U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime

Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons Learned From the States

California • Massachusetts • New Jerse y • New York • Pennsylvania • Virginia

“Putting Victims First” U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street NW. Washington, DC 20531

Alberto R. Gonzales Attorney General

Tracy A. Henke Acting Assistant Attorney General

John W. Gillis Director, Office for Victims of Crime

Office of Justice Programs Partnerships for Safer Communities www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Office for Victims of Crime www.ovc.gov

NCJ 208799

The Office for Victims of Crime is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. RESPONDING TO SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE STATES Cover photos 1 and 2 courtesy of Pelco; photo 3 courtesy of Brian Schrock, Daily American, Somerset, PA; photo 4 courtesy of Chief Petty Officer Johnny Bivera, U.S. Navy. Message From the Director

On September 11, 2001, thousands of people going about their daily lives became crime victims in a matter of hours. As an unprecedented demand for assistance and compensation services unfolded, victim service providers across the country began to address the complexities of responding to an over­ whelming number of victims in need of swift, compassionate, professional, and coordinated assistance. In particular, staff from victim assistance and victim compensation programs in New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California realized that they would play an integral role in addressing victims’ needs.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) provided these states with approximately $65.2 million in emergency and supplemental grant funds to assist victims, emergency responders, and their families. State Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) administrator agencies were awarded grants to administer the funds. The agencies provided myriad assistance and compensation services directly to victims, while coordinating with countless other agencies at the fed­ eral, state, and local level. State VOCA administrator agencies faced significant challenges and over­ came numerous obstacles to provide comprehensive, timely assistance. Undoubtedly, valuable lessons can be learned from their experiences.

OVC and the state VOCA administrator agencies believe it is important for all state victim assistance and compensation programs, as well as other entities involved in responding to mass criminal victim­ ization, to be aware of their experiences. To accurately document the states’ challenges, lessons learned, and promising practices in responding to victims’ needs, OVC supported the development of this report, which describes their efforts. OVC plans to use this valuable information to help inform pro­ gram and policy development.

OVC knows that other state VOCA administrator agencies provided important victim assistance and compensation services that are also worthy of recognition. Thus, OVC would like to thank not only the state agency representatives directly involved in developing this report, but also all of the victim assistance professionals at the federal, state, and local level who devoted their time, expertise, and financial resources to assisting September 11 victims, emergency responders, and their families. We commend and thank you all for your valiant efforts.

John W. Gillis Director Office for Victims of Crime

iii Acknowledgments

First and foremost, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) would like to acknowledge the efforts of program staff from the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) state administrator victim assistance and com­ pensation programs who made substantial contributions to this report. Following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, OVC chronicled the response efforts to that tragedy in a report and approached the September 11 state VOCA administrators with the idea of a report to document their efforts. OVC believed it was important to allow the VOCA administrators to present this information from a state perspective.

OVC would like to take this opportunity to thank the following programs and individuals for their contributions to this report and dedication to meeting the needs of September 11 victims: Pennsylva­ nia Commission on Crime and Delinquency, Office of Victims’ Services (Carol Lavery, Lori Sywensky, and Lynn Shiner); New York State Crime Victims Board (Joan Cusack, Anne Marie Strano, Christina Hernandez, and Ron Dickens); Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Victims Services Sec­ tion (Mandie Patterson, John Mahoney, and Karen Thomas); Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund (Mary Vail Ware); New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy (Sandra McGowan, Theresa Martinac, and James Reilly); New Jersey Victims of Crime Compensation Board (Richard Pompelio, Jacob Toporek, and James Casserly); Massachusetts Office for Victim Assis­ tance (Janet Fine, Brenda Noel, Allison Tassie, Sandra Field, and Karen Dempsey); California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (Karen McGagin, Catherine Close, and Anita Ahuja); Network of Victim Assistance of Bucks County, Pennsylvania (Barbara Clark and Susan Bizon); and Oklahoma Crime Victims Compensation Board, District Attorneys Council (Suzanne Breedlove).

We would also like to thank the author of the report, Patricia Hoag, with the OVC Training and Technical Assistance Center (TTAC) for a job well done, as well as OVC TTAC staff members Penny Tinsman, Rick Custer, and Johane Celestin for their assistance in completing this project.

Finally, we would like to thank OVC Principal Deputy Director Carolyn Hightower for her leadership and support of this initiative and Barbara Johnson and Brad Mitchell of OVC’s Terrorism and Interna­ tional Victim Assistance Services Division for their overall management of this project, their efforts immediately following the terrorist attacks to address the needs of victims and service providers, and their continued efforts to provide technical assistance support and to facilitate the coordination of resources to the September 11 state VOCA administrators.

v Contents

Message From the Director ...... iii

Acknowledgments ...... v

Executive Summary ...... ix

Introduction ...... 1

Background ...... 2 Purpose of This Report ...... 3 Sources Consulted ...... 3

Lessons Learned From State VOCA Administrator Agencies ...... 5 Promising Practices ...... 5 Training and Responder Preparedness ...... 5 Professional and Volunteer Alliances ...... 5 Hotlines/Helplines ...... 6 Emergency Operations Centers ...... 6 Family Assistance Centers ...... 6 Case Management ...... 6 Counseling ...... 7 Mental Health Counseling, Support Groups, and Community Healing Rituals ...... 7 Compensation ...... 8

Challenges to Meeting Victims’ Needs ...... 8 Different Requirements for Compensation and Victim Services ...... 8 Difficulty Responding to the Massive Impact ...... 9 Lack of Uniform Standards and Criteria for Financial Assistance ...... 9 Victim Identification and Communication Issues ...... 10 Barriers to Serving Special Victim Populations ...... 10 Geographical Issues ...... 10 Emotional Impact ...... 10 Fragmentation of Service Delivery ...... 11

vii Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons Next Steps ...... 13 Learned From the States Develop a National Perspective on Consequences of Mass Criminal Victimization ...... 13 Prepare To Respond to Immediate, Intermediate, and Long-Term Needs ...... 13 Set Assistance Parameters ...... 14 Formalize Response Channels ...... 15 Reach Out to All Victims ...... 16 Monitor and Evaluate Interventions ...... 17 Balance Planning and Response ...... 17

Conclusion ...... 19

viii Executive Summary

fter the terrorist attacks of September Furthermore, the grantees pointed to thorough 11, 2001, the Office for Victims of planning and coordination of resources as vital A Crime (OVC) awarded crisis response components for enhancing victim assistance as grants and subsequent appropriated funding to a well as a need for federal support to perform both. number of state Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) administrator agencies to provide a broad range Promising Practices of services to victims of the attacks. At a meeting from December 7–8, 2003, those grantees had an The state VOCA administrator agencies opportunity to describe their experiences and the launched a variety of innovative strategies to lessons they learned as they mobilized to meet quickly and efficiently meet victims’ needs, and the demand for victim assistance and compensa­ they credit several of these approaches with hav­ tion after September 11. This report reflects the ing a positive effect on September 11 victims’ frontline perspective on victim assistance services lives. From their perspective, the following prac­ by these state VOCA administrator agencies and tices brought substantial benefits to all victims of offers lessons learned to state, federal, and private mass violence: decisionmakers for organizing effective responses ✦ Providing emergency training that combines to possible future mass criminal victimization. preparedness for the physical, psychological, Even though grantees had solid resources in place and emotional effects of a disaster. before September 11 for victim compensation ✦ Assigning tasks before, during, and after and assistance, they were challenged by the a disaster that capitalize on the specific severity and magnitude of victims’ needs. They strengths of both professionals and found that although there were similarities, the volunteers. needs of victims of mass criminal events were unique compared with the needs of victims of ✦ Setting up toll free hotlines for access to other crimes. Displaced workers, individuals assistance, compensation, and referrals. affected by subsequent economic fallout, and vic­ tims and responders who face unknown long­ ✦ Integrating victim compensation and assis­ term health hazards require special services tance personnel into emergency operations following mass criminal incidents. The grantees centers. also discovered that existing systems for emer­ gency management or terrorism planning were ✦ Establishing centralized victim resource sites based primarily on a public safety model of disas­ at local family assistance centers. ter response that focused on saving lives and ensuring citizens’ immediate safety. For the most ✦ Adopting a case management approach to part, these models were not developed to take coordinating and delivering services. into account the human impact of mass criminal ✦ incidents and did not recognize the social, psy- Supplementing compensation and mental chological, and economic toll that might mani­ health services with counseling on legal, fest itself in physical or emotional symptoms. financial, and other daily concerns of victims.

ix Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons ✦ Offering victims and emergency responders a ✦�Identifying and communicating with victims Learned From range of stress management and psychologi­ was hampered because VOCA administrator the States cal care techniques to use as the process of agencies could not share information about post-event trauma unfolds. victims with charitable agencies and other government programs that provided similar ✦ Streamlining compensation processes to services and financial assistance. This was accommodate a high volume of claimants. primarily due to privacy and confidentiality concerns. ✦ Scheduling public events as outlets for com­ munity expressions of grief and opportunities ✦�The diverse needs, beliefs, and lifestyles of for healing. special victim populations had an impact on service delivery. Lessons Learned ✦�Victims who lived far from the attack sites In responding to the extraordinary demand for felt isolated and confronted barriers to victim services prompted by the September 11 receiving services. terrorist attacks, state VOCA administrator agen­ cies faced several challenges that warrant consid­ ✦�Depression and fatigue affected victim com­ eration for planning and implementing future pensation and assistance staff who had to response protocols. They identified the following balance the emotions and demands of challenges: September 11 victims with those of other victims. ✦ Compared with emergency management and response to natural disasters, mass crim­ ✦�A lack of coordinated resources impeded inal victimization demands specialized smooth delivery of services to victims, and response strategies that address the complex any collaborations that were formed after toll on people. September 11 were based on personal rela­ tionships among service providers rather ✦ The impact of the crisis and the scope of than on institutional procedures and/or victims’ needs were not anticipated, severely agreements. straining existing resources and jeopar­ dizing effective compensation and victim Recommended Actions assistance. Input from state VOCA administrator agencies ✦ Financial responsibilities of state agencies also revealed several potential actions that may and local organizations toward victims were improve the response to mass criminal victimiza­ unclear because of the numerous govern­ tion. Among the top recommendations were the mental and charitable programs and following: resources available to victims. ✦�Consider emergency management not only ✦ The lack of a centralized database that from a prevention or intervention perspec­ would provide information about payments tive, but also from a standpoint that takes made by government agencies and promi­ into account the aftermath of the crisis. nent charities complicated determinations of what expenses should be covered by state ✦�Balance funding for prevention, interven­ compensation programs. tion, and aftermath services.

✦�Set aside funding to support advance devel­ opment of a disaster response structure.

x Executive Summary

✦�Integrate victim issues seamlessly into emer­ ✦ Balance the needs of victims of gency preparedness planning, training, and mass criminal incidents with the implementation. needs of other victims.

✦�Adopt standardized emergency management ✦ Conduct data collection and evaluation to procedures to formalize collaborative agree­ inform decisionmakers and providers about ments that foster efficient service delivery the nature, duration, and effectiveness of vic­ and ensure a high level of accountability, par­ tim services. ticularly with state agency leadership. Without exception, state VOCA administrator ✦�Address the unique needs of victims of mass agencies agreed that carefully crafted federal criminal events through continual care that action will complement and enhance the efforts is backed by rigorous planning, prompt vic­ of state agencies to provide comprehensive ser­ tim identification, and thorough outreach. vices to victims of mass violence and will further the capacity of all Americans to cope with any ✦�Take prudent, measured action to ensure ade­ future domestic incidents. quate but appropriate services to optimize response to victims’ needs, rather than fol­ lowing a “one-size-fits-all” approach.

xi Chapter 1 Introduction

he September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks Because funds could be used to support resulted in the largest mass victimization community-based victim service programs that T in American history, with approximately provided crisis counseling, crisis intervention, 3,000 deceased,1 thousands injured, and scores of mental health counseling, and peer support, survivors of the deceased. The Office for Victims funds were awarded to five state victim assistance of Crime (OVC), which had experience working agencies that administer victim assistance formu­ with communities that responded to five previous la grants awarded annually by OVC. OVC award­ incidents of terrorism and mass violence, was ed grants to two state crime victim compensation identified to administer funds and programs to programs, also the recipients of annual formula assist victims of the September 11 attacks. grant awards. Nine grants were awarded directly from OVC to nongovernmental, nonprofit organ­ Within days of the tragic events, OVC allocated izations that did not receive funding from any funds from its Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve other federal source. In total, 6 states and 55 to assist victims in the three states where the nonprofit organizations received funding from crimes occurred, ultimately awarding about $3.1 OVC to assist victims of the terrorist attacks. million in victim assistance funding and $13.5 million in victim compensation funding to the As of May 2003, nearly 22,000 victims, crisis State of New York and the Commonwealths of responders, and family members had been assisted Virginia and Pennsylvania. The governor- by state agencies and local programs using OVC appointed victim assistance and/or compensation funds. Approximately 37,000 victims were assist­ agency in each jurisdiction received OVC fund­ ed through OVC’s 24-hour, toll free call center ing to coordinate with state and federal agencies with referrals for financial, housing, and counsel­ in assessing immediate needs and assisting vic­ ing assistance. In addition, 1,800 victims and tims through crisis counseling and other direct family members traveling to funerals and memo­ services and to offset out-of-pocket expenses rial services received support via OVC’s Victim incurred by victims and their family members for and Family Travel Assistance Center. medical and mental health services, funeral and burial costs, and lost wages. From December 7–8, 2003, OVC convened a meeting attended by representatives of state Vic­ In addition to the 120-day crisis response grants, tims of Crime Act (VOCA) administrator agen­ the Department of Defense Appropriations Act cies that were involved in managing OVC grants of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-117) authorized $68.1 to provide assistance and compensation services million to address immediate and long-term to victims of the September 11 attacks. State rep­ needs of the September 11 victims. Congress resentatives from California, New Jersey, New specifically directed OVC to award grants for York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia participated in counseling programs to assist victims, family the meeting, which was held in Baltimore, Mary­ members of victims, and crisis responders. land. Representatives from Massachusetts were unable to attend because of severe weather.

1 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Crime in the United States 2001.

1 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons The meeting of state VOCA administrators was ✦�The Massachusetts Office for Victim Assis­ Learned From designed as an opportunity for grantees and OVC tance administers the federal VOCA victim the States to strengthen the partnership they established assistance program, providing funding for with the initial 120-day crisis response grants state and community-based organizations to from OVC’s Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve offer free mental health counseling and a and the subsequent $68.1 million in funding from range of other specialized services for crime the Defense Appropriations Act of 2002. victims. Each year, more than $7 million in VOCA funds are distributed to more than Background 100 programs across Massachusetts to help survivors of homicide victims, children who Before September 11, 2001, the grantee states witness violence, and victims of child abuse, had well-established resources, tools, and rela­ domestic violence, sexual assault, drunk tionships for providing services to victims of driving, hate crimes, elder abuse, and politi­ crime. However, the magnitude of the terrorist cal torture. attacks and the resulting mass victimization forced them to adapt existing systems rapidly on ✦�New Jersey’s Victims of Crime Compensation an unprecedented scale. The following is a brief Board, established in 1971 as an independent description of the structure of each state’s victim executive branch agency, covers nonreim­ service program: bursable medical expenses or loss of earnings due to crime-related injuries, as well as funer­ ✦ California’s Victim Compensation Program al expenses or loss of support from a deceased (VCP) is the largest in the Nation. Since its victim. The board provides secondary cover­ inception in 1965, the program has paid out age for New Jersey residents injured by acts more than $1 billion to victims of violence of crime outside the state. The board works and their families. VCP provides help for closely with the state’s Office of Victim- California residents regardless of where the Witness Advocacy, Office of the Attorney crime occurred and for nonresidents who General, which maintains victim-witness become victims of violent crime within the units in 21 county prosecutors’ offices. The state. The program also assists the victim’s victim-witness units are staffed with trained spouse, domestic partner, child, parent, sib­ professionals who accompany victims ling, grandparent, grandchild, or household through every step of the criminal justice member. While victim advocates are not system from the initial phases of arrest and connected to VCP through funding or prosecution to the final outcome of a case, administration, they are the ambassadors of including the parole process. They also help the compensation program at the local victims obtain other assistance services. level. Crime victims in California’s 58 coun­ ties and the City of Los Angeles turn to ✦�The New York State Crime Victims Board advocates in victim assistance centers to provides emergency awards and regular com­ gain information about victim compensa­ pensation to victims across the state. The tion. In addition to helping victims navigate board also supports grants to almost 200 the criminal justice system and access com­ programs in community-based organizations munity resources, advocates help victims statewide that offer victim assistance services, apply for compensation and act as represen­ including the YWCA and grassroots groups tatives to the program on behalf of the vic­ as well as local government, state, and tim or claimant. The Office of Emergency national programs. The board funds 80 Services funds the victim assistance centers. programs in New York City’s five boroughs, including homicide counseling programs, victim/witness programs within prosecutors’ offices, and hospital-based programs that provide counseling services.

2 Introduction

✦�In Pennsylvania, the Office of Victims’ Ser­ scope and impact of victim services vices is a component of the Pennsylvania offered and underscores their impor­ Commission on Crime and Delinquency and tance to victims. It details post-September promotes victims’ rights and services. The 11 patterns for organizing, identifying audi­ office administers the Victims Compensation ences for, developing timetables for, and imple­ Assistance Program, which originated in menting a comprehensive response to victims’ 1976 and handles VOCA assistance grants needs while pinpointing best practices. The for Pennsylvania. The Office of Victims’ report can provide useful information for state Services also provides statewide education to VOCA administrator agencies nationwide, OVC victim service professionals and outreach to leadership, and other federal, state, and local the public as well as support for the Victims organizations as they plan and launch collabora­ Services Advisory Committee and its numer­ tive actions to respond to future mass criminal ous subcommittees. victimization.

✦�The Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensa­ Sources Consulted tion Fund (CICF) was created by the Vir­ ginia General Assembly in 1977 to pay This report is based on a review of a written sum­ unreimbursed expenses of victims who suffer mary of the December 2003 meeting of state personal physical injury or death as a result of VOCA administrator agencies, indepth inter­ a crime. CICF is administered by the Virginia views with VOCA administrators from the six Workers’ Compensation Commission and is states, and content analysis of a variety of inter­ funded by court fees, assessments on offend­ nal and external documents from the September ers, and restitution; it also receives federal 11 state VOCA grantees. funds. Since its inception, the fund has processed more than 25,000 claims from Before the state VOCA administrators’ meeting, Virginians who have been victims of violent participants were encouraged to prepare responses crime. CICF receives about 1,800 claims and to a set of focused questions designed to prompt awards approximately $3 million annually to open discussion at the plenary and group sessions. assist victims with medical costs, lost wages, Attendees were asked to consider details about funeral expenses, and counseling costs that the resources, tools, relationships, and other key are not covered by any other source. Virginia variables that had an impact on victim services administers victim assistance through its in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist Department of Criminal Justice Services, attacks. Highlights of the topics discussed in which oversees victim assistance program those sessions were presented in the Meeting development, management, and monitoring, Summary Report of the September 11th Grantees a victim resource center, training and men­ Meeting for State VOCA Administrators. toring for victim service providers, and a toll To continue the dialogue between grantees and free statewide crime victim assistance infor­ OVC that took place during the state VOCA mation line. administrators meeting, a series of 10 indepth telephone interviews were conducted within 2 Purpose of This Report months of the meeting. VOCA representatives This report documents the lessons learned from from each of the six states were interviewed to state efforts to respond to the diverse needs of further explore the lessons learned from their September 11 victims. It presents a summary of perspectives. promising practices, challenges, and lessons learned from select state VOCA administrator Additionally, interviewees from California, Mass­ agencies whose firsthand experiences in address­ achusetts, and Virginia supplied sample written ing victims’ needs may assist others in their documentation including memos, activity reports, strategic planning. The report also describes the performance reports, resource guides, letters, press

3 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons releases, advertisements, and program agendas While the information obtained through these Learned From developed or distributed by agencies that con­ methods is substantive and informative, it reflects the States tributed staff and resources to September 11 vic­ the experiences of only a limited number of tim assistance or compensation services. The states. Nevertheless, their experiences shed signif­ documents supplemented the comments of meet­ icant light on the current and emerging mass ing participants and interviewees and supported criminal victimization issues confronting state the key points they had made. VOCA administrator agencies across the country and offer direction for planning, implementation, and evaluation.

4 Chapter 2 Lessons Learned From State VOCA Administrator Agencies

ntil September 11, 2001, the 1995 team whose solid training, professionalism, and bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Fed­ performance enabled them to act as liaisons U eral Building in Oklahoma City had between victims and those who made decisions been the largest scale terrorist incident on U.S. about compensation. soil, prompting an extraordinary effort to help victims. One of the lessons agencies learned from Other states rapidly mobilized post-September this experience was that victims of terrorism 11, capitalizing on professional alliances and per­ share many of the needs of other victims of vio­ sonal relationships to set in motion a comprehen­ lent crime, but they also face unique challenges, sive response to victims’ needs. One state funded as do the victim service providers and allied pro­ a daylong training session at which representa­ fessionals who respond to them. tives from numerous agencies identified their particular areas of expertise. With visual support Promising Practices from a large map, agency personnel were matched with a specific victim’s family members During a mass criminal incident, saving lives and based on geography and anticipated need. ensuring citizen safety are the preeminent consid­ Another state trained military casualty officers erations. Subsequently, the response shifts to who then supported agency staff in helping vic­ treating the effects of violence, as victims seek a tims fill out applications for compensation. variety of immediate, short-, and long-term ser­ vices. As state VOCA administrator agencies In some states, training for emergency responders began to provide those services to September 11 extended to addressing their own unique needs. victims, a number of practices emerged that were Unlike direct victims, emergency responders are particularly effective in helping victims stabilize more likely to be exposed to the aftermath of a their lives and cope with the impact of the event. crisis for a longer time, which can build on past exposure to trauma. Also, emergency responders Training and Responder Preparedness are not always taught how to cope with their own Emergency response training traditionally has emotional responses to traumatic events and focused on response to and recovery from the therefore may require more support services in physical impact of a disaster. Therefore, some the future. One VOCA administrator agency col­ emergency responders were insufficiently pre­ laborated with a hospital to develop a series of pared to handle the significant human impact of training sessions about general health and well­ the September 11 events. As one interviewee put ness, which included both the physical and men­ it, “We were just completely taken by surprise.” tal challenges facing rescue personnel.

However, some states were able to launch a swift, Professional and Volunteer Alliances efficient response to victims’ needs with resources All of the grantees relied on volunteers exten­ that were already in place, highlighting the sively to optimize victim assistance and compen­ importance of thorough advance training for vic­ sation, particularly in the days immediately tim service providers and emergency responders. following the terrorist attacks. One state’s crisis One state activated its existing crisis intervention response team represented a mix of professionals

5 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons and volunteers who were prepared to mobilize and volunteer resources also on hand, victim Learned From quickly to reach a crisis site with many victims. assistance and compensation experts staffed the States They also were trained to recognize and respond emergency operations centers. They also coordi­ to the broad range of emotions, feelings, and nated data collection and ensured the number of physical symptoms that traumatic victimization claims received and paid was incorporated into can generate. daily situation reports for governors and federal agencies. One VOCA administrator agency relied on per­ sonnel from other state agencies who volunteered Family Assistance Centers their time to complete tasks such as data entry for Three state VOCA administrator agencies compensation claims or to answer telephones described the family assistance centers that until midnight or later. Each state, some in coor­ served as a positive precedent and model for con­ dination with the state bar association, also solidating services in one location. Set up in pub­ offered pro bono legal services to victims and lic or private facilities near the attack sites, family surviving family members. assistance centers gave victims one-stop access to a host of resources, including attorneys to assist Hotlines/Helplines with custody and probate issues, insurance com­ All of the grantees established hotlines, some panies, charities, personnel from the FBI and the almost immediately, to give victims access to Social Security Administration, and representa­ assistance, compensation, and referral informa­ tives from airlines. Clergy, therapists, therapy tion. One VOCA administrator agency collabo­ animals, childcare (while families completed rated successfully with its state’s Department of applications and other paperwork), DNA draw Motor Vehicles (DMV) to plan, staff, and imple­ sites (where DNA samples were collected from ment a hotline that was housed at DMV head­ relatives to help identify the deceased), and quarters. Drawing on the DMV’s extensive onsite memorials were also available at the technology resources, the toll free line was estab­ centers. lished within 14 hours and could be staffed by up to 30 operators (both DMV employees and Equipped with computer terminals and Internet victim/witness agency personnel). DMV staff access, family assistance centers were staffed by screened calls, making referrals as necessary to compensation and victim assistance professionals, victim/witness staff, and developed a resource and including those from urban areas and those with referral list to direct callers to appropriate ser­ significant experience working with families of vices. In addition, DMV’s automated resources homicide victims. They linked people with grief featured a database that reported hourly on the counseling and made referrals to local victim/ number of calls, the number of rings, the purpose witness agencies, recognizing the anticipated of the call, and resolution of the call, as well as need for ongoing counseling for some victims. the name, address, and phone number of the Military personnel and victim/witness profession­ caller. als from other states supported local personnel who were handling regular caseloads in addition Emergency Operations Centers to processing September 11 victim claims. For police, fire, and medical personnel trained to respond to dangerous situations, setting up an Case Management emergency command center is common practice. State VOCA administrator agencies unanimously However, because the September 11 events were and vigorously supported a case management also crimes, VOCA administrator agencies in model with assigned case managers who advocat­ states with crash sites worked with their respec­ ed on behalf of victims, allowing them to bypass tive state departments of emergency services, many complications and barriers to receiving most for the first time, to establish disaster comprehensive services. Two states cited the field offices. With federal, state, military,

6 Lessons Learned From State VOCA effectiveness of a case management model for worked and devised resource lists that Administrator coordinating and delivering services to Septem­ included a broad range of services, from Agencies ber 11 victims. Following an advocacy case man­ attorneys who would donate pro bono agement approach, state VOCA administrator services for handling compensation claims or agencies developed individual recovery plans to immigration issues to volunteers from benevo­ help victims return to predisaster status as quickly lent associations who would rake lawns. as possible by providing referrals to counseling, support groups, legal services, immigration ser­ Two state VOCA administrator agencies com­ vices, job training, placement agencies, and other mented that although the practical resources resources that matched an individual’s specific developed and the relationships fostered were needs. beneficial to families, they were unique to the events of September 11 and in their current for­ Case managers also handled professionally many mat would not likely be useful in the future. They of the emotionally draining tasks that families suggested that states create more formal, compre­ faced. In addition to collecting DNA samples hensive mechanisms for coordinating with other and transporting families to assistance centers agencies in an effort to safeguard against misin­ and memorial services, case managers arranged formation or inappropriate victim referrals. for such basics as food, heat, and clothing when paychecks stopped and other assistance had not Mental Health Counseling, begun. They also assisted local police with death Support Groups, and notification when the FBI confirmed identifica­ Community Healing Rituals tion of a loved one’s body part. They helped fam­ No one who witnesses or is victimized by mass ilies access the daunting array of charitable violence is untouched by it. Accordingly, all state organizations that offered financial assistance and VOCA administrator agencies facilitated mental other services, and they campaigned for scholar­ health counseling for primary and secondary vic­ ships and additional remedies for families with tims of September 11. college-age children. Because victims were vulnerable in different ways One state VOCA administrator agency appoint­ to stresses associated with the disaster and experi­ ed case managers to work exclusively with partic­ enced distinct concerns and reactions, mental ular victim categories, such as people who were health counseling took various forms. In addition at the World Trade Center, or those who were to contracting for crisis and individual counsel­ directly affected by one of the plane crashes. Case ing, states coordinated and scheduled support managers worked closely with survivors, family groups that generated a sense of closeness among members, and rescue workers to coordinate bene­ participants. These groups were instrumental in fits and services with charitable organizations and helping victims deal with grief, guilt, and other alternative funding sources. They explained ben­ repressed emotions and in understanding the efits and claims eligibility requirements, managed impact of trauma. and attended peer support group meetings, facili­ tated pro bono legal assistance, and simply lis­ In a pilot project, one state VOCA administrator tened compassionately. agency collaborated with a university trauma recovery center to host a series of regional Counseling support group meetings, monthly at first and Immediately after September 11, state VOCA quarterly beginning in 2003. administrator agencies, particularly those that fol­ lowed the case management model, collected Several states reported that the structure of sup­ information about local, state, and federal port groups was important to addressing the resources that could provide practical assistance needs of survivors who had been at the World for victims. They identified financial support Trade Center compared with sessions for grieving entities with whom they typically had not family members. The optimum structure was

7 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons found by presenting some components for all Having expanded customer service units, states Learned From attendees followed by breakout sessions for sub­ assigned victim compensation personnel to staff the States sets of the entire group. Other states pointed to family assistance centers where they helped vic­ the need to fund children’s programs in the after­ tims complete applications and determine unmet math of a crisis. According to some state VOCA needs. To ensure high-quality service to all administrator agencies, local mental health claimants, one state developed the 9-11 Call Cen­ experts continue to note behavioral issues among ter Resource Guide for customer service represen­ children who lost a parent and the importance of tatives and temporary agency staff. Another state providing them with special support. dispatched its existing mobile compensation pro­ gram to a crash site and supplemented its grant Mental health experts found that although sur­ with emergency services funds that allowed the vivors of mass criminal victimization react differ­ program to hire additional staff. All states stream­ ently to the grief and stress produced by the lined their conventional compensation proce­ tragedy, public or private rituals, spiritually ori­ dures to expedite September 11 claims, and one ented memorial services, grief seminars or educa­ state instituted an abbreviated application for tional programs, and nonreligious ceremonies urban search and rescue workers who had been such as military honors can significantly con­ deployed to attack sites. Another state was suc­ tribute to a victim’s recovery. While none of the cessful in initiating a relationship with the gover- state VOCA administrator agencies reported nor’s office to pass emergency legislation to sponsoring community healing events, one expedite compensation payments to victims. agency spearheaded state legislation in 2002 to allow the compensation board to pay families for Challenges to Meeting wages lost during travel to and from memorial services or government events honoring victims. Victims’ Needs The agency also scheduled support group meet­ As state VOCA administrator agencies and their ings to coincide with a statewide Day of Remem­ colleagues addressed the complex needs of vic­ brance and anniversary memorials that included tims, they identified and implemented response interfaith services. models that not only contributed to the recovery of those victims, but also could be replicated for Compensation other incidents. However, despite the immediate Victim compensation programs had been long- and long-term positive impact these services had standing in each state. However, for victims of on the lives of victims, the experiences of state September 11, it was a challenge for states to VOCA administrator agencies highlight several process the extraordinary number of claims, espe­ challenges that merit attention as planning and cially in those states where the events occurred. implementation go forward. Approximately 3 years after the attacks, payouts of up to $25,000 per claim have exceeded $10 Different Requirements for million in one state, primarily for loss of support, Compensation and Victim Services but also for mental health counseling for sur­ The inherently unpredictable nature of mass vivors and those who were either physically criminal victimization distinguishes it from many injured or directly threatened by the attacks. Sev­ natural disasters and has implications for pre­ eral states worked cooperatively for the first time paredness and response. Government agencies as they identified which had primary and second­ and nonprofit organizations, particularly those in ary jurisdiction for claims. Additionally, because high-risk meteorological or geological regions, state compensation schedules differed, it was traditionally have emergency management plans imperative to determine which expenses (med­ in effect, but these focus primarily on the safety ical bills or loss of support due to physical and operational response to natural disasters and injury or death) were to be reimbursed. neglect to address the human impact of a mass

8 Lessons Learned From State VOCA criminal crisis. State VOCA administrator agen­ residents, providing nearly $4 million Administrator cies cited the need to recognize that mass crimi­ in reimbursement, mostly for loss of Agencies nal victimization and natural disasters generate income or support, to survivors, family distinctive circumstances and response require­ members, search and rescue workers, and ments. As one interviewee remarked, “[We were] victims of hate crimes that occurred after in uncharted territory.” September 11.

The events of September 11 prompted a response Little experience existed to establish and guide unlike any previous response to a disaster and appropriate services for terrorist-caused psycho­ presented a number of challenges for victim ser­ logical trauma. As a result, federal and state agen­ vice providers. State VOCA administrator agen­ cies providing compensation for mental health cies discovered that even experienced mental services varied in terms of eligibility criteria, in health providers were not necessarily adequately particular, whether a documented physical injury trained to deal with people struggling with grief was a prerequisite for support. Programs struggled and posttraumatic stress disorder. In addition, the with determining whether rescuers and respond­ different requirements of mental health providers ers were eligible for compensation, as they were and compensation agencies proved problematic. not direct victims of the attacks. In addition, Many mental health providers did not ask clients some state VOCA administrator agencies report to divulge personal information to receive ser­ that even now derivative victims such as rescuers vices. Compensation agencies, on the other are still coming forward to submit claims. hand, wanted specific information and documen­ tation of victimization, as required by statute and Lack of Uniform Standards and grant reporting specifications, causing some Criteria for Financial Assistance clients to become angry or upset. Also, coordi­ The development of financial projections and nating referrals was jeopardized in some states identification of federal, state, and private fund­ where unlicensed victim assistance providers who ing resources is an essential component of a had training and experience in dealing with grief comprehensive response to mass criminal victimi­ and posttraumatic stress disorder were unable to zation. The importance of economic planning is contribute to counseling projects managed by underscored by the experiences of state VOCA mental health organizations that required coun­ administrator agencies that were forced to organ­ selors to be licensed. ize in a few days an effort that normally would take months or years. They pointed to the need Difficulty Responding for adopting standardized criteria for agency fund­ to the Massive Impact ing and financial assistance to victims. Despite awareness of victim service efforts that were launched in response to the Oklahoma City In one state, existing homicide bereavement pro­ bombing, the scale of September 11 over­ grams were called on to expand services without whelmed localities. The terrorist attacks far additional funds. While they were regarded as the surpassed the 1995 event in Oklahoma City, in state experts at providing direct services to sur­ impact as well as scope of victim services offered. vivors, these programs were underfunded even as State VOCA administrator agencies were called mental health programs generally enjoyed ade­ on to apply existing procedures, systems, and per­ quate funding. sonnel to address an exponentially greater demand for services. Also, as agencies sorted out financial responsibili­ ties and payout procedures, some of the first vic­ More than 700 residents of one state died, trig­ tims to apply for compensation received generous gering over 600 claims for compensation. One payments, while those who applied later some­ state VOCA administrator agency distributed times had difficulty gaining compensation. With more than 400 applications at the family assis­ no central database that included financial assis­ tance center. Another served more than 350 tance provided by the plethora of charities,

9 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons federal agencies and funds, and other state agen­ Barriers to Serving Special Learned From cies as well as victim compensation programs, it Victim Populations the States was difficult to determine whether a specific A comprehensive response to a mass criminal expense or bill was presented to different sources crisis recognizes the social, emotional, psycho­ for duplicate payment. logical, and economic toll on victims. Several state VOCA administrator agencies found that Victim Identification and services also need to be sensitive to the cultural, Communication Issues ethnic, and language considerations of the com­ Once state VOCA administrator agencies and munity and address the diverse and unique needs, their colleagues launched services for September beliefs, and lifestyles of affected victims. Particu­ 11 victims, they were faced with defining which larly in communities with a wide variety of cul­ populations actually needed assistance and the tures and languages, certain ethnic or cultural optimum methods for contacting people to groups can be vulnerable in unique ways and can announce service availability. Identifying victims experience distinct concerns and reactions that was difficult, as victims’ names were not always require specialized resources. State VOCA shared among agencies due to confidentiality administrator agencies also addressed the needs concerns. One interviewee recalled how staffers of individuals and communities victimized by resorted to reading local newspapers to obtain post-September 11 hate crimes. names and other victim information, aiming to identify individual victims and victim groups Geographical Issues whose needs were unmet. Interviewees discussed a particular challenge in providing appropriate services to victims whose All of the state VOCA administrator agencies home base was far from the crisis center sites. admitted to struggling with determining how to Two state VOCA administrator agencies reported provide the services victims needed without com­ that due to their geographic distance from the promising their privacy or overwhelming them. September 11 events, victims within their states For their part, many victims felt they were falling felt out of the loop and experienced a sense of through the cracks, but at the same time, alienation stemming from people who did not expressed feelings of vulnerability and reluctance consider their state affected by September 11. to disclose personal information. In one state that With no critical mass of survivors and family did not have a crash site, an airport became the members in their home communities, these vic­ default gathering place for victims’ families; how­ tims felt isolated because others did not under­ ever, despite vigorous outreach, the state VOCA stand what they were going through. administrator agency encountered barriers to con­ necting people with resources. In one large state with a greatly dispersed victim population, travel time was a barrier to victims While many states streamlined filing require­ attending monthly support groups. The other ments and reduced application paperwork, state VOCA administrator agency affected by government agencies differed from private organ­ geography also had to address providers’ concerns izations on the documentation necessary for about boundary or territorial issues related to obtaining benefits. The result was that individu­ handling referrals to victim services. als could use multiple providers, without docu­ mentation, or receive duplicate compensation. Emotional Impact Also, from a management perspective, unantici­ pated supplemental federal reporting require­ State VOCA administrator agencies had to man­ ments added to administrative burdens of age the complex sensitivities that emerge in agencies as they balanced the priority of citizen/service provider interactions as they with­ September 11 victims’ claims with trying stood, and often internalized, the force of victim to avoid delayed processing of other emotions. Some victims felt that their status as victims’ claims.

10 Lessons Learned From State VOCA September 11 victims superseded the needs of agency had to schedule meetings with Administrator victims of domestic abuse, homicide, or other federal agencies simply to gain access to Agencies victims. Likewise, those other victims, who were buildings, particularly those not normally sympathetic at first, grew increasingly impatient open to the public. State VOCA administra­ as all attention was focused on meeting Septem­ tor agencies also had to work with federal law ber 11 victims’ needs. enforcement organizations to obtain victim lists that substituted for police reports and death cer­ All state VOCA administrator agencies reported tificates for families seeking compensation. that depression and fatigue, in varying degrees, affected staff. However, because people are often Because they often take different approaches to uncomfortable with terms associated with mental psychological intervention, state VOCA admin­ health and mental illness, it was important to put istrator agencies had to persuade some mental stress management and psychological care tech­ health professionals of the need for targeted niques in a context that made people receptive counseling in the aftermath of mass victimiza­ to them. For staff, training designed to help “take tion. Subsequently, mental health providers wel­ care of yourself” was a useful method of psycho­ comed the opportunity to schedule training in logical intervention. crisis response and trauma and grief counseling, especially when they learned that the mental Fragmentation of Service Delivery health departments and the state VOCA admin­ Mistrust or miscommunication among agencies istrator agencies shared some clientele. within a jurisdiction can lead to fragmentation or unnecessary duplication of services and can even State VOCA administrator agencies agreed that hamper service delivery. The majority of state relationships formed after September 11 were tied VOCA administrator agencies cited collabora­ to individuals and overly dependent on particular tion and coordination of resources as having a personalities. Since then, however, formalization significant impact on service delivery. They has been launched in some jurisdictions. One underscored the importance of coordination state has established a team of state agencies, among disciplines and emphasized the need for coordinated by the emergency management organizations to actively commit to working agency and chaired by the state’s victim advo­ together, drawing on the expertise of previously cate, to develop a protocol for working coopera­ nonallied agencies to deliver timely services to tively in the future, addressing relevant issues, victims. and assigning roles to handle immediate, inter­ mediate, and long-term concerns. Another state In some states, victim assistance had not been reported that a similar collaborative model met coordinated with victim compensation and, at with early enthusiasm but that recent disaster the same time, both entities found themselves planning meetings were less well attended, cast­ working with emergency management personnel ing doubt on whether awareness of victims’ needs with whom they had virtually no history of had been raised to the institutional level. collaboration. One state VOCA administrator

11 Chapter 3 Next Steps

tate VOCA administrator agencies pro­ ✦�Promote mutual respect and collaboration vided a broad range of crisis counseling; among agencies with disparate focuses (natu­ S social, financial and emotional support; ral versus criminal disasters) and modes of and referral services to September 11 victims. operation (handling safety and security versus Their experiences reflect current best practices handling people). and identify areas for improved victim services. Their know-how lends valuable guidance to ✦�Develop broad written procedural guidelines other state VOCA administrator agencies across or models for a response to mass criminal vic­ the country and to decisionmakers for focusing timization, and define required policies, pro­ expertise and funds on preparing Americans for cedures, and protocols and how they will be mass criminal incidents. In addition, their input devised. offers a framework for a strategic approach to ✦ developing multidisciplinary response protocols. �Involve top leadership, particularly gover­ The following outlines their identified next steps nors’ offices, in gaining priority status for to ensure followthrough for enhanced services victims throughout a state’s administration. nationwide. ✦�Develop and offer disaster training that focuses on the human impact of mass crimi­ Develop a National nal events as well as the physical effects. Perspective on ✦�Act collaboratively as members of a commu­ Consequences of Mass nity of responders, understanding that vic­ Criminal Victimization tim service organizations need to work in tandem. Many government agencies have had emergency management plans in place that focus mainly on ✦�Address the geographical and territorial the safety and operational response to natural issues inherent in a national approach to disasters but do not address the impact of a mass assisting large populations of victims. criminal crisis that can be felt over wide or multi­ ple geographic areas. Recommended next steps ✦�Safeguard the integrity of services to all vic­ include the following: tims, and ensure that funding for mass crimi­ nal victimization does not proportionally ✦ �Recognize the importance of comprehensive outstrip funding for other victim services. planning, despite the inherently unpre­ dictable and uncontrollable nature of mass Prepare To Respond to criminal victimization. Immediate, Intermediate, ✦�Integrate a focus on victims’ needs into and Long-Term Needs national preparedness planning. Survival, safety, food, and shelter are the primary ✦�Merge the response to natural disasters with response considerations during a mass violence approaches to managing criminal disasters. incident, after which the desire for information

13 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons and the location and condition of family mem­ ✦�Craft a community mental health interven­ Learned From bers and other loved ones are the immediate vic­ tion program targeted to reduce long-term the States tim needs. State VOCA administrator agencies impairment to those directly and indirectly point to additional immediate, intermediate, and affected by mass criminal victimization. long-term services that can diminish the negative effects of mass violence among survivors. They ✦�Organize and schedule support groups for suggested these next steps: specific populations (e.g., parents who lost children), and expand services, such as offer­ ✦ Establish a memorandum of understanding ing childcare, to victims with highly specific (MOU) with individual state government needs. and nonprofit organizations to provide immediate crisis assistance to survivors, ✦�Educate police, fire, emergency personnel, their families, and community members. and other responders about the potential effects they might experience from assisting ✦ Look beyond states where events occur to victims of mass disaster and how these effects account for all potential secondary victims can last for years and have implications for and their ongoing needs and to assess where responders’ long-term reactions and the sup­ resources and services are dedicated. port services they might need.

✦ Design and deliver flexible services that do Set Assistance Parameters not conform to a one-size-fits-all approach. Mass criminal victimization generates a broad ✦ Develop a service implementation plan that range of emotions, feelings, and physical symp­ adapts to ongoing and changing victim toms that different individuals or groups can needs and allows for smooth adjustment of experience at different times. However, according services. to one state VOCA administrator agency, “If you’re counseling 3 days a week 2 years later, it’s ✦ Build awareness of how post-event trauma not about this. Trauma-related things are more unfolds over a period of time and how it short-term than that. At some point, you need to demands a continuum of care for primary draw a new line, because instead of helping peo­ and secondary victims. ple with recovery, you may be helping them relive their victimization.” These comments ✦ Provide services over an appropriately long highlight the difficult decisions state VOCA period of time because grief can unexpected­ administrator agencies and victim service ly return, even as survivors and families providers face as they help victims transition begin to stabilize their lives and cope with from immediate to long-term support and the impact of the event. beyond. State VOCA administrator agencies recommended the following next steps: ✦ Deliver services that address the financial and employment concerns that can impede ✦�Develop personalized transition plans for recovery. moving from short- to long-term assistance, ✦ Offer crisis counseling related to birthdays taking into account individual reactions to of victims, holidays, important family tragedy, grieving styles, and recovery rates. anniversaries, and the first anniversary of ✦�Incorporate a response to mass criminal vic­ the event. timization into existing service systems.

✦�Follow a realistic methodology for action that acknowledges that initial needs of vic­ tims might not be monetary but rather counseling, comfort, or support.

14 Next Steps

✦�Clarify which individuals and groups are eli­ Formalize Response gible for expanded benefits and services (e.g., grandparents, grandchildren, in-laws). Channels All state VOCA administrator agencies ✦ �Delineate in advance who will offer finan­ spoke of the value of formal, standardized prac­ cial support to victims as a first and last tices and procedures to enable agencies within, resort, what it covers, and at what monetary and across, jurisdictions to work effectively in levels to avoid duplication of payments and cases of mass criminal victimization. In fact, one ensure identification of unmet victim needs. state victim compensation board is now a mem­ Offer training and technical assistance to ber of a statewide terrorism task force headed by respective agencies. the state’s Office of Emergency Services. It includes the Department of Mental Health, ✦�Formulate shared administrative systems Office of Criminal Justice Planning, Department between states and prominent charities, of Transportation, and additional state agencies. other state agencies, and federal sources of Before September 11, the compensation board assistance so that information on payments had no continuing relationship with the Office of to victims can be tracked and shared. Emergency Services. Afterward, the board gained widespread respect for having met the tremen­ ✦�Describe precisely what the mental health response to mass criminal victimization will dous needs of victims. Now, as members of the be, as referral and long-term response can task force, board representatives help inform and become problematic after the first few days influence the planning and direction of disaster following a crisis. response. However, other states report that while positive ✦�Prepare a calendar for long-term services such as support groups. relationships among agencies were formed follow­ ing September 11, there has been little follow- ✦�Determine appropriate intervals for followup through. They formed relationships with people interventions (e.g., 3 months, 6 months, in mental health, emergency management, and event anniversary), and offer services such as other departments but not with the institutions. crisis intervention and transportation associ­ They are convinced that they would have to start ated with anniversary commemorations. from scratch in another mass crisis and that, while the personal relationships are advanta­ ✦�Create “drop-in” sites for counseling and geous, they would operate only if the same indi­ other services for citizens and rescuers viduals were in the same roles. Therefore, state affected by generalized fear (“walking VOCA administrator agencies advised taking the wounded”) when they do not fit into following next steps: traditional categories of victims eligible for funded services. ✦ Hold a series of cross-agency meetings to develop objectives and identify strategies ✦�Expand the categories of allowable activities and methods for comprehensive disaster under federal grant guidelines to include the response. provision of respite care for family caretak­ ers of those injured. ✦ Draft a long-range implementation plan that clearly defines response roles and ✦�Forecast funding requirements beyond avail­ responsibilities to avoid duplication of able grants and balance funding allocations services. and services equitably between victims of mass violence and other victims. ✦ Involve local disaster assistance in all plan­ ning activities. Federal and state prepared­ ness and emergency management programs

15 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons notwithstanding, the immediate response to ✦�Recruit and assign response personnel who Learned From mass criminal victimization is generally car­ are culturally sensitive to working with eth­ the States ried out locally. nic populations and who are trained to work with special populations such as children, ✦ Develop formal mechanisms for communi­ older people, and people with disabilities. cating with, hosting, and directing multidis­ ciplinary teams of disaster response and ✦�Establish standing contracts with diverse victim service professionals and volunteers media to advertise hotline numbers, victim from other states. services, and other information important to victims once a mass crisis occurs. ✦ Integrate victim services formally into any emergency operations center used by public ✦�Activate an easily accessible national clear­ safety agencies to command and manage inghouse for information about charitable responders. giving and services from corporations and foundations that offer scholarships, mort­ ✦ Recruit and screen volunteers with the essen­ gage payments, counseling, children’s ser­ tial training credentials to perform specific vices, and other types of support to victims jobs successfully, eliminating well-meaning and families as well as ongoing donation but inexperienced or untrained individuals. opportunities. Categorize and name the specific qualifica­ tions and skills sought. ✦�Write and distribute regular newsletters to victims and families to update them on the ✦ Develop volunteer guidelines to define status of issues such as compensation, sup­ responsibilities in relation to other respond­ port organizations, meetings, and events. ers and describe performance expectations of them during a mass criminal victimization. ✦�Disseminate information via a secure group Web site that also provides a chat feature Reach Out to All Victims allowing survivors and family members to communicate. In addition to helping direct victims who suffered physical or emotional injuries related to the Sep­ ✦�Take an active approach to reaching victims tember 11 crisis, communities responded to sec­ by visiting community meetings, church ondary or other victims, many of whom lost their services, fire departments, and other sites employment. However, state VOCA administra­ where victim assistance and mental health tor agencies faced some difficulty in finalizing a staff can interact with victims. definition of “victim” and in reaching some groups and individuals who ultimately were ✦�Offer debriefing opportunities to emergency deemed eligible for assistance. They recommend­ responders and victim service staff to pre­ ed the following next steps: vent emotional burnout caused by exposure to intense human pain and anger. ✦ Develop an instrument to identify potential victim groups resulting from specific types of ✦�Recognize that some individuals choose not mass crisis and their potential needs (e.g., to take advantage of victim services and evacuees from a chemical attack would not that outreach by letter, telephone, or other need long-term shelter, but residents dis­ means should not become intrusive or placed from a radiological attack might overwhelming. never be able to return home). ✦�Acknowledge that all participation in vic­ tim services must be voluntary and that there is a limit to what can be done to help people.

16 Next Steps Monitor and Evaluate ❖ Determine what is appropri­ ate followup, for whom, and Interventions over what period of time. Systematic data collection and evaluation are essential to determining the effectiveness of Balance Planning intervention on behalf of victims of mass crimi­ and Response nal incidents. Similar to the continuum of care that state VOCA administrator agencies referred All state VOCA administrator agencies con­ to in discussing the immediate, short-, and long- curred that despite extraordinary efforts and suc­ term needs of victims, a continuum of evaluation cesses in addressing the incomparable needs of is a rational model for assessing whether benefits September 11 victims, focus on the human and services were helpful to victims and will con­ impact of mass criminal violence lags behind the tribute to decisions regarding the scope, nature, concentration on prevention and intervention. and duration of assistance delivered. Interviewees They understand that institutions traditionally urged the following next steps: have a difficult time dealing with the needs of victims during a crisis and that it is easier, on ✦�Plan for data collection before, during, and many levels, to secure a physical target than to after incidents of mass violence. help people cope with mental anguish. A com­ plete integration of victims’ issues into emer­ ✦ �Obtain details about current and anticipat­ gency management has not been achieved. Some ed reporting requirements of federal agen­ states report they have now just begun to catch cies to plan for and set protocols to capture up on September 11 applications for assistance necessary data. and have not yet performed any disaster planning for future events. State VOCA administrator ✦�Research and draft evaluation protocols and agencies suggest the following next steps: reporting requirements. ✦ Incorporate victim services into disaster ✦�Determine the nature, format, and usage planning and response protocols, also taking guidelines for evaluation instruments. into account the psychological conse­ quences of such events. ✦�Capitalize on existing technology resources (e.g., DMV automated systems) to establish ✦ Establish a state emergency management or a comprehensive database of victims, a governor’s office antiterrorism task force as inquiries, and needs. the lead agency to formalize planning and response channels and ensure built-in ✦�Conduct surveys and schedule focus groups with general and specialized victim popula­ accountability. tions and victim service providers to— ✦ Encourage victim assistance and compensa­ tion staff to participate in developing and ❖�Identify program components or activi­ ties that merit continuation, fine tuning, updating state preparedness plans. or abandonment. ✦ Assign equal importance to victim benefits and assistance and to safety and security ❖�Explore whether victims still experience the physical and emotional symptoms issues in preparedness planning. typically associated with traumatic ✦ Allocate funding evenly among law enforce­ events. ment, fire, EMS, and other equipment- dependent activities, and crisis aftermath ❖�Ensure services remain responsive to the changing needs of victims. services.

17 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons ✦ Revamp preparedness and response plans as ✦�Establish MOUs between state and local Learned From community variables shift (e.g., housing agencies and encourage participation of pro­ the States trends, school trends, commercial versus fessional associations such as state chapters of residential distribution). psychological associations. Request assign­ ment of individuals with specialized training ✦ Schedule regular training sessions for victim in victim assistance, particularly those who assistance professionals, mental health have assisted families of homicide victims providers, and emergency management per­ and have experience with death notification sonnel to enhance collaboration among state and funeral arrangements. agencies.

18 Chapter 4 Conclusion

he information gathered from select issues inherent to assisting large populations of state VOCA administrator agencies sup­ victims, as well as creating centralized databases T ports developing comprehensive inter­ to track compensation and dissemination of ser­ ventions on behalf of victims of mass criminal vices to avoid duplication of efforts. incidents. Central to their experiences are several themes that transcend unique circumstances of State VOCA administrator agencies counsel particular states. They cite the critical need for thoughtful, prudent action in providing services preparedness planning that recognizes the dra­ to victims and encourage adoption of a case man­ matic human impact of mass criminal victimiza­ agement strategy to ensure that services fit pre­ tion and the value of integrating victim services cisely the immediate, intermediate, and seamlessly into disaster response. They also point long-term concerns of individuals and groups. to the importance of understanding the special They also agree that carefully crafted federal needs and vulnerabilities of victims of mass crim­ action will complement and enhance the efforts inal events, particularly their requirements for of state agencies. mental health and emotional support services. Overall, the experiences and insights of state State VOCA administrator agencies call for VOCA administrators lend sound guidance to smooth coordination of services among federal, programming and funding authorities as they set state, and local agencies and organizations and priorities, allocate resources, establish protocols, for formalizing collaborative relationships at the and determine accountability criteria for these institutional level to define realistic policies, pro­ important initiatives in which all Americans cedures, and protocols. Additionally, they recom­ have a stake. mend addressing geographical and territorial

19 Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons Learned From the States

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