Table of Contents

ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICALUPHEAVAL Introduction...... 5 What Can I Do about It? ...... 6 A Visible Figure...... 7 “The Bulldozer” ...... 8 ’s New Government ...... 13 Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions...... 15 ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL Introduction

On February 6, 2001, Israelis elected a new well-publicized visit to a religious site in prime minister. The choice they had to make Jerusalem that is considered holy to both between the two candidates for the position Muslims and Jews. Sharon’s visit was skill- could not have been clearer. On one side was fully timed both to advance his own position incumbent prime minister Ehud Barak, who within his party at the expense of his dis- headed a precarious minority Labour Party graced rival, former prime minister Benjamin government and who had called the snap Netanyahu, and to embarrass Barak for his election to secure a new mandate in order to government’s alleged soft stance on ’s pursue the peace process with the Palestin- claim to Jerusalem as its eternal capital. ians. A few months before the vote, Barak Enraged by Sharon’s action, local Jerusalem had participated in high-level talks with his Arab residents began a riot that soon spread Palestinian counterpart, PLO Chairman into full-scale fighting between Palestinians , talks brokered by U.S. Presi- and Israeli forces throughout the West Bank dent , at Camp David, Maryland. and Gaza, even spreading into Israel itself. At these intense negotiating sessions, the As the violence raged on day after day, Israelis and Palestinians had come tantaliz- intensely covered by the world’s media, a ingly close to a definitive peace agreement number of horrific incidents occurred that that could have ended the long years of shocked local and international opinion and conflict between them. But in the end, the served to harden attitudes on both sides. talks broke down, while at the same time a Palestinians and Israelis alike gained martyrs new round of bloody violence had erupted in for their respective causes, and hopes that the the , a region that is no stranger peace process might be resumed grew in- to such upheavals and reversals. Many Israeli creasingly faint. Despite the fact that the voters, disillusioned with a peace process that Israeli government was forced to act in seemed to have brought them no peace, held response to a renewed Arab uprising in the Barak responsible for the failure of the Occupied Territories, a revolt sparked by negotiations with the Palestinians and the actions on both sides, many Israeli voters upheavals that had followed. When the who were disillusioned with what seemed a results were announced, they proved to be a fruitless peace process held Barak respon- massive rejection of him and his sible for the failure of the negotiations with government’s policies. the Palestinians and the renewed upheaval. Ironically, the winner of the election for The election results proved to be a massive prime minister was the same man who many rejection of him and his government’s poli- in the area held at least indirectly responsible cies. for the cycle of violence that had gripped Israelis and Palestinians during the months Note to teachers: This report contains before the vote. On September 28, 2000, footage that may be inappropriate for Ariel Sharon, a major figure in the opposition younger viewers. Please preview the material Likud Party, had staged a provocative and carefully.

News in Review — 5 — March 2001 ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL What Can I Do about It?

News events can often seem overwhelming to the average person; as outside observers of conflicts reported in the news, we may feel a sense of powerlessness and even hopelessness. For most people watching reports of the Arab revolt in the Occupied Territories and renewed violence between Israelis and Palestinians, there doesn’t seem to be much that one can do about it. It is important, however, to understand that as outside observers, our prime responsi- bility is to understand the facts in the situation as best we can but also to try and understand what general forces are at work.

The fact that conflict has always been with us and probably always will be is not necessarily reason for despair. One way we can begin to understand tragic conflicts such as that occurring in the Middle East is to consider certain universal aspects of conflict and conflict manage- ment, and by applying these principles to what we know of the situation, we begin to under- stand better the nature of that particular conflict.

Choose one of the items below (these may be assigned) and, while watching this News in Review report, think about how the current situation as reported here reflects the item you have chosen. Be prepared to express in your own words your findings. 1. It is important to understand the patterns of conflict. 2. It is important to know what options or alternatives there are for dealing with conflict. 3. It is important to understand that different individuals have different approaches to conflict. 4. It is important to understand that managing conflict requires specific, and fre- quently, special, skills. 5. Conflict management is based on minds being directed toward solving mutual problems. 6. Conflict management involves the effective use of language. Unfortunately, conflict itself can also result from or be escalated by language; and not all lan- guage is verbal. The saying “Actions speak louder than words” is very true in conflict and conflict management. 7. To manage and solve conflict, the objective should be agreement, not victory. 8. Conflict management negotiations must recognize a conflict of interests. 9. It is important to understand the difference between managing conflict, suppress- ing conflict, and letting conflict escalate. 10. Conflict management must take into account rational and emotional components. 11. Successful conflict management is based on a win-win mode of thinking as opposed to a win-lose mode of thinking.

Follow-up Discussion Suggest how each of the following contributed to the revolt and renewed violence: holy sites, revenge/retribution, martyrdom, “a simple mistake,” rumours, “savagery,” the Israeli view that its soldiers are sacred, “an attack on the seat of their government’s power,” inflammatory statements, public appearances, mutual condemnation, terrorism, pressure for military action, political pressure.

March 2001 — 6 — News in Review ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL A Visible Figure

To many inside and outside Israel, Ariel Sharon is a frightening figure with a record of vio- lence and uncompromising positions toward the Palestinians and his country’s other Arab neighbours. His sweeping victory in the election was a very disturbing and discouraging development to Israel’s embattled pro-peace camp and to world leaders who hoped for a resumption of constructive talks between the two sides. For his part, Sharon has stated that he supports a peaceful settlement of Israel’s differences with the Palestinians, but that any new negotiations to reach this goal must be predicated on a complete cessation of violence on the Palestian side. Further, he has also made it clear that any deal he might be willing to accept will contain far fewer concessions to the Palestinians than Barak had offered. On key issues such as the status of Jerusalem, Arab refugees’ right of return, the preservation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the borders of a future Palestinian state, Sharon is firm and unrelenting. And although he has extended an olive branch to his Labour Party opponents, offering them at least eight Cabinet posts in his government, it remains unclear exactly what steps he is prepared to take in order to begin meaningful talks with Arafat, a man he had described as a “terrorist” until quite recently. Sharon’s assumption of power in Israel, coupled with the continuation of violence and unrest in Palestinian territory, has cast a dark shadow on the prospects for peace in the Middle East, dashing hopes that a few months before had appeared on the verge of realization.

Viewing Activity and Discussion Cue up this News in Review video to the section in which we first see Ariel Sharon (In: “Day one. As advertised in advance, Likud leader Ariel Sharon steps onto the platform known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to Arabs as Haram esh Sharif...”). 1. After viewing this News in Review report again, describe the visual impact of Sharon’s appearance here on September 28, 2000. In what ways was it (a) a catalyst; (b) a provocation; (c) a calculated challenge; (d) a historic and symbolic gesture (e) successful; (f) counterproductive?

2. News events frequently have many elements of high drama, and public figures are very aware of the theatricality and dramatic effect of their public appearances. In dramatic terms, what is the importance of Sharon’s appearance here? What stock dramatic figure might he represent? How does this event advance the sequence of events in this tragic “drama”?

3. What other dramatic elements such as irony, setting, and staging are evident here? How do they underscore the connections between drama and real life?

News in Review — 7 — March 2001 ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL “The Bulldozer”

Like many conflicts, the ongoing one in the Middle East is an example of history repeating itself, especially given the re-emergence of Ariel Sharon. While reading the following infor- mation, consider in what ways this is a situation of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. In what ways might history have taken a new direction in the Middle East?

The Making of a Military Leader The man an overwhelming majority of Israeli electors endorsed as their country’s prime minister on February 6, 2001, is no stranger to them. But if they had been asked only a short time ago if they thought it likely that Ariel Sharon would one day lead their nation, it is quite likely that the vast majority would have said “never.” Sharon’s impressive victory over his rival, incumbent prime minister Ehud Barak, by a stunning two-to-one margin, is a clear indication of just how far this political figure has come in his lifelong battle for credibility and recognition from his compatriots. Until recently he was almost universally reviled, by both Arabs and pro-peace Israelis alike, as a hawkish hardliner with a record of violence and heavy-handedness in his dealings with both the Palestinians and Israel’s neighbours. Sharon’s friends and supporters affectionately refer to him as “the bulldozer,” a nickname that points to both his aggressive political style and his practice of ordering the bulldozing of Palestinian homes as a collective act of reprisal for violence against Israelis. But to his many enemies among the Palestinians, and in the broader Arab world, Sharon is called “the butcher of Beirut” for his orchestration of an Israeli military invasion of in 1982 that resulted in the massacre of over 800 innocent Palestinian civilians by his Christian Lebanese allies.

At 72, Sharon’s entire adult life has been spent in the service of his country, both as a military officer and a political leader of Israel’s hardline, right-wing Likud Party. Like another of Israel’s legendary war leaders, Moshe Dayan, Sharon is a sabra, a native-born Israeli whose parents immigrated to Palestine, fleeing anti-Semitic persecutions in their native Russia. When Sharon was born, the present-day state of Israel did not yet exist. Palestine, as the area was then known, was inhabited by roughly equal proportions of Jews and Arabs, and was under the control of Britain, control that country had been granted by the League of Nations after the end of the First World War. Sharon grew up on a large collectively run farm, or kibbutz, north of the major city of Tel Aviv, and has maintained close ties with Israel’s rural community ever since. He now lives on a 400-hectare ranch, which is believed to be the largest private farm in the country. His other residence is a house in the mainly Arab part of Jerusalem, a site Sharon deliberately chose to inhabit a few years ago as a gesture of support for the principle that the city should remain forever united and under sole Israeli rule.

As a young army officer, Sharon gained his first combat experience during the 1948 War of Independence, when the fledgling Israeli state successfully fought off attacks from its Arab neighbours, , , and Syria, in the wake of its establishment by the United Nations over strong Arab opposition. From the beginning of his military career, Sharon revealed a strong tendency to act on his own initiative, frequently defying the instructions of his superior officers. He also demonstrated a capacity for ruthlessness and cold-bloodedness in his cam- paigns against enemy forces and civilians that caused both terror and revulsion among his

March 2001 — 8 — News in Review enemies both inside and outside Israel. An example of this occurred in 1953 when he led a commando raid against the Palestinian village of Qibya, then inside Jordanian territory. This action was intended as a reprisal for the murder of three Israeli citizens a short time before. Sharon’s forces entered the village, entirely inhabited by civilians, many of whom were women, children, and elderly people. They proceeded to blow up 45 homes, killing 69 resi- dents in the process. This attack was condemned by the United Nations, and was strongly questioned inside Israel itself.

Three years later, Sharon fought in the Sinai War that resulted from Israel’s involvement in a joint Franco-British invasion of Egypt after President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. During this campaign, he violated direct orders from Israeli military chief of staff Moshe Dayan not to enter the Mitla Pass, a narrow gorge surrounded by Egyptian forces. Sharon ordered his paratroopers to proceed into the pass, where they were ambushed, with heavy losses. Because of this disobedience, Sharon found his advancement in Israel’s Defence Forces blocked for many years to follow.

Reflection Some historical and political figures seem particularly larger than life in that their lives mirror events, issues, and themes inherent in the history of the regions from which they come. In what ways is this true of Ariel Sharon?

From Battlefield to Political Arena When the Six-Day War broke out in June 1967, Sharon was able to turn his aggressive mili- tary style to his advantage. Now an army division commander, he captured a fortified Egyp- tian position in the Sinai through the use of a brilliant encirclement tactic that is still used as a model in military schools in Israel and other countries. He was appointed head of the army’s Southern Command, where he pursued a relentless campaign against guerrilla units of the fledgling Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by his long-time opponent Yasser Arafat. During these actions, Sharon gained his nickname of “the bulldozer” because of his destruction of hundreds of Palestinian homes and the resulting homelessness of their inhabitants. He ordered this action so army engineers could build wider roads to move mili- tary vehicles and heavy armament more efficiently into combat zones. According to two of Israel’s leading political analysts, Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Sharon’s methods prove that he was not concerned with causing considerable civilian casualties as long as he succeeded in instilling a healthy fear of the Israeli army among the Palestinian residents of Gaza.

In early 1973, Sharon briefly retired from active military service in order to pursue his dream of a political career. But a major reason for his departure was the jealousy of his army col- leagues who resented his battlefield triumphs. Using a mixture of cajoling and threats, Sharon almost single-handedly united Israel’s disparate right-wing parties, both religious and secular, into a single alliance, the Likud Bloc, that he was convinced would eventually succeed in replacing the centre-left Labour Party, which had governed the country since independence. But when Egyptian forces attacked Israel in October 1973, using the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur to achieve maximum surprise, Sharon was recalled to lead an army division. Many military analysts believe that his strategy in the Sinai theatre was instrumental in turning what could have been a debacle for Israeli forces into a hard-won, last minute victory over their Arab opponents.

News in Review — 9 — March 2001 In 1977, under the leadership of , Likud scored a stunning upset in the Israeli elections, defeating Labour for the first time in the country’s history. Sharon assumed the position of minister of agriculture, largely because of his own farming experience and his commitment to expanding Jewish agricultural settlements in the mainly Arab territories that Israel had captured during the 1967 and 1973 wars. Again, he more than lived up to his nickname, as he personally oversaw the bulldozing of new roads and the building of an extensive network of new Jewish settlements on land that Palestinian farmers had owned and worked for centuries. These enclaves, deeply resented by the local Arab population, remain a major stumbling block to a lasting peace in the region. Their survival and even expansion over the last decades is largely the result of Sharon’s aggressive policy of promoting “facts on the ground,” the fait accompli of permanent Jewish settlements on Palestinian land that any future peace settlement between the two parties will have to recognize and acknowledge as a perma- nent reality.

In 1982, Sharon was named minister of defence, and embarked on what is probably the most controversial military campaign of his entire career, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Initially a response to PLO cross-border attacks on isolated Israeli settlements, the operation soon became a full-scale invasion of a neighbouring Arab state with which Israel was not techni- cally at war. While assuring his political superiors that the invasion’s goals were limited, Sharon ordered his field commanders to move on Beirut, the Lebanese capital. In the ensuing fighting, over 600 Israeli troops and countless more Palestinian guerrilla fighters lost their lives. But the most horrific consequence of the invasion was the massacre of unarmed civil- ians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. After Yasser Arafat ordered the evacuation of his military units in the wake of the invasion, these Palestinians were helpless and unde- fended.

As the surrounding Israeli units stood by, Sharon approved a plan that authorized the Leba- nese Christian Phalange militia, a staunch Israeli ally and bitter enemy of the PLO, to enter the camps in order to mop up any remaining Palestinian fighters. Enraged by the assassination of their leader a few days before, the Phalange initiated an orgy of bloodshed inside the camps, brutally killing over 800 innocent people. Public opinion inside Israel and around the world was united in its revulsion at this barbarous act, for which Sharon was held personally respon- sible. An ensuing military commission of inquiry found Sharon to blame for the massacre, because he failed to order Israeli forces to enter the camps and restrain their bloodthirsty allies. He was dismissed as defence minister, a position he would never again be permitted to hold. But so great was his popularity among hardline Israelis that Prime Minister Begin retained him as minister of housing. From this post, he was able to supervise the construction of even more Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Reflection It is an understatement to say that it is ironic that when the two sides in the Middle East were so close to a possible peace agreement, things should take a turn for the worse and a man should emerge who his critics would refer to as excessively militaristic. Trace the events and circumstances that, in your opinion, facilitated Sharon’s return to power as well as the reversal of fortunes in the Middle East.

March 2001 — 10 — News in Review A Warrior Contemplating Peace In the fall of 1987, after enduring years of suffering under a brutal Israeli occupation, the Palestinian inhabitants of these occupied territories rose in a spontaneous rebellion known as the Intifadah. As unarmed Palestinian youths hurled stones at Israeli troops, who responded sometimes with live ammunition, in incidents that received widespread coverage from the international media, public opinion in many Western countries began to turn against Israel for the first time. Members of ’s Labour government came to recognize that only serious negotiations with the PLO could halt the downward spiral of violence that could touch off another regional war in the Middle East.

Sharon had nothing but contempt for this view, which he regarded as a predictable sign of weakness from his Labour opponents. Instead, he argued that the Palestinians understood only brute force, and that Israel should not hesitate to use its vastly superior military position to crush the uprising once and for all, whatever the toll in civilian casualties. While right-wing Israelis rallied around him, a growing majority of his fellow citizens began to realize that peace was the much-preferred option. In September 1993, following months of secret talks between PLO and Israeli negotiators in Oslo, Norway, Prime Minister Rabin and Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn in a ceremony overseen by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Under the Oslo Accords, which both leaders signed that day, Israel and the Palestin- ians committed themselves to embarking on a peace process that would eventually result in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Israel’s borders.

During the years since the signing of the Oslo Accords, progress toward a lasting peace in the Middle East has been agonizingly slow. Events such as the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the election of the right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, and sporadic outbreaks of violence in the West Bank and Gaza, have done nothing to advance the process of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. In May 1999, Labour regained office under the leadership of Ehud Barak, and hopes for movement in negotiations were rekindled. But after the breakdown of the Camp David talks between Barak and Arafat in July 2000, over the sensitive issue of control of Jerusalem, the process appeared to be seriously stalled. Shortly after the failure of the negotiations, Ariel Sharon took it upon himself to stage a visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, a site known as Haram al-Sharif to Muslims. Sharon’s well-publicized visit triggered a predictable explosion of Palestinian outrage that quickly escalated into full-scale fighting in Gaza, the West Bank, and even parts of Israel itself.

The revulsion of many Israelis toward the latest round of violence was also predictable, even though the vast majority of its victims have been Palestinians. When confronted with the choice of continuing the uncertain path toward peace under Barak’s leadership, or turning to Sharon and his promises of security through strength, two-thirds of the voters opted for the latter course. According to Avishai Margalit, a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was indicative of his approach to military and political conflict—always escalate. In Margalit’s view, Sharon believes that he can benefit from the confusion and uncertainty caused by an increase in violence, and he knows how to create a situation in which Israelis will turn to him because he seems to represent strength and self- assurance.

News in Review — 11 — March 2001 Margalit and Uri Dan, close advisors to Sharon, do not think it is likely that he will launch a full-scale war on the Palestinians, which might result in an all-out regional conflict drawing in Israel’s Arab neighbours. But they do believe he will not hesitate to employ commando-style actions such as the targeting of prominent Palestinian officials for assassination, or bombing attacks on key Palestinian sites. He might even endorse a peace settlement, if one could be negotiated under his rigid terms, if he thought it would gain him greater popularity among Israeli Jews.

Reflection People trained in conflict management learn to recognize (a) the chain of events: provocation, intensification, and confrontation; as well as (b) the principle that in such situations there is a tipping point beyond which conflict can expand exponentially, beyond which conflict creates conflict. With reference to the events outlined in this News in Review report, suggest how these two patterns of conflict development are evident.

March 2001 — 12 — News in Review ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL Ariel Sharon’s New Government

Prime Minister Sharon is only one person; he must form a government and a Cabinet that will govern alongside him. While reading the following information, consider what short-term and long-term thinking Sharon may have engaged in while considering the make-up of his gov- ernment. One month after his sweeping victory in the Israeli elections, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon began putting together a new Cabinet that now contains members from a number of different political groupings. He offered at least eight posts to the opposition Labour Party, whose former leader and prime minister, Ehud Barak, he had decisively beaten at the polls and was now retired. After a bitter internal debate, Labour Party members voted by a strong majority to accept Sharon’s offer to join his government. Despite widespread revulsion of Sharon and his policies, and suspicion that the party was being manipulated into an untenable position, Labour’s leading figures, including former prime minister , accepted Sharon’s offer. Labour will be given the key posts of defence and foreign policy, where it should be able to obtain some significant input into the development of the Sharon government’s poli- cies toward negotiating a peace agreement with the Palestinians. But Sharon’s new Cabinet will also contain some surprising figures, drawn from opposite ends of the country’s varie- gated political spectrum. How people from such different backgrounds, and holding such diametrically opposing views will be able to work together in the same government is a major challenge in what is already a highly unstable and unpredictable political situation inside Israel. An Israeli Druze Makes History Salah Tarif broke a 52-year barrier in Israeli politics when he entered Ariel Sharon’s Cabinet as a minister without porfolio from the opposition Labour Party. This is because, as a Muslim member of the minority Druze sect, Tarif is the first non-Jew to hold a Cabinet post in the country’s history. The Druze are a small group within the total Arab Israeli population, along with mainstream Muslims and Christians. Israeli Arabs represent about one-fifth of the country’s inhabitants, and their votes in the past have largely gone to the Labour Party. One of the reasons for Barak’s devastating defeat in the recent elections for prime minister was the fact that Israeli Arabs stayed home on voting day in protest over what they viewed as his lukewarm support for a serious peace deal with the Palestinians. Tarif is a ranking reserve officer in the Israeli Defence Forces. Unlike most Muslims, the Druze are permitted to serve in the country’s military. He has been a member of the , the Israeli parliament, for 10 years, and intends to use his new position within the Cabinet to promote the interests of Israeli Arabs. His appointment was met with outbursts of joy from his Arab supporters in the city of Tel Aviv. Tarif wants to persuade the government to do more to provide schools, roads, and other improvements for the country’s Arab inhabitants, and to lift the crippling military blockade that is destroying the economy of the Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza. How much real power Tarif will have in a Cabinet headed by Ariel Sharon is doubtful, but the very fact that he has been appointed signifies an important shift in the country’s political life. A Hawk Enters the Government Not long ago, many Israelis regarded Ariel Sharon as an extremist who occupied the outer edges of respectable political opinion in the country. This was because of his uncompromising

News in Review — 13 — March 2001 views on the major issues in contention between Israel and the Palestinians, including the future of Jerusalem, the survival of Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, the right of return of Arab refugees, and the boundaries of a future Palestinian state. But now that Sharon is the new prime minister, political figures with even more hardline positions have entered his Cabinet, drawn from minority parties of the extreme right. The most notorious of these is the ultra-nationalist Rehavam Ze’evi, who heads the minority National Union Party. A hawk with little patience or tolerance for Palestinians, Ze’evi has long advocated a policy that many consider to be ethnic cleansing. He believes that no permanent peace is possible for Israel as long as Palestinians remain inside the country’s borders. For this reason, he supports the removal of the entire Palestinian population of the West Bank and its relocation across the Jordan River inside Jordan proper. While he does not support a forced relocation, he calls on the government to make economic conditions so harsh inside these territories that the local residents would have no option other than resettlement inside Jordan. Ze’evi is one of many Israelis who consider their nation to encompass the entire Biblical Jewish kingdom. This includes the West Bank of the Jordan River, an area slated to form the basis of a new Palestinian state once a final peace agreement is signed. Ze’evi has also de- manded a commitment from the new government that Israel will meet any military opposition from its Arab neighbours with maximum force, including the launching of missiles against the Iranian capital, Tehran, and the Aswan Dam in Egypt. Ze’evi’s views still represent a minority position in Israeli politics today, but they are finding increased favour with a number of people who are totally disillusioned with the progress of peace so far. About 30 per cent of Israelis think his idea of relocating the Palestinians of the West Bank into Jordan has some value. And many are happy to see someone like him inside the Sharon Cabinet, serving as the guard dog against any agreement with the Palestinians that they view as imperiling Israel’s vital national interests or the aspirations of its religious ex- tremists.

Discussion 1. How do you think Salah Tarif and Rehavam Ze’evi will be able to work together as members of the same government in Israel?

2. Of these two Israeli political leaders, who do you think will have more input into policy-making in the Sharon government? Why?

3. In your opinion, does the composition of this new government balance and temper Sharon’s hawkish style in any way or does it serve to accentuate and perpetuate his methods of governing?

March 2001 — 14 — News in Review ARAB REVOLT: ISRAELI POLITICAL UPHEAVAL Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions

1. Research the backgrounds of some of the leading figures in the Middle East dispute, including Ariel Sharon, Ehud Barak, Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, Benjamin Netanyahu, , or any other significant leader.

2. Many books have been written about the Middle East conflict. Consider the titles below. How do the titles themselves suggest the enormous complexity of this situation? Locate and read one of these books and prepare a book review: Sepa- rate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem; The Trans- formation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building; Jerusalem: The Endless Crusade; Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution; Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process; Remak- ing the Middle East; Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1889-1999; The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting History; Children of Israel, Children of Palestine: Our Own True Stories; One Hand Alone Cannot Clap: An Arab-Israeli Universe; Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern Na- tional Consciousness; Struggle for the Holy Land: Arabs, Jews, and the Emer- gence of Israel; The Palestine Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Palestine.

3. Edward W. Said is a well-known Palestinian-American professor of literature at Columbia University in New York. Born in Jerusalem, Said has lived most of his life in exile in Egypt and the United States. He is an eloquent advocate of the Palestinian cause and has written a number of books and articles critical of both the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority headed by Yasser Arafat. Find out more about Said and his views, by consulting one of the following sources: “America’s Last Taboo,” (New Left Review, 6, November-December 2000, pp. 45-53); Out of Place: A Memoir; Reflections on Exile and Other Essays; The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After; After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives; The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determina- tion, 1969-94; The Question of Palestine; and Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine and the Middle East Peace Process. Also useful is a 1999 interview with Said contained in The Edward Said Reader, edited by Moustafa Bayoumi and Andrew Rubin.

4. Using newspaper and/or magazine articles, the books referred to above, or rel- evant Web sites, research, prepare, and present a summary of the major issues in dispute between Israel and the Palestinians that formed part of the peace negotia- tions between 1993-2000, and the difficulties involved in resolving them. Among these are: (a) the future status of Jerusalem; (b) the continued existence of Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank; (c) the right of Palestinian Arab refugees to return to their original homes inside Israel; (d) the boundaries of a future Pales- tinian state, and guarantees of Israel’s security; and (e) the sharing of water rights between Israel and Palestine.

News in Review — 15 — March 2001