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The September 11 Detainees

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The September 11 Detainees TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . 1 I. Background . 1 II. Methodology of this Review . 5 III. Organization of this Report . 8 CHAPTER 2: ARREST AND PROCESSING OF ALIENS IN RESPONSE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS . 10 I. Initial Law Enforcement Response . .10 A. Initial FBI Response . 10 B. Department of Justice Response . 12 C. New York FBI’s Response . 13 D. SIOC Working Group . 15 II. Arrests of September 11 Detainees . 15 III. Assignment to a Detention Facility . 17 A. FBI Assessment . .17 B. INS Housing Determination . 18 C. BOP Confinement Decisions . 19 D. Department of Justice’s Role . 20 IV. Demographics of September 11 Detainees . .20 V. Processing of September 11 Detainees from Arrest to Clearance . 23 CHAPTER 3: CHARGING OF SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES . 27 I. INS Regulations and Policies Governing the Timing of Charging Decisions . 27 A. The Charging Determination . 27 B. Serving the Notice to Appear (NTA) . 28 II. Service of NTAs on September 11 Detainees . 29 III. Reasons for Delay in Serving NTAs . 30 A. Pending Criminal Charges . 30 B. Delays Caused by Logistical Disruptions in New York City . .31 C. Delays Caused by INS Headquarters Review of NTAs . 32 D. Delays Caused by Transfers of September 11 Detainees . 33 IV. OIG Analysis . 35 CHAPTER 4: THE CLEARANCE PROCESS . 37 I. “Hold Until Cleared” Policy . 37 A. Origins of Policy . 37 B. Implementation of Policy . 40 II. INS Operational Orders . .43 III. The Clearance Process . 46 A. Determining Which Aliens Would be Subject to the Clearance Process . .46 B. FBI Field Office Role in the Clearance Investigation . 48 C. CIA Name Checks . 50 IV. Timing of Clearances . 51 V. Delays in the Clearance Process . 52 A. Inclusion of New York Arrests on the INS’s “Special Interest” List Requiring Clearances . 53 1. Background to the New York Custody List . 53 2. Merger of Lists . 55 B. Delays in the Field Portion of the Clearance Investigation . 57 C. CIA Name Checks . 58 D. Examples of Delays . 62 E. Knowledge of the Delays in the Clearance Process. 65 VI. FBI Watch List . 67 VII. OIG Analysis . 69 CHAPTER 5: THE DEPARTMENT’S “NO BOND” POLICY FOR SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES . 72 I. Background on Immigration Law . 72 II. Department’s Strategy for Maintaining Detainees in Custody . 74 III. INS Efforts to Maintain Detainees in Custody . 76 A. Initial “No Bond” Determination . 76 B. Pearson Order . 77 C. Creation of a Bond Unit at INS Headquarters . 77 D. Opposing Release at Bond Hearings . 78 1. Concerns About Lack of Evidence for Bond Hearings and Impact of Delays in the Clearance Process . 78 2. Difficulties Presented by New York Cases Added to INS Special Interest List . 80 3. INS Attempts to Revise Bond Policy . 81 E. Proposed Inter-Agency Memoranda . 84 F. Impact of Pearson Order . 85 IV. OIG Analysis . 88 CHAPTER 6: REMOVAL OF SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES . 91 I. Background . 91 II. Discussion of the Limits of the INS’s Detention Authority . 92 III. Detainees’ Lawsuits . 98 IV. Policy Change Allowing Detainees to Be Removed Without FBI Clearance . 100 V. OLC Opinion . .106 VI. Post-Order Custody Reviews of September 11 Detainees . 107 VII. OIG Analysis . 108 CHAPTER 7: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK . 111 I. Introduction . 111 II. Initial Communications Blackout After September 11 . 112 III. Impact of Detainee Classification . 115 A. Detainees’ Classification . 115 B. MDC’s Special Housing Unit (SHU) . 118 C. ADMAX SHU Policies and Procedures . 124 D. Detainee Complaint Process . 125 IV. Housing Assignment of September 11 Detainees . 126 A. Assignment of September 11 Detainees to the ADMAX SHU . 126 B. Reassigning September 11 Detainees to the General Population . 127 1. Centralizing the Notification Process . 127 2. Inconsistencies in Detainee Reassignment Procedures . 129 V. Access to Legal Counsel . 130 A. Legal Telephone Calls . 130 B. Attorney Visits . .135 C. Pro Bono Attorney List . 137 D. Social Visits . 138 E. Contact with Foreign Consulates . 140 VI. Allegations of Physical and Verbal Abuse . 142 A. OIG Site Visit . .143 B. OIG Investigation of Abuse . 144 C. FBI and BOP Investigations of Abuse . .146 D. Allegations of Harassment . 147 E. Reporting Allegations of Abuse . 148 F. MDC Videotapes . 149 VII. Other Issues . 151 A. Medical Care . 151 B. Recreation . 152 C. Lighting in the ADMAX SHU . 153 D. Personal Hygiene Items . 155 E. Hunger Strikes . 156 VIII. OIG Analysis . 157 CHAPTER 8: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AT THE PASSAIC COUNTY JAIL IN PATERSON, NEW JERSEY . 165 I. Introduction . 165 II. Background on Passaic County Jail . 166 III. Housing of Detainees . 167 A. Processing of September 11 Detainees . 167 B. SDU Housing Reviews . 170 IV. Access to Legal Counsel . 172 A. Background . .172 B. Legal Telephone Calls . 174 C. Pro Bono Attorney List . 175 D. Legal Rights Presentations . 176 V. Allegations of Physical and Verbal Abuse . 177 VI. Other Issues . 180 A. Medical Care . 180 B. Hunger Strikes . 181 C. Recreation . 182 VII. INS Newark District Monitoring of September 11 Detainees . .182 VIII. OIG Analysis . 184 CHAPTER 9: OIG RECOMMENDATIONS . 186 I. Uniform Arrest and Detainee Classification Policies . 186 II. Inter-Agency Cooperation on Detainee Issues . 188 III. FBI Clearance Process . ..
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