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Bogotá, 30 De Abril De 2021 Honorables Magistrados, Sala De Bogotá, 30 de Abril de 2021 Honorables Magistrados, Sala de Reconocimiento de Responsabilidad y de Determinación de Hechos y Conductas JURISDICCIÓN ESPECIAL PARA LA PAZ Ref. Respuesta y observaciones al Auto 019 del 26 de enero de 2021 por parte de exintegrantes del secretariado de las FARC-EP, comparecientes dentro del Caso 001 “Toma de Rehenes y otras graves privaciones a la libertad”. RODRIGO LONDOÑO ECHEVERRY, JULIÁN GALLO CUBILLOS, PABLO CATATUMBO, JAIME ALBERTO PARRA, MILTON DE JESÚS TONCEL REDONDO, PASTOR ALAPE LASCARRO, RODRIGO GRANDA ESCOBAR, identificados como aparece al pie de nuestra firma y representados legalmente por los abogados DIEGO ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ CASTILLO, CAMILO ERNESTO FAGUA CASTELLANOS, ORLANDO BERNAL, ÁLVARO BENITEZ, ANA MARIA TONCEL JARAMILLO y ERNESTO MORENO GORDILLO, identificados como aparece al final de este documento, nos dirigimos respetuosamente ante la Sala de Reconocimiento de Verdad y Responsabilidad de la Jurisdicción especial para la paz, con el fin de dar cumplimiento a lo ordenado en los numerales TERCERO, QUINTO Y SEXTO de la parte resolutiva del Auto 019 del 26 de enero de 2021. 1 TABLA DE CONTENIDO CONSIDERACIONES PREVIAS ...................................................................................... 7 1. RECONOCIMIENTOS INDIVIDUALES ............................................................... 11 1.1. Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry ........................................................................................... 11 1.1.1. Sobre mi responsabilidad por la “Política financiera” y su implementación ......................... 12 1.1.2. Sobre mi responsabilidad por la política de “retener” oficiales y suboficiales para “canje” y por su implementación .............................................................................................................................. 12 1.1.3. Sobre mi responsabilidad por la política de “retener” civiles para “canje” y por su implementación ......................................................................................................................................... 13 1.1.4. Sobre mi responsabilidad por la política de privar de la libertad a civiles como parte de las dinámicas de control social y territorial en el Magdalena Medio ............................................................. 13 1.1.5. Respuestas a preguntas que me formularon las víctimas de manera personal ........................ 14 1.1.5.1. Respuesta respecto a lo solicitado por los familiares de Códs. 111, 145, 771, 1291, 1571, 1577, 2013, 2021, 2022, 2024 y 2294 …………………………………………………... 14 1.1.5.2. Asesinatos a Códs. 849 y 1280 .......................................................................................... 16 1.1.6. Plan de contribución a la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas .............................. 17 1.2. Julián Gallo Cubillos ........................................................................................................ 17 1.2.1. Sobre mi responsabilidad por la “Política financiera” y Responsabilidad por la Política de “retener” oficiales y suboficiales para “canje” .......................................................................................... 19 1.2.1.1. Demanda de verdad y reconocimiento de Cód. 41: ............................................................ 23 1.2.1.2. Demandas de verdad de Cód. 20 ....................................................................................... 26 1.3. Jaime Alberto Parra Rodríguez ...................................................................................... 27 1.3.1. Demandas de verdad trasladadas a los comparecientes ........................................................... 32 1.3.1.1. Cód. 2066: ........................................................................................................................... 33 1.3.1.2. Aporte de verdad adicional ................................................................................................. 35 1.4. Pablo Catatumbo Torres Victoria .................................................................................. 36 1.4.1. Sobre la Responsabilidad por la “Política financiera” y su implementación .......................... 41 1.4.2. Sobre la responsabilidad por la política de “retener” civiles para “canje” y mi participación en el secuestro de los Códs. 111, 145, 771, 1291, 1571, 1577, 2013, 2021, 2022, 2024 y 2294 .................. 47 1.4.3. Sobre la responsabilidad por la política de “Retenciones” de “enemigos,” funcionarios públicos y por “castigo” a la población civil ........................................................................................................... 50 1.4.4. Sobre la desaparición del Cód. 1280 ...................................................................................... 57 1.4.5. Sobre información para conocer el destino de Códs. 1555 58 1.4.6. Información sobre cómo ocurrieron los hechos que terminaron en la desaparición del Cód. 1265 60 1.4.7. Sobre el caso del XXXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXX ............................................ 62 1.5. Pastor Lisandro Alape Lascarro ..................................................................................... 63 1.6. Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo .................................................................................... 66 1.6.1. Sobre las preguntas de la familia del Cód. 1148 ..................................................................... 69 1.6.2. Caso de Cód. 716 .................................................................................................................... 70 2 1.6.3. Frente a las preguntas elevadas por Cód. 1083 ....................................................................... 71 1.6.4. Sobre las preguntas trasladadas por Cód. 2107 ....................................................................... 71 1.7. Rodrigo Granda Escobar ................................................................................................. 72 1.8. Juan Hermilo Cabrera Díaz ............................................................................................ 74 2. RESPUESTAS A LAS DEMANDAS DE VERDAD Y OBSERVACIONES POR BLOQUES ........................................................................................................................... 75 2.1. BloQue Magdalena Medio ................................................................................................ 75 2.1.1. Política de privación de la libertad a civiles como parte de las dinámicas de control social y territorial en el Bloque Magdalena Medio ................................................................................................ 76 2.1.2. Hechos ocurridos en el marco de operaciones militares .......................................................... 83 2.1.3. Hechos sobre los que no eXiste suficiente información y aportes para la contrastación de la Sala 89 2.1.4. Observaciones de contexto ...................................................................................................... 96 2.2. BloQue Oriental ............................................................................................................... 103 2.2.1. Sobre las “pescas milagrosas” en el marco de la política determinada por la Sala “Privaciones de la libertad a civiles con fines de financiación” ................................................................................... 107 2.2.2. Demandas de verdad de las víctimas ..................................................................................... 113 2.2.3. ConteXto que facilitó el desarrollo de las “pescas milagrosas” ............................................. 118 2.2.4. Hechos relacionados con la “política de privar de la libertad militares y policías para intercambiar por guerrilleros presos” y conductas conexas. ................................................................... 121 2.2.4.1. Operación Militar (Toma) De Miraflores ......................................................................... 123 2.2.4.2. Demandas de verdad de las víctimas ................................................................................ 125 2.2.4.3. Operación Militar Toma de Mitú ...................................................................................... 128 2.2.5. Ubicación y condiciones de los distintos campamentos ........................................................ 131 2.2.5.1. Cárcel segura ..................................................................................................................... 133 2.2.5.2. Embarrizado ...................................................................................................................... 135 2.2.5.3. Temporal ........................................................................................................................... 136 2.2.5.4. Último campamento .......................................................................................................... 137 2.2.6. Demandas de verdad sobre hechos en que eXistió violencia seXual contra las personas secuestradas ............................................................................................................................................ 140 2.2.7. Demandas de verdad según el lugar de los hechos ................................................................ 146 2.2.7.1. Demandas de verdad sobre hechos ocurridos en Arauca, Boyacá y Casanare .................. 146 2.2.7.2. Demandas de verdad sobre hechos ocurridos en Bogotá y Cundinamarca ....................... 164 2.2.7.3.
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