde Leonardi 1 1 Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; [email protected] (F.G.M.); [email protected] (L.B.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.L.) 2 Experimental Medicine and Medical Humanities-PhD Program, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department and Center for Clinical Ethics, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy 3 Oncology Department, Mario Negri Institute for Pharmacological Research IRCCS, 20156 Milan, Italy; veronicaandrea.fi[email protected] 4 Center for Clinical Ethics, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +39-02-2394-2709 Abstract: The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007–2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue.
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About Ned Block New York University I
    To appear in The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Consciousness, Philosophical Issues about Ned Block New York University I. The Hard Problem There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state of reflexive consciousness. This entry will start with phenomenality, moving later to reflexivity and then to one other kind of consciousness. The Hard Problem of consciousness is how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. If neural state N is the neural basis of the sensation of red, why is N the basis of that experience rather than some other experience or none at all? Chalmers (1996) distinguishes between the Hard Problem and “easy” problems that concern the function of consciousness. The Hard Problem (though not under that name) was identified by Nagel (1974) and further analyzed in Levine (1983). There are two reasons for thinking that the Hard Problem has no solution. 1. Actual Failure. In fact, no one has been able to think of even a highly speculative answer. 2. Principled Failure. The materials we have available seem ill suited to providing an answer. As Nagel says, an answer to this question would seem to require an objective account that necessarily leaves out the subjectivity of what it is trying to explain.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein and Descartes on Consciousness
    International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention ISSN (Online): 2319 – 7722, ISSN (Print): 2319 – 7714 www.ijhssi.org Volume 3 Issue 10 ǁ October. 2014 ǁ PP.27-30 Wittgenstein and Descartes on Consciousness Dr. Bimal Chandra Gogoi Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Lakhimpur Kendriya Mahavidyalaya (Dibrugarh University), North Lakhimpur, Assam, India ABSTRACT : The concept of consciousness has been discussed by a number of philosophers in the history of philosophy but it still needs more detailed interpretations. Philosophy has never been stable and as time passes philosophical problems arises with new directions of study. Descartes, in his Meditations, proved that his essence is thinking or consciousness and discussed the nature of mind, its relation to material body and consciousness without the body etc. Wittgenstein doesn’t regard consciousness to be the essence of mind or mental phenomena. He criticizes the Cartesian theory of consciousness, which regards consciousness to be a private inner essence. The aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the views of both the philosophers about the nature of consciousness. KEWORDS: Consciousness, Criticism, Essence, Descartes, Wittgenstein I. INTRODUCTION . In the history of philosophy, the problem of mind or soul is regarded as one of the vital problems, which attracted philosophers a good deal. Man as an intellectual being; always tries to inquire into his own mind. It is a bare fact that we have a mind and it is accepted by every person. Although “mind” is an ambiguous term no body would accept that he has no mind, but it does not mean that he knows the meaning of it or he is pointing out something to be his mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness 1
    FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series: Linguistics and Literature Vol. 7, No 2, 2009, pp. 173 - 182 SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 1 UDC 81'23(049.32) Đorđe Vidanović Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, Serbia E-mail: [email protected] Abstract. In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness). Key words: Searle, Dennett, Multiple Drafts Model, consciousness,memes, genes, intentionality "No activity of mind is ever conscious" 2 (Karl Lashley, 1956) 1. INTRODUCTION In his collection of the New York Times book reviews, The Mystery of Conscious- ness (1997), John Searle criticizes Daniel Dennett's explanation of consciousness, stating that Dennett actually renounces it and proposes a version of strong AI instead, without ever accounting for it. Received June 27, 2009 1 A version of this paper was submitted to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Maribor, Slovenia, as part of the Festschrift for Dunja Jutronic in 2008, see http://oddelki.ff.uni-mb.si/filozofija/files/Festschrift/Dunjas_festschrift/vidanovic.pdf 2 Lashley, K.
    [Show full text]
  • Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness
    7/28/2015 Cosmology About Contents Abstracting Processing Editorial Manuscript Submit Your Book/Journal the All & Indexing Charges Guidelines & Preparation Manuscript Sales Contact Journal Volumes Review Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Cosmology, 2014, Vol. 18. 231-245 Cosmology.com, 2014 Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness Subhash Kak1, Deepak Chopra2, and Menas Kafatos3 1Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078 2Chopra Foundation, 2013 Costa Del Mar Road, Carlsbad, CA 92009 3Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866 Abstract: Our sense of reality is different from its mathematical basis as given by physical theories. Although nature at its deepest level is quantum mechanical and nonlocal, it appears to our minds in everyday experience as local and classical. Since the same laws should govern all phenomena, we propose this difference in the nature of perceived reality is due to the principle of veiled nonlocality that is associated with consciousness. Veiled nonlocality allows consciousness to operate and present what we experience as objective reality. In other words, this principle allows us to consider consciousness indirectly, in terms of how consciousness operates. We consider different theoretical models commonly used in physics and neuroscience to describe veiled nonlocality. Furthermore, if consciousness as an entity leaves a physical trace, then laboratory searches for such a trace should be sought for in nonlocality, where probabilities do not conform to local expectations. Keywords: quantum physics, neuroscience, nonlocality, mental time travel, time Introduction Our perceived reality is classical, that is it consists of material objects and their fields. On the other hand, reality at the quantum level is different in as much as it is nonlocal, which implies that objects are superpositions of other entities and, therefore, their underlying structure is wave-like, that is it is smeared out.
    [Show full text]
  • Mysticism and Mystical Experiences
    1 Mysticism and Mystical Experiences The first issue is simply to identify what mysti cism is. The term derives from the Latin word “mysticus” and ultimately from the Greek “mustikos.”1 The Greek root muo“ ” means “to close or conceal” and hence “hidden.”2 The word came to mean “silent” or “secret,” i.e., doctrines and rituals that should not be revealed to the uninitiated. The adjec tive “mystical” entered the Christian lexicon in the second century when it was adapted by theolo- gians to refer, not to inexpressible experiences of God, but to the mystery of “the divine” in liturgical matters, such as the invisible God being present in sacraments and to the hidden meaning of scriptural passages, i.e., how Christ was actually being referred to in Old Testament passages ostensibly about other things. Thus, theologians spoke of mystical theology and the mystical meaning of the Bible. But at least after the third-century Egyptian theolo- gian Origen, “mystical” could also refer to a contemplative, direct appre- hension of God. The nouns “mystic” and “mysticism” were only invented in the seven teenth century when spirituality was becoming separated from general theology.3 In the modern era, mystical inter pretations of the Bible dropped away in favor of literal readings. At that time, modernity’s focus on the individual also arose. Religion began to become privatized in terms of the primacy of individuals, their beliefs, and their experiences rather than being seen in terms of rituals and institutions. “Religious experiences” also became a distinct category as scholars beginning in Germany tried, in light of science, to find a distinct experi ential element to religion.
    [Show full text]
  • Mysticism and Cognitive Neuroscience: We Stand at the Threshold of a New Era in Modern Science … with the Coming of the Neuroscience Revolution
    248 discipline within a network of diverse approaches to humanistic issues. Taylor writes that, Mysticism and cognitive neuroscience: We stand at the threshold of a new era in modern science … with the coming of the neuroscience revolution. Before, pure science was able a partnership in the quest for consciousness to brush the philosophical questions aside and, indeed, banished all but the most positivist rhetoric from the discussion of what constituted * Brian Les Lancaster scientific reality. Now, the neuroscience revolution, with its inter- disciplinary communication between the basic sciences, its cross- -fertilization of methods, and its focus for the first time on the biology of Resumo consciousness, appears to have important humanistic implications far beyond the dictates of the reductionistic approach that spawned it. Neste artigo são integrados os conhecimentos neurofisiológicos com (p. 468) um modelo de processos perceptuais e de memória, baseado no misticismo da linguagem Sufi e judaica, e com a análise do pensamento An indicator of the importance of neuroscience may be observed in fundado em textos do Budista Abhidhamma. Os estados místicos pro- the various hybrid disciplines that have been spawned over recent years, movidos nestas tradições parecem envolver consciência, sugerindo-se each of which includes the prefix ‘neuro-’ as an emblem of authority, as it que são estes estados de pré-consciência que produzem a consciência were. Illustrative of this trend are neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996, 1999), de algo mais que William James, Rudolph Otto e outros classicamente neuro-psychoanalysis (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Solms, 2000), and the associaram no sentido do espiritual, em particular a asserção principal, topic of my paper, neurotheology (Ashbrook, 1984; d’Aquili & Newberg, dos textos místicos Judeus de que o impulso de baixo activa o de cima é comparável com a neurociência da consciência.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Consciousness? Integrated Information Vs. Inference
    entropy Article What Is Consciousness? Integrated Information vs. Inference James E. Cooke 1,2 1 Institute of Behavioural Neuroscience (IBN), University College London (UCL), London WC1H 0AP, UK; [email protected] 2 Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland Abstract: Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.
    [Show full text]
  • DENNETT's CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED: ITS CRITICS, and the CONTROVERSY OVER the “TRUE NATURE” of CONSCIOUSNESS BENJAMIN NEWMAN Swarthmore College
    DENNETT'S CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED: ITS CRITICS, AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE “TRUE NATURE” OF CONSCIOUSNESS BENJAMIN NEWMAN Swarthmore College Are zombies possible? They’re not just possible, they’re actual. We’re all zombies. (Dennett Consciousness Explained, 406) It would be an act of desperate intellectual dishonesty to quote this assertion out of context! (footnote to the above). IN CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED, Daniel Dennett sets forth an extended sketch of what may, or may not, be an explanation of consciousness. The controversy regarding what, exactly, Dennett does explain, and what, if anything, he omits, arises both from profound and genuine disagreement with his views on the part of many contemporary philosophers and from ambiguities in the definitions of some key terms (e.g. “consciousness” and “explanation”). Between the fundamentally conflicting worldviews and behind the conceptual ambiguities, is there a real philosophical controversy to be found, or just a lot of empty rhetoric? I believe that there is a real and meaningful question lurking in the interplay between Dennett and his critics, and it will be my goal in this paper to bring that question to light and to frame it in such a way that it is clear what is at stake. What is at stake? Dennett’s approach to the problem of consciousness is firmly reductive and materialistic. He believes that the physical facts about the brain (and, to a lesser extent, about the context in which it finds itself) are sufficient to account for all of the facts about the mind, consciousness included. Some of Dennett’s critics would have ended that last sentence with the words “consciousness excluded,” and they do have a point.
    [Show full text]
  • A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory Of
    entropy Article A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Jon Mallatt The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA; [email protected] Abstract: This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as φMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT’s strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative “experience- first” approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body (“hard”) problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested.
    [Show full text]
  • INFORMATION– CONSCIOUSNESS– REALITY How a New Understanding of the Universe Can Help Answer Age-Old Questions of Existence the FRONTIERS COLLECTION
    THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION James B. Glattfelder INFORMATION– CONSCIOUSNESS– REALITY How a New Understanding of the Universe Can Help Answer Age-Old Questions of Existence THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION Series editors Avshalom C. Elitzur, Iyar, Israel Institute of Advanced Research, Rehovot, Israel Zeeya Merali, Foundational Questions Institute, Decatur, GA, USA Thanu Padmanabhan, Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics (IUCAA), Pune, India Maximilian Schlosshauer, Department of Physics, University of Portland, Portland, OR, USA Mark P. Silverman, Department of Physics, Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA Jack A. Tuszynski, Department of Physics, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Rüdiger Vaas, Redaktion Astronomie, Physik, bild der wissenschaft, Leinfelden-Echterdingen, Germany THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION The books in this collection are devoted to challenging and open problems at the forefront of modern science and scholarship, including related philosophical debates. In contrast to typical research monographs, however, they strive to present their topics in a manner accessible also to scientifically literate non-specialists wishing to gain insight into the deeper implications and fascinating questions involved. Taken as a whole, the series reflects the need for a fundamental and interdisciplinary approach to modern science and research. Furthermore, it is intended to encourage active academics in all fields to ponder over important and perhaps controversial issues beyond their own speciality. Extending from quantum physics and relativity to entropy, conscious- ness, language and complex systems—the Frontiers Collection will inspire readers to push back the frontiers of their own knowledge. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5342 For a full list of published titles, please see back of book or springer.com/series/5342 James B.
    [Show full text]
  • Carl G. Jung's Synchronicity and Quantum Entanglement: Schrödinger's Cat 'Wanders' Between Chromosomes
    Carl G. Jung’s Synchronicity and Quantum Entanglement: Schrödinger’s Cat ’Wanders’ Between Chromosomes Igor Limar To cite this version: Igor Limar. Carl G. Jung’s Synchronicity and Quantum Entanglement: Schrödinger’s Cat ’Wan- ders’ Between Chromosomes. NeuroQuantology, NeuroQuantology, 2011, 9 (2), pp.313-321. hprints- 00637383v2 HAL Id: hprints-00637383 https://hal-hprints.archives-ouvertes.fr/hprints-00637383v2 Submitted on 22 Jun 2012 (v2), last revised 19 Jul 2012 (v3) HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Limar IV., C.G. Jung’s Synchronicity and Quantum Entanglement 1 C.G. Jung’s Synchronicity and Quantum Entanglement: Schrodinger’s Cat ‘Wanders’ Between Chromosomes Igor V. Limar Abstract One of the most prospective directions of study of C.G. Jung’s synchronicity phenomenon is reviewed considering the latest achievements of modern science. The attention is focused mainly on the quantum entanglement and related phenomena – quantum coherence and quantum superposition. It is shown that the quantum non-locality capable of solving the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox represents one of the most adequate physical mechanisms in terms of conformity with the Jung’s synchronicity hypothesis. An attempt is made on psychophysiological substantiation of synchronicity within the context of molecular biology.
    [Show full text]