Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness 7/28/2015 Cosmology About Contents Abstracting Processing Editorial Manuscript Submit Your Book/Journal the All & Indexing Charges Guidelines & Preparation Manuscript Sales Contact Journal Volumes Review Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Order from Amazon Cosmology, 2014, Vol. 18. 231-245 Cosmology.com, 2014 Perceived Reality, Quantum Mechanics, and Consciousness Subhash Kak1, Deepak Chopra2, and Menas Kafatos3 1Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078 2Chopra Foundation, 2013 Costa Del Mar Road, Carlsbad, CA 92009 3Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866 Abstract: Our sense of reality is different from its mathematical basis as given by physical theories. Although nature at its deepest level is quantum mechanical and nonlocal, it appears to our minds in everyday experience as local and classical. Since the same laws should govern all phenomena, we propose this difference in the nature of perceived reality is due to the principle of veiled nonlocality that is associated with consciousness. Veiled nonlocality allows consciousness to operate and present what we experience as objective reality. In other words, this principle allows us to consider consciousness indirectly, in terms of how consciousness operates. We consider different theoretical models commonly used in physics and neuroscience to describe veiled nonlocality. Furthermore, if consciousness as an entity leaves a physical trace, then laboratory searches for such a trace should be sought for in nonlocality, where probabilities do not conform to local expectations. Keywords: quantum physics, neuroscience, nonlocality, mental time travel, time Introduction Our perceived reality is classical, that is it consists of material objects and their fields. On the other hand, reality at the quantum level is different in as much as it is nonlocal, which implies that objects are superpositions of other entities and, therefore, their underlying structure is wave-like, that is it is smeared out. This discrepancy shows up in the framework of quantum theory itself because the wavefunction unfolds in a deterministic way excepting when it is observed which act causes it to become localized. The fact that the wavefunction of the system collapses upon observation suggests that we should ask whether it fundamentally represents interaction of consciousness with matter. In reality this question is meaningful only if we are able to define consciousness objectively. Since consciousness is not a thing or an external object, its postulated interaction with matter becomes paradoxical. If we rephrased our question we could ask where our personal self is located and if it is just some neural structure that exists in the classical world, why is it that its activity (observation) collapses the wavefunction? The human observer interacts with the quantum system through apparatus devised by him and, therefore, the actual interaction is between physical systems. If the human were directly observing the system, then also the interaction is within the human brain that consists of various neural structures. The observation is associated with a time element since the apparatus must first be prepared and then examined after the interaction with the quantum system has occurred. The http://cosmology.com/ConsciousTime107.html 1/10 7/28/2015 Cosmology observer’s self-consciousness is also the product of life experience, and therefore the variable of time plays a central role in it. Neuroscience, which considers brain states in terms of electrical and chemical activity in the interconnection of the neurons, that somehow gives rise to awareness, cannot explain where the aware self is located. Since each neuron can only carry a small amount of information, no specific neuron can be the location of the self. On the other hand, if the self is distributed over a large area of the brain, what is it that binds this area together? Furthermore, since we have different inner senses of self in different states of mind, are these based on recruitment of different set of neurons, and why is it that behind each such sense of selfhood, ostensibly associated with different parts of the brain, is the certitude that it corresponds to the same individual? What integrates all these different senses into one coherent and persisting sense of self? Behind these questions lie a whole set of complementarities. Thus in some contexts it is appropriate to view the self as located at some point in the brain, whereas in other contexts it is distributed all over the body. The question whether mental states are governed by quantum laws is answered in the affirmative by those who accept a quantum basis of mind (von Neumann, 1932/1955; Wigner, 1983; Penrose, 1994; Nadeau and Kafatos, 1999; Roy and Kafatos, 2004; Hameroff and Penrose, 2003; Stapp, 2003; Freeman and Vitiello, 2006). Recent findings in support of quantum models for biology (e.g., Lambert et al., 2013) lend additional support to this position. We add a point of caution here: mind as a random quantum machine as suggested by some theories may be an advance but not the complete picture since it will not be able to account for the individual’s freedom and agency; and it cannot imply an objective reality independent of observation. The question related to the limitations on what can be known by the mind has a logical component related to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and logical paradoxes (Davis, 1965), which can also apply to limits of knowing in physics and biology (Herrnstein, 1985; Grandpierre and Kafatos, 2012; Kak, 2012; Buser et al., 2013). In this article, we focus on the relationship between reality and our conceptions of it as mediated by consciousness. This mediation may be seen through the lenses of neuroscience and physics. We first show how the mind constructs reality; later we discuss how the nonlocality inherent in quantum theory and, therefore, in physical process, is veiled by consciousness so that it appears to be local (Kak, 2014; Kafatos and Kak, 2014). This veiling is a characteristic of consciousness as process and it mirrors the way quantum theory conceals all the details of the state of a single particle by means of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Finally, we consider how indirect evidence in terms of anomalous probabilities in certain events can be adduced as evidence in support of reality being quantum-like at a fundamental level. Interpretations of Quantum Theory The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics separates the physical universe in two parts, the first part is the system being observed, and the second part is the human agent, together with his instruments. The extended agent is described in mental terms and it includes not only his apparatus but also instructions to his colleagues on how to set up the instruments and report on their observations. The Heisenberg cut (also called the von Neumann cut) is the hypothetical interface between quantum events and an observer's information, knowledge, or conscious awareness. Below the cut everything is governed by the wave function; above the cut a classical description applies. In the materialist conception, which leaves out quantum processes since they were until recently thought not to play a role in brain processes, consciousness is an epiphenomenon with biology as ground. But, although this is the prevalent neuroscience paradigm, there is no way we can justify the view that material particles somehow acquire consciousness on account of complexity of interconnections between neurons. There is also the panpsychist position that consciousness is a characteristic of all things, but in its usual formulation as in the MWI position that will be discussed later it is merely a restatement of the materialist position so as to account for consciousness (Strawson, 2006). On the other hand is the position that consciousness is a transcendent phenomenon – since it cannot be a thing – which interpenetrates the material universe. The human brain, informed by the phenomenon of consciousness, has self-awareness to contemplate its own origins. We do know that mental states are correlated with activity in different parts of the brain. With regard to mental states several questions may be asked: 1. Do mental states interact with the quantum wavefunction? 2. Are mental states governed by quantum laws? 3. Are there limitations to what the mind can know about reality? There is considerable literature on research done on each of these questions. The question of interaction between mental states and the wavefunction was addressed by the pioneers of quantum theory and answered in the affirmative in the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) (von Neumann, 1932/1955). In CI, the wavefunction is properly understood epistemologically, that is, it represents the experimenter’s knowledge of the system. Upon observation there is a change in this knowledge. It postulates the observer without explaining how the capacity of observation arises (Schwartz et al., 2005; Stapp, 2003). Operationally, it is a dualist position, where there is a fundamental split between observers and objects. There is the added variance or interpretation of CI followed by von Neumann in his discussion of the quantum cut which implies that although the separation between observers and objects has to be brought into actual experimental setups, that it is not fundamental. In the realistic view of the wavefunction as in the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI), there is no collapse of the wavefunction. Rather, the interaction is seen through the lens of decoherence, which occurs when states interact with the environment producing entanglement (Zurek, 2003). By the process of decoherence the system makes transition from a pure state to a mixture of states that observers end up measuring. In the MWI interpretation, which may be called the ontic interpretation, the wavefunction has objective reality. The problem of collapse of the wavefunction is sidestepped by speaking of interaction between different subsystems. But since http://cosmology.com/ConsciousTime107.html 2/10 7/28/2015 Cosmology the entire universe is also a quantum system, the question of how this whole system splits into independent subsystems arises.
Recommended publications
  • 01. Pre-Socratic Cosmology and Plato I. Basic Issues (1) Metaphysical (A) What Do Things Consist Of? • One Substance (Monism) Socrates ("SOH-Kra-Teez") Died: 399 B.C
    01. Pre-Socratic Cosmology and Plato I. Basic Issues (1) Metaphysical (a) What do things consist of? • one substance (monism) Socrates ("SOH-kra-teez") Died: 399 B.C. • many substances (pluralism) Problem of the One and the Many - How is diversity derived from unity? - How is unity derived from diversity? (b) What is the nature of change? (2) Epistemological (a) What is the nature of knowledge? (b) How is knowledge obtained? Three questions to keep in mind: 1. What counts as a "scientific" explanation of a phenomenon? • An account of the causes of the phenomenon? • An account that places the phenomenon within a larger explanatory framework? • An account of the phenomenon that indicates how it follows from basic laws of nature? 2. What counts as "scientific" knowledge? • Knowledge of causes, natural laws, and/or general physical principles? • Knowledge based on observation and inductive inference? • Knowledge that makes no appeal to supernatural causes? 3. What distinguishes a natural explanation from a supernatural explanation? • testability? • reliability? • accuracy? • repeatability? II. Pre-Socratics (~6th - 5th cent. B.C.) 1. Milesians and Monism (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes) Thales ("THAY-leez") ~585 B.C. • The Earth rests on water. • Water is the archê (source) of all things. • All things are full of gods. • The magnet has a soul. Anaximander ("Ah-NAX-ee-mander") ~550 B.C. • Monism based on "apeiron". • "apeiron" = the infinite/indeterminate/unlimited. • lacking in qualities (boundedness, determinateness, limits, etc). Possible motivation • Observable phenomena are constituted from earth, air, fire, water. • But the elements are opposed to each other. • Thus, there must be some basic neutral substratum devoid of qualities out of which everything, including the elements, is constituted.
    [Show full text]
  • Theoretical Models of Consciousness: a Scoping Review
    brain sciences Review Theoretical Models of Consciousness: A Scoping Review Davide Sattin 1,2,*, Francesca Giulia Magnani 1, Laura Bartesaghi 1, Milena Caputo 1, Andrea Veronica Fittipaldo 3, Martina Cacciatore 1, Mario Picozzi 4 and Matilde Leonardi 1 1 Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; [email protected] (F.G.M.); [email protected] (L.B.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.L.) 2 Experimental Medicine and Medical Humanities-PhD Program, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department and Center for Clinical Ethics, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy 3 Oncology Department, Mario Negri Institute for Pharmacological Research IRCCS, 20156 Milan, Italy; veronicaandrea.fi[email protected] 4 Center for Clinical Ethics, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +39-02-2394-2709 Abstract: The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007–2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue.
    [Show full text]
  • Arxiv:1511.01069V1 [Quant-Ph]
    To appear in Contemporary Physics Copenhagen Quantum Mechanics Timothy J. Hollowood Department of Physics, Swansea University, Swansea SA2 8PP, U.K. (September 2015) In our quantum mechanics courses, measurement is usually taught in passing, as an ad-hoc procedure involving the ugly collapse of the wave function. No wonder we search for more satisfying alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation. But this overlooks the fact that the approach fits very well with modern measurement theory with its notions of the conditioned state and quantum trajectory. In addition, what we know of as the Copenhagen interpretation is a later 1950’s development and some of the earlier pioneers like Bohr did not talk of wave function collapse. In fact, if one takes these earlier ideas and mixes them with later insights of decoherence, a much more satisfying version of Copenhagen quantum mechanics emerges, one for which the collapse of the wave function is seen to be a harmless book keeping device. Along the way, we explain why chaotic systems lead to wave functions that spread out quickly on macroscopic scales implying that Schr¨odinger cat states are the norm rather than curiosities generated in physicists’ laboratories. We then describe how the conditioned state of a quantum system depends crucially on how the system is monitored illustrating this with the example of a decaying atom monitored with a time of arrival photon detector, leading to Bohr’s quantum jumps. On the other hand, other kinds of detection lead to much smoother behaviour, providing yet another example of complementarity. Finally we explain how classical behaviour emerges, including classical mechanics but also thermodynamics.
    [Show full text]
  • Demnächst Auch in Ihrem Laptop?
    The Measurement Problem Johannes Kofler Quantum Foundations Seminar Max Planck Institute of Quantum Optics Munich, December 12th 2011 The measurement problem Different aspects: • How does the wavefunction collapse occur? Does it even occur at all? • How does one know whether something is a system or a measurement apparatus? When does one apply the Schrödinger equation (continuous and deterministic evolution) and when the projection postulate (discontinuous and probabilistic)? • How real is the wavefunction? Does the measurement only reveal pre-existing properties or “create reality”? Is quantum randomness reducible or irreducible? • Are there macroscopic superposition states (Schrödinger cats)? Where is the border between quantum mechanics and classical physics? The Kopenhagen interpretation • Wavefunction: mathematical tool, “catalogue of knowledge” (Schrödinger) not a description of objective reality • Measurement: leads to collapse of the wavefunction (Born rule) • Properties: wavefunction: non-realistic randomness: irreducible • “Heisenberg cut” between system and apparatus: “[T]here arises the necessity to draw a clear dividing line in the description of atomic processes, between the measuring apparatus of the observer which is described in classical concepts, and the object under observation, whose behavior is represented by a wave function.” (Heisenberg) • Classical physics as limiting case and as requirement: “It is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About Ned Block New York University I
    To appear in The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Consciousness, Philosophical Issues about Ned Block New York University I. The Hard Problem There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state of reflexive consciousness. This entry will start with phenomenality, moving later to reflexivity and then to one other kind of consciousness. The Hard Problem of consciousness is how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. If neural state N is the neural basis of the sensation of red, why is N the basis of that experience rather than some other experience or none at all? Chalmers (1996) distinguishes between the Hard Problem and “easy” problems that concern the function of consciousness. The Hard Problem (though not under that name) was identified by Nagel (1974) and further analyzed in Levine (1983). There are two reasons for thinking that the Hard Problem has no solution. 1. Actual Failure. In fact, no one has been able to think of even a highly speculative answer. 2. Principled Failure. The materials we have available seem ill suited to providing an answer. As Nagel says, an answer to this question would seem to require an objective account that necessarily leaves out the subjectivity of what it is trying to explain.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein and Descartes on Consciousness
    International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention ISSN (Online): 2319 – 7722, ISSN (Print): 2319 – 7714 www.ijhssi.org Volume 3 Issue 10 ǁ October. 2014 ǁ PP.27-30 Wittgenstein and Descartes on Consciousness Dr. Bimal Chandra Gogoi Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Lakhimpur Kendriya Mahavidyalaya (Dibrugarh University), North Lakhimpur, Assam, India ABSTRACT : The concept of consciousness has been discussed by a number of philosophers in the history of philosophy but it still needs more detailed interpretations. Philosophy has never been stable and as time passes philosophical problems arises with new directions of study. Descartes, in his Meditations, proved that his essence is thinking or consciousness and discussed the nature of mind, its relation to material body and consciousness without the body etc. Wittgenstein doesn’t regard consciousness to be the essence of mind or mental phenomena. He criticizes the Cartesian theory of consciousness, which regards consciousness to be a private inner essence. The aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the views of both the philosophers about the nature of consciousness. KEWORDS: Consciousness, Criticism, Essence, Descartes, Wittgenstein I. INTRODUCTION . In the history of philosophy, the problem of mind or soul is regarded as one of the vital problems, which attracted philosophers a good deal. Man as an intellectual being; always tries to inquire into his own mind. It is a bare fact that we have a mind and it is accepted by every person. Although “mind” is an ambiguous term no body would accept that he has no mind, but it does not mean that he knows the meaning of it or he is pointing out something to be his mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Advanced Quantum Theory AMATH473/673, PHYS454
    Advanced Quantum Theory AMATH473/673, PHYS454 Achim Kempf Department of Applied Mathematics University of Waterloo Canada c Achim Kempf, September 2017 (Please do not copy: textbook in progress) 2 Contents 1 A brief history of quantum theory 9 1.1 The classical period . 9 1.2 Planck and the \Ultraviolet Catastrophe" . 9 1.3 Discovery of h ................................ 10 1.4 Mounting evidence for the fundamental importance of h . 11 1.5 The discovery of quantum theory . 11 1.6 Relativistic quantum mechanics . 13 1.7 Quantum field theory . 14 1.8 Beyond quantum field theory? . 16 1.9 Experiment and theory . 18 2 Classical mechanics in Hamiltonian form 21 2.1 Newton's laws for classical mechanics cannot be upgraded . 21 2.2 Levels of abstraction . 22 2.3 Classical mechanics in Hamiltonian formulation . 23 2.3.1 The energy function H contains all information . 23 2.3.2 The Poisson bracket . 25 2.3.3 The Hamilton equations . 27 2.3.4 Symmetries and Conservation laws . 29 2.3.5 A representation of the Poisson bracket . 31 2.4 Summary: The laws of classical mechanics . 32 2.5 Classical field theory . 33 3 Quantum mechanics in Hamiltonian form 35 3.1 Reconsidering the nature of observables . 36 3.2 The canonical commutation relations . 37 3.3 From the Hamiltonian to the equations of motion . 40 3.4 From the Hamiltonian to predictions of numbers . 44 3.4.1 Linear maps . 44 3.4.2 Choices of representation . 45 3.4.3 A matrix representation . 46 3 4 CONTENTS 3.4.4 Example: Solving the equations of motion for a free particle with matrix-valued functions .
    [Show full text]
  • NIETZSCHE and NIHILISM Brian Gilbert a Thesis Submitted In
    NIETZSCHE AND NIHILISM Brian Gilbert A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education Department of Theory and Policy Ontario hstitute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto O Copyright by Brian Gilbert (1999) National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON KtA ON4 canada canada Your Me Votre reference Our Ne Notre ref6rence The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, ban, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. NIETZSCHE AND NIHILISM Brian Howard Gilbert, Ed. D., 1999 Department of Theory and Policy Studies University of Toronto ABSTRACT The failure of Hegel's attempt at a 'grand' synthesis of Platonic and Christian thought has forced upon continental philosophy a radical rethinking and reevaluation of both metaphysics and theology -what Heidegger has called the onto-theological tradition.
    [Show full text]
  • Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness 1
    FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series: Linguistics and Literature Vol. 7, No 2, 2009, pp. 173 - 182 SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 1 UDC 81'23(049.32) Đorđe Vidanović Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, Serbia E-mail: [email protected] Abstract. In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness). Key words: Searle, Dennett, Multiple Drafts Model, consciousness,memes, genes, intentionality "No activity of mind is ever conscious" 2 (Karl Lashley, 1956) 1. INTRODUCTION In his collection of the New York Times book reviews, The Mystery of Conscious- ness (1997), John Searle criticizes Daniel Dennett's explanation of consciousness, stating that Dennett actually renounces it and proposes a version of strong AI instead, without ever accounting for it. Received June 27, 2009 1 A version of this paper was submitted to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Maribor, Slovenia, as part of the Festschrift for Dunja Jutronic in 2008, see http://oddelki.ff.uni-mb.si/filozofija/files/Festschrift/Dunjas_festschrift/vidanovic.pdf 2 Lashley, K.
    [Show full text]
  • Mysticism and Mystical Experiences
    1 Mysticism and Mystical Experiences The first issue is simply to identify what mysti cism is. The term derives from the Latin word “mysticus” and ultimately from the Greek “mustikos.”1 The Greek root muo“ ” means “to close or conceal” and hence “hidden.”2 The word came to mean “silent” or “secret,” i.e., doctrines and rituals that should not be revealed to the uninitiated. The adjec tive “mystical” entered the Christian lexicon in the second century when it was adapted by theolo- gians to refer, not to inexpressible experiences of God, but to the mystery of “the divine” in liturgical matters, such as the invisible God being present in sacraments and to the hidden meaning of scriptural passages, i.e., how Christ was actually being referred to in Old Testament passages ostensibly about other things. Thus, theologians spoke of mystical theology and the mystical meaning of the Bible. But at least after the third-century Egyptian theolo- gian Origen, “mystical” could also refer to a contemplative, direct appre- hension of God. The nouns “mystic” and “mysticism” were only invented in the seven teenth century when spirituality was becoming separated from general theology.3 In the modern era, mystical inter pretations of the Bible dropped away in favor of literal readings. At that time, modernity’s focus on the individual also arose. Religion began to become privatized in terms of the primacy of individuals, their beliefs, and their experiences rather than being seen in terms of rituals and institutions. “Religious experiences” also became a distinct category as scholars beginning in Germany tried, in light of science, to find a distinct experi ential element to religion.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Does Consciousness Really Collapse the Wave Function?
    Does consciousness really collapse the wave function?: A possible objective biophysical resolution of the measurement problem Fred H. Thaheld* 99 Cable Circle #20 Folsom, Calif. 95630 USA Abstract An analysis has been performed of the theories and postulates advanced by von Neumann, London and Bauer, and Wigner, concerning the role that consciousness might play in the collapse of the wave function, which has become known as the measurement problem. This reveals that an error may have been made by them in the area of biology and its interface with quantum mechanics when they called for the reduction of any superposition states in the brain through the mind or consciousness. Many years later Wigner changed his mind to reflect a simpler and more realistic objective position, expanded upon by Shimony, which appears to offer a way to resolve this issue. The argument is therefore made that the wave function of any superposed photon state or states is always objectively changed within the complex architecture of the eye in a continuous linear process initially for most of the superposed photons, followed by a discontinuous nonlinear collapse process later for any remaining superposed photons, thereby guaranteeing that only final, measured information is presented to the brain, mind or consciousness. An experiment to be conducted in the near future may enable us to simultaneously resolve the measurement problem and also determine if the linear nature of quantum mechanics is violated by the perceptual process. Keywords: Consciousness; Euglena; Linear; Measurement problem; Nonlinear; Objective; Retina; Rhodopsin molecule; Subjective; Wave function collapse. * e-mail address: [email protected] 1 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Mysticism and Cognitive Neuroscience: We Stand at the Threshold of a New Era in Modern Science … with the Coming of the Neuroscience Revolution
    248 discipline within a network of diverse approaches to humanistic issues. Taylor writes that, Mysticism and cognitive neuroscience: We stand at the threshold of a new era in modern science … with the coming of the neuroscience revolution. Before, pure science was able a partnership in the quest for consciousness to brush the philosophical questions aside and, indeed, banished all but the most positivist rhetoric from the discussion of what constituted * Brian Les Lancaster scientific reality. Now, the neuroscience revolution, with its inter- disciplinary communication between the basic sciences, its cross- -fertilization of methods, and its focus for the first time on the biology of Resumo consciousness, appears to have important humanistic implications far beyond the dictates of the reductionistic approach that spawned it. Neste artigo são integrados os conhecimentos neurofisiológicos com (p. 468) um modelo de processos perceptuais e de memória, baseado no misticismo da linguagem Sufi e judaica, e com a análise do pensamento An indicator of the importance of neuroscience may be observed in fundado em textos do Budista Abhidhamma. Os estados místicos pro- the various hybrid disciplines that have been spawned over recent years, movidos nestas tradições parecem envolver consciência, sugerindo-se each of which includes the prefix ‘neuro-’ as an emblem of authority, as it que são estes estados de pré-consciência que produzem a consciência were. Illustrative of this trend are neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996, 1999), de algo mais que William James, Rudolph Otto e outros classicamente neuro-psychoanalysis (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Solms, 2000), and the associaram no sentido do espiritual, em particular a asserção principal, topic of my paper, neurotheology (Ashbrook, 1984; d’Aquili & Newberg, dos textos místicos Judeus de que o impulso de baixo activa o de cima é comparável com a neurociência da consciência.
    [Show full text]