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ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL Ariel Sharon's New Government

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ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL Ariel Sharon's New Government Table of Contents ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICALUPHEAVAL Introduction.......................................................................................................... 5 What Can I Do about It? ...................................................................................... 6 A Visible Figure......................................................................................................7 “The Bulldozer” .................................................................................................... 8 Ariel Sharon’s New Government ..........................................................................13 Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions.......................................................... 15 ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL Introduction On February 6, 2001, Israelis elected a new well-publicized visit to a religious site in prime minister. The choice they had to make Jerusalem that is considered holy to both between the two candidates for the position Muslims and Jews. Sharon’s visit was skill- could not have been clearer. On one side was fully timed both to advance his own position incumbent prime minister Ehud Barak, who within his party at the expense of his dis- headed a precarious minority Labour Party graced rival, former prime minister Benjamin government and who had called the snap Netanyahu, and to embarrass Barak for his election to secure a new mandate in order to government’s alleged soft stance on Israel’s pursue the peace process with the Palestin- claim to Jerusalem as its eternal capital. ians. A few months before the vote, Barak Enraged by Sharon’s action, local Jerusalem had participated in high-level talks with his Arab residents began a riot that soon spread Palestinian counterpart, PLO Chairman into full-scale fighting between Palestinians Yasser Arafat, talks brokered by U.S. Presi- and Israeli forces throughout the West Bank dent Bill Clinton, at Camp David, Maryland. and Gaza, even spreading into Israel itself. At these intense negotiating sessions, the As the violence raged on day after day, Israelis and Palestinians had come tantaliz- intensely covered by the world’s media, a ingly close to a definitive peace agreement number of horrific incidents occurred that that could have ended the long years of shocked local and international opinion and conflict between them. But in the end, the served to harden attitudes on both sides. talks broke down, while at the same time a Palestinians and Israelis alike gained martyrs new round of bloody violence had erupted in for their respective causes, and hopes that the the Middle East, a region that is no stranger peace process might be resumed grew in- to such upheavals and reversals. Many Israeli creasingly faint. Despite the fact that the voters, disillusioned with a peace process that Israeli government was forced to act in seemed to have brought them no peace, held response to a renewed Arab uprising in the Barak responsible for the failure of the Occupied Territories, a revolt sparked by negotiations with the Palestinians and the actions on both sides, many Israeli voters upheavals that had followed. When the who were disillusioned with what seemed a results were announced, they proved to be a fruitless peace process held Barak respon- massive rejection of him and his sible for the failure of the negotiations with government’s policies. the Palestinians and the renewed upheaval. Ironically, the winner of the election for The election results proved to be a massive prime minister was the same man who many rejection of him and his government’s poli- in the area held at least indirectly responsible cies. for the cycle of violence that had gripped Israelis and Palestinians during the months Note to teachers: This report contains before the vote. On September 28, 2000, footage that may be inappropriate for Ariel Sharon, a major figure in the opposition younger viewers. Please preview the material Likud Party, had staged a provocative and carefully. News in Review — 5 — March 2001 ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL What Can I Do about It? News events can often seem overwhelming to the average person; as outside observers of conflicts reported in the news, we may feel a sense of powerlessness and even hopelessness. For most people watching reports of the Arab revolt in the Occupied Territories and renewed violence between Israelis and Palestinians, there doesn’t seem to be much that one can do about it. It is important, however, to understand that as outside observers, our prime responsi- bility is to understand the facts in the situation as best we can but also to try and understand what general forces are at work. The fact that conflict has always been with us and probably always will be is not necessarily reason for despair. One way we can begin to understand tragic conflicts such as that occurring in the Middle East is to consider certain universal aspects of conflict and conflict manage- ment, and by applying these principles to what we know of the situation, we begin to under- stand better the nature of that particular conflict. Choose one of the items below (these may be assigned) and, while watching this News in Review report, think about how the current situation as reported here reflects the item you have chosen. Be prepared to express in your own words your findings. 1. It is important to understand the patterns of conflict. 2. It is important to know what options or alternatives there are for dealing with conflict. 3. It is important to understand that different individuals have different approaches to conflict. 4. It is important to understand that managing conflict requires specific, and fre- quently, special, skills. 5. Conflict management is based on minds being directed toward solving mutual problems. 6. Conflict management involves the effective use of language. Unfortunately, conflict itself can also result from or be escalated by language; and not all lan- guage is verbal. The saying “Actions speak louder than words” is very true in conflict and conflict management. 7. To manage and solve conflict, the objective should be agreement, not victory. 8. Conflict management negotiations must recognize a conflict of interests. 9. It is important to understand the difference between managing conflict, suppress- ing conflict, and letting conflict escalate. 10. Conflict management must take into account rational and emotional components. 11. Successful conflict management is based on a win-win mode of thinking as opposed to a win-lose mode of thinking. Follow-up Discussion Suggest how each of the following contributed to the revolt and renewed violence: holy sites, revenge/retribution, martyrdom, “a simple mistake,” rumours, “savagery,” the Israeli view that its soldiers are sacred, “an attack on the seat of their government’s power,” inflammatory statements, public appearances, mutual condemnation, terrorism, pressure for military action, political pressure. March 2001 — 6 — News in Review ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL A Visible Figure To many inside and outside Israel, Ariel Sharon is a frightening figure with a record of vio- lence and uncompromising positions toward the Palestinians and his country’s other Arab neighbours. His sweeping victory in the election was a very disturbing and discouraging development to Israel’s embattled pro-peace camp and to world leaders who hoped for a resumption of constructive talks between the two sides. For his part, Sharon has stated that he supports a peaceful settlement of Israel’s differences with the Palestinians, but that any new negotiations to reach this goal must be predicated on a complete cessation of violence on the Palestian side. Further, he has also made it clear that any deal he might be willing to accept will contain far fewer concessions to the Palestinians than Barak had offered. On key issues such as the status of Jerusalem, Arab refugees’ right of return, the preservation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the borders of a future Palestinian state, Sharon is firm and unrelenting. And although he has extended an olive branch to his Labour Party opponents, offering them at least eight Cabinet posts in his government, it remains unclear exactly what steps he is prepared to take in order to begin meaningful talks with Arafat, a man he had described as a “terrorist” until quite recently. Sharon’s assumption of power in Israel, coupled with the continuation of violence and unrest in Palestinian territory, has cast a dark shadow on the prospects for peace in the Middle East, dashing hopes that a few months before had appeared on the verge of realization. Viewing Activity and Discussion Cue up this News in Review video to the section in which we first see Ariel Sharon (In: “Day one. As advertised in advance, Likud leader Ariel Sharon steps onto the platform known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to Arabs as Haram esh Sharif...”). 1. After viewing this News in Review report again, describe the visual impact of Sharon’s appearance here on September 28, 2000. In what ways was it (a) a catalyst; (b) a provocation; (c) a calculated challenge; (d) a historic and symbolic gesture (e) successful; (f) counterproductive? 2. News events frequently have many elements of high drama, and public figures are very aware of the theatricality and dramatic effect of their public appearances. In dramatic terms, what is the importance of Sharon’s appearance here? What stock dramatic figure might he represent? How does this event advance the
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