Now on My Way to Meet Who? South Korean Television, North Korean Refugees, and the Dilemmas of Representation
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Volume 11 | Issue 41 | Number 2 | Article ID 4007 | Oct 13, 2013 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Now On My Way to Meet Who? South Korean Television, North Korean Refugees, and the Dilemmas of Representation Christopher K. Green, Stephen Epstein Introduction demographic shift. Nevertheless, other than journalistic treatment, only a limited number of In 2011, the recently established South Korean South Korean scholars (e.g. Tae and Hwang broadcasting network Channel-A launched Ije 2012; Oh 2013) and Western academic mannareo gamnida (Now on My Way to Meet bloggers (Draudt and Gleason 2012) have thus You), a program whose format brings together far investigated the show and its larger social a group of a dozen or more femaletalbukja ramifications. In this paper, we ask howNow (North Korean refugees)2 on a weekly basis. on My Way to Meet You is to be understood These women interact with host Nam Hui-seok, within the contexts of South Korean society, its an additional female co-host (or, in the earlier evolving media culture, and developments in episodes, two), and a panel composed of four South Korean popular representations of North male South Korean entertainers. Episodes Koreans. We offer close readings of segments typically open in a lighthearted manner, with from Ije mannareo gamnida in order to elicit conversation about daily life in North Korea motifs that recur as it pursues its stated goal of alongside mild flirtation between the Southern humanizing North Korea for a South Korean male and Northern female participants, often audience and giving defectors a voice amidst involving song and dance, but climax with a the general populace. Given that the show’s talbuk seuteori, an emotionally harrowing very title intimates that a genuine encounter is narrative from one of the border-crossers about to take place, one might reasonably ask detailing her exodus from North Korea. Via this how successfully Ije mannareo gamnida framework Ije mannareo gamnida attempts to establishes a meeting point for South Koreans nurture the integration of North Korean with these recent arrivals from North Korea: in refugees into South Korean society;other words, does the show fulfill its stated aim personalization of their plight occurs inof breaking down prejudices against North conjunction with reminders of a shared Korean Korean refugees and supplying them with a identity maintained despite the regime they vehicle that allows self-expression?3 Or, have fled, which is depicted as cruel, repressive alternatively, does it reinforce, even if and backward. The show has proven a minor unintentionally, pre-existing regimes of hit within South Korea and received coverage knowledge and actually impede understanding from local and global media (see, e.g., Kim of North Korea and its people? As we will 2012; Choi 2012; Noce 2012). argue, given the broader sociopolitical context, the show’s desire to reinforce elements of The unusual subject matter ofIje mannareo commonality between North and South while gamnida itself renders the show worthy of illuminating life in North Korea leads to a analysis; equally significantly, it offers a useful double bind: viewers are encouraged to window into attempts to address South Korea’s recognize homogeneity with the newcomers increasingly diverse society, which nowbased on a shared ethnic and cultural identity, includes a large number of North Koreans, as even as the conversations and editing well as media practice in the face of this techniques applied to the material often 1 11 | 41 | 2 APJ | JF represent the Northern panelists as Others. approximately 70% are female (Kim 2013). This explosion in the number of North Koreans living in South Korea has coincided with significant developments in governmental approaches to the North. The Sunshine Policy, under which South Korea adopted a more open approach toward North Korea between 1998 and 2008, laid the groundwork for new understandings of the North-South relationship and how this relationship might be portrayed in popular culture (Kim 2007; Bevan 2010). Until then, Southern portraits of North Koreans had been almost inevitably monochromatic, treating Figure 1: “The longing of 61 years, the counterparts across the 38th Parallel as dreams of 61 years...now on my way to virulently evil Communists or downtrodden, meet you.” brainwashed automatons. From around the turn of the millennium, though, such depictions Now on Our Way to Ije Mannareo Gamnida began to encompass ever more multifaceted and sympathetic renderings of the life worlds of The debut of, and attention accorded to,Ije North Koreans, most notably in the Mannareo Gamnida, or Imangap, as it has come blockbusters Shiri (1999) andJ.S.A.: Joint to be nicknamed, rely on phenomena that have Security Area (2000). As discussed by one of made the show compelling to audiences now the co-authors for this journal (Epstein 2009a), when its very appearance could scarcely have frequently light-hearted modes of presentation been imagined even a decade ago. Perhaps also surfaced, which included a number of B- most importantly, the size and demographic movie comedies that envisioned romances profile of the defector population within South between Northern and Southern protagonists, Korea has undergone significant change in such as the 2003 movie trio Namnam bungnyeo recent years. Stirred initially by the disastrous (Love Impossible), Geunyeoreul moreumyeon North Korean famine of the 1990s, the number gancheop (Spy Girl) and Donghaemulgwa of talbukja arrivals grew steadily to one to two baekdusani (North Korean Guyz). The thousand each year between 2002 and 2005, simultaneous appearance of these films, though and then climbed to an annual level of two to seemingly coincidental, clearly responded to an three thousand in the period between 2006 and atmosphere of hopefulness about North-South 2010. This rapid growth has been accompanied reconciliation after the 2000 summit meeting by a marked shift in the gender distribution of between former leaders Kim Dae-jung and Kim refugees.4 Although the majority of defectors Jong-il. were male up through the end of the twentieth century, as the trickle of those escaping from Ironically, however, another corollary effect of North Korea grew into a steadier flow, more the warming at the state level was to move North Korean women began to cross into China troubling issues involving defectors out of (Lankov 2006). Most have stayed in China or policy discourse. Both the Kim Dae-jung and returned to North Korea, but many have Roh Moo-hyun administrations avoided shining travelled on to South Korea. As of 2013, there too bright a light on the sufferings of incoming exists a substantial community of roughly North Koreans out of a concern that doing so 25,000 talbukja in South Korea; among these, might cause the North Korean government to 2 11 | 41 | 2 APJ | JF protest strenuously and retreat fromA recent significant change in the structure of engagement. Politically prominent defectors South Korea’s media has also played a critical who might otherwise have acted as leaders of role in the arrival of Ije mannareo gamnida: a the fledgling defector community, most notably controversial bill passed under the Lee former Workers’ Party International Secretary government in 2009 granted permission for the Hwang Jang-yop, were restricted in their first time to print media companies to operate movements, partly for their own security. television networks. Furthermore these new comprehensive broadcasting channels (jonghap In late 2007, however, the South Korean public pyeonseong cheneol, or jongpyeon for short) voted in Lee Myung-bak and a far more have extended operational powers that allow conservative administration. The subsequent them to create educational and publically shooting of a Southern civilian by a DPRK oriented programs to be disseminated more soldier at the Mt. Geumgang tourist resort zone broadly and thus make them more similar to in summer 2008 then pushed the newlarge terrestrial networks than other cable government into an even harder stance against channels. The Kim and Roh administrations had North Korea than most had anticipated. North maintained the state regulation of a previous Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the March era; given the finances of the South Korean 2010 sinking of a ROK Navy vessel, and the mediascape, the companies best positioned to shelling of Yeonpyeong Island that November, take advantage of any such modification would which brought two civilian deaths, heightened have been far from progressive. While skepticism throughout society aboutconsideration of the many issues occasioned by possibilities for rapprochement withthis change and the bitter debate that they Pyongyang. have aroused within Korea lie beyond the scope of this paper (for more see T. Kim 2011), for Moreover, such events have spurred a renewed our purposes it is important to note that the focus on North Korean refugees and expedited palette of South Korean television now the increasing influence of those working to incorporates within its pigmentation such raise awareness of their plight. This trend has outlets as Channel-A, owned by the led, for example, to defector Cho Myung-chul, conservative Dong-A Ilbo, and TV Chosun, former director of the Institute for Unification affiliated via its parent company with the Education, becoming a lawmaker in theChosun Ilbo, widely recognized as the nation’s National Assembly. There he has found a like- most notable right-wing daily. Both have minded