China Sets Sail Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein & Carnes Lord
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THE NEW ASIAN ORDER China has been undergoing an historic shift in emphasis from land to naval power. Is its maritime buildup a strategic necessity or an ill-conceived diversion? China Sets Sail Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein & Carnes Lord he People’s Republic of China is in With but one notable exception, China’s the process of an astonishing, multi- rulers throughout history have traditionally em- T faceted transformation. If the explosive phasized land power over sea power. Of course, growth of China’s industrial economy over the ordinary Chinese living on the country’s exten- past several decades is the most obvious com- sive coastline have always taken to the sea for ponent of that transformation, no less remark- their livelihood, but the economy of China has able is China’s turn to the sea. With its stun- always been fundamentally rooted in its soil. To ning advance in global shipbuilding markets, the extent that the Chinese engaged in com- its vast and expanding merchant marine, the mercial activities over the centuries, they did so wide reach of its offshore energy and minerals primarily with a view to their large and largely exploration, its growing fishing fleet, and not self-sufficient internal market, readily accessible least, its rapidly modernizing navy, China is through China’s great navigable river systems fast becoming an outward-looking maritime as well as its many seaward ports. Moreover, state. At a time when the U.S. Navy continues prior to 1840, the Chinese faced virtually no to shrink in numbers if not relative capability, sustained security threats on their ocean flank. while the traditional naval powers of Europe Historically, the security threat that preoccupied are in sharp decline, this is a development that China’s leaders was exposure to raiding or inva- deserves careful consideration by students of sion by the steppe nomads of Inner Asia. This contemporary global affairs. threat was always latent and sometimes lethal: More than one Chinese dynasty succumbed to Andrew Erickson is an associate professor and the horsemen of the north. The strategic culture a founding member of the Naval War College’s formed by this history and political geography (NWC) China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). was therefore a profoundly continentalist one. Lyle Goldstein is an associate professor at NWC Throughout most of the past two centuries, and the founding director of CMSI. Carnes Lord this strategic culture retained its power. In the is professor of Naval and Military Strategy at NWC 19th century, Qing China proved incapable of and editor of the Naval War College Review. This meeting the maritime challenge posed by the article draws on their edited volume China Goes to Western powers, even as it conquered vast new Sea (Naval Institute Press, 2009). territories on its inner Asian periphery. In the SUMMER (MAY /JUNE ) 2010 27 THE NEW ASIAN ORDER First Opium War (1839–42), a British fleet of the Western powers and further humiliation penetrating to the heart of China’s riverine for the regime. In 1905, China suffered pas- network threatened to shut down China’s in- sively as the Russo-Japanese War was waged ternal commerce, forcing the regime to sue for on its territory and in its territorial waters. All peace; it was at this time that Britain acquired of these developments helped to fatally weaken Hong Kong. In the 1880s, defeat of a Chinese the foundations of the dynasty and, indeed, fleet at the hands of the French sealed the end the legitimacy of the empire itself. of China’s traditional influence in Indochina. The fall of the Qing in 1911 led to a long pe- By the last decade of the century, despite their riod of internal instability. Local warlords con- acquisition of significant naval capabilities, tended with the Kuomintang movement under the Chinese proved no match for their rapidly Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the Commu- modernizing island neighbor. Humiliating de- nists under Mao Zedong, and the Japanese feat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 led army in a complex struggle for control of the to a Japanese protectorate in Korea and the loss territories bequeathed by imperial China. The of Taiwan. eventual Communist victory in 1949 restored Pressed by the Russians from the north as China to unity—except for Taiwan and some well as by Japan and the Western maritime smaller offshore islands held by the retreating powers, the imperial court was forced into Kuomintang. This legacy of China’s Civil War commercial and territorial concessions. Popu- fundamentally changed the political and stra- lar resistance to these developments culminat- tegic geography of China and the thinking of ed in 1900 in the Boxer Rebellion, a series of China’s Communist elites concerning national spontaneous acts of violence against Western security: No longer could China all but ignore interests that the court tried to use to its po- its seaward frontier. It is only recently, however, litical advantage. The result was a lengthy oc- that these changes have had a transformative cupation of the imperial capital itself by forces effect on Chinese security behavior. © Philadelphia Museum of Art/CORBIS Japan Defeats the Chinese Fleet Near Phungtau (1894), by Kobayashi Kiyochika 28 THE AMERICAN IN T ERE st CHINA SETS SAIL The reason for the delay turns on several naval and maritime activities as well. The events that reinforced the inherent land-war- Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) had a fare orientation of Communist China’s mili- seaport on the lower Yangzi River as its capital tary elites. These events include the disinte- (Hangzhou), a city greatly admired by Marco gration of the alliance between China and the Polo when he visited it. Its large shipyards sup- Soviet Union in the 1950s, which resulted in a ported a significant naval force. When the renewed threat to China’s Inner Asian frontier. Mongols overthrew the Song, their Yuan Dy- Also influential was the poor showing of the nasty (1271–1368) inherited these naval assets People’s Liberation Army in its brief war with and accompanying nautical skills, enabling it Vietnam in 1979, which focused the attention to launch major (albeit unsuccessful) amphibi- of the PRC leadership on modernization of the ous expeditions against Japan, Vietnam and Chinese army at the expense of the navy. Java—thought to be the largest such operations With the end of the Cold War and the col- in all of the Middle Ages. In the 14th century, lapse of the Soviet Union, China no longer the Chinese made significant advances in ship- faced an existential threat on its inner Asian building technology and naval armaments, as frontier. Its primary security concerns were well as in astronomy and cartography. The Chi- clearly shifting to the maritime domain. In nese are, indeed, credited with having invented the first instance, territorial disputes in off- the magnetic compass. shore waters with various regional states as- Moreover, the Ming Dynasty first estab- sumed greater salience, beginning with the lished itself by defeating its rivals in southern PRC’s clash with Vietnam over the Paracel China largely through the use of naval power. Islands in the South China Sea in 1974. Sec- The decisive battle of Lake Poyang (1363) in- ond, the evolution of Taiwan’s domestic poli- volved hundreds of warships on both sides, tics in a democratic direction was threatening larger than all but a few sea battles in earlier or to move the Republic of China away from its for that matter later times. Riverine operations long-standing “One China” policy toward de like this, too often slighted in conventional na- facto and even de jure independence. At the val histories, are of central importance to the same time, the apparent willingness of the maritime history of China. United States to act as Taiwan’s protector— The great exception to the continentalist despite its normalization of relations with the narrative is of course the series of voyages under- PRC in the 1970s and the quasi-alliance of taken by the eunuch admiral Zheng He in the the two countries in the 1980s—forced the early 15th century (1405–33). Under the patron- Chinese to contemplate the prospect of even- age of the Ming Emperor Yongle, Zheng He un- tually engaging the U.S. Navy in East Asian dertook an ambitious program of ship construc- waters. Finally, the rapid growth of the Chi- tion and maritime infrastructure development. nese economy made comprehensive modern- Zheng commanded seven major expeditions, ization of China’s naval forces at long last a typically consisting of hundreds of ships and tens feasible objective of Chinese Communist of thousands of men, which showed the Ming military policy. flag in the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and even East Africa. The fleet included warships mounting cannon as well as The Long View “treasure ships”, of which the largest may have been 440 feet in length and displaced more than ooking at China’s current maritime trans- 20,000 tons; vessels on this scale dwarfed any- L formation in a longer historical perspective, thing known in the West at that time. These though, it is possible to overstate the extent to vast and no doubt expensive enterprises do not which Chinese strategic culture over the centu- seem to have brought commensurate benefit to ries has been strictly continentalist. the empire, however, and the impetus behind Conventional historiography has exagger- them flagged not long after Emperor Yongle’s ated Ming neglect of the maritime domain, death. The mandarins of the imperial bureau- and ignored earlier but lesser known Chinese cracy seem to have opposed them as risky and SUMMER (MAY /JUNE ) 2010 29 THE NEW ASIAN ORDER wasteful; in the century following, imperial population and significant commerce from ear- edicts discouraged long-distance maritime com- ly times, it is surprising that the French did not merce, and Zheng He’s navy fell into disrepair.